Online Appendix for *External Threat and Human Rights: How International Conflict Leads to Domestic Repression*

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This document comprises the online appendix for the journal article *External Threat and Human Rights: How International Conflict Leads to Domestic Repression*. Please email me at the above address if you have any questions.

1 Alternative Dependent Variables

Readers may wonder if the general findings presented in the main manuscript hold when using alternative dependent variables measuring governmental respect for human rights. First, I provide summary statistics for all of these alternative dependent variables in Table 1 discussed below. I have recreated the main models using Fariss' latent measure of physical integrity rights (higher values indicate better respect for human rights). I also drew on the Political Terror Scale's measure of physical integrity rights relying on US State Department reports with Amnesty International report values supplementing missing values in the State Department variable as needed (the State Department variable contains fewer missing values to begin with).

In addition, I recreated the main models using ordinal measures of human rights from V-Dem as best possible but there are several deviations. First, the V-Dem data provides ordinal measures of only a few physical integrity rights violations: torture and political killings. The current publicly available data divides ordinal measures of discussion (speech) and domestic movement by gender for men and women. I include results for both genders in this appendix.

When looking at Figure 1 with Fariss' latent mean as the DV, we see the *Threat Index* is negative and statistically significant in a time-series regression with fixed effects ($p < .001$) and when random effects and a lagged dependent variable are used ($p = .009$). The inclusion of the lagged DV in the second model suppresses the explanatory value and magnitude of the coefficients of the independent variables, which is unsurprising because they are all correlated with past values of respect for human rights. For example, the *Threat Index* is correlated with the lagged value of the latent measure of human rights at $r = -.32$.

Turning to the PTS model in Figure 2, the scale of the odds ratio plot is distorted by the massive confidence intervals associated with *Civil War*, but the *Threat Index* is still positive and significant, suggesting that it is associated with higher odds of an observation falling into the top value of the PTS scale (5). This is consistent with expectations as the PTS scale rates more repressive states with higher numerical values.

Next, the V-Dem models show in Figures 3 and 4 that the *Threat Index* is negatively associated with freedom from *Torture*, freedom from *Political Killings*, and freedom of *Foreign Movement*. The *Threat Index* approaches statistical significance in the model looking at freedom of *Domestic Movement* for men ($p = .06$). However, the main independent variable is not significant in models looking at freedom of *Domestic Movement* for women and *Freedom of Discussion*.

2 Alternate Configurations of the Empirical Model

In addition to the main model presented in the manuscript, I have estimated a series of empirical models that include independent variables that proxy civilian behavior during conflict to challenge government repression. In the main model I include a measure of civil war. Citizens have other options beyond rebellion as well of course–the public could choose a non-violent approach. In particular the public might choose to publicly protest the government's behavior. To examine this possibility, I included a measure from Banks' *Time Series Cross-National Dataset* that counts the number of public anti-government demonstrations with over 100 participants in a country in each year as a control variable in the baseline model. The results are available in the appendix to this memo in Figures 5-7. These results show that accounting for at least this form of peaceful anti-government behavior does not alter the findings.

I also considered and modeled another peaceful approach that the public may take in this situation–appealing to international civil society in an attempt to build social pressure on their home government. To model this I included a measure on the count of shaming events emanating from international civil society that target a government in a specific year from Murdie and Davis' 2012 article on how shaming and human rights NGOs can affect governmental respect for human rights (“"Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs”) into the empirical model as a robustness test. Is it important to note that this measure does not directly capture the concept of interest (strategic appeals made by the public to civil society) but I believe it is a reasonable proxy. It is also worth noting that this events data is only available for the time period after 1991.

The results (Figures 8-10) regarding the main independent variable are largely the same with *Shaming* included with two exceptions; the *The Threat Index* is no longer significant in the models looking at freedom from torture and freedom of association. The next question is whether these results are due to accurately modeling the behavior of other key actors in this process or the result of the constrained time period under analysis in the *Shaming* model. To examine this I re-ran the baseline model without *Shaming* looking only at data from years 1992-2000. The results in Figure 11 tell us that the *Threat Index* is not a significant predictor of government torture from 1992-2000 whether the *Shaming* indicator is included or not (i.e. we just need more data to see the relationship between conflict and torture). The freedom of association model tells us that the main IV *is* significant when shaming is excluded. This suggests that the results do change in one model as a result of modeling the intervention of civil society, which I theorize could be the result of action by the public in response to wartime repression. Overall though, this is a very minor change in both the actual freedom of association model (the main IV is still significant at the $p < .10$ level).

3 Disaggregating the Threat Index

As demonstrated here no one component of the main independent variable drive the results. Instead these three elements of the index work in conjunction to produce the overall results reported in the main manuscript. To illustrate this, I disaggregated the index into its three components (I took the

natural log of each standardized measure as I do with the final index measure) and examined their effect in a series of models. The results of this analysis is depicted in Figures 12-18 in the appendix to this memo. There are a few cases where an individual component is not significant but the main measure is in the manuscript (all three components in the Association model; *Probability of Losing* in the Disappearances and Torture models; the *Distance* component in the Disappearances and Torture models) but overall the results are statistically and substantively similar to the picture illustrated in the main manuscript. I believe the results are fairly comparable across models for two reasons. First, in a large-n empirical analysis of all states, these three indicators basically highlight a small but similar subsets of states (the ones involved in a lot of threatening conflict). Second, all of these variables have been normalized and then log-transformed. This transformation means they, by definition, share a mean and standard deviation, and it increases the likelihood that they demonstrate similar ranges.

4 Tables and Figures

4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Dependent Variables

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Dependent Variables

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Fariss Latent Mean	.07	1.28	-2.84	4.34
Political Terror Scale (State)	2.45	1.18	1	5
V-Dem Torture	2.00	1.32	0	4
V-Dem Political Killings	2.43	1.40	4	0
V-Dem Domestic Movement (Men)	3.44	.88	4	0
V-Dem Domestic Movement (Women)	3.24	1.03	4	0
V-Dem Foreign Movement	3.04	1.15	4	0
V-Dem Freedom of Discussion (Men)	2.34	1.36	4	0
V-Dem Freedom of Discussion (Women)	2.47	1.30	4	0

4.2 Model Results Using Various Alternative Dependent Variables

Figure 1: Model results for international conflict and repression using Fariss' Latent Measure



Figure 2: Model results for international conflict and repression using Political Terror Scale



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 3: Model results for international conflict and repression using V-Dem Data



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 4: Model results for international conflict and repression using V-Dem Data, cont.



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

4.3 Model Results Using Different Control Variables

Figure 5: Model results with demonstration count included



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 6: Model results with demonstrations cont.



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 7: Model results with demonstrations cont.



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 8: Model results with shaming count included



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 9: Model results with shaming count cont.



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 10: Model results with shaming count cont.



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 11: Model results, baseline model, 1992-2000



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4.4 Model Results w/ Index Elements Disaggregated

Figure 12: Disaggregated results w/ tangible costs component



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Figure 13: Disaggregated results w/ tangible costs component cont.



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 14: Disaggregated results w/ distance component



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 15: Disaggregated results w/ distance component



Note: Results from time-series ordinal logistic regression represented via odds ratio. Each estimate is the effect of a one-unit increase on the odds of an observation falling into the highest category of respect for each human rights dependent variable. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Lagged dependent variable indicators are suppressed to conserve space.

Figure 16: Disaggregated results w/ distance component cont.



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Figure 17: Disaggregated results w/ probability of loss component



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Figure 18: Disaggregated results w/ probability of loss component cont.



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