The Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project (VICDP) Codebook[1]

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Introduction

The Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project (VICDP) is primarily motivated by the lack of events data for intranational conflict and cooperation. In the field of International Relations, several event data projects exist: Dimensionality of Nations (DON), Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB) World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS), SHERFACS, and Behavioral Correlates of War, among others. In recent years, the Protocol for Assessing Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) project (Bond et al. 1996) and Intranational Political Interactions (IPI) projects (Leeds et al., 1995) were begun to help fill the void.[2] VICDP--which was created in 1992--is a precursor to the IPI project. As such, VICDP is a completed project--additional efforts to generate these data will be conducted using the IPI coding scheme. Nevertheless, VICDP generated data for six cases--Colombia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe--covering the years 1955-1991.

The Need for Events Data

While the conflict literature has a relatively well developed research programme with respect to "attributes" types of theories *and* empirical tests, we have an impoverished literature that examines intranational conflict as a process and uses time-series data to test those ideas[3]. One of the primary reasons that the tests have not been performed is simply that the data do not exist. Until we remedy this situation, it will be near impossible to advance our theoretical understanding by the means of hypothesis testing.

To argue that we lack sufficient data to test process theories of conflict is not equivalent to stating that we lack data that can be used to study intranational conflict. We do, of course, have such data. However, those data are only useful with respect to testing the hypotheses derived from the extant literature on attributes as causes. Scholars familiar with the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (Taylor & Jodice, 1983) might object that this data set provides precisely the type of data needed to estimate equations 1 and 2 (i.e., events data that identify actors and targets). Thus, it is useful to examine closely the *Handbook* data. The relevant data set is the "Daily Political Events Data" file which codes several classifications of conflict relevant events: there are four types of demonstrations, six types of armed attacks, two types of strikes, seven types of leadership changes, five types of elections, nine types of state action with respect to civil liberties, and finally the number of riots and the number of deaths from domestic political violence. While this is an impressive collection of variables, only a limited number of events are coded, thus limiting the utility of that data for the study of both the behavior and the interaction of parties to intranational conflicts. For example, the *Handbook* ignores statements, speeches and petitions. Clearly, these events are relevant to the study of intranational conflict (i.e., the opposition makes demands against the state, the state denounces the opposition, etc.). If we are interested in modelling conflict processes, and testing those models, then we need data that accounts for the full spectrum of relevant events.

In addition to the type of event, the *Handbook* codes the actor, the target and the issue that motivated the event, as well as other information. While the inclusion of this information makes it clear that Taylor & Jodice wanted to make their data useful for testing hypotheses regarding the behavior of actors and their interactions, their choice of actor and target designations leads one to believe that they were envisioning cross-national studies rather than time-series case studies. For example, there are eight "actor

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[2] The URL (i.e., WWW address) for IPI is:
http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~whmoore/ipi/ipi.html

[3] Though, for an exception, see Allan & Stahel (1983).

groups" variables: government, political party, political group, military, clergy, intellectuals, workers, students, minorities, revolutionaries, and general population. While these categories are useful for broad comparisons across many cases, they are less useful for the analysis of specific countries (e.g., in many countries there are several political parties pursuing very different policies, but the *Handbook* coding scheme lumps them together in one group).[4] A better approach would be to specify the actors by assigning unique codes--this would not preclude aggregation into categories such as political parties, students, etc. for cross-national studies, but would also enable scholars interested in time-series case studies to use the data.[5] Finally, the *Handbook* data are not well suited for time-series case studies because of the brief temporal domain (though one might employ a pooled time-series design): most of the variables noted above were added to the 3rd edition of the handbook, and thus only cover the period 1968-82.

I should note that the *Handbook* is not the only source for events data on intranational conflicts. Two other sources are available. The first is a set of studies done in the 1960s: The Political Events Project, 1948-65 (Feierabend, Feierabend & Nesvold), Domestic Conflict Behavior, 1919-66 (Banks), Civil Strife Events, 1955-70 (Gurr), Contentious Gatherings in Britain, 1758-1834 (Horn & Tilly), and Violent Events in France, 1830-60 and 1930-60 (Tilly & Zambrano).[6] Like the *Handbook*, these collections aggregate the actors by groups and do not always specify a target, thus limiting their utility. The second source is the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) project (Azar nd), which includes data on conflict and cooperation between as well as within nation states. Unfortunately, the utility of the domestic COPDAB data is limited by the fact that it is aggregated at the national level: one cannot distinguish among actors. As such, one has a summary indicator of the cooperation and conflict in a given nation state, but cannot determine the extent to which the state or opposition groups are instigating the violence. It is precisely this ability that is needed. To remedy this situation and catalogue conflictual and cooperative events within nation states, one need only mirror the COPDAB data collection effort at the international level, using the domestic actors as the unit of analysis. That is, models for collecting these data already exist: the events data sets used in the study of international relations can be used as a starting point for generating useful data at the national level.

This codebook is organized in the following way. First we discuss the scale used, second we discuss scale weights (blank), third and fourth we discuss the sources used and the coding procedures utilized in the data collection. We conclude the codebook with some descriptive statistics form the data set.

The VICDP Event Scale

The COPDAB data-set utilizes a fifteen point cooperation-conflict scale for determining degree of cooperation and conflict. While the COPDAB scale cannot be used to code events data for intranational

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[4] The categories for target are rather confusing. They are: (1) Missing, (2) Support of the state and its policies, (3) Protest against another group, (4) Overthrow of the government, (5) control of the insurgents, and (6) other. More importantly, the variable is in practice--in the Zimbabwe case--useless. Of the 843 events coded between the fourth quarter of 1957 and the fourth quarter of 1979 (the temporal domain used in the analysis reported below), 673 (80%) are coded as "missing " on the target variable. Similarly, 492 (58%) of the events are coded as missing with respect to the initiating actor.

[5] As part of the Data Development in International Relations project directed by Zinnes and Merritt, Gurr and his colleagues at Maryland have developed a standardized coding scheme for sub-national actors.

[6] For brief descriptions of these data sets, see the ICPSR's *Guide to Resource and Services, 1991-1992*, pp. 63-67.

cooperation and conflict, it can be used as a model from which to create such a scale. To do so, the lead author began with the two endpoints (the most cooperative and most conflictual types of events), and worked toward the middle (neutral events). While he was not committed to retaining the fifteen point scale, it turned out to be a useful number of types of events. The scale of event types, along with a brief description of each, is reproduced in Table 1.

Obviously, the most cooperative type of event is an agreement to terminate the conflict and cooperate. In creating the cooperative endpoint, we make use of Burton's (1990:3) distinction between resolution and settlement :

> We thus make a distinction between *resolution*, that is, treatment of the problems that are the sources of conflict, and the suppression or *settlement* of conflict by coercive means, or by bargaining and negotiation in which relative power determines the outcome. (emphasis original)

Given that distinction, we defined the most cooperative event type as an agreement that not only terminates the conflict (in many cases, an internal war), but also eliminates the underlying causes of the conflict (in Burton's language, addresses the human needs of each of the parties). While this category does not manifest itself frequently (if ever), it is theoretically possible, and thus important to include.

The next most cooperative event type is a settlement where institutional mechanisms are established to prevent the conflict from manifesting itself in future violence. This is followed by a third type of termination: one in which no institutional mechanisms are put in place to manage competing claims, but rather, the status quo is re-enforced. In the former, institutions such as elections, blocking rules in a legislature, etc. are put in place to guarantee the rights of minorities, etc. When such guarantees are missing from a settlement, then while the current form for waging the conflict (e.g., internal war) will be terminated by an agreement, the underlying conflict remains unaddressed. This type of termination is likely to be the outcome when one side is victorious (e.g., the post-WW II civil war in Greece), or a third party imposes a "peace" but fails to establish institutions to address the conflict (e.g., Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956).

Prior to reaching an agreement, parties to conflicts engage in negotiations. We maintain that statements of support (whether of one's adversary or one's adversary's position) are a more cooperative type of event than negotiations themselves, which may or may not produce positive statements regarding one's opponent(s). Further, prior to negotiating, the parties must agree to sit down together at the table. Given that such agreements often break down, we included this as a separate category as it is a significant cooperative gesture, but less significant than actually negotiating or making positive statements. The least cooperative event on the scale are "talks about talks" or meetings short of negotiations. These kinds of meetings are often held secretly, though their occurrence is often "leaked" to the press by factions within the parties trying to discredit the leadership or having some other motive. Between the cooperative and conflictual sides of the scale, we followed COPDAB and included a neutral category that simply records statements and events that are non-committal with respect to one's adversary(s) or their positions.

On the conflictual end of the scale, regularly engaging in acts of internal war is the most conflictual type of event possible. The emphasis on "regular" adds a subjective element to the typology, but it enables us to distinguish isolated or sporadic acts of internal war from the former category. This is useful for the same reason it is useful to distinguish nuclear war from conventional war or, to make a more direct analogy, to distinguish a total mobilization from a limited mobilization: these pairs are qualitatively distinct (i.e., a threshold exists over which one must cross that indicates a stronger commitment to defeating one's adversary via violent means). The distinction between small scale military acts and limited war acts is based on the target of the activity, not the means employed: the latter represent violence against human beings whereas the former represent violence against property.

The next two categories--political-military and diplomatic-economic hostile actions--are also

distinguished from one another on the basis of target . Political-military actions are targeted at agents of the state or state policies regarding political rights (when carried out by the opposition) or targeted at restricting the political/military rights of the populace (or sub-groupings of the populace). Diplomatic-economic actions by the opposition are targeted at the economy or the state's diplomatic status in the international community. Diplomatic-economic actions by the state, on the other hand, are directed against the economic rights of (sectors of) the population.

The final two categories are both verbal expressions. They are distinguished by the intensity of the condemnation. These kinds of distinctions are a part of normal political discourse and, it is assumed, are not controversial. While making such a distinction requires the coder to exercise judgment when coding negative statements, a series of examples can be created to facilitate intercoder reliability. For our purposes, the distinction used is whether or not threats are a part of the verbal statement. If threats are included we have coded it as a strong verbal statement, if not, a mild one.

This list of events is certainly not a complete list of conflictual events that takes place in an intranational conflict. During the process of coding, new types of events, particularly conflict events, caught our attention. We then used the original scale and our judgement to determine to what degree certain events were conflictual or cooperative. Some examples of such events are kidnapping, placing of government or guerrilla forces, and civil disobedience movements. These events are included in the description of events in table 1.

The actor coding sheets are different for each of the cases, although we have standardized the actor codes in the cases where similar groups are active in different cases (i.e. students). The actor sheets are based on Gurr's Minorities at Risk scheme (Lee 1993). However, since he only coded major ethnic groups, we have made large additions to the actor lists. The designation of actor codes was an ongoing process by the coders. Any individual or group that appeared as an actor or a target in a specific case were given an actor code. Furthermore, due to the fact that some reports in the *TNYTI* and the *New York Times* do not adequately specify the actors/targets of events, we have included generic codes such as, unspecified guerilla group, left/right wing political opposition, media, peasants etc. We have included all actors that appear to have been related to political intranational conflict or cooperation.

One of the most important questions we had to deal with in collecting the data was what events to code and not to code. We exclusively coded actions take between the state and non state actors. Thus conflicts between legally sanctioned political parties[7] has not been coded unless those political parties utilize extralegal tactics (i.e., a political party that becomes outlawed will become an actor as their legal status as a state institution is removed).

Furthermore, we exclusively focused on intranational interactions. We assume that other existing data sets have picked up any international interaction taking place regarding the conflict at hand. However, if a foreign actor interacts directly with a non-government group in the case at hand that state becomes coded as an actor in the intranational conflict. It should be noted that this type of interaction does not fit the coding scale well and is very problematic, particularly on the cooperative end of the scale.

A more practical case of non coding is the distinction between events reported and editorial comments in our sources. Any event referred to in editorial comments has not been coded. A copy of our "Events Not To Code" sheet can be found in table 2.

The VICDP Weights

A popular use of events data requires that one aggregate the individual events over time and then calculate a summary score of the cooperative and/or conflictual behavior sent between actors. To aggregate events

[7] That is, parties that have not been banned by the government.

data in such a fashion, one must create a weighting scheme. In a study using VICDP data (Moore 1995), the first author simply proposed the weighting scheme in table 3. However, following Goldstein (1991) we also conducted a survey of several scholars who work in the intranational conflict area.

The judges were mailed a list of events (see table 4) and given the following instructions:

Instructions for Generating Intensity Weights

```
You will find two envelopes, one marked COOPERATIVE EVENTS,
the other marked CONFLICTUAL EVENTS.  Each envelope contains
strips of paper with fictionalized `news accounts' of events
(there are 14 cooperative and 21 conflictual events).   The
events are assumed to be taking place in the context of a
conflict between a nation state's government and a group that
challenges the government's authority to rule and policies.

I would like you to scale the two sets of events separately,
beginning with the conflictual events.  Imagine an 11 point
scale ranging from 0 to 10 where zero is a neutral event and
10 is the most conflictual/cooperative event in which an actor
could engage (or, in some cases, situation which could
obtain).  Please arrange the strips into eleven piles
(assuming that you assign at least one event to each point on
the scale--note that this is NOT necessary).  The sheet of
paper with lines marking off spaces 0-10 should facilitate the
process.  After assigning each of the events to a point on the
scale, please compare the events assigned a value of 2 with
those assigned a value of 4.  If you find that those with a
value of 4 are not `twice as conflictual' as those you
assigned a 2, please adjust the events accordingly.  Please
repeat this comparison across the events assigned 3 and 4, 4
and 8 and 5 and 10.  Please record the score assigned to each
event on the Results Sheet.

Finally, please repeat this process for the fourteen events in
the COOPERATIVE EVENTS envelope.

Please use the self addressed stamped envelope to return the
Results Sheet (please recycle/discard the other items).  Thank
you.
```

Fourteen judges returned the weights. The results are reported in table 5.

A shortcoming in my procedure made itself clear when we examined the weight scores: like Goldstein (1991) we should have asked people to have weighted the descriptions of event types in table 1. The reason is that--in several cases--there were dramatic differences between high and low scores on an event. We suspect that this was probably driven by the fact that we created generic event descriptions--in an effort to eliminate any differences across judges based on familiarity with a case--rather than using event descriptions from actual news reports. In hindsight we suspect that doing so allowed the judges to anchor the generic event in a specific case with which they were familiar. Discussion with a non-scientific sample of the judges suggests that this was the case.

The Sources

The primary source for our data is *The New York Times Index (TNYTI)*. As mentioned above the index has been used for event counts in COPDAB, however, it is not a complete source (Brockett, 1992:169-170)).

To make up for the shortcomings in the reporting in the *TNYTI* we have complemented the data with secondary and tertiary sources for each case. These sources are found in table 6. By complementing the *TNYTI* data with sources specialized in the specific areas under study we have controlled for some of the biases included in the . The sources used for each case have been picked based on the assumption that these sources have less variation in their focus due to the centrality of the problem in each of the cases.

Coding Procedures

In coding the five cases we began by coding the *TNYTI* for each case from 1948-1991. The coding was done by the graduate assistant of the project and several hired undergraduate students with an interest in and basic understanding of the field of intranational conflict. Most of these students were recruited from the lead authors classes dealing with the subject. (I have included this since the question of the ability of the coders will certainly become an issue in regard to the data set).

The coders received instruction on the coding procedure from both authors. Then, weekly meetings were held with the second author to clarify any questions and issues that came up during the coding procedure. At these weekly sessions questions about actors to include and exclude, events to include and exclude and what codes to give certain events were addressed. Those meetings were followed by a weekly meeting between the two authors. A copy of the coding sheet is reproduced in table 7.

The Cases

The cases chosen for this project are: Colombia, Peru, Lebanon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. In addition, an undergraduate student coded the Philippines case as part of an independent study (the other coders--also undergraduates--were paid). These cases were selected to give the project geographic, cultural and historical diversity. The first author is primarily interested in conflicts in the so-called Third World, and the cases within each region were selected more or less at random.

Neither the Philippines nor Lebanon data are being distributed unless specifically requested. The reason is that we have less confidence in the reliability of these data. In the Lebanese case, the project attracted a number of students who coded for a few weeks and then quit. As a consequence, the data were coded by a variety of coders. In the Philippines case, the coder did not attend the weekly meetings because the coding was done after the other coding had been completed (i.e., there were no meetings to attend while he was coding).

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Standardized Actor/Target Codes

State

00	National (i.e., Federal)
70	Military
71	Regional/State Government
72	City/Village Government
73	Para-Military Troops
74	Police
75-79	Other Sub-national government actors

Ethnic Populations

1-8	Use Gurr's Minorities at Risk; Does not include political parties that represent these groups.
9	General Population

Dissident Organizations

10	Unspecified Guerrillas (includes terrorists, leftist guerrillas, etc.)
11-29	Others

Social Actors

30	Media
31	Students
32	Government Workers
33	Unspecified Laborers
34	Educators
35	Peasants
36	Roman Catholic Church (local, not Vatican)
37	Other Christian Churches/Organizations
38	Buddhist Monks
39	Muslim Clerics
40-49	Others

Political Parties

50	Communists
51	Leftists (unspecified)
52	Rightests (unspecified)
53-69	Other Political Parties

Sub-State Actors

70	Armed Forces
71	Local/Municipal Government
72	Other Paramilitary Forces

Organized Crime

80	Drug Traffickers
81-89	Other

Unused

90-98	Unassigned

Missing

99	Missing/Need More information

Actor/Target Codes for Colombia

00 Government
- 00 Belisario Bentancur Cuartas Presidency (make sure not coded outside of term)
- 00 Vigilio Barco Vergas Presidency (make sure not coded outside of term)
- 00 Valencia Presidency {Conservative Party} 8/8/62--
- 00 Misael Pastrana Borrera Presidency (make sure not coded outside of term)
- 00 Turbay Ayala Presidency (make sure not coded outside of term)
- 00 Alfonso Lopez Michelsen Presidency (make sure not coded outside of term)
- 00 Cesar Gaviria Trujillo Presidency (make sure not coded outside of term)
- 00 Lleras Presidency

01 Blacks
02 Native Highlanders
03 Native Lowlanders
04 Protestants
09 Public

10 Unspecified Guerrillas
- 10 Marxist Guerrillas
- 10 Unspecified Terrorists

11 ELN; National Liberation Army (a.k.a. Leftist Guerrillas; 1965--; see FECODE)
- 11 Military Nucleus of the National Liberation Army (ELN)
- 11 Rev. Torres

12 FARC; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; April 1966--; see Patriotic Union Party)
- 12 Leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces (see FARC)
- 12 Marxist Armed Revolutionary Forces

13 M-19; April 19th Movement (Movimento 19 de Abril; linked with ANAPO; Jan 1974--)

14 EPL; People's (Popular) Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación; Jan 1968--; Maoist)
- 14 PLA; Pedro León Arboleda Brigade (Brigada Pedro León Arboleda; wing of EPL; 1980--)

15 MAS; Death to kidnappers (Muerte a Secuestradores; death squad, 1981-)

16 Ricardo Franco Commando--Souther Front (Commando Ricardo Franco--Frente Sur; former M-19 guerrillas who broke away from M-19 in 1984; linked to 17)

17 Ricardo Franco Front (Frente Ricardo Franco; former FARC guerrillas who broke away from FARC in 1984; linked to 16)

18 MAO; Workers' Self-Defence Movement (Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera; 1978-84)
- 18 September 14 Commando (Comando 14 de Septiembre; wing of MAO)

19 Unspecified Opponents of the State
20 Right Wing Military Group

30 Media
31 Students
31 Student Maoists
32 Government Workers
33 Unspecified Laborers/Union
34 Educators
35 Peasants
36 Roman Catholic Church

37 Other Christian Churches/Organization
38 Buddhist Monks
39 Muslim Clerics
40 CSTC; Colombian Workers' Trade Union Confederation (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia; linked to PCC)
41 Colombian Workers Union (UTC, linked with #6)
42 Colombian Federation of Teachers (FECODE)
43 Lawyers, Judges

50 Communists (unspecified)
51 Leftists (unspecified)
52 Rightists (unspecified)
53 Christian Democrats (1964--) (a.k.a. Conservatives)//check to see if they are the same
54 PL; Liberal Party (Partido Liberal; 1840--) {Lleras-Camargo, circa 55-57}
55 Conservative Party (Partido Conservador; 1849--) {Leon Valenica & Gomez, circa 55-57}
56 ANAPO; National Popular Alliance (General Rojas Panilla founder, linked with M-19 Movement; 1960--). {prior to 1960 this refers to Rojas supporters; esp. after 57 coup}
57 PCC; Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista de Colombia; a.k.a. Leftists/ Communists, linked w/CSTC)
58 UP; Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica; legal arm of FARC)
59 MOIR; Independent Revolutionary Workers' Moverment (Movimento Obrero Independiente Revolucionario; 1974--, Maoist)
60 Opposition Party (unspecified)
61 PRT; Workers Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajaderos; 1985--; urges united front among left-wing guerrillas; stages kidnappings)

70 Army (recode actor to 00 unless target = 00)
74 Police (recode actor to 00 unless target = 00)

80 Drug Traffickers (a.k.a. Cartel, Drug Barons)
81 Bandits {`Pajaros Azules' in Valle de Cauca Dept in 1957}

99 Missing

Nigerian (475) Actors/Targets

00 State

01 Hausa-Fulani
02 not used
03 Ibo/Biafra
04 Yoruba
05 Tiv People
06 Foreigners (Dr. Allen)
09 Population

10 Unspecified Guerrillas
11 not used
12 Secret Society
13 Unidentified State Opponents
14 not used
15 not used
16 Grand Alliance
17 International Red Cross (see "international actors" below)
18 USA (see "international actors" below)
19 Izala (Islamic fundamentalists)
20 Maitatsine (Islamic sect)

30 Media
31 Students
32 Government Workers
33 Unspecified Laborers/Unions
34 Educators
35 Peasants
36 Roman Catholic Church (local, not Vatican)
37 Other Christian Churches/Organizations
38 Buddhist Monks
39 Muslim Clerics
40 Foreign newsmedia (see below)
50 Communists
51 Leftists (unspecified)
52 Rightests (unspecified)
53 Northern People's Conference
54 Action Group Party (Western Region Opposition Action Group)
55 not used
56 Unidentified Opposition Party

70 Military
71 Regional/State Government
72 City/Village Government
73 Para-Military Troops
74 Police
75 East Regional Government
76 West Regional Government
77 North Regional Government

78 Mid-West Regional Government
79 Biafran Rebel State (1967-69)
99 Missing

International Actors[8]

18 United States
200 England (UK)
235 Portugal
328 Vatican
365 Soviet Union (USSR)
404 Guniea-Bissau
432 Mali
433 Senegal
434 Benin (Dahomey)
435 Mauritania
436 Niger
437 Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
438 Guinea
439 Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)
450 Liberia
451 Sierra Leone
452 Ghana
461 Togo
471 Cameroon
481 Gabon
482 Central African Republic
483 Chad
484 Congo
490 Zaire
499 Economic Committee of West African States (ECOWAS)
500 Uganda
501 Kenya
510 Tanzania
516 Burundi
517 Rwanda
520 Somalia
530 Ethiopia
540 Angola
541 Mozambique
551 Zambia (Northern Rhodesia)
552 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)
553 Malawi
560 South Africa

[8] One of the coders for Nigeria coded events where international actors were involved, and rather than delete them, I left these events in the data set. He used the above list, though not all actors listed were assigned to an event. I do not encourage their use as the coding scheme was not produced to code international events, but the user can do with them as s/he sees fit.

570 Lesotho
571 Botswana
580 Madagascar
590 Mauritius
599 Organization of African Unity (OAU)
625 Sudan
996 United Nations Organizations (except IMF & World Bank)
17 Red Cross (International)

Peru: List of Actors/Targets

00 Government

Ethnic Groups and Population
01 Blacks
02 Native Highlanders
03 Native Lowlanders
04 Indians
09 Population

Guerillas
10 Unspecified Guerillas
11 Sendero Luminoso
12 Peruvian Popular Army
13 Communist Guerillas
14 Revolutionary Vanguard
15 Tupac Amaru
16 National Liberation Front
17 Jaen
18 Revolutionary Vanguard
19 Rodrigo Franco Command

Social Groups
30 Media
31 Students
32 Government Workers
33 Workers
34 Educators
35 Peasants
36 Indian Peasants
37 Peasant Guerilla Sympathizers
38 Pro Government Peasants
39 General Confed. of Workers of Peru
40 Labor Revolutionary Movement
41 Farmers
42 Roman Catholic Church
43 Religious Leaders

Parties
50 National Coalition Party
51 National COalition
52 APRA
53 Chrisitan Democrats
54 Communists
55 Popular Action Party
56 Popular Christian Party

57 National Liberation Front

Sub Government Organization
70 Military
71 Unspecified Government Forces

Organized Crime
80 Drug traffickers

Elites
90 Landowners
91 Amnesty International
92 Cocoa Growers
93 Human Rights Watch
94 Red Cross
95 Americas Watch
96 Foreigners

99 Missing

Sri Lanka: List of Actors/Targets

00 Government

Ethnic Groups and Population
01 Indian Tamils
02 Sri Lankan Tamils
03 Moslems
04 Sinhalese
05 Indian Tamil Immigrants
06 Malayalees
09 Population

Guerilla Groups
10 Unspecified Guerillas
11 Unspecified Tamil Guerillas
12 Unidentified Sinhalese Guerillas
13 Liberation Tigers of Elam
14 Eelam National Liberation Front
15 Che Guevarra Movement
* JVP-Liberation Front (see Political Parties)
* Tamil United Liberation Front (see Political Parties)

Social Groups
30 Media
31 Students
32 Government Workers
33 Unspecified Labor
38 Buddhist Monks

Political Parties
50 Communists
51 Leftists
52 Rightists
53 Tamil Federal Party
54 Sri Lanka Freedom Party
(Supporters of Mrs Bandarnaike)
55 United National Party
(Supporters of Mr Bandarnaike)
56 JVP-Liberation Front
57 Tamil United Liberation Front
58 Ceylon Worker's Party
59 Lanka Sama Samaj Party (Trotskyite)

Sub-Government Groups
70 Military

Organized Crime
81 Sinhalese Vigilante Groups

Elites
90 Intellectuals
91 Business Organization

99 Missing

International Actors
750 Indian Peace Keepers
(i.e., Indian Troops fighting with government are coded as India)
995 Amnesty International

Zimbabwe: List of Actors/Targets

00 State

01 Europeans/Whites
02 Shona/Mashona
03 Ndebele/Matebele
04 Africans (unspecified)
05 Asian/Coloured
06 Foreign Visitors/Tourists/Reporters
09 Population

10 Unspecified guerrilla group
11 Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU, also People's Caretaker Council, PCC)
12 Zimbabwe African National Union--Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)
13 Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI)

30 Media
31 Students
32 Government Workers
33 Unspecified Laborers
34 Educators
35 Peasants
36 Roman Catholic Church (local, not Vatican)
37 Other Christian Churches/Organizations
38 African Methodist Church

50 Communists
51 Leftists (unspecified)
52 Rightests (unspecified)
53 African National Congress (of Southern Rhodesia; 1957--60)
54 United Federal Party
55 National Democratic Party (NDP; 1960-62)
56 African Chiefs (Council)
57 African Members of Parliament
58 African National Council, Muzorewa (ANC; 1971--)
59 Zimbabwe African National Union--Sithole (ZANU-S; 1978--)
60 Republican Front (Ian Smith; 1980--)

70 Armed Forces
71 Local/Municipal Government
72 Other Paramilitary Forces

99 Missing

Table 1: VICDP Event Scale

1) Agreement - Resolution: The internal war is terminated because the underlying conflict is resolved such that each party's needs are guaranteed.

2) Agreement - Settlement: The internal war is terminated and the underlying conflict settled as a consequence of the construction of institutions that will manage future conflict.

3) Agreement - Termination: The parties agree to terminate the internal war but do not create new institutions for managing the underlying conflict.

4) Statements of Support: One party supports another; rescinding policies aimed at hindering adversary; cease-fire; release of prisoners.

5) Negotiations: Parties to the conflict negotiate with one another.

6) Agreement to Negotiate: Parties to the conflict agree to negotiate with one another.

7) Meetings: Talks about talks; exchanges of officials; dialogue between the parties; statements/expressions of willingness to consider adversary's position; canceling censorship of press.

8) Neutral & "No Comment" Statements: Non-committal comments regarding other parties to the conflict and their actions; government's release of prisoners against whom it has no case.

9) Mild Verbal Expressions: Mildly negative statements about other parties to the conflict, their representatives, proposals, or activities.

10) Strong Verbal Expressions: Strongly negative statements about other parties to the conflict, their representatives, proposals, or activities.

11) Diplomatic-Economic Hostile Actions: Urging other states to adopt economic sanctions; laws that restrict economic activity of non-europeans; strikes, consumer boycotts, non-violent demonstrations.

12) Political-Military Hostile Actions: Demonstrations turned violent (only code state if police/army is sole perpetrator of violence--code non-state activity as 11; if no state action, code non-european population or group as sole actor); discriminatory laws of a political nature; arrests; sentencing to prison, detention, death, etc.

13) Small Scale Military Acts: Land mines; sabotage (non-human targets); forced relocation of population (Private Villages); capturing adversary's troops.

14) Limited War Acts: Isolated/sporadic guerrilla activity (human targets); isolated/sporadic human rights violations (Collective Punishment); isolated/sporadic counter-insurgent operations; suspension of civil law in selected areas.

15) Extensive War Acts Causing Deaths, Dislocation & High Strategic Costs: Regular guerrilla warfare; regular counter-insurgent operations; systematic human rights violations; widespread (gt 80% of territory) suspension of civil law.

Table 2: Events Not to Code

1. International Actors interacting with the government.

    Examples:
    a. Economic sanctions against a government.
    b. Recall of diplomatic staff
    c. Military threats by a foreign government.

        Note: If a foreign government interacts with a non-state actor (i.e., rebels or a guerrilla movement), please code that event.

2. Conflicts within government, if they take place through instituional and legal means.

    Examples:
    a. Cabinet is dissolved or changed.
    b. Political opposition calls for re-elections.
    c. Ministers resign in protest.
    d. Legally sanctioned political parties make strong demands or protest government actions.

3. Editorial statements or opinion columns.

Table 3: Weightings Scheme #1

Scale	Weight
Conflictual Events	
15	100
14	85
13	65
12	45
11	30
10	15
9	5
Neutral Events	
8	0
Cooperative Events	
7	5
6	10
5	15
4	25
3	45
2	75
1	100

Table 4: Events Weighted by Judges

Cooperative Events

PA. Cease fire is declared between government and Group A.
PB. Government refuses to comment on situation.
PC. Government and Group A sign peace treaty, agree to elections to select representatives to a constitutional convention.
PD. Group A and government open peace talks in Geneva amidst renewed reports of clashes back home.
PE. Government and Group A discuss possibility of negotiations
PF. Government announces that it will meet leaders of Group A.
PG. Group A surprises pundits and declares its support for recent Government actions.
PH. A recent poll makes it clear that the two major political parties of country X no longer mobilize the electorate along the ethnic lines that served as the foundation for the 15 year civil war that was settled 2 years ago: each party received over 35% of its support from members of the former rival ethnic group.
PI. Group A announces that it has agreed to meet representatives of government to discuss peace settlement.
PJ. Government grants general amnesty in exchange for laying down weapons.
PK. Group A states that they see the recent proposals by the government as worthy of further discussion.
PL. Group A refuses to comment on situation.
PM. Government lifts curfew.
PN. Negotiated settlement between Group A and government produces a new Constitution. Regional autonomy has been granted and the political rights of minority groups are guaranteed in the historic document.

Conflictual Events

NA. Bombs destroy electrical power relays in capital city. Group A claims responsibility.
NB. Group A kidnaps daughter of cabinet minister.
NC. Government Minister lashes out at Group A for recent bombing.
ND. Fifth day of large scale fighting between government and Group A near capital city produces 37 dead and 56 wounded.
NE. Government declares curfew in capital city.
NF. Rural police station near border of countries X and Y is over-run and held by Group A for 14 hours. Fifth such attack in past two years.
NG. Riot Police break-up peaceful demonstration, 3 killed and 14 injured.
NH. Government states that if Group A does not lay down arms, it will be forced to begin military sweeps of region where Group A has been active.
NI. Group A spokesperson visits United Nations and urges Security Council to adopt sanctions.
NJ. Government suspends constitutional rule and declares martial law throughout the nation due to recent widespread violence.
NK. Spokesperson for Group A criticizes new government policy.
NL. Group A sponsors peaceful demonstration in capital to protest government policies.
NM. 20 civilians are massacred by Group A in new outbreak of violence.
NN. Government routs Group A forces in large, three day battl
NO. Violent demonstrations and rioting reported in capital city.
NP. Government announces it will relocate members of ethnic group X, accused of supporting Group A, to protected villages.
NQ. Group A threatens to commence a bombing campaign if government refuses to rescind policies.
NR. Government closes major newspaper due to recent critical articles.
NS. Government destroys village while searching for dissidents/rebels. Event marks a resurgence in government's stalled counterinsurgency campaign.
NT. Group A claims responsibility for assassination of government minister.
NU. Government mobilizes armed forces in anticipation of guerrilla campaign by Group A.

Table 5: Weighting Scheme II

Scale	Weight	Raw Weight
1	5.0	5.1
2	10.0	9.76
3	9.0	8.86
4	5.0	4.96
5	5.0	5.14
6	4.0	4.15
7	3.5	3.39
8	0.0	0.25
9	1.5	1.33
10	3.0	2.86
11	3.5	3.32
12	6.0	5.83
13	6.0	5.95
14	8.0	7.81
15	8.5	8.52

To calculate these scores, we took the mean value assigned each event by the judges, and took the mean of those scores across each of the scale values (e.g., events PB and PL were both assigned a scale value of 8, and we added their scores and divided by two to produce the weights above). The weights were rounded to the nearest 0.5.

These are the scores of the 14 expert judges who were willing to score them as an interval scale. The following events were missing in 1 case each, making the N=13: PE, PH, ND.

Table 6: Sources

1	The New York Times Index
2	The New York Times
3	Latin American Index
4	Keesing's Contemporary Archives
5	Asian Recorder
6	The Times of India
7	The Middle East Journal
8	Arab Report and Record
9	Middle East Contemporary Survey
10	Africa Research Bulletin
11	African Recorder
12	West Africa

Table 7: The Coding Sheet

12 October 1992
Will Moore

Coder: _____ Country: _____

Events Coding Sheet

1) Date: _____ (DD MM YY)

2) Actor: _____

3) Target: _____

4) Event: _____

5) Description: _____

_____

_____

6) Source: _____

7) Date, Volume, Page (of Source): _____

8) Issue: _____