Replication Notes and Output for 'What Politicians Don't Know Can Hurt You: The effects of information on politicians' spending decisions' American Political Science Review

Ryan Jablonski

14 September 2023

Contents

Replication Notes **2**

Effects of the Need Information Treatment **4**
Conditional Logit Estimates of the Need Information Treatment (Figure 8, Table S8-S9, Figure S15, Table S35, Table 2) . . . 4
Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Need Information Treatment (Figure S8) . . . 9
Heterogenous Effects of the Need Information Treatment (Figure S4) . . . 12
Additional Pre-Registered Tests of the Need Information Treatment (Figure S7) . . . 14

Effects of the Voting Information Treatment **16**
Conditional Logit Estimates of the Voting Information Treatment (Figure 10, Table S12-S13, Figure S17, Table S37, Table 4) . . . 16
Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Voting Information Treatment (Figure S10) . . . 21
Heterogenous Effects of the Voting Information Treatment (Figure S6) . . . 23
Estimates with Alternative Coding of Voting (Tables S29 and S30) . . . 25

Effects of the Aid Information Treatment **33**
Conditional Logit Estimates of the Aid Information Treatment (Figure 9, Table S10-S11, Figure S16, Table S36, Table 3) . . . 33
Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Aid Information Treatment (Figure S9) . . . 38
Heterogenous Effects of the Aid Information Treatment (Figure S5) . . . 40

Other Treatment Effect Estimates **42**
Interactions between Treatments (Tables S31, S32, S33) . . . 42
Multiple Comparison Corrections (Figure S3, Tables S17, S18, 19) . . . 43
Interaction Effect Plot (Figure 11, Tables S14, S15, S16) . . . 45
Interaction of Information Treatments with Transparency Treatments (Tables S26, S27, S28) . . . 48

Politician Knowledge and Updating **53**
Correlates of Politician Knowledge (Table S34) . . . 53
Summary of Quiz Answers (Figure 3 and Figure S14) . . . 54
Questions on the Usefulness of Information (Figures S11, S12, S13) . . . 55

Attrition, Compliance and Bias **56**
Attrition Statistics (Table S42, S43, S44, S45) . . . 56
Tests of Desirability Bias (Tables S20, S21, S22) . . . 59
Treatment Compliance Tests (Figures S23, S24, S25) . . . 68

Politician Visits (Figure 2, Table S1) **70**

Politician Learning (Figure 1) **72**

Head Teacher Prioritization of School Needs (Figure S19) **73**

Power Analysis (Figures S1 and S2) **74**

Summary Statistics **75**
Number of Maps Receiving Different Combinations of Transparency and Information Treatments (Table S47) . . . 75
Local Councillor Sample Statistics (Table S38) . . . 75
MP Sample Statistics (Table S39) . . . 75
Variable Summary Statistics (Figures S40-S41) . . . 76
Correlation Matrix (Figure S18) . . . 85
Statistics for CONSORT Diagram (Figure 6) . . . 86
Association between School Characteristics and School Selection (Figure 7, Tables S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, and S7) . . . 87

Replication Notes

The code in this folder generates all the tables and figures from Ryan Jablonski and Brigitte Seim "What Politicians Don't Know Can Hurt You: The effects of information on politicians' spending decisions" in the *American Political Science Review*. The full output of the replication code is appended to this file.

This code is designed to be compiled with rMarkdown. It was originally run on RStudio Version RStudio 2022.07.1+554 with R 4.2.0 for Windows 10 x64. All data has been anonymized to protect respondents.

The main replication file is GenerateTablesFigures.rmd. In order to replicate the results, you must first change the "working_dir" variable in this file to the directory of the replication files.

Note that the results markdown file will differ in size and resolution from the main text. For final source files see the ./Output folder.

This replication code relies on the following source files:

1. *GenerateTablesFigures.rmd* This file is an rMarkdown file to generate all tables and figures
2. *./data/labels.csv* this file contains labels for all variables
3. *./data/all_withcovariates.csv* this is a school-level dataset containing all variables used for the main treatment analysis
4. *./data/c_withcovariates.csv* this is a school-level dataset containing all variables used for the councillor only treatment analysis
5. *./data/c_withcovariates_withattritted.csv* this is identical to the file above, but also includes attritted respondents. It is used for attrition analysis in the SI.
6. *./data/mp_withcovariates.csv* this is a school-level dataset containing all variables used for the MP only treatment analysis
7. *./data/mp_withcovariates_withattritted.csv* this is identical to the file above, but also includes attritted respondents. It is used for attrition analysis in the SI.
8. *./data/citizen_survey.csv* this file contains survey responses from citizens in the catchment area of a sample of schools included in this experiment. Among other things, it contains spatial data on patterns of politician visits to constituents.

9. *./data/citizen_survey.csv* this file contains survey responses from citizens in the catchment area of a sample of schools included in this experiment. Among other things, it contains spatial data on patterns of politician visits to constituents.
10. *./data/headteacher_survey.csv* this file contains survey responses from head teachers in the catchment area of a sample of schools included in this experiment. Among other things, it contains responses to a question about teacher prioritization of school needs.
11. *./data/how_useful_survey_questions.csv* this file summarizes politician responses to an open ended question about the usefulness of information in the experiment.
12. *./data/followupsurvey.csv* this file contains politician responses to a follow-up phone survey about constituent information. It is used to generate Figure 1.
13. *./data/lc_schools_all.csv* this file contains details of schools which were eligible to be included in the experimental sample for councillors. It is used to generate sample summary data.
14. *./data/mp_schools_all.csv* this file contains details of schools which were eligible to be included in the experimental sample for MPs. It is used to generate sample summary data.
15. *./data/power_sim.csv* this file contains power simulations for the main treatment effect.
16. *./data/power_sim_interactions.csv* this file contains power simulations for interactions between treatments.

For questions about this replication contact Ryan Jablonski at r.s.jablonski@lse.ac.uk.

Effects of the Need Information Treatment

Conditional Logit Estimates of the Need Information Treatment (Figure 8, Table S8-S9, Figure S15, Table S35, Table 2)



pdf 2



pdf 2

Table 1: The Effect of School Need Information on School Selection

	(1)	(2)
Need Treatment* School Need Index	0.074**	0.082**
	(0.038)	(0.039)
School Need Index	0.036	0.061*
	(0.027)	(0.031)
Controls	No	Yes
N Maps	1164	1164
N Schools	3492	3492
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.020

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. See SI 3.3, Table S8 for complete model results.

Table 2: Estimates from Main Text Figure 8 (part 1)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Need Treatment* School Need Index	0.074**	0.082**	0.089**	0.031
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.068)
School Need Index	0.036	0.061*	0.050	0.006
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.047)
Need Treatment				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Good Types		0.364		
		(0.232)		
Aid Project Count		−0.428		
		(0.314)		
Family Attends School		0.430***		
		(0.149)		
Incumbent Percent		0.710***		
		(0.234)		
Log Enrollment		0.122***		
		(0.044)		
Log Permanent Classrooms		−0.075		
		(0.118)		
Log Permanent Houses		0.023		
		(0.062)		
Log Teachers		0.041		
		(0.101)		
Log Temporary Classrooms		−0.091		
		(0.070)		
Log Temporary Houses		0.029		
		(0.063)		
Log Turnout		−0.208**		
		(0.084)		
Opposition Percent (LC)		−0.207		
		(0.273)		
Percent Votes (MP)		0.196		
		(0.240)		
Pop Density at School		−0.003		
		(0.003)		
Observations	3,492	3,492	2,439	1,053
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.020	0.009	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 3: Estimates from Main Text Figure 8 (part 2)

	Transparency Interactions
Need Treatment*School Need Index*Transparency Treatment	0.065
	(0.089)
Need Treatment*School Need Index	0.024
	(0.077)
School Need Index*Transparency Treatment	−0.001
	(0.063)
Need Treatment*Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
School Need Index	0.037
	(0.055)
Need Treatment	
	(0.000)
Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Observations	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.006

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 4: Interactions of Need Information Treatment with School Knowledge

	without controls	with controls
	(1)	(2)
Need Treatment*Need Knowledge*School Need Index	0.002	0.038
	(0.130)	(0.134)
Need Treatment*School Need Index	0.075	0.066
	(0.073)	(0.075)
Need Knowledge*School Need Index	−0.052	−0.091
	(0.092)	(0.096)
Need Treatment*Need Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
School Need Index	0.060	0.104*
	(0.050)	(0.055)
Need Treatment		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Need Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.006	0.020

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 5).

Table 5: Interactions of Need Information Treatment with School Knowledge, Full Model

	without controls	with controls
	(1)	(2)
Need Treatment*Need Knowledge*School Need Index	0.002	0.038
	(0.130)	(0.134)
Need Treatment*School Need Index	0.075	0.066
	(0.073)	(0.075)
Need Knowledge*School Need Index	−0.052	−0.091
	(0.092)	(0.096)
Need Treatment*Need Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
School Need Index	0.060	0.104*
	(0.050)	(0.055)
Need Treatment		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Need Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
number_aid_categories		0.369
		(0.233)
past_aid_project		−0.438
		(0.314)
any_children_attend_school		0.430***
		(0.149)
winner_percent_imp		0.716***
		(0.235)
log_number_of_students		0.123***
		(0.044)
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.073
		(0.118)
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.022
		(0.062)
log_number_of_teachers		0.038
		(0.101)
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.090
		(0.070)
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		0.029
		(0.063)
log_ps_total_votes		−0.211**
		(0.084)
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.218
		(0.274)
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.200
		(0.240)
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.003
		(0.003)
Observations	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.006	0.020

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Need Information Treatment (Figure S8)



pdf 2

Table 6: The Effect of School Need Information, Linear Estimates

	All Surveys	with Controls
	(1)	(2)
Need Treatment* School Need Index	0.025**	0.027**
	(0.013)	(0.012)
School Need Index	0.012	0.020*
	(0.009)	(0.010)
information_need		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
number_aid_categories		0.117
		(0.075)
past_aid_project		−0.138
		(0.102)
any_children_attend_school		0.152***
		(0.053)
winner_percent_imp		0.232***
		(0.074)
log_number_of_students		0.039***
		(0.014)
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.024
		(0.038)
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.007
		(0.019)
log_number_of_teachers		0.011
		(0.031)
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.029
		(0.024)
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		0.009
		(0.021)
log_ps_total_votes		−0.067**
		(0.028)
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.066
		(0.084)
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.066
		(0.076)
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.001
		(0.001)
R^2	0.008	0.029

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients from linear fixed effect regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 7: The Effect of School Need Information, Linear Estimates

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Need Treatment* School Need Index	0.025**	0.027**	0.030**	0.011
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.024)
School Need Index	0.012	0.020*	0.017	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Need Treatment				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Good Types		0.117		
		(0.075)		
Aid Project Count		−0.138		
		(0.102)		
Family Attends School		0.152***		
		(0.053)		
Incumbent Percent		0.232***		
		(0.074)		
Log Enrollment		0.039***		
		(0.014)		
Log Permanent Classrooms		−0.024		
		(0.038)		
Log Permanent Houses		0.007		
		(0.019)		
Log Teachers		0.011		
		(0.031)		
Log Temporary Classrooms		−0.029		
		(0.024)		
Log Temporary Houses		0.009		
		(0.021)		
Log Turnout		−0.067**		
		(0.028)		
Opposition Percent (LC)		−0.066		
		(0.084)		
Percent Votes (MP)		0.066		
		(0.076)		
Pop Density at School		−0.001		
		(0.001)		
Observations	3,492	3,492	2,439	1,053
R^2	0.008	0.029	0.014	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients from linear fixed effect regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 8: Interactions of Need Information with Transparency, Linear Estimates

	Transparency Interactions
Need Treatment*School Need Index*Transparency Treatment	0.022
	(0.028)
Need Treatment*School Need Index	0.008
	(0.023)
School Need Index*Transparency Treatment	−0.0003
	(0.021)
Need Treatment*Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
School Need Index	0.012
	(0.018)
Need Treatment	
	(0.000)
Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Observations	3,492
R^2	0.009

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients from linear fixed effect regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Heterogenous Effects of the Need Information Treatment (Figure S4)



pdf 2

Table 9: The Effect of Need Information, Heterogenous Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
information_need				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
school_need_index	0.064	−0.095	−0.110	−0.067
	(0.072)	(0.090)	(0.164)	(0.082)
contest_electionYes				
	(0.000)			
genderM				
		(0.000)		
timeliving				
			(0.000)	
useful				
				(0.000)
information_need:school_need_index	0.073	0.235*	−0.089	0.166*
	(0.091)	(0.123)	(0.220)	(0.103)
information_need:contest_electionYes				
	(0.000)			
school_need_index:contest_electionYes	−0.033			
	(0.078)			
information_need:school_need_index:contest_electionYes	−0.002			
	(0.100)			
information_need:genderM				
		(0.000)		
school_need_index:genderM		0.145		
		(0.094)		
information_need:school_need_index:genderM		−0.179		
		(0.129)		
information_need:timeliving				
			(0.000)	
school_need_index:timeliving			0.147	
			(0.167)	
information_need:school_need_index:timeliving			0.180	
			(0.223)	
information_need:useful				
				(0.000)
school_need_index:useful				0.062
				(0.046)
information_need:school_need_index:useful				−0.051
				(0.059)
Pseudo-R^2	0.006	0.006	0.008	0.007

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Additional Pre-Registered Tests of the Need Information Treatment (Figure S7)



pdf 2

Table 10: Additional Pre-Registered Tests of the Need Information Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
information_need						
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
z_winner_percent	0.230***	0.206***				
	(0.065)	(0.069)				
number_aid_categories		0.357		0.362		0.475*
		(0.232)		(0.232)		(0.270)
past_aid_project		−0.425		−0.427		−0.549
		(0.313)		(0.313)		(0.364)
winner_percent_imp				0.707***		0.584**
				(0.234)		(0.274)
any_children_attend_school		0.419***	0.561***	0.439**		0.420**
		(0.149)	(0.200)	(0.204)		(0.174)
log_number_of_students		0.125***		0.120***		0.115**
		(0.044)		(0.044)		(0.051)
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.065		−0.070		−0.104
		(0.118)		(0.118)		(0.138)
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.023		0.021		−0.043
		(0.062)		(0.062)		(0.071)
log_number_of_teachers		0.038		0.041		0.013
		(0.102)		(0.101)		(0.119)
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.100		−0.095		−0.165*
		(0.070)		(0.070)		(0.080)
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		0.026		0.029		0.013
		(0.063)		(0.063)		(0.073)
log_ps_total_votes		−0.242***		−0.211**		−0.189*
		(0.088)		(0.084)		(0.097)
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.194		−0.193		−0.218
		(0.274)		(0.273)		(0.311)
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.211		0.185		−0.073
		(0.240)		(0.239)		(0.280)
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.003		−0.003		−0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.004)
school_need_index		0.106***		0.103***		0.109***
		(0.024)		(0.024)		(0.028)
information_need:z_winner_percent	−0.114	−0.102				
	(0.090)	(0.091)				
information_need:any_children_attend_school			−0.051	−0.031		
			(0.289)	(0.292)		
z_school_home_distance					−0.089	−0.046
					(0.069)	(0.072)
information_need:z_school_home_distance					−0.067	−0.063
					(0.096)	(0.098)
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.019	0.004	0.018	0.003	0.020

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Effects of the Voting Information Treatment

Conditional Logit Estimates of the Voting Information Treatment (Figure 10, Table S12-S13, Figure S17, Table S37, Table 4)



pdf 2



pdf 2

Table 11: The Effect of Political Information on School Selection

	(1)	(2)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent	0.019	0.022
	(0.090)	(0.091)
Incumbent Percent	0.162***	0.143**
	(0.065)	(0.069)
Controls	No	Yes
N Maps	1161	1161
N Schools	3482	3482
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.019

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results are in SI 3.3, Table S12.

Table 12: Estimates from Main Text Figure 10 (part 1)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	0.019	0.022	−0.040	0.116
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.115)	(0.149)
Incumbent Percent	0.162***	0.143**	0.201**	0.104
	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.084)	(0.103)
Voting Treatment				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Good Types		0.357		
		(0.232)		
Aid Project Count		−0.421		
		(0.313)		
Family Attends School		0.427***		
		(0.149)		
Log Enrollment		0.125***		
		(0.044)		
Log Permanent Classrooms		−0.063		
		(0.118)		
Log Permanent Houses		0.024		
		(0.062)		
Log Teachers		0.032		
		(0.102)		
Log Temporary Classrooms		−0.099		
		(0.070)		
Log Temporary Houses		0.026		
		(0.063)		
Log Turnout		−0.242***		
		(0.088)		
Opposition Percent (LC)		−0.181		
		(0.273)		
Percent Votes (MP)		0.198		
		(0.240)		
Pop Density at School		−0.003		
		(0.003)		
School Need Index		0.106***		
		(0.024)		
Observations	3,482	3,482	2,429	1,053
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.019	0.004	0.005

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 13: Estimates from Main Text Figure 10 (part 2)

	Transparency Interactions
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent*Transparency Treatment	−0.149
	(0.211)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	0.132
	(0.184)
Incumbent Percent*Transparency Treatment	0.065
	(0.153)
Voting Treatment*Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Incumbent Percent	0.112
	(0.134)
Voting Treatment	
	(0.000)
Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Observations	3,482
Pseudo-R^2	0.004

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 14: Interactions of Voting Information Treatment with Voting Knowledge

	without controls	with controls
	(1)	(2)
Voting Treatment*Voting Knowledge*Incumbent Percent	−0.146	−0.114
	(0.321)	(0.325)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	0.056	0.052
	(0.117)	(0.118)
Voting Knowledge*Incumbent Percent	−0.073	−0.116
	(0.237)	(0.242)
Voting Treatment*Voting Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incumbent Percent	0.179**	0.168**
	(0.084)	(0.087)
Voting Treatment		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Voting Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	3,482	3,482
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.020

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 15).

Table 15: Interactions of Voting Information Treatment with Voting Knowledge

	without controls	with controls
	(1)	(2)
Voting Treatment*Voting Knowledge*Incumbent Percent	−0.146	−0.114
	(0.321)	(0.325)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	0.056	0.052
	(0.117)	(0.118)
Voting Knowledge*Incumbent Percent	−0.073	−0.116
	(0.237)	(0.242)
Voting Treatment*Voting Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incumbent Percent	0.179**	0.168**
	(0.084)	(0.087)
Voting Treatment		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Voting Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	3,482	3,482
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.020

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Voting Information Treatment (Figure S10)



pdf 2

Table 16: The Effect of Political Information, Linear Model

	All Surveys	with Controls
	(1)	(2)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent	0.006	0.008
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Incumbent Percent	0.054***	0.046**
	(0.020)	(0.020)
N Maps	1161	1161
N Schools	3482	3482
R^2	0.006	0.029

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients linear fixed effect regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 17: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Need Information Treatmen (Figure S9)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	0.006	0.008	−0.013	0.037
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.048)
Incumbent Percent	0.054***	0.046**	0.066**	0.035
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.030)
Voting Treatment				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Good Types		0.114		
		(0.075)		
Aid Project Count		−0.136		
		(0.101)		
Family Attends School		0.151***		
		(0.054)		
Log Enrollment		0.040***		
		(0.014)		
Log Permanent Classrooms		−0.021		
		(0.038)		
Log Permanent Houses		0.008		
		(0.019)		
Log Teachers		0.008		
		(0.031)		
Log Temporary Classrooms		−0.032		
		(0.024)		
Log Temporary Houses		0.008		
		(0.022)		
Log Turnout		−0.077***		
		(0.028)		
Opposition Percent (LC)		−0.057		
		(0.085)		
Percent Votes (MP)		0.067		
		(0.076)		
Pop Density at School		−0.001		
		(0.001)		
School Need Index		0.034***		
		(0.008)		
Observations	3,482	3,482	2,429	1,053
R^2	0.006	0.029	0.006	0.008

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients linear fixed effect regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 18: Estimates from Main Text Figure 9 (part 2), Linear Model

	Transparency Interactions
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent*Transparency Treatment	−0.048
	(0.066)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	0.042
	(0.056)
Incumbent Percent*Transparency Treatment	0.022
	(0.046)
Voting Treatment*Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Incumbent Percent	0.037
	(0.040)
Voting Treatment	
	(0.000)
Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Observations	3,482
R^2	0.007

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients linear fixed effect regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Heterogenous Effects of the Voting Information Treatment (Figure S6)



pdf 2

Table 19: The Effect of Voting Information, Heterogenous Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
information_votes				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
z_winner_percent	0.154	0.075	−0.116	0.174
	(0.169)	(0.221)	(0.310)	(0.178)
contest_electionYes				
	(0.000)			
genderM				
		(0.000)		
timeliving				
			(0.000)	
useful				
				(0.000)
information_votes:z_winner_percent	−0.004	0.338	−0.116	0.114
	(0.221)	(0.295)	(0.404)	(0.240)
information_votes:contest_electionYes				
	(0.000)			
z_winner_percent:contest_electionYes	0.010			
	(0.183)			
information_votes:z_winner_percent:contest_electionYes	0.029			
	(0.243)			
information_votes:genderM				
		(0.000)		
z_winner_percent:genderM		0.095		
		(0.232)		
information_votes:z_winner_percent:genderM		−0.355		
		(0.310)		
information_votes:timeliving				
			(0.000)	
z_winner_percent:timeliving			0.276	
			(0.317)	
information_votes:z_winner_percent:timeliving			0.166	
			(0.415)	
information_votes:useful				
				(0.000)
z_winner_percent:useful				−0.009
				(0.103)
information_votes:z_winner_percent:useful				−0.058
				(0.140)
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.004

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Estimates with Alternative Coding of Voting (Tables S29 and S30)

Table 20: Effect of Incumbent Votes on School Selection with Non-Linear Effects

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Incumbent Percent	−0.330	−0.685	−0.303	−0.810
	(1.215)	(1.268)	(1.470)	(2.237)
Observations	1,683	1,683	1,161	522
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.020	0.005	0.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. It is intended to assess whether there are non-linear effects of incumbent votes. Sample excludes maps with voting information. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 21).

Table 21: Effect of Incumbent Votes on School Selection with Non-Linear Effects

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Incumbent Percent	1.052	1.366	1.212	1.184
	(1.140)	(1.177)	(1.427)	(1.989)
Incumbent Percent Squared	−0.330	−0.685	−0.303	−0.810
	(1.215)	(1.268)	(1.470)	(2.237)
number_aid_categories		0.0004		
		(0.342)		
past_aid_project		0.050		
		(0.471)		
any_children_attend_school		0.255		
		(0.225)		
log_number_of_students		0.093		
		(0.061)		
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.072		
		(0.166)		
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.131		
		(0.088)		
log_number_of_teachers		0.125		
		(0.148)		
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.175*		
		(0.100)		
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		−0.017		
		(0.094)		
log_ps_total_votes		−0.051		
		(0.126)		
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.338		
		(0.405)		
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.676**		
		(0.340)		
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.005		
		(0.005)		
school_need_index		0.104***		
		(0.035)		
Observations	1,683	1,683	1,161	522
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.020	0.005	0.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. It is intended to assess whether there are non-linear effects of incumbent votes. Sample excludes maps with voting information. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 22: The Effect of Political Information with Non-Linear Voting Effects

	All Surveys	with Controls
	(1)	(2)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent	0.019	0.015
	(0.338)	(0.342)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent Squared	0.004	0.041
	(1.661)	(1.682)
Incumbent Percent	0.224	0.270
	(0.245)	(0.249)
Incumbent Percent Squared	−0.318	−0.665
	(1.213)	(1.240)
N Maps	1161	1161
N Schools	3482	3482
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.019

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. It is intended to assess whether there are non-linear effects of incumbent votes. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 23).

Table 23: The Effect of Political Information with Non-Linear Voting Effects

	All Surveys	with Controls
	(1)	(2)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent	0.019	0.015
	(0.338)	(0.342)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent Squared	0.004	0.041
	(1.661)	(1.682)
Incumbent Percent	0.224	0.270
	(0.245)	(0.249)
Incumbent Percent Squared	−0.318	−0.665
	(1.213)	(1.240)
information_votes		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
number_aid_categories		0.358
		(0.232)
past_aid_project		−0.422
		(0.314)
any_children_attend_school		0.433***
		(0.149)
log_number_of_students		0.125***
		(0.044)
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.063
		(0.118)
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.026
		(0.062)
log_number_of_teachers		0.028
		(0.102)
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.102
		(0.070)
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		0.027
		(0.063)
log_ps_total_votes		−0.246***
		(0.088)
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.211
		(0.277)
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.196
		(0.240)
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.003
		(0.003)
school_need_index		0.106***
		(0.024)
N Maps	1161	1161
N Schools	3482	3482
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.019

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. It is intended to assess whether there are non-linear effects of incumbent votes. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 24: Effect of Incumbent Votes on School Selection with Non-Linear Effects

	All Surveys	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Victory Margin	0.143**	0.136**	0.194**	0.176**	0.083
	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.102)
Victory Margin Squared		−0.018	−0.030	−0.022	−0.011
		(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.087)
Observations	1,683	1,683	1,683	1,161	522
Pseudo-R^2	0.003	0.003	0.021	0.004	0.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. It is intended to assess whether there are non-linear effects of victory margin. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 25).

Table 25: Effect of Incumbent Votes on School Selection with Non-Linear Effects

	All Surveys	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Victory Margin	0.143**	0.136**	0.194**	0.176**	0.083
	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.102)
Victory Margin Squared		−0.018	−0.030	−0.022	−0.011
		(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.087)
number_aid_categories			−0.009		
			(0.342)		
past_aid_project			0.067		
			(0.471)		
any_children_attend_school			0.268		
			(0.224)		
log_number_of_students			0.091		
			(0.061)		
log_school_classrooms_permanent			−0.062		
			(0.166)		
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent			0.129		
			(0.087)		
log_number_of_teachers			0.124		
			(0.148)		
log_school_classrooms_temporary			−0.169*		
			(0.100)		
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary			−0.015		
			(0.094)		
log_ps_total_votes			−0.059		
			(0.126)		
ps_opposition_percent_lc			0.108		
			(0.470)		
ps_opposition_percent_mp			0.858**		
			(0.363)		
pop_per_hectacre_imp			−0.005		
			(0.005)		
school_need_index			0.105***		
			(0.035)		
Observations	1,683	1,683	1,683	1,161	522
Pseudo-R^2	0.003	0.003	0.021	0.004	0.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. It is intended to assess whether there are non-linear effects of victory margin. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 26: The Effect of Political Information with Non-Linear Voting Effects

	All Surveys	All Surveys	with Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voting Treatment* Victory Margin	−0.006	0.014	0.015
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Voting Treatment* Victory Margin Squared		0.050	0.053
		(0.067)	(0.067)
Victory Margin	0.143**	0.136**	0.151**
	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.076)
Victory Margin Squared		−0.018	−0.033
		(0.050)	(0.050)
N Maps	1161	1161	1161
N Schools	3482	3482	3482
Pseudo-R^2	0.003	0.003	0.019

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. It is intended to assess whether there are non-linear effects of victory margin. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 25).

Table 27: The Effect of Political Information with Non-Linear Voting Effects

	All Surveys	All Surveys	with Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voting Treatment* Victory Margin	−0.006	0.014	0.015
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Voting Treatment* Victory Margin Squared		0.050	0.053
		(0.067)	(0.067)
Victory Margin	0.143**	0.136**	0.151**
	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.076)
Victory Margin Squared		−0.018	−0.033
		(0.050)	(0.050)
information_votes			
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
number_aid_categories			0.368
			(0.232)
past_aid_project			−0.432
			(0.313)
any_children_attend_school			0.444***
			(0.149)
log_number_of_students			0.124***
			(0.044)
log_school_classrooms_permanent			−0.063
			(0.118)
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent			0.025
			(0.062)
log_number_of_teachers			0.029
			(0.102)
log_school_classrooms_temporary			−0.098
			(0.070)
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary			0.029
			(0.063)
log_ps_total_votes			−0.243***
			(0.088)
ps_opposition_percent_lc			0.069
			(0.323)
ps_opposition_percent_mp			0.307
			(0.256)
pop_per_hectacre_imp			−0.003
			(0.003)
school_need_index			0.107***
			(0.024)
N Maps	1161	1161	1161
N Schools	3482	3482	3482
Pseudo-R^2	0.003	0.003	0.019

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. It is intended to assess whether there are non-linear effects of victory margin. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Effects of the Aid Information Treatment

Conditional Logit Estimates of the Aid Information Treatment (Figure 9, Table S10-S11, Figure S16, Table S36, Table 3)



pdf 2



pdf 2

Table 28: The Effect of Foreign Aid Information on School Selection

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count	−0.203*	−0.220**		
	(0.113)	(0.115)		
Aid Project Count	0.118	0.073		
	(0.079)	(0.083)		
Aid Treatment* Aid Good Types			−0.227*	−0.239*
			(0.120)	(0.122)
Aid Good Types			0.206***	0.165**
			(0.086)	(0.089)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
N Maps	1164	1164	1164	1164
N Schools	3492	3492	3492	3492
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.019	0.002	0.019

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. See SI 3.3, Table S10 for complete model results.

Table 29: Estimates from Main Text Figure 9 (part 1)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Alternate Coding	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	−0.203*	−0.220**		−0.372***	0.164
	(0.113)	(0.115)		(0.136)	(0.206)
Aid Project Count	0.118	0.073		0.121	0.110
	(0.079)	(0.083)		(0.094)	(0.147)
Aid Treatment*Aid Good Types			−0.227*		
			(0.120)		
Aid Good Types			0.206***		
			(0.086)		
Aid Treatment					
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Project Count		0.424***			
		(0.149)			
Family Attends School		0.723***			
		(0.234)			
Incumbent Percent		0.118***			
		(0.044)			
Log Enrollment		−0.060			
		(0.118)			
Log Permanent Classrooms		0.031			
		(0.062)			
Log Permanent Houses		0.063			
		(0.101)			
Log Teachers		−0.086			
		(0.070)			
Log Temporary Classrooms		0.029			
		(0.063)			
Log Temporary Houses		−0.227**			
		(0.084)			
Log Turnout		−0.175			
		(0.273)			
Opposition Percent (LC)		0.201			
		(0.240)			
Percent Votes (MP)		−0.003			
		(0.003)			
Pop Density at School		0.104***			
		(0.024)			
Observations	3,492	3,492	3,492	2,439	1,053
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.019	0.002	0.003	0.004

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 30: Estimates from Main Text Figure 9 (part 2)

	Transparency Interactions
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count*Transparency Treatment	−0.359
	(0.265)
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	0.072
	(0.231)
Aid Project Count*Transparency Treatment	0.141
	(0.177)
Aid Treatment*Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Aid Project Count	0.017
	(0.150)
Aid Treatment	
	(0.000)
Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Observations	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 31: Interactions of Aid Information Treatment with Aid Knowledge

	without controls	with controls
	(1)	(2)
Aid Treatment*Aid Knowledge*Aid Project Count	−0.183	−0.442
	(0.584)	(0.594)
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	−0.186	−0.180
	(0.124)	(0.126)
Aid Knowledge*Aid Project Count	0.174	0.315
	(0.409)	(0.412)
Aid Treatment*Aid Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Project Count	0.102	0.043
	(0.088)	(0.092)
Aid Treatment		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.019

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 32)

Table 32: Interactions of Aid Information Treatment with Aid Knowledge, Full Model

	without controls	with controls
	(1)	(2)
Aid Treatment*Aid Knowledge*Aid Project Count	−0.183	−0.442
	(0.584)	(0.594)
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	−0.186	−0.180
	(0.124)	(0.126)
Aid Knowledge*Aid Project Count	0.174	0.315
	(0.409)	(0.412)
Aid Treatment*Aid Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Project Count	0.102	0.043
	(0.088)	(0.092)
Aid Treatment		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Knowledge		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
any_children_attend_school		0.430***
		(0.150)
winner_percent_imp		0.724***
		(0.234)
log_number_of_students		0.118***
		(0.044)
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.062
		(0.118)
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.030
		(0.062)
log_number_of_teachers		0.066
		(0.101)
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.086
		(0.070)
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		0.030
		(0.063)
log_ps_total_votes		−0.229***
		(0.084)
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.175
		(0.273)
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.200
		(0.240)
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.003
		(0.003)
school_need_index		0.105***
		(0.024)
Observations	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.019

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Aid Information Treatment (Figure S9)



pdf 2

Table 33: The Effect of Foreign Aid Information, Linear Model

	All Surveys	with Controls	Alternate Coding
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count	−0.068*	−0.069*	
	(0.035)	(0.035)	
Aid Project Count	0.039		
	(0.024)	(0.000)	
Aid Treatment* Aid Good Types			−0.074*
			(0.038)
Aid Good Types			0.066***
			(0.024)
R^2	0.001	0.030	0.003

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients from linear regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 34: Estimates from Main Text Figure 9 (part 1), Linear Model

	All Surveys	with Controls	Alternate Coding	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	−0.068*	−0.069*		−0.124***	0.054
	(0.035)	(0.035)		(0.042)	(0.060)
Aid Project Count	0.039			0.040	0.037
	(0.024)	(0.000)		(0.028)	(0.050)
Aid Treatment*Aid Good Types			−0.074*		
			(0.038)		
Aid Good Types			0.066***		
			(0.024)		
Aid Treatment					
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Project Count		0.086**			
		(0.038)			
Family Attends School		−0.047			
		(0.043)			
Incumbent Percent		0.150***			
		(0.054)			
Log Enrollment		0.227***			
		(0.074)			
Log Permanent Classrooms		0.037**			
		(0.014)			
Log Permanent Houses		−0.019			
		(0.038)			
Log Teachers		0.009			
		(0.019)			
Log Temporary Classrooms		0.013			
		(0.031)			
Log Temporary Houses		−0.028			
		(0.024)			
Log Turnout		0.010			
		(0.021)			
Opposition Percent (LC)		−0.068**			
		(0.028)			
Percent Votes (MP)		−0.060			
		(0.085)			
Pop Density at School		0.066			
		(0.076)			
School Need Index		−0.001			
		(0.001)			
school_need_index		0.034***			
		(0.008)			
Observations	3,492	3,492	3,492	2,439	1,053
R^2	0.001	0.030	0.003	0.005	0.006

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients from linear regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 35: Estimates from Main Text Figure 9 (part 2), Linear Model

	Transparency Interactions
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count*Transparency Treatment	−0.119
	(0.079)
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	0.024
	(0.068)
Aid Project Count*Transparency Treatment	0.047
	(0.055)
Aid Treatment*Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Aid Project Count	0.006
	(0.046)
Aid Treatment	
	(0.000)
Transparency Treatment	
	(0.000)
Observations	3,492
R^2	0.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients from linear regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Heterogenous Effects of the Aid Information Treatment (Figure S5)



pdf 2

Table 36: The Effect of Aid Information, Heterogenous Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
information_aid				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
z_past_aid_project	−0.104	−0.157	−0.033	−0.117
	(0.189)	(0.267)	(0.299)	(0.230)
contest_electionYes				
	(0.000)			
genderM				
		(0.000)		
timeliving				
			(0.000)	
useful				
				(0.000)
information_aid:z_past_aid_project	−0.231	−0.339	−0.403	−0.045
	(0.272)	(0.371)	(0.461)	(0.323)
information_aid:contest_electionYes				
	(0.000)			
z_past_aid_project:contest_electionYes	0.269			
	(0.208)			
information_aid:z_past_aid_project:contest_electionYes	0.035			
	(0.299)			
information_aid:genderM				
		(0.000)		
z_past_aid_project:genderM		0.301		
		(0.279)		
information_aid:z_past_aid_project:genderM		0.158		
		(0.390)		
information_aid:timeliving				
			(0.000)	
z_past_aid_project:timeliving			0.163	
			(0.310)	
information_aid:z_past_aid_project:timeliving			0.184	
			(0.475)	
information_aid:useful				
				(0.000)
z_past_aid_project:useful				0.151
				(0.137)
information_aid:z_past_aid_project:useful				−0.097
				(0.190)
Pseudo-R^2	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Other Treatment Effect Estimates

Interactions between Treatments (Tables S31, S32, S33)

Table 37: Information Treatment Interactions with School Need Index

	(1)	(2)
School Need Index	0.037	0.037
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Need Treatment*School Need Index	0.071	0.115**
	(0.054)	(0.054)
Voting Treatment*School Need Index	−0.001	
	(0.054)	
Aid Treatment*School Need Index		−0.002
		(0.054)
Need Treatment*Voting Treatment*School Need Index	0.006	
	(0.076)	
Need Treatment*Aid Treatment*School Need Index		−0.079
		(0.076)
Observations	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.006

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 38: Information Treatment Interactions with Percent Votes

	(1)	(2)
Incumbent Percent	0.230**	0.128
	(0.092)	(0.092)
Need Treatment*Incumbent Percent	−0.136	
	(0.130)	
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	−0.001	−0.012
	(0.129)	(0.126)
Aid Treatment*Incumbent Percent		0.069
		(0.130)
Need Treatment*Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	0.042	
	(0.181)	
Voting Treatment*Aid Treatment*Incumbent Percent		0.070
		(0.181)
Observations	3,482	3,482
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.005

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 39: Information Treatment Interactions with Aid Projects

	(1)	(2)
Aid Project Count	−0.005	0.122
	(0.111)	(0.120)
Need Treatment*Aid Project Count	0.251	
	(0.160)	
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	0.151	−0.091
	(0.162)	(0.165)
Voting Treatment*Aid Project Count		−0.007
		(0.160)
Need Treatment*Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	−0.695***	
	(0.228)	
Aid Treatment*Voting Treatment*Aid Project Count		−0.223
		(0.226)
Observations	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Multiple Comparison Corrections (Figure S3, Tables S17, S18, 19)

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:02 2023

Table 40: Multiple Comparison Adjustment, School Need Information

Hypothesis	Unadjusted	BH	Bonferroni	Unadjusted with controls	BH with controls	Bonferroni with controls
H1. Politicians will be more likely to allocate to schools in areas with high need.	0.0484	0.1453	0.1453	0.0343	0.1029	0.1029
H2. Politicians will be be more likely to allocate to schools located in areas with higher support in the last election.	0.2247	0.3371	0.6741	0.3138	0.4707	0.9415
H3. Politicians will be less likely to allocate to schools located in their home community or where family members attend.	0.5241	0.5241	1.0000	0.9614	0.9614	1.0000

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:03 2023

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:03 2023

Table 41: Multiple Comparison Adjustment, Foreign Aid Information

Hypothesis	Unadjusted Aid Types	BH Aid Types	Bonferroni Aid Types	Unadjusted Aid Projects	BH Aid Projects	Bonferroni Aid Projects
H1. Politicians will be more likely to allocate to schools that have already benefitted from more past aid projects and where donors have provided more categories of goods.	0.0548	0.1096	0.2191	0.0546	0.2184	0.2184
H2. Treatment effect will be greater when politicians interact frequently with donors.	0.7903	0.7903	1.0000	0.5043	0.5043	1.0000
H3. Treatment effect will be greater where the politician did not receive a high proportion of votes.	0.0295	0.1096	0.1178	0.1630	0.3260	0.6521
H4. Treatment effect will be greater where schools are less needy.	0.2661	0.3549	1.0000	0.4279	0.5043	1.0000

Table 42: Multiple Comparison Adjustment, Political Support Information

Hypothesis	Unadjusted	BH	Bonferroni	Unadjusted with Controls	BH with Controls	Bonferroni with Controls
H1. Politicians will be more likely to allocate to schools located in areas with higher support for the politicians in the last election.	0.8320	0.9092	1.0000	0.7674	0.8180	1.0000
H2. Politicians will be less likely to allocate to schools in areas with high need	0.9092	0.9092	1.0000	0.8180	0.8180	1.0000





pdf 2

Interaction Effect Plot (Figure 11, Tables S14, S15, S16)



pdf 2

Table 43: Estimates from Main Text Figure 11 (Need Interactions)

	Distance Interactions	Density Interactions	Voting Interactions
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Need Treatment*Log Distance from Hometown*School Need Index	0.048		
	(0.047)		
Need Treatment*Incumbent Percent*School Need Index			0.022
			(0.039)
Need Treatment*Pop Density at School*School Need Index		−0.104*	
		(0.065)	
Need Treatment*School Need Index	0.057	0.073*	0.073*
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Need Treatment*Log Distance from Hometown	−0.070		
	(0.097)		
Need Treatment*Pop Density at School		−0.084	
		(0.139)	
Need Treatment*Incumbent Percent			−0.109
			(0.091)
Log Distance from Hometown*School Need Index	−0.052		
	(0.035)		
Pop Density at School*School Need Index		0.159***	
		(0.054)	
Incumbent Percent*School Need Index			−0.019
			(0.028)
Need Treatment			
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
School Need Index	0.052	0.044	0.038
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Incumbent Percent			0.230***
			(0.065)
Log Distance from Hometown	−0.093		
	(0.069)		
Pop Density at School		−0.075	
		(0.096)	
Observations	2,612	3,375	3,482
Pseudo-R^2	0.009	0.011	0.010

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 44: Estimates from Main Text Figure 11 (Aid Interactions)

	Distance Interactions	Density Interactions	Voting Interactions
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Aid Treatment*Log Distance from Hometown*Aid Project Count	0.077		
	(0.092)		
Aid Treatment*Incumbent Percent*Aid Project Count			0.110
			(0.084)
Aid Treatment*Pop Density at School*Aid Project Count		0.174	
		(0.124)	
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	-0.412^{***}	-0.232^{**}	-0.206^{*}
	(0.131)	(0.115)	(0.114)
Aid Treatment*Log Distance from Hometown	-0.120		
	(0.098)		
Aid Treatment*Pop Density at School		0.147	
		(0.128)	
Aid Treatment*Incumbent Percent			0.098
			(0.091)
Log Distance from Hometown*Aid Project Count	-0.117		
	(0.072)		
Pop Density at School*Aid Project Count		-0.053	
		(0.086)	
Incumbent Percent*Aid Project Count			0.028
			(0.058)
Aid Treatment			
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Aid Project Count	0.181^{**}	0.147^{**}	0.127^{*}
	(0.094)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Incumbent Percent			0.126^{**}
			(0.063)
Log Distance from Hometown	-0.061		
	(0.074)		
Pop Density at School		-0.094	
		(0.090)	
Observations	2,612	3,375	3,482
Pseudo-R^2	0.008	0.002	0.007

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 45: Estimates from Main Text Figure 11 (Voting Interactions)

	Distance Interactions	Density Interactions
	(1)	(2)
Voting Treatment*Log Distance from Hometown*Incumbent Percent	−0.095	
	(0.094)	
Voting Treatment*Pop Density at School*Incumbent Percent		−0.268*
		(0.161)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	0.117	0.003
	(0.109)	(0.096)
Voting Treatment*Log Distance from Hometown	0.175	
	(0.102)	
Voting Treatment*Pop Density at School		−0.173
		(0.129)
Log Distance from Hometown*Incumbent Percent	−0.019	
	(0.065)	
Pop Density at School*Incumbent Percent		0.032
		(0.121)
Voting Treatment		
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incumbent Percent	0.117*	0.175***
	(0.079)	(0.070)
Log Distance from Hometown	−0.171**	
	(0.073)	
Pop Density at School		0.010
		(0.090)
Observations	2,602	3,365
Pseudo-R^2	0.009	0.007

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Interaction of Information Treatments with Transparency Treatments (Tables S26, S27, S28)

Table 46: Interaction of Aid Information Treatment with Transparency Treatments

	Any Treatment	Donor Treatment	Radio Treatment	All Treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aid Project Count	0.017	0.130	0.076	0.017
	(0.150)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.150)
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count	0.072	−0.173	−0.099	0.072
	(0.231)	(0.155)	(0.163)	(0.231)
Aid Project Count*Transparency Treatment	0.141			
	(0.177)			
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count*Transparency Treatment	−0.359			
	(0.265)			
Aid Project Count*Donor Transparency		−0.026		0.136
		(0.159)		(0.229)
Aid Project Count*Aid Treatment*Donor Transparency		−0.060		−0.340
		(0.226)		(0.330)
Aid Project Count*Radio Transparency			0.084	0.239
			(0.159)	(0.219)
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count*Radio Transparency			−0.198	−0.460
			(0.226)	(0.316)
Aid Project Count*Radio Transparency*Donor Transparency				−0.330
				(0.320)
Aid Treatment*Aid Project Count*Radio Transparency*Donor Transparency				0.520
				(0.456)
Observations	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 47: Interaction of Aid Information Treatment with Transparency Treatments

	Any Treatment	Donor Treatment	Radio Treatment	All Treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aid Good Types	0.191	0.297**	0.140	0.191
	(0.180)	(0.125)	(0.122)	(0.180)
Aid Treatment*Aid Good Types	−0.091	−0.240	−0.127	−0.091
	(0.261)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.261)
Aid Good Types*Transparency Treatment	0.020			
	(0.205)			
Aid Treatment*Aid Good Types*Transparency Treatment	−0.172			
	(0.294)			
Aid Good Types*Donor Transparency		−0.174		−0.094
		(0.172)		(0.243)
Aid Good Types*Aid Treatment*Donor Transparency		0.017		−0.060
		(0.240)		(0.349)
Aid Good Types*Radio Transparency			0.130	0.205
			(0.172)	(0.253)
Aid Treatment*Aid Good Types*Radio Transparency			−0.193	−0.277
			(0.241)	(0.351)
Aid Good Types*Radio Transparency*Donor Transparency				−0.152
				(0.345)
Aid Treatment*Aid Good Types*Radio Transparency*Donor Transparency				0.125
				(0.485)
Observations	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 48: Interaction of Need Information Treatment with Transparency Treatments

	Any Treatment	Donor Treatment	Radio Treatment	All Treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
School Need Index	0.037	0.023	0.019	0.037
	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.055)
Need Treatment*School Need Index	0.024	0.073	0.112**	0.024
	(0.077)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.077)
School Need Index*Transparency Treatment	−0.001			
	(0.063)			
Need Treatment*School Need Index*Transparency Treatment	0.065			
	(0.089)			
School Need Index*Donor Transparency		0.026		−0.033
		(0.054)		(0.076)
School Need Index*Need Treatment*Donor Transparency		0.002		0.176
		(0.075)		(0.109)
School Need Index*Radio Transparency			0.034	−0.027
			(0.054)	(0.077)
Need Treatment*School Need Index*Radio Transparency			−0.074	0.092
			(0.076)	(0.107)
School Need Index*Radio Transparency*Donor Transparency				0.122
				(0.108)
Need Treatment*School Need Index*Radio Transparency*Donor Transparency				−0.336**
				(0.152)
Observations	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 49: Interaction of Voting Information Treatment with Transparency Treatments

	Any Treatment	Donor Treatment	Radio Treatment	All Treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Incumbent Percent	0.112	0.146*	0.206**	0.112
	(0.134)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.134)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent	0.132	0.051	0.008	0.132
	(0.184)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.184)
Incumbent Percent*Transparency Treatment	0.065			
	(0.153)			
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent*Transparency Treatment	−0.149			
	(0.211)			
Incumbent Percent*Donor Transparency		0.030		0.187
		(0.131)		(0.191)
Incumbent Percent*Voting Treatment*Donor Transparency		−0.061		−0.247
		(0.181)		(0.260)
Incumbent Percent*Radio Transparency			−0.083	0.069
			(0.131)	(0.193)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent*Radio Transparency			0.017	−0.162
			(0.182)	(0.261)
Incumbent Percent*Radio Transparency*Donor Transparency				−0.286
				(0.263)
Voting Treatment*Incumbent Percent*Radio Transparency*Donor Transparency				0.339
				(0.365)
Observations	3,482	3,482	3,482	3,482
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Politician Knowledge and Updating

Correlates of Politician Knowledge (Table S34)

Table 50: Correlates of School Knowledge

	All Questions	School Questions	Voting Questions
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log Distance from Hometown	−0.038***	−0.048***	−0.048*
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.026)
Incumbent Percent	0.001	−0.043**	0.095***
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.026)
Pop Density at School	0.003	−0.011	−0.043
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.031)
School Need Index	0.029***	0.020	0.069***
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.022)
School Enrollment	−0.012	−0.018	−0.121**
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.051)
Number of Permanent Classrooms	−0.004	−0.019	0.159***
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.049)
Poverty at School	−0.003	0.007	0.011
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Observations	940	807	492
Pseudo-R^2	0.377	0.447	0.780

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the results of a linear fixed-effect regression of school covariates on the proportion of correct answers about each school included in the post-experiment quiz. The outcome variable is the share of correct questions about each school.

Summary of Quiz Answers (Figure 3 and Figure S14)



pdf 2

Questions on the Usefulness of Information (Figures S11, S12, S13)



pdf 2



pdf 2



pdf 2

Attrition, Compliance and Bias

Attrition Statistics (Table S42, S43, S44, S45)

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:14 2023

Table 51: Summary Statistics by Survey Attrition Status

Variable	NotAttritted	Attritted	Difference
Aid Good Types	0.699 (0.668)	0.708 (0.637)	0.009 (0.155)
Aid Project Count	0.521 (0.477)	0.535 (0.45)	0.013 (0.109)
Incumbent Percent	0.492 (0.215)	0.452 (0.21)	-0.039 (0.051)
Log Enrollment	6.12 (1.544)	6.061 (1.805)	-0.059 (0.434)
Log Permanent Classrooms	1.859 (0.714)	1.899 (0.731)	0.04 (0.177)
Log Permanent Houses	1.097 (0.742)	1.196 (0.718)	0.099 (0.174)
Log Teachers	2.467 (0.545)	2.442 (0.595)	-0.025 (0.143)
Log Temporary Classrooms	0.395 (0.644)	0.254 (0.525)	-0.141 (0.129)
Log Temporary Houses	0.418 (0.662)	0.293 (0.571)	-0.126 (0.139)
Log Turnout	7.011 (0.643)	7.194 (0.581)	0.183 (0.141)
Opposition Percent (LC)	0.238 (0.156)	0.253 (0.162)	0.015 (0.039)
Percent Votes (MP)	0.253 (0.179)	0.261 (0.176)	0.008 (0.043)
Pop Density at School	9.774 (16.663)	8.045 (7.871)	-1.728 (2.066)
School Need Index	-0.015 (1.806)	-0.138 (1.835)	-0.124 (0.444)

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:14 2023

Table 52: Summary Statistics by Survey Attrition Status

Variable	NotAttritted	Attritted	Difference
Aid Good Types	0.783 (0.688)	0.607 (0.591)	-0.176 (0.097)
Aid Project Count	0.558 (0.479)	0.481 (0.43)	-0.077 (0.069)
Incumbent Percent	0.416 (0.215)	0.45 (0.225)	0.034 (0.034)
Log Enrollment	6.158 (1.475)	6.034 (1.645)	-0.125 (0.247)
Log Permanent Classrooms	1.849 (0.684)	1.846 (0.774)	-0.003 (0.116)
Log Permanent Houses	1.121 (0.727)	1.087 (0.731)	-0.034 (0.113)
Log Teachers	2.443 (0.536)	2.466 (0.586)	0.024 (0.089)
Log Temporary Classrooms	0.389 (0.638)	0.412 (0.659)	0.023 (0.101)
Log Temporary Houses	0.41 (0.646)	0.469 (0.699)	0.06 (0.106)
Log Turnout	6.981 (0.573)	7.066 (0.676)	0.085 (0.1)
Opposition Percent (LC)	0.242 (0.16)	0.235 (0.141)	-0.007 (0.023)
Percent Votes (MP)	0.263 (0.187)	0.263 (0.182)	0 (0.029)
Pop Density at School	9.565 (24.497)	12.627 (23.117)	3.062 (3.663)
School Need Index	-0.059 (1.831)	0.035 (1.876)	0.095 (0.289)

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.3 by Marek Hlavac, Social Policy Institute. E-mail: marek.hlavac at gmail.com % Date and time: Thu, Sep 14, 2023 - 06:56:14

Table 53: The Effect of Covariates on Survey Attrition

	MP Survey	Councillor Survey
	(1)	(2)
Aid Good Types	−0.488**	0.012
	(0.206)	(0.071)
Aid Project Count	0.666**	−0.011
	(0.306)	(0.102)
Incumbent Percent	0.320	−0.025
	(0.271)	(0.101)
Log Enrollment	−0.173*	−0.021
	(0.096)	(0.029)
Log Permanent Classrooms	0.294	0.027
	(0.235)	(0.074)
Log Permanent Houses	−0.123	0.041
	(0.127)	(0.041)
Log Teachers	−0.002	−0.076
	(0.178)	(0.057)
Log Temporary Classrooms	0.071	−0.028
	(0.189)	(0.057)
Log Temporary Houses	0.156	−0.029
	(0.132)	(0.044)
Log Turnout	0.108	0.085**
	(0.121)	(0.036)
Opposition Percent (LC)	−0.059	0.030
	(0.455)	(0.178)
Percent Votes (MP)	0.214	0.037
	(0.436)	(0.105)
Pop Density at School	0.0004	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.001)
School Need Index	0.085	−0.037
	(0.081)	(0.034)
Constant	−0.047	−0.295
	(0.836)	(0.247)
Observations	187	353
R^2	0.101	0.041
F Statistic	1.376 (df = 14; 172)	1.028 (df = 14; 338)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 54: Effect of treatment on attrition due to politician contesting a school location

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Need Treatment	−0.014			−0.013
	(0.013)			(0.013)
Aid Treatment		−0.010		−0.010
		(0.013)		(0.013)
Voting Treatment			−0.018	−0.017
			(0.013)	(0.013)
N Maps	1252	1252	1252	1252
Observations	1,252	1,252	1,252	1,252
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.0004	0.001	0.002
Adjusted Pseudo-R^2	−0.0001	−0.0004	0.0004	−0.00001
Residual Std. Error	0.249 (df = 1250)	0.249 (df = 1250)	0.249 (df = 1250)	0.249 (df = 1248)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the results of a linear regression. The outcome variable is one if a map is attritted due to politicians contesting map boundaries and zero if the map remains in the analysis sample. Estimates are clustered on respondent.

Tests of Desirability Bias (Tables S20, S21, S22)

Table 55: Treatment Effects Conditional on Donor Interaction and Tearfund Knowledge

	All Surveys	All Surveys	All Surveys
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.015		
	(0.037)		
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Heard of Tearfund		0.056	
		(0.077)	
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Worked with Tearfund			0.072
			(0.103)
Need Treatment* School Need Index	0.090*	0.041	0.063
	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.041)
School Need Index* Frequency of Donor Interaction	0.001		
	(0.025)		
School Need Index* Heard of Tearfund		−0.017	
		(0.055)	
School Need Index* Worked with Tearfund			−0.014
			(0.069)
School Need Index	0.033	0.046	0.039
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.030)
Observations	3,486	3,486	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.006	0.006

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 56: Treatment Effects Conditional on Donor Interaction and Tearfund Knowledge

	Councillors	Councillors	Councillors
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.042		
	(0.049)		
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Heard of Tearfund		0.057	
		(0.120)	
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Worked with Tearfund			0.090
			(0.110)
Need Treatment* School Need Index	0.126**	0.042	0.068
	(0.059)	(0.109)	(0.052)
School Need Index* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.011		
	(0.035)		
School Need Index* Heard of Tearfund		−0.104	
		(0.087)	
School Need Index* Worked with Tearfund			−0.056
			(0.074)
School Need Index	0.055	0.137*	0.066*
	(0.041)	(0.079)	(0.038)
Observations	2,433	2,433	2,439
Pseudo-R^2	0.010	0.010	0.009

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 57: Treatment Effects Conditional on Donor Interaction and Tearfund Knowledge

	MPs	MPs	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Frequency of Donor Interaction	0.047		
	(0.062)		
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Heard of Tearfund		−0.120	
		(0.262)	
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Worked with Tearfund			−0.676
			(0.567)
Need Treatment* School Need Index	−0.016	0.036	0.041
	(0.108)	(0.072)	(0.069)
School Need Index* Frequency of Donor Interaction	0.034		
	(0.042)		
School Need Index* Heard of Tearfund		−0.019	
		(0.139)	
School Need Index* Worked with Tearfund			0.663
			(0.469)
School Need Index	−0.043	0.009	−0.003
	(0.078)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Observations	1,053	1,053	1,053
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.001	0.003

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 58: Treatment Effects Conditional on Donor Interaction and Tearfund Knowledge

	All Surveys	All Surveys	All Surveys
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Frequency of Donor Interaction	0.067		
	(0.107)		
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Heard of Tearfund		−0.195	
		(0.228)	
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Worked with Tearfund			−0.107
			(0.321)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count	−0.269*	−0.103	−0.183
	(0.156)	(0.173)	(0.122)
Aid Project Count* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.068		
	(0.074)		
Aid Project Count* Heard of Tearfund		−0.081	
		(0.161)	
Aid Project Count* Worked with Tearfund			−0.134
			(0.231)
Aid Project Count	0.185*	0.165	0.136*
	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.085)
Observations	3,486	3,486	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.002	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 59: Treatment Effects Conditional on Donor Interaction and Tearfund Knowledge

	Councillors	Councillors	Councillors
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Frequency of Donor Interaction	0.022		
	(0.146)		
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Heard of Tearfund		0.261	
		(0.337)	
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Worked with Tearfund			−0.062
			(0.351)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count	−0.385**	−0.598**	−0.358**
	(0.179)	(0.300)	(0.150)
Aid Project Count* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.026		
	(0.097)		
Aid Project Count* Heard of Tearfund		−0.048	
		(0.217)	
Aid Project Count* Worked with Tearfund			−0.027
			(0.253)
Aid Project Count	0.138	0.157	0.126
	(0.127)	(0.188)	(0.103)
Observations	2,433	2,433	2,439
Pseudo-R^2	0.003	0.004	0.003

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 60: Treatment Effects Conditional on Donor Interaction and Tearfund Knowledge

	MPs	MPs	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.035		
	(0.179)		
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Heard of Tearfund		0.152	
		(0.655)	
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Worked with Tearfund			0.573
			(0.967)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count	0.215	0.119	0.130
	(0.339)	(0.221)	(0.212)
Aid Project Count* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.150		
	(0.127)		
Aid Project Count* Heard of Tearfund		−0.349	
		(0.387)	
Aid Project Count* Worked with Tearfund			−0.861
			(0.703)
Aid Project Count	0.331	0.171	0.158
	(0.240)	(0.162)	(0.151)
Observations	1,053	1,053	1,053
Pseudo-R^2	0.007	0.005	0.006

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 61: Treatment Effects Conditional on Donor Interaction and Tearfund Knowledge

	All Surveys	All Surveys	All Surveys
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.005		
	(0.089)		
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Heard of Tearfund		−0.248	
		(0.183)	
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Worked with Tearfund			−0.230
			(0.241)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent	0.018	0.165	0.059
	(0.128)	(0.138)	(0.100)
Incumbent Percent* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.050		
	(0.064)		
Incumbent Percent* Heard of Tearfund		0.073	
		(0.131)	
Incumbent Percent* Worked with Tearfund			0.165
			(0.176)
Incumbent Percent	0.215**	0.121	0.134**
	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.071)
Observations	3,476	3,476	3,482
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.005	0.005

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 62: Treatment Effects Conditional on Donor Interaction and Tearfund Knowledge

	Councillors	Councillors	Councillors
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Frequency of Donor Interaction	0.070		
	(0.123)		
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Heard of Tearfund		−0.039	
		(0.316)	
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Worked with Tearfund			−0.237
			(0.269)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent	−0.098	−0.010	0.019
	(0.152)	(0.291)	(0.132)
Incumbent Percent* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.072		
	(0.091)		
Incumbent Percent* Heard of Tearfund		−0.150	
		(0.246)	
Incumbent Percent* Worked with Tearfund			0.177
			(0.197)
Incumbent Percent	0.260**	0.331	0.156*
	(0.113)	(0.229)	(0.097)
Observations	2,423	2,423	2,429
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.005	0.005

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 63: Treatment Effects Conditional on Donor Interaction and Tearfund Knowledge

	MPs	MPs	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.153		
	(0.141)		
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Heard of Tearfund		−0.711*	
		(0.462)	
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Worked with Tearfund			0.110
			(0.693)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent	0.308	0.200	0.111
	(0.242)	(0.159)	(0.152)
Incumbent Percent* Frequency of Donor Interaction	−0.002		
	(0.099)		
Incumbent Percent* Heard of Tearfund		0.258	
		(0.312)	
Incumbent Percent* Worked with Tearfund			−0.101
			(0.515)
Incumbent Percent	0.107	0.072	0.108
	(0.174)	(0.110)	(0.105)
Observations	1,053	1,053	1,053
Pseudo-R^2	0.007	0.007	0.005

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Treatment Compliance Tests (Figures S23, S24, S25)

Table 64: Treatment Effects by Compliance

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Misunderstood Maps (Q1.22)	−0.316		
	(0.339)		
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Requested Other School (Q1.71)		−0.279	
		(0.733)	
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count* Requested Other Goods (Q1.73)			0.002
			(0.758)
Aid Treatment* Aid Project Count	−0.181	−0.216*	−0.219*
	(0.126)	(0.118)	(0.118)
Aid Project Count* Misunderstood Maps (Q1.22)	0.059		
	(0.227)		
Aid Project Count* Requested Other School (Q1.71)		−0.019	
		(0.514)	
Aid Project Count* Requested Other Goods (Q1.73)			0.507
			(0.497)
Aid Project Count	−0.151	−0.148	−0.150
	(0.132)	(0.129)	(0.130)
Observations	3,492	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.021	0.020	0.021

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 65: Treatment Effects by Compliance

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Misunderstood Maps (Q1.22)	−0.170		
	(0.121)		
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Requested Other School (Q1.71)		−0.018	
		(0.252)	
Need Treatment* School Need Index* Requested Other Goods (Q1.73)			−0.157
			(0.216)
Need Treatment* School Need Index	0.104**	0.082**	0.088**
	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.040)
School Need Index* Misunderstood Maps (Q1.22)	0.244***		
	(0.088)		
School Need Index* Requested Other School (Q1.71)		−0.066	
		(0.163)	
School Need Index* Requested Other Goods (Q1.73)			0.126
			(0.155)
School Need Index	0.032	0.065**	0.058*
	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Observations	3,492	3,492	3,492
Pseudo-R^2	0.023	0.021	0.021

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 66: Treatment Effects by Compliance

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Misunderstood Maps (Q1.22)	−0.190		
	(0.304)		
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Requested Other School (Q1.71)		0.013	
		(0.519)	
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent* Requested Other Goods (Q1.73)			−0.483
			(0.551)
Voting Treatment* Incumbent Percent	0.044	0.032	0.041
	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Incumbent Percent* Misunderstood Maps (Q1.22)	−0.048		
	(0.209)		
Incumbent Percent* Requested Other School (Q1.71)		−0.423	
		(0.402)	
Incumbent Percent* Requested Other Goods (Q1.73)			0.221
			(0.402)
Incumbent Percent	6.315	7.886	6.243
	(16.380)	(16.327)	(16.325)
Observations	3,482	3,482	3,482
Pseudo-R^2	0.020	0.021	0.020

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Politician Visits (Figure 2, Table S1)

Error in chol.default(mat, pivot = TRUE, tol = tol) : 'a' must have dims > 0 Error in chol.default(mat, pivot = TRUE, tol = tol) : 'a' must have dims > 0 Error in chol.default(mat, pivot = TRUE, tol = tol) : 'a' must have dims > 0 Error in chol.default(mat, pivot = TRUE, tol = tol) : 'a' must have dims > 0

Table 67: Estimates from Main Text Figure 2

	Linear Effect	0-25 perc.	25-50 perc.	50-75 perc.	75-100 perc.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log Distance from Hometown	−0.095***				
	(0.022)				
Intercept	0.513***	0.414***	0.272***	0.250***	0.212***
	(0.058)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.029)
Observations	1,864	495	453	511	405
R^2	0.027	−0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Error in chol.default(mat, pivot = TRUE, tol = tol) : 'a' must have dims > 0 Error in chol.default(mat, pivot = TRUE, tol = tol) : 'a' must have dims > 0 Error in chol.default(mat, pivot = TRUE, tol = tol) : 'a' must have dims > 0 Error in chol.default(mat, pivot = TRUE, tol = tol) : 'a' must have dims > 0 pdf 2


0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Share of citizens visited by the incumbent
0−25%
25−50%
50−75%
75−100%
Distance from incumbent's hometown
(percentile)

Politician Learning (Figure 1)



pdf 2

Head Teacher Prioritization of School Needs (Figure S19)



pdf 2

Power Analysis (Figures S1 and S2)



Number of politicians=460;
Number of maps=1380;
Number of simulations=300



Number of politicians=460;
Number of maps=1380;
Number of simulations=100;
assumed b3=0.09

Summary Statistics

Number of Maps Receiving Different Combinations of Transparency and Information Treatments (Table S47)

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:24 2023

	Control	Donor Audit	Radio	Radio + Donor Audit	Sum
Aid	34	33	37	44	148
Control	37	33	33	35	138
Political Support (PS)	32	44	43	40	159
PS + Aid	29	41	38	31	139
PS + SN	44	34	33	37	148
PS + SN + Aid	25	44	47	42	158
School Need (SN)	33	36	39	33	141
SN + Aid	34	40	35	29	138
Sum	268	305	305	291	1169

Local Councillor Sample Statistics (Table S38)

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:25 2023

Table 68: Local Councillor Sample Statistics

Variable	In_Sample	Out_of_Sample	Difference
Mean School Enrollment	938.859 (411.212)	1566.974 (964.155)	-628.115 (152.893)
Mean Number of Teachers	13.26 (5.631)	20.948 (12.028)	-7.688 (1.937)
Mean Student to Teacher Ratio	72.946 (18.749)	77.365 (26.933)	-4.42 (4.787)
Number of Aid Projects	11.03 (10.836)	4.681 (7.567)	6.349 (1.928)
Number of Schools	12.94 (6.226)	6.447 (5.295)	6.493 (1.192)
Turnout	0.699 (0.086)	0.678 (0.129)	0.021 (0.023)
Incumbent Victory Margin	0.259 (0.193)	0.172 (0.148)	0.088 (0.035)
Registered Voters	18090.91 (7642.809)	15736.553 (14056.628)	2354.357 (2333.846)
Incumbent Percent	0.49 (0.143)	0.436 (0.12)	0.054 (0.027)
DPP Incumbent	0.334 (0.471)	0.468 (0.504)	-0.134 (0.101)
UDF Incumbent	0.036 (0.186)	0.021 (0.146)	0.015 (0.034)
MCP Incumbent	0.232 (0.422)	0.234 (0.428)	-0.002 (0.088)
PP Incumbent	0.104 (0.306)	0.043 (0.204)	0.062 (0.054)
Independent Incumbent	0.069 (0.253)	0.064 (0.247)	0.005 (0.052)
Average School Population Density	11.356 (15.838)	39.7 (63.663)	-28.344 (9.569)

MP Sample Statistics (Table S39)

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:25 2023

Table 69: MP Sample Statistics

Variable	In_Sample	Out_of_Sample	Difference
Mean School Enrollment	938.859 (411.212)	1566.974 (964.155)	-45.519 (69.649)
Mean Number of Teachers	13.26 (5.631)	20.948 (12.028)	-0.894 (0.897)
Mean Student to Teacher Ratio	72.946 (18.749)	77.365 (26.933)	3.813 (3.123)
Number of Aid Projects	11.03 (10.836)	4.681 (7.567)	6.085 (3.344)
Number of Schools	12.94 (6.226)	6.447 (5.295)	0.068 (2.144)

Turnout	0.699 (0.086)	0.678 (0.129)	-2345.005 (2137.803)
Incumbent Victory Margin	0.259 (0.193)	0.172 (0.148)	-0.04 (0.028)
Registered Voters	18090.91 (7642.809)	15736.553 (14056.628)	NA (NA)
Incumbent Percent	0.49 (0.143)	0.436 (0.12)	-0.035 (0.022)
DPP Incumbent	0.334 (0.471)	0.468 (0.504)	-0.162 (0.073)
UDF Incumbent	0.036 (0.186)	0.021 (0.146)	0.022 (0.021)
MCP Incumbent	0.232 (0.422)	0.234 (0.428)	0.087 (0.064)
PP Incumbent	0.104 (0.306)	0.043 (0.204)	0.006 (0.043)
Independent Incumbent	0.069 (0.253)	0.064 (0.247)	-0.095 (0.039)
Average School Population Density	11.356 (15.838)	39.7 (63.663)	-2.222 (2.63)

Variable Summary Statistics (Figures S40-S41)

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:26 2023

Table 70: Summary Statistics, MPs

Variable	Mean	SD	Details
Log Population	11.257	0.392	Log Constituency/Ward Population (WorldPop)
Log Area	10.698	0.727	Log Constituency/Ward Area in Square Km (WorldPop)
Log Enrollment	6.163	1.475	Log Number of Students in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
Log Teachers	2.448	0.537	Log Number of Teachers in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
ChildrenAttend=Yes	0.592	0.492	Whether incumbent's or family members' children attend school in the constituency=Yes (survey)
ChildrenAttend=No	0.399	0.49	Whether incumbent's or family members' children attend school in the constituency=No (survey)
ChildrenAttend=Don't Know	0.008	0.092	Whether incumbent's or family members' children attend school in the constituency=Don't Know (survey)
Incumbent's Children Attends School	0.003	0.053	Whether incumbent's children attends this school (survey)
Incumbent's Relatives Attend School	0.027	0.163	Whether incumbent's family members' children attends this school (survey)
Family Attends School	0.028	0.166	Whether incumbent's children or family members' children attends this school (survey)
Incumbent Understood Maps	0.887	0.317	Whether incumbent correctly indicated a response in a test map (survey)
Log Temporary Classrooms	0.389	0.637	Log Number of Temporary Classrooms in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
Log Permanent Classrooms	1.857	0.678	Log Number of Permanent Classrooms in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
Log Temporary Houses	0.406	0.647	Log Number of Temporary Teacher Houses in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
Log Permanent Houses	1.124	0.727	Log Number of Permanent Teacher Houses in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)

Choice=Dictionary	0.329	0.47	Allocation decision on this map was about dictionaries (survey)
Choice=Teacher Bags	0.326	0.469	Allocation decision on this map was about teacher bags (survey)
Choice=Solar Lamps	0.346	0.476	Allocation decision on this map was about solar lamps (survey)
Opposition Votes (LC)	301.308	271.395	Votes at Polling Station for Leading Opposition Candidate in Councillor Election (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Opposition Percent (LC)	0.242	0.16	Percent Votes at Polling Station for Leading Opposition Candidate in Councillor Election (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Opposition Votes (MP)	322.779	304.401	Votes at Polling Station for Leading Opposition Candidate in MP Election (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Percent Votes (MP)	0.262	0.187	Percent Votes at Polling Station for Leading Opposition Candidate in MP Election (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Victory Margin (MP)	0.154	0.344	Victory Margin at Polling Station for incumbent MP (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Pop Density at School	9.755	26.318	Population per hectare (World Pop Project)
Pop Density at School	9.731	25.028	Population per hectare (World Pop Project)
Poverty at School	0.631	0.156	Proportion of Area in Poverty (World Pop Project)
Poverty at School	0.631	0.156	Proportion of Area in Poverty (World Pop Project)
Turnout	1261.678	748.263	Turnout at Polling Station
Log Turnout	6.984	0.572	Log Votes at Polling Station
Gender	0.884	0.321	Gender of respondent, male=1 and female=0 (survey)
Education Plan=Yes	0.875	0.33	Incumbent's council has an education plan=Yes (survey)
Education Plan=No	0.116	0.321	Incumbent's council has an education plan=No (survey)
Education Plan=Don't Know	0	0	Incumbent's council has an education plan=Don't Know (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Chewa	0	0	Incumbent is from Chewa tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Lomwe	0	0	Incumbent is from Lomwe tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Ngoni	0	0	Incumbent is from Ngoni tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Other	1	0	Incumbent is from Other tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Sena	0	0	Incumbent is from Sena tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Tumbuka	0	0	Incumbent is from Tumbuka tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Yao	0	0	Incumbent is from Yao tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Chewa	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Chewa tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Lomwe	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Lomwe tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Ngoni	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Ngoni tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Other	1	0	Constituency is predominately from Other tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Sena	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Sena tribe (survey)

ConstituencyTribe=Tumbuka	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Tumbuka tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Yao	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Yao tribe (survey)
Contest=Yes	0.864	0.343	Plan to contest election=Yes (survey)
Contest=No	0.025	0.158	Plan to contest election=No (survey)
Contest=Don't Know	0	0	Plan to contest election=Don't Know (survey)
Contest=Undecided	0.11	0.314	Plan to contest election=Undecided (survey)
Opposition Percent Votes in Ward	0.236	0.073	Percent votes for leading opposition candidate in ward (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Opposition Votes in Constituency	0.148	0.149	Percent votes for leading opposition candidate in constituency (Malawi Electoral Commission)
HighestEd=Certificate	0.11	0.314	Incumbent's highest education level=Certificate (survey)
HighestEd=Degree	0.272	0.445	Incumbent's highest education level=Degree (survey)
HighestEd=Diploma	0.354	0.478	Incumbent's highest education level=Diploma (survey)
HighestEd=PhD	0.045	0.208	Incumbent's highest education level=PhD (survey)
HighestEd=Primary	0	0	Incumbent's highest education level=Primary (survey)
HighestEd=Secondary	0.093	0.291	Incumbent's highest education level=Secondary (survey)
Income1	0.042	0.202	Incumbent household income 100,000-200,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income2	0.102	0.303	Incumbent household income 200,000-400,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income3	0.292	0.455	Incumbent household income 400,000-1,000,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income4	0.479	0.5	Incumbent household income 1,000,000-5,000,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income5	0.068	0.252	Over 5,000,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income6	0.008	0.092	Under 100,000 kwacha/month (survey)
IncomeDeclined	0.008	0.092	Incumbent declined to declare income (survey)
LengthResidence1	0.014	0.118	Incumbent resided in constituency less than 5 years (survey)
LengthResidence2	0.034	0.181	Incumbent resided in constituency 5-10 years (survey)
LengthResidence3	0.181	0.385	Incumbent resided in constituency more than 10 years (survey)
LengthResidence4	0.754	0.431	Incumbent resided in constituency all their life (survey)
Length of Residence	2.703	0.604	0-3 index of how long incumbent resided in constituency (<5 yrs, 5-10 yrs, >10yrs or entire life) (survey)
LengthResidenceDontKnow	0	0	Incumbent doesn't know how long s/he resided in constituency (survey)

VoteAFORD	0.008	0.092	Incumbent would vote for AFORD party (survey)
VoteDPP	0.249	0.433	Incumbent would vote for DPP party (survey)
VoteIndependent	0.045	0.208	Incumbent would vote for Independent party (survey)
VoteMCP	0.292	0.455	Incumbent would vote for MCP party (survey)
VoteDeclined	0.19	0.392	Incumbent declined to declare party vote (survey)
VotePP	0.099	0.299	Incumbent would vote for PP party (survey)
VoteUDF	0.116	0.321	Incumbent would vote for UDF party (survey)
Pop Density	0.558	0.798	Average number of persons per grid cell in ward/constituency (WorldPop)
Incumbent Percent	0.418	0.215	Percent votes at polling station for incumbent (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Incumbent Votes	525.091	405.09	Votes at polling station for incumbent (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Aid Treatment	0.49	0.5	Equals one if a map was assigned the aid information treatment and zero otherwise
Need Treatment	0.484	0.5	Equals one if a map was assigned the school need information treatment and zero otherwise
Voting Treatment	0.504	0.5	Equals one if a map was assigned the percent votes information treatment and zero otherwise
Need Knowledge	0.449	0.255	Average score in school knowledge questions (survey)
Voting Knowledge	0.244	0.304	Average score in political knowledge questions (survey)
Aid Knowledge	0.128	0.229	Average score in donor knowledge questions (survey)
Aid Good Types	-0.002	1	A count of the number of types of aid projects delivered by donors at this school (donors)
Information Usefulness	1.75	0.561	A 0 to 2 scale indicating how useful the information was to the respondent (survey)
Learning from Experiment	0.474	0.5	Whether the respondent indicated that they learned something from the experimental interaction (survey)
Frequency of Donor Interaction	1.346	1.152	A 0 to five scale indicating how frequently incumbents interact with donors (survey)
Student to Teacher Ratio	75.044	33.824	Number of students per teacher in a school (Ministry of Education EMIS Statistics)
Student to Classroom Ratio	126.952	158.201	Number of students per class in a school (Ministry of Education EMIS Statistics)
Temporary Classroom Ratio	0.475	0.969	Number of temporary to permanent classrooms in a school (Ministry of Education EMIS Statistics)
School Need Index (ward)	-0.077	1.78	Index of school need within the ward (Ministry of Education)

School Need Index (constituency)	-0.056	1.826	Index of school need within the constituency (Ministry of Education)
School Need Index	-0.056	1.826	Index of school need within the constituency or ward (Ministry of Education)
Aid Project Count	-0.007	0.993	Number of aid projects at school (various donors)
Test Question Classes	0.479	0.5	Whether the respondent could correctly identify a school with the least number of permanent classes
Test Question Votes	0.377	0.485	Whether the respondent could correctly identify a school with the least percentage of votes for the incumbent
Test Question Enrollment	0.618	0.486	Whether the respondent could correctly identify a school with the highest number of students
Test Question Projects	0.238	0.426	Whether the respondent could correctly identify a school with the most donor projects
Test Question Enrollment Specific	0.252	0.434	Whether the respondent could correctly identify the range of enrollment at a chosen school
Test Question Votes Specific	0.11	0.314	Whether the respondent could correctly identify the range of percent votes at a chosen school
Test Question Aid Projects Specific	0.018	0.12	Whether the respondent could correctly identify one or more donors with projects on a map
Radio Transparency	0.518	0.5	Treatment telling incumbent that decisions would be broadcast on radio
Donor Transparency	0.533	0.499	Treatment telling incumbent that decisions would be shared with donors
Transparency Treatment	0.799	0.401	Either transparency treatment
Incumbent Percent	0.418	0.215	Percent votes at polling station for incumbent (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Log Distance from Hometown	2.751	0.814	Log distance in km (+1) from incumbent's self-reported hometown
Heard of Tearfund	0.125	0.33	Equals one if the incumbent has heard of Tearfund and zero otherwise (survey)
Worked with Tearfund	0.051	0.22	Equals one if the incumbent has worked with Tearfund and zero otherwise (survey)
Victory Margin	0.156	0.345	Victory Margin at Polling Station for incumbent (Malawi Electoral Commission)

% latex table generated in R 4.2.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Thu Sep 14 06:56:28 2023

Table 71: Summary Statistics, MPs

Variable	Mean	SD	Details
Log Population	10.521	0.462	Log Constituency/Ward Population (WorldPop)
Log Area	9.91	0.884	Log Constituency/Ward Area in Square Km (WorldPop)

Log Enrollment	6.104	1.548	Log Number of Students in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
Log Teachers	2.46	0.545	Log Number of Teachers in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
ChildrenAttend=Yes	0.795	0.404	Whether incumbent's or family members' children attend school in the constituency=Yes (survey)
ChildrenAttend=No	0.205	0.404	Whether incumbent's or family members' children attend school in the constituency=No (survey)
ChildrenAttend=Don't Know	0	0	Whether incumbent's or family members' children attend school in the constituency=Don't Know (survey)
Incumbent's Children Attends School	0.043	0.204	Whether incumbent's children attends this school (survey)
Incumbent's Relatives Attend School	0.059	0.236	Whether incumbent's family members' children attends this school (survey)
Family Attends School	0.078	0.268	Whether incumbent's children or family members' children attends this school (survey)
Incumbent Understood Maps	0.858	0.349	Whether incumbent correctly indicated a response in a test map (survey)
Log Temporary Classrooms	0.396	0.645	Log Number of Temporary Classrooms in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
Log Permanent Classrooms	1.855	0.712	Log Number of Permanent Classrooms in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
Log Temporary Houses	0.42	0.665	Log Number of Temporary Teacher Houses in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
Log Permanent Houses	1.096	0.739	Log Number of Permanent Teacher Houses in School +1 (Malawi Dept of Education)
Choice=Dictionary	0.324	0.468	Allocation decision on this map was about dictionaries (survey)
Choice=Teacher Bags	0.333	0.472	Allocation decision on this map was about teacher bags (survey)
Choice=Solar Lamps	0.343	0.475	Allocation decision on this map was about solar lamps (survey)
Opposition Votes (LC)	315.08	294.439	Votes at Polling Station for Leading Opposition Candidate in Councillor Election (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Opposition Percent (LC)	0.239	0.157	Percent Votes at Polling Station for Leading Opposition Candidate in Councillor Election (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Opposition Votes (MP)	341.167	352.331	Votes at Polling Station for Leading Opposition Candidate in MP Election (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Percent Votes (MP)	0.252	0.179	Percent Votes at Polling Station for Leading Opposition Candidate in MP Election (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Victory Margin (MP)	0.179	0.335	Victory Margin at Polling Station for incumbent MP (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Pop Density at School	9.679	16.634	Population per hectare (World Pop Project)
Pop Density at School	9.666	16.598	Population per hectare (World Pop Project)

Poverty at School	0.616	0.164	Proportion of Area in Poverty (World Pop Project)
Poverty at School	0.616	0.164	Proportion of Area in Poverty (World Pop Project)
Turnout	1347.38	945.126	Turnout at Polling Station
Log Turnout	7.007	0.647	Log Votes at Polling Station
Gender	0.902	0.297	Gender of respondent, male=1 and female=0 (survey)
Education Plan=Yes	0.67	0.47	Incumbent's council has an education plan=Yes (survey)
Education Plan=No	0.322	0.467	Incumbent's council has an education plan=No (survey)
Education Plan=Don't Know	0	0	Incumbent's council has an education plan=Don't Know (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Chewa	0	0	Incumbent is from Chewa tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Lomwe	0	0	Incumbent is from Lomwe tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Ngoni	0	0	Incumbent is from Ngoni tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Other	1	0	Incumbent is from Other tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Sena	0	0	Incumbent is from Sena tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Tumbuka	0	0	Incumbent is from Tumbuka tribe (survey)
IncumbentTribe=Yao	0	0	Incumbent is from Yao tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Chewa	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Chewa tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Lomwe	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Lomwe tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Ngoni	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Ngoni tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Other	1	0	Constituency is predominately from Other tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Sena	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Sena tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Tumbuka	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Tumbuka tribe (survey)
ConstituencyTribe=Yao	0	0	Constituency is predominately from Yao tribe (survey)
Contest=Yes	0.766	0.424	Plan to contest election=Yes (survey)
Contest=No	0.034	0.182	Plan to contest election=No (survey)
Contest=Don't Know	0	0	Plan to contest election=Don't Know (survey)
Contest=Undecided	0.2	0.4	Plan to contest election=Undecided (survey)
Opposition Percent Votes in Ward	0.23	0.073	Percent votes for leading opposition candidate in ward (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Opposition Votes in Constituency	0.165	0.165	Percent votes for leading opposition candidate in constituency (Malawi Electoral Commission)
HighestEd=Certificate	0.317	0.466	Incumbent's highest education level=Certificate (survey)
HighestEd=Degree	0.025	0.155	Incumbent's highest education level=Degree (survey)
HighestEd=Diploma	0.096	0.294	Incumbent's highest education level=Diploma (survey)

HighestEd=PhD	0	0	Incumbent's highest education level=PhD (survey)
HighestEd=Primary	0.013	0.115	Incumbent's highest education level=Primary (survey)
HighestEd=Secondary	0.549	0.498	Incumbent's highest education level=Secondary (survey)
Income1	0.362	0.481	Incumbent household income 100,000-200,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income2	0.304	0.46	Incumbent household income 200,000-400,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income3	0.119	0.324	Incumbent household income 400,000-1,000,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income4	0.018	0.134	Incumbent household income 1,000,000-5,000,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income5	0	0	Over 5,000,000 kwacha/month (survey)
Income6	0.197	0.398	Under 100,000 kwacha/month (survey)
IncomeDeclined	0	0	Incumbent declined to declare income (survey)
LengthResidence1	0.005	0.07	Incumbent resided in constituency less than 5 years (survey)
LengthResidence2	0.031	0.172	Incumbent resided in constituency 5-10 years (survey)
LengthResidence3	0.214	0.411	Incumbent resided in constituency more than 10 years (survey)
LengthResidence4	0.738	0.44	Incumbent resided in constituency all their life (survey)
Length of Residence	2.706	0.547	0-3 index of how long incumbent resided in constituency (<5 yrs, 5-10 yrs, >10yrs or entire life) (survey)
LengthResidenceDontKnow	0	0	Incumbent doesn't know how long s/he resided in constituency (survey)
VoteAFORD	0	0	Incumbent would vote for AFORD party (survey)
VoteDPP	0.38	0.485	Incumbent would vote for DPP party (survey)
VoteIndependent	0.004	0.061	Incumbent would vote for Independent party (survey)
VoteMCP	0.333	0.472	Incumbent would vote for MCP party (survey)
VoteDeclined	0.147	0.354	Incumbent declined to declare party vote (survey)
VotePP	0.048	0.213	Incumbent would vote for PP party (survey)
VoteUDF	0.088	0.284	Incumbent would vote for UDF party (survey)
Pop Density	0.611	0.901	Average number of persons per grid cell in ward/constituency (WorldPop)
Incumbent Percent	0.488	0.216	Percent votes at polling station for incumbent (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Incumbent Votes	657.79	555.811	Votes at polling station for incumbent (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Aid Treatment	0.502	0.5	Equals one if a map was assigned the aid information treatment and zero otherwise

Need Treatment	0.507	0.5	Equals one if a map was assigned the school need information treatment and zero otherwise
Voting Treatment	0.522	0.5	Equals one if a map was assigned the percent votes information treatment and zero otherwise
Need Knowledge	0.475	0.306	Average score in school knowledge questions (survey)
Voting Knowledge	0.241	0.295	Average score in political knowledge questions (survey)
Aid Knowledge	0.122	0.222	Average score in donor knowledge questions (survey)
Aid Good Types	-0.007	1	A count of the number of types of aid projects delivered by donors at this school (donors)
Information Usefulness	1.552	0.676	A 0 to 2 scale indicating how useful the information was to the respondent (survey)
Learning from Experiment	0.271	0.444	Whether the respondent indicated that they learned something from the experimental interaction (survey)
Frequency of Donor Interaction	0.771	0.97	A 0 to five scale indicating how frequently incumbents interact with donors (survey)
Student to Teacher Ratio	72.719	33.563	Number of students per teacher in a school (Ministry of Education EMIS Statistics)
Student to Classroom Ratio	135.787	262.25	Number of students per class in a school (Ministry of Education EMIS Statistics)
Temporary Classroom Ratio	0.492	0.913	Number of temporary to permanent classrooms in a school (Ministry of Education EMIS Statistics)
School Need Index (ward)	-0.014	1.805	Index of school need within the ward (Ministry of Education)
School Need Index (constituency)	-0.013	1.88	Index of school need within the constituency (Ministry of Education)
School Need Index	-0.014	1.805	Index of school need within the constituency or ward (Ministry of Education)
Aid Project Count	-0.006	1.002	Number of aid projects at school (various donors)
Test Question Classes	0.51	0.5	Whether the respondent could correctly identify a school with the least number of permanent classes
Test Question Votes	0.31	0.463	Whether the respondent could correctly identify a school with the least percentage of votes for the incumbent
Test Question Enrollment	0.613	0.487	Whether the respondent could correctly identify a school with the highest number of students
Test Question Projects	0.213	0.41	Whether the respondent could correctly identify a school with the most donor projects
Test Question Enrollment Specific	0.304	0.46	Whether the respondent could correctly identify the range of enrollment at a chosen school

Test Question Votes Specific	0.173	0.378	Whether the respondent could correctly identify the range of percent votes at a chosen school
Test Question Aid Projects Specific	0.031	0.166	Whether the respondent could correctly identify one or more donors with projects on a map
Radio Transparency	0.506	0.5	Treatment telling incumbent that decisions would be broadcast on radio
Donor Transparency	0.5	0.5	Treatment telling incumbent that decisions would be shared with donors
Transparency Treatment	0.759	0.428	Either transparency treatment
Incumbent Percent	0.488	0.217	Percent votes at polling station for incumbent (Malawi Electoral Commission)
Log Distance from Hometown	2.366	0.848	Log distance in km (+1) from incumbent's self-reported hometown
Heard of Tearfund	0.801	0.399	Equals one if the incumbent has heard of Tearfund and zero otherwise (survey)
Worked with Tearfund	0.229	0.42	Equals one if the incumbent has worked with Tearfund and zero otherwise (survey)
Victory Margin	0.249	0.327	Victory Margin at Polling Station for incumbent (Malawi Electoral Commission)

Correlation Matrix (Figure S18)



pdf 2

Statistics for CONSORT Diagram (Figure 6)

```
all.surveys.byresp=all.surveys.fullsample[!duplicated(all.surveys.fullsample$resp_id),]
all.surveys.bymap=all.surveys.fullsample[!duplicated(all.surveys.fullsample$map_id),]

#number of politicians
nrow(all.surveys.byresp)
```

```
## [1] 460
```

```
#transparency treatments
xtabs(~all.surveys.byresp$transparency_radio+all.surveys.byresp$transparency_donor)
```

```
##                                      all.surveys.byresp$transparency_donor
## all.surveys.byresp$transparency_radio   0   1
##                                     0 108 120
##                                     1 117 115
```

```
#number of maps
nrow(all.surveys.bymap)
```

```
## [1] 1252
```

```
#number of maps excluded
xtabs(~all.surveys.bymap$mapwithwrongschool)
```

```
## all.surveys.bymap$mapwithwrongschool
##    0    1
## 1169   83
```

```
#information treatments
xtabs(~all.surveys.bymap$information_aid + all.surveys.bymap$information_votes + all.surveys.bymap$infor
```

```
## , , all.surveys.bymap$information_need = 0
##
##                                    all.surveys.bymap$information_votes
## all.surveys.bymap$information_aid   0   1
##                                   0 152 165
##                                   1 162 151
##
## , , all.surveys.bymap$information_need = 1
##
##                                    all.surveys.bymap$information_votes
## all.surveys.bymap$information_aid   0   1
##                                   0 150 164
##                                   1 147 161
```

Association between School Characteristics and School Selection (Figure 7, Tables S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, and S7)

Table 72: Estimates from Figure 7 (School Need Index)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
School Need Index	0.066	0.107	0.091	0.011
	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.087)
Observations	1,743	1,743	1,197	546
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.021	0.002	0.00003

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 73).

Table 73: Estimates from Figure 7 (School Need Index) with controls

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
School Need Index	0.066	0.107	0.091	0.011
	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.087)
number_aid_categories		0.474***		
		(0.178)		
past_aid_project		−0.326**		
		(0.170)		
any_children_attend_school		0.460**		
		(0.209)		
winner_percent_imp		0.934***		
		(0.339)		
log_number_of_students		0.062		
		(0.062)		
log_school_classrooms_permanent		0.060		
		(0.163)		
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		−0.082		
		(0.087)		
log_number_of_teachers		−0.110		
		(0.146)		
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.038		
		(0.099)		
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		0.121		
		(0.088)		
log_ps_total_votes		−0.190		
		(0.128)		
ps_opposition_percent_lc		0.129		
		(0.386)		
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.028		
		(0.352)		
pop_per_hectacre_imp		0.00002		
		(0.003)		
Observations	1,743	1,743	1,197	546
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.021	0.002	0.00003

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 74: Estimates from Figure 7 (School Need Index*Distance)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
School Need Index*Log Distance from Hometown	−0.095	−0.095	−0.133**	0.057
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.146)
School Need Index	0.094	0.094	0.116*	0.034
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.069)	(0.118)
Log Distance from Hometown	−0.092	−0.092	−0.053	−0.179
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.081)	(0.133)
Observations	1,287	1,287	926	361
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.006

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 75).

Table 75: Estimates from Figure 7 (School Need Index*Distance) with controls

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
School Need Index*Log Distance from Hometown	−0.095	−0.095	−0.133**	0.057
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.146)
School Need Index	0.094	0.094	0.116*	0.034
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.069)	(0.118)
Log Distance from Hometown	−0.092	−0.092	−0.053	−0.179
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.081)	(0.133)
Observations	1,287	1,287	926	361
Pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.006

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 76: Estimates from Figure 7 (Incumbent Votes)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Incumbent Percent	0.162***	0.162**	0.201**	0.104
	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.103)
Observations	1,683	1,683	1,161	522
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.020	0.005	0.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 77).

Table 77: Estimates from Figure 7 (Incumbent Votes) with controls

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Incumbent Percent	0.162***	0.162**	0.201**	0.104
	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.103)
number_aid_categories		0.030		
		(0.176)		
past_aid_project		−0.014		
		(0.170)		
any_children_attend_school		0.250		
		(0.225)		
log_number_of_students		0.094		
		(0.061)		
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.070		
		(0.166)		
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.127		
		(0.087)		
log_number_of_teachers		0.134		
		(0.148)		
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.172*		
		(0.100)		
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		−0.018		
		(0.094)		
log_ps_total_votes		−0.051		
		(0.126)		
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.302		
		(0.398)		
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.678**		
		(0.340)		
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.004		
		(0.005)		
school_need_index		0.104***		
		(0.035)		
Observations	1,683	1,683	1,161	522
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.020	0.005	0.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 78: Estimates from Figure 7 (Family Attends School)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Family Attends School	0.537***	0.428***	0.550***	0.458
	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.156)	(0.384)
Observations	3,492	3,492	2,439	1,053
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.019	0.005	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 79).

Table 79: Estimates from Figure 7 (Family Attends School) with controls

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Family Attends School	0.537***	0.428***	0.550***	0.458
	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.156)	(0.384)
number_aid_categories		0.275**		
		(0.122)		
past_aid_project		−0.257**		
		(0.117)		
winner_percent_imp		0.692***		
		(0.234)		
log_number_of_students		0.117**		
		(0.044)		
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.058		
		(0.118)		
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.023		
		(0.062)		
log_number_of_teachers		0.047		
		(0.101)		
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.091		
		(0.070)		
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		0.033		
		(0.063)		
log_ps_total_votes		−0.208**		
		(0.084)		
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.194		
		(0.273)		
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.185		
		(0.239)		
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.003		
		(0.003)		
school_need_index		0.105***		
		(0.024)		
Observations	3,492	3,492	2,439	1,053
Pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.019	0.005	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 80: Estimates from Figure 7 (Aid Project Count)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aid Project Count	0.118	−0.215	0.121	0.110
	(0.079)	(0.164)	(0.094)	(0.147)
Observations	1,752	1,752	1,218	534
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.025	0.001	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 81).

Table 81: Estimates from Figure 7 (Aid Project Count) with controls

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aid Project Count	0.118	−0.215	0.121	0.110
	(0.079)	(0.164)	(0.094)	(0.147)
number_aid_categories		0.350**		
		(0.172)		
any_children_attend_school		0.402*		
		(0.221)		
winner_percent_imp		0.480		
		(0.332)		
log_number_of_students		0.056		
		(0.060)		
log_school_classrooms_permanent		0.102		
		(0.159)		
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.044		
		(0.089)		
log_number_of_teachers		0.076		
		(0.146)		
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.063		
		(0.099)		
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		−0.029		
		(0.092)		
log_ps_total_votes		−0.414***		
		(0.127)		
ps_opposition_percent_lc		0.127		
		(0.400)		
ps_opposition_percent_mp		−0.173		
		(0.347)		
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.004		
		(0.004)		
school_need_index		0.148***		
		(0.034)		
Observations	1,752	1,752	1,218	534
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.025	0.001	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 82: Estimates from Figure 7 (Population Density)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pop Density at School	−0.030	0.105	−0.006	−0.095
	(0.049)	(0.296)	(0.059)	(0.120)
Observations	3,375	3,375	2,427	948
Pseudo-R^2	0.0001	0.021	0.00000	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 83).

Table 83: Estimates from Figure 7 (Population Density) with controls

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pop Density at School	−0.030	0.105	−0.006	−0.095
	(0.049)	(0.296)	(0.059)	(0.120)
number_aid_categories		0.293**		
		(0.125)		
past_aid_project		−0.258**		
		(0.119)		
any_children_attend_school		0.438***		
		(0.152)		
winner_percent_imp		0.803***		
		(0.243)		
log_number_of_students		0.130***		
		(0.045)		
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.105		
		(0.122)		
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		0.046		
		(0.063)		
log_number_of_teachers		0.063		
		(0.103)		
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.113		
		(0.072)		
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		0.037		
		(0.065)		
log_ps_total_votes		−0.198**		
		(0.086)		
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.145		
		(0.276)		
ps_opposition_percent_mp		0.203		
		(0.248)		
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.009		
		(0.016)		
school_need_index		0.104***		
		(0.025)		
Observations	3,375	3,375	2,427	948
Pseudo-R^2	0.0001	0.021	0.00000	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.

Table 84: Estimates from Figure 7 (Distance)

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log Distance from Hometown	−0.123**	−0.078	−0.112*	−0.147
	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.088)
Observations	2,612	2,612	1,916	696
Pseudo-R^2	0.002	0.021	0.002	0.004

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician. Full model results can be found on the APSR dataverse 'Replication Notes and Output.pdf' file at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S (Table 85).

Table 85: Estimates from Figure 7 (Distance) with controls

	All Surveys	with Controls	Councillors	MPs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log Distance from Hometown	−0.123**	−0.078	−0.112*	−0.147
	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.088)
number_aid_categories		0.344**		
		(0.140)		
past_aid_project		−0.315**		
		(0.133)		
any_children_attend_school		0.420**		
		(0.174)		
winner_percent_imp		0.568**		
		(0.274)		
log_number_of_students		0.114**		
		(0.051)		
log_school_classrooms_permanent		−0.096		
		(0.138)		
log_school_teacher_houses_permanent		−0.040		
		(0.071)		
log_number_of_teachers		0.022		
		(0.119)		
log_school_classrooms_temporary		−0.162*		
		(0.080)		
log_school_teacher_houses_temporary		0.020		
		(0.073)		
log_ps_total_votes		−0.185*		
		(0.097)		
ps_opposition_percent_lc		−0.223		
		(0.311)		
ps_opposition_percent_mp		−0.059		
		(0.280)		
pop_per_hectacre_imp		−0.004		
		(0.004)		
school_need_index		0.110***		
		(0.028)		
Observations	2,612	2,612	1,916	696
Pseudo-R^2	0.002	0.021	0.002	0.004

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the coefficients (in log odds) from conditional logit regressions on school selection. Standard errors are clustered on politician.


School Need Index
School Need Index
Far from Hometown
School Need Index
Near to Hometown
Incumbent Percent
Family Attends School
Aid Project Count
Pop Density at School
Log Distance from Hometown
MPs
LCs
All
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Marginal Effect
(Change in Odds of School Selection)

pdf 2


School Need Index
School Need Index
Far from Hometown
School Need Index
Near to Hometown
Incumbent Percent
Family Attends School
Aid Project Count
Pop Density at School
Log Distance from Hometown
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Marginal Effect
(Change in Odds of School Selection)

pdf 2