The Role of Foreign Aid in Procuring Civil War Party Consent to Peacekeeping

Johannes Karreth
Associate Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations
Ursinus College
jkarreth@ursinus.edu

Timothy J.A. Passmore
Assistant Professor
Department of International Studies and Political Science
Virginia Military Institute
passmoretj@vmi.edu

Jaroslav Tir
Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Colorado Boulder
jtir@colorado.edu

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Abstract: The success of peacekeeping operations relies heavily on the conflict parties providing unrestricted consent to the intervention: accepting the mission without restricting its operational mandate. Consent is, however, often withheld or limited by one or more parties who calculate a higher cost to peace than to continued fighting. We highlight the role of international economic incentives in the form of foreign development aid in overcoming crucial hurdles to the provision of unrestricted consent. We argue that past foreign aid sends a credible signal of future, post-conflict material benefits to be obtained by the belligerents *if* they work toward peace. This conditionality of future benefits not only helps overcome credible commitment hurdles but also incentivizes the belligerents to take steps toward an effective transition to peace and stability, including providing unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions. Analyses of up to 119 post-Cold War civil wars and a brief narrative of peacekeeping operations during East Timor's transition to independence demonstrate that international incentives in the form of foreign aid significantly and substantially increase the likelihood of unrestricted consent from all conflict parties. The findings have implications for the literature on international influences on domestic political contestation and for research on the prospects of successful peacekeeping operations. The study also suggests that incentives based on development-oriented aid can facilitate the type of peacekeeping operations that are most likely to enhance human security.

Introduction

One of the key challenges to establishing and successfully carrying out multinational peacekeeping operations is gaining the consent of the conflict parties (government and rebels) to these interventions. Unrestricted consent, whereby the conflict parties both agree to the mission and impose no restrictions on its operational mandate, best positions the mission to achieve peace. Peacekeeping providers have therefore identified unrestricted consent to peacekeeping as critical to mission success, where an absence of consent or restrictions to mission parameters lead either to no peacekeeping or operations that face significant challenges.

Lacking the consent of the conflict parties, whether fully or partially, may lead to major obstructions to the fulfillment of the mandate, such as stakeholders antagonizing peacekeepers or restrictions on peacekeepers' operational movement. Such scenarios pose significant threats to the peacekeeping entities, where mission objectives are thwarted, peacekeepers are put at risk, and the mission may be drawn into a long and expensive deployment with no clear exit strategy (Sebastián and Gorur 2018, 5). Beyond this, the reputation of peacekeeping providers such as the UN is challenged, leaving them appearing ineffective at addressing global conflicts and humanitarian crises. The case of Angola illustrates these problems, where the UNAVEM III and subsequent MONUA missions lacked unrestricted consent and overwhelmingly failed to bring a peaceful conclusion to the conflict. Other peacekeeping failures such as Chad, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan have been attributed to lacking consent (Johnstone 2011, 168).

Consent to peacekeeping is difficult to achieve, reflecting a conflict party's hesitation to agree to any intervention that may be subsequently detrimental to that party. A key issue is the commitment problem between the conflict parties. Since peace operations and associated negotiations typically require rebels to disarm and demobilize, the government struggles to credibly commit to not violating the process and acting on its position of advantage. Other incentives to withhold consent also exist. In particular, the government may be resistant to outside interference that threatens to restrict its freedom to conduct counterinsurgency operations, or that infringes upon its sovereignty

in other ways.

While prior work has highlighted the importance of consent (Duursma 2020; Yuen 2020), our study focuses on the less well-understood issue of how international third parties can solve the challenge of getting governments and rebels to provide unrestricted consent to peacekeeping operations. Unrestricted consent means that neither of the conflict parties are placing any restrictions on the PKO's parameters. We highlight the role of international economic incentives in the form of foreign aid in overcoming crucial hurdles to the provision of unrestricted consent. We argue that past foreign aid sends a credible signal of future, post-conflict material benefits to be obtained by the belligerents *if they work toward peace*. This conditionality of future benefits not only helps overcome credible commitment hurdles but also incentivizes the belligerents to take steps toward an effective transition to peace and stability, including providing unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions. Analyses of up to 119 post-Cold War civil wars and a brief narrative of peacekeeping operations during East Timor's transition to independence demonstrate that international incentives in the form of foreign aid significantly and substantially increase the likelihood of unrestricted consent provision. Our study of the role of international incentives in the form of foreign aid tackles an important domestic policy decision involving both the state and non-state actors and speaks to broader debates about the primacy of interests, ideas, or institutions, especially in shaping the behavior of state and non-state actors that may otherwise be hard to constrain.

Consent in peacekeeping

The study of peacekeeping has produced a wealth of insights in recent years regarding two issues in particular: first, where peacekeeping is most likely to occur (e.g., Aydin 2010; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Walter 2009; Stojek and Tir 2015), and second, how effective peacekeeping is (e.g., Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; 2014; Beardsley 2011; Bara 2020). Much of this research has, however, focused heavily on the organizational and structural aspects of peacekeeping, treating the creation and implementation of such operations as largely exogenous to the conflict parties themselves. Although various case studies have shed

light on how the interaction of peacekeepers and belligerents shapes operational outcomes, we have little systematic understanding of the ways in which conflict parties elicit the deployment of peacekeeping in the first place. We address this gap by considering the important role played by consent to peacekeeping. In particular, under what conditions are conflict parties more likely to provide unrestricted consent to a peacekeeping operation than others?

Consent to peacekeeping broadly refers to the acceptance by one or more conflict parties to a peacekeeping intervention. In reality, the process by which consent is achieved, the actors involved, and the nature of the consent given can vary significantly and reflect an often complex situation. Here, we give a brief overview of the role consent plays in peacekeeping and the process by which consent is sought and achieved.[1]

Since consent to peacekeeping was secured for its first mission, UNEF I in 1956, the UN has reaffirmed its importance in subsequent operations and peacekeeping strategies such as the 1992 Agenda for Peace and the 2000 Brahimi Report. In fact, consent has been one of the three pillars of UN peacekeeping since its inception (alongside impartiality and the limited use of force). Empirical findings largely support the emphasis placed on consent for successful operations, where some have argued it is the most critical factor (Howard 2008, 10). Fortna (2008) finds that smaller operations without a mandate to use force but which achieve consent are no less effective at procuring lasting peace than robust enforcement missions. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) find that consent-based missions are more effective at creating self-sustaining peace after civil wars than enforcement missions without consent. Yuen (2020) finds further that consent is crucial to enduring peace, but only when it is given fully by the belligerents. The latter finding emphasizes the non-binary nature of consent, whereby it is often not given by all parties to the conflict, or is given but with limitations.

Consent has been identified as central to peacekeeping successes in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, and East Timor (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Conversely, failure to secure consent, and especially unrestricted consent, has been cited as a key

[1]For a more exhaustive discussion of this process see Johnstone (2011); Piccolino and Karlsrud (2011); Sebastián and Gorur (2018).

cause of failure in missions such as Chad, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan (Johnstone 2011, 168). In recent years, UN peacekeeping has increasingly had to rely on enforcement mandates when consent is not forthcoming or is highly tenuous. However, consent remains a priority for organizations like the UN that provide peacekeeping (e.g., Lipson 2007). According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict, and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace" (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2018).

Despite its importance as a principle of peacekeeping, the UN has no defined procedure for securing consent (Sebastián and Gorur 2018, 15). However, a general process has emerged over the years. Consent is typically the result of negotiations that take place between the peacekeeping provider and the conflict parties. In the case of the UN, this involves the Secretariat, members of the Security Council, and the potential host-state government at a minimum, though ideally rebel groups would also participate in discussions. Other parties to the discussions might include regional actors, other UN member states, intergovernmental organizations, and additional relevant external actors (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2018). Should negotiations permit it, the Secretariat deploys a technical assessment mission to determine the feasibility and structure of a future operation based on conditions in the country. At this point, further negotiations with the conflict parties will determine if consent is to be given for the proposed operation or if the plan is deemed unacceptable in its present form. Should discussions result in consent, whether it be full consent given by all conflict parties, restricted consent, or consent given by only one or some parties, the Secretary-General then provides a report to the Security Council outlining any possible mission. Should the Security Council deem a peacekeeping mission to be a suitable option, it then adopts a resolution outlining the mandate, specific tasks, and authorized size of the mission (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2018).

Based on these potential outcomes, and utilizing definitions from studies such as Yuen (2020), we categorize consent according to two primary criteria: whether or not it was given with restric-

tions, and whether or not all conflict parties offered it. We distinguish unrestricted consent (where all conflict parties consent without restrictions) from restricted consent (where conflict parties put restrictions on the PKO), partial consent (where not all parties gave unrestricted consent to the PKO), or no consent. Whether or not (and the extent to which) *all* conflict parties accept the presence of a peacekeeping intervention and allow it to perform its mandated tasks is critical to peacekeeping. Constraints such as restricted or partial consent create formidable challenges for peacekeepers and severely limit their impact. Unrestricted consent is therefore considered highly desirable for effective peacekeeping.

Unrestricted consent: A commitment problem between belligerents

Unrestricted initial consent is key to successful peacekeeping (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008; Yuen 2020). It allows the peacekeeping entity, such as the UN, to optimize the mission parameters, goals, scope, and size in ways that best match the needs on the ground. Restrictions on consent, in contrast, handicap missions, lowering their chances of success. Withholding consent altogether may well lead to no intervention at all.

Securing consent from all parties and without restrictions is often difficult, though, because it can generate political, military, strategic, and other costs for the government and the rebels. This tension typically reflects the perceived power position or expected gains of the conflict parties at the time of negotiating the intervention. Governments in conflict countries must not only relinquish a degree of sovereignty by permitting an outside intervention (Buitelaar and Hirschmann 2021), but may also be restricted from carrying out counterinsurgency operations as they wish. Furthermore, governments may be concerned that peacekeeping may serve to freeze the current status quo and thereby solidify rebel gains, such as territorial holdings. A government believing it will lose more by allowing a PKO will be reluctant to offer consent, or will negotiate a much less robust mission. Such was the case with Indonesia's conflict with the GAM separatist rebel movement in the Aceh region. The Indonesian government made clear early on that it had no desire to accept a PKO for fear of losing more of its sovereign territory, as had occurred with the UN's presence in East Timor

several years earlier. Consent to a mission was therefore a nonstarter, and the conflict's resolution relied on other third party mediation mechanisms instead. In the instance of giving restricted consent to a mission, Chad serves as an example. Despite the UN's desire to implement a political mission, the Chad government insisted that the rebels were mere "mercenaries" and that there was no political solution at which to arrive. Rather, the government saw the main problem as a humanitarian one, leaving the UN with a mandate restricted to protection of civilians as fighting continued between government and rebel forces (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, 459). The government later withdrew its consent altogether.

Even if the government can be convinced to assent to a peacekeeping intervention, it will struggle to convince the rebels that it will not subsequently change strategies to take advantage of the situation. Peacekeeping interventions — and especially those in the presence of a potential peace agreement — typically require rebels to lay down their arms and demobilize. The rebels will thus fear that the government may exploit this strategic advantage and come after the (now disarmed) rebels. The rebels will therefore be reticent to consent to peacekeeping Walter (1997; 2002).

Restricted, partial, or no consent can be severely costly for peacekeeping providers if they proceed with an operation nonetheless. The increasing demand for peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era has placed considerable constraints on the UN and other providers of peacekeeping such as the African Union, NATO, and ECOWAS, which regularly struggle to obtain the finances and personnel required for their operations (Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018). Such organizations, and the UN in particular, are therefore under increasing pressure to use their peacekeeping resources both efficiently and effectively. This pressure has been borne out in peacekeeping deployment decisions. Commenting on the 2015 report of the High-level Panel on Peace Operations, the UN Secretary-General asserted that "[t]he proliferation of conflict is outpacing our efforts" (United Nations, General Assembly & Security Council 2015, 2). With limited resources, and facing the critical oversight of the international community, an inability to obtain consent may threaten the very viability of international peacekeeping.

Foreign development aid as a key incentive for consent

We argue that certain factors external to the conflict may help overcome the problems associated with gaining unrestricted consent to peacekeeping. That the international dimension of expected benefits of peace can help tip the scales in favor of unrestricted consent aligns with a literature showing that international third parties can credibly address fundamentally domestic collaboration problems (e.g., Matanock 2020; Tir and Karreth 2018). The specific solution highlighted in this study relies on tangible ties between a civil war state and international third parties. We maintain that such ties will increase the likelihood that the civil war parties will provide unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions meant to manage and resolve the conflict. Zeroing in on economic resources such as foreign development aid, we argue that such ties create a heightened interest in resolving the conflict for both the belligerents (and primarily the state) and international third parties. Past resources provided to the civil war state via such channels constitute investments, but protracted conflict hinders these investments from achieving their goal. International third parties thus have a vested interest in seeing the conflict resolved so that their projects and development agendas can resume and show positive measurable results (e.g., Gulrajani and Honig 2016; Tir and Karreth 2018).

This in turn means that the civil war state's government has a credible reason to believe that resolving the conflict will prompt an influx of further resources. This expectation of future resources incentivizes the government to cooperate with international efforts to resolve the conflict, such as providing unrestricted consent for peacekeeping missions on its territory. Not following the cooperative path would instead create mounting opportunity costs for the government as international development programs and aid are unlikely to resume should the conflict continue (e.g., Balla and Reinhardt 2008; Swedlund 2017).

Expectations and incentives for unrestricted consent

The expectation of future economic gains can help overcome not only the internal sovereignty costs of unrestricted consent, but also alter the government's very calculus when it comes to fighting the rebels. Ideally, the government may want to score a military victory, vanquishing the rebels and not having to engage in making compromises that would call for the sharing of power and resources in the country. Yet, the odds of such a scenario actually transpiring are low. Fewer than half of the internal armed conflicts, according to Sullivan and Karreth (2019), end with the government's military victory over insurgents. Governments fighting against an insurgency typically face a choice between compromising with the rebels or engaging in a prolonged and costly fight with an uncertain outcome.

The expectation of future economic gains derived from international third parties can help tip this calculus toward compromise. If the expected economic gains are sizeable enough, they can help outweigh the costs of compromising with the rebels and of providing unrestricted consent to peacekeeping. In contrast, rejecting peacekeeping or constraining it would risk conflict continuation or resumption — and create the perception that the government is unwilling to work with the international community toward peace. This in turn jeopardizes future economic gains from international third parties. The government would therefore face both the costs of continued fighting and opportunity costs of not receiving the economic assistance from international third parties, or considerably less of it. In other words, though compromising with the rebels will be costly for the government, these costs can be outweighed by the expected near-term economic gains from resumed aid and development programs (Carnahan, Gilmore, and Durch 2007).[2]

This incentive structure has implications for the rebel side as well, though it may not necessarily be tied directly and formally to international third parties. The odds of rebels scoring a military

[2]Note that other studies show such gains to be immediate but potentially also short-lived (Aning and Edu-Afful 2013; Bove and Elia 2017; Beber, Gilligan, Guardado, and Karim 2019). This is consistent with governments pursuing short-term benefits that can be associated with clientelist policies by both governments and rebels, touting peacekeeping-related growth as a function of purposeful policies by those in power at the national and local level. Nevertheless, because immediate gains are desirable, international incentives are particularly important to overcome the hurdles for consenting to, and deploying, peacekeeping operations.

victory against the government are even lower, at one in four cases per Sullivan and Karreth (2019). Additionally, even if a conflict-ending compromise could be struck, the rebels would be particularly vulnerable to the credible commitment problem (Walter 1997; 1999). Peace plans often call for the rebels to disarm or integrate because a country cannot have two competing military forces. This would put the rebels in a dangerous position. Fearing for their safety, they may not want to pursue a peace plan in the first place.

But if the government is subject to incentive-based constraints from international third parties, the rebels can expect that the government has self-interested stakes in pursuing peace and not harming the rebels after they disarm. Otherwise, the international third party aid and programs would either not materialize or be quickly suspended (Matanock 2020). In addition, rebels can also assume that existing international ties (e.g. through development aid) come with stronger international exposure. Such exposure heightens rebels' concerns about their international reputation and recognition, which are known to drive cooperative behavior of rebel groups (Jo 2015; Stanton 2016; Huang 2016; Gleditsch, Hug, Schubiger, and Wucherpfennig 2018; Fazal and Konaev 2019; Stanton 2020).

This conditionality — future resources in exchange for pursuing peace — is critical to the resolution of the credible commitment problem precluding unrestricted consent. Foreign development aid and lending programs can serve as a conditional incentive. Rarely do third parties provide all the promised resources at once. Rather, they are disbursed piecemeal over time. There is also the potential for program renewals or broadening further into the future. This piecemeal approach allows not only for the monitoring of how the money is spent and whether various program benchmarks are being met, but also for the remaining promised funds to be withheld should there be backpedaling conflict resolution-wise. Among other outcomes, this threat serves as an incentive to provide unrestricted consent for peacekeeping missions. In addition, donors tend to move in unison and often reinforce each other's aid efforts (Nunnenkamp, Öhler, and Thiele 2013). This implies that incentives toward unrestricted consent are clear and independent from specific donors.

In scenarios where the government can expect sizeable international assistance post-conflict,

the rebels have more of a reason to believe that the government can credibly commit to peace. Both parties therefore should be willing to accept peacekeepers with broad mandates. Rebel resistance to peace and peacekeepers can be reduced even further if the expected international third party resources can be used in part on rebel areas or on issues important to the rebels. The extent of the expected international third party assistance will be critical in helping tip the scales away from continued fighting and toward a path toward peace that involves providing unrestricted consent for peacekeeping missions. Not all civil war countries will therefore be equally incentivized to provide unrestricted consent to peacekeeping.

Prior development aid as a key incentive

Our argument suggests prior foreign development aid as a key incentive, for multiple reasons. Countries that have already received foreign economic assistance have established channels with donors that can serve as conduits for future aid. Existing aid can also have reached different parts of the country and different levels of government, making it more likely that actors beyond the central government can benefit from it. Donors can also leverage incentives if they have established delivery mechanisms, rather than having to promise to set up such channels upon the aid recipient pursuing a desired policy (such as providing unrestricted consent). Having established connections also allows for a faster disbursement of resources — a factor that is important to the conflict parties and that renders future resources more concrete and tangible. Both help overcome the hesitation against PKOs that are rooted in commitment problems and concerns about internal sovereignty (for the government) and safety (for the rebels).

International incentives in the form of development aid can only overcome the problems associated with consent and deployment of PKOs if donors can make these incentives conditional on the "desired behavior". In the context of peacekeeping operations, shirking from the "desired behavior" would imply refusal to provide unrestricted consent to a peacekeeping operation or to otherwise set up roadblocks for an available PKO. The term "conditions" here does not suggest that specific aid programs or related resources explicitly feature a demand for unrestricted consent.

However, donors' preferences toward peace and stability have been clearly shown (Campbell and Spilker 2022). Operational rules and program design usually prevent aid programs from continuing in fragile conditions. While PKOs provide some degree of stability, rejecting or constraining a PKO also endangers the continuation of existing aid programs. In sum, established aid channels are a feasible proxy for incentives that international actors can provide to conflict parties with the goal of inducing actions that will stabilize the post-conflict country.

Past aid can serve as a proxy for how foreign actors can credibly incentivize the conflict parties. Past aid signals the third parties' commitment to seeing the mission through, and hence gives the state confidence to seek peace. Without prior aid, the state may be willing to take the carrot, but third parties may be less invested in a peaceful outcome since they lose little by continuing conflict. Improving upon more general measures that capture primarily the *potential* for future benefits (for instance existing connections to international organizations that administer such benefits (e.g., Tir and Karreth 2018; Karreth 2018), this study relies on the volume of *existing* (i.e., "real") benefits as a proxy for credible incentives. These aid measures capture international "investment" (not in the narrow sense of foreign direct investment) in the conflict country. Some of these benefits have already been disbursed, some are committed and thus should be disbursed. Both connect to our argument about tangible incentives to provide unrestricted consent to a PKOs.

Official development aid also differs from other potential international influences such as trade or FDI in that it can directly reach central or local governments. Trade and FDI may also take longer to generate revenue for governments, making the payoff from them look more uncertain and remote. From a cynical perspective, it is easier for governments to siphon off aid, which in turn makes governments more susceptible to aid as an incentive. The same can be applied to rebels, especially if they have or can achieve control over territory and local bureaucracies. Aid is also *comparatively* more likely than private profit-oriented capital to target areas of need such as rebel-controlled territories, which tend to be more geographically remote and may have suffered (infrastructure) damage during the war. Our argument leads to the following hypothesis.

H1: Governments and rebel groups are more likely to give unrestricted consent to

peacekeeping operations if their state has received larger — as opposed to smaller — volumes of prior foreign development aid.

We note here that the relationship between the conflict parties and the third party donors should be distinguished from the interaction between the conflict parties and the peacekeeping providers. While PKOs often struggle to receive unrestricted consent, we do not argue that the PKO must convince the conflict parties that they will not bear costs by consenting to the PKO's presence. Rather, we argue that the benefits obtained from future development aid will outweigh any costs incurred by allowing the PKO to proceed. The conflict parties depend on the aid, and therefore signal to donors their willingness to pursue peace in order to receive that aid in future. The PKO is simply the vehicle through which that peace is delivered, which is desirable for donors (as opposed to other routes to peace, which tend to be less effective). We also note that the PKO is not the vehicle through which the third-party aid is implemented. While certain multidimensional PKOs with heavy peacebuilding elements may adopt the responsibility for the implementation of some post-conflict aid programs, we assume that most ODA programs are implemented directly by donors. This is reinforced by our measurement of prior development aid, implying links between third parties and the conflict country prior to the existence of the PKO.

Quantitative evidence on consent

Research design

Outcome Our hypothesis focuses on conflict parties providing unrestricted consent to a peacekeeping operation. We use data by Fortna to define the sample of cases for our analysis. Fortna (2008) identifies the following sources of peacekeeping: the UN, regional organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS, or NATO, and ad-hoc missions led by a global or regional power. Yuen (2020) identifies whether or not all parties consent to the mission and whether restrictions were placed on consent, such as restricting the tasks, geographic access, or deployment size of the operation. If conflict parties imposed no such restrictions, and if all conflict parties consented to

the operation, we refer to this as unrestricted consent. We define two outcomes of interest, leading to different samples. First, we code as 1 those cases in which all conflict parties grant unrestricted consent. All other instances (restricted, partial, or no consent, and no PKO deployment at all) are coded as 0. This coding decision matches our research question and theory: our discussion of consent highlights that unrestricted consent is clearly the most desirable setting for any PKO, whereas restricted, partial, or no consent all create considerable costs for PKOs. Understanding why conflict parties give unrestricted consent (compared to restricted, partial, or no consent) therefore is the key goal of this study.

Second, we examine variation in consent types between PKOs that received some form of consent, and exclude cases without consent or cases without PKOs. This restricted sample serves to differentiate more clearly between unrestricted consent versus restricted or partial consent. Here, we continue to code unrestricted consent as 1 and restricted or partial consent as 0, respectively; cases in which there was no consent or no PKO are removed from this analysis. By doing so, we also ensure that cases without consent or cases without PKOs (which might differ from those with at least some form of consent) do not drive any results in the full sample.

Unit of analysis and time period We analyze internal armed conflicts, as defined in Fortna (2008) and updated by Yuen (2020). Like Fortna and Yuen, we analyze conflicts after they reached ceasefires that lasted at least one month. Fortna's sample stretches from 1990 to 2011 because the frequency and nature of peacekeeping changed after 1990 (e.g., Malone and Wermester 2000) and much current empirical work on peacekeeping has focused on the post-Cold War period. Among peacekeeping missions, those led by the United Nations under Chapter VII, Article 42 are distinct in that they may not *require* consent. However, Chapter VII missions typically seek consent, and usually receive it in some format. The Chapter VII authorization gives the UN the option to switch to enforcement if necessary, such as when consent breaks down. Our analyses therefore separate between two samples: one without Chapter VII missions (because it can be argued that they do not require consent) and one with these missions and an indicator for them (because they typically do

seek consent).

Operationalizing international incentives

Our argument suggests that conflict parties are more likely to grant unrestricted consent in countries exposed to larger volumes of international incentives. As proxy for these incentives, we rely on measures of engagement with bilateral and multilateral donors. Economic aid from donors can be a crucial resource especially in post-conflict recoveries (Girod 2012; 2015; Findley 2018; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2009). To "induce" (Matanock 2020, 366) conflict parties toward consent, incentives must be credible, sizeable, and beneficial to all conflict parties. To match these conditions, we rely on immediate past foreign aid to conflict countries.

To capture these dynamics, we measure foreign aid *commitments* reported by the OECD covering OECD/DAC donors (OECD 2020) on actual flows of aid-related capital to states: total official aid flows (OECD 2020). Our argument suggests that more exposure to larger incentives will influence the behavior of conflict parties. We operationalize "more" and "larger" by capturing the volume of prior aid-related commitments, and by accounting for the relative importance of this incentive for the recipient by scaling it by GDP. The resulting measure is then standardized for estimation purposes. This procedure also serves to account for the fact that not all countries can be equally incentivized, and that aid may matter more to some countries than others. We note that this measure captures only aid to governments and not rebel groups. As we have argued, while the state is the primary recipient of the aid, it will nevertheless incentivize rebel groups to give consent to peacekeeping, albeit through different mechanisms than the incentivization of the state. We also clarify that we use development aid rather than, or in addition to, military aid. We believe military aid would be unlikely to play the same role in eliciting consent for two reasons. First, unlike development aid, military aid would only benefit the recipient side rather than having a diffuse benefit for both or resolving the credible commitment problem we have proposed, thus making the provision of unrestricted consent by all sides highly improbable. Second, development aid is a much more likely tool of leverage to address conflict than military aid, as expressed in the

literature (see, e.g. Sullivan, Blanken, and Rice 2020). Our measure focuses on the time period before the ceasefire, averaging aid during that time period up to three years. This time choice is a compromise: it captures aid that is promised or disbursed before the ceasefire, and therefore is not endogenous to, and thus a reward for, the ceasefire itself. On the other hand, because donors often reduce or suspend aid during violent conflict, this measure may underestimate the prior amount of engagement by foreign actors in a country — and thus underestimate the incentives they may credibly leverage toward conflict parties' support of a PKO.[3] This research design sets a high bar for finding quantitative evidence for our hypothesis.

Control variables for regression adjustment

The decision to consent to a PKO is likely also impacted by factors besides aid. Donors may also allocate aid strategically and engage more in countries that they perceive more likely to return to peace quickly. Our quantitative estimates therefore account for the characteristics of the conflict, of the conflict country, and its relations with influential states, all with the goal to provide a cleanly identified estimate of the role of foreign aid. Summary statistics and detailed information for these variables can be found in the supporting information. Several of these variables were originally coded by Yuen (2020).

Starting with conflict characteristics, we include victory and treaty indicators, comparing them to the baseline category of truces, and the total civilian and battlefield casualties occurring in the conflict (Fortna 2008). Comparing the role of aid across these varying conflict outcomes ensures that we do not capture higher aid as a result of a lopsided conflict outcome where consent is perhaps more likely. Conflict duration, measured in years, helps address the concern that longer-lasting conflicts might see more aid and more pressure toward consenting to PKOs. Government army size, measured as the natural log of the number of military personnel in the conflict state Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2009) captures the possibility that countries with smaller militaries might receive more aid (in relative terms) and,

[3]The SI includes additional analyses using aid before the conflict's initiation. The results are consistent with our main findings.

at the same time, more likely to consent to PKOs given their comparatively lower ability to win the conflict in military terms. Factions, a dichotomous measure taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000), where 0 reflects two parties to the conflict and 1 reflects three or more, accounts for the possibility that more complex conflicts make consent more difficult to obtain and might also offer more obstacles to foreign aid due to more complex security situations. Major Power, a binary indicator of the presence of a major third party state in the civil war, addresses the possibility that major powers as biased mediators may be more effective at pushing for consent and also help in attracting more aid, including from multilaterals.

Turning to conflict country characteristics, to account for scenarios where wealth-related factors may drive conflict parties' behavior toward PKOs, we keep the wealth of the country constant by including GDP per capita as a control variable (World Bank 2015; Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015; Graham and Tucker 2019). To account for the state's political institutions, our analyses include the median Polity IV score during the three years prior to the ceasefire (Marshall and Jaggers 2009) — an issue of concern if democracies were to attract more aid at the same time. Lastly, to account for potential strategic interests of major powers, we follow Yuen (2020) and include ideal point measures relative to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). Similar to the major power variable above, this helps account for scenarios where the interests of major powers both influence the amount of aid flowing to a conflict country and push conflict parties toward consent.

Statistical method

We analyze the relationship between aid-based incentives and the granting of unrestricted consent using logistic regression. Because of the small number of cases, we turn to Bayesian estimation (Albert and Chib 1993; Karreth 2018) and use student-t priors (mean 0, standard deviation 2.5, 5 degrees of freedom) following Gelman, Jakulin, Pittau, and Su (2008). These priors insert a small amount of information that pulls the estimates toward 0, i.e. they represent a more conservative approach than using uninformative priors or frequentist regression modeling, while yielding stable

estimates even in small samples. The results in this paper summarize posterior distributions of logit coefficients.[4]

Results

Results for the sample including Chapter VII missions are shown in Table 1, while the sample excluding these missions is reflected in Table 2. Across the board, the estimates suggest that conflict parties in countries with exposure to more prior foreign development aid provided unrestricted consent at considerably higher rates. This pattern holds for both outcome types we use. As a rough estimate across measures, a country that had received two more standard deviations of foreign development aid commitments before the ceasefire was about 30% more likely to grant unrestricted consent.

[4] All posterior distributions are based on four parallel chains with 1,000 iterations each (after discarding 1,000 initial warm-up iterations), obtained by using `rstanarm` (Goodrich, Gabry, Ali, and Brilleman 2020). Convergence diagnostics suggest no divergent chains. We evaluate posterior distributions by printing the 90% highest posterior density interval and noting whether that interval includes zero or not. The SI also shows that the results are robust to alternative estimation strategies such as linear probability models and frequentist logit estimates.

Table 1: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	2.00	5.92
	[−3.44; 7.90]	[−1.36; 14.38]
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.10*	1.27*
	[0.15; 2.15]	[0.10; 2.50]
GDP per capita (logged)	0.18	−0.24
	[−0.28; 0.62]	[−0.93; 0.47]
Victory	−0.48	−0.66
	[−1.95; 0.83]	[−2.37; 1.00]
Settlement	0.30	0.14
	[−0.70; 1.35]	[−1.22; 1.52]
Total war deaths	−0.10	−0.49*
	[−0.33; 0.14]	[−0.87; −0.14]
Gov't army size	−0.68*	−0.48
	[−1.14; −0.26]	[−1.08; 0.09]
More than 2 factions	0.13	0.10
	[−0.87; 1.13]	[−1.25; 1.48]
Neighbor intervened	0.41	0.45
	[−0.53; 1.53]	[−0.70; 1.72]
War duration	0.10*	0.18*
	[0.04; 0.17]	[0.09; 0.28]
Major power involved in war	0.03	1.14
	[−1.03; 1.02]	[−0.26; 2.56]
Democracy	0.06	0.05
	[−0.03; 0.15]	[−0.08; 0.18]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.31	0.27
	[−1.37; 0.73]	[−0.88; 1.50]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.47	1.46
	[−0.11; 2.93]	[−0.27; 3.26]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.75	−0.31
	[−1.71; 0.21]	[−1.43; 0.80]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.86	−0.53
	[−5.93; 3.59]	[−5.43; 4.27]
Chapter VII mission	1.27*	0.67
	[0.22; 2.35]	[−0.45; 1.77]
Observations	119	78

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Table 2: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	6.04	19.27*
	[−2.25; 15.05]	[4.11; 32.63]
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.53*	2.09*
	[0.23; 2.81]	[0.06; 4.21]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.12	−1.32*
	[−0.77; 0.47]	[−2.50; −0.16]
Victory	−1.11	−1.45
	[−2.97; 0.58]	[−3.77; 0.85]
Settlement	−0.01	−0.99
	[−1.15; 1.18]	[−2.90; 0.76]
Total war deaths	−0.08	−0.90*
	[−0.37; 0.20]	[−1.48; −0.30]
Gov't army size	−0.84*	−0.84*
	[−1.40; −0.33]	[−1.73; −0.03]
More than 2 factions	0.27	0.04
	[−0.95; 1.46]	[−1.71; 1.84]
Neighbor intervened	0.34	0.31
	[−0.90; 1.63]	[−1.34; 2.20]
War duration	0.13*	0.40*
	[0.05; 0.21]	[0.21; 0.58]
Major power involved in war	−0.39	2.14
	[−1.58; 0.88]	[−0.09; 4.17]
Democracy	0.12*	0.04
	[0.00; 0.23]	[−0.13; 0.22]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.58	0.11
	[−2.01; 0.73]	[−1.42; 1.87]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.43	1.36
	[−0.33; 3.23]	[−0.79; 3.81]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−1.27	−0.85
	[−2.59; 0.14]	[−2.59; 0.98]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.49	−0.08
	[−5.89; 4.21]	[−4.71; 5.08]
Observations	91	50

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

One of many examples of conflict parties granting unrestricted consent at high exposure to international incentives includes two missions in Indonesia (related to East Timor) in 1999 and 2000, where Indonesia ranks over two standard deviations above the mean of the aid measure; we explore this case in more detail below. Also consistent with our argument, there are many cases that did *not* grant unrestricted consent and also had little or no ties to previous international incentives, i.e., which received little or no aid. One example is Angola, a comparatively low aid recipient, which experienced a major failure of its peace process in the 1990s. Although a UN PKO was deployed to oversee the peace process, lacking consent ultimately meant the UN could

not carry out its mandate effectively. In 1997, the MONUA mission prematurely replaced the larger UNAVEM III operation, which had never fully gained the consent of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Such consent was not forthcoming with MONUA either, which prevented the mission from establishing its security guarantee to promote peaceful negotiations. Conflict soon resumed and the UN even became a target, where UNITA fighters fired upon peacekeepers and aid workers, shot down two UN planes, and regained previously controlled territories. By 1998, the country had returned to full-scale civil war when the mission was terminated (Howard 2008, 36-41).

We also briefly note cases that appear not to fit our theory: countries that were exposed to considerable incentives, yet did not grant unrestricted consent. Focusing on the raw volume of aid suggests Russia (Chechnya 1996), India (various conflicts in the 1990s), and Turkey (in the Kurdish areas in the 1990s) as cases where the leverage derived from recent aid did not convert to unrestricted consent. These countries all have major strategic interests and powerful militaries, possibly increasing concerns about sovereignty. Our control variables (especially GDP per capita, UNGA ideal point distance, government army size) measure these other influences well. This results in relatively accurate predictions of *no* unrestricted consent with the estimated probability of unrestricted consent below 0.2 in each of these cases.

Our empirical results are consistent with a narrative that previous exposure to international incentives in the form of aid and loans boosts the willingness of conflict parties to provide unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions. Established channels enhance the credibility of international promises to support the economic recovery of the conflict country during and after a PKO. Such support can translate into material gains for the conflict parties themselves, thus serving as a credible incentive to overcome commitment and other problems that might block consent.

The associations are also robust whether Chapter VII missions are included or excluded from the sample. In addition, the Bayesian approach allows a brief discussion of other predictors of consent even despite a small sample size. Unrestricted consent to a PKO was less likely after deadlier conflicts and those where governments commanded large armies. Conflict parties granted

unrestricted consent at higher rates after longer wars and, with less statistical certainty, when a major power was involved in the conflict.

Robustness tests (all listed in the SI) also show that aid during the conflict is a credible signal, rather than aid before the conflict: controlling for aid *before* the conflict leaves the association between aid before the ceasefire and consent intact (Tables A3 and A4). Along with our theoretical argument, the credibility of aid is not tied to the identity of the donor, whether we consider the largest donor (as the potentially most influential one) in Tables A5 and A6 or specific donors that might hold leverage by reputation or other factors (Tables A7 and A8). These additional tests suggest that the volume of foreign development aid altogether (and not contributions from specific donors) drive higher consent rates.

Addressing potential threats to quantitative inference

The analyses above show a robust and sizeable correlation between prior foreign development aid and a key outcome: conflict parties' unrestricted consent to peacekeeping operations. This is consistent with our argument that the prospect of further aid and support after the end of a conflict incentivizes conflict parties to clear the way for peacekeeping operations. To assess this evidence, we briefly discuss potential alternative explanations for this finding — and why they are unlikely.

Aid and PKOs all go to "easier" cases. This view suggests that higher aid indicates an "easier" case, where donors are more likely to be active and the conditions for conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations are more favorable. In this scenario, aid is endogenous to other international support (such as peacekeeping) but not a driver of any behavior that facilitates peacekeeping.

Our analyses suggest that this is unlikely. We use several control variables to account for "easier" and "harder" cases: whether there was a settlement, the number of war deaths, the number of factions, the duration of the war, and whether neighbors or major powers were involved in the war. All these variables cover the features commonly associated with "hard" cases. The estimate of the correlation between international incentives and consent/PKOs should therefore be free from

bias related to easier or harder cases. Other potential approaches to reducing or eliminating this bias are not available given the data structure at the conflict/operation level. We cannot rely on within-country differences in aid (using a fixed effects approach) because our outcomes of interest do not vary within cases. In addition, within-country changes in aid could well be related to other factors indicating easier or harder cases—and we account for such known factors already. Lastly, common instrumental variables for foreign development aid (such as countries' current or future temporary membership on the UN Security Council) are also clearly related to our outcomes of interest.[5] The best alternative, and the approach we choose, is therefore to account for all known characteristics that might distinguish harder from easier cases.

Aid is a proxy for major power interests. A common theme in the aid literature is that donors give foreign aid for strategic purposes (Alesina and Dollar 2000). If this is universally the case, our findings might imply that countries receiving more aid are strategically more important to donors. Conflict parties are then more likely to consent to a PKO, knowing that the odds for a PKO are favorable; contributing countries are then also more likely to send a robust mission, knowing that powerful countries are supporting it.

Our analyses aim to address this possibility as well and, as a result, we do not believe that our findings simply represent stronger influence of strategic donors. First, we control for indicators that would capture such major power interest: whether a major power intervened during the war, and the ideal point distance to the closest and farthest member of the UN Security Council, as well as variation in ideal points between UNSC members. Prior intervention by a major power is a strong indicator for major power interest. Close ideal points to a P5 member also measures such interest.

In additional analyses (not reported here), we also directly measured strategic interest of major powers using trade volume with the rest of the world, with the P5 members, and with the P5 members plus Germany and Japan. None of these variables exhibited a clear relationship with

[5]Dreher, Gould, Rablen, and Vreeland (2014) show that involvement in conflict reduces countries' probability to be elected onto the UNSC. For our study, this would invalidate the use of UNSC membership as an instrument for aid.

consent. Lastly, we point to research suggesting that major power dominance in aid allocation, especially in fragile contexts, may be less prominent in the post-Cold War era (Bermeo 2017; Bearce and Tirone 2010). Because our results only cover the post-Cold War era, that finding strengthens our confidence that major power behavior is not driving these results.

Aid targets issues unrelated to conflict. A more fundamental concern might be that aid is allocated based on concerns about development or other issues, and unrelated to conflict. If so, it would be hard to see why conflict parties might respond differently to the prospect of a PKO in a country that receives more or less aid.

Several points address this. First, our argument and evidence do not suggest direct conditionality whereby donors send aid only if conflict parties consent to a PKO. Instead, we build on prior work that emphasizes that the realistic prospect of aid and support can function as an incentive if it is clear that ending a conflict (and facilitating a PKO) will create conditions for further international engagement and the resulting benefits (Karreth and Tir 2013; Tir and Karreth 2018; Matanock 2020). Second, from other work (Balla and Reinhardt 2008; Campbell and Spilker 2022) and from practitioners' perspectives it is clear that donors do hesitate to engage in fragile areas. This is well known to governments and insurgents alike. Therefore, past aid is a meaningful indicator for the likelihood of future donor engagement—but the engagement itself and its benefits are considerably more likely if PKOs are established (see, e.g., Beber et al. 2019).

Case illustration: East Timor

Peacekeeping efforts during East Timor's transition to independence illustrate how consent to interventions is shaped by credible expectations of future foreign aid. We focus on two major peacekeeping operations that were deployed, first to address widespread instability as pro-independence groups clashed with the Indonesian military, and subsequently to oversee the transition of power to a newly-formed East Timorese government. In both cases, all parties gave consent without restrictions. At the time, Indonesia was a recipient of significant amounts of foreign aid, ranking

about two standard deviations above the mean of the aid measure used in this study. The historical record of this case documents multiple international efforts to pressure the Indonesian government to settle the conflict over East Timorese independence peacefully and to allow peacekeepers in to oversee these processes. Two stylized facts in particular are consistent with our argument: first, both the Indonesian government and pro-independence rebels were sensitive to aid incentives, and second, donors specifically used existing aid as leverage to pressure the parties for consent.

Peacekeeping in East Timor occurred amid the enduring dispute over the territory's independence. The island of Timor was under colonial rule until Indonesia (including West Timor) gained its independence from the Dutch in 1949 and Portugal effectively abandoned the eastern part of the island in 1975 amid its own domestic political turmoil. Two main parties — the pro-Portuguese Democratic Union of Timor and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) — rose to prominence in the absence of central control. When fighting between the two broke out and the dominant Fretilin unilaterally declared independence for East Timor, neighboring Indonesia intervened, fearing the revolution was Marxist in nature. Indonesia subsequently annexed East Timor in 1976 with little condemnation from the international community (Howard 2008, 262). Fighting between Indonesian forces and Fretilin continued for two decades which, combined with the Indonesian government's oppressive rule, led to the death of around one quarter of East Timor's population (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010, 273). Mounting international pressure, along with the transfer of power in Indonesia from Suharto to B. J. Habibie, eventually led, in 1999, to an agreement to allow East Timor to decide its own fate. Pro-Indonesian militias in the East opposed such a concession. When 78 percent of East Timorese voted for independence, heavy violence broke out. A multinational force of 11,000 led by Australia, the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), soon deployed to restore peace. This was followed in 2000 by the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), which would take on the unprecedented task of assuming control of the territory during its transition to independence. In both instances, the peacekeeping providers sought and received consent to the intervention.[6]

[6]While additional UN missions deployed to East Timor during this conflict (e.g., UNAMET, UNMISET, and UNOTIL) they were follow-on missions with more limited mandates that did not require new consent from the conflict

Although Indonesia's foreign aid receipts at the time were influenced by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the country had received significant inflows of aid for the three decades prior to the crisis. This aid came largely from western states seeking to shore up anti-communist support in the region. During this period aid as a proportion of Indonesia's GDP peaked at 6.5 percent in 1988. While this number dropped to 2 percent prior to the crisis, it subsequently rose to 4 percent in the aftermath (10 percent if including its loans from the International Monetary Fund). Aid flows came from diverse sources: twenty countries including the United States and thirteen multilateral agencies. The sheer quantity of foreign aid received in the 1990s led Indonesia to become one of the most aid-dependent countries in South and Southeast Asia (Chowdhury and Sugema 2005, 187-191).

After the 1997 financial crisis, aid in the form of the International Financial Rescue Package combined $18 billion from three intergovernmental organizations: the World Bank, the IMF, and the Asian Development Bank. In addition, individual states pledged $20 billion (Chowdhury and Sugema 2005, 197). While these states, such as Australia, Japan, and the United States, applied a degree of pressure on the Indonesian government to consent to peacekeeping, it was the aid from the World Bank and the IMF that was primarily used as leverage to procure consent to peacekeeping in 1999. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council refused to approve of an intervention without Indonesian consent (Howard 2008, 271), while Australia was highly reticent to lead the INTERFET mission without consent (Howard 2008, 267). The US' controlling stakes in both the World Bank and IMF allowed it to threaten to block the aid if Indonesia did not allow peacekeepers in. The resolve of these threats was illustrated in the IMF canceling a visit to Jakarta to discuss its aid to address the economic crisis (Kingsbury 2009, 74). This pressure subsequently induced unrestricted consent first for INTERFET and then for UNTAET the following year.

Although it was the government's consent that was primarily sought by the international community, the cooperation of Fretilin was also strongly desired, most notably to win the support of the East Timorese people (Howard 2008, 286). Such cooperation was achievable due to the

parties.

fact that East Timor relied on foreign assistance for its economic stability and directly benefited from a number of foreign development programs established in Indonesia (Tir and Karreth 2018). Decades of fighting wrought devastation on the territory, where approximately 70 percent of infrastructure was destroyed and the same proportion of its population was displaced (Howard 2008, 266). Thus, both the government and rebel parties had incentives to extend consent to avoid the prospect of foreign aid being withheld.

Having given consent, these benefits subsequently resumed. Between 1999 and 2002, $2.2 billion from international donors flowed into East Timor, which included $150 million in reconstruction aid from the World Bank and $600 million for the undertaking of UNTAET's mandate. The size of this support is startling when considering the budget of East Timor's central authorities was a mere $59.2 million in 2000-2001. This aid would be supplemented by a further $360 million for post-independence reconstruction in 2002 (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 251-52). The aid had clear benefits for those supporting East Timorese independence, where some primary objectives included reestablishing the territory's agriculture and investing in health, education, water and sanitation, and development in communities (Howard 2008, 288).

The conflict in East Timor is therefore a good illustration of the role that foreign aid, and particularly the mix of threat of losing aid access and promise of future aid, plays in establishing consent to peacekeeping interventions. A protracted conflict involving a government initially highly resistant to external interference ultimately became a successful operation whereby peacekeepers were allowed to operate without restriction. This case also suggests two additional insights that warrant further research beyond this study. First, continued dependence on aid flows indicate that consent may not only be given at the outset of a PKO, but that such leverage likely continues to elicit cooperation from the belligerents throughout the mission's implementation. Second, the use of aid as leverage may not only push the belligerents to accept peacekeepers for fear of losing that aid, but also enhance their confidence in the mission itself. The broad international commitment to peace and stability in East Timor likely signaled to the parties that the PKOs were backed by international resolve, thus mitigating the commitment problem so often faced by conflict parties

considering laying down arms.

Conclusion

Seeking successful outcomes in peacekeeping while using resources efficiently has become increasingly important for peacekeeping in recent years as both demand for those resources and scrutiny of peacekeeping have grown. How the UN and other peacekeeping providers can overcome problems associated with gaining consent is of paramount importance to the venture and may even surpass other characteristics of the mission such as how many peacekeepers are deployed, where they come from, and what functions they perform. We find evidence that unrestricted peacekeeping consent was more likely to be given where the conflict parties are more exposed to tangible financial incentives from international third parties. We measure these incentives as the prior commitments of foreign aid to a conflict country.

Unrestricted consent to a peacekeeping operation means that a government cedes some internal sovereignty to the PKO (Buitelaar and Hirschmann 2021). Similarly, rebels give up some protection by surrendering or limiting their use of arms. Giving this consent is a difficult policy decision with stark consequences. Our study shows that international third parties can facilitate this decision through material incentives. This finding adds to a literature on international actors facilitating and enforcing domestic policies by aligning domestic actors' interests (e.g., Donno 2013; Girod and Tobin 2016; Tir and Karreth 2018; Matanock 2020).

Our study suggests that peacekeeping providers and other third parties pursuing conflict resolution should continue to rely strategically on existing incentive structures. Such strategies must be carefully designed so as to not push the conflict parties, and particularly the potential host government, away from peacekeepers. In some instances, the perceived costs of peacekeeping to the conflict parties will outweigh the expected gains from international third parties' aid and subsequent economic benefits. Alternately, leaders may be unresponsive to those incentives and instead see the interference of PKOs and donors as a threat to their legitimacy and autonomy, effectively breaking off those relationships and dissolving whatever leverage they had over the conflict par-

ties. It is also possible that leaders might turn to other sources of foreign aid from partners that are less interested in the establishment of PKOs, and that might compensate for the loss of aid as discussed in this study. In addition, even though this study did not yield such evidence, the credibility of incentives may depend on factors beyond the volume of aid, such as cultural or historical ties between donor and recipient countries. Future academic and policy research should therefore consider how third party based incentives during negotiations among these various actors can most effectively nudge preferences to agree to stabilizing peacekeeping measures.

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Supporting Information

This supplementary document contains:

- Summary statistics for the data used in the analyses in the main text
- List of cases analyzed in the main text

Summary statistics

Table A1: Descriptive statistics for analyses of consent, including Chapter VII missions. Analyses use standardized values (original values divided by two standard deviations). Economic variables and democracy scores are measured in the year before the ceasefire that makes conflicts eligible for peacekeeping operations.

	Table 1, Model 1		Table 1, Model 2	
Variable	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Consent	0.30	0.46	0.46	0.50
Total official aid flows/GDP	0.36	0.56	0.39	0.61
GDP per capita (logged)	6.97	1.21	6.94	1.11
Victory	0.21	0.41	0.17	0.38
Settlement	0.42	0.50	0.50	0.50
Total war deaths	10.49	2.30	10.82	2.38
Gov't army size	4.34	1.46	3.90	1.23
More than 2 factions	0.69	0.46	0.77	0.42
Neighbor intervened	0.51	0.50	0.65	0.48
War duration	8.34	8.47	7.49	7.73
Major power involved in war	0.43	0.50	0.45	0.50
Democracy	-0.94	5.55	-1.38	4.87
Natural resource revenue available	0.78	0.41	0.69	0.46
Distance to closest P5 member	0.40	0.27	0.42	0.28
Distance to farthest P5 member	3.27	0.58	3.19	0.60
Coef of Var on ideal points	0.25	0.02	0.25	0.02
Chapter VII mission	0.24	0.43	0.36	0.48

Table A2: Descriptive statistics for analyses of consent, excluding Chapter VII missions. Analyses use standardized values (original values divided by two standard deviations). Economic variables and democracy scores are measured in the year before the ceasefire that makes conflicts eligible for peacekeeping operations.

	Table 2, Model 1		Table 2, Model 2	
Variable	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Consent	0.26	0.44	0.48	0.50
Total official aid flows/GDP	0.40	0.54	0.46	0.61
GDP per capita (logged)	7.05	1.21	7.07	1.07
Victory	0.20	0.40	0.12	0.33
Settlement	0.37	0.49	0.46	0.50
Total war deaths	10.34	2.38	10.72	2.61
Gov't army size	4.37	1.58	3.70	1.29
More than 2 factions	0.62	0.49	0.68	0.47
Neighbor intervened	0.46	0.50	0.64	0.48
War duration	8.80	8.99	7.86	8.43
Major power involved in war	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.51
Democracy	-0.31	5.89	-0.48	5.24
Natural resource revenue available	0.81	0.39	0.70	0.46
Distance to closest P5 member	0.40	0.28	0.42	0.30
Distance to farthest P5 member	3.29	0.56	3.19	0.58
Coef of Var on ideal points	0.25	0.03	0.25	0.03



Figure A1: Distribution of total official aid flows/GDP by estimation sample. The aid measure is standardized (divided by two standard deviations). Per the common measurement approach to net aid received, "loan repayments are recorded as negative and deducted from ODA and loans. In some cases, loan repayments are higher than new ODA and net ODA will show as a negative number." (Source: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/faq.htm).

Details on variables and measurement

Total official aid flows/GDP. We measure foreign aid *commitments* reported by the OECD covering OECD/DAC donors (OECD 2020) on actual flows of aid-related capital: total official aid flows (OECD 2020). We then account for the relative importance of this incentive for the recipient by scaling it by GDP (World Bank 2015; Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015; Graham and Tucker 2019). Following other recent work, we transform this ratio using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation ($\text{IHST}(x) = \log(x + (x^2 + 1)^{0.5})$) to reduce sensitivity to outliers; for a recent application in political science, see Betz, Fortunato, and O'Brien (2021). The resulting measure is then standardized (divided by two standard deviations) for estimation purposes. Our measure focuses on the time period before the ceasefire, averaging aid during that time period up to three years.

GDP per capita (logged). This is taken directly from the World Development Indicators and Penn World Tables, aggregated by Graham and Tucker (2019).

Victory. This is a binary indicator for cases where one conflict party won (versus baseline of a truce); it is taken from Yuen (2020).

Settlement. This is a binary indicator for cases with a settlement (versus baseline of a truce); it is taken from Yuen (2020).

Total war deaths. This variable captures the total number of civilian and battlefield casualties occurring in the conflict (Fortna 2008; Yuen 2020).

Gov't army size. This variable is the natural log of the number of military personnel in the conflict state. It is taken from Yuen (2020) and coded from the Correlates of War's National Material Capabilities data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) and also from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2009).

More than 2 factions. This binary indicator is coded such that 0 reflects two parties to the conflict and 1 reflects three or more. It is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and updated in Yuen (2020).

Neighbor intervened. This is a binary indicator for whether a neighboring state intervened (Yuen 2020).

War duration. This variable is measured in years (Yuen 2020).

Major power involved in war. This is a binary indicator of the presence of a major third party state in the civil war (Yuen 2020).

Democracy. We code this variable as the median Polity IV score during the three years prior to the ceasefire (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

Natural resource revenue available. This is a binary indicator set to 1 for countries where revenue is available from extracting oil, drugs, gemstones and 0 for all others. The variable comes from Lujala (2010).

Distance to closest and farthest P5 member This distance measure is based on the conflict country's ideal point measures (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017) relative to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (Yuen 2020).

Coefficient of variation on ideal points This measure captures the cohesion (or dispersion) of ideal points (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017) among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, proxying for the underlying probability of obtaining approval for PKOs in general (Yuen 2020).

Robustness tests

Including pre-conflict aid

Table A3: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	4.53	10.23*
	[−1.49; 10.94]	[1.81; 20.24]
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.10*	1.12
	[0.00; 2.36]	[−0.21; 2.51]
Total official aid flows/GDP before war	−0.23	0.43
	[−1.42; 0.90]	[−1.22; 1.95]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.02	−0.63
	[−0.52; 0.52]	[−1.62; 0.31]
Victory	−0.60	−0.91
	[−1.97; 0.94]	[−2.83; 0.94]
Settlement	−0.08	−0.23
	[−1.20; 1.03]	[−1.74; 1.25]
Total war deaths	−0.19	−0.76*
	[−0.46; 0.06]	[−1.20; −0.32]
Gov't army size	−0.83*	−0.73*
	[−1.31; −0.35]	[−1.39; −0.08]
More than 2 factions	0.21	0.05
	[−0.83; 1.30]	[−1.43; 1.62]
Neighbor intervened	0.31	0.25
	[−0.76; 1.36]	[−1.09; 1.63]
War duration	0.15*	0.26*
	[0.07; 0.23]	[0.14; 0.38]
Major power involved in war	0.20	1.84*
	[−0.97; 1.27]	[0.12; 3.61]
Democracy	0.03	−0.02
	[−0.06; 0.13]	[−0.17; 0.12]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.19	0.96
	[−1.34; 0.97]	[−0.40; 2.34]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.68*	2.07*
	[0.15; 3.35]	[0.04; 4.21]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.68	0.06
	[−1.81; 0.51]	[−1.32; 1.41]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−1.19	−1.09
	[−6.85; 4.02]	[−6.56; 4.13]
Chapter VII mission	0.92	−0.05
	[−0.23; 2.08]	[−1.26; 1.23]
Observations	107	68

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Table A4: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	14.06*	34.56*
	[2.48; 24.62]	[13.89; 56.04]
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.74*	2.62*
	[0.26; 3.40]	[0.25; 5.48]
Total official aid flows/GDP before war	−0.67	−0.74
	[−2.33; 1.01]	[−3.61; 2.15]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.51	−2.60*
	[−1.36; 0.26]	[−4.82; −0.80]
Victory	−1.52	−2.01
	[−3.48; 0.26]	[−4.50; 0.95]
Settlement	−0.73	−1.70
	[−2.23; 0.54]	[−3.87; 0.48]
Total war deaths	−0.29	−1.52*
	[−0.63; 0.04]	[−2.37; −0.72]
Gov't army size	−1.19*	−1.31*
	[−1.88; −0.58]	[−2.47; −0.18]
More than 2 factions	0.34	−0.19
	[−0.92; 1.59]	[−2.35; 2.21]
Neighbor intervened	0.13	0.26
	[−1.30; 1.52]	[−1.86; 2.35]
War duration	0.24*	0.60*
	[0.12; 0.35]	[0.37; 0.87]
Major power involved in war	0.02	4.34*
	[−1.33; 1.39]	[1.46; 7.65]
Democracy	0.07	−0.00
	[−0.07; 0.20]	[−0.24; 0.22]
Natural resource revenue available	−1.13	0.09
	[−2.62; 0.39]	[−1.79; 2.01]
Distance to closest P5 member	2.00	2.26
	[−0.05; 3.90]	[−0.27; 5.23]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−1.82*	−0.81
	[−3.54; −0.05]	[−3.07; 1.34]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.53	−0.16
	[−5.38; 4.46]	[−5.33; 4.44]
Observations	82	43

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Including separate measure for aid from biggest donor

Table A5: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	3.10	7.56
	[−2.60; 9.25]	[−0.62; 14.99]
Total official aid flows from all sources, excluding largest state donor/GDP	0.91*	1.04*
	[0.17; 1.69]	[0.20; 1.95]
Total official aid flows from largest state donor/GDP	−3.75	−2.66
	[−14.67; 2.79]	[−9.79; 3.26]
GDP per capita (logged)	0.06	−0.40
	[−0.41; 0.52]	[−1.13; 0.27]
Victory	−0.44	−0.70
	[−1.84; 0.88]	[−2.37; 0.94]
Settlement	0.32	0.10
	[−0.65; 1.41]	[−1.26; 1.50]
Total war deaths	−0.13	−0.49*
	[−0.37; 0.13]	[−0.89; −0.11]
Gov't army size	−0.67*	−0.48
	[−1.10; −0.24]	[−1.05; 0.09]
More than 2 factions	0.20	0.07
	[−0.85; 1.21]	[−1.30; 1.47]
Neighbor intervened	0.57	0.59
	[−0.41; 1.66]	[−0.73; 1.82]
War duration	0.09*	0.18*
	[0.03; 0.16]	[0.08; 0.28]
Major power involved in war	−0.05	1.02
	[−1.05; 0.98]	[−0.47; 2.40]
Democracy	0.07	0.06
	[−0.02; 0.17]	[−0.07; 0.18]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.25	0.32
	[−1.30; 0.85]	[−0.80; 1.58]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.69*	1.77
	[0.14; 3.32]	[−0.04; 3.71]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.76	−0.37
	[−1.70; 0.25]	[−1.51; 0.74]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.76	−0.44
	[−5.89; 4.37]	[−5.42; 4.22]
Chapter VII mission	1.24*	0.65
	[0.28; 2.34]	[−0.46; 1.73]
Observations	119	78

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Table A6: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	7.29	20.73*
	[−1.33; 15.77]	[7.87; 36.01]
Total official aid flows from all sources, excluding largest state donor/GDP	1.09*	1.43
	[0.13; 2.10]	[−0.00; 3.04]
Total official aid flows from largest state donor/GDP	−1.83	−0.90
	[−8.30; 3.15]	[−6.25; 3.99]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.20	−1.43*
	[−0.79; 0.43]	[−2.62; −0.27]
Victory	−1.07	−1.41
	[−2.88; 0.54]	[−3.83; 0.72]
Settlement	0.12	−0.90
	[−1.06; 1.29]	[−2.75; 0.84]
Total war deaths	−0.12	−0.93*
	[−0.39; 0.17]	[−1.49; −0.32]
Gov't army size	−0.83*	−0.84
	[−1.36; −0.30]	[−1.67; 0.01]
More than 2 factions	0.30	0.05
	[−0.93; 1.53]	[−1.68; 1.90]
Neighbor intervened	0.44	0.37
	[−0.81; 1.67]	[−1.43; 2.13]
War duration	0.12*	0.38*
	[0.04; 0.21]	[0.21; 0.57]
Major power involved in war	−0.43	1.95
	[−1.62; 0.82]	[−0.20; 3.94]
Democracy	0.11*	0.03
	[0.01; 0.23]	[−0.14; 0.20]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.71	−0.07
	[−1.99; 0.57]	[−1.69; 1.50]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.49	1.37
	[−0.43; 3.21]	[−0.96; 3.70]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−1.23	−0.79
	[−2.54; 0.19]	[−2.59; 0.99]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.57	−0.12
	[−5.94; 4.62]	[−4.73; 4.89]
Observations	91	50

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Focusing on aid from largest individual donors

Table A7: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	3.92	9.30*
	[−2.43; 10.12]	[0.69; 17.26]
Total official aid flows from Canada/GDP	1.19	1.15
	[−0.11; 2.37]	[−0.32; 2.64]
Total official aid flows from France/GDP	0.93	2.21
	[−0.81; 2.92]	[−0.14; 4.65]
Total official aid flows from Germany/GDP	−2.99*	−2.84*
	[−5.73; −0.46]	[−5.53; −0.33]
Total official aid flows from Japan/GDP	0.92	2.60
	[−1.05; 3.04]	[−0.24; 5.78]
Total official aid flows from UK/GDP	1.30	0.50
	[−0.05; 2.64]	[−1.25; 2.48]
Total official aid flows from US/GDP	−1.30	−1.69
	[−2.97; 0.04]	[−3.66; 0.07]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.13	−0.76
	[−0.64; 0.46]	[−1.56; 0.04]
Victory	0.57	0.32
	[−0.79; 1.90]	[−1.56; 2.13]
Settlement	0.64	0.21
	[−0.46; 1.78]	[−1.28; 1.70]
Total war deaths	−0.08	−0.34
	[−0.35; 0.18]	[−0.73; 0.06]
Gov't army size	−0.55*	−0.41
	[−1.01; −0.12]	[−1.05; 0.19]
More than 2 factions	0.30	0.39
	[−0.95; 1.45]	[−1.08; 1.95]
Neighbor intervened	1.08	0.70
	[−0.05; 2.17]	[−0.69; 2.09]
War duration	0.07	0.14*
	[−0.00; 0.14]	[0.04; 0.24]
Major power involved in war	−0.03	0.59
	[−1.15; 1.05]	[−0.93; 2.18]
Democracy	0.07	0.08
	[−0.03; 0.18]	[−0.06; 0.23]
Natural resource revenue available	−1.26*	0.06
	[−2.46; −0.03]	[−1.34; 1.41]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.62*	2.31*
	[0.10; 3.29]	[0.59; 4.40]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.66	−0.58
	[−1.71; 0.31]	[−1.75; 0.52]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.74	−0.40
	[−5.66; 4.11]	[−5.22; 4.29]
Chapter VII mission	0.98	0.44
	[−0.07; 2.18]	[−0.80; 1.73]
Observations	119	78

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Table A8: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	7.70	21.95*
	[−1.60; 16.43]	[8.29; 38.44]
Total official aid flows from Canada/GDP	1.68*	2.77*
	[0.19; 3.24]	[0.55; 5.43]
Total official aid flows from France/GDP	−0.36	−0.23
	[−2.42; 1.79]	[−3.17; 2.69]
Total official aid flows from Germany/GDP	−2.99*	−1.00
	[−6.22; −0.04]	[−4.91; 2.26]
Total official aid flows from Japan/GDP	1.55	4.84*
	[−1.07; 4.13]	[0.29; 10.29]
Total official aid flows from UK/GDP	1.23	0.93
	[−0.60; 2.83]	[−2.08; 4.46]
Total official aid flows from US/GDP	−0.15	−0.21
	[−2.18; 1.99]	[−3.21; 2.66]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.24	−1.29*
	[−0.90; 0.53]	[−2.46; −0.02]
Victory	−0.15	−0.92
	[−1.87; 1.71]	[−3.27; 1.54]
Settlement	0.65	−0.23
	[−0.72; 1.90]	[−2.33; 1.57]
Total war deaths	−0.11	−0.99*
	[−0.43; 0.20]	[−1.68; −0.26]
Gov't army size	−0.78*	−1.01*
	[−1.37; −0.18]	[−2.03; −0.01]
More than 2 factions	0.35	0.04
	[−1.12; 1.68]	[−2.03; 2.15]
Neighbor intervened	0.80	0.03
	[−0.58; 2.17]	[−1.88; 1.99]
War duration	0.10	0.40*
	[−0.00; 0.19]	[0.16; 0.62]
Major power involved in war	−0.50	1.42
	[−1.88; 0.83]	[−0.94; 3.79]
Democracy	0.10	0.08
	[−0.03; 0.21]	[−0.12; 0.30]
Natural resource revenue available	−1.13	0.92
	[−2.66; 0.44]	[−1.32; 3.15]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.22	1.27
	[−0.77; 3.07]	[−1.26; 3.98]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−1.24	−1.48
	[−2.62; 0.20]	[−3.57; 0.42]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.47	−0.08
	[−5.33; 4.29]	[−5.25; 4.77]
Observations	91	50

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Linear probability models

Table A9: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	0.96	1.62
	[−0.19; 2.09]	[−0.05; 3.17]
Total official aid flows/GDP	0.13	0.21
	[−0.03; 0.31]	[−0.02; 0.43]
GDP per capita (logged)	0.02	−0.04
	[−0.05; 0.10]	[−0.17; 0.10]
Victory	−0.04	−0.20
	[−0.27; 0.17]	[−0.59; 0.18]
Settlement	0.04	0.00
	[−0.15; 0.22]	[−0.31; 0.33]
Total war deaths	−0.01	−0.08
	[−0.06; 0.03]	[−0.15; 0.00]
Gov't army size	−0.08*	−0.06
	[−0.15; −0.03]	[−0.15; 0.04]
More than 2 factions	0.01	0.00
	[−0.16; 0.17]	[−0.27; 0.32]
Neighbor intervened	0.06	0.10
	[−0.11; 0.23]	[−0.15; 0.39]
War duration	0.01*	0.03*
	[0.00; 0.02]	[0.01; 0.04]
Major power involved in war	0.04	0.19
	[−0.13; 0.22]	[−0.11; 0.52]
Democracy	0.01	0.01
	[−0.00; 0.03]	[−0.02; 0.04]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.06	0.05
	[−0.27; 0.15]	[−0.23; 0.30]
Distance to closest P5 member	0.25	0.34
	[−0.04; 0.53]	[−0.11; 0.74]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.07	−0.03
	[−0.21; 0.09]	[−0.27; 0.17]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−1.75	−1.24
	[−4.50; 0.98]	[−4.50; 2.27]
Chapter VII mission	0.22*	0.14
	[0.03; 0.40]	[−0.12; 0.39]
Observations	119	78

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Table A10: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	1.27	2.77*
	[−0.13; 2.56]	[0.59; 4.87]
Total official aid flows/GDP	0.14	0.22
	[−0.06; 0.33]	[−0.08; 0.51]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.01	−0.15
	[−0.08; 0.07]	[−0.31; 0.02]
Victory	−0.07	−0.34
	[−0.30; 0.15]	[−0.80; 0.10]
Settlement	0.01	−0.17
	[−0.18; 0.21]	[−0.54; 0.19]
Total war deaths	−0.01	−0.09
	[−0.05; 0.04]	[−0.18; 0.01]
Gov't army size	−0.09*	−0.08
	[−0.15; −0.03]	[−0.19; 0.04]
More than 2 factions	0.03	−0.00
	[−0.13; 0.20]	[−0.33; 0.28]
Neighbor intervened	0.03	0.02
	[−0.16; 0.21]	[−0.29; 0.32]
War duration	0.01*	0.04*
	[0.00; 0.02]	[0.02; 0.06]
Major power involved in war	−0.01	0.14
	[−0.19; 0.17]	[−0.21; 0.50]
Democracy	0.02*	0.01
	[0.00; 0.03]	[−0.02; 0.04]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.09	0.03
	[−0.33; 0.15]	[−0.30; 0.37]
Distance to closest P5 member	0.17	0.26
	[−0.12; 0.50]	[−0.20; 0.76]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.09	−0.09
	[−0.25; 0.09]	[−0.39; 0.19]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−1.49	−0.89
	[−4.14; 1.34]	[−4.57; 2.77]
Observations	91	50

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Frequentist logit estimates

Table A11: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	1.56	5.35
	(3.29)	(5.06)
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.07 *	1.25 *
	(0.56)	(0.62)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.16	-0.27
	(0.23)	(0.48)
Victory	-0.51	-0.85
	(1.00)	(1.26)
Settlement	0.22	-0.02
	(0.60)	(0.96)
Total war deaths	-0.09	-0.44 *
	(0.15)	(0.24)
Gov't army size	-0.59 *	-0.40
	(0.30)	(0.31)
More than 2 factions	0.08	-0.02
	(0.59)	(0.84)
Neighbor intervened	0.41	0.49
	(0.65)	(0.72)
War duration	0.09 *	0.16 *
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Major power involved in war	0.02	1.15
	(0.62)	(1.04)
Democracy	0.06	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Natural resource revenue available	-0.21	0.34
	(0.69)	(0.79)
Distance to closest P5 member	1.49	1.63
	(0.96)	(1.24)
Distance to farthest P5 member	-0.72	-0.28
	(0.59)	(0.77)
Chapter VII mission	1.21 *	0.70
	(0.71)	(0.78)
Num.Obs.	119	78
AIC	149.9	120.9
BIC	194.4	158.6
Log.Lik.	-58.959	-44.450
RMSE	0.41	0.44
Std.Errors	HC1	HC1

* $p < 0.1$. Note that these regression exclude the "coefficient of variation on ideal points" variable due to quasi-separation.

Table A12: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	5.73	21.38
	(5.13)	(17.66)
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.49 *	3.14
	(0.83)	(2.39)
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.12	-1.64
	(0.30)	(1.61)
Victory	-1.27	-2.84
	(1.48)	(2.20)
Settlement	-0.09	-1.94
	(0.71)	(2.08)
Total war deaths	-0.08	-0.99
	(0.17)	(0.67)
Gov't army size	-0.74	-0.80
	(0.47)	(0.57)
More than 2 factions	0.21	-0.33
	(0.67)	(1.46)
Neighbor intervened	0.35	0.91
	(0.89)	(1.36)
War duration	0.12 *	0.44
	(0.04)	(0.28)
Major power involved in war	-0.41	3.02
	(0.81)	(2.72)
Democracy	0.10	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.09)
Natural resource revenue available	-0.47	0.57
	(0.83)	(1.15)
Distance to closest P5 member	1.65	2.48
	(1.25)	(2.60)
Distance to farthest P5 member	-1.28	-1.08
	(0.88)	(1.36)
Num.Obs.	91	50
AIC	107.6	72.8
BIC	145.2	101.5
Log.Lik.	-38.776	-21.402
RMSE	0.36	0.36
Std.Errors	HC1	HC1

* $p < 0.1$. Note that these regression exclude the "coefficient of variation on ideal points" variable due to quasi-separation.

List of cases

Table A13: Cases used for analyses in Table 1, Model 1

Conflict	Year	Conflict	Year
Liberia	1990	Sri Lanka (Tamil)	1995
Lebanon	1990	Haiti	1996
Papua New Guinea	1990	Guatemala	1996
Mali	1991	Peru	1996
Somalia	1991	Croatia	1996
Ethiopia-Eritrea	1991	Russia-Chechnya	1996
Ethiopia-ideology	1991	Russia-Chechnya	1996
Angola	1991	Liberia	1996
Morocco/WestSah	1991	Sierra Leone	1996
India-Assam	1991	Iraq-Kurds	1996
India-Assam	1991	Philippines-Mindanao	1996
Cambodia	1991	Haiti	1997
Indonesia-Aceh	1991	Liberia	1997
Papua New Guinea	1991	Central African Rep.	1997
El Salvador	1992	Congo-Brazzaville	1997
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1992	CongoD.R./Zaire	1997
Uganda-LRA	1992	Angola	1997
Rwanda	1992	Algeria-FIS/AIS	1997
Somalia	1992	Tajikistan	1997
Somalia	1992	Bangladesh-CHT	1997
Djibouti	1992	Papua New Guinea	1997
Mozambique	1992	U.K.-N. Ireland	1998
Afghanistan-Mujahideen	1992	Croatia	1998
Bangladesh-CHT	1992	Croatia	1998
Cambodia	1992	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1998
Haiti	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Senegal	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Liberia	1993	Central African Rep.	1998
Rwanda	1993	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1999
Rwanda	1993	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1999
Somalia	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Turkey-Kurds	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Iraq-Shia	1993	Sierra Leone	1999
Iraq-Kurds	1993	Sierra Leone	1999
Israel-Palestinians	1993	Congo-Brazzaville	1999
Afghanistan-Taliban	1993	CongoD.R./Zaire	1999
India-Sikh	1993	Sudan	1999
Myanmar-Kachin	1993	Turkey-Kurds	1999
Cambodia	1993	Indonesia-E. Timor	1999
Philippines-Mindanao	1993	Indonesia-E. Timor	2000
Haiti	1994	Burundi	2002
U.K.-N. Ireland	1994	Indonesia-Aceh	2002
Croatia	1994	Ivory Coast	2003
Georgia-Abkhazia	1994	Liberia	2003
Georgia-Ossetia	1994	Burundi	2003
Chad	1994	Nepal-Maoist	2003
Congo-Brazzaville	1994	Haiti	2004
Rwanda	1994	Haiti	2004
Djibouti	1994	Ivory Coast	2004
South Africa	1994	Sudan-Darfur	2004
Yemen	1994	Sudan	2005
Tajikistan	1994	Indonesia-Aceh	2005
Croatia	1995	Sudan-Darfur	2006
Bosnia	1995	Nepal-Maoist	2006
Bosnia	1995	Indonesia-E. Timor	2006
Bosnia	1995	CongoD.R./Zaire	2009
Mali	1995	Yemen-Houthis	2010
Liberia	1995	Sudan	2011
Angola	1995	South Sudan	2011
Myanmar-Karen	1995		

Table A14: Cases used for analyses in Table 1, Model 2

Conflict	Year	Conflict	Year
Liberia	1990	Sierra Leone	1996
Lebanon	1990	Iraq-Kurds	1996
Angola	1991	Haiti	1997
Morocco/WestSah	1991	Liberia	1997
Cambodia	1991	Central African Rep.	1997
Papua New Guinea	1991	Congo-Brazzaville	1997
El Salvador	1992	Angola	1997
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1992	Tajikistan	1997
Rwanda	1992	Papua New Guinea	1997
Somalia	1992	Croatia	1998
Somalia	1992	Croatia	1998
Djibouti	1992	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1998
Mozambique	1992	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Cambodia	1992	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Haiti	1993	Central African Rep.	1998
Liberia	1993	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1999
Rwanda	1993	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1999
Rwanda	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Somalia	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Iraq-Kurds	1993	Sierra Leone	1999
Cambodia	1993	Sierra Leone	1999
Haiti	1994	CongoD.R./Zaire	1999
Croatia	1994	Indonesia-E. Timor	1999
Georgia-Abkhazia	1994	Indonesia-E. Timor	2000
Georgia-Ossetia	1994	Burundi	2002
Rwanda	1994	Ivory Coast	2003
South Africa	1994	Liberia	2003
Tajikistan	1994	Burundi	2003
Croatia	1995	Haiti	2004
Bosnia	1995	Haiti	2004
Bosnia	1995	Ivory Coast	2004
Bosnia	1995	Sudan-Darfur	2004
Liberia	1995	Sudan	2005
Angola	1995	Indonesia-Aceh	2005
Sri Lanka (Tamil)	1995	Sudan-Darfur	2006
Haiti	1996	Indonesia-E. Timor	2006
Guatemala	1996	CongoD.R./Zaire	2009
Croatia	1996	Sudan	2011
Liberia	1996	South Sudan	2011

Table A15: Cases used for analyses in Table 2, Model 1

Conflict	Year	Conflict	Year
Papua New Guinea	1990	Bosnia	1995
Mali	1991	Mali	1995
Somalia	1991	Liberia	1995
Ethiopia-Eritrea	1991	Angola	1995
Ethiopia-ideology	1991	Myanmar-Karen	1995
Angola	1991	Sri Lanka (Tamil)	1995
Morocco/WestSah	1991	Haiti	1996
India-Assam	1991	Guatemala	1996
India-Assam	1991	Peru	1996
Cambodia	1991	Russia-Chechnya	1996
Indonesia-Aceh	1991	Russia-Chechnya	1996
Papua New Guinea	1991	Sierra Leone	1996
El Salvador	1992	Philippines-Mindanao	1996
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1992	Haiti	1997
Uganda-LRA	1992	Central African Rep.	1997
Rwanda	1992	Congo-Brazzaville	1997
Somalia	1992	CongoD.R./Zaire	1997
Djibouti	1992	Angola	1997
Mozambique	1992	Algeria-FIS/AIS	1997
Afghanistan-Mujahideen	1992	Bangladesh-CHT	1997
Bangladesh-CHT	1992	Papua New Guinea	1997
Cambodia	1992	U.K.-N. Ireland	1998
Senegal	1993	Croatia	1998
Liberia	1993	Croatia	1998
Rwanda	1993	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1998
Rwanda	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Turkey-Kurds	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Iraq-Shia	1993	Central African Rep.	1998
Israel-Palestinians	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Afghanistan-Taliban	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1999
India-Sikh	1993	Congo-Brazzaville	1999
Myanmar-Kachin	1993	Sudan	1999
Cambodia	1993	Turkey-Kurds	1999
Philippines-Mindanao	1993	Indonesia-E. Timor	2000
U.K.-N. Ireland	1994	Burundi	2002
Croatia	1994	Indonesia-Aceh	2002
Georgia-Abkhazia	1994	Ivory Coast	2003
Georgia-Ossetia	1994	Nepal-Maoist	2003
Chad	1994	Sudan-Darfur	2004
Congo-Brazzaville	1994	Indonesia-Aceh	2005
Rwanda	1994	Nepal-Maoist	2006
Djibouti	1994	Indonesia-E. Timor	2006
South Africa	1994	Yemen-Houthis	2010
Yemen	1994	Sudan	2011
Tajikistan	1994	South Sudan	2011
Croatia	1995		

Table A16: Cases used for analyses in Table 2, Model 2

Conflict	Year	Conflict	Year
Angola	1991	Sri Lanka (Tamil)	1995
Morocco/WestSah	1991	Haiti	1996
Cambodia	1991	Guatemala	1996
Papua New Guinea	1991	Sierra Leone	1996
El Salvador	1992	Haiti	1997
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1992	Central African Rep.	1997
Rwanda	1992	Congo-Brazzaville	1997
Somalia	1992	Angola	1997
Djibouti	1992	Papua New Guinea	1997
Mozambique	1992	Croatia	1998
Cambodia	1992	Croatia	1998
Liberia	1993	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1998
Rwanda	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Rwanda	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Cambodia	1993	Central African Rep.	1998
Croatia	1994	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Georgia-Abkhazia	1994	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Georgia-Ossetia	1994	Indonesia-E. Timor	2000
Rwanda	1994	Burundi	2002
South Africa	1994	Ivory Coast	2003
Tajikistan	1994	Sudan-Darfur	2004
Croatia	1995	Indonesia-Aceh	2005
Bosnia	1995	Indonesia-E. Timor	2006
Liberia	1995	Sudan	2011
Angola	1995	South Sudan	2011