The Comparative Unemployment Benefit Conditions and Sanctions Dataset

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Codebook

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Contents

1 Description **1**
- 1.1 Investigators & Contributors . . . 1
- 1.2 Summary . . . 5
- 1.3 Coverage . . . 5

2 Variables **6**
- 2.1 Suitable Employment . . . 7
- 2.2 Proof of Job-Search Activities . . . 11
- 2.3 Sanction rules . . . 12
- 2.4 Synthetic indicators . . . 15

List of Tables

1 Country Assignments . . . 1
2 Expert Reviewers . . . 2
2 Expert Reviewers (continued) . . . 3
3 Coding scheme – conditions-indicator (C) . . . 16
4 Coding scheme – sanctions indicator (S) . . . 17
5 Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions . . . 21
5 Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued) . . . 22
5 Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued) . . . 23
5 Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued) . . . 24
5 Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued) . . . 25
5 Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued) . . . 26
5 Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued) . . . 27

1 Description

1.1 Investigators & Contributors

Principal investigators: Carlo Knotz & Moira Nelson

Table 1: Country Assignments

Investigator	Country
Carlo Knotz	Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (responsible for organizing data collection in Greece)
Moira Nelson	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, Switzerland, United States (responsible for organizing data collections in Japan, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands)
Varvara Lalioti	Greece
Stefano Sacchi & Patrik Vesan	Italy
Takeshi Yanagisawa	Japan
Albertjan Tollenaar & Gijsbert Vonk	Netherlands
Luis Gonzales da Silva	Portugal
Alejandra Keidel Fernandez	Spain

Table 2: Expert Reviewers

Country	Reviewer(s)
Australia	Agnieszka Nelson, Australian National University/FaHCSIA and David Stanton, Australian National University
Austria	Sarah Bruckner and Günter Krapf, Arbeiterkammer Wien
Belgium	Ive Marx, Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy, Antwerp University
Canada	Ann Porter, York University
Denmark	Thomas Bredgaard, Aalborg University
Finland	Heikki Räisänen, Ministry of Employment Finland/University of Tampere
France	Jean-Claude Barbier, Université Paris 1 Sorbonne
Germany	Jochen Clasen, University of Edinburgh and Regina Konle-Seidl, Institute for Employment Research (IAB)
Greece	Dimitris Karantinos, National Centre for Social Research (EKKE)
Ireland	Mel Cousins, Trinity College Dublin

Table 2: Expert Reviewers (continued)

Country	Reviewer(s)
Italy	Stefano Sacchi, University of Milan/Collego Carlo Alberto Turin and Patrik Vesan, Università della Valle d'Aosta
Japan	Takeshi Yanagisawa, Meijo University
Netherlands	Frans Penning, Utrecht University and Albertjan Tollenaar, University of Groningen
New Zealand	Alex McKenzie, Ministry of Social Development New Zealand
Norway	Ivar Lødemel, Oslo and Akershus University of Applied Sciences
Portugal	Luis Gonzales da Silva, Instituto do Direito do Trabalho
South Korea	Deok Soon Hwang, Korea Labor Institute
Spain	David Rueda, University of Oxford
Sweden	Ola Sjöberg, SOFI/Stockholm University
Switzerland	Carola Togni, EESP Lausanne
United Kingdom	Jochen Clasen, University of Edinburgh

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Disclaimer We have taken great care to produce high-quality data, but we can unfortunately not give any warranty that the dataset and all the accompanying files are free of errors. Should you detect an error in any of the files or would like to suggest any other modifications, please feel free to contact us (see the contact details on the first page). We reject all liability for any damages incurred while using any of the materials provided by us.

1.2 Summary

This dataset provides information on the strictness of job-availability and job-search requirements as well as benefit sanction rules in 21 advanced democracies in Europe, North America, and Australiasia and their changes between 1980 and 2012.

1.3 Coverage

Countries (with numerical code) 1 Australia; 2 Austria; 3 Belgium; 4 Canada; 5 Denmark; 6 Finland; 7 France; 8 Germany; 9 Greece; 10 Ireland; 11 Italy; 12 Japan; 13 Korea; 14 Netherlands; 15 New Zealand; 16 Norway; 17 Portugal; 18 Spain; 19 Sweden; 20 Switzerland; 21 United Kingdom.

Years We generally provide information for all countries for at least the years between 1980 and 2012. Data on earlier periods (the 1970s and 1960s) are available for most countries (from the Excel-spreadsheet containing the 'raw', that is coded but unmodified or amended data available here, as well as in the qualitative material available from http://benefitconditionality.weebly.com/); in the cases of Greece and Ireland the time-series go back to the 1950s, and in the case of Italy even to 1924. Exceptions are the data on Switzerland, the Netherlands, and South Korea, which are available from 1982, 1986, and 1996 onwards, respectively. Sanctioning rules were not codified in the Netherlands before 1986, Korea introduced its unemployment insurance system only in 1996, and unemployment insurance was not mandatory in Switzerland before 1982.

2 Variables

The variables are grouped in four categories:

1. Constituent variables that measure how 'suitable employment' is defined.
2. Component variables that measure the intensity of checks of job-search activities
3. Component variables that measure the strictness of sanction rules.
4. Synthetic indicators constructed from the component variables

2.1 Suitable Employment

Occupational Mobility These variables measures the degree to which claimants are required to accept employment outside their previous or usual occupation. Given the diversity of arrangements, we provide two variables that measure a) whether or not there is such a requirement and b) if there is a requirement, the length of a possible 'protected period' during which this requirement is not applied:

- **occ:** ordinal: can claimants refuse jobs in other occupations than the one they are trained for or usually work in for some period or indefinitely? (A corresponding variable is used by Estévez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (2001).)
  - 0 no right to refuse
  - 1 refusal allowed for some period
  - 2 refusal allowed indefinitely (as long as benefits are claimed)
- **occ_dp:** continuous: the duration of the period (in weeks) during which claimants can refuse employment in other occupations (0 if **occ** = 0; missing if **occ** = 2).

Geographical Mobility These variables measure the degree to which claimants are expected to move or commute in order to find employment.

- **move:** binary: can claimants – in principle – be required to move?
  - 1 Yes, relocation can in principle be required
  - 0 No, claimants can never be asked to relocate
- **comm:** binary: does a requirement to commute exist (1 if yes)?
- **comm_t:** continuous: the maximal daily commuting time considered suitable (both ways, in hours)

Other Valid Reasons The following variables capture the extent to which 'other reasons' can justify a refusal of an offer of employment (see also Venn 2012 or Council of Europe 2009). All variables except for **pwage_r** and **bwage_r** are binary: 1 if the respective reason/criterion is specified as a valid criterion, 0 otherwise. Additional information on how exactly suitable wages are defined in selected countries is also provided in Table 5 below.

- **phys:** physical & mental capabilities of claimant must be considered
- **skill:** claimant's skills must be considered[1]
- **age:** different requirements for claimants above or below some age
- **family:** different requirements for claimants with or without family/dependents; caring responsibilities must be considered
- **mwage:** expected wage most be consistent with minimum wage (includes also de-facto minimum wages specified by collective agreements/awards)
- **uwage:** expected wage must be consistent with wage that is usually paid in the respective occupation.
- **pwage:** expected wage must correspond to previous wage
- **pwage_r:** minimum ratio of expected wage to previous wage (only if **pwage** = 1)
  - *Note:* some countries specify graduated schedules, e.g. X percent during the first Y days of unemployment, and $Z < X$ percent during the remaining days. We consider only the ratio during the first of any defined periods of unemployment.
- **bwage:** expected wage must correspond to current benefit
- **bwage_r:** minimum ratio of expected wage to current benefit (only if **bwage** = 1))

[1] This does not imply that the claimant's skills also have to match with the requirements of the job. In other words, this just means that claimants must not be *under-* but may well be *over*qualified for the job in question.

— *Note:* some countries specify graduated schedules, e.g. X percent during the first Y days of unemployment, and $Z < X$ percent during the remaining days. The raw dataset – i.e. this variable – considers only the ratio during the first of any defined periods of unemployment. The additional data preparation `Stata` DoFile adds variables for the cases where such more complex rules are defined.

– **hours:** job must not be less than full-time

– **temp:** job must not be temporary

– **cond_l:** working conditions must conform to legal standards

– **cond_c:** working conditions must conform to collective agreement

– **strike:** vacancy must not be due to strike/lockout

– **relig:** claimant's religious/cultural/moral customs/convictions must be considered

– **othwork:** offers not suitable if claimant has already found other employment but has not yet started to work

2.2 Proof of Job-Search Activities

These variables capture the strictness of job-search reporting requirements.

iap: ordinal: this variable indicates whether claimants may enter into a binding agreement with the employment service/benefit office, which defines each party's rights and responsibilities. This is often called 'individual action plan', but may also be called e.g. 'integration contract' or 'jobseeker's agreement' (see e.g. OECD 2007, 226-7):

- 0 not used
- 1 used, but voluntary or only for some claimants
- 2 used and mandatory for all claimants

attend: binary: are claimants *in principle* required to attend the employment/benefit office?

proof: binary: do claimants have to provide evidence of recent job-search activities?

freq: continuous: if **proof** is equal to 1, how frequently do claimants have to provide evidence (in weeks; `999` if not defined)?

- *Note:* France post-2006: claimants are grouped into three tracks (1 for the most employable, 2 for intermediate cases, 3 for the least-employable). For those in group 1, monthly interviews become only mandatory after 3 months of unemployment. Finland post-2010: the schedule is every 3 months for the first half-year of unemployment, and every 6 months thereafter. This is coded as every 6 months.

2.3 Sanction rules

We provide information on the strictness of sanction rules for four different types of infractions: refusal of an offer of employment (first, second, third, and further occurrences), voluntary unemployment, failure to attend an interview/meeting at the benefit office, failure to provide sufficient evidence of recent job-search activities.

- *Note:* some countries specify graduated sanctioning schedules where the duration of the suspension of payments depends on the duration of unemployment (e.g. Australia for some years; see also Knotz 2018). We consider only the first out of any considered number of periods of unemployment.

1. Sanctions that apply the first time a claimant refuses an offer of employment:
   - **firsan:** binary: complete loss of eligibility (1 if yes); temporary suspension until recompliance coded as `999`
   - **firsan_d:** continuous: if **firsan** is equal to 0, duration of suspension (in weeks).
     - *Note:* the rules in Austria provide that claimants who refuse an offer of employment lose their entitlement to unemployment benefits for the time the refusal persists, but for at least four weeks. The latter provision was used (which is in line with the findings by Council of Europe (2009); Hasselpflug (2005); Ministry of Finance Denmark (1998); Venn (2012)).
   - **firsan_r:** continuous: reduction of benefit amount in percent ($\in [0, 1]$; 1 if benefits are suspended entirely)
2. Sanctions that apply the second time a claimant refuses an offer of employment.
   - *Note:* some countries only provide rules for the first and for 'repeated refusals' – i.e. there are sometimes no specific rules for the second and third refusal. If this applies, the duration of sanctions is captured by **fursan**. For any of **firsan**, **secsan**, or **thirsan**, all sanctions that apply to subsequent infractions are missing by default if the consequence at that point is a complete loss of eligibility.

- **secsan:** binary: complete loss of eligibility (1 if yes); temporary suspension until recompliance coded as `999`
- **secsan_d:** continuous: if **secsan** is equal to 0, duration of suspension (in weeks).
- **secsan_r:** continuous: reduction of benefit amount in percent ($\in [0, 1]$; 1 if benefits are suspended entirely)

3. Sanctions that apply the third time a claimant refuses an offer of employment.
   - **thirsan:** binary: complete loss of eligibility (1 if yes); temporary suspension until recompliance coded as `999`
   - **thirsan_d:** continuous: if **thirsan** is equal to 0, duration of suspension (in weeks).
   - **thirsan_r:** continuous: reduction of benefit amount in percent ($\in [0, 1]$; 1 if benefits are suspended entirely)
4. Sanctions that apply for any further instance of refusal.
   - **fursan:** binary: complete loss of eligibility (1 if yes); temporary suspension until recompliance coded as `999`
   - **fursan_d:** continuous: if **fursan** is equal to 0, duration of suspension (in weeks).
     - *Note:* Finland (all years) and Sweden (1973-2000): claimants had to be in employment for a certain period to re-gain eligibility; these in-work conditions ('*försvarsarbete*') are counted as duration of sanction.
   - **fursan_r:** continuous: reduction of benefit amount in percent ($\in [0, 1]$; 1 if benefits are suspended entirely)
5. Sanctions that apply to claimants that are unemployed voluntarily.
   - **volsan:** binary: complete loss of eligibility (1 if yes); temporary suspension until recompliance coded as `999`

- **volsan_d:** continuous: if **volsan** is equal to 0, duration of suspension (in weeks).
  - *Note:* France (post-1992) requires claimants to be in work for a certain number of days before they can claim benefits after becoming unemployed voluntarily (similar to the cases of Sweden and Finland as noted under **fursan_d** above).
- **volsan_r:** continuous: reduction of benefit amount in percent ($\in [0, 1]$; 1 if benefits are suspended entirely)

6. Sanctions that apply when claimants fail to attend a scheduled meeting at the benefit/employment service office
   - **attsan:** binary: loss of eligibility (1 if yes); temporary suspension until recompliance coded as `999`
   - **attsan_d:** continuous: if **attsan** is equal to 0, duration of suspension (in weeks).
     - *Note:* Finland (1993-1997/1997-2001): only sanctions for *repeated* failures to provide information or to cooperate specified; note that there was no real requirement to be actively looking for work yet.
   - **attsan_r:** continuous: reduction of benefit amount in percent ($\in [0, 1]$; 1 if benefits are suspended entirely)
7. Sanctions that apply when claimants fail to provide or provide insufficient evidence of job-search activities
   - **actsan:** binary: loss of eligibility (1 if yes); temporary suspension until recompliance coded as `999`
   - **actsan_d:** continuous: if **actsan** is equal to 0, duration of suspension (in weeks).
     - *Note:* Finland (1993-1997/1997-2001): only sanctions for *repeated* failures to provide information or to cooperate specified; note that there was no real requirement to be actively looking for work yet.
   - **actsan_r:** continuous: reduction of benefit amount in percent ($\in [0, 1]$; 1 if benefits are suspended entirely)

2.4 Synthetic indicators

Sub-indicators: Using the component variables and some additional data from Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto (2014), the component variables were coded into a set of sub-indicators using the coding scheme shown overleaf:

Table 3: Coding scheme – conditions-indicator (C)

Item	Coding
(1) Occupational protection	0: The unemployed can refuse jobs in other areas indefinitely 1: The unemployed can refuse jobs for a 'reasonable' period 2: The unemployed can restrict their availability for more than 36 weeks. 3: The unemployed can restrict their availability for between more than 20 and 36 weeks. 4: The unemployed can restrict their availability for between more than 10 and 20 weeks. 5: The unemployed can restrict their availability for up to 10 weeks. 6: The unemployed must accept all jobs they are capable of doing from the beginning of the unemployment spell on
(2) Wage protection	0: More than 80% of the claimants previous earnings are effectively protected. 1: The wage must correspond to the 'usually' paid wage *and* claimants can never be required to change their occupation. 2: More than 50% but less than 80% of the claimants previous earnings are effectively protected 3: Less than 50% (but more than 0%) of the claimants previous earnings are effectively protected 4: The wage needs to be consistent with both applicable collective agreements/the minimum wage and the 'usually' paid wage. 5: The wage needs to be consistent with either applicable collective agreements/the minimum wage, or the 'usual' wage 6: No earnings protection.
(3) Number of other valid reasons	0: > 10 1: $> 8; \leq 10$ 2: $> 6; \leq 8$ 3: $> 4; \leq 6$ 4: $> 2; \leq 4$ 5: $> 0; \leq 2$ 6: 0
(4) Checks of job-search activities	0: No checks of job-search activity 1: Activity checked less often than every 6 months, including checks in undefined intervals 2: Activity checked between every three and every six months 3: Activity checked between every three months and every month 4: Activity checked between every month or more frequently 5–6: +1 point if Jobseeker Agreement (JSA) voluntary or for selected groups, +2 points if JSA compulsory for all claimants

Note: based on Venn (2012, 11); see also Hasselpflug (2005) and Ministry of Finance Denmark (1998).

Table 4: Coding scheme – sanctions indicator (S)

Item	Coding
(6) Voluntary unemployment	0: No sanction 1: less than 5 weeks 2: $\geq 5; < 9$ weeks 3: $\geq 9; < 12$ weeks 4: $\geq 12; < 26$ weeks 5: ≥ 26 weeks 6: Loss of eligibility
(7) First refusal	0: No sanction 1: Undefined period: no payment until re-compliance 2: $> 0; \leq 4$ weeks 3: $> 4; \leq 9$ weeks 4: $> 8; \leq 13$ weeks 5: > 13 weeks 6: Loss of eligibility
(8) Repeated refusals	0: Milder sanctions for subsequent refusals 1: No specific rules defined or same penalty as for first refusal 2: $> 0; \leq 2$ additional weeks or disqualification until re-compliance 3: $> 2; < 10$ additional weeks 4: $\geq 10; < 18$ additional weeks 5: $\geq 18; \leq 169$ additional weeks 6: Loss of eligibility
(8) Failure to report/conduct job-search	0: Not defined or no sanction 1: disqualification until re-compliance 2: $> 0; < 42$ weeks 3: $\geq 4; \leq 6$ weeks 4: $> 6; \leq 8$ weeks 4: > 8 weeks 5: > 8 weeks 6: Loss of eligibility

Note: based on Venn (2012, 11); see also Hasselpflug (2005) and Ministry of Finance Denmark (1998).

These computations, which are also documented in the Replication materials, produce the following set of sub-indicators:

- **occup**: ranges from 0 (most lenient) to 6 (most strict) and measures the degree of occupational protection;
- **wage**: ranges from 0 (most lenient) to 6 (most strict) and measures the degree of wage protection;
- **oth**: ranges from 0 (most lenient) to 6 (most strict) and measures the degree to which 'other reasons' can justify rejecting an offer of employment;
- **jsr**: ranges from 0 (most lenient) to 6 (most strict) and measures the strictness of job-search requirements;
- **vol**: ranges from 0 (most lenient) to 6 (most strict) and measures the strictness of sanction rules for voluntary unemployment;
- **ref**: ranges from 0 (most lenient) to 6 (most strict) and measures the strictness of sanction rules for a first refusal of suitable work;
- **rep**: ranges from 0 (most lenient) to 6 (most strict) and measures the strictness of sanction rules for repeated refusals of suitable work;
- **fail**: ranges from 0 (most lenient) to 6 (most strict) and measures the strictness of sanction rules for failures to report job-search activities;

Aggregate indicators These sub-indicators are then aggregated into three summary indicators as follows: The scores assigned to each of the four types of conditions listed above (denoted c) are summed up to yield an overall score of the strictness of conditions:

$$C = \sum c \tag{1}$$

The same applies to the scores assigned to each of the types of sanctions (s):

$$S = \sum s \tag{2}$$

Summing the scores reflects that countries can combine various types of conditions in different ways Goertz (2006, Chapter 2). Some may choose to put strict requirements on occupational mobility while others allow for few other limitations on availability. Each aspect contributes by itself to the overall strictness of conditions, a relationship that is best reflected by summation. (The logic is similar to a linear specification of a regression model, where each parameter makes its own independent contribution to the overall outcome.)

Both these scores are then multiplied. Multiplication is chosen here since it reflects the conditional relationship between the strictness of conditions and sanctions (again Goertz 2006, Chapter 2). Intuitively, strict conditions are of little consequence where sanctions are very lenient and therefore failures to comply have few consequences. Similarly, strict sanctions matter less where conditions are lenient and there are few reasons claimants could get sanctioned for. In both cases, the overall conditionality of benefits is low, even though one set of rules is strict. Only where both conditions and sanctions are strict is the conditionality of benefits high. The logic here is similar to an interaction effect in a regression model, where the effect of one parameter is made to depend on the level of another parameter.

Since the resulting function, the product of two integers, is exponential, an increase in the strictness of conditions or sanctions in a given country has a larger effect the higher the country scored to begin with, which in turn magnifies the differences between stricter and more lenient countries. To correct for this, the square root of the product is taken. The result is then divided by the theoretical maximum to obtain an overall score of the conditionality of unemployment benefits of between 0 and 1:

$$\kappa = \frac{\sqrt{C \times S}}{\sqrt{C_{max} \times S_{max}}} \tag{3}$$

Similar scores for the strictness of job-search and availability conditions and sanction rules are also constructed separately:

$$C^* = \frac{\sum c}{C_{max}} \tag{4}$$

and

$$S^* = \frac{\sum s}{S_{max}} \tag{5}$$

For more information see also Knotz (2018) and the Supplement for this article (available here). The end result are following three aggregate indicators:

- **conditionality**: allowed to range from 0 (most lenient) to 1 (most strict); measures the overall conditionality of unemployment benefit systems
- **conditions:** allowed to range from 0 (most lenient) to 1 (most strict); measures the overall strictness of job-search and availability conditions
- **sanctions:** allowed to range from 0 (most lenient) to 1 (most strict); measures the overall strictness of sanction rules

Table 5: Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions

	Definition of suitable wage relative to...	
Country	Benefit (`bwage`)	Previous wage (`pwage`)
Austria (post-2004)		Ratio of offered earnings ('*sozialversicherungspflichtiges Entgelt*') to previous average earnings during reference period ('*Bemessungsgrundlage für das Arbeitslosengeld*') – § 9(3), Arbeitslosenvers.-gesetz
Belgium (post-1991)	Net wage ('*nettobezoldiging*') after travel costs and family benefits cannot be lower than net benefit after travel costs and family benefits – Art. 26, Arrêté Ministériel 1991	
Canada (1971-2012)		'*Rate of earnings*' – art. 2, 1971 Unemployment Insurance Act & art. 2, 1996 Employment Insurance Act

Table 5: Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued)

	Definition of suitable wage relative to...	
Country	Benefit (`bwage`)	Previous wage (`pwage`)
Canada (post-2012)		Offered earnings with respect to reference earnings; reference earnings are the earnings from the employment in which the claimant had worked the most (relative) hours during the qualifying period. – s. 9.004, 2012 Employment Insurance Regulations (SOR/96-332)
Finland (1990-92)	Net earnings relative to net benefit ("*lönen för arbetet och den arbetslöshetsdagpenning som eventuellt betalas till honom, efter avdrag av kostnaderna för arbetsresor och övriga kostnader som beror på att han tar emot arbetet, blir mindre än den arbetslöshetsdagpenning som betalas till honom*") – § 7a, 1984 Unemployment Benefit Act1984 (602/1984; official Swedish translation)	

Table 5: Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued)

	Definition of suitable wage relative to...	
Country	Benefit (`bwage`)	Previous wage (`pwage`)
Germany (1982-1997)	After 4*th* month: net wage ('*Nettoarbeitsentgeld'*) relative to received benefit ('*Arbeitslosengeldsatz*') – § 6, Zumutbarkeitsanordnung 1982	First 4 months: offered wage less of one-off and recurrent benefits ('*Arbeitsentgeld ohne einmalige und wiederkehrende Zuwendungen*') relative to the wage used to calculate the benefit amount ('*Arbeitsentgeld das der Bemessung der Leistung zugrundeliegt*') – § 10, Zumutbarkeitsanordnung 1982
Germany (post-1997)	After 6*th* month: net income ('*Nettoeinkommen*') after additional costs ('*mit der Beschäftigung zusammenhängenden Aufwendungen*') relative to received benefit – § 121, Arbeitsförderungsgesetz 1997	First 6 months: offered wage ('*Arbeitsentgeld*') relative to wage used to calculate the benefit amount ('*Arbeitsentgeld das der Bemessung der Leistung zugrundeliegt*') – § 121, Arbeitsförderungsgesetz 1997

Table 5: Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued)

	Definition of suitable wage relative to...	
Country	Benefit (`bwage`)	Previous wage (`pwage`)
Ireland		'*Rate of remuneration*' cannot be lower than that usually received or that claimant would have received – s. 17, 1952 Social Welfare Act
Italy (2003-2011)		Offered wage compared to the previous wage ('*un lavoro inquadrato in un livello retributivo non inferiore del 20 per cento rispetto a quello delle mansioni di provenienza*') – Art. 3, § 137 2004 Budget Act, (*Legge 24 dicembre 2003, n. 350 Disposizioni per la formazione del bilancio annuale e pluriennale dello Stato (legge finanziaria 2004)*)

Table 5: Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued)

	Definition of suitable wage relative to...	
Country	Benefit (`bwage`)	Previous wage (`pwage`)
Italy (post-2011)	Offered gross wage relative to gross benefit (‘*un lavoro inquadrato in un livello retributivo superiore almeno del 20 per cento rispetto all’importo lordo dell’indennita’ cui ha diritto*’) – Art. 4, § 41(b), *Legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92 Disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva di crescita.*	
Netherlands (1992-2007)	Offered remuneration (*‘[l]oon’*) compared to benefit payments (*‘uitkerningsniveau’*) – Richtlijn passende arbeid 1996, Staatscourant 1996, nr. 60, pag. 15	Offered remuneration (*‘de beloning’ or* ‘loon’) compared to previous earnings (*‘hetgeen betrokkene voorheen verdiende’*) – Richtlijn passende arbeid 1996, Staatscourant 1996, nr. 60, pag. 15

Table 5: Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued)

	Definition of suitable wage relative to...	
Country	Benefit (`bwage`)	Previous wage (`pwage`)
Portugal (post-2006)	Gross salary relative to the amount of unemployment benefit received – Art. 13, Decree-Law 220/2006	
Sweden (pre-2001)	Offered wage ('*erbjudna lönen*') relative to benefit ('*kassaersättingen*') – 1975 AMS *Handbok för Arbetslöshetsförsäkringen* (cited in Jansson 2012, 53 & 78)	
Sweden (post-2001)	Income ('*Arbetsinkomsten*') relative to benefit payments ('*fastställda dagpenningen*') – § 18 AMS FS (2001:10); § 15 IAF FS (2004:3); § 12 IAF FS (2012:1)	
Switzerland (1982-1995)	Remuneration ('*rètribution*') relative to received benefit ('*l'indemnité de chômage à laquelle il a droit*') – Art. 16(e), 1982 Unemployment Insurance Act	

Table 5: Country-Specific Wage Protection Provisions (continued)

	Definition of suitable wage relative to...	
Country	Benefit (`bwage`)	Previous wage (`pwage`)
Switzerland (post-1995)	Remuneration ('*rémunération*') relative to received benefit ('*gain assuré*') – Art. 16(2)(i), 1995 Unemployment Insurance Act	
United Kingdom		'*Rate/level of remuneration*' offered compared to previously received/usually paid – s. 20(4)(b-c), 1975 Social Security Act; s. 20A(1)(b), 1989 Social Security Act & s. 6, S.I. 1989/1324; s. 72 & 9, S.I. 1996/207

Notes: Canada (post-2012): see also 'Digest of Benefit Entitlement Principles - Chapter 9' (http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/ei/digest/9_4_0.shtml; last access on November 13, 2014). Germany (1982-1997): an offered wage below the currently received benefit is only suitable if the previously received wage was extraordinarily high. A net wage below the unemployment assistance (*Arbeitslosenhilfe*) benefit level is never suitable. Netherlands: The 1992 and 1996 guidelines on suitable work are identical with respect to wage mobility requirements.

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