Supplementary Information for *Women Grab Back: Exclusion, Policy Threat, and Women's Political Ambition*

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A Treatment Vignettes

A.1 Photo Matching

We vary the gender-composition of a hypothetical eight-member city council to either consist of only men, or four men and four women. We use 12 photos in total: 4 core men who appear in both the all-male and gender-balanced councils, 4 women who appear in the gender-balanced vignettes, and 4 additional men for the all-male council vignettes.

We originally selected 147 public domain images of state legislators. We narrowed these down to fifty photos of middle-aged candidates with similar facial expressions, dress, and affect. We then used a sample of 200 respondents on Mturk to gauge their attractiveness, likeability, competence, perceived age, and partisanship.

We selected the four core men as those that were closest to the mean on the five indicators. We used the matching program, MatchIt, in R (`gking.harvard.edu/matchit`) to match the four rotating men with the four rotating women to attain similar characteristics for each group. We found successful matches on all measures except for partisanship; respondents thought women were more likely to be Democrats. These matched images are the ones that rotate between the gender-balanced panel and the all-male panel. They are placed in the same location in the group shot as their matched pair.

A.2 Vignette Mockups

THE TRIBUNE

City Council to Finalize Budget for Women's Reproductive Health After Election

By Forum News Service on Oct 1, 2020 at 7:02 p.m.

All eight members of the Fairview City Council (pictured above) are up for re-election in March.

Recently, the council considered changing how the city supports women's reproductive healthcare. These changes include significant revisions to the operating budgets of the city's reproductive health clinics, which provide access to contraception and other family planning services.

After the election, the city manager wants the council to finalize the budget for women's reproductive health services. If the budget is cut, up to 50 percent of women in the city could lose access to reproductive healthcare.

Regina Williams, a healthcare advocate, said "I hope the council considers how critical these services are to women."

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B Additional CATES

There are many other differences among women that might differently affect the effect sizes that we detect. Here we offer an exploratory analysis of two of them: education (Figure SI. 1) and political interest (Figure SI. 2).

B.1 Education level



Figure SI. 1: CATEs for women by education level. Dynata survey. Dot size indicates n for each education category. Error bars at 95% confidence intervals. Also see Table SI.1

All-male panel	Edu. Scale	N	Race Interest	SD	SE	CI	Treatment
0.00	1. HS or less	22.00	2.73	1.20	0.26	0.53	Gender Balanced Panel
0.00	2. Some College	28.00	2.32	1.19	0.22	0.46	Gender Balanced Panel
0.00	3. Two-year degree	10.00	2.30	1.25	0.40	0.90	Gender Balanced Panel
0.00	4. Four-year degree	48.00	2.44	1.05	0.15	0.30	Gender Balanced Panel
0.00	5. Post-grad degree	23.00	2.35	0.88	0.18	0.38	Gender Balanced Panel
1.00	1. HS or less	18.00	2.17	1.10	0.26	0.55	All Male Panel
1.00	2. Some College	20.00	2.90	1.02	0.23	0.48	All Male Panel
1.00	3. Two-year degree	16.00	2.69	0.95	0.24	0.50	All Male Panel
1.00	4. Four-year degree	36.00	2.78	0.96	0.16	0.32	All Male Panel
1.00	5. Post-grad degree	31.00	2.71	1.07	0.19	0.39	All Male Panel

Table SI.1: Treatment effects for women respondents on interest in hypothetical race by education level (See Figure SI. 1).

B.2 Political interest



Figure SI. 2: CATEs for women by pre-treatment political interest levels. Dynata survey. Dot size indicates n for each political interest category. Error bars at 95% confidence intervals. Also see Table SI.2

All-male panel	Political Interest	N	Race Interest	SD	SE	CI	Treatment
0.00	1. Hardly at all	16.00	2.25	1.29	0.32	0.69	Gender Balanced Panel
0.00	2. Only now and then	17.00	2.29	0.99	0.24	0.51	Gender Balanced Panel
0.00	3 .Some of the time	31.00	2.13	0.76	0.14	0.28	Gender Balanced Panel
0.00	4. Most of the time	67.00	2.66	1.16	0.14	0.28	Gender Balanced Panel
1.00	1. Hardly at all	11.00	2.09	1.22	0.37	0.82	All Male Panel
1.00	2. Only now and then	16.00	2.62	0.89	0.22	0.47	All Male Panel
1.00	3 .Some of the time	40.00	2.60	0.93	0.15	0.30	All Male Panel
1.00	4. Most of the time	54.00	2.87	1.06	0.14	0.29	All Male Panel

Table SI.2: Treatment effects for women respondents on interest in hypothetical race by political interest level (See Figure SI. 2).

B.3 Abortion attitudes

In the manuscript, Figure 5 shows CATES among both pro-choice and anti-choice women. Table SI.3 displays the associated regression results for pro-choice women.

	Model 1
(Intercept)	2.295***
	(0.096)
All-male council	−0.010
	(0.132)
Reproductive health	0.121
	(0.144)
I(All-male council * Reproductive health)	0.350*
	(0.204)
R^2	0.031
Adj. R^2	0.024
Num. obs.	406

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table SI.3: Difference-in-difference test for effects among pro-choice women. Sample includes women respondents who reported that limiting access to abortion was "a bad idea." Dynata data.

B.4 Candidate type

In the manuscript, Figure 7 plots CATES for women respondents on interest in hypothetical race by pre-treatment candidate type. Below we represent these CATES in tabular form.

Treatment Condition	All Male Panel	N	Race Interest	SD	SE	CI
Make Diff Repro	0.00	78.00	2.56	1.09	0.12	0.25
Make Diff Repro	1.00	78.00	2.87	0.94	0.11	0.21
Make Diff Energy	0.00	100.00	2.50	0.92	0.09	0.18
Make Diff Energy	1.00	100.00	2.49	0.99	0.10	0.20
Enjoy Repro	0.00	25.00	2.28	0.98	0.20	0.40
Enjoy Repro	1.00	22.00	2.32	1.04	0.22	0.46
Enjoy Energy	0.00	33.00	2.18	0.95	0.17	0.34
Enjoy Energy	1.00	28.00	2.00	1.02	0.19	0.39
Win Repro	0.00	16.00	2.81	0.98	0.25	0.52
Win Repro	1.00	14.00	2.71	1.14	0.30	0.66
Win Energy	0.00	31.00	2.52	0.96	0.17	0.35
Win Energy	1.00	27.00	2.56	0.80	0.15	0.32

Table SI.4: Treatment effects for women respondents on interest in hypothetical race by pre-treatment candidate type (See Figure 7 in text).

B.5 Partisanship

In the manuscript, Figure 8 plots CATES for women respondents on interest in hypothetical race by party identification. Below we represent these CATES in tabular form.

	All Male Panel	Partisanship	N	Race Interest	SD	SE	CI	Treatment
1	0.00	1. Dem	65.00	2.60	1.12	0.14	0.28	Gender Balanced
2	0.00	2. Lean Dem	11.00	2.55	0.82	0.25	0.55	Gender Balanced
3	0.00	3. Independent	17.00	1.82	0.81	0.20	0.42	Gender Balanced
4	0.00	4. Lean Rep	2.00	2.00	1.41	1.00	12.71	Gender Balanced
5	0.00	5. Rep	36.00	2.42	1.16	0.19	0.39	Gender Balanced
6	1.00	1. Dem	53.00	2.70	1.05	0.14	0.29	All Male Panel
7	1.00	2. Lean Dem	14.00	3.07	0.92	0.25	0.53	All Male Panel
8	1.00	3. Independent	22.00	2.73	1.08	0.23	0.48	All Male Panel
9	1.00	4. Lean Rep	6.00	2.67	1.37	0.56	1.43	All Male Panel
10	1.00	5. Rep	26.00	2.38	0.90	0.18	0.36	All Male Panel

Table SI.5: Conditional average treatment effects for women respondents on interest in hypothetical race by party identification.

B.6 Race/ethnicity

In the manuscript, Figure 9 plots CATES for women respondents by respondent race / ethnicity. Below we represent these CATES in tabular form.

	All Male Panel	N	Race Interest	SD	SE	CI
Black Women Repro	0.00	29.00	2.31	1.14	0.21	0.43
Black Women Repro	1.00	28.00	2.71	1.12	0.21	0.43
Black Women Energy	0.00	45.00	2.56	0.99	0.15	0.30
Black Women Energy	1.00	47.00	2.28	1.02	0.15	0.30
Latina Women Repro	0.00	18.00	2.56	1.20	0.28	0.60
Latina Women Repro	1.00	17.00	2.59	1.12	0.27	0.58
Latina Women Energy	0.00	16.00	2.50	0.89	0.22	0.48
Latina Women Energy	1.00	14.00	2.43	1.09	0.29	0.63
White Women Repro	0.00	73.00	2.45	1.05	0.12	0.25
White Women Repro	1.00	62.00	2.74	1.01	0.13	0.26
White Women Energy	0.00	97.00	2.23	0.95	0.10	0.19
White Women Energy	1.00	101.00	2.30	1.02	0.10	0.20

Table SI.6: Conditional treatment effects for women respondents on interest in hypothetical race by respondent race / ethnicity. Error bars at 95% confidence intervals.

B.7 Combination of race and abortion attitudes

We analyze subgroup effects for Black women, white women, and Latinas who support or oppose abortion restrictions. Figure SI. 3 displays conditional average treatment effects within the reproductive healthcare condition. The left column shows pro-choice women in each racial / ethnic group, and the right column shows anti-choice women for the same group, all within the issue of reproductive healthcare.

We find that both Black women (top row) and white women (bottom row) who identify as pro-choice are mobilized by the all-male panel, whereas we do not find a similar significant effect among Latinas (middle row). We are unsure of how to interpret these findings. It could be that our results are due to a limited sample size, particularly once we begin to look within smaller and smaller sub-groups of respondents; for instance, there are only 20 pro-choice Latinas in our sample (about 10 each in the all-male and gender-balanced conditions, respectively). This limits our ability to make confident claims and would encourage work that oversamples women of color.

It may also be the case that our results are indicative of important differences among women that have received limited attention in the literature. As noted, existing work suggests that both Latinas and Black women feel best represented by candidates who share both their race/ethnicity and their gender (Montoya et al., 2021, Table 1). Yet, Montoya et al. (2021) also find that Black women are less likely than Latinas to report believing that a white male candidate would represent their interests. While this is purely speculative, it could be the

case that Black women, more than Latinas, are wary that an all-male, majority white council would be able to sufficiently represent their interests.



Figure SI. 3: CATEs for Black (top row), Latina (middle row), and white women (bottom row) by abortion stance on the topic of reproductive healthcare. Dynata survey. Error bars at 95% confidence intervals. Also see Table SI.7

Group	All-male panel	N	Race Interest	SD	SE	CI
Black Women Pro-Choice	0.00	20.00	2.20	1.15	0.26	0.54
Black Women Pro-Choice	1.00	18.00	2.67	1.24	0.29	0.61
Black Women Anti-choice	0.00	8.00	2.50	1.20	0.42	1.00
Black Women Anti-choice	1.00	10.00	2.80	0.92	0.29	0.66
Latina Women Pro-choice	0.00	13.00	2.69	1.18	0.33	0.71
Latina Women Pro-choice	1.00	7.00	2.86	1.07	0.40	0.99
Latina Women Anti-choice	0.00	5.00	2.20	1.30	0.58	1.62
Latina Women Anti-choice	1.00	8.00	2.12	1.13	0.40	0.94
White Women Pro-Choice	0.00	47.00	2.45	1.08	0.16	0.32
White Women Pro-Choice	1.00	45.00	2.84	1.02	0.15	0.31
White Women Anti-Choice	0.00	26.00	2.46	1.03	0.20	0.42
White Women Anti-Choice	1.00	17.00	2.47	0.94	0.23	0.48

Table SI.7: Conditional treatment effects for women respondents on interest in hypothetical race by respondent race / ethnicity and abortion stance. See Figure SI. 3

B.8 Efficacy by race / ethnicity

	Model 1 Latinas	Model 2 Black women	Model 3 White women
(Intercept)	2.750^{***}	3.000^{***}	2.495^{***}
	(0.224)	(0.136)	(0.089)
I(All-male * women's health)	-0.328	0.524^{*}	0.460^{**}
	(0.447)	(0.286)	(0.197)
All-male council	0.250	-0.404^{**}	-0.119
	(0.328)	(0.190)	(0.125)
Women's health policy	-0.083	-0.444^{**}	0.245^{*}
	(0.308)	(0.204)	(0.136)
R^2	0.028	0.038	0.079
Adj. R^2	-0.019	0.020	0.070
Num. obs.	65	165	333

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table SI.8: Conditional average treatment effects for the dependent variable of political efficacy by race/ethnicity for women respondents.

C CES Replication

C.1 CATES by partisanship for women respondents

	Model 1 Dem.	Model 2 Lean Dem.	Model 3 Ind.	Model 4 Lean Rep.	Model 5 Rep.
(Intercept)	2.453***	2.308***	1.857***	1.905***	1.538***
	(0.119)	(0.187)	(0.171)	(0.194)	(0.137)
I(All-male * women's health)	0.318	−0.154	0.500	0.506	−0.080
	(0.259)	(0.421)	(0.347)	(0.508)	(0.285)
All-male council	−0.319*	−0.308	−0.357	0.186	0.017
	(0.165)	(0.280)	(0.242)	(0.331)	(0.198)
Women's health policy	−0.060	0.104	0.000	−0.597*	0.291
	(0.182)	(0.297)	(0.242)	(0.314)	(0.191)
R^2	0.017	0.040	0.041	0.106	0.023
Adj. R^2	0.005	0.004	0.014	0.052	0.003
Num. obs.	264	84	109	54	146
RMSE	1.033	0.953	0.904	0.889	0.855

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table SI.9: Conditional average treatment effects by partisanship for women respondents. Dependent variable: interest in the race. CES data.

C.2 CATES by race / ethnicity for women respondents

	Model 1 White Women	Model 2 Black Women	Model 3 Latina Women
(Intercept)	1.989***	2.357***	2.111***
	(0.073)	(0.189)	(0.184)
I(All-male * women's health)	0.281*	0.866**	−0.074
	(0.162)	(0.380)	(0.407)
All-male council	−0.058	−0.600**	−0.202
	(0.110)	(0.257)	(0.275)
Women's health policy	−0.037	−0.524**	0.365
	(0.110)	(0.252)	(0.279)
R^2	0.009	0.056	0.043
Adj. R^2	0.004	0.031	0.010
Num. obs.	605	117	90
RMSE	0.990	1.001	0.958

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table SI.10: Conditional average treatment effects by race / ethnicity for women respondents. Dependent variable: interest in the race. CES data.



Figure SI. 4: CATEs by race / ethnicity for women respondents. CES data. Dot size indicates n for each race / ethnicity group. Error bars at 95% confidence intervals. Also see Table SI.11

Group	All-male panel	N	Race Interest	SD	SE	CI
Black Women Repro	0.00	36.00	1.83	0.97	0.16	0.33
Black Women Repro	1.00	20.00	2.10	1.07	0.24	0.50
Black Women Energy	0.00	28.00	2.36	1.06	0.20	0.41
Black Women Energy	1.00	33.00	1.76	0.94	0.16	0.33
Latina Women Repro	0.00	21.00	2.48	0.93	0.20	0.42
Latina Women Repro	1.00	20.00	2.20	1.06	0.24	0.49
Latina Women Energy	0.00	27.00	2.11	0.97	0.19	0.39
Latina Women Energy	1.00	22.00	1.91	0.87	0.19	0.38
White Women Repro	0.00	147.00	1.95	1.01	0.08	0.16
White Women Repro	1.00	131.00	2.18	1.02	0.09	0.18
White Women Energy	0.00	182.00	1.99	0.96	0.07	0.14
White Women Energy	1.00	145.00	1.93	0.98	0.08	0.16

Table SI.11: Conditional treatment effects for women respondents on interest in hypothetical race by respondent race / ethnicity. CES Data. See Figure SI. 4

D Pre-Analysis Plan

D.1 Motivation and Introduction

Normative and empirical scholars have long argued that who our political representatives are matters. Representatives' characteristics and identities reflect the broader dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within the polity. Men occupy most elected offices worldwide. Women hold 24 percent of seats in the lower or single chambers of the world's legislatures (and 23.5 percent of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives). Men's legislative over-representation – and women's under-representation – sends powerful signals about who "can" and "should" hold political office. The gender distribution of legislators further signifies which voices are heard when policy decisions are made.

Foundational studies examining the consequences of representatives' gender diversity for citizens' attitudes and behaviors (often called "symbolic representation") broadly suggest that women are more engaged in politics when there are a greater number of women representatives (Alexander, 2012; Atkeson and Carrillo, 2007; Campbell, Childs and Lovenduski, 2006; Desposato and Norrander, 2009; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012; Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007). This work posits that the election of more women to political office sends a message to women citizens that the polity is inclusive and represents a diversity of interests, compelling them to become more engaged in the political process. Said plainly, this work holds that inclusion mobilizes women, generating a positive feedback effect.

Yet, this theory does little to explain substantial shifts in women's political ambition during key moments in U.S. history. The "Year of the Woman" in 1992, for example, is often linked to the widely publicized Senate confirmation hearing of Justice Clarence Thomas, in which an all-male, all-white committee questioned Anita Hill about her experiences of sexual harassment while working for Thomas. In 2018, even more women ran for Congress in response to the 2016 presidential elections, when Donald Trump won despite his overt misogyny, which included bragging about committing sexual assault. The Trump Administration continued its frontal assault on women's rights—appointing yet another Supreme Court Justice accused of sexual misconduct, for instance—and in 2020, even more women are running relative to 2018. These political moments suggest that women's ambition also increases under conditions of marginalization – women participate when they receive signals that they do not matter. Exclusion, not inclusion, in some cases appears to mobilize women.

The gains in women's candidacies in 1992 and 2018 go against the conventional wisdom in gender and politics research, which has largely held that women's political under-representation depresses their political ambition. No previous research has explored whether and when women's exclusion activates their ambition. Moreover, we do not know of any work examining whether and when women's exclusion activates the demand for women candidates from both men and women voters.

We posit that although exclusion alone may not be enough to mobilize women, when combined with other factors it can yield heightened ambition. In particular, Thomas's confirmation and Trump's election demonstrated the policy consequences of women's exclusion. Men without firm commitments to protecting women's rights gained office, resulting in un-

favorable outcomes for women as a group. This suggest that group-specific policy threat combined with exclusion appears to be mobilizing the supply of women candidates.

D.2 Hypotheses

Recent work on gender and political ambition suggests women are more interested in running for office when political careers are framed as achieving communal or issue-based advocacy goals rather than power-related goals (Schneider et al., 2016). In such instances, observing a group of men legislators deciding policy about women's rights might compel women to engage in politics when they would not previously have done so. Counterintuitively, then, an all-male group of lawmakers poised to roll back women's rights may increase women's feelings of internal efficacy or the feeling that "politics is a place where someone like me can make a difference." Feeling that were their voices to be included, then the outcome could be different, may increase women's political ambition. We do not expect the theoretical reasoning above to apply to men, and thus we do not expect similar effects among men related specifically to political ambition.

Though understudied in the gender and politics literature, work in other areas of group rights has connected policy decisions that threaten group rights with increased political participation due to fear of a continued policy threat (Cho, Gimpel and Wu, 2006). An instance in which a group of male lawmakers makes a policy decision that directly harms women as a group may confirm the cognitive link voters may have between women's descriptive presence in political bodies and the substantive representation of women's interests (see Mansbridge, 1999). In such instances, voters associate male over-representation with the possibility that such legislative bodies will continue to produce policy decisions detrimental to the status of women. Consequently, we anticipate policy threat may bolster women's desire to seek public office.

Our theory as it relates to political ambition is about women's behavior. We do not have any strong a priori expectations about men's behavior in response to the gender composition of legislative bodies.[16] This leads to our first hypothesis:

> **H1**: When combined with a group-specific policy threat, the exclusion of women from elected office will increase women respondents' – more than men respondents' – political ambition.

We expect there to be considerable variation among respondents with respect to both their preferences for descriptive representation and their concern with group-specific policy threats, which we expect will moderate the effects that we hypothesize above. We posit that this variation can largely be captured by partisanship. Women who identify as Democrats (or democratic leaners) will be more likely to be moved by the exclusion + policy threat condition than women who identify as Republicans or Independents.

[16] We also pre-registered a number of additional hypotheses, 10 in total, including those that are beyond the scope of the current project. In this PAP, we only include the pre-registered hypotheses that we are able to test in the current project.

H2: When combined with a group-specific policy threat, the exclusion of women from elected office will increase Democratic women respondents' political ambition to a greater degree than Republican or Independent women.

Our expectations thus far implicitly refer to within-subject change in political ambition and differences in demand for women candidates post-treatment. We use variation in the gender composition of the hypothetical political body and the policy area under discussion to examine the underpinnings of our proposed theory. Our primary expectation is that the exclusion + policy threat condition will raise women's political ambition more than any other condition. There are two primary comparisons that allow us to make this assessment. Our first comparison is within the policy area of women's rights. Because a gender-balanced political body does not carry the same message that women's voices were not included in the deliberative process, we do not expect a gender-balanced council to have the same effects as an all-male council. This leads us to hypothesize:

H3: When combined with a group-specific policy threat, the exclusion of women from elected office will have a greater effect on the women's political ambition than the inclusion of women.

The second comparison is women's inclusion v. exclusion in a policy area that is not directly related to women's rights. Above, we hypothesized that policy threat is particularly mobilizing when respondents can clearly see the need for women's perspectives in the decision-making process – or as we put it above – when respondents are able to make a cognitive link between women's descriptive presence in political bodies and the substantive representation of women's interests. We propose that exclusion in the absence of a direct policy threat either has no impact on women's political ambition or may even have a demobilizing effect. Indeed, when women encounter messages that reinforce that politics is an exclusively male domain it may depress women's political ambition when the policy area is not specifically related to women's rights.

Pulling from previous empirical and theoretical work, women may perceive that they do not belong in politics when they do not have visible role models. We posit this is most likely to be true when the policy domain is not directly related to women's rights. Yet, we are somewhat agnostic about the extent to which a message of exclusion in the absence of a policy threat changes women's current perceptions of politics as a predominately male domain. What we are primarily interested in for the purposes of this study is how exclusion mobilizes women in a non-gendered policy area relative to women's exclusion in a gendered policy. We hypothesize that:

H4: The exclusion of women from elected office will increase women's political ambition to a greater degree in a gendered policy area than in a non-gendered policy area.

D.3 Design

We test our hypotheses using a survey experiment in which respondents read a short newspaper article about a city council. The experimental design varies the article on two dimensions. First, we vary the gender-composition of a hypothetical eight-member city council to either consist of only men, or four men and four women. Second, we also vary the policy area under consideration. Though all vignettes explain that the city council is considering a 50 percent reduction in city spending, we vary whether that reduction applies to group-specific (i.e., gendered) issue (women's reproductive health) or a generalized, not directly gendered, issue (renewable energy). Designed in this way, we vary both exclusion—understood as the gender composition of the city council—and the policy threat—understood as a policy decision that explicitly harms women as a group.

D.4 Survey Outcomes

Our design measures political ambition in two ways: (1) within respondent changes in nascent political ambition and (2) interest in pursuing the city council race described in the vignettes. Before exposure to the vignette, all respondents are asked:

> In general, which best characterizes your attitudes toward running for political office in the future?
>
> 1. It is something I am unlikely to do.
> 2. I would not rule it out forever, but I currently have no interest.
> 3. It is something I might undertake if the opportunity presented itself.
> 4. It is something I definitely would like to undertake in the future.

After exposure to the vignette, all respondents are again asked about their attitudes towards running for political office (as above). They were also asked about their interest in running for the city council election described in the vignette, as well as questions capturing political efficacy. The Dynata survey, which allows for more outcome variables given the greater survey length, contains additional moderators and outcome questions.

D.5 Data Collection Plan

Our data collection involves two efforts:

- Dynata full survey ($n \approx 1250$): In July 2020, we will field the full study to a sample via the survey firm Dynata and will select respondents to mirror the U.S. adult population in terms of gender, race / ethnicity, age, and geographic region.
- CES survey ($n \approx 1500$): We have space through [University name blinded] on the CES pre-election survey, which will be fielded in October 2020. We will include an abridged version (seven questions) of the full Dynata survey.

E Focus Group Protocols

Focus group protocols were approved by the institutional review boards at [Author's West Coast university] and [Author's Southern university]. Upon contact, investigators told participants that they sought to learn more about women's calculations about running for office and that they would participate in a focus group with other prospective women candidates; the project's coauthors were identified to the participants by name; and participants were told that anonymized focus group transcripts and notes would be shared with all coauthors on the project. Once contacted individuals agreed to participate, they received a copy of the informed consent form via email, which was presented again when the focus group convened in-person. The informed consent form affirmed investigators' commitment to keeping participant identities confidential and participants' rights to exit the group at any time. Throughout the sessions, all focus group participants engaged actively, with no consent withdrawn during or after the study.

F Human Subjects Research

This research employs a quantitative analysis of originally collected data as well as data from qualitative focus groups in the United States. This appendix details how precaution was taken to adhere to the APSA Council's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research regarding originally collected data.

General principles: The procedures used to obtain the quantitative data (both the survey data and the Mturk data to pre-test treatment images) and qualitative data (focus groups) featured in this study respect the autonomy and wellbeing of respondents / participants and of other people affected by the research, as detailed in the following sections.

Power: Survey participants were recruited by the survey firms Dynata (full survey) and YouGov (CES data) from a panel of participants that have previously expressed an interest in completing surveys for compensation. After being recruited, all participants had the ability to opt in to the online survey. Our recruitment practices for the focus groups are detailed in SI §E. We also used a sample of 200 respondents from Amazon's platform, Mechanical Turk (MTurk), to pre-test our treatment images (see SI §A). Across all three data collection efforts, participation was entirely voluntary, and participants could withdraw from the study at any time. No covert or deceptive research practices were used.

Consent: Across all three data collection efforts, all respondents / participants were given an information sheet about the study, and gave their informed consent in order to participate. Respondents / participants were made aware that they could opt-out at any point of the photo assessments / survey / focus group and still receive the same compensation. For the focus groups, this research employed standard techniques and involved minimal risk and harm to participants.

Deception: No deception of any sort was used in this study. The researchers accurately described the nature of the research in the photo assessment (MTurk) and survey (Dynata) consent form and in the focus group protocol.

Harm and Trauma: The topic of the surveys / focus groups—women's political ambition—did not entail any harm or trauma to participants. Women's representation in politics is a topic that is frequently discussed and debated by media outlets in the United States, as well as openly in other public fora by public officials and citizens alike.

Confidentiality: We did not record identifying information (respondent name, social security number, etc.) across all three data collection efforts.

Impact: The surveys / focus groups conducted for this study did not compromise the integrity of political processes in any way.

Laws, Regulations, and Prospective Review: The procedures used to conduct the surveys / focus groups for this study fully comply with U.S. law. This research was approved by the Human Subjects Internal Review Board at Vanderbilt University (IRB # 201004 for the main study and IRB # 201476 for the CES replication module) and Occidental College (IRB # SP20-002-PISC). Further, the researchers attest to the ethics of the research beyond institutional approvals.

Compensation: Dynata compensates individuals for participating in their online survey panel at a standard rate that they have set. As discussed in the main manuscript, we chose to give focus group participants compensation for participation in our study in the form of Amazon gift cards. We provided gift cards to focus group participants to encourage participation and compensate them for the time that they spent participating in our study. We chose the amounts for this compensation after consultation with local experts who indicated that the figures we chose would be sufficient to encourage participation but without being so large that people would feel pressured to do so (75 USD for the two candidate focus groups, and 50 USD for the student group in Nashville). For the MTurk pre-test sample of respondents who assessed photos of state legislators to use in our treatments, we compensated respondents $2.10 for the task. The task on average took 7 minutes, resulting in an hourly rate of $18. See also our discussion above on Power for a discussion of the voluntary nature of participation in the research.

Shared Responsibility: The researchers have sought to adhere to the principle of shared responsibility as described in the APSA Council's guidelines.