Appendix I

Interview Codebook

Table 1. Interview Codebook

Interview Code[1]	Date and Place	Source	Format	Length	Transparency
KZ-#1	2015-8-19 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#2	2015-8-20 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#3	2015-8-25 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#5	2015-9-16 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#6	2015-9-28 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#12	2015-10-22 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#7	2015-9-30 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#8	2015-10-6 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#4	2015-9-15 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#10	2015-10-13 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#9	2015-10-9 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Declined	Interviewee declined citing reasons that the interviewee is not familiar with the area.	Sample frame			
KZ-#11	2015-10-14 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required

[1] Due to concerns about safety of the interviewees, interviewees remain anonymous.

Declined	Interviewee declined citing reasons that the interviewee is not familiar with the area.	Snowball			
KZ-#13	2015-11-17 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#14	2015-11-25 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#22	December 15, 2015 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Declined	Interviewee declined citing reasons that the interviewee is not familiar with the area.	Snowball			
No response	Cannot seem to be able to contact the interviewee (emails sent always automatically returned by the system).	Snowball			
KZ-#36	2016-1-18 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#37	2016-1-19 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#41	2016-1-22 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#43	2016-1-28 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#38	2016-1-20 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#39	2016-1-22 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#42	2016-1-25 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Declined	Interviewee declined citing reasons that the interviewee is not familiar with the area.	Sample frame			
Declined	Interviewee declined citing reasons that the interviewee is not familiar with the area.	Sample frame			
KZ-#18	2015-12-3 Guangzhou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#19	2015-12-4 Guangzhou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#85	2016-5-23 Guangzhou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#16	2015-11-30 Guangzhou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	2 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#17	2015-12-1 Guangzhou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#20	2015-12-9: Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required

KZ-#21	2015-12-10 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#23	2015-12-19 Beijing, China	Snowball	Unstructured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#24	2015-12-29 Nanjing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#25	2015-12-30 Nanjing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#26	2015-12-30 Nanjing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#27	2015-12-31 Nanjing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#28	2016-1-5 Haikou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#29	2016-1-5 Haikou, China	Snowball	Unstructured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#32	2016-1-7 Haikou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	2 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#30	2016-1-6 Haikou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#31	2016-1-6 Haikou, China	Snowball	Unstructured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#34	2016-1-8 Haikou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#35	2016-1-18 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#40	2016-1-22 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#44	2016-2-2 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#45	2016-2-2 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#52	2016-3-9 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Declined	Interviewee declined citing reasons that the interviewee is not familiar with the area.	Snowball			
KZ-#49	2016-2-23 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#50	2016-3-3 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#63	2016-4-25 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#46	2016-2-15 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#51	2016-3-8 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#55	2016-4-12 Haikou, China	Snowball	Unstructured	2 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#56	2016-4-13 Haikou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#57	2016-4-14 Haikou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	2 hours	Confidentiality required

KZ-#93	2016-6-16 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Declined	Interviewee declined citing reasons that the interviewee is not familiar with the area.	Snowball			
KZ-#92	2016-6-8 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#95	2016-7-4 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#94	2016-6-27 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#100	2016-7-28 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Unavailable	Interviewee is away and will not be back until later.				
KZ-#89	2016-5-25 Guangzhou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#47	2016-2-17 Email exchange	Snowball	Structured	N/A	Confidentiality required
KZ-#48	2016-2-20 Email exchange	Snowball	Structured	N/A	Confidentiality required
KZ-#53	2016-3-17 Atlanta, USA	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#54	2016-4-8 Haikou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#60	2016-4-18 Wuhan, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#61	2016-4-18 Wuhan, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#62	2016-4-20 Wuhan, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#59	2016-4-18 Wuhan, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Declined	Interviewee declined, citing reasons that as a government policy analyst, the interviewee is not allowed to discuss China's foreign policy decision-making with me.				
KZ-#65	2016-4-27 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#64	2016-4-27 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#58	2016-4-14 Haikou, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Declined	Declined stating that the interviewee is more familiar with issues regarding international law, but not the questions that I ask.				
Declined	Interviewee declined stating the interviewee is not familiar with the topic.				

KZ-#66	2016-5-4 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#67	2016-5-4 Shanghai, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#80	2016-5-13 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#70	2016-5-5 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#71	2016-5-6 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-79	2016-5-13 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Declined	Interviewee declined stating that the interviewee is not familiar with the topic.				
Declined	Interviewee declined stating that the interviewee is not familiar with the topic.				
KZ-#117	2016-5-5 Cell phone exchange	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#73	2016-5-8 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#68	2016-5-5 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#74	2016-5-10 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#81	2016-5-15 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#69	2016-5-5 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#72	2016-5-7 Shanghai, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#76	2016-5-12 Shanghai, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#75	2016-5-12 Shanghai, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#77	2016-5-12 Shanghai, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#82	2016-5-16 Shanghai, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#78	2016-5-13 Shanghai, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#83	2016-5-20 Guangzhou, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#87	2016-5-24 Guangzhou, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#86	2016-5-23 Guangzhou, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#90	2016-5-25 Guangzhou, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ -#84	2016-5-21 Guangzhou, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required

KZ-#88	2016-5-25 Guangzhou, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Declined	Interviewee declined stating that it is complicated				
KZ-#97	2016-7-18 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#96	2016-7-6 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#91	2016-6-7 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	2 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#92	2016-6-13 Xiamen, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	2 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#99	2016-7-21 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	2 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#98	2016-7-20 Cell phone exchange	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#106	2016-9-22 Washington, D.C., USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#102	2016-8-21 Washington, D.C., USA	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#109	2016-12-5 Washington, D.C., USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#101	2016-8-17 Washington, D.C., USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#104	2016-9-6 Washington, D.C., USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#103	2016-9-2 Philadelphia, USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#108	2016-9-29 Washington, D.C., USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#105	2016-9-22 Washington, D.C., USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#107	2016-9-28 Washington, D.C., USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#110	2016-12-6 Washington, D.C., USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#111	2016-12-27 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	0.5 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#112	2016-12-27 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	2 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#113	2016-12-29 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#114	2016-12-29 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1.5 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#115	2017-1-18 Washington, D.C., USA	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#116	2017-12-19 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required

KZ-#118	2018-3-26 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#119	2018-3-27 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#120	2018-3-29 Beijing, China	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#121	2018-8-2 Boston, USA	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#122	2018-10-5 Palo Alto, USA	Snowball	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
KZ-#123	2018-12-26 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	2 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#124	2019-1-3 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hours	Confidentiality required
KZ-#125	2019-1-8 Beijing, China	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hours	Confidentiality required
Interview	December 30, 2013, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview-1	January 14, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview-2	January 14, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	January 20, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	June 5, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	June 6, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	June 10, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	June 11, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	June 12, 2014. Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	June 26, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	June 30, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	July 3, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview-1	July 9, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview-2	July 9, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	July 15, 2014, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	January 7, 2015, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview	January 8, 2015, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview-1	January 13, 2015, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview-2	January 13, 2015, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required

Interview-3	January 13, 2015, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview-1	January 14, 2015, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required
Interview-2	January 14, 2015, Beijing, China	Previous interviews	Semi-structured	1 hour	Confidentiality required

Appendix II

Figure 1. Overall Trends of China's Coercion 1990-2020[1]



Figure 2. China's Coercion and Choices of Coercive Tools 1990-2020[2]



[1] This includes China's military coercion in Sino-Indian land border disputes as well as military coercion in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995 and 1996. For data regarding military coercion on Sino-Indian border disputes, see Ketian Zhang, "Explaining Chinese Military Coercion in Sino-Indian Border Disputes," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 2022, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2022.2090081.
[2] Ibid.

Appendix III

Table 1. Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea 1990-2020

Year	Country Involved and Incident	Goal of Coercion	Diplomatic Sanctions (and Magnitude if Used)	Economic Sanctions (and Magnitude if Used)	Gray-zone Coercion (and Magnitude if Used)	Military Coercion (and Magnitude if Used)
1994.7	Vietnam deployed an oil rig to the Vanguard Bank area.	"Demanded that the Vietnamese side stop the drilling activities immediately" [3]	No	No	No	**Yes.** Chinese naval ships expelled at least one Vietnamese vessel
1995.1	Philippine fishers stopped by the Mischief Reef	Stop the Philippines from controlling the Mischief Reef while enforcing the "policy of restraint" on claimants	No	No	**Yes.** Chinese fishery administrative ships blocked and investigated the Philippine fishing vessels	No
1995.5	The Philippines dispatched a naval vessel to Mischief Reef, which had foreign and domestic journalists onboard	See above	No	No	**Yes.** Chinese fishery administrative ships blocked Philippine naval vessels, leading to a 70-minute standoff	No
1995.12	China was reportedly drilling for oil near Spratly Isles, and Vietnam sent vessels to monitor		No	No	No	**Yes.** A Chinese naval vessel fired warning shots at a Vietnamese vessel

[3] "China sends warships to Vietnam oil site," *The New York Times,* July 21, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/21/world/china-sends-warships-to-vietnam-oil-site.html; cross-checked by MFA's statement on June 16: China demanded that Vietnam stop all activities that encroach upon China's sovereign rights, including sending survey ships into the Vanguard area. See *People's Daily,* June 16, 1994. http://www.ziliaoku.org/rmrb/1994-06-17-4#967214.

1996.4	Vietnam gave what was previously the China-Crestone deal to U.S. company Conoco regarding oil exploration around the Vanguard Bank	Force Conoco to give up the deal[4]	No	**Yes.** China warned Conoco off the project before the contract was signed. Chen Bingqian, vice president of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, threatened "confrontation, losses and liabilities" if the deal was consummated. Conoco's parent company, Dupont, has several joint ventures in China.	No	No
1997.4	Philippine Navy disrupted amateur wireless transmission (radio) enthusiasts' trip to the Scarborough Shoal – these people came from China, Japan, and the United States	Demanded that the Philippines immediately stop actions that encroach upon Chinese sovereignty.[5]	No	No	**Yes.** Chinese maritime surveillance ships faced a standoff with the Philippine Navy.	No
1999.11	The Philippines planned to "sit" its naval ship by the Scarborough Shoal	Demanded that the ship be towed from the Shoal.[6]	**Yes.** China applied diplomatic pressure	No	No	No

[4] See appendix III.
[5] *People's Daily,* May 23, 1997, http://www.ziliaoku.org/rmrb/1997-05-23-4#1077432, accessed August 19, 2017.
[6] See appendix III.

2007.4	Vietnam planned to work with British Petroleum (BP) in Spratlys	Force BP to give up the deal.[7]	No	**Yes.** China made threats of economic sanctions regarding BP in June 2007; BP eventually gave up the bid in 2009	No	No
2007.4	Vietnam conducted oil exploration with Russian ships in the Spratlys	Force the ships to stop exploration[8]	No	No	**Yes.** China's maritime surveillance ships expelled the ships	No
2008.7	Vietnam planned to work with ExxonMobil in the Spratlys	Force ExxonMobil to give up the deal[9]	No	**Yes.** China made threats of business interests with ExxonMobil	No	No
2010	Vietnam carved out block 113 in the Spratlys		No	No	**Yes.** China's maritime surveillance ships conducted patrol around the block	No
2010.4	The Royal Malaysian Navy sent its warship to chase Chinese fishery administrative ships out of Malaysian water. The two met around the Swallow Reef (Layang Layang).		No	No	**Yes.** Chinese fishery administrative ship no. 311 showed presence and faced off the Malaysian Navy.	No
2011.3	Philippine oil exploration ships were conducting	Force the Philippines to stop exploration	No	No	**Yes.** Chinese maritime surveillance	No

[7] See appendix III.
[8] See appendix III.
[9] See appendix III.

	explorations around the Reed Bank	activities around the bank and leave the area[10]			ships expelled the Philippine ships.	
2011.5	Vietnam conducted oil exploration activities around the Vanguard Bank	MFA: China objected to Vietnamese exploration activities which encroached upon Chinese sovereignty[11]	No	No	**Yes.** China dispatched its maritime surveillance ships and Chinese maritime surveillance vessels on May 26 cut exploration cables of Viet Nam's Binh Minh 02 vessel in Block 148	No
2011.6	Vietnam's state-run energy company PetroVietnam was conducting seismic surveys in the Spratlys	Demanded that Vietnam immediately stop actions that encroach upon Chinese sovereignty[12]	No	No	**Yes (2)** A Chinese fishing boat supported by Chinese fishery administrative ships no. 311 and 303 cut the cable of the Vietnamese survey ship.	No
2012.4	The Philippine Navy tried to arrest Chinese fishers around the Scarborough Shoal	MFA: demanded that Philippine ships leave the Scarborough area.[13] (See Chapter 5 for the case study)	**Yes.** China terminated all senior-level (ministerial level and above) bilateral visits between	**Yes.** A one-month banana ban of Philippine banana export to China	**Yes.** Chinese maritime surveillance ships blocked Philippine vessels from entering the shoal, leading to a two-month	No

[10] See appendix III.
[11] MFA Press Conference, May 28, 2011, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/t826094.shtml, accessed August 19, 2017.
[12] MFA Press Conference, June 9, 2011, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/t829297.shtml, accessed August 19, 2017.
[13] MFA Press Conference, April 16, 2012, reported in *People's Daily,* April 2017. http://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t923279.shtml, accessed August 19, 2017.

			China and the Philippines		standoff. China eventually took control of the shoal	
2012.8	One Malaysian seismic survey ship was conducting explorations in Block SR 318 under contract to Shell Sarawak	Force Malaysia to stop its survey activities[14]	No	No	**Yes.** Chinese patrol vessels ordered the Malaysian vessel to cease and desist. It complied but renewed its work after a protective buffer was put in place	No
2013.1	The Philippines handed the South China Sea disputes to the Arbitration Tribunal.	Demanded that the Philippines stop actions that further complicate the [South China Sea] issue and return to the correct path of bilateral negotiations [15]	**Yes.** From 2013 to 2015, there were no formal meetings between the foreign ministers of the two countries	No	No	No
2013.1	Shell contracted survey vessels were conducting exploration in the Luconia Shoal area	Force Malaysia to stop its survey activities.[16]	No	No	**Yes.** Chinese patrol ships ordered the Malaysian vessels to leave	No
2013.5	The Philippines used ships to transport food and water to those guarding the	Demanded that the Philippines stop taking "provocative" actions that further complicate	No	No	**Yes.** Chinese maritime surveillance ships tried to stop the resupply	No

[14] See appendix III.
[15] MFA Press Conference, February 19, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1014798.shtml, accessed August 19, 2017.
[16] See appendix III.

	Second Thomas Shoal	peace and stability in the South China Sea[17]				
2014.3	The Philippines attempted to refuel the Second Thomas Shoal	Expel the Philippine vessels carrying construction materials[18]	No	No	**Yes.** Two Chinese maritime surveillance ships were trying to blockade the Philippine vessels, and they succeeded	No
2014.3	Philippine Navy attempted to use *civilian* ships to refuel the Second Thomas Shoal	China would not allow any means the Philippines took to encroach upon the Second Thomas Shoal[19]	No	No	**Yes.** There were two Chinese maritime surveillance ships; a two-hour standoff	No
2014.5	China sent oil rig 981 to the Paracels, and Vietnam sent law enforcement ships to counter	(See Chapter 4 for the case study)	Yes (1) But very briefly; relations resumed relatively fast	No	**Yes.** Chinese coast guard ships rammed into and sunk Vietnamese vessels	No
2015. 6	Vietnam accused China of attacking its fishermen[20]	No	No	No	**Yes**	No
2015. 6	Vietnam accused China of attacking its fishermen	No	No	No	**Yes**	No

[17] MFA, Press Conference, May 30, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1045556.shtml; MFA, Press Conference, May 22, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1042669.shtml; MFA Press Conference, May 28, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1044736.shtml, accessed August 19, 2017.
[18] Press Conference, March 10, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1135809.shtml, accessed August 19, 2017.
[19] MFA, Press Conference, March 29, 2014, 2014-03-29 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/t1142204.shtml, accessed August 19, 2017.
[20] "Vietnam accuses China's attacking its fishermen," AP, June 16, 2015. The accusation was the attack took place three times, hence the two incidents below.

2015. 6	Vietnam accused China of attacking its fishermen	No	No	No	**Yes**	No
2015.10	Vietnam accused China of sinking its fishing boat[21]	No	No	No	**Yes**	No
2015.4[22]	The Philippines accused China of robbing its fishermen around the Scarborough Shoal	Yes	No	No	**Yes**	No
2015.1.29[23]	China rammed three Philippine fishing vessels near the Scarborough Shoal	Yes	No	No	**Yes**	No
2016.6: faceoff between Philippine youth and Chinese Coast Guard ships at the Scarborough Shoal[24]	Yes	No	No	**Yes**	No	
2016.7: the Tribunal[25]	Yes	No	No	**Yes:** China blocked Philippine fishermen from the Scarborough Shoal[26]	No	
2017.8: The Philippines built sandbar huts on a	Yes	No	No	Yes: Chinese patrol boats soon approached the sandbar	No	

[21] "Vietnam accuses Chinese vessel for sinking fishing boat," AP, June 15, 2015.
[22] "Philippines accuses China coastguard of armed robbery," AFP, April 23, 2015.
[23] https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/china-defends-ships-action-south-china-sea.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] "China digs in after tribunal rebuke; Philippines wants talks," AP, July 18, 2016.

sandbar near Thitu Island[27]				and demanded that the huts be removed. The Philippines complied.		
2018.5: Philippines upgraded Thitua Island[28]	Yes	No	No	Yes: Chinese Coast Guard coerced fishermen around the Scarborough Shoal	No	
2019.2: Philippines upgraded Thitu Island[29]	Yes	No	No	Yes: Chinese Coast Guard ships in the area	No	
2020.3.30: Vietnam's UN submission on South China Sea[30]	Yes	No	No	Yes: on April 2, the Chinese Coast Guard Ship No. 4301 rammed a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the Paracels[31]	No	
2020.8: the Philippines named several features around the Thitu Island.[32]	Yes	No	No	Yes: coercion against fishermen in the Scarborough Shoal.[33]	No	

Incidents and Reactive and Immediate Cases of Coercion in the South China Sea

Table 1. Incidents Regarding Island Control and Oil Exploration

Year /Incidents	No action/rhetorical	Diplomatic Sanctions	Economic Sanctions	Gray-zone Coercion	Military coercion

[27] *Ibid.*
[28] NISSS, 2018nian nanhai dashiji.
[29] NISCSS, 2019nian nanhai dashiji.
[30] MFA Press Conference, April 21, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2020-04/21/c_1125887543.htm.
[31] NISCSS, 2020nian nanhai dashiji.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.

		(Including Duration)		(Specific kinds: expelling or etc.)	(Including Duration)
Control Over Land Features in the South China					
1991.9.1: Malaysia planned to build an airstrip on Layang Layang Island in the Spratlys[34]	Diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
1991.11.3: Vietnam took the Grainger bank in the Spratlys[35]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
1990.11.4: Vietnam took the Prince Consort Bank (Bai Phuc Nguyen) [36]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
1991.11.30: Vietnam took the Alexandra Bank[37]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
Summer 1992: Malaysia finished the runway on Layang Layang[38]	No action, nor diplomatic mentioning publicly.	No	No	No	No
1992.7.19: Vietnam established a small fishing harbor on the Changsha island in the Spratlys[39]	No action, nor diplomatic mentioning; China stressed the need to peacefully resolve issues in the South China Sea.[40]	No	No	No	No

[34] *Herald Sun*, September 2, 1991, Kuala Lumpur.
[35] Hainan Provincial Office, *Hainan shengzhi — xinanzhong sha qundao zhi [Gazetteer of Hainan — Regarding the Paracel, Macclesfield, and Spratly Islands]*, compiled by the government in Haikou in 2005, p. 313. This material is available in the library of NISCSS; cross-checked with Alexander L. Vuving, "South China Sea: Who Claims What in the Spratlys?," *The Diplomat*, May 6, 2016, https://tribunecontentagency.com/article/south-china-sea-who-claims-what-in-the-spratlys/, accessed April 17, 2018.
[36] Hainan Provincial Office, *Hainan shengzhi — xinanzhong sha qundao zhi [Gazetteer of Hainan — Regarding the Paracel, Macclesfield, and Spratly Islands]*, p. 313; cross-checked with Alexander L. Vuving, "South China Sea: Who Claims What in the Spratlys?"
[37] Li Jinming, *Nanhai botao — dongnanya guojia yu nanhai wenti*, p. 34; cross-checked with Alexander L. Vuving, "South China Sea: Who Claims What in the Spratlys?."
[38] Makito Ohashi, *The Nikkei Weekly (Japan)*, May 30, 1992.
[39] Zhang Liangfu, *Nansha qundao dashiji*, p. 230.
[40] *Ibid.*

1992.5: Philippines took four land features in the Spratlys[41]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
1992.3.19: Vietnamese armed fishery boat No. 710 removed Chinese markers in the Spratlys on the Alison Reef[42]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
1993.5.15: The Philippines ordered its armed forces to expand airports in disputed islands of the Spratlys[43]	Yes, no action, nor diplomatic mentioning	No	No	No	No
1993.7: The Philippines removed Chinese markers on the Mischief reef[44]	Yes, no action, nor diplomatic mentioning	No	No	No	No
1993.8.15: Philippine frigate no. 28 removed Chinese markers in Spratlys.[45]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
Southwest Cay: Song Tu Tay lighthouse is about 320 nautical miles from Nha Trang. The island of Song Tu Tay has an area of about 12 hectares. It is one of the six largest islands in Truong Sa. The lighthouse was built in 1993, with a height of about 36m. [46]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No

[41] No specific date was given, see Alexander L. Vuving, "South China Sea: Who Claims What in the Spratlys?;" in 1992, the Philippine Navy rehabilitated the lighthouse and reported it to the International Maritime Organization for publication in the List of Lights (currently, this lighthouse is not operational). See Mark E. Rosen, "Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis," A CNA Occasional Paper, August 2014, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/IOP-2014-U-008435.pdf, acessed April 17, 2018. The Chinese sources provided the month, see Hainan Provincial Office, *Hainan shengzhi — xinanzhong sha qundao zhi [Gazetteer of Hainan — Regarding the Paracel, Macclesfield, and Spratly Islands]*, p. 314.
[42] *Ibid.,* p. 314.
[43] Zhang Liangfu, *Nansha qundao dashiji*, p. 247; for cross-checking, see "Taiwan considering building airfield in Spratly Islands," *Taiwan Economic News*, July 14, 1993.
[44] Hainan Provincial Office, *Hainan shengzhi — xinanzhong sha qundao zhi [Gazetteer of Hainan — Regarding the Paracel, Macclesfield, and Spratly Islands]*, p. 314.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] See "Photos: Nine lighthouses in Truong Sa," *VietNamNet Bridge*, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/vietnam-in-photos/138216/photos--nine-lighthouses-in-truong-sa.html; Russ Rowlett, "Lighthouses of the Spratly Islands," https://www.unc.edu/~rowlett/lighthouse/spr.htm; Vietnam Ministry of Transport, "Song Tu Tay," http://www.vms-south.vn/en/hai-dang-luong-hang-hai/he-thong-hai-dang/song-tu-tay, accessed April 17, 2018.

1994.5.27: Vietnam established a lighthouse on Ladd Reef.[47]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1994.6.7: Vietnam established lighthouses on the West London Reef.[48] One of which was completed on June 21, 1994, which was presumably the West London Reef.[49]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1994.8.27:Vietnam finished a fishing harbor on the Spratly island.[50]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
1994.9.27: Philippines established a marker on land features in the Spratlys[51]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
1994.9.29: Philippines established markers on land features in the Spratlys[52]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
1994.12 to 1995.2 Mischief Reef incident: China established infrastructure on the mischief reef first (through China's fishery administration).	Yes, multiple diplomatic protests[54]; but relations improved soon after; and Chinese FM Qian	No – negotiations continued despite all the below episodes.[56]	No	Yes: 1995. 1. 10 1995. 1. 17	No

[47] Zhang Liangfu, *Nansha qundao dashiji*, p. 265; cross-checked: Maritime Briefs, *Journal of Commerce*, July 1, 1994, Friday; Da Lat lighthouse is located on Ladd Reef that belongs to West Pole of Spratly islands, in Truong Sa district, Khanh Hoa province. It was established in 1994. Vietnam Ministry of Transport, "Da Lat," http://www.vms-south.vn/en/hai-dang-luong-hang-hai/he-thong-hai-dang/da-lat, accessed April 17, 2018.
[48] Zhang Liangfu, *Nansha qundao dashiji*, p. 265; The Da Tay Lighthouse is on Da Tay reef, built in June 1994, with a height of 20m. See "Photos: Nine lighthouses in Truong Sa."
[49] Da Tay lighthouse is located on West London Reef that belongs to Spratly islands, in Truong Sa district, Khanh Hoa province. West London Reef consists of a eastern part is a sand-dune 0,6m in height, a western part us a coral bank that only rises when the tide is coming. West London Reef is a part of London Reefs. It was established on 06/21/1994. Vietnam Ministry of Transport, "Da Tay," http://www.vms-south.vn/en/hai-dang-luong-hang-hai/he-thong-hai-dang/da-tay, accessed April 17, 2018.
For others such as Grainger Bank and Alexandra Bank, see Russ Rowlett, "Lighthouses of the Spratly Islands."
[50] Hainan Provincial Office, *Hainan shengzhi — xinanzhong sha qundao zhi,* p. 316.
[51] Hainan Provincial Office, *Hainan shengzhi — xinanzhong sha qundao zhi,* p. 316. The start date of the Philippine occupation of Commodore Reef remains uncertain. Philippine troops landed on the reef in August 1980 and removed a marker that Malaysia installed there a few months before, but it is unknown whether they stayed or left after the operation. One report states that they deserted it since 1986, but it is currently occupied by a military detachment. See Alexander L. Vuving, "South China Sea: Who Claims What in the Spratlys?"
[52] Hainan Provincial Office, *Hainan shengzhi — xinanzhong sha qundao zhi,* p. 316.
[54] *Ibid.,* p. 279.
[56] See Zhang Liangfu, *Nanhai wanlixing — zai nansha qundao xuhang de rizi.*

And in January 1995, Philippine fishers stopped by the reef, and was faced with Chinese coercion[53]	Qichen met with his Philippine counterpart, stating that SCS issue should not affect the bilateral relations[55]	Result: the Philippines accquised Chinese occupation of the mischief reef.			
Mid to late March 1995: the Philippine navy destroyed Chinese wind-shielding infrastructure on the Mischief reef (China established infrastructure there in the first place); The Philippine naval ships went to the reef[57]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1995 March: As a spin-off from the mischief reef incident, The Philippine navy destroyed the infrastructure of eight of the reefs claimed by China, including Xian'e, Xinyi, Banyue, Ren'ai, and Wufan reefs.[58]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1995.5.13: as a spin-off of the Mischief incident, the Philippines dispatched journalists to the reef	Yes	No	No	Yes: 1995. 5. 13: Chinese fishery's administrative ship no. 34. Result of this incident: on June 1, 1995, both sides reached an agreement on joint development.	No; there was the presence of two Chinese naval frigates – but again, they were 25 kilometers away

[53] Zhang Liangfu, *Nansha qundao dashiji*, p. 57.
[55] *Ibid.,* p. 277 and p. 282.
[57] Information comes from Zhang Liangfu, *Nanhai wanlixing — zai nansha qundao xuhang de rizi*; Ralf Emmers, *Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia*, p. 71.
[58] Nirmal Ghosh, Manila Correspondent, "No co-operative ventures in Spratlys until atmosphere improves,"*The Straits Times (Singapore)*, Manila, April 7, 1995; Lindsay Murdoch, "Spratly bombing fuels row," *The Age (Melbourne, Australia)*, March 25, 1995, Saturday, Late Edition.

				[59] This incident ended in August 1995.[60]	
1995.5: Dr Mahathir visited Layang Layang Island.[61]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
1996. 5: Dr Mahathir visited Layang Layang.[62]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
1997.4. 30-5.2: as a spin-off, The Philippine navy disrupted amateur wireless transmission (radio) enthusiasts' trip to the Scarborough shoal – these people come from China, Japan, and the United States.[63]	Yes, diplomatic protest	No	No	Yes: Chinese maritime surveillance ships 74 and 72 faced a standoff with The Philippine navy.[64] Their basic goal seemed to be protecting these wireless transmission lovers. They left peacefully without harm; but The Philippines strengthened control of the Scarborough shoal afterwards. China, as its MFA spokesperson stated, was indeed acting restraint.[65]	No
1997.5.9: Philippine congressmen and	No	No	No	No	No (there used to be Chinese naval ships

[59] Shen Jindong, "1995nian dongnanya dashini [Chronology of events in Southeast Asia 1995]," *Dongnanya zongheng jikan [Around Southeast Asia, quarterly journal]*, Issue 1 (1996).
[60] Zhang Liangfu, *Nanhai wanlixing — zai nansha qundao xuhang de rizi,* p. 73.
[61] "Mahathir: BBC congenitally incapable of truth," *New Straits Times (Malaysia),* May 27, 1995.
[62] *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, May 1, 1996.
[63] David Lague, *Sydney Morning Herald (Australia)*, May 24, 1997 Saturday, Early Edition; Zhang Liangfu, Nanhai wanlixing — zai nansha qundao xuhang de rizi, p. 29; "Three star Philippines guards shoal from Chinese," St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri), May 19, 1997, Monday, p. 05A.
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Ibid.,* p. 148

reporters visited Thitu island.[66]					around, but they were not present at that time)
1997.6 The Philippines navy destroyed Chinese infrastructure on Xianbin reef[67]	Yes, diplomatic protest; but relations improved soon after	No	No	No	No
1998.6: Vietnam took Aonan Shoal and Kingston Shoal.[68]	Diplomatic protests: China has protested to Vietnam and demanded that it withdraw at once from a pair of submerged reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea that its navy ''illegally seized'' recently, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tuesday.[69]	No	No	No	No
1999.5.15: Malaysia established infrastructure on Yulin and Boqi shoals.[70]	Yes, diplomatic protest.	No	No	No	No
1999.3 The Philippines constructed military infrastructure on Thitu islands	Yes, diplomatic protest; but relations improved soon after	No	No	No	No
1999.5: The Philippine navy occupied the Second Thomas Shoal[71]	Yes, diplomatic protest; but relations improved soon after	No	No	No	No

[66] Xiao Xiqing, *Nansha fengyu – nansha qundao wenti de yanpan yu fenxi [Analyzing the South China Sea issue]* (Taipei: Taiwan Student Press, 2010), p. 361.
[67] "Manila defends Spratly action," *The Weekend Australian*, July 5, 1997, Saturday, Source: AFP, p. 14
[68] Zhang Liangfu, Nanhai wanlixing — zai nansha qundao xuhang de rizi, p. 29.
[69] The reefs in question, known as Orleans Shoal and Kingston Shoal, are called Aonan and Jindun by China. The two shoals lie about 20 kilometers apart in the southwestern portion of the Spratlys. "China demands Vietnam withdraw from reefs in Spratlys," *Asian Political News*, September 14, 1998.
[70] "Atolls within Malaysian EEZ," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, June 24, 1999.
[71] This case stands in contrast with Chinese behavior in 2014. Alexander L. Vuving, "South China Sea: Who Claims What in the Spratlys?"

1999.11.3, the Philippines planned to "sit" naval ship by the Scarborough shoal.	Yes, diplomatic protest	Yes, diplomatic pressure applied.[72] Premier Zhu Rongji was about to visit the Philippines – The Philippines seemed to have caved in on 11. 29.[73]	No	No	No
2000: Vietnam: established Tiên Nữ (Pigeon Reef, Tennent Reef) lighthouse.[74]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2003.4: Vietnamese congress members and deputy defense ministers visited the Spratlys.[75]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2003.11：Philippines removed markers China placed in the Spratlys[76]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2003.4: Philippine navy sent local politicians to the Thitu island for a commemoration ceremony.[77]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2004.4.20 Vietnamese boats which boarded 100 tourists went to disputed islands in the Spratlys.[78]	Diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No

[72] Zhang Liangfu, *Nanhai wanlixing — zai nansha qundao xuhang de rizi*, p. 152
[73] "Philippines tows navy ship from disputed shoal near Spratlys," *Agence France-Presse,* November 30, 1999.
[74] Russ Rowlett, "Lighthouses of the Spratly Islands."
[75] Liu Kang et al., "Nanzhongguohai xingshi burong leguan [The dire situation in the South China Sea]," *Xinhua Net*, January 12, 2004, http://news.sohu.com/2004/01/12/00/news218390085.shtml, accessed May 5, 2018.
[76] Luz Baguioro, "Manila considers Spratlys protest," *The Straits Times (Singapore)*, November 8, 2003.
[77] Fu Ying and Wu Shicun, "The South China Sea: Historical perspectives and contemporary reflections," *Manila Bulletin*, June 24, 2016, http://2016.mb.com.ph/2016/06/24/the-south-china-sea-historical-perspectives-and-contemporary-reflections/, accessed May 5, 2018.
[78] *Ibid.;* cross-checked by "Vietnam to go forward with oil and gas exploration near disputed Spratly Islands," *Associated Press*, October 21, 2004.

2007: Vietnam constructed a harbor on the West Reef.[79]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2007: Vietnam began constructing a runway on the Spratly island and it was completed in 2008.[80]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2008: Vietnam began reclamation on Southwest Cay.[81]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2008: the Philippine defense minister went to the Thitu island.[82] (In 2007 the air force announced plans to rehabilitate the airstrip with an eye to encouraging development of the island as a beach resort.[83])	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2008.8: Malaysian vice prime minister Najib went to the Layang Layang[84]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
Vietnamese lighthouse was established in 2009 – active on sand cay[85]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2009: Lighthouse by Vietnam: Trường Sa Lớn (Spratly Island).[86]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2009.3.5: Malaysian Prime Minister	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No

[79] For more images, see CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/west-reef-tracker/, accessed April 17, 2018; data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[80] "Feiyue zhan nanai daojiao kuojian jichang [The Philippines and Vietnam are building airports on islands in the South China Sea]," *Global Times*, November 10, 2015, http://mil.sohu.com/20151110/n425848377_1.shtml; for cross-checking, see CSIS AMTI, Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/spratly-island-tracker, accessed April 17, 2018.
[81] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange; for cross-checking, see CSIS AMTI, Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/Southwest-cay-tracker, accessed April 17, 2018.
[82] Jefferson Antiporda, "Philippines won't provoke confrontation at Spratlys," *Manila Times (Philippines),* March 27, 2008 Thursday.
[83] Russ Rowlett, "Lighthouses of the Spratly Islands."
[84] Adrian David, "Modern weapons a must for security, says Najib," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, August 13, 2008 Wednesday.
[85] Russ Rowlett, "Lighthouses of the Spratly Islands."
[86] *Ibid.*

Abdullah Badawi went to Layang Layang.[87]					
2009.5.6: Malaysia and Vietnam handed over documents claiming sovereign rights to CLCS[88]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2009 The Philippines passed a bill indicating the Scarborough Shoal as its national territory[89]	Yes, diplomatic protest; but relations improved soon after	No	No	No; the MFA spokesperson particularly *ruled out* the rumor that China planned to retaliate by recalling Chinese working in the Philippines.	No
Lighthouse on Sin Cowe Island: built around 2010. Active; focal plane about 25 m (82 ft); three red flashes, in a 2+1 pattern, every 15 s. 23 m (75 ft) square cylindrical concrete tower with lantern and gallery, rising from a 2-story station building.[90]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
Lighthouse in 2010: Vietnam: Đá Đông (East London Reef)[91]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2010.4: Chinese fishery administrative ship no. 311 was faced with the Malaysian navy around Layang Layang.[92]	No	No	No	Yes: Standoff: showing presence.	No
2010.3: Vietnamese prime minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng visited a land feature in the Spratlys.[93]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No

[87] K. Kesavapany, "Flashpoint: South China Sea," *The Straits Times (Singapore),* April 15, 2009 Wednesday.
[88] See Carnegiee Endownment report, "Chronology of South China Sea events since 2006."
[89] *Ibid.*
[90] Russ Rowlett, "Lighthouses of the Spratly Islands;"
CSIS AMTI, Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/sin-cowe-island-tracker/, accessed April 17, 2018.
[91] Russ Rowlett, "Lighthouses of the Spratly Islands."
[92] *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, August 26, 2010.
[93] Carnegiee Endownment report, "Chronology of South China Sea events since 2006."

Lighthouse in 2010: Vietnam: Phan Vinh (Pearson Reef)[94]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
Lighthouse in 2010: Vietnam: Nam Yết (Namyit Island)[95]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2011: Vietnam started reclamation on the Pearson reef.[96]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2011.7 The Philippines naval personnel and politicians boarded the Thitu island[97]	Yes, no action, nor diplomatic mentioning; president Aquino visited China for the first time in August 2011	No	No	No	No
2011.5: Philippine navy removed markers in the Spratlys.[98]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2011.7-8: Philippines strengthened infrastructures on the Thitu island and planned to renovate the airport.[99]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
Vietnam: Between August 2011 and February 2015 significant upgrades were made to the Sand Cay island in the Spratlys.[100]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
West reef: Vietnam began land reclamation on the West Reef in the	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No

[94] Russ Rowlett, "Lighthouses of the Spratly Islands."
[95] *Ibid.*
[96] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange; cross-checked by CSIS AMTI, Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/pearson-reef-tracker/, accessed April 17, 2018.
[97] See Wang Shumin, "Analysis of Philippines' Standoff with China on the South China Sea Issue and Factors Influencing this Standoff [Feilvbin zai nanhai wenti shang yu zhongguo de duikang ji yuanyin fenxi — yi ajinuo sanshi shangren yeller weili]," *Journal of Hainan Normal University [Hainan shifan daxue bao],* No. 155, Vol. 28 (2015); AFP and Johanna Paola D. Poblete, "Lawmakers visit Spratly islands despite China warning," *Business World*, July 21, 2011 Thursday.
[98] "Navy and Coast Guard remove Chinese markers," *Gulf News (United Arab Emirates)*, June 16, 2011 Thursday.
[99] AFP, "Filipinos fly flag in South China Sea," *Times of Oman*, July 23, 2011 Saturday.
[100] CSIS AMTI, Island Tracker, http://amti.csis.org/vietnam-island-building/; Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.

Spratlys starting August 2012.[101]					
Central reef: Vietnam began land reclamation in 2012.[102]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
Grierson Reef: Vietnam began land reclamation in 2012.[103]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2012.6.21: Vietnam passed maritime law confirming the sovereignty over Spratlys and Paracels.[104]	No direct diplomatic protests.	No	No	No	No
2012.4: Scarborough incident[105]	Yes	Yes	Yes: short-term, banana quarantine	Yes[106]	No
2013.1: Philippines handed over case to the tribunal [107]	Yes	No	Diplomatic sanctions?	No	No
2013.5: the Philippines used ships to transport food and water to those guarding the Second Thomas Shoal.[108]	No	No	No	Yes: use of maritime surveillance ships. [109] [110]	No

[101] *Ibid.*
[102] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange; cross-checked by CSIS AMTI, Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/central-reef-tracker/
[103] *Ibid.*
[104] "China criticizes Vietnam in disputes over islands," *New York Times,* June 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/world/asia/china-criticizes-vietnam-in-dispute-over-islands.html, accessed April 17, 2018.
[105] For more information, see "Are maritime law enforcement forces destabilizing Asia?," CSIS China Power Project.
[106] *China Maritime Yearbook 2013*, p. 151.
[107] Ye Jingsi, "Zhongguo fa lichang wenjian bochi feilvbin nanhai zhongcai an [China released a position paper to counter Philippine's South China Sea arbitration]," *BBC News*, December 7, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/12/141207_china_philippines_maritime_dispute, accessed May 6, 2018.
[108] "China admits monitoring PH in disputed waters," *Manila Bulletin*, May 30, 2013; "Are maritime law enforcement forces destabilizing Asia?" CSIS China Power Project.
[109] "Zhongguo quzhujian jinru nanhai ren'ai jiao haiyu [Chinese destroyers entered into waters surrounding the Thomas Reef]," *Xinhua News*, May 11, 2013, http://view.news.qq.com/a/20130511/000011.htm, accessed April 17, 2018.
[110] See also MFA, Press Conference, May 30, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1045556.shtml; MFA, Press Conference, May 22, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1042669.shtml; MFA Press Conference, May 28, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1044736.shtml, accessed April 17, 2018.

2013.6.19 The Philippines navy completed the refueling activity on the Thomas reef[111]	Yes, no action, nor diplomatic mentioning	No	No	No	No
2013: Philippines renovated the airport on the Thitu island.[112]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2014: Vietnam began reclamation on Namyit Island.[113]	No	No	No	No	No
2014: Vietnam began reclamation on Cornwallis South Reef.[114]	No	No	No	No	No
2014: Vietnam began reclamation on Sin Cowe Island.[115]	No	No	No	No	No
2014: Vietnam began reclamation on Amboyna Cay.[116]	No	No	No	No	No
2014.3.9 The Philippines attempts to refuel the Thomas reef (i.e., to strengthen the construction)	Yes, diplomatic protests	Yes?	No	Yes; there were two Chinese maritime surveillance ships trying to blockade and they succeeded.[117]	No
2014.3.29 The Philippine navy attempted to use *civilian* ships to refuel the Thomas reef	Yes, diplomatic protests; protests also on 3.30 for The Philippines handling the	Yes?	No	Yes; There were two Chinese maritime surveillance ships; a two-	No

[111] Manuel Mogato, "Exclusive: Philippines reinforcing rusting ship on Spratly reef outpost - sources," *Reuters*, July 13, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-philippines-shoal-exclu-idUSKCN0PN2HN20150714, accessed April 17, 2018.
[112] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange. Major changes, however, did not seem to take place due to budgetary constraints. See Carmela Fonbuena, "Hitches in repair of PH air field in Spratlys," *Rappler*, June 18, 2014, http://www.rappler.com/nation/60918-runway-kalayaan-spratlys, accessed April 17, 2018.
[113] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[114] CSIS AMTI, Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/cornwallis-reef-tracker/; Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[115] CSIS AMTI, Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/cornwallis-reef-tracker/; Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[116] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[117] MFA Press Conference, March 10, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1135809.shtml; for cross-check, see CSIS China Power Project, "Are maritime law enforcement forces destabilizing Asia?," accessed April 17, 2018.

	case to ICJ (is that why China acted?)			hour standoff.[118]	
2015.5.11: Philippine officials visited Pag-as Island (Thitu Island)[119]	No	No	No	No	No
2015.7.26: The Philippines removed Chinese buoys near the Scarborough Shoal[120]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2015: Vietnam began reclamation on Barque Canada Reef.[121]	No	No	No	No	No
2015: Vietnam began reclamation on Collins Reef.[122]	No	No	No	No	No
2015: Vietnam began reclamation on Grainger Bank.[123]	No	No	No	No	No
2015: Vietnam began reclamation on East Reef.[124]	No	No	No	No	No
2015: Vietnam began reclamation on Discovery Great Reef.[125]	No	No	No	No	No
2015: Vietnam began reclamation on Spratly Island.[126]	No	No	No	No	No
2016.1: The Philippines planned more infrastructure update on Thitu Island	Yes	No	No	No	No
2016.3: China blocked the Philippine fishermen from the Jackson Atoll following the Philippines'	Yes	No	No	Yes	No

[118] CIMA, *China Maritime Development Report 2015,* p. 87; MFA, Press Conference, March 29, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/t1142204.shtml; for cross-check, see CSIS China Power Project, "Are maritime law enforcement forces destabilizing Asia?," accessed April 17, 2018.
[119] "Philippine military chief visits South China Sea island," AP, May 11, 2015.
[120] "REFILE-Filipino fishermen remove Chinese buoys near disputed shoal, officials say," Reuters, July 26, 2015.
[121] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[122] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[123] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[124] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[125] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange.
[126] Data regarding the timing is provided by researchers at NISCSS, via email exchange. See CSIS AMTI's Island Tracker also for cross-checking, https://amti.csis.org/spratly-island/, accessed April 17, 2018.

abandonment of a ship near the Atoll[127]					
2016.5: Vietnam's land reclamation in the South China Sea[128]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2016.6: faceoff between Philippine youth and Chinese Coast Guard ships at the Scarborough Shoal[129]	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
2016.7: the Tribunal[130]	Yes	No	No	Yes: China blocked Philippine fishermen from the Scarborough Shoal[131]	No
2016.8[132]: Vietnam's upgrade in land features in the South China Sea	Yes	No	No	No	No
2016.11: Vietnam's land reclamation in the South China Sea[133]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2017.4: Philippine military officials visited Thitu Island[134]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2017.8: The Philippines built sandbar huts on a sandbar near Thitu Island[135]	Yes	No	No	Yes: Chinese patrol boats soon approached the sandbar and demanded that the huts be removed. The Philippines complied.	No

[127] NISCSS, 2016nian nanhai dashiji [Chronology of South China Sea events 2016].
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid.
[131] "China digs in after tribunal rebuke; Philippines wants talks," AP, July 18, 2016.
[132] NISCSS, 2016nian nanhai dashiji.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Zhang Jie ed., *2018nian Zhongguo zhoubian anquan xingshi pinggu* [The 2018 Assessment of China's Regional Security Environment] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 2018), p. 117.
[135] *Ibid.*

2018.5: Philippines upgraded Thitu Island[136]	Yes	No	No	Yes: Chinese Coast Guard coerced fishermen around the Scarborough Shoal	No
2019.2: Philippines upgraded Thitu Island[137]	Yes	No	No	Yes: Chinese Coast Guard ships in the area	No
2019.12: Malaysia's UN submission on South China Sea[138]	Yes	No	No	Yes: Since December, Chinese forces have been harassing supply ships servicing the West Capella, an oil exploration vessel operated by Petronas. This continued through 2020.[139]	No
2020.6: Philippine defense chief went to Thitu Island[140]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2020.3.30: Vietnam's UN submission on South China Sea[141]	Yes	No	No	Yes: on April 2, the Chinese Coast Guard Ship No. 4301 rammed a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the Paracels[142]	No
2020.6: The Philippines began the operation of a port on Thitu Island and officials attended the ceremony.[143]	Yes	No	No	No	No

[136] NISSS, 2018nian nanhai dashiji.
[137] NISCSS, 2019nian nanhai dashiji.
[138] NISCSS, 2019nian nanhai dashiji.
[139] "Malaysia calls for peaceful end to months-long South China Sea standoff," Reuters, April 23, 2020.
[140] "Philippine defense chief flies to disputed island amid feud," Associated Press, June 9, 2020.
[141] MFA Press Conference, April 21, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2020-04/21/c_1125887543.htm.
[142] NISCSS, 2020nian nanhai dashiji.
[143] NISCSS, 2020nian nanhai dashiji.

2020.8: the Philippines named several features around the Thitu Island.[144]	Yes	No	No	Yes: coercion against fishermen in the Scarborough Shoal.[145]	No
Oil and Gas Drilling and Contrast Signing Activities					
1992: Vietnam and Malaysia signed a joint development agreement.[146]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1992: Vietnam's Oil Firm in Joint Venture: Petrovietnam, Vietnam's state oil company, signed an agreement with a Canadian group to set up a joint venture that will build a natural gas pipeline and a gas plant for $300 million.[147]	No?	No	No	No	No
1992.6: Vietnam signed oil contracts with Norwegian company NOPEC.[148]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1992: Vietnam signed contracts with Indonesia petrol company Astra Petronusa.[149]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1993: Malaysia signed contracts with Mobil to explore oil and gas near the Vanguard bank block.[150]	Yes	No	No	No	No

[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Li Jinming, *Nanhai botao — dongnanya guojia yu nanhai wenti*, appendix; Ismail Kassim, "Malaysia, Vietnam agree on framework for joint oil search,"*The Straits Times,* June 6, 1992.
[147] Times Staff and Wire Reports, *Los Angles Times,* April 20, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-20/business/fi-506_1_natural-gas, accessed April 17, 2018. The agreement was signed in Hanoi with Liquigaz/SNC, which groups one of Canada's biggest natural gas recovery companies, Liquigaz, with SNC, Canada's biggest engineering and construction firm.
[148] See Li Jinming, *Nanhai botao — dongnanya guojia yu nanhai wenti*, appendix; Patrick Donovan, "BP to help rebuild Kuwait's oilfields," *The Guardian (London)*, July 28, 1992.
[149] Harish Mehta, "Vietnam to sign oil deals with 3 foreign groups next month," *Business Times (Singapore),* September 14, 1992.
[150] Li Jinming, *Nanhai botao — dongnanya guojia yu nanhai wenti*, appendix; "Mobil-Malaysia Deal," *The New York Times*, September 30, 1993, Thursday, Late Edition.

1993.3: Vietnam signed contracts with Mobil.[151]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1993.4.15: Vietnam signed a contract for joint development with BHP, Total, Petronas, and a Japanese company.[152]	Yes?	No	No	No	No
1993.12: PetroVietnam signed a contract with Mobil along with other oil companies.[153]	Yes?	No	No	No	No
1993.5.13: A Chinese seismic survey ship was firing seismographic air guns into the sea late last week not far from where two companies working for BP were conducting a marine seismic surveys. Mr Yeldham said the Chinese ship left the area on Monday. "The Vietnamese naval vessels appeared. They observed. They left. And soon afterward the Chinese vessel moved on," said Mr Yeldham. "There was no engagement.[154]	Yes?	No	No	No	No
1994.4.18: CNOOC was conducting exploration with Crestone around the Vanguard bank. Vietnam dispatched exploratory ships into the Wan'an area in the Spratlys, disrupting also Chinese exploratory activities	Yes, diplomatic protests; but China eventually gave in, (de facto) postponing the deal made with U.S. company Creston to explore the	No	No	No[158]	No

[151] Li Jinming, *Nanhai botao — dongnanya guojia yu nanhai wenti*, appendix.
[152] Carlyle A. Thayer, "Visit by PM marks a high point in bilateral relations," *Australian Financial Review,* June 16, 1993 Wednesday.
[153] Li Jinming, *Nanhai botao — dongnanya guojia yu nanhai wenti*, appendix; Agis Salpukas, "Mobil Wins Right to Drill for Oil Off Vietnam," *The New York Times*, December 21, 1993, Tuesday, Late Edition.
[154] Wong Joon San, "Chinese seismic ship leaves BP survey area, Business," *South China Morning Post,* May 14, 1993, p. 1; Carlyle A. Thayer, "Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 34, No. 6 (Jun., 1994), p. 525.
[158] Interviews with Chinese crew on board, see Shan Zhiqiang, "1994nian zhongyue duizhi shijian [the 1994 standoff between China and the Philippines]."

with naval and armed ships[155]; Chinese exploratory ships (in contract with Creston) were forced to return[156]	Wan'an area in 1996 (even though the contract was still effective.) China acted restraint.[157]				
1994.7.6: the Philippines announced cooperation with Alcom to explore oil resources around Reed Bank.[159][160]	Yes	No	No	No	No
First half of 1994: Vietnam had drilled 6 wells with BP in the Vanguard basin.[161]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1994.4.19: Mobil and PetroVietnam officially began to implement their contract.[162][163]	Yes	No	No	No	No
1994: Vietnam and Russia engaged in joint exploration in the Spratlys[164] in the same Wan'an 21 area	Yes, diplomatic protests[165]	No	No	No	No
1994.7: Oil analysts said Vietnam established the small oil rig this year in an area of the South China Sea that it calls the Wanan Bei block, about 280 miles off southern Vietnam. The Vietnamese claim, which China had earlier described as illegal, is	Yes	No	No	No	Yes. China has deployed two warships in the South China Sea to blockade a Vietnames e oil rig

[155] This seems to stand in contrast with what happens in 2014.
[156] Zhang Liangfu, *Nanhai wanlixing — zai nansha qudao xuhang de rizi*, p. 264; "American Oil Company in Dispute Between Vietnam and China," *The Associated Press*, April 21, 1994.
[157] Wu Shicun, *Nansha zhengduan de qiyuan yu fazhan [Origins and development of the South China Sea disputes]* (Beijing: China Economics Press, 2010), p. 93.
[159] An Yingmin ed., *Jiyu nanhai zhuquan zhanlue de haiyang xingzheg guanli chuangxin,* p. 177.
[160] Zhang Liangfu, *Nansha qundao dashiji,* p. 257; Bill Hayton, *The South China Sea: Struggle For Power in Asia*.
[161] Wu Shicun, *Nansha zhengduan de qiyuan yu fazhan*, p. 10; Neil Thapar, "Vietnam gas find helps BP turn up heat," *The Independent (London)*, September 11, 1994, Sunday.
[162] Martha M. Hamilton, "Mobil Strikes Oil Deal With Vietnam; Company Gets Go-Ahead for Exploration in Part of South China Sea," *The Washington Post*, April 20, 1994, Wednesday, Final Editiont.
[163] Li Jinming, *Nanhai botao — dongnanya guojia yu nanhai wenti*, appendix.
[164] *Ibid*., p. 273
[165] Li Guoqiang, *Nanzhongguo hai yanjiu [Analysis of the South China Sea]* (Harbin: Heilongjiang Press, 2003), p. 186.

being developed by a consortium of foreign oil companies led by Mobil.					built at a site claimed by both China and Vietnam, diplomats and oil industry analysts said today. The Chinese ships have already turned back at least one Vietnames e vessel that was ferrying supplies to the rig, in a dramatic increase in a long-simmering dispute between the two countries over oil rights in the South China Sea. A spokesman for the Vietnames e Embassy in Beijing, Nguyen Hong Hai, said embassy officials were "very concerned" about reports of the blockade, although he said he

					could not confirm that a Vietnamese vessel had been turned back by Chinese ships.[166]
1994: PetroVietnam: with PVEP POC at 05-1a called Dai Hung (Big Bear)[167]	No?	No	No	No	No
1994.7.7: The Exxon Corporation plans to invest $650 million in a Malaysian offshore natural gas project, an executive of the company's Malaysian subsidiary said this week. Rob Fisher, operation manager for Esso Production Malaysia Inc., said work on a platform in the Lawlit gas field, in the South China Sea, would begin in the next six months.[168]	No?	No	No	No	No
1995: PetroVietnam with VSP at 09-1[169]	No	No	No	No	No
1995.4.28: Petronas has signed a new 25-year production sharing contract (PSC) with its exploration and production arm, Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd, for the Samarang-Asam Paya oilfield, offshore Sabah.[170]	No	No	No	No	No

[166] "China sends warships to Vietnam oil site," *New York Times,* July 21, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/21/world/china-sends-warships-to-vietnam-oil-site.html, accessed April 18, 2018.
[167] See Petro Vietnam Website, http://english.pvn.vn/, accessed April 18, 2018.
[168] "Exxon Malaysian Deal," *The New York Times*, July 8, 1994, Friday, Section D, p. 7.
[169] See PetroVietnam Website.
[170] "Petronas Carigali gets new 25-year contract," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, April 28, 1995, p. 16.

1995.1: According to Shell Malaysia, the field, located in waters up to 500m deep, is part of the Block G production sharing contract awarded by Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) in 1995 (with Shell).[171]	No	No	No	No	No
1995.12; China reportedly drilling for oil near Spratly Isles.	Yes	No	No	No	China reportedly began oil-drilling operations, well-informed sources here said. One report said that a Chinese naval vessel, which was escorting a ship used for drilling operations, fired warning shots at a Vietnamese vessel that was monitoring the drilling operations. The incident reportedly took place about 400 kilometers southeast of the Vietnamese city of

[171] "Shell and partners to invest, develop Malikai field," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, February 2, 2013 Saturday, p. 2.

					Vung-tau.[172]
1996.4.10 Vietnam gave what was previously the China-Crestone deal to U.S. company Conoco[173]	Yes[174]	No	Yes, threats of sanctions? China warned Conoco off the project before the contract was signed, according to a report earlier this month in the Houston Chronicle. In a letter to former Conoco chief executive Constantine Nicandros obtained by the newspaper, Chen Bingqian, vice president of the China National Offshore Oil Corp. threatened 'confrontation, losses and liabilities' if the deal was consummated. Conoco's parent company, Dupont, has several joint	No	No

[172] Hiroyuki Sugiyama, Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent, "China reportedly drilling for oil near Spratly Isles," *The Daily Yomiuri,* January 30, 1996, Tuesday.
[173] Again, this stands in contrast with Chinese behavior to U.S. and British firms in 2007 and 2008. See Reuters, "Hanoi-Conoco Oil Pact Reopens Island Dispute," *The New York Times*, April 13, 1996, Saturday, Late Edition; see also Marcus W. Brauchli, "China, in Sharp Rebuke, Warns Conoco About Plans to Seek Oil With Vietnam," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 23, 1996.
[174] Marcus W. Brauchli, "China, in Sharp Rebuke, Warns Conoco About Plans to Seek Oil With Vietnam."

			ventures in China.[175]		
1996.4.6: Petronas yesterday signed a production sharing contract with Sarawak Shell Bhd for the exploration and development of its sixth deepwater block, about 100km off the coast of Miri.[176]	No	No	No	No	No
1997.6.28: Petronas yesterday signed three new Production Sharing Contracts with exploration subsidiary Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd and three Shell companies for oil and gas exploration, development and production in Sarawak and Sabah.[177]	No	No	No	No	No
1997: with TML (seems to be a Malaysian company: Block PM3-CAA (overlapping area between Viet Nam and Malaysia with 50% interest of Viet Nam)[178]	No?	No	No	No	No
1997: with TML (seems to be a Malaysian company) at Block 46-CN[179]	No?	No	No	No	No
1997.4.8: disputes between China and Vietnam over oil	No.[181]	No	No	No	No

[175] "China raps Vietnam over oil contract," *United Press International,* April 17, 1996, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1996/04/17/China-raps-Vietnam-over-oil-contract/4430829713600/, accessed May 6, 2018.
[176] Azman Ibrahim, "Petronas signs second deal with Sarawak Shell," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, April 6, 1996, p. 25.
[177] Desmond Ngiam, "Petronas signs new production-sharing contracts," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, June 28, 1997, p. 19.
[178] PetroVietnam website.
[179] PetroVietnam website.
[181] "China, Vietnam hold talks on offshore oil dispute," *Reuters News*, April 10, 1997.

drilling in disputed waters.[180]					
1998: JVPC – a subsidiary of JX Nippon Oil & Gas Exploration – at blocks 15-2[182]	No?	No	No	No	No
1998: with PCVL (a Malaysian joint venture) at blocks 01&02[183]	No?	No	No	No	No
1998.9.14: Petro Vietnam and CONOCO signed contracts regarding 15-1[184]	No?	No	No	No	No
1998.2.24: Petronas yesterday signed production sharing contracts with Amerada Hess of the United States and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd for exploration activities in two blocks offshore Terengganu and Sarawak. Amerada Hess will be the operator of both Block PM304 located offshore Terengganu, and Block SK306 located offshore Sarawak.[185]	No?	No	No	No	No
1998.7.30: Petronas yesterday signed two production sharing contracts with US company Santa Fe Energy Resources Inc and Sarawak Shell Bhd. The PSC with Santa Fe - one of the largest independent oil companies in the US - is for Block PM308 which	No?	No	No	No	No

[180] Xiao Xiqing, *Nansha fengyu – nansha qundao wenti de yanpan yu fenxi,* p. 503; Jeremy Grant, "China rig leaves the disputed zone," *Financial Times*, April 5, 1997; "China offers to resolve disputes with Vietnam," *The Associated Press*, March 27, 1997; John Chalmers, "Hanoi says China drilling in block it claims as own," *Reuters News*, March 17, 1997.
[182] PetroVietnam website.
[183] PetroVietnam website.
[184] "PEDCO to Join Oil Development Project in Vietnam," *The Korea Herald*, September 17, 1998, Thursday.
[185] Amerada Hess, "Petronas sign PSC for two blocks," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, February 24, 1998, p. 17.

covers an area of 10,800 sq kilometres within the Penyu Basin, located off the Malaysian coast north of Pulau Tioman.[186]					
1999: with 46 CNTML at block 46-CN[187]	No?	No	No	No	No
1999.1.28: Murphy Oil Co. is making its first inroads into the upstream sector of Malaysia's energy sector, signing three production-sharing contracts Wednesday with Petroliam Nasional Bhd., the national oil firm known as Petronas.[188]	No?	No	No	No	No
2000.7.3: National oil company Petronas has signed a production sharing contract with Amerada Hess International Ltd and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd for the exploration of deepwater Block F in offshore Sarawak. This is the 10th and the last of the demarcated deepwater blocks to be awarded by Petronas. Amerada Hess (Malaysia-Block F) Ltd, a subsidiary of Amerada Hess, will operate the block.[189]	No?	No	No	No	No
2001.4: Vietnamese seismic survey ships operating in blocks 05-2, 05-3, and the oil rigs later went to block 12b in May.[190]	Yes	No	No	No	No

[186] "Petronas signs production sharing deals,"*New Straits Times (Malaysia),* July 30, 1998, p. 23.
[187] PetroVietnam website.
[188] P.T. Bangsberg, "Murphy signs three pacts for Malaysia exploration," *Journal of Commerce*, January 28, 1999, Thursday, p. 9A.
[189] "More oil exploration off Sarawak," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, July 3, 2000, p. 24.
[190] Li Jinming, *Nanhai botao — dongnanya guojia yu nanhai wenti*, appendix.

2001: with JVPC at 15-2[191]	No?	No	No	No	No
2001.6.26: Petrona has signed a production sharing contract (PSC) with Sabah Shell Petroleum Company Ltd, Shell Sabah Selatan Sdn Bhd and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd for the exploration and production of Block SB303 in offshore Sabah. The contract, which is the 16th revenue-over-cost PSC, was signed in Kuala Lumpur yesterday.[192]	No	No	No	No	No
2002: with TNK Vietnam at 06.1[193]	No?	No	No	No	No
2002: with KNOC at 11-2, called Rong Doi/West Rong Doi (natural gas)[194]	No?	No	No	No	No
2002.1.9: PetroVietnam and Indonesia's Pertamina to explore for hydrocarbon resources in Vietnam. The new outfit, Con Son Joint Operating Company, will see the participation of PetroVietnam Investment & Development Company (40 percent), Petronas Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd (30 percent) and Pertamina (30 percent). The signing of the deal, the first such alliance between the countries, signaled a step towards	No?	No	No	No	No

[191] PetroVietnam website.
[192] Rupa Damodaran, "Petronas, Shell sign petroleum contract," *New Straits Times (Malaysia),* June 26, 2001, p. 22.
[193] PetroVietnam website.
[194] PetroVietnam website.

"a more meaningful and mutually beneficial partnership between three of Asean's national oil companies", Petronas said. Exploration work on the southern continental shelf of Vietnam was scheduled to begin early this year, followed by the drilling of the first two wells next year.[195]					
2003: with CLJOC at block 15-1 called Su Tu Den (Black Lion)[196]	No?	No	No	No	No
2003: with TML&TVL at PM3-CAA & 46-CN called East Bunga Kekwa – Cai Nuoc (natural and associated gas)[197]	No?	No	No	No	No
2003: with TML at PM3-CAA, four wells at West Bunga Kekwa (natural and associated gas), Bunga Raya, Bunga Seroja (natural gas)[198]	No?	No	No	No	No
2003: Philippine minister of energy opened up 46 blocks for bidding.[199]	No?	No	No	No	No
2003.4-end of 2003: Malaysia had dispatched four teams to explore oil and gas in the Spratlys.[200]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2004.10.28: Vietnam signed contracts with three Japanese companies.[201]	Yes	No	No	No	No

[195] "Petronas signs exploration deal," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, January 9, 2002, Wednesday, p. 2.
[196] PetroVietnam website.
[197] PetroVietnam website.
[198] PetroVietnam website.
[199] Ralf Emmers, *Resource Management and Contested Territories in East Asia*, p. 58.
[200] Zhang Liangfu, *Nanhai wanlixing — zai nansha qudao xuhang de rizi*, p. 246.
[201] On October 28, 2004, Idemitsu, as an Operator, entered into a Production Sharing Contract together with JX Nippon Oil & Gas Exploration Corporation and Teikoku Oil (Con Son) Co., Ltd. with Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (Petrovietnam) for the Blocks 05-1b and 05-1c offshore Vietnam. See Idemitsu's official website

2004: with PVEP SH at Song Hong basin, called D14&Song Tra Ly (natural gas)[202]	No?	No	No	No	No
2005: more than 20 Malaysian oil exploration ships operated in the Spratlys.[203]	No?	No	No	No	No
2006: Vietnam gave Indian company the right for oil exploration in blocks 127 and 128.[204]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2006: joint ventures with South Korea, gas first produced from this block in December 2006	Yes, diplomatic protests (See Fravel 2011 table)	No	No	No	No
2006.5.15: joint venture signed with U.S. companies	Yes, diplomatic protests (See Fravel 2011 table)	No	No	No	No
2006.11.6 and 12.26: joint venture with British companies	Yes, diplomatic protests (See Fravel 2011 table)	No	No	No	No
2006: Petrofac at PM-304 (Malaysia): 2006.5.3: Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas), together with joint venture partner Chevron Corp, has been awarded a deepwater exploration block offshore Vietnam, the state oil company's first deepwater acreage in the country.[205]	No?	No	No	No	No
2006: with TML at PM3-CAA, called Bunga Tulip (associated gas)	No?	No	No	No	No

regarding "Offshore Vietnam - Blocks 05-1b and 05-1c," http://www.idemitsu.com/products/resource/oil/project/vietnam/index.html, accessed April 18, 2018.

[202] PetroVietnam website.

[203] An Yingmin ed., *Jiyu nanhai zhuquan zhanlue de haiyang xingzheg guanli chuangxin.*

[204] "Yindu shiyou gongs cheng buhui yin zhongguo kangyi tuichu nanhai shiyou kaicai [Indian oil company states that it will not back down due to Chinese protests over oil exploration in the South China Sea]," *Global Times*, April 25, 2012, http://energy.people.com.cn/GB/17742165.html, accessed April 18, 2018; "Vietnam: PetroVietnam inks deal with India firm," *Thai News Service*, May 29, 2006.

[205] "Petronas, Chevron awarded Vietnam contract,"*Business Times (Malaysia)*, May 3, 2006, Wednesday, p. 44

2006: with KNOC at 11-2, Rong Doi/West Rong Doi (Natural gas)	No?	No	No	No	No
Santos announced its first entry into Vietnam in April 2006 with commencement of drilling at Dua in the Nam Con Son Basin.[206]	Yes	No	No	No	No
October 2006: Santos signed a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) with the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (Petrovietnam) and the Singapore Petroleum Corporation (SPC) for a venture in the Song Hong Basin, continuing its plans to expand its operations in Vietnam.[207]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2006.1.24: Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) signed yesterday a production sharing contract with Murphy Sabah Oil Co Ltd for the ultra-deepwater Block P, a newly re-demarcated exploration area offshore Sabah.[208]	No	No	No	No	No
2007.6**:** PetroChina exploration ships surrounded by Vietnamese ships.[209]	Yes	No	No	No?	No
2007.3.24: National oil firm Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) has awarded two production sharing contracts (PSCs) to BHP Billiton Petroleum Sabah Corp (BHPB) and its exploration and production arm,	No	No	No	No	No

[206] See official website of the Vietnamese embassy in Australia at http://members.webone.com.au/~vembassy/Relations.htm, accessed April 18, 2018.
[207] *Ibid.*
[208] "Murphy gets Petronas contract for ultra-deepwater block," *Business Times (Malaysia)*, January 24, 2006 Tuesday, p. 2.
[209] Li Jinming, *Zhongguo nanhai jiangyu yanjiu,* p. 266.

Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd, for the ultra-deepwater Blocks N and Q, offshore Sabah.[210]					
2007.12.8: Petronas has awarded a production-sharing contract (PSC) to Nippon Oil Exploration Ltd (Noex) and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd for onshore Block SK333 in Sarawak.[211]	No	No	No	No	No
2007: ONGC's exploration with Vietnam in block 127 and 128[212]	Diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
2007.4.20 Vietnam planned to work with BP in Spratlys[213]	Diplomatic protests	No	Yes, threats of sanctions regarding BP in June 2007; BP eventually gave up the bid in 2009; note that this falls into targeted sanctions	No	No
2007. 4: with Vietnam-backed Russian exploration ships[214]	Yes	No	No	Yes, use of maritime surveillance ships	No
2007.5.16: U.S. company Conoco announces ten year investment plan in 2006	Yes, diplomatic protests (See Fravel 2011 table)	No	No	No?	No
2007.6.27, 7.27, and 8.2: France company conducting surveys for VietsoPetro in Nam Con Son	Yes, diplomatic protests (See Fravel 2011 table)	No	No	No?	No

[210] "Petronas awards 2 deepwater contracts," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, March 24, 2007, Saturday, p. 38.
[211] Azlan Abu Bakar, "Noex, Petronas Carigali clinch production-sharing contract," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, December 8, 2007, Saturday.
[212] Jyoti Mukul, "China protests OVL deal in Vietnam," *DNA - Daily News & Analysis*, December 1, 2007.
[213] This seems to signify a change. Note also that China protested 11 times in 2007 regarding oil exploration deals made between Vietnam and foreign companies, including British, Russian, French, Norwegian, U.S., and Australian companies (see Fravel's table below). However, it does seem that China only picked on BP for sanctions threats.
[214] Li Jinming, *Zhongguo nanhai jiangyu yanjiu*, p. 266.

2007.7.10: Japanese company Idemitsu first exploratory well drilled in 2007	Yes, diplomatic protests (See Fravel 2011 table)	No	No	No?	No
2007.8.6: Norwegian company conducted seismic survey for VN	Yes, diplomatic protests (See Fravel 2011 table)	No	No	No?	No
2007.8.6: joint venture with U.S. company Chevron	Yes, diplomatic protests (See Fravel 2011 table)	No	No	No?	No
2007.11.6: joint venture with AUS company	Yes, diplomatic protests (See Fravel 2011 table)	No	No	No?	No
2007.11: Vietnam signing PSCs with Nippon Oil.[215]					
2008.7 Vietnam planned to work with ExxonMobil	Diplomatic protests	No	Yes, threats of business interests with ExxonMobil[216]	No	No
2008: with JVPC at 15-2[217]	No?	No	No	No	No
2008: with TML at PM3-CAA, called Bunga Orkid (natural gas)[218]	No?	No	No	No	No
2008: with CLJOC at 15-1 (Su Tu Vang)[219]	No?	No	No	No	No
2008: with TSJOC at 46/02[220]	No?	No	No	No	No
2008: with HVJOC at 09-2, called Ca Ngu Vang[221]	No?	No	No	No	No

[215] Official website of JX compamy, "Nippon Oil Exploration Limited Entered into Block 16-2 Production Sharing Contract Offshore Vietnam," November 16, 2007, http://www.nex.jx-group.co.jp/english/newsrelease/2007/e71_enpr_071116.html, accessed April 18, 2018.
[216] Yee Kai Pin, "China Pressures Exxon, Vietnam Beijing Concerned Over Small Project In South China Sea," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 24, 2008, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121683746072777899, accessed May 6, 2018.
[217] PetroVietnam website.
[218] PetroVietnam website.
[219] PetroVietnam website.
[220] PetroVietnam website.
[221] PetroVietnam website.

2008.1.2: Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) has signed a production sharing contract (PSC) with Shell Energy Asia Ltd, ConocoPhillips Sabah Gas Bhd and its Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCSB) unit to conduct exploration and production (E&P) activities in the offshore Kebabangan Cluster fields.[222]	No?	No	No	No	No
2008.3.27: Exploration and Production Malaysia Inc (EMEPMI), a subsidiary of Exxon Mobil Corp, has signed a deal with Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) to renew its production sharing contract (PSC) for another 25 years.[223]	No?	No	No	No	No
2008.4.8: Petronas has awarded three offshore exploration blocks, two offshore West Malaysia and the third offshore Sabah, to joint ventures (JVs) led by Sweden's Lundin Petroleum AB.[224]	No?	No	No	No	No
2008.5.23: National oil and gas company Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) has awarded a production sharing contract (PSC) for blocks PM303 and PM324 offshore Peninsular Malaysia to Total E&P Malaysia, a subsidiary of Total SA,	No?	No	No	No	No

[222] Alfean Hardy, "ConocoPhillips, Shell, PCSB secure Petronas deal," *The Malaysian Reserve*, January 2, 2008 Wednesday, p. 4.
[223] "ExxonMobil unit, Petronas renew contract," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, March 27, 2008 Thursday, p. 40.
[224] Alfean Hardy, "Petronas awards drilling areas to Sweden's Lundin," *The Malaysian Reserve*, April 8, 2008 Tuesday, p. 8.

and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd.[225]					
2009.6.4: Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) yesterday signed a $2US.1 billion (RM7.3 billion) production sharing contract (PSC) with a unit of ExxonMobil to develop seven existing oil fields offshore Peninsular Malaysia.[226]	No?	No	No	No	No
2009.10.29: Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) has awarded two production sharing contracts (PSCs) for two offshore Sabah blocks to a partnership between its Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd unit and Talisman Malaysia Ltd, which have a combined minimum financial commitment of RM650 million.[227]	No?	No	No	No	No
2009: with CLJOC at 15-1 called Su Tu Den/Su Tu Vang/Northeast Su Tu Den (associated gas)[228]	No?	No	No	No	No
2009: with PCPP at SK305, D30 (Malaysia)[229]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: with PCPP at SK305, D30 (Malaysia)[230]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: with VRJ/VSP at 09-3[231]	No?	No	No	No	No

[225] "Total unit, Petronas Carigali get production deal," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, May 23, 2008 Friday, p. 37.
[226] "Petronas, ExxonMobil in $2USb PSC deal," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, June 4, 2009, Thursday, p. 1.
[227] Alfean Hardy, "Petronas awards two PSCs valued at RM650m minimum," *The Malaysian Reserve*, October 27, 2009 Tuesday, p. 2.
[228] PetroVietnam website.
[229] PetroVietnam website.
[230] PetroVietnam website.
[231] PetroVietnam website.

2010: two wells with PCVL at blocks 01&02[232]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: with CLJOC at block 15-1 called Su Tu Den Dong Bac[233]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: with PCPP at SK305 (Malaysia)[234]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: the Vietnamese government and Russia signed an agreement on further cooperation in geological exploration and petroleum production on Vietnam's continental shelf within Vietsovpetro joint framework.[235]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: Block 105-110/04 (Neon Energy)[236]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: Block 04-2 (Pearl Oil)[237]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: Block 51 (Mitra/Kufpec/PVEP) [238]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: Block 46/07 (Mitra/PVEP)[239]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: Block 01&02/10, Block 09-2 (PVEP)[240]	No?	No	No	No	No
2010: Vietnam carved out block 113.	Yes	No	No	Conducted patrol around the block.[241]	No

[232] PetroVietnam website.
[233] PetroVietnam website.
[234] PetroVietnam website.
[235] "Vietnam, Russia boost links in oil and gas production," *Vietnam News Agency*, July 5, 2016, http://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-russia-boost-links-in-oil-and-gas-production/95702.vnp, accessed April 18, 2018.
[236] PetroVietnam website.
[237] PetroVietnam website.
[238] PetroVietnam website.
[239] PetroVietnam website.
[240] PetroVietnam website.
[241] *China Maritime Yearbook 2011,* p. 151.

2010.2.23: Malaysia has awarded a production sharing contract for an oil block to Abu Dhabi's Mubadala Development Co. and Petronas Carigali, the exploration and production arm of the state oil firm.[242]	No	No	No	No	No
2010.5.20: National-oil company, Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) has awarded two exploration blocks in offshore Sabah under a single Production Sharing Contract (PSC) to a partnership comprising Lundin Malaysia B V, Nio Petroleum Ltd, and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd.[243]	No	No	No	No	No
2010.12.14: Malaysia and Brunei Monday signed a deal to jointly develop two oil areas off Borneo, ending a border dispute dating from 2003 which had held up exploration. The agreement will see the national oil firms of Malaysia and Brunei take part in exploration and production in the potentially oil-and-gas rich blocks over the next 40 years, Malaysian state news agency Bernama said. The signing ceremony in Brunei was witnessed by Brunei's Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak. In a bid to end the spat, the two countries	No	No	No	No	No

[242] "UAE's Mubadala, Petronas Carigali Get Malaysian Oil Block Contract," *Khaleej Times (United Arab Emirates),* February 23, 2010 Tuesday.
[243] "Petronas awards 2 offshore exploration blocks in Sabah," *The Malaysian Reserve,* May 20, 2010 Thursday, p. 2.

agreed in March last year that the disputed areas are no longer part of Malaysia but allowed Malaysia's state-owned Petronas to enter into new production-sharing contracts.[244]					
2011.8.22: Its general manager for corporate affairs and planning, Matthew Gerber, said the award of the RSC for Balai cluster field offshore Bintulu, Sarawak, by Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) to the ROC-Dialog Group Bhd-Petronas partnership last Tuesday marks the Australian company's entry in the Malaysian market.[245]	No	No	No	No	No
2011.3: Philippine oil exploration ships exploring around Reed bank[246]	Yes	No	No	Yes Chinese forces expelled the ships. (Maritime Surveillance Ships)[247]	No
2011.6: the Philippines announced blocks for foreign oil and gas companies to bid[248]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2011: with PCPP at SK305 (Malaysia)[249]	No?	No	No	No	No

[244] "Malaysia, Brunei end fight over oil blocks," *The Financial Express (Bangladesh)*, December 14, 2010 Tuesday.
[245] Kamarul Yunus, "Balai deal marks the first step," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, August 22, 2011 Monday, p. 4.
[246] CSIS China Power Project, "Are maritime law enforcement forces destabilizing Asia?"
[247] "Philippines suspends gas, oil exploration in Reed Bank," *Kyodo News,* March 3, 2015, http://news.abs-cbn.com/business/03/03/15/philippines-suspends-gas-oil-exploration-reed-bank, accessed April 18, 2018; *China Maritime Yearbook 2012,* p. 176; Tom Grieder, "Sino-Philippine Tensions Rise in South China Sea As Chinese Patrol Boats Threaten Seismic Vessel," *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis,* March 8, 2011.
[248] Li Guoqiang, China Sea Oil and Gas Resources, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015Y 05/11/content_7894391.htm, accessed August 26, 2016; for cross-check, see Emilia Narni J. David, "Spratlys dispute unlikely to derail exploration plans," *Business World*, June 15, 2011 Wednesday.
[249] PetroVietnam website.

2011: with HLJOC at 16-1[250]	No?	No	No	No	No
2011: with POVO at 12W[251]	No?	No	No	No	No
2011: PVEP/Talisman (a Canadian company at blocks 05-2/10, 135-136/03) PVEP/Mitra (a Canadian company at 45)[252]	No?	No	No	No	No
2011: Santos/PVEP (an Australian company at 13/05)[253]	No?	No	No	No	No
2011.4.26: The Arktik mor nefte gazrazvedka (AMNGR) federal state unitary enterprise based in Russia's Murmansk Region, plans to sign new contracts for offshore drilling in Vietnam. AMNGR plans to finish drilling a third offshore well in the Vietnamese waters of the South China Sea to the order of Vietsovpetro, a Russian-Vietnamese oil and gas joint venture.[254]	No?	No	No	No	No
2011.5.26: Vietnam conducted oil exploration activities around the Vanguard bank.[255]	Yes	No	No	Yes, use of maritime surveillance ships to block Vietnamese vessels.[256]	No

[250] PetroVietnam website.
[251] PetroVietnam website.
[252] PetroVietnam website.
[253] PetroVietnam website.
[254] "Russian oil prospectors drill third offshore well in Vietnam," *Russian Financial Control Monitor (RFCM)* : *International Cooperation (English)*, April 26, 2011 Tuesday, by LexisNexis.
[255] "Chinese party-owned daily warns Vietnam over Spratly Islands issue,"*BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, June 6, 2011 Monday; CSIS China Power Project, "Are maritime law enforcement forces destabilizing Asia?"
[256] Li Jinming, "Quyu wai daguo jieru yu nanhai zhengyi fazhan qushi [External powers and the South China Sea disputes]," in An Yingmin ed., *Nanhai quyu wenti yanjiu diyiji [Volume 1 of South China Sea Issues]* (Beijing: China Economics Press: 2012).

				Similar action may have been taken in 2010. This includes the cutting of the cable[257] (Chinese marine surveillance vessel on May 26 cut exploration cables of Viet Nam's Binh Minh 02 vessel in Block 148 within Viet Nam's continental shelf)[258]	
2011.6.9[259]: Vietnam's foreign ministry says a Chinese fishing boat supported by two Chinese patrol craft cut a cable being used by a seismic survey craft operated by state-run energy company PetroVietnam.[260] The Vietnamese MOFA states they are fishery administrative ships.[261]	Yes	No	No	A Chinese fishing boat similarly rammed the survey cables of another Vietnamese survey vessel. They were Yuzheng 311 and 303.[262]	No
2011.9 Indian national Petro company joined	Yes, diplomatic protests[264]	No	No	No[265]	No

[257] Joseph Santolan, "Chinese patrol boats confront Vietnamese oil exploration ship in South China Sea," *World Socialist Website*, May 31, 2011, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/05/chin-m31.html, accessed April 18, 2018.
[258] Vietnamese MOFA Press Conference, June 9, 2011, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110610145220/view, accessed April 18, 2018.
[259] Leszek Buszynski, "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.—China Strategic Rivalry," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, Issue 2 (Spring 2012), p. 139-156; CSIS China Power Project, "Are maritime law enforcement forces destabilizing Asia?"
[260] "China and Vietnam: a timeline of conflict," *CNN,* June 27, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/27/china.vietnam.timeline/, accessed April 18, 2018.
[261] Vietnamese MOFA Press Conference, June 9, 2011.
[262] *China Maritime Yearbook 2012,* p. 176.
[264] "Yinyue nanhai Haifa you xiangmu qinfan zhongguo zhuquan [Vietnamese-Indian oil and gas projects in the South China Sea encroached upon China's sovereignty]," *People's Daily*, September 22, 2011, http://www.chinanews.com/ny/2011/09-22/3345149.shtml; also confirmed by Petrovietnam, http://english.pvn.vn/?portal=news&page=file_list, accessed April 18, 2018.
[265] Not mentioned.

Vietnamese exploration in the Spratlys[263]					
2012.4.10 Vietnam planned to work with Gazprom of Russia	Yes, diplomatic protests[266]	No	No	No	No
2012: with CLJOC at block 15-1 called Su Tu Trang[267]	No?	No	No	No	No
2012: with TNK Vietnam at 06-1, called[268]	No?	No	No	No	No
November 30, 2012: Most recently, in early morning of November 30, 2012, while carrying out normal seismic survey activities deep inside Viet Nam's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf (at a latitude of 17o 26,2 North and 1080 02 East, about 43 nautical miles off Con Co island of Viet Nam, Binh Minh 02 seismic survey vessel of Viet Nam was intentionally blocked and its cable was severed by two Chinese fishing vessel (No 16025 and No 16028) which had ignored warning signals from Viet Nam's authorized forces. [269]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2012.7: The Philippines accepted on Tuesday four bids for three oil and gas exploration blocks in the South China Sea, including	Yes	No	No	No	No

[263] "A pact that may annoy Beijing,"*DNA (Daily News & Analysis),* October 13, 2011 Thursday.
[266] C. Raja Mohan, "Snubbing Moscow," *Indian Express,* April 18, 2012 Wednesday, via LexisNexis academic.
[267] PetroVietnam website.
[268] PetroVietnam website.
[269] http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns121206103459/view

two prospects in waters claimed by China.[270]					
2012.1.18: Petroliam Nasional Bhd awarded two deepwater exploration blocks, offshore Sabah, under separate production sharing contracts (PSC) in partnership between JX Nippon, INPEX Corp and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd. The PSC for Deepwater Block R was awarded to the partnership of JX Nippon Oil & Gas Exploration (Deepwater Sabah) Ltd (the operator with 37.5 percent stake)[271]	No	No	No	No	No
2012.1.18: the other one: INPEX Offshore South West Sabah Ltd (37.5 percent) and Petronas Carigali (25 percent).[272]	No	No	No	No	No
2012.5.29: Malaysian national oil firm Petroliam Nasional, or Petronas, yesterday signed a US$1 billion production sharing contract (PSC) with the local unit of Canada-based Talisman Energy to develop and recover oil from the Kinabalu Fields, a number of oilfields offshore Sabah.[273]	No	No	No	No	No

[270] Li Guoqiang, "China Sea Oil and Gas Resources;" Erik dela Cruz, "Philippines gets 4 bids for disputed S.China Sea oil, gas blocks," *Reuters,* http://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-philippines-idUSL4E8IV3M420120731, accessed April 18, 2018.

[271] "Petronas awards 2 deepwater blocks offshore Sabah," *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, January 18, 2012, p. 6.

[272] *Ibid.*

[273] "Petronas, Canadian firm in US$1b oil production deal; Joint venture gets incentives for more challenging fields," *The Business Times Singapore,* May 29, 2012 Tuesday.

2012.6.21: Petronas signs PSCs for North Malay Basin project in Malaysia The first contract is the amended Production Sharing Contract (PSC) for offshore Block PM302 while the other two contracts are new exploration PSCs for Blocks PM325 and PM326B adjacent to Block PM302. All three PSCs are on a 50:50 equity split between Petronas Carigali and Hess Exploration and Production Malaysia with Petronas.[274]	No	No	No	No	No
On August 19, 2012	No	No	No	Chinese patrol vessels confronted a seismic vessel in Malaysia's Block SR 318 undertaking work under contract to Shell Sarawak. They ordered the vessel to cease and desist and it complied. But it renewed its work after a protective buffer was put in place. Malaysia did not publicly protest because it does not want its disputes with China in the South China Sea to affect their	No

[274] "Petronas signs PSCs for North Malay Basin project in Malaysia," *WMI Company News*, June 21, 2012 Thursday.

				economic relationship.[275]	
2012.10.9: India's private sector drilling contractor, Aban Offshore announced on Monday that it has received a letter of award for the deployment of the jack-up rig Deep Driller 3 (owned by the Company's step down subsidiary) offshore Malaysia, from Petronas Carigali Sdn. Bhd., The drilling contract is for a firm period of three years.[276]	Yes	No	No	No	No
2012.12.7: Lundin Petroleum which engages in the exploration, development, and production of oil and gas properties and holds an 85 percent stake in PM319 via its subsidiary Lundin Malaysia BV along with Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd with a 15 percent interest stated that it has inked a new production sharing contract (PSC) with Petronas with an aim to increase in footprint to 7 blocks.[277]	No	No	No	No	No
2012.12.13: ConocoPhillips, Anglo-Dutch supermajor Shell and Petronas Carigali have bagged the	No	No	No	No	No

[275] Wu Shicun, Nong Hong, *Recent Developments in the South China Sea Dispute*, p. 7. Also confirmed by Scott Bentley, "Malaysia's 'Special Relationship' with China and the South China Sea: Not So Special Anymore," *The Asan Forum*, July 31,2015 , http://www.theasanforum.org/malaysias-special-relationship-with-china-and-the-south-china-sea-not-so-special-anymore/, accessed April 18, 2018.
[276] "Aban Offshore bags drilling contract from Petronas," *Dion Global Solutions Limited,* October 9, 2012 Tuesday.
[277] "Lundin Petroleum wins PSC contract India," *Dion Global Solutions Limited*, December 7, 2012 Friday.

production sharing contract for Block SB311, off Sabah from Malaysia's state-run oil company Petronas.[278]					
2013.11.21: Vietnam awarded five blocks to India	Yes, diplomatic protests[279]	No	No	No	No
2013 January: with Malaysia	No	No	No	By January 2013, similar incidents had occurred "involving Chinese ships and a Shell-contracted survey vessel" in areas proximate to South Luconia Shoals.[280]	No
2013.2.2: Shell Malaysia and its exploration and production partners Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd and ConocoPhillips Sabah Ltd have agreed to invest and develop deepwater Malikai oil field, some 100km offshore Sabah.[281]	No	No	No	No	No
2013.12.13: JX Nippon Oil & Gas Exploration's Malaysian subsidiary has signed a production sharing contract (PSC) with Petronas for deepwater Block 3F in the Sarawak region.[282]	No	No	No	No	No

[278] "Petronas inks PSC with ConocoPhillips, Shell & Petronas Carigali off Sabah,"*Dion Global Solutions Limited*, December 13, 2012 Thursday.
[279] "India-Vietnam ink pact to expand oil exploration in South China Sea," *New Indian Express*, November 21, 2013, http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/India-Vietnam-ink-pact-to-expand-oil-exploration-in-South-China-Sea/2013/11/21/article1902209.ece, accessed April 18, 2018.
[280] Scott Bentley, "Malaysia's 'Special Relationship' with China and the South China Sea: Not So Special Anymore."
[281] "Shell and partners to invest, develop Malikai field," *New Straits Times (Malaysia),* February 2, 2013 Saturday, p. 2.
[282] See official Petronas website, "JX Nippon signs PSC with Petronas for Block 3F in Malaysia," http://www.Petronas.com.my/media-relations/media-releases/Pages/article/PETRONAS-CELEBRATES-100-ACTIVE-PRODUCTION-SHARING-CONTRACTS.aspx, accessed April 18, 2018.

2014.5: Oil rig crisis with Vietnam[283]	Yes, diplomatic protests	Yes, but very briefly; China had a rethink and relations resumed relatively fast[284]	No	Yes, use of civilian law enforcement, with fishing boats at the center, forming a concentric circle	No
2014.6.17: Vietnam Oil & Gas Group, or Petrovietnam, has signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia's JSC Zarubezhneft for joint oil and gas exploration at two blocks offshore central Vietnam[285]	Yes?	No	No	No	No
2014.10: On Tuesday, Vietnam offered India two oil-exploration blocks located in disputed South China Sea waters, prompting a sharp reaction from Beijing.[286]	Yes, diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
2015.11.5: Petroliam Nasional (Petronas) has approved SapuraKencana Energy's (SKE) field development plan (FDP) for the SK310 B15 gas field project in offshore east Malaysia. This is the company's first upstream gas development project in the country.[287]	No	No	No	No	No

[283] Most drastic up till now regarding Vietnam; for information, see CSIS China Power Project, "Are maritime law enforcement forces destabilizing Asia?"
[284] Li Xiangyang ed., *Yatai diqu fazhan baogao 2015,* p. 239-240.
[285] "Vietnam to join China talks but signs oil and gas deal with Russia," *Vietcombank Securities,* June 18, 2014, http://www.vcbs.com.vn/en/Article/4/Vietnam-to-Join-China-Talks-but-Signs-Oil-Gas-Deal-with-Russia-95140, accessed April 18, 2018.
[286] "Philippines gets 4 bids for disputed S.China Sea oil, gas blocks," *International Business Times*, October 29, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/vietnam-india-sign-oil-naval-agreement-amid-south-china-sea-disputes-angering-beijing-1715677, accessed April 18, 2018.
[287] "Sapura Kencana secures approval to develop B15 gas field offshore Malaysia,"*Progressive Media - Company News*, November 5, 2015 Thursday.

2015.9: India's plans to conduct oil exploration off Vietnam coast in the South China Sea[288]	Yes, diplomatic protests[289]	No	No	No	No
2015.9.3: Rosneft Vietnam B.V., a company of Rosneft Group, and Japan Drilling Co., Ltd. (JDC) represented by its subsidiary Hakuryu 5, Inc. signed an agreement on provision and operation of the marine drilling rig Hakuryu-5, for the purposes of drilling exploration wells within the framework of Rosneft's projects in Vietnam. It is planned to drill two wells in Blocks 06.1 and 05-3/11 in the Nam Con Son basin offshore Vietnam in 2016.[290]	No	No	No	No	No
On August 11, 2015, Idemitsu, as an Operator, entered into a Production Sharing Contract together with Sumitomo Corporation and Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (Petrovietnam) for the Blocks 39 and 40/02 offshore Vietnam.[291]	No	No	No	No	No
2016.3: Vietnam conducted oil and gas exploration with India[292]	Yes	No	No	No	No

[288] "Fillip for ONGC arm," *The Telegraph*, August 28 , 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1150828/jsp/business/story_39431.jsp#.VjXEXK4rKT8, accessed April 18, 2018.
[289] "India's oil exploration off Vietnam 'illegal', Chinese mouthpiece says," *The Times of India*, September 1, 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indias-oil-exploration-off-Vietnam-illegal-Chinese-mouthpiece-says/articleshow/48763255.cms, accessed April 18, 2018.
[290] Rosneft company website, "Rosneft and Japan Drilling Co., Ltd. signed an agreement for drilling exploration wells offshore Vietnam," September 4, 2015, https://www.rosneft.com/press/releases/item/176083/, accessed April 18, 2018.
[291] See official website of Idemitsu, http://www.idemitsu.com/products/resource/oil/project/vietnam/v39_40.html, accessed April 18, 2018.
[292] NISCSS, "2016nian nanhai dashiji."

2017.6: Talisman-Vietnam's oilrig was operating in block 136-03.[293]	China gave warning. Vietnam stopped the operation in July.	No	No	No	No
2018.5: Vietnam to explore block 06-1 with Russia[294]	No	No	No	No	No
2019.7: Faceoff between Vietnam and China over Chinese oil and gas exploration ship Dizhi 8 near Vanguard Bank[295]	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
2020.11: The Malaysian ship Gunnlod is operating in block SK410B, exploring for natural gas under a contract with Thailand's PTT Exploration and Production (PTTEP).[296]	Yes	No	No	Yes: Chinese Coast Guard Ship standoff with Malaysian Navy	No

[293] Zhang, *2018nian Zhongguo zhoubian anquan xingshi pinggu*, p. 171.
[294] NISCSS, "2018nian nanhai dashiji" [South China Sea Events 2018].
[295] NISCSS, "2019nian nanhai dashiji" [South China Sea Events 2019].
[296] https://amti.csis.org/china-and-malaysia-in-another-staredown-over-offshore-drilling/.

Appendix IV

Incidents and Cases of Coercion in the East China Sea

Table 1. All case regarding island control and oil exploration

Year /Issue	No action/rhetorical	Diplomatic Sanctions (Including Duration)	Economic Sanctions	Gray-zone Coercion	Military coercion (Including Duration)
1996.9.26: Chinese activists defending the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were turned back by Japanese coast guards. One activist from Hong Kong drowned.[1]	Yes, diplomatic protests[2]	No	No	No	No
1996.10: Japanese coast guards blocked Chinese protesting ships.[3]	Yes, diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
1997.5.26: Japanese coast guards blocked Chinese protesting ships.[4]	Yes, diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
1997: a Japanese legislator landed on one of the islands in the Senkakus.[5]	Yes, diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
2003.1.1: Japanese government rented three of	Yes, diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No

[1] Edward A. Gargan, "Man Drowns During a Protest Over Asian Islets," *The New York Times,* September 27, 1996, Friday, Late Edition.
[2] For all the recorded protests, see http://58.68.146.102/pd/wjbyl/s?qs={%22cId%22:%2238%22,%22cds%22:[{%22fld%22:%22contentText%22,%22cdr%22:%22AND%22,%22hlt%22:%22true%22,%22vlr%22:%22OR%22,%22qtp%22:%22DEF%22,%22val%22:%22%E9%92%93%E9%B1%BC%E5%B2%9B%22}]}, this is a search via the *People's Daily* section of foreign press conference, with the keyword being "Diaoyudao."
[3] Michio Sakamura, "Japanese in Hong Kong fret about island ire Political groups drive sovereignty protests over Senkaku-Diaoyu dispute," *The Nikkei Weekly (Japan).*
[4] Russell Skelton, "Japanese turn back island activists," *The Age (Melbourne, Australia)*, May 27, 1997 Tuesday, Late Edition; "Chronology of Senkaku events," http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5f98669f0101747n.html, accessed April 18, 2018.
[5] Ralf Emmers, *Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia*, p. 52.

the Senkaku islands.[67]					
2003.6: Japanese coast guards blocked Chinese protesting ships.[8]	Yes, diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
2004.3 Japan returned Chinese baodiao protestors back to China.[9]	Yes, diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
February 2005: Japan placed a lighthouse built by rightists in 1998 on the largest island of the Senkakus under state control[10]	Yes, diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
2005.7.14: Japan granted a license to Tokyo-based Teikoku Oil Co. to conduct its exploration in the Chunxio area – including in disputed waters. Japanese officials said they would give a green light to Teikoku to proceed into the East China Sea, perhaps with an escort of Japanese coast guard vessels, if the two nations cannot reach a negotiated	Yes, diplomatic protests	No	No	Standoff with the Japanese coast guards and maritime self defense force, by the Chinese maritime surveillance ships.	No

[6] "Govt renting 3 Senkaku islands," *The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo),* January 1, 2003 Wednesday.
[7] Feng Liang, *Zhongguo heping fazhan yu haishang anquan huanjing [China's peaceful development and maritime security]* (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2010), p. 172.
[8] "Chronology of Senkaku events;" "Chinese protest vessel halted on way to Senkakus," *The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo),* June 24, 2003 Tuesday.
[9] "Chronology of Senkaku events;" Anthony Faiola, "Isles Become Focus For Old Antagonisms; Japan's Neighbors, Resentful Since War, View a Rise in Nationalism With Worry," *The Washington Post,* March 27, 2004 Saturday, Final Edition.
[10] Ralf Emmers, *Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia*, p. 53.

settlement in the near term.[11]					
October 2006: the Japanese coast guard prevented an attempted landing by Hong Kong activists to mark the tenth anniversary of the death of David Chan.[12]	Lack of tension (Abe and Hu were meeting back then)	No	No	No	No
2007.10.28 Chinese protestors went to the Senkakus and were blocked by Japanese coast guards.[13]	No action, nor diplomatic mentioning	No	No	No	No
2008.7.1: Japanese lawmakers conducted an aerial survey of the Senkakus.[14]	Yes, diplomatic protests[15]	No	No	No	No
2009.2.10: The Japanese maritime self defense force stationed PHL-class patrol ships around the waters of the Senkakus.	Yes, diplomatic protests[16]	No	No	No	No
2010 September incident: boat clash	Diplomatic protests	Yes: cancelled	Yes: including canceling tourist groups to Japan.	Yes: patrol by fishery administrative ships	No

[11] Anthony Faiola, "Japan-China Oil Dispute Escalates; Relations Already Uneasy as Tokyo Accuses Beijing of Tapping Disputed Fields," *The Washington Post*, October 22, 2005 Saturday, Final Edition.
[12] Ralf Emmers, *Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia*, p. 54.
[13] "Chronology of Senkaku events;" "Japanese coast guards stop following Chinese protest boat," *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, October 29, 2007 Monday, Text of report in English by Japanese news agency Kyodo.
[14] Juan Ning, "Riben yiyuan shicha diaoyudao yinfa dalutaiwan jilie fandui," Ralf Emmers, *Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia*, p. 60.
[15] Juan Ning, "Riben yiyuan shicha diaoyudao yinfa dalutaiwan jilie fandui [Japanese member of parliament's visit to the Senkakus generated protests from mainland and Taiwan]," Sina, July 6, 2008, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/p/2008-07-06/0935508943.html, accessed May 6, 2018.
[16] *Diaoyudao zhuquan guishu [On the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands]* (Beijing: People's Daily Press, 2013).

		meetings, etc.[17][18]	Rare earth metal embargo: from Japanese diplomat: He said he could not talk about the specific duration, but it was at least 6 months. And the complaints that Japanese firms, especially IT firms, were quite long in terms of duration and impact.[19]		
2012.3: Japan named the islands in the Senkakus.	Diplomatic protests[20]	No	No	Yes: rights-defending patrol by the maritime surveillance ships.[21]	No
2012.8: Japan arrested Hong Kong activists who landed on the Senkakus[22]	Diplomatic protests	No	No	No	No
2012 September nationalization incident[23]	Diplomatic protests	Yes Duration: from interviews, it seems to have lasted through 2013 and onto early 2014.	Yes Small-scale: Japanese diplomat: He thinks that: Before 2011 or 2010, China believed that economic sanctions could	Yes: regularized patrol.[26] Duration: this is ongoing	No

[17] Hu Bo, *2049nian de zhongguo haisshangquanli [China's maritime power in 2049]*, p. 236.
[18] Duration of the termination of senior level exchange is about half a year. It was not until the earthquake in Japan and senior level exchanges resumed. Interview KZ-#10
[19] Interview with a former Japanese diplomat based in Beijing.
[20] "Chinese patrol boats could trigger future conflict with Japan," *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, March 22, 2012 Thursday.
[21] *China Maritime Yearbook,* p. 150.
[22] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/9485798/Anti-Japan-protests-erupt-in-China-following-island-demonstration.html; http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/08/20/national/chinese-stage-anti-japan-rallies-over-senkakus/#.WCtaZeErKT8
[23] Most radical up to date.
[26]

		He states that China and Japan have the most instituted bilateral dialogues and frameworks such as in finance, industry, IR, etc. So one form of economic sanctions is meetings have been put on hold for two or three years. So there are definitely diplomatic sanctions. Such as no response or canceling meetings. It is similar to the industry experience. Mr. Abe says that his Chinese counterpart needs the green light from the higher up to return his emails, phone calls, or requests for meetings. (Note this is similar to what prof. Yu Tiejun says).	be used against Japan. After 2010: China learned that economic sanctions are ineffective against Japan, leading to smaller or virtually no sanctions. But he thinks that still in 2012: in each industry and some companies, there are still complaints about Japanese companies being precluded from some of the biddings or contracting processes. "under the excuse of the administrative guidance."[25]		

[25] Interview with a former Japanese diplomat based in Beijing.

		He thinks that diplomatic relations improved since April 2014 after a group of Japanese diet members were received in China, which is ice breaking and kind of like a green light to Chinese diplomats → more exchanges at Mr. Abe's level.[24]			

[24] Interview with one former Japanese diplomat, confirmed also with KZ-#10.

Appendix V

Arms Sales to Taiwan and Chinese Coercion

Table 1. French arms sales to Taiwan in 1992

Year	French Arms Sales to Taiwan	Other Issues Between China and France[1]	Chinese Reaction: Diplomatic Protest	Chinese Reaction: Diplomatic Sanctions	Chinese Reaction: Economic Sanctions
1992	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 2. U.S.-China Mil-Mil Exchanges and U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Since 1999[2]

Year	U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan	Amount (millions of U.S. dollars, i.e., as notified to congress[3])	Other Issues Between China and the United States[4]	Chinese Reaction: Diplomatic Protest	Chinese Reaction: Diplomatic Sanctions (Pausing Mil-Mil Exchanges)	Chinese Reaction: Economic Sanctions
1990	Yes	153	No	Yes	No	No
1991	Yes	372	No	Yes	No	No
1992	Yes	7706	No	Yes	No[5]	No
1993	Yes	2184	No	Yes	No[6]	No
1994	Yes	171	No	Yes	No	No
1995	Yes	273	No	Yes	No	No
1996	Yes	1034	No	Yes	No	No
1997	Yes	1247	No	Yes	No	No
1998	Yes	1296	No	Yes	No	No

[1] The purpose of this column is to make sure if there is Chinese non-military coercion, it is not about issues unrelated to arms sales to Taiwan.

[2] Information comes mostly from Shirley A. Kan, "Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990," and Shirley A. Kan, "U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress."
According to a study conducted by Project 2049 institute, China has a well-established track record of responding negatively and stridently to public announcements of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Congressional notifications will likely remain the primary trigger for Chinese responses, rather than earlier decision-points in the process such as providing Price and Availability (P&A) data in response to a Letter of Request (LOR) from Taiwan. See US-Taiwan Business Council and Project 2049 Institute, "Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales," March 2012, http://project2049.net/documents/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf, accessed April 8, 2015.

[3] Shirley A. Kan, "Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990."

[4] The purpose of this column is to make sure if there is Chinese non-military coercion, it is not about issues unrelated to arms sales to Taiwan.

[5] Chinese official newspaper announced a pause in mil-mil exchange due to the U.S. decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan. However, according to the CRS report on U.S.-China mil-mil contacts, due to the 1989 Tiananmen incident, mil-mil exchange did not resume until 1993. So this is not really Chinese coercion.

[6] A coding of "no" results from the events sequence in the two documents in footnote 71 and also the fact that Kan would denote if there is a pause of mil-mil exchange due to Chinese reactions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. So "no" indicates that mil-mil exchanges continue despite U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. And the sequences confirm the continuity, i.e., no break before, during, and after U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

1999	Yes	637	Yes (Belgrade Bombing)	Yes	Yes: suspension of mil-mil exchange (but China was reacting mainly to the Belgrade bombing of Chinese embassy), *not* arms sales to Taiwan.[7] Resumed in January 2000.	No
2000	Yes	1866	No	Yes: raised concerns about arms sales to Taiwan but resumed mil-mil contacts previously suspended due to the Belgrade bombing[8]	No	No
2001	Yes	1082	Yes (EP-3 Incident)[9]	Yes	Yes: suspension of mil-mil exchange (China was reacting primarily to the EP-3 incident).[10] Arms sales to Taiwan also added to Chinese anger.[11] Resumed nominally in April 2002, but fully in June 2002.	No

[7] Shirley A. Kan, "U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress," p. 62, accessed April 8, 2015. Still it seems that low-level mil-mil exchanges resumes.
[8] See Shirley A. Kan, "U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress."
[9] See *ibid*.
[10] See *ibid*.
[11] "U.S. Navel vessels replenished in Hong Kong for the first time since 9/11," *Radio Free Asia*, November 29, 2001, http://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/70683-20011129.html, accessed April 8, 2015.

2002	Yes	1521	No	Yes	No	No
2003	Yes	775	No	Yes	No	No
2004	Yes	1776	No	Yes	No	No
2005	Yes	280	No	Yes	No	No
2006	No	0	No	Yes	No	No
2007	Yes (larger than previous years, fifth largest, falling only behind the 1992 level and the 2008 and 2009 level)	3717	No	Yes	Maybe? Not confirmed, but the Chinese disapproval of a port call U.S. naval ships coincided with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.[12]	No
2008	Yes (October 3), significantly larger (second largest)	6463	No	Yes	Yes. Confirmed: China suspended mil-mil exchanges due to U.S. arms sales. Resumed in February 2009.[13]	No
2009	No	0	No	No	No	No
2010	Yes (as large as 2008, third largest)	6392	No	Yes	Highly likely. Not confirmed. Very limited contacts, no formal pause, but citing "obstacles."[14] Chinese reports seem to confirm pause of certain exchange programs.[15] Some reports indicate a freeze in mil exchanges.[16]	Threats of economic sanctions?

[12] Shirley A. Kan, "U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress."
[13] See *ibid*.
[14] See *ibid*.
[15] See "Zhongmei junshi jiaoliu 30nian [30 years of Sino-U.S. Mil-Mil exchanges]," *Yangtze Daily*, April 11, 2014, http://news.cntv.cn/2014/04/11/ARTI1397164870344615.shtml, accessed May 6, 2018.
[16] US-Taiwan Business Council and Project 2049 Institute, "Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales."

2011 (This is the last time that the president notified Congress of major FMS to Taiwan, which occurred on Sept. 21, 2011)[17]	Yes (fourth largest)	5852	No	Yes	Very limited contacts, no formal pause, but citing "obstacles."[18] Other reports cite relatively mute response from China.[19] And Chinese MOD indicates so: China said on Thursday that the latest U.S. arms sale to Taiwan has created "severe obstacles" for the two countries' military-to-military exchanges.[20]	No
2012	No, no notification, that is.	0	No	Reacting to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which indicates continuous arms sales to Taiwan.[21]	No	No
2013	No, no notification, that is.	0	No	No	No	No

[17] Shirley Kan, "PacNet #39 - Obama's policy on arms sales to Taiwan needs credibility and clarity," CSIS, July 7, 2015, http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-39-obamas-policy-arms-sales-taiwan-needs-credibility-and-clarity, accessed April 8, 2015.
[18] See *ibid*.
[19] See March 2012 report from Project 2049 institute.
[20] "China says U.S. arms sale to Taiwan creates "severe obstacles" for bilateral military exchanges," *Xinhua News*, September 22, 2011, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgxss/t861449.htm, accessed April 8, 2015.
[21] *Xinhua News,* December 23, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-12/23/c_114126824.htm, accessed April 8, 2015.

2014	No, no notification, that is.	0	No	Yes[22] (although this is not about the notification.)	No	No
2015	Yes	1830[23]	No	Yes[24]	Not confirmed yet? At least there are threats from Chinese Ministory of Defense[25]	Yes (threats of economic sanctions[26]) Wording is even more specific than 2010.[27]
2016	No	0	No	No	No	No
2017	Yes	1363[28]	Yes	No	No	No
2018	Yes	330	Yes	No	No	No
2019	Yes	10723.56 (including F-16s)	Yes	Yes[29]	No	No
2020	Yes	5863.1	Yes	Yes[30]	No	No

[22] *Xinhua News,* December 19, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-12/19/c_1113711238.htm#pinglun, accessed April 8, 2015.
[23] David Brunnstrom and Patricia Zengerle, "Obama administration authorizes $1.83 billion arms sale to Taiwan," *Reuters*, December 16, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-arms-idUSKBN0TZ2C520151216?utm_source=The+Sinocism+China+Newsletter&utm_campaign=acfef4d917-Sinocism_12_16_1512_16_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_171f237867-acfef4d917-29627041&mc_cid=acfef4d917&mc_eid=1207849200, accessed April 8, 2015.
[24] "China strongly opposes U.S. arms sale to Taiwan," *Xinhua News*, December 17, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/17/c_134924598.htm?utm_source=The+Sinocism+China+Newsletter&utm_campaign=acfef4d917-Sinocism_12_16_1512_16_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_171f237867-acfef4d917-29627041&mc_cid=acfef4d917&mc_eid=1207849200, accessed April 8, 2015.
[25] Chinese MOD, "Qianglie duncu meifang chexiao junshou xiangmu [MOD strongly urges the United States to revoke its arms sales]," Chinese Ministry of Defense, December 17, 2015, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2015-12-17/doc-ifxmttcn4941528.shtml, accessed April 8, 2015.
[26] "China strongly opposes U.S. arms sale to Taiwan."
[27] MFA Press Conference, December 17, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1325267.shtml, accessed April 8, 2015.
[28] Sources: https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ustaiwan.html.
[29] MFA Press Conference, July 12, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1680700.shtml.
[30] https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-54703484.

Appendix VI

Foreign Leaders' Reception of the Dalai Lama (DL) and Chinese Coercion

Table 1. The Dalai Lama (DL) as Received by Head of the Government/State by Year (1990-Present)[354]

Date and Year	Country	China's Rhetorical Reaction (Public/diplomatic sanctions or not)[355]	Diplomatic Sanctions	Economic Sanctions
1991.12.8	Norway (PM)	None (Yes?[356])	No	No
1991.9.30	Lithuania (PM)	None	No	No
1991.10.5	Bulgaria (President)	None	No	No
1991.12.7	Poland (President)	None	No	No
1991.12.2	UK (PM, officially at Downing 10)	Yes	No	No
1991.3.22	Ireland (President)	None	No	No
1991.4.16	United States (President Bush senior met with the Dalai Lama as a private person in the White House. This is the first time that the head of the state in the western world met with the DL.)	Yes[357]	No	No
1992.5.4	Cambodia (PM)	None	No	No
1992.6.11	Argentina (President)	None	No	No
1992.5.13	New Zealand (PM)	None	No	No

[354] This means that only prime ministers, presidents, premiers, and chancellors, etc. are counted. This dataset is cross-checked with the Dalai Lama's official travel log: http://www.dalailama.com/biography/travels/1990---1999; official Chinese website of the Dalai Lama, http://www.dalailamaworld.com/topic.php?t=197; http://www.dalailamaworld.com/topic.php?t=198; official website of the Tibet Religious Foundation of the Dalai Lama, http://webarchive.ncl.edu.tw/archive/disk22/04/86/37/79/67/200909043020/20130218/web/tibet.org.tw/dalailama_meet.html, accessed May 6, 2018.

[355] Made public by the MFA. Unless otherwise noted, data comes from a search of the word "达赖" on the website of the MFA Press Conference after 2001. For data before 2001, I look at MFA statements on the *People's Daily.* Only the United States and the EU were mentioned or criticized.

[356] At least this does not appear in the People's Daily.

[357] The *People's Daily* did not cite MFA criticism against the United States until 1995. After 1995, routinized criticism: Strong Dissatisfaction (*qianglie buman*, here after SD) and Firm Opposition (*jianjue fandui,* here after FO).

1992.5.8	Australia (PM)	None	No[358]	No
1992.6.12	Chile (President)	None	No	No
1992.3.1	India (PM)	None	No	No
1993.5.17	Poland (President)	None	No	No
1993.6.14	Austria (PM)	None	No	No
1993.4.27	United States (Vice President Gore met with the Dalai Lama in his office in the White Office, and President Clinton dropped by. This is the first time the Dalai Lama was officially received in the White House.)	Yes	No	No
1994.6.6	Austria (PM)	None	No	No
1994.7.5	Nicaragua (President)	None	No	No
1994.4.28	United States (President Clinton met with the Dalai Lama in the White House.)	Yes	No	No
1996.9.11	New Zealand (PM)	None	No	No
1996.9.14	Australia (PM)	Yes	No	No
1996.8.22	South Africa (President)	None	No	No
1997.9.5	Czech (President)	None	No	No
1997.4.23	United States (President Clinton met with the Dalai Lama in the White House)[359]	Yes	No	No
1998.12.8	France (President Chirac)	None	No	No
1998.11	United States (President Clinton met with the Dalai Lama in the White House)[360]	Yes	No	No

[358] This is confirmed.
[359] Zhang Huanping, "Mei lianxu siren zongtong huijian dalai [Four U.S. presidents have met with the Dalai Lama consecutively]," *Caixin*, February 6, 2015, http://datanews.caixin.com/2015-02-06/100782251.html, accessed May 6, 2018.
[360] Zhang Huanping, "Mei lianxu siren zongtong huijian dalai."

1999.5.10	UK (PM, officially at Downing 10)	Yes	No	No
1999.4.13	Chile (President)	None	No	No
1999.4.7	Brazil (President)	None	No	No
1999. 5.4	Belgium (PM)	None	No	No
1999.10.18	Netherlands (PM)	None	No	No
1999.10.26	Italy (PM)	None	No	No
2000.5.23	Norway (PM)	None (Yes?[361])	No	No
2000.5.11	Poland (President)	None	No	No
2000.10.16	Czech (President)	FO; stating also it might make Sino-Czech relations deteriorate[362]	No	No
2000.10.11	Hungary (PM)	None	No	No
2000.10.21	Ireland (President)	None	No	No
2000.11.17	Sweden (PM)	SD	No	No
2000.5.21[363]	Denmark (PM)	FO	No	No
2000.6.20	United States (President Clinton met with the Dalai Lama in the White House.)	Yes	No	No
2001.5.23	United States (President Bush Junior met with the Dalai Lama in his office residence in the White House on the day of China's anniversary of Tibetan Liberation).	Yes	No	No
2001.10.24	Bulgaria (President)	None	No	No
2001.6.24	Lithuania (PM)	None	No	No
2001.6.21-23	Latvia (PM and President)	None[364]	No	No
2001.11.28	Portugal (President)	FO and SD	No	No
2001.6.19	Estonia (PM)	None	No	No

[361] At least this does not appear in the *People's Daily*.
[362] "China protesting the Dalai Lama," *VOA*, September 11, 2009, http://m.voachinese.com/a/a-21-2009-09-11-voa40-60916987/1017104.html, accessed April 8, 2015.
[363] Did not meet with the Dalai Lama in 2015, which China acknowledged and seemed positive about. See MFA Press Conference, May 21, 2000, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1235740.shtml, accessed April 8, 2015.
[364] Relations seemed well even after the Dalai Lama visit, see "Zhongguo tong latuoweiya de guanxi [China's relations with Latvia]," November 22, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/gj/zlk/2014/01-16/444_2.shtml, accessed April 8, 2015.

2002.5.28	New Zealand (PM)	FO and SD	No	No
2002.7.2	Czech (President)	None	No	No
2002.7.5	Slovenia (PM and President)	SD and lodged solemn representation	No	No
2002.7.8	Croatia (PM)	None[365]	No	No
2002.11.7	Mongolia (PM)	FO and SD	No	Yes (three-day ban on railway, affecting copper transportation[366])
2003.9.10	United States (President Clinton met with the Dalai Lama in the White House.)	Yes	No	No
2003.6.6	Denmark (PM)	None	No	No
2004.4.23	Canada (PM, in his private residency)	Warning before the DL visit; but no MFA press conference mention after	No[367]	No
2005.6	Sweden (PM)	Moderate rhetoric: expressed concern (*guanqie*)	No	No
2007.6.12	Australia (PM)[368]	SD and FO	No	No
2007.9.22	Austria (PM, met with the chancellor in the chancellory[369])	SD and FO [370]	Yes: diplomatic sanctions. Diplomatic relations between Austria and China deteriorated significantly, leading to what the media described as a "minor ice-age" between the two	No

[365] The MFA protested against Slovenia but did not seem to make public statements about Croatia, see "China protesting the Dalai Lama's visit to Europe," *BBC*, July 7, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_2110000/newsid_2114600/2114600.stm, accessed April 8, 2015.

[366] Dagiisuren Dorjderem, "21shiji zhongmeng guanxi yanjiu," Ph.D. Dissertation: Jilin University, 2014.

[367] Confirmed by Canadian media.

[368] *Xinhua News,* June 15, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-06/15/content_6247822.htm, accessed April 8, 2015; and this indeed seems to be a public event and there was media exposure. They met in Sydney. See Leigh Sales, "Howard, Dalai Lama hold meeting," *ABC News*, June 15, 2007, http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/s1953114.htm; "Australian Prime Minister John Howard Meets The Dalai Lama," *Getty Images*, June 15, 2007, http://www.gettyimages.com/event/australian-prime-minister-john-howard-meets-the-dalai-lama-74544653#australian-prime-minister-john-howard-greets-the-14th-dalai-lama-on-picture-id74633814, accessed April 8, 2018.

[369] Offcial website of the Dalai Lama, http://www.dalailama.com/news/post/150-the-dalai-lama-arrives-in-dharamsala-after-ground-breaking-european-tour, accessed April 8, 2015.

[370] "China strongly protests Austrian officials receiving the Dalai Lama," *BBC*, May 26, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/2012/05/120526_dalai_austria.shtml, accessed April 8, 2015.

			countries. Media reported that Austrian diplomats were banned from contact with Chinese officials for about one year.[371]	
2007.9.23	Germany (Chancellor, met with the Dalai lama as a private person in her presidential residence[372])	SD and FO	Yes, diplomatic sanctions: cancelled meeting with German Treasury Minister	Yes.[373]
2007.10.29	Canada (PM official meeting with high publicity, as in *gongkai jianmian* and allowing the media to take pictures[374])[375]	SD and FO	Yes?	Yes
2007.10.17	United States (President Bush junior went to the Congress to present the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama. This is the first time the incumbent U.S. present appeared publicly with the Dalai Lama together.[376])	SD and FO	No	No

[371] Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, "Paying a Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect on International Trade," Working Paper, http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1103.pdf, accessed May 5, 2018.
[372] "Merkel Meets Dalai Lama Despite Chinese Criticism," *Deutsche Welle,* http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-meets-dalai-lama-despite-chinese-criticism/a-2793322; *New York Times,* September 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/world/europe/23iht-berlin.4.7609899.html, accessed April 8, 2015.
[373] Confirmed by interviews with Chinese scholars who had contacts with the German investors in China back then, but magnitude was small. Some, though, think there is no coercion against Germany economically, for example, May from Frei University in Berlin.
[374] "Jianada zongli habo shouci fanghua [Canadian Prime Minister Harper visited China for the first time]," People's Daily website, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/175544/, accessed April 8, 2015.
[375] "Dalai lama zaifang jianada jinu beijing [The Dalai Lama's visit to Canada angered Beijing]," *Radio France Internationale*, January 11, 2007, http://www1.rfi.fr/actucn/articles/095/article_4396.asp, accessed April 8, 2015.
[376] Brian Knowlton, "Bush and Congress Honor Dalai Lama," *The New York Times,* October 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/18/washington/18lama.html, accessed April 8, 2015.

2008.5.23[377]	UK (PM, met in a church that is a religious place, as opposed to in Downing 10[378])	SD and FO	No	No
2008.11.30	Czech (PM)	SD and FO	Yes, diplomatic sanctions; CCP acknowledged the visit but directed its anger towards France;[379] relations with Czech became cold after the DL visit; The MFA deemed the relations warm again in April 2014, when Sino-Czech Press Communiqué was signed. Czech promised to uphold the one-China policy and to reject any form of Tibetan independence[380] also confirmed by press.[381]	No
2008. 12.6	France (President, meeting as the president, also as the rotating chair of the EU).[382]	SD and FO	Yes, diplomatic sanctions; SD and FO; canceling Sino-EU meeting in January 2009 while assigning blame to France[383]	Yes

[377] *Xinhua News,* May 24, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-05/24/content_8243861.htm, accessed April 8, 2015.
[378] David Batty and agencies, "Brown meets Dalai Lama for 'warm' talks," *the Guardian*, May 23, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/may/23/brown.dalai, accessed April 8, 2015.
[379] *Xinhua News,* December 7, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-12/07/content_10469357.htm, accessed April 8, 2015.
[380] "Zhongjie waijiaobu xinwen gongbao [Press announcement from the Chinese and Czech foreign ministries]," *China News*, April 29, 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/04-29/6119404.shtml, accessed April 8, 2018.
[381] Diplomats say the Czech Republic has had particularly frosty relations with China over its dealings with the Tibetan spiritual leader, who has visited the country nine times and was a friend of the late Vaclav Havel, its former president. "They have been made an example of; it is easier to punish smaller countries," said one.
[382] Matthew Day, "Defiant Nicolas Sarkozy meets Dalai Lama despite China's trade threat," *The Telegraph*, December 6, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/3629865/Defiant-Nicolas-Sarkozy-meets-Dalai-Lama-despite-Chinas-trade-threat.html, accessed April 8, 2018.
[383] Ian Traynor, "China cancels EU summit over Dalai Lama visit," *The Guardian*, November 26, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/27/china-dalai-lama-nicholas-sarkozy; "China assails France after Sarkozy meets with Dalai Lama," *The New York Times*, November 7, 2008,

2008.12.10	Poland (President)	SD	No	No
2009.5.29	Denmark (PM)	SD and FO	Yes, diplomatic sanctions – suspended diplomatic relations.[384]	No
2010.8.11	India (PM)	Protest through diplomatic channel, not through MFA press conference[385]	No	No
2010.2.18	United States (President Obama met with the Dalai Lama in the White House as a private person.)[386]	Yes	No	No
2011.9	Mexico (President)	SD and FO	No?[387]	No
2011.8	Estonia (PM)	Yes	Diplomatic sanctions; No MFA press mention; but Estonian Ambassador to China summoned; China cancelled meeting with Estonian Agriculture Minister[388] Also confirmed by the press.[389]	No
2011.7.16	United States (President Obama met with the Dalai Lama in the White House as a	Yes	No	No

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/07/world/europe/07iht-france.1.18462289.html, accessed April 8, 2018.

[384] In May, China suspended diplomatic relations with Denmark after Prime Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen met with the Dalai Lama, then resumed them only after Copenhagen promised to notify Beijing before inviting him again.

[385] "China protested against the Dalai Lama's routine meeting with the Indian Prime Minister," *BBC*, August 21, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2010/08/100821_dalai_singh.shtml, accessed April 8, 2018.

[386] Zhang Huanping, "Mei lianxu siren zongtong huijian dalai."

[387] There does not appear to be clear diplomatic sanctions, after a search with lexis nexis

[388] Bai Hua, "Boluodihai guojia liyu dalai lama [Baltic states kindly received the Dalai Lama]," *VOA*, September 14, 2013, http://www.voachinese.com/content/dalai-lama-visit-baltic-countries-20130914/1749775.html, accessed April 8, 2018.

[389] More recently, it is understood to have cancelled bilateral visits after the Estonian president and other politicians met the Dalai Lama last summer (the report itself was in 2012).

	private person.)[390]			
2012.5. 14	UK (PM, not even in downing 10, Mr Cameron and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg met the Dalai Lama privately on Monday at St Paul's Cathedral.)[391]	SD and FO	Yes, diplomatic sanctions: cancelled meeting. Denied Cameron of state visit to China.	No
2012.5.26	Austria (PM and President)	SD and FO	Yes: Small-scale sanction on travel visa to Tibet.[392]	No
2013.9.11	Lithuania (President; She was then also the rotating chair of the EU presidency)[393]	Yes	Yes, diplomatic sanctions it seems; relations did not resume the until end of 2014[394]	No
2014.2.21	United States (President Obama met with the Dalai Lama in the White House as a private person.)[395]	Yesf	No	No

[390] Zhang Huanping, "Mei lianxu siren zongtong huijian dalai."
[391] "David Cameron's Dalai Lama meeting sparks Chinese protest," *BBC*, May 16, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-18084223, accessed April 8, 2018.
[392] See *Lexis Nexis* news: "Travel firms see political reasons for denial of Tibet visas to Austria, Excerpt from report," *Die Presse (Austrian newspaper)*, July 26, 2012; for the end result, see MFA Press Conference, September 5, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/t1073210.shtml, accessed April 8, 2018.
[393] "Litaowan nvzongtong gelibaosi kaite huijian xizang dalai lama zunzhe [Lithuanian president met with the Dalai Lama]," *Boxun News*, September 12, 2013, http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/intl/2013/09/201309122125.shtml#.VNn_ibDF-4I, accessed April 8, 2018.
[394] MFA Press Conference, February 10, 2015, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0210/c1002-26541771.html, accessed April 8, 2018.
[395] Zhang Huanping, "Mei lianxu siren zongtong huijian dalai."