Supplementary Materials for:

Norm Diffusion through US Military Training in Tunisia

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Forthcoming, *Security Studies*

Contents

1 Appendix A: US and French Militaries **2**

2 Appendix B: Survey 1 **5**

3 Appendix C: Survey 2 **11**

4 Appendix D: Robustness Checks **18**

1 Appendix A: US and French Militaries

Political Positions

Tables 1 and 2 show which US and French presidents and defense secretaries were previously commissioned military officers.

Table 1: American and French Presidents since WWII

United States			**France**		
Year	**Name**	**Officer**	**Year**	**Name**	**Officer**
1945-1953	Harry S. Truman	✓	1947-1954	Vincent Auriol	
1953-1961	Dwight D. Eisenhower	✓	1954-1959	René Coty	
1961-1963	John F. Kennedy	✓	1959-1969	Charles de Gaulle	✓
1963-1969	Lyndon B. Johnson	✓	1969-1974	Georges Pompidou	✓
1969-1974	Richard Nixon	✓	1974-1981	Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	
1974-1977	Gerald Ford	✓	1981-1995	Francóis Mitterrand	
1977-1981	Jimmy Carter	✓	1995-2007	Jacques Chirac	✓
1981-1989	Ronald Reagan	✓	2007-2012	Nicolas Sarkozy	
1989-1993	George H. W. Bush	✓	2012-2017	Francois Holland	✓
1993-2001	Bill Clinton		2017-	Emmanuel Macron	
2001-2009	George W. Bush	✓			
2009-2017	Barack Obama				
2017-	Donald Trump				
Percent Officer, Overall:		77% (10/13)			40% (4/10)

Note: Data collected from online biographies.

Table 2: American and French Defense Secretaries/Ministers since WWII

United States			France		
Year	**Name**	**Officer**	**Year**	**Name**	**Officer**
1947-1949	James Forrestal	✓	1947-1948	Pierre-Henri Teitgen	
1949-1950	Louis A. Johnson	✓	1948-1948	René Mayer	
1950-1951	George C. Marshall	✓	1948-1949	Paul Ramadier	
1951-1953	Robert A. Lovett	✓	1949-1950	René Pleven	
1953-1957	Charles E. Wilson		1950-1951	Jules Moch	
1957-1959	Neil McElroy		1951-1952	Georges Bidault	
1959-1961	Thomas Gates Jr.	✓	1952-1954	René Pleven	
1961-1968	Robert McNamara	✓	1954-1954	Marie-Pierre Kœnig	✓
1968-1969	Clark Clifford	✓	1954-1955	Emmanuel Temple	
1969-1973	Melvin Laird	✓	1955-1955	Jacques Chevallier	
1973-1973	Eliot Richardson	✓	1955-1955	Marie-Pierre Kœnig	✓
1973-1975	James Schlesinger		1955-1956	Pierre Billotte	✓
1975-1977	Donald Rumsfeld	✓	1956-1957	Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury	✓
1977-1981	Harold Brown		1957-1957	André Morice	
1981-1987	Caspar Weinberger	✓	1957-1958	Jacques Chaban-Delmas	✓
1987-1989	Frank Carlucci	✓	1958-1958	Chevigné Stone	✓
1989-1993	Richard Cheney		1958-1959	Charles de Gaulle	✓
1993-1994	Leslie Aspin	✓	1959-1960	Pierre Guillaumat	
1994-1997	William Perry	✓	1960-1969	Pierre Messmer	✓
1997-2001	William Cohen		1969-1973	Michel Debré	
2001-2006	Donald Rumsfeld	✓	1973-1974	Robert Galley	
2006-2011	Robert Gates	✓	1974-1975	Jacques Soufflet	✓
2011-2013	Leon Panetta	✓	1975-1980	Yvon Bourges	
2013-2015	Chuck Hagel		1980-1980	Joël Le Theule	
2015-2017	Ash Carter		1980-1981	Robert Galley	
2017-2018	Jim Mattis	✓	1981-1985	Charles Hernu	
2019-	Mark Esper	✓	1985-1986	Paul Quilès	
			1986-1988	André Giraud	
			1988-1991	Jean-Pierre Chevènement	
			1991-1993	Pierre Joxe	
			1993-1995	Francois Léotard	
			1995-1997	Charles Millon	
			1997-2002	Alain Richard	
			2002-2007	Michèle Alliot-Marie	
			2007-2010	Hervé Morin	
			2010-2011	Alain Juppe	
			2011-2012	Gérard Longuet	
			2012-2017	Jean-Yves Le Drian	
			2017-	Florence Parly	
Percent Officer, Overall:		70% (19/27)			23% (9/39)

Note: Does not include acting defense ministers/secretaries. Data collected from online biographies.

Voter Turnout

In the text, I note that the US military turns out to vote at considerably higher rates than civilians. Unlike for the US, there are no publicly available data on voter turnout for the French military. However, there are two ways to proxy for it. The first I mention in the paper: veterans, showing that American veterans are more likely to vote than non-veterans, but French ones are less likely to. A second route is to examine voter turnout in eight small French towns that house large military bases, where military personnel thus make up the majority of the population. Employing this strategy, Fourquet and Manternach (2019) show that these eight towns saw considerably higher vote shares for the far-right party than the average town in those departments (roughly, counties).[1] They thus infer that the French military tends to vote far-right, but they do not examine turnout. In Table 3, I show that in the 2017 parliamentary elections, these eight military towns saw an average voter turnout of 46%, compared to 53% for the broader departments, suggesting that French military personnel were roughly 7 percentage points less likely to vote than the general population. Nor is this a new phenomenon: in the 2002 parliamentary elections as well, these military towns were 6 percentage points less likely to vote (59 to 65%).

Table 3: Voter turnout in French municipalities with military bases

		Turnout, 2017 Parli Elections			**Turnout, 2002 Parli Elections**		
Municipality	**Department**	**Mun. %**	**Dept. %**	**Diff.**	**Mun. %**	**Dept. %**	**Diff.**
Mailly-le-Camp	Aube	41	53	-12	61	65	-4
Sissonne	Aisne	48	50	-2	62	64	-2
Suippes	Marne	38	52	-14	51	62	-11
Mourmelon-le-Grand	Marne	46	52	-6	52	62	-10
Mourmelon-le-Petit	Marne	47	52	-5	54	62	-8
Saint-Christol	Vaucluse	55	55	0	64	68	-4
La Cavalerie	Aveyron	50	60	-10	72	72	0
Auxonne	Cote-d'Or	44	53	-9	60	66	-6
Average		**46**	**53**	**-7**	**59**	**65**	**-6**

Note: Elections data available here.

[1] See Jerome Fourquet and Sylvain Manternach, "Pour qui votent les casernes?", Fondation Jean Jaures, July 15, 2019, https://jean-jaures.org/nos-productions/pour-qui-votent-les-casernes.

2 Appendix B: Survey 1

To evaluate the representativeness of survey 1, we can compare the survey sample to a dataset created from official biographies published by the Ministry of Defense.[2] The biographies contain information on all 662 senior and mid-level officers who had retired by 2009, which I subset to the 259 who retired between 2001-2009. While imperfect, we can compare this population of officers retired from 2001-2009 to the survey sample of officers retired from 2001-2015.

Tables 4 and 5 therefore presents the demographic comparison of the survey sample with this retired officers dataset. Since most survey respondents are Colonels and Colonel Majors, the following table also presents the comparison for this subset. The comparisons suggest that the survey sample is fairly representative in terms of branch, birthplace and gender. The survey has a significantly higher proportion of US-trained officers – likely the result of the officers who retired from 2010-2015.

Comparing Colonels and Colonel Majors

Tables 6 and 7 compare just Colonels and Colonel Majors, who had made up 93% of the survey sample.

[2]The biographies were available in an internal Ministry of Defense publication, "Registry of Retired Officers: Commanders and Senior Officers," produced in June 2009 (the most recent version).

Table 4: Officers Survey (N=72)

Retired 2001-2015

Demographic	Percent
Rank	
General	0
Colonel Major	43
Colonel	50
Lt. Col.	4
Major	3
Branch	
Army	46
Navy	11
Air Force	13
Military Security	4
Joint Services	30
Birthplace	
Tunis	26
Sahel	33
North	24
Center	6
South	11
Foreign Training	
U.S.	54
France	55
Other	10
None	0
Gender	
Male	97
Female	3
Total N	72

Table 5: Retired Officers Dataset (N=259)

Retired 2001-2009

Demographic	Percent
Rank	
General	4
Colonel Major	22
Colonel	25
Lt. Col.	24
Major	24
Branch	
Army	40
Navy	13
Air Force	14
Military Security	?
Joint Services	32
Birthplace	
Tunis	16
Sahel	42
North	27
Center	4
South	12
Foreign Training	
U.S.	13
France	32
Other	7
None	49
Gender	
Male	99
Female	1
Total N	259

Table 6: Officers Survey (N=67)

Retired 2001-2015

Demographic	**Percent**
Rank	
Colonel Major	46
Colonel	54
Branch	
Army	48
Navy	10
Air Force	13
Military Security	3
Joint Services	27
Birthplace	
Tunis	27
Sahel	33
North	24
Center	4
South	12
Foreign Training	
U.S.	55
France	55
Other	10
None	0
Gender	
Male	97
Female	3
Total N	67

Table 7: Retired Officers Dataset (N=124)

Retired 2001-2009

Demographic	**Percent**
Rank	
Colonel Major	47
Colonel	53
Branch	
Army	36
Navy	17
Air Force	13
Military Security	?
Joint Services	34
Birthplace	
Tunis	14
Sahel	46
North	23
Center	2
South	16
Foreign Training	
U.S.	19
France	52
Other	7
None	23
Gender	
Male	100
Female	0
Total N	124

Note: The two female colonels in the survey retired after 2009, and therefore do not appear in the retired officers dataset.

Bivariate Correlations

Figure 1: Bivariate Correlations



Covariate Balance

Retired officers who trained in the U.S. retired later, were higher ranking, and more supportive of defense minister Farhat Horchani than French-trained ones. These covariate imbalances highlight the importance of including these covariates in the analysis.

Figure 2: Covariate Balance, American Trained v. French Trained



Questionnaire

Survey questions used in this paper include:

1. What is your gender?
    - Male
    - Female
2. What year did you retire from the armed forces? _____
3. What was your specialty in the armed forces? [Check all that apply]
    - Army
    - Navy
    - Air Force
    - Military Security
    - Joint services
4. What was the highest rank you reached in the armed forces? _____
5. Where did you grow up? _____
    - Governorate: _____
    - City/Village: _____
6. Where did you perform your basic training?
    - Tunisia
    - Other country: _____
7. In which countries did you receive additional training? [Check all that apply]

- The United States
- France
- Belgium
- Italy
- Greece
- Turkey
- Other: _____

8. How much do you support the following presidents?
    - Beji Caid Essebsi (1-5)
9. How much do you support the following defense ministers?
    - Farhat Horchani (1-5)
10. [**Democracy**] "Suppose there was a scale from 1-5 measuring the extent to which democracy is suitable for Tunisia, with 1 meaning that democracy is absolutely inappropriate for Tunisia and 5 meaning democracy is completely appropriate for Tunisia. To what extent do you think democracy is suitable for Tunisia?"
11. [**Retired-MOD**] "The Minister of Defense should be a retired officer."
12. [**Right to Vote**] "Soldiers and officers should have the right to vote in elections."
13. [**Chief of Staff**] "The president should appoint a new chief of staff of the armed forces and create a plan outlining his duties."
14. [**Parliament**] "A military advisor should be appointed for the parliament for deputies to consult with on technical and defense matters."

3 Appendix C: Survey 2

The online survey of military personnel in Tunisia was fielded between July 7-August 19, 2018. Respondents were recruited into the survey through advertisements on Facebook that were shown to adult Tunisians that Facebook has classified as having an interest in the military.

The Facebook advertisement (figure 3) featured a picture of the military with the title: "Survey about Security in the Middle East." The text says "Fill out this survey about security in the Middle East and in return you will receive free prepaid credit on your mobile phone, if you are selected." Respondents willing to enter their phone number at the end of the survey (about one-third of the sample) received this credit (incentives discussed below).

Figure 3: Facebook advertisment

Figure 4 presents the targeting used. Facebook allows advertisers to specify the user's country (in our case, Tunisia), age (over 18), language, as well as a sample list of interests and employers. For the latter, I clicked all options related to the military:

Figure 4: Facebook targeting (Tunisia)



Platform

Clicking on the advertisement took Facebook users to a separate platform, Qualtrics, where they read a consent form and then completed the survey.[3] Users could choose to take the survey in Arabic, French, or English. 66% chose Arabic and 33% French. Any Tunisian over 18 was allowed to enter the survey (see eligibility page below). In the interests of transparency, a banner featuring the Princeton University Qualtrics logo headed every page.

Figure 5: First page of the Qualtrics survey

Survey Incentives

In the eligibility page, respondents also chose among a pre-defined list of cell phone service providers. In the subsequent consent page, they saw the amount of phone credit they would receive (or would be entered into a raffle to receive) if they were to complete the survey. The credit was sent through the Swiss company CY.SEND.

Respondents with service providers Ooredoo or Tunisia Telecom were guaranteed to receive phone credit, while those using Orange were entered in a raffle to receive 9 Tunisian

[3]There are many ethical concerns about the data Facebook collects on its users. Because our survey is conducted on a separate platform, Facebook cannot see the respondents' answers, nor even whether the respondent filled out the survey. All Facebook learns from this study is which Facebook users engaged with and clicked on our advertisement, which in our opinion is relatively innocuous.

Table 8: Survey Incentives: Cell Phone Credit

Country	Service	Amount	Amount (USD)	Chance
Tunisia	Ooredoo	2 DT	$1.19	100%
Tunisia	Telecom	5.4 DT	$2.92	100%
Tunisia	Orange	9 DT	$3.81	45%

dinars (45% chance). The amounts were the minimum permitted on CY.SEND. Importantly, every respondent (civilian or military) was eligible to receive phone credit, regardless of their answers (i.e., regardless of whether they were civilian or military). As I note in the text, there is therefore no incentive to lie and claim they are members of the military.

One way to verify whether the survey takers were indeed real people and not computer bots[4] seeking to maximize phone credit is to examine how long it took to complete the survey. Bots would complete the survey instantly. Figure 6 shows that the median time to completion was 24 minutes. Fewer than 4% of the survey takers completed the survey in less than 10 minutes. Beyond ruling out bots, this time to completion suggests that respondents were taking the survey seriously and not zipping through as quickly as possible.



Figure 6: Time to Completion

[4]We can discount this possibility in two additional ways. First, Qualtrics prevents the same IP address from taking the survey more than once, and we can verify that there are no duplicate IP addresses. Second, a bot would duplicate answers, but we had no perfect duplicates and only 2% of the surveys were even 85% the same.

Representativeness

Figure 7 provides the self-reported ranks of the military personnel surveyed. 56 respondents chose not to report their ranks.

Figure 7: Military Ranks, Survey 2 (N=197)



Table 9 provides demographic data on the survey sample, in terms of branch, conscription, active-duty or retired, gender, hometown, and level of education.

Table 9: Demographics by Rank, Tunisia

Demographic	**Total** (N=253)	**Soldier** (N=47)	**NCO** (N=82)	**Officer** (N=68)	**Rank Unknown** (N=56)
Branch					
Army	82	84	77	87	84
Navy	10	13	12	7	8
Air Force	7	2	11	6	8
Conscript	18	38	12	0	29
Active-Duty	54	49	56	61	49
Age (among active)					
% 18-24	18	27	15	12	21
% 25-29	22	27	29	18	13
Female	2.3	0	1.4	3.7	4.1
Hometown					
Greater Tunis	24	27	21	26	27
Sahel	19	24	11	24	20
Education					
Less than H.S.	11	27	7	2	12
High School	32	44	40	11	33
B.A. or higher	57	29	53	87	55

Examining how biased the survey is difficult given the lack of publicly-available data on the overall Tunisian military (the dataset created for survey 1 was just of senior officers). However, clearly biased is education, with the majority (57%) in survey 2 claiming they have

at least a college degree, compared to just 33% of Tunisians overall. The demographic table, however, also help to validate the survey sample. The Tunisian militaries is overwhelmingly male, as in our survey. The survey sample is also internally consistent, with soldiers being considerably younger and lesser educated than officers.

In terms of location, there also appears to be an urban bias – i.e., the areas with higher internet penetration. Figure 8 presents the approximate location of the survey takers based on the IP addresses.[5] Indeed, the respondents appear to come from the urban areas in each governorate, though importantly, there is still considerable geographic distribution across the country – they do not all come from Tunis.

Figure 8: Map of Survey Respondents



There are two demographics for which data is publicly available for the actual Tunisian military: branch and percent conscript for each branch (from IISS's military balance). Table 10 compares the survey sample with the actual military on these two demographics. The comparisons reveal that the survey samples are relatively proportional to the actual militaries in terms of branch, with the vast majority in the land army. However, the samples actually under-represent conscripts, perhaps again due to the higher socioeconomic status of the survey sample. This bias is useful for our study, as we are primarily interested in career military personnel.

[5]The geolocation reveals the city, but nothing more fine grained than that. Nearly half of the respondents simply had country level coordinates – 34 latitude by 9 longitude, i.e., the center of Tunisia. I have removed those country-level coordinates before plotting this map.

Table 10: Survey Representativeness, Tunisia

Military Survey (N=253)

Demographic	Percent
Branch	
Army	82
Navy	10
Air Force	7
Conscript	
Overall	18
Army	16
Navy	30
Air Force	19

Tunisian Military (N=38,500)

Demographic	Percent
Branch	
Army	76
Navy	13
Air Force	11
Conscript	
Overall	?
Army	81
Navy	?
Air Force	?

Bivariate Correlations

Figure 9: Bivariate Correlations



Questionnaire

Additional survey questions beyond those used in survey 1:

1. Do you have military experience? [Yes; No]

2. How would you describe your military experience? [Active-duty; Retired]

3. How much do you support the following defense ministers?

    - Abdelkrim Zbidi (1-5)

4. **[Retired-Pres]** "The President should be a retired officer." [strongly agree to strongly disagree]

5. How appropriate would it be for someone in the military to perform the following actions? Please answer on a 1-5 scale, where 1 means very inappropriate and 5 means very appropriate.

    - **[Voting]** "Voting in elections"

4 Appendix D: Robustness Checks

Table 11: Separating US training into US only and both US and French training (OLS)

	Dependent variable:			
	Survey 1		Survey 2	
	Retired MOD	Right to Vote	Retired Pres	Voting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Only U.S. Training	0.614**	0.667*	1.430**	1.114
	(0.258)	(0.357)	(0.573)	(0.697)
Both US/France Training	1.323***	0.929	0.702	1.232*
	(0.442)	(0.612)	(0.620)	(0.726)
Other Western Training			0.353	0.988
			(0.560)	(0.630)
Non-Western Training	0.918	−0.204	0.286	−0.484
	(0.939)	(1.301)	(0.776)	(0.827)
No Foreign Training			−0.174	0.308
			(0.394)	(0.456)
Female	0.752	3.752***	−0.229	−0.650
	(0.717)	(0.992)	(0.628)	(0.655)
Army	−0.294	−0.228	0.051	−0.137
	(0.226)	(0.313)	(0.204)	(0.231)
Interior Region	0.479*	0.016	−0.496**	0.405*
	(0.258)	(0.357)	(0.214)	(0.244)
MOD Horchani/Zbidi	−0.007	−0.035	0.032	−0.081
	(0.180)	(0.250)	(0.110)	(0.127)
Pres. Essebsi	−0.496**	−0.368	0.229**	0.013
	(0.202)	(0.280)	(0.105)	(0.123)
Democracy	0.050	−0.138	−0.264***	0.018
	(0.167)	(0.232)	(0.072)	(0.083)
Retirement Year	−0.107***	−0.052		
	(0.035)	(0.049)		
Active-Duty			0.553***	0.407*
			(0.204)	(0.231)
Rank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	3.205**	−0.640	2.753***	1.739**
	(1.236)	(1.711)	(0.627)	(0.726)
Observations	70	70	190	159
R^2	0.329	0.292	0.217	0.124
Adjusted R^2	0.173	0.128	0.150	0.033

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*
Note: Reference category is French-trained officers.

It is possible that socialization effects are stronger for those who go abroad early in their career. Table 12 therefore divides up the US-trainees by whether they went for candidacy school or more advanced courses. The vast majority went for advanced courses, only two in survey 1 and six in survey 2 went for candidacy school. Results are inconclusive: for wanting a retired officer as defense minister, those who went for candidacy school do appear more affected, but they appear less affected for the three other outcomes.

Table 12: Does socialization vary by stage of career?

	Dependent variable:			
	Retired MOD	Right to Vote	Retired Pres	Voting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
US Training-Candidacy	3.660***	−0.025	0.398	0.841
	(1.227)	(1.790)	(0.886)	(1.092)
US Training-Advanced	0.588**	0.709**	1.037**	1.029*
	(0.241)	(0.351)	(0.520)	(0.610)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	70	70	190	159
R^2	0.394	0.290	0.213	0.128
Adjusted R^2	0.253	0.125	0.145	0.036

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*
Note: Reference category is French-trained officers.

Table 13 examines whether the effect of US training varies by how long they spent abroad (asked only in survey 2). For both outcomes, there is no significant interaction between training in the US and how many months they spent there, though it is leaning positive.

Socialization effects might also vary by when respondents went abroad. While neither survey asked this explicitly, we can proxy for period by examining whether the effect of US training varies by retirement year in survey 1, or by whether respondents are retired or active-duty in survey 2. Table 14 shows that results are inconclusive: on one outcome (voting in survey 1), those who trained in the US more recently were less affected, but finds no significant interaction for the other three.

Table 13: Does socialization vary by length of time abroad?

	Dependent variable:	
	Retired Pres	Voting
	(1)	(2)
US Training	0.999	0.486
	(0.912)	(1.031)
Months Abroad	−0.190	0.018
	(0.153)	(0.169)
US Training*Months Abroad	0.077	0.191
	(0.238)	(0.271)
Controls	✓	✓
Observations	190	159
R^2	0.221	0.130
Adjusted R^2	0.149	0.032

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*
Note: Reference category is French-trained officers.

Table 14: Does socialization vary by when they went abroad?

	Dependent variable:			
	Retired MOD	Right to Vote	Retired Pres	Voting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
US Training	1.346*	3.851***	0.956	1.238*
	(0.696)	(0.837)	(0.644)	(0.729)
Retirement Year	−0.094**	0.041		
	(0.041)	(0.049)		
US Training*Retirement Year	−0.067	−0.338***		
	(0.070)	(0.084)		
Active-Duty			0.522**	0.417*
			(0.214)	(0.241)
US Training*Active-Duty			0.262	−0.128
			(0.701)	(0.819)
Observations	70	70	190	159
R^2	0.308	0.450	0.213	0.124
Adjusted R^2	0.148	0.322	0.145	0.033

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*
Note: Reference category is French-trained officers.

One confounder might be whether respondents speak English, which might allow them to follow US news and learn about the US military even without having trained there. While neither survey asked about English language skills, respondents could choose what language to take the second survey in. Only 2 of 253 respondents chose English, but for what it's worth, Table 15 shows that results hold controlling for them.

Table 15: Controlling for taking survey in English

	Dependent variable:	
	Retired Pres	Voting
	(1)	(2)
US Training	1.179**	1.128*
	(0.496)	(0.576)
Other Western Training	0.368	0.974
	(0.560)	(0.622)
Non-Western Training	0.308	−0.502
	(0.776)	(0.817)
No Foreign Training	−0.130	0.248
	(0.393)	(0.451)
English	−1.068	2.750*
	(0.989)	(1.428)
Female	−0.177	−0.662
	(0.625)	(0.642)
Army	0.022	−0.098
	(0.202)	(0.228)
Interior Region	−0.495**	0.443*
	(0.214)	(0.240)
MOD Zbidi	0.027	−0.087
	(0.109)	(0.125)
Pres. Essebsi	0.219**	0.012
	(0.105)	(0.121)
Democracy	−0.250***	−0.006
	(0.072)	(0.082)
Active-Duty	0.543***	0.454**
	(0.204)	(0.229)
Rank FE	✓	✓
Constant	2.705***	1.816**
	(0.627)	(0.718)
Observations	190	159
R^2	0.217	0.146
Adjusted R^2	0.150	0.057

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*
Note: Reference category is French-trained officers.