Online Appendix for: Considering Concessions?

A Survey Experiment on the Colombian Peace Process

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A Surveyed Municipalities



Source: LAPOP 2015

Figure 1: Map of surveyed municipalities

B Balance

Table 1: Balance across experimental groups

	Prime treat. Endor. ctrl.	Prime treat. Endors. treat.	Prime ctrl. Endors. ctrl.	Prime ctrl. Endors. treat.	Total
Woman					
Man	11%	12%	14%	13%	50%
Woman	13%	12%	11%	14%	50%
Total	24%	24%	25%	27%	100%
Age					
18-25	7%	5%	7%	9%	28%
26-35	8%	6%	6%	7%	27%
36-45	4%	6%	4%	3%	17%
46-55	3%	4%	4%	3%	13%
56-65	3%	2%	2%	2%	9%
66+	1%	2%	2%	1%	6%
Total	24%	24%	25%	27%	100%
Income Quintiles					
1	4%	5%	6%	5%	20%
2	5%	5%	5%	6%	21%
3	5%	5%	4%	5%	20%
4	4%	5%	5%	6%	20%
5	5%	5%	5%	5%	20%
Total	24%	24%	25%	27%	100%
Rural					
Urban	14%	15%	16%	16%	60%
Rural	10%	9%	10%	11%	40%
Total	24%	24%	25%	27%	100%

Source: Authors' calculations

C Comparison LAPOP wave 2014 vs wave 2015



Figure 2: This Figure presents the evolution of average support to different Colombian institutions and to the current peace process. Notice that the questions that refer to electoral and political provisions (that we use as outcome variables) were only asked in 2015.



Figure 3: This Figure presents the evolution of the average ideology by survey wave.



Figure 4: This Figure presents the evolution of socio-demographic characteristics by survey wave.

D Attitudes toward the peace process LAPOP 2015



Figure 5: The figure shows the percentage of individuals who answered each of the categories in the *x*-axis to the following question: *Of the following options to solve the current conflict with the guerrilla, which one do you think is the best?* AmericasBarometer 2015



Figure 6: The figure shows the average response to the following statements: [From left to right bars] *Members of the FARC who confess their crimes should receive a reduction in their sentences., The Colombian government should provide financial assistance to the rank and file members of the FARC (no commanders) who decide to demobilize, The rank and file members of the FARC (not commanders) who demobilize should not be tried by justice., The Colombian government should ensure that members of the FARC who demobilize can participate in politics* and *The Colombian government should provide some spaces of political representation (e.g. a seat in Congress) to members of the FARC once they demobilize.* All questions are answered in a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents "Not at all" and 7 "A lot". AmericasBarometer 2015

E Results Additional Analyses for the Prime Experiment

E.1 Results for the Estimation of the Effects of the Prime Experiment on Two Additional Outcomes

We also estimate the effect of the prime experiment on the following two outcomes:

```
COLESPA6. If in the next local elections---that is, for the ones in 2015,
a demobilized member of the FARC runs for mayor in your municipality,
what would you do? [Read options]
(1) I would vote for this candidate, that is, for the demobilized member of the FARC.
(2) I wouldn't vote for this candidate.

COLESPA8. If in the next local elections---that is, for the ones in 2015,
a demobilized member of the FARC is elected mayor in your municipality,
what would you do? [Read options]
```

(1) I would accept the results of the elections
(2) I would not accept the results of the elections

Table 2: Effect of prime experiment on two additional outcomes

	(1)	(2)
VARIABLES	Seats for FARC	FARC Party
Prime treatment	-0.00739	-0.0528**
	(0.0170)	(0.0268)
Constant	0.117***	0.513***
	(0.0120)	(0.0186)
Observations	1,390	1,390
R-squared	0.000	0.003

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The dependent variable in column 1 is a dummy variable where 1 corresponds to individuals who answered "I would vote for this candidate, ..." and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in column 2 is a dummy variable where 1 corresponds to individuals who answered "I would accept the results of the elections, ..." and 0 otherwise. Thus, coefficients of columns 1 and 2 can be interpreted as the difference in the proportion of respondents who answered yes to each question within each group.

E.2 Results Subgroup Analysis for the Prime Experiment

E.2.1 Results Rural versus Urban Respondents

Table 3 presents the results when analyzing heterogeneity in terms of area of residency. The effect of being primed is still not statistically distinguishable from zero for all of the outcomes except in one case. When asked whether they would vote for a demobilized member of the FARC in the local elections ($colespa6$), only individuals who reside in rural areas would be less likely to do so when primed on the association of this group with drug-trafficking.[1] For urban respondents, the effect is not statistically significant. This finding implies that this linkage does matter in rural areas of the country when it comes to electing political leaders who might be closer to the citizen, such as the mayor, as opposed to Congressmen or attitudes towards other formal rules of political participation that could be granted to the FARC once demobilized. We come back to this possible interpretation in the discussion section.

[1] The difference correspond to ≈ 5.1 percentage points, with an associated standard error of ≈ 2 p.p.

Table 3: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Area of Residency

VARIABLES	(1) Seats for FARC	(2) FARC Party	(3) Vote for FARC Mayor	(4) Accept FARC Mayor
Prime treatment	-0.172	-0.0998	0.0220	-0.0368
	(0.127)	(0.133)	(0.0229)	(0.0346)
Rural	0.127	-0.119	0.00736	-0.0478
	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.0247)	(0.0382)
Rural X Prime	0.198	0.244	-0.0729**	-0.0375
	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.0339)	(0.0546)
Constant	2.760***	2.855***	0.114***	0.532***
	(0.0873)	(0.0925)	(0.0152)	(0.0238)
Observations	1,279	1,304	1,390	1,390
R-squared	0.005	0.001	0.005	0.007

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: See notes in Table 2.

E.2.2 Results by Gender

Women also differ from men in their reaction to the FARC's involvement in drug trafficking. Table 4 summarizes the results for the heterogeneous treatment effects related to gender. The priming effect continues to be not statistically significant for *colprime1*, *colprime2* and *colespa6* as in Table 2. Yet, we find that for *colespa8*, the interaction of the prime experiment and individual's sex is positive and statistically significant. Likewise, the pure treatment effect is also significant, but negative. This means that when it comes to the most dramatic measure of support for the peace process and political participation, the effect of stronger associations between the FARC and drug-trafficking is different for women than it is for men. In particular, among women, priming has no effect on the proportion of respondents who would accept the results of the elections if a demobilized member of the FARC is elected.[2]. On the contrary, priming substantially reduces this amount among men—in almost 10 percentage points.

From Table 4 it also stands out that women are also associated with less support towards the political participation of the FARC, and this effect is consistent across all outcomes. These results, while not given any causal interpretation, motivates further exploration of heterogeneity by gender in the following analyses. We also discuss this further below.

[2]While the treatment effect statistically differs by gender (see coefficient of interaction term of third column in Table 4), among women, the effect of priming is close to zero and is not statistically significant.

Table 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Gender

VARIABLES	(1) Seats for FARC	(2) FARC Party	(3) Vote for FARC Mayor	(4) Accept FARC Mayor
Prime treatment	-0.171	-0.0566	-0.0251	-0.0991***
	(0.152)	(0.157)	(0.0266)	(0.0378)
Woman	-0.563***	-0.769***	-0.0808***	-0.159***
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.0235)	(0.0368)
Woman X Prime	0.207	0.172	0.0397	0.100*
	(0.203)	(0.205)	(0.0338)	(0.0533)
Constant	3.071***	3.171***	0.155***	0.590***
	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.0188)	(0.0255)
Observations	1,279	1,304	1,390	1,390
R-squared	0.017	0.034	0.011	0.017

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: See notes in Table 2.

E.2.3 Results by Prior victimization

Table 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Prior Victimization

VARIABLES	(1) Seats for FARC	(2) FARC Party	(3) Vote for FARC Mayor	(4) Accept FARC Mayor
Prime treatment	-0.318**	-0.214	-0.0165	-0.0677
	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.0238)	(0.0418)
Victim of conflict	0.00521	0.0827	0.0343	0.0435
	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.0238)	(0.0380)
Victim X Prime	0.382*	0.360*	0.0161	0.0235
	(0.206)	(0.209)	(0.0335)	(0.0545)
Constant	2.806***	2.760***	0.0962***	0.488***
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.0173)	(0.0293)
Observations	1,277	1,302	1,388	1,388
R-squared	0.006	0.007	0.005	0.006

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Variable *victim* corresponds to any type of victimization by the conflict. We follow the definition used by LAPOP, available at `http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/studies-year.php`.

F Ex-post Power Calculations



Figure 7: This figure presents an ex-post power calculation varying the number of observations as well as treatment effect size.

G Formal Test Difference in Differences Estimator for Prime and Endorsement Experiments

Table 6: Difference in differences estimator

VARIABLES	(1) Support $Circunscripciones$
Prime treatement	0.0904
	(0.155)
Endorsement experiment	-0.662***
	(0.149)
Prime X Endorsement	-0.160
	(0.218)
Constant	4.093***
	(0.109)
Observations	1,292
R-squared	0.035

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The dependent variable is coded in a 1 to 7 scale were 1 represents "Totally disagrees" and 7 "Totally agrees"

H Estimation of the Basic Specification of the Models for the Endorsement and Prime Experiment using Clustered Standard Errors at the Municipal Level

Table 7: Estimation models using clustered standard errors at the municipal level

VARIABLES	(1) Seats for FARC	(2) FARC Party	(3) Special Seats
Prime treatment	-0.0918	-0.00414	
	(0.0891)	(0.101)	
Endorsement experiment			-0.740***
			(0.107)
Constant	2.808***	2.810***	4.138***
	(0.0862)	(0.0852)	(0.113)
Observations	1,279	1,304	1,292
R-squared	0.001	0.000	0.035

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models were estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered by municipality.

I Spanish version of the questionnaire (see next page)

Group 1

Las FARC han tenido presencia en zonas rurales del país hace ya más de cincuenta años ***y han estado involucradas en el cultivo, producción y comercialización de drogas ilícitas en Colombia***. Frente a la firma de un posible acuerdo de paz, ¿qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con las siguientes propuestas? **COLPRIME1T.** Que se creen curules especiales en el Congreso para partidos políticos formados por desmovilizados de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **COLPRIME2T.** Que una vez se desmovilicen, las FARC formen un partido político para lograr obtener cargos en el Congreso mediante elecciones populares. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **COLENDORS1T. Las FARC** han propuesto reservar curules del Congreso para las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto armado, con el fin de que estas regiones tengan mayor representación en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	**1-7** **88=NS** **98=NR**

Group 2

Las FARC han tenido presencia en zonas rurales del país hace ya más de cincuenta años ***y han estado involucradas en el cultivo, producción y comercialización de drogas ilícitas en Colombia***. Frente a la firma de un posible acuerdo de paz, ¿qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con las siguientes propuestas? **COLPRIME1T.** Que se creen curules especiales en el Congreso para partidos políticos formados por desmovilizados de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **COLPRIME2T.** Que una vez se desmovilicen, las FARC formen un partido político para lograr obtener cargos en el Congreso mediante elecciones populares. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **COLENDORS1C.** Algunas personas han propuesto reservar curules del Congreso para las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto armado, con el fin de que estas regiones tengan mayor representación en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	**1-7** **88=NS** **98=NR**

Group 3

Las FARC han tenido presencia en zonas rurales del país hace ya más de cincuenta años. Frente a la firma de un posible acuerdo de paz, ¿qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo estaría usted con las siguientes propuestas? **COLPRIME1T.** Que se creen curules especiales en el Congreso para partidos políticos formados por desmovilizados de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **COLPRIME2T.** Que una vez se desmovilicen, las FARC formen un partido político para lograr obtener cargos en el Congreso mediante elecciones populares. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **COLENDORS1T. Las FARC** han propuesto reservar curules del Congreso para las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto armado, con el fin de que estas regiones tengan mayor representación en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	**1-7** **88=NS** **98=NR**

Group 4

Las FARC han tenido presencia en zonas rurales del país hace ya más de cincuenta años. Frente a la firma de un posible acuerdo de paz, ¿qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo estaría usted con las siguientes propuestas? **COLPRIME1T.** Que se creen curules especiales en el Congreso para partidos políticos formados por desmovilizados de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **COLPRIME2T.** Que una vez se desmovilicen, las FARC formen un partido político para lograr obtener cargos en el Congreso mediante elecciones populares. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **COLENDORS1C.** Algunas personas han propuesto reservar curules del Congreso para las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto armado, con el fin de que estas regiones tengan mayor representación en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	**1-7** **88=NS** **98=NR**

COLESPA6. Si en las próximas elecciones locales, es decir las de 2015, un desmovilizado de las FARC se presenta como candidato a la alcaldía de su municipio, ¿qué haría usted? **[Leer opciones]**
(1) Votaría por ese candidato, es decir por el desmovilizado de las FARC
(2) No votaría por ese candidato
(88) NS (98) NR

COLESPA8. Si en las próximas elecciones locales, es decir las de 2015, un desmovilizado de las FARC gana la alcaldía de su municipio, ¿qué haría usted? **[Leer opciones]**
(1) Aceptaría el resultado de las elecciones (2) NO aceptaría el resultado de las elecciones
(88) NS (98) NR