Supporting Information
"Congress and the President in Times of War"

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This Supporting Information (SI) appendix contains additional material referenced in the body of the manuscript, including a codebook for the roll call variables employed there and in the supplemental analyses contained in Appendix B, which is comprised of a series of tables that cover robustness checks, alternative model specifications, and different construction of some of the key independent variables.

Appendix A: Coding of Vote Types

The main and supplemental analyses required identification of various classes of votes: those involving war/defense issues, domestic policy, and foreign policy; votes on treaties and nominations; and, for the selection models, votes involving purely procedural matters and those that involved a procedural question on an underlying substantive issue. This appendix describes the coding protocol used to differentiate among these vote types.

Coding of Foreign Policy and Defense Votes

Rohde's (2005) House dataset:

101 Appropriations: Foreign Economic Aid
102 Appropriations: Foreign Military Aid
110-119 Appropriations: Defense
140-149 Appropriations: Foreign Operations
240-249 Appropriations: Defense (cont'd from 110s)
300-399 Defense
400-499 Foreign Policy

Rohde/PIPC (2010) Senate dataset:

101 Appropriations: Foreign Economic Aid
102 Appropriations: Foreign Military Aid
110-129 Appropriations: Defense
140-149 Appropriations: Foreign Operations
250-269 Appropriations: Homeland Security
300-399 Defense
400-499 Foreign Policy
780-789 Government Operations, Civil Rights, and Justice: Homeland Security

Senate-Specific Votes

Confirmation and Treaty Votes — Our analysis also accounts for the Constitution's "advice and consent" provision in Article II, which gives the Senate an additional role in executive-legislative relations that is not applicable to the House. As such, we identify those votes involving the confirmation process on executive and judicial branch nominees and the ratification process for treaties and related matters using the information in the bill descriptor fields of the Senate roll call data and, if necessary, the vote type codes (65=confirmation, 34 and 155=ratification).

Procedural Votes

Our analysis of presidential success focuses on those votes on which the president takes a position. The Heckman analysis shifts the analysis forward to include the prior stage, which involves identifying those votes on which the president chooses to take a position. Because of the separation of powers principle and the constitutional prerogative of the two chambers of Congress to set their own rules, we set aside votes on purely internal, housekeeping matters such as adjournment and election of chamber officers. Thus, our sample includes votes on substantive matters, some of which deal with procedural questions about special rules, cutting off debate, etc., while omitting those votes that are purely procedural in nature.

Pure Procedural Votes — A purely procedural vote is coded as one in which no bill—or, in the case of the Senate, no bill, treaty, or nomination—was linked to the vote. For the Senate, the most common examples include votes to compel the attendance of absent members, motions to table, and judgments of the Senate. For the House, the most common examples are votes to approve the Journal and adjournment motions.

Procedural Votes — The vast majority of procedural votes in both chambers can be linked to a substantive issue. The various roll call datasets we employed include a field identifying the underlying bill or matter relating to the vote. In these cases, we categorized a vote as procedural if it fell into the following categories from Rohde's roll call database. For the Senate: vote types in the 50s or beyond (includes tabling motions, budget waivers, cloture votes, etc.), excluding 65 (confirmation), 155 (ratification of treaties, conventions, and associated protocols), and 171 (adoption of preamble or section of a bill); for the House: vote types in the 50s, 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s (includes adoption of special rules, motions to recommit, previous question on a special rule, etc.).

Appendix B: Robustness Checks

As described in the paper, we are agnostic on the likelihood that strategic considerations are at work in affecting the president's consideration of position-taking. Moreover, our theoretical interests do not lie in explaining whether the president announces a position (what would be the first stage if this were a multi-stage process). Yet accounting for this possibility is important, and we approach this issue in two ways with the supplemental analysis that follows.

Selection Effects and Heckman Results

First, we follow prior research in political science that accounts for the potential impact of selection (e.g. Dubin and Rivers 1989; Berinsky 1999; Reed 2000; Plümper, Schneider, and Troeger 2006). We therefore estimate a Heckman probit model (Heckman 1976; 1979) to account for the possibility that unobserved variables in the first stage are correlated with unobserved variables in the second stage—that is, that the two stages are not independent. The Heckman procedure, which is well known in the econometrics literature, is based on a two-stage estimation process and produces a parameter estimate ρ that indicates the degree of correlation of the errors across the two stages. For instance, if ρ is negative and significant, this lends support to the argument that not staking out a public position in the first stage is associated with a lower likelihood of success in the second stage. On the other hand if ρ is not significant, then the second stage is not dependent on the first and it is preferable to fall back on a simple probit estimation of presidential success.

While the first-stage estimation of a Heckman model can include many or even all the variables that appear in the outcome stage, at least one additional independent variable is required in order to identify the equation. Otherwise, the equation is identified on the functional form alone—an assumption that is difficult to justify on theoretical or statistical grounds (Sartori 2003). We considered two instruments that we believe are theoretically-

justified. The first accounts for the significance of the legislation, since a president's decision to indicate a preference on a given vote is more likely the greater the importance of the bill and we suspect unrelated to his likelihood of success conditional on the other explanatory factors. One commonly used indicator of salience is whether a bill was deemed important enough to warrant attention in the *CQ Almanac* (***Important Bill***).[1] This is the variable we use in the analysis that follows. We also investigated an instrument that taps whether the vote in question dealt with a procedural aspect of the underlying substantive issue. In this case, one might suspect that a president is less likely to take a position on a 'Procedural Vote' such as adoption of the rule to consider a bill in the House as opposed to a substantive vote on an amendment or final passage of the bill. In the second stage, however, we do not believe that whether the vote is procedural or substantive will impact the likelihood of presidential success when a position is taken. As a whole, the models employing either or both of these instruments resulted in substantively similar results for the covariates, with the primary exception being that a model identified only on Procedural Votes in the selection equation failed to converge in the case of Senate votes on foreign policy. In light of the similarities, and for the sake of brevity, we present only one set of results using the CQ Bill variable here.[2]

The results from the robustness checks using the Heckman models appear in Tables A1 and A2. As indicated there, ρ is only marginally significant in the Senate model for votes during wartime (column 2 of Table A2), suggesting the possibility of a selection effect in

[1]These data were collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922, and are available through the Policy Agendas Project at: `http://www.policyagendas.org/` (last accessed March 20, 2014). Neither the NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis we report.

[2]The coding of the Procedural Vote variable is described in Appendix A. For the instruments to be valid, they must be correlated with the endogenous variable (represented by our selection model) and, conditional on the other regressors, uncorrelated with heterogeneity in the outcome equation. On the use of CQ as an indicator of importance, see, e.g., Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson (1995); Jones and Baumgartner (2005). The first condition for identification is evident in the results presented later; the second cannot be assessed directly and is typically defended on theoretical grounds. However, the level of correlation between the errors of the second-stage model and the omitted instruments—which in the case of the models estimated here does not approach statistical significance at conventional levels—provides additional confidence in the models as specified.

that case—i.e., correlation in the disturbances between the president's decision to voice a preference and the outcome of the Senate's vote. Nonetheless, the second-stage results are largely the same and the variables of primary interest relating to our theory of salience and the effect of casualties are substantively unchanged. Neither roll call votes on domestic or foreign policy issues in the House and Senate, nor pooled votes for either chamber, engendered a selection effect. Moreover, the model for wartime votes in the House did not indicate the presence of correlated errors across the two equations. Thus, to the degree that we can assess the possibility of a selection effect with this approach, we believe the key results are robust.

Table A1: Impact of War on Support of the President's Position (Roll Call)

	House		Senate	
	All Votes	Wartime	All Votes	Wartime
Presidential Support				
Wartime	0.323***		0.134*	
	(0.063)		(0.057)	
Casualties (% Change)	0.010	0.030*	−0.016+	0.003
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.012)
MIP:defense	0.061	0.627***	−0.203*	0.274+
	(0.123)	(0.141)	(0.085)	(0.159)
MIP:defense*Casualties	−0.019	−0.048**	0.010	−0.016
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Rally Effect	0.068	−0.001	0.642*	0.344
	(0.294)	(0.306)	(0.259)	(0.278)
Approval	0.003	0.002	0.010***	0.005+
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Ideological Distance	−1.477***	−0.992***	−1.450***	−1.105***
	(0.076)	(0.208)	(0.083)	(0.207)
Treaty			1.781***	7.631***
			(0.219)	(1.651)
Nomination			1.897***	1.636***
			(0.179)	(0.344)
Constant	0.930*	0.728*	0.345	−0.020
	(0.394)	(0.370)	(0.340)	(0.289)
President Voiced Preference				
Wartime	−0.068*		0.111***	
	(0.033)		(0.032)	
Casualties (% Change)	−0.017***	−0.035***	0.000	−0.021***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
MIP:defense	0.479***	−0.084	0.272***	−0.184**
	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.036)	(0.060)
MIP:defense*Casualties	−0.007	0.019***	−0.007	0.017**
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Rally Effect	−0.608***	−0.309*	−0.071	0.339**
	(0.120)	(0.133)	(0.110)	(0.128)
Approval	0.003*	0.000	0.007***	0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Ideological Distance	−0.136***	−0.653***	−0.679***	−1.187***
	(0.037)	(0.109)	(0.038)	(0.085)
Important Bill (CQ)	0.212***	0.431***	−0.234***	−0.185***
	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.036)
Constant	−1.006***	−0.489***	−0.584***	0.134
	(0.059)	(0.135)	(0.059)	(0.106)
Constant	0.076	0.102	0.374	0.695+
	(0.252)	(0.249)	(0.245)	(0.408)
Observations	20225	6302	17878	5785
Uncensored Obs.	3901	1171	4708	1661
Log Pseudolikelihood	−12007.249	−3512.924	−12160.691	−4123.539
ρ	0.076	0.102	0.358	0.601
	(0.2251)	(0.246)	(0.213)	(0.261)
$Wald\chi^2$ ($H_0 : \rho = 0$)	0.09	0.17	2.34	2.90+

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2: Impact of War on House Support of the President's Position (Roll Call)

	All Issues	Wartime	Domestic Policy	Foreign Policy
Presidential Support				
Casualties (% Change)	0.030*	0.030*	0.027*	0.049
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.055)
MIP:defense	0.172	0.627***	−0.077	0.877***
	(0.117)	(0.141)	(0.134)	(0.165)
MIP:defense*Casualties	−0.031*	−0.048**	−0.020	−0.075
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.048)
Rally Effect	0.261	−0.001	0.275	0.185
	(0.300)	(0.306)	(0.379)	(0.472)
Presidential Approval	0.000	0.002	0.003	−0.008*
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Ideological Distance	−1.423***	−0.992***	−1.656***	−0.843***
	(0.078)	(0.208)	(0.112)	(0.136)
Constant	1.121**	0.728*	1.301**	0.948
	(0.399)	(0.370)	(0.425)	(0.779)
President Voiced Preference				
Casualties (% Change)	−0.020***	−0.035***	−0.013***	−0.060***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.011)
MIP:defense	0.438***	−0.084	0.496***	0.221*
	(0.039)	(0.063)	(0.043)	(0.087)
MIP:defense*Casualties	−0.004	0.019***	−0.008+	0.026*
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.012)
Rally Effect	−0.638***	−0.309*	−0.782***	−0.334+
	(0.119)	(0.133)	(0.149)	(0.203)
Presidential Approval	0.003**	0.000	0.005***	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Ideological Distance	−0.145***	−0.653***	−0.156***	−0.190*
	(0.037)	(0.109)	(0.042)	(0.081)
Important Bill	0.212***	0.431***	0.240***	0.153***
	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.044)
Constant	−1.030***	−0.489***	−1.197***	−0.428***
	(0.058)	(0.135)	(0.067)	(0.120)
Constant	0.032	0.102	−0.103	0.282
	(0.258)	(0.249)	(0.276)	(0.621)
Observations	20225	6302	16024	4201
Uncensored Obs.	3901	1171	2852	1049
Log Pseudolikelihood	−12024.18	−3512.92	−8986.65	−2906.90
ρ	0.0318	0.102	−0.103	0.275
	(0.257)	(0.246)	(0.273)	(0.574)
$Wald\chi^2$ $(H_0 : \rho = 0)$	0.02	0.17	0.14	0.21

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3: Impact of War on Senate Support of the President's Position (Roll Call)

	All Issues	Wartime	Domestic Policy	Foreign Policy
Pres. Support				
Casualties (% Change)	−0.008	0.003	0.004	−0.055**
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.017)
MIP:defense	−0.138	0.274+	−0.219*	0.040
	(0.087)	(0.159)	(0.102)	(0.152)
MIP:defense*Casualties	0.004	−0.016	−0.006	0.043*
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.019)
Rally Effect	0.688**	0.344	0.561*	4.615***
	(0.255)	(0.278)	(0.271)	(1.205)
Approval	0.009***	0.005+	0.010***	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Ideological Distance	−1.397***	−1.105***	−1.555***	−1.032***
	(0.076)	(0.206)	(0.099)	(0.163)
Treaty	1.762***	9.390	2.009***	1.376***
	(0.223)	(.)	(0.415)	(0.329)
Nomination	1.876***	1.635***	2.076***	
	(0.185)	(0.343)	(0.178)	
Constant	0.362	−0.020	0.458	0.575
	(0.345)	(0.288)	(0.424)	(0.542)
President Voiced Interest				
Casualties (% Change)	0.007+	−0.021***	0.018***	−0.029***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)
MIP:defense	0.328***	−0.184**	0.339***	0.313***
	(0.031)	(0.060)	(0.036)	(0.067)
MIP:defense*Casualties	−0.012**	0.017**	−0.017***	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Rally Effect	−0.033	0.339**	0.025	−0.272
	(0.109)	(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.250)
Approval	0.006***	0.006**	0.007***	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Ideological Distance	−0.634***	−1.187***	−0.598***	−0.747***
	(0.035)	(0.085)	(0.041)	(0.074)
Important Bill (CQ)	−0.232***	−0.185***	−0.245***	−0.204***
	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.043)
Constant	−0.548***	0.134	−0.699***	−0.015
	(0.058)	(0.106)	(0.067)	(0.124)
Constant	0.403	0.695+	0.263	0.578
	(0.252)	(0.407)	(0.277)	(0.546)
Observations	17878	5785	13902	3976
Uncensored Obs.	4708	1661	3451	1257
Log Pseudolikelihood	−12168.90	−4123.54	−9090.12	−2960.95
ρ	0.382	0.601	0.257	0.521
	(0.215)	(0.260)	(0.258)	(0.398)
$Wald\chi^2$ ($H_0 : \rho = 0$)	2.56	2.92+	0.90	1.12

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Analysis of Budget Data

As noted in the body of the paper, estimation of a Heckman model can be challenging empirically, and many researchers question the reality of identifying a credible variable that meets the exclusion restriction. This has led a number of scholars to examine budgetary data (see, e.g., Canes-Wrone and Water's Edge book). Most recently, Howell et al. have employed the budget data to good advantage in their work on presidential influence during wartime. While their focus lies with the nationalization of politics, the logic of using budgetary politics extends well to our analysis as well:

"Appropriations present a reasonably clear opportunity to assess Congress's variable willingness during war and peace to support the president—and to do so without introducing the substantial identification issues endemic to previous research on war and presidential power" (108). The two advantages they note involve bypassing the endogeneity arising from strategic selection on the part of the president as to taking a position and the nature of the budget process itself, in which the president is required to issue a request that enables scholars to ascertain how close the final product hewed to this public preference.

Thus, as a second robustness check, we replicate Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski's models on wartime influence on the discrepancies between requested and appropriated budgets for major executive agencies, adding our two measures of interest and their interactive term.[3] The results (presented in Table A3) confirm our main findings. However, the annual nature of the dependent variable renders our main independent variables as much more blunt instruments—we lose the nuance of the moving averages corresponding to votes over the course of congressional sessions—which may explain the lack of findings for the submodel on wartime budgets. Nonetheless, the results of the full model and the as well as the submodels for defense and non-defense agencies, replicate our main findings and therefore offer further support that our models are robust.

[3]We are grateful to Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski for sharing their data with us.

Table A4: Replication of Howell et al. Main Models Using Casualties & MIP

	All Agencies	Wartime Only	Defense Agencies	Non-Defense Agencies
Wartime	0.172		0.067	0.216
	(0.187)		(0.208)	(0.233)
Casualties (%Change)	-0.095^{**}	-0.056	-0.126^{**}	-0.083^{+}
	(0.033)	(0.078)	(0.041)	(0.042)
MIP:defense	-0.594^{***}	-0.452	-0.686^{*}	-0.572^{**}
	(0.154)	(0.518)	(0.284)	(0.185)
MIP:defense*Casualties	0.073^{*}	0.008	0.152^{**}	0.046
	(0.034)	(0.087)	(0.049)	(0.041)
ln(Unemployment)	-1.496^{***}	-3.500^{+}	-0.095	-1.869^{***}
	(0.418)	(1.846)	(0.672)	(0.488)
Real Deficit	0.156^{*}	-0.002	0.136	0.162^{*}
	(0.062)	(0.348)	(0.083)	(0.078)
RGDPGA	-7.832^{**}	2.882	-6.992^{*}	-8.035^{**}
	(2.377)	(14.426)	(2.835)	(2.960)
ln(Proposal)	1.073^{***}	0.898^{***}	1.261^{**}	1.072^{***}
	(0.180)	(0.229)	(0.360)	(0.208)
Constant	-0.395	5.458	-5.696	0.379
	(2.807)	(5.556)	(5.909)	(3.358)
Agency Fixed Effects	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
President Fixed Effects	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Observations	2307	619	513	1794
R^2	0.681	0.706	0.750	0.637
AIC	10211.970	2761.829	2110.805	8066.671

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).
Clustered standard errors (on agency) in parentheses.

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