Supporting Information for

The Role of Foreign Aid in Procuring Civil War Party Consent to Peacekeeping

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All data and code required to reproduce the results in this study are available in a replication package posted at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jkarreth.

This supplementary document contains:

1 Summary statistics for the data used in the analyses in the main text
2 Full results for robustness tests referenced in the manuscript
3 Details on variables and measurement
4 List of cases analyzed in the main text

Summary statistics

Table A1: Descriptive statistics for analyses of consent, including Chapter VII missions. Analyses use standardized values (original values divided by two standard deviations). Economic variables and democracy scores are measured in the year before the ceasefire that makes conflicts eligible for peacekeeping operations.

	Table **??**, Model 1		Table **??**, Model 2	
Variable	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Consent	0.30	0.46	0.46	0.50
Total official aid flows/GDP	0.36	0.56	0.39	0.61
GDP per capita (logged)	6.97	1.21	6.94	1.11
Victory	0.21	0.41	0.17	0.38
Settlement	0.42	0.50	0.50	0.50
Total war deaths	10.49	2.30	10.82	2.38
Gov't army size	4.34	1.46	3.90	1.23
More than 2 factions	0.69	0.46	0.77	0.42
Neighbor intervened	0.51	0.50	0.65	0.48
War duration	8.34	8.47	7.49	7.73
Major power involved in war	0.43	0.50	0.45	0.50
Democracy	-0.94	5.55	-1.38	4.87
Natural resource revenue available	0.78	0.41	0.69	0.46
Distance to closest P5 member	0.40	0.27	0.42	0.28
Distance to farthest P5 member	3.27	0.58	3.19	0.60
Coef of Var on ideal points	0.25	0.02	0.25	0.02
Chapter VII mission	0.24	0.43	0.36	0.48

Table A2: Descriptive statistics for analyses of consent, excluding Chapter VII missions. Analyses use standardized values (original values divided by two standard deviations). Economic variables and democracy scores are measured in the year before the ceasefire that makes conflicts eligible for peacekeeping operations.

	Table **??**, Model 1		Table **??**, Model 2	
Variable	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Consent	0.26	0.44	0.48	0.50
Total official aid flows/GDP	0.40	0.54	0.46	0.61
GDP per capita (logged)	7.05	1.21	7.07	1.07
Victory	0.20	0.40	0.12	0.33
Settlement	0.37	0.49	0.46	0.50
Total war deaths	10.34	2.38	10.72	2.61
Gov't army size	4.37	1.58	3.70	1.29
More than 2 factions	0.62	0.49	0.68	0.47
Neighbor intervened	0.46	0.50	0.64	0.48
War duration	8.80	8.99	7.86	8.43
Major power involved in war	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.51
Democracy	-0.31	5.89	-0.48	5.24
Natural resource revenue available	0.81	0.39	0.70	0.46
Distance to closest P5 member	0.40	0.28	0.42	0.30
Distance to farthest P5 member	3.29	0.56	3.19	0.58
Coef of Var on ideal points	0.25	0.03	0.25	0.03



Figure A1: Distribution of total official aid flows/GDP by estimation sample. The aid measure is standardized (divided by two standard deviations). Per the common measurement approach to net aid received, "loan repayments are recorded as negative and deducted from ODA and loans. In some cases, loan repayments are higher than new ODA and net ODA will show as a negative number." (Source: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/faq.htm).

Details on variables and measurement

Total official aid flows/GDP. We measure foreign aid *commitments* reported by the OECD covering OECD/DAC donors (OECD 2020) on actual flows of aid-related capital: total official aid flows (OECD 2020). We then account for the relative importance of this incentive for the recipient by scaling it by GDP (World Bank 2015; Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015; Graham and Tucker 2019). Following other recent work, we transform this ratio using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation ($\text{IHST}(x) = \log(x + (x^2 + 1)^{0.5})$) to reduce sensitivity to outliers; for a recent application in political science, see Betz, Fortunato, and O'Brien (2021). The resulting measure is then standardized (divided by two standard deviations) for estimation purposes. Our measure focuses on the time period before the ceasefire, averaging aid during that time period up to three years.

GDP per capita (logged). This is taken directly from the World Development Indicators and Penn World Tables, aggregated by Graham and Tucker (2019).

Victory. This is a binary indicator for cases where one conflict party won (versus baseline of a truce); it is taken from Yuen (2020).

Settlement. This is a binary indicator for cases with a settlement (versus baseline of a truce); it is taken from Yuen (2020).

Total war deaths. This variable captures the total number of civilian and battlefield casualties occurring in the conflict (Fortna 2008; Yuen 2020).

Gov't army size. This variable is the natural log of the number of military personnel in the conflict state. It is taken from Yuen (2020) and coded from the Correlates of War's National Material Capabilities data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) and also from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2009).

More than 2 factions. This binary indicator is coded such that 0 reflects two parties to the conflict and 1 reflects three or more. It is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and updated in Yuen (2020).

Neighbor intervened. This is a binary indicator for whether a neighboring state intervened (Yuen 2020).

War duration. This variable is measured in years (Yuen 2020).

Major power involved in war. This is a binary indicator of the presence of a major third party state in the civil war (Yuen 2020).

Democracy. We code this variable as the median Polity IV score during the three years prior to the ceasefire (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

Natural resource revenue available. This is a binary indicator set to 1 for countries where revenue is available from extracting oil, drugs, gemstones and 0 for all others. The variable comes from Lujala (2010).

Distance to closest and farthest P5 member This distance measure is based on the conflict country's ideal point measures (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017) relative to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (Yuen 2020).

Coefficient of variation on ideal points This measure captures the cohesion (or dispersion) of ideal points (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017) among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, proxying for the underlying probability of obtaining approval for PKOs in general (Yuen 2020).

Robustness tests

Including pre-conflict aid

Table A3: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	4.53	10.23*
	[−1.49; 10.94]	[1.81; 20.24]
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.10*	1.12
	[0.00; 2.36]	[−0.21; 2.51]
Total official aid flows/GDP before war	−0.23	0.43
	[−1.42; 0.90]	[−1.22; 1.95]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.02	−0.63
	[−0.52; 0.52]	[−1.62; 0.31]
Victory	−0.60	−0.91
	[−1.97; 0.94]	[−2.83; 0.94]
Settlement	−0.08	−0.23
	[−1.20; 1.03]	[−1.74; 1.25]
Total war deaths	−0.19	−0.76*
	[−0.46; 0.06]	[−1.20; −0.32]
Gov't army size	−0.83*	−0.73*
	[−1.31; −0.35]	[−1.39; −0.08]
More than 2 factions	0.21	0.05
	[−0.83; 1.30]	[−1.43; 1.62]
Neighbor intervened	0.31	0.25
	[−0.76; 1.36]	[−1.09; 1.63]
War duration	0.15*	0.26*
	[0.07; 0.23]	[0.14; 0.38]
Major power involved in war	0.20	1.84*
	[−0.97; 1.27]	[0.12; 3.61]
Democracy	0.03	−0.02
	[−0.06; 0.13]	[−0.17; 0.12]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.19	0.96
	[−1.34; 0.97]	[−0.40; 2.34]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.68*	2.07*
	[0.15; 3.35]	[0.04; 4.21]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.68	0.06
	[−1.81; 0.51]	[−1.32; 1.41]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−1.19	−1.09
	[−6.85; 4.02]	[−6.56; 4.13]
Chapter VII mission	0.92	−0.05
	[−0.23; 2.08]	[−1.26; 1.23]
Observations	107	68

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Table A4: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	14.06*	34.56*
	[2.48; 24.62]	[13.89; 56.04]
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.74*	2.62*
	[0.26; 3.40]	[0.25; 5.48]
Total official aid flows/GDP before war	−0.67	−0.74
	[−2.33; 1.01]	[−3.61; 2.15]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.51	−2.60*
	[−1.36; 0.26]	[−4.82; −0.80]
Victory	−1.52	−2.01
	[−3.48; 0.26]	[−4.50; 0.95]
Settlement	−0.73	−1.70
	[−2.23; 0.54]	[−3.87; 0.48]
Total war deaths	−0.29	−1.52*
	[−0.63; 0.04]	[−2.37; −0.72]
Gov't army size	−1.19*	−1.31*
	[−1.88; −0.58]	[−2.47; −0.18]
More than 2 factions	0.34	−0.19
	[−0.92; 1.59]	[−2.35; 2.21]
Neighbor intervened	0.13	0.26
	[−1.30; 1.52]	[−1.86; 2.35]
War duration	0.24*	0.60*
	[0.12; 0.35]	[0.37; 0.87]
Major power involved in war	0.02	4.34*
	[−1.33; 1.39]	[1.46; 7.65]
Democracy	0.07	−0.00
	[−0.07; 0.20]	[−0.24; 0.22]
Natural resource revenue available	−1.13	0.09
	[−2.62; 0.39]	[−1.79; 2.01]
Distance to closest P5 member	2.00	2.26
	[−0.05; 3.90]	[−0.27; 5.23]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−1.82*	−0.81
	[−3.54; −0.05]	[−3.07; 1.34]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.53	−0.16
	[−5.38; 4.46]	[−5.33; 4.44]
Observations	82	43

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Including separate measure for aid from biggest donor

Table A5: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	3.10	7.56
	[−2.60; 9.25]	[−0.62; 14.99]
Total official aid flows from all sources, excluding largest state donor/GDP	0.91*	1.04*
	[0.17; 1.69]	[0.20; 1.95]
Total official aid flows from largest state donor/GDP	−3.75	−2.66
	[−14.67; 2.79]	[−9.79; 3.26]
GDP per capita (logged)	0.06	−0.40
	[−0.41; 0.52]	[−1.13; 0.27]
Victory	−0.44	−0.70
	[−1.84; 0.88]	[−2.37; 0.94]
Settlement	0.32	0.10
	[−0.65; 1.41]	[−1.26; 1.50]
Total war deaths	−0.13	−0.49*
	[−0.37; 0.13]	[−0.89; −0.11]
Gov't army size	−0.67*	−0.48
	[−1.10; −0.24]	[−1.05; 0.09]
More than 2 factions	0.20	0.07
	[−0.85; 1.21]	[−1.30; 1.47]
Neighbor intervened	0.57	0.59
	[−0.41; 1.66]	[−0.73; 1.82]
War duration	0.09*	0.18*
	[0.03; 0.16]	[0.08; 0.28]
Major power involved in war	−0.05	1.02
	[−1.05; 0.98]	[−0.47; 2.40]
Democracy	0.07	0.06
	[−0.02; 0.17]	[−0.07; 0.18]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.25	0.32
	[−1.30; 0.85]	[−0.80; 1.58]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.69*	1.77
	[0.14; 3.32]	[−0.04; 3.71]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.76	−0.37
	[−1.70; 0.25]	[−1.51; 0.74]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.76	−0.44
	[−5.89; 4.37]	[−5.42; 4.22]
Chapter VII mission	1.24*	0.65
	[0.28; 2.34]	[−0.46; 1.73]
Observations	119	78

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Table A6: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	7.29	20.73*
	[−1.33; 15.77]	[7.87; 36.01]
Total official aid flows from all sources, excluding largest state donor/GDP	1.09*	1.43
	[0.13; 2.10]	[−0.00; 3.04]
Total official aid flows from largest state donor/GDP	−1.83	−0.90
	[−8.30; 3.15]	[−6.25; 3.99]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.20	−1.43*
	[−0.79; 0.43]	[−2.62; −0.27]
Victory	−1.07	−1.41
	[−2.88; 0.54]	[−3.83; 0.72]
Settlement	0.12	−0.90
	[−1.06; 1.29]	[−2.75; 0.84]
Total war deaths	−0.12	−0.93*
	[−0.39; 0.17]	[−1.49; −0.32]
Gov't army size	−0.83*	−0.84
	[−1.36; −0.30]	[−1.67; 0.01]
More than 2 factions	0.30	0.05
	[−0.93; 1.53]	[−1.68; 1.90]
Neighbor intervened	0.44	0.37
	[−0.81; 1.67]	[−1.43; 2.13]
War duration	0.12*	0.38*
	[0.04; 0.21]	[0.21; 0.57]
Major power involved in war	−0.43	1.95
	[−1.62; 0.82]	[−0.20; 3.94]
Democracy	0.11*	0.03
	[0.01; 0.23]	[−0.14; 0.20]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.71	−0.07
	[−1.99; 0.57]	[−1.69; 1.50]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.49	1.37
	[−0.43; 3.21]	[−0.96; 3.70]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−1.23	−0.79
	[−2.54; 0.19]	[−2.59; 0.99]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.57	−0.12
	[−5.94; 4.62]	[−4.73; 4.89]
Observations	91	50

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Focusing on aid from largest individual donors

Table A7: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	3.92	9.30*
	[−2.43; 10.12]	[0.69; 17.26]
Total official aid flows from Canada/GDP	1.19	1.15
	[−0.11; 2.37]	[−0.32; 2.64]
Total official aid flows from France/GDP	0.93	2.21
	[−0.81; 2.92]	[−0.14; 4.65]
Total official aid flows from Germany/GDP	−2.99*	−2.84*
	[−5.73; −0.46]	[−5.53; −0.33]
Total official aid flows from Japan/GDP	0.92	2.60
	[−1.05; 3.04]	[−0.24; 5.78]
Total official aid flows from UK/GDP	1.30	0.50
	[−0.05; 2.64]	[−1.25; 2.48]
Total official aid flows from US/GDP	−1.30	−1.69
	[−2.97; 0.04]	[−3.66; 0.07]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.13	−0.76
	[−0.64; 0.46]	[−1.56; 0.04]
Victory	0.57	0.32
	[−0.79; 1.90]	[−1.56; 2.13]
Settlement	0.64	0.21
	[−0.46; 1.78]	[−1.28; 1.70]
Total war deaths	−0.08	−0.34
	[−0.35; 0.18]	[−0.73; 0.06]
Gov't army size	−0.55*	−0.41
	[−1.01; −0.12]	[−1.05; 0.19]
More than 2 factions	0.30	0.39
	[−0.95; 1.45]	[−1.08; 1.95]
Neighbor intervened	1.08	0.70
	[−0.05; 2.17]	[−0.69; 2.09]
War duration	0.07	0.14*
	[−0.00; 0.14]	[0.04; 0.24]
Major power involved in war	−0.03	0.59
	[−1.15; 1.05]	[−0.93; 2.18]
Democracy	0.07	0.08
	[−0.03; 0.18]	[−0.06; 0.23]
Natural resource revenue available	−1.26*	0.06
	[−2.46; −0.03]	[−1.34; 1.41]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.62*	2.31*
	[0.10; 3.29]	[0.59; 4.40]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.66	−0.58
	[−1.71; 0.31]	[−1.75; 0.52]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.74	−0.40
	[−5.66; 4.11]	[−5.22; 4.29]
Chapter VII mission	0.98	0.44
	[−0.07; 2.18]	[−0.80; 1.73]
Observations	119	78

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Table A8: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	7.70	21.95*
	[−1.60; 16.43]	[8.29; 38.44]
Total official aid flows from Canada/GDP	1.68*	2.77*
	[0.19; 3.24]	[0.55; 5.43]
Total official aid flows from France/GDP	−0.36	−0.23
	[−2.42; 1.79]	[−3.17; 2.69]
Total official aid flows from Germany/GDP	−2.99*	−1.00
	[−6.22; −0.04]	[−4.91; 2.26]
Total official aid flows from Japan/GDP	1.55	4.84*
	[−1.07; 4.13]	[0.29; 10.29]
Total official aid flows from UK/GDP	1.23	0.93
	[−0.60; 2.83]	[−2.08; 4.46]
Total official aid flows from US/GDP	−0.15	−0.21
	[−2.18; 1.99]	[−3.21; 2.66]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.24	−1.29*
	[−0.90; 0.53]	[−2.46; −0.02]
Victory	−0.15	−0.92
	[−1.87; 1.71]	[−3.27; 1.54]
Settlement	0.65	−0.23
	[−0.72; 1.90]	[−2.33; 1.57]
Total war deaths	−0.11	−0.99*
	[−0.43; 0.20]	[−1.68; −0.26]
Gov't army size	−0.78*	−1.01*
	[−1.37; −0.18]	[−2.03; −0.01]
More than 2 factions	0.35	0.04
	[−1.12; 1.68]	[−2.03; 2.15]
Neighbor intervened	0.80	0.03
	[−0.58; 2.17]	[−1.88; 1.99]
War duration	0.10	0.40*
	[−0.00; 0.19]	[0.16; 0.62]
Major power involved in war	−0.50	1.42
	[−1.88; 0.83]	[−0.94; 3.79]
Democracy	0.10	0.08
	[−0.03; 0.21]	[−0.12; 0.30]
Natural resource revenue available	−1.13	0.92
	[−2.66; 0.44]	[−1.32; 3.15]
Distance to closest P5 member	1.22	1.27
	[−0.77; 3.07]	[−1.26; 3.98]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−1.24	−1.48
	[−2.62; 0.20]	[−3.57; 0.42]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−0.47	−0.08
	[−5.33; 4.29]	[−5.25; 4.77]
Observations	91	50

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Linear probability models

Table A9: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	0.96	1.62
	[−0.19; 2.09]	[−0.05; 3.17]
Total official aid flows/GDP	0.13	0.21
	[−0.03; 0.31]	[−0.02; 0.43]
GDP per capita (logged)	0.02	−0.04
	[−0.05; 0.10]	[−0.17; 0.10]
Victory	−0.04	−0.20
	[−0.27; 0.17]	[−0.59; 0.18]
Settlement	0.04	0.00
	[−0.15; 0.22]	[−0.31; 0.33]
Total war deaths	−0.01	−0.08
	[−0.06; 0.03]	[−0.15; 0.00]
Gov't army size	−0.08*	−0.06
	[−0.15; −0.03]	[−0.15; 0.04]
More than 2 factions	0.01	0.00
	[−0.16; 0.17]	[−0.27; 0.32]
Neighbor intervened	0.06	0.10
	[−0.11; 0.23]	[−0.15; 0.39]
War duration	0.01*	0.03*
	[0.00; 0.02]	[0.01; 0.04]
Major power involved in war	0.04	0.19
	[−0.13; 0.22]	[−0.11; 0.52]
Democracy	0.01	0.01
	[−0.00; 0.03]	[−0.02; 0.04]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.06	0.05
	[−0.27; 0.15]	[−0.23; 0.30]
Distance to closest P5 member	0.25	0.34
	[−0.04; 0.53]	[−0.11; 0.74]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.07	−0.03
	[−0.21; 0.09]	[−0.27; 0.17]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−1.75	−1.24
	[−4.50; 0.98]	[−4.50; 2.27]
Chapter VII mission	0.22*	0.14
	[0.03; 0.40]	[−0.12; 0.39]
Observations	119	78

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Table A10: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	1.27	2.77*
	[−0.13; 2.56]	[0.59; 4.87]
Total official aid flows/GDP	0.14	0.22
	[−0.06; 0.33]	[−0.08; 0.51]
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.01	−0.15
	[−0.08; 0.07]	[−0.31; 0.02]
Victory	−0.07	−0.34
	[−0.30; 0.15]	[−0.80; 0.10]
Settlement	0.01	−0.17
	[−0.18; 0.21]	[−0.54; 0.19]
Total war deaths	−0.01	−0.09
	[−0.05; 0.04]	[−0.18; 0.01]
Gov't army size	−0.09*	−0.08
	[−0.15; −0.03]	[−0.19; 0.04]
More than 2 factions	0.03	−0.00
	[−0.13; 0.20]	[−0.33; 0.28]
Neighbor intervened	0.03	0.02
	[−0.16; 0.21]	[−0.29; 0.32]
War duration	0.01*	0.04*
	[0.00; 0.02]	[0.02; 0.06]
Major power involved in war	−0.01	0.14
	[−0.19; 0.17]	[−0.21; 0.50]
Democracy	0.02*	0.01
	[0.00; 0.03]	[−0.02; 0.04]
Natural resource revenue available	−0.09	0.03
	[−0.33; 0.15]	[−0.30; 0.37]
Distance to closest P5 member	0.17	0.26
	[−0.12; 0.50]	[−0.20; 0.76]
Distance to farthest P5 member	−0.09	−0.09
	[−0.25; 0.09]	[−0.39; 0.19]
Coef of Var on ideal points	−1.49	−0.89
	[−4.14; 1.34]	[−4.57; 2.77]
Observations	91	50

* Null hypothesis value outside 90% highest posterior density interval.

Frequentist logit estimates

Table A11: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions included.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	1.56	5.35
	(3.29)	(5.06)
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.07 *	1.25 *
	(0.56)	(0.62)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.16	-0.27
	(0.23)	(0.48)
Victory	-0.51	-0.85
	(1.00)	(1.26)
Settlement	0.22	-0.02
	(0.60)	(0.96)
Total war deaths	-0.09	-0.44 *
	(0.15)	(0.24)
Gov't army size	-0.59 *	-0.40
	(0.30)	(0.31)
More than 2 factions	0.08	-0.02
	(0.59)	(0.84)
Neighbor intervened	0.41	0.49
	(0.65)	(0.72)
War duration	0.09 *	0.16 *
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Major power involved in war	0.02	1.15
	(0.62)	(1.04)
Democracy	0.06	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Natural resource revenue available	-0.21	0.34
	(0.69)	(0.79)
Distance to closest P5 member	1.49	1.63
	(0.96)	(1.24)
Distance to farthest P5 member	-0.72	-0.28
	(0.59)	(0.77)
Chapter VII mission	1.21 *	0.70
	(0.71)	(0.78)
Num.Obs.	119	78
AIC	149.9	120.9
BIC	194.4	158.6
Log.Lik.	-58.959	-44.450
RMSE	0.41	0.44
Std.Errors	HC1	HC1

* $p < 0.1$. Note that these regression exclude the "coefficient of variation on ideal points" variable due to quasi-separation.

Table A12: Determinants of consent. Columns represent two different comparisons of consent vs. other outcomes. Cases: ceasefires that last at least one month in civil conflicts, 1990-2011, Chapter VII missions excluded.

	Unrestricted vs. any other, including no PKO	Unrestricted vs. partial/restricted consent, PKOs only
Intercept	5.73	21.38
	(5.13)	(17.66)
Total official aid flows/GDP	1.49 *	3.14
	(0.83)	(2.39)
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.12	-1.64
	(0.30)	(1.61)
Victory	-1.27	-2.84
	(1.48)	(2.20)
Settlement	-0.09	-1.94
	(0.71)	(2.08)
Total war deaths	-0.08	-0.99
	(0.17)	(0.67)
Gov't army size	-0.74	-0.80
	(0.47)	(0.57)
More than 2 factions	0.21	-0.33
	(0.67)	(1.46)
Neighbor intervened	0.35	0.91
	(0.89)	(1.36)
War duration	0.12 *	0.44
	(0.04)	(0.28)
Major power involved in war	-0.41	3.02
	(0.81)	(2.72)
Democracy	0.10	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.09)
Natural resource revenue available	-0.47	0.57
	(0.83)	(1.15)
Distance to closest P5 member	1.65	2.48
	(1.25)	(2.60)
Distance to farthest P5 member	-1.28	-1.08
	(0.88)	(1.36)
Num.Obs.	91	50
AIC	107.6	72.8
BIC	145.2	101.5
Log.Lik.	-38.776	-21.402
RMSE	0.36	0.36
Std.Errors	HC1	HC1

* $p < 0.1$. Note that these regression exclude the "coefficient of variation on ideal points" variable due to quasi-separation.

List of cases

Table A13: Cases used for analyses in Table 1, Model 1

Conflict	Year
Liberia	1990
Lebanon	1990
Papua New Guinea	1990
Mali	1991
Somalia	1991
Ethiopia-Eritrea	1991
Ethiopia-ideology	1991
Angola	1991
Morocco/WestSah	1991
India-Assam	1991
India-Assam	1991
Cambodia	1991
Indonesia-Aceh	1991
Papua New Guinea	1991
El Salvador	1992
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1992
Uganda-LRA	1992
Rwanda	1992
Somalia	1992
Somalia	1992
Djibouti	1992
Mozambique	1992
Afghanistan-Mujahideen	1992
Bangladesh-CHT	1992
Cambodia	1992
Haiti	1993
Senegal	1993
Liberia	1993
Rwanda	1993
Rwanda	1993
Somalia	1993
Turkey-Kurds	1993
Iraq-Shia	1993
Iraq-Kurds	1993
Israel-Palestinians	1993
Afghanistan-Taliban	1993
India-Sikh	1993
Myanmar-Kachin	1993
Cambodia	1993
Philippines-Mindanao	1993
Haiti	1994
U.K.-N. Ireland	1994
Croatia	1994
Georgia-Abkhazia	1994
Georgia-Ossetia	1994
Chad	1994
Congo-Brazzaville	1994
Rwanda	1994
Djibouti	1994
South Africa	1994
Yemen	1994
Tajikistan	1994
Croatia	1995
Bosnia	1995
Bosnia	1995
Bosnia	1995
Mali	1995
Liberia	1995
Angola	1995
Myanmar-Karen	1995
Sri Lanka (Tamil)	1995
Haiti	1996
Guatemala	1996
Peru	1996
Croatia	1996
Russia-Chechnya	1996
Russia-Chechnya	1996
Liberia	1996
Sierra Leone	1996
Iraq-Kurds	1996
Philippines-Mindanao	1996
Haiti	1997
Liberia	1997
Central African Rep.	1997
Congo-Brazzaville	1997
CongoD.R./Zaire	1997
Angola	1997
Algeria-FIS/AIS	1997
Tajikistan	1997
Bangladesh-CHT	1997
Papua New Guinea	1997
U.K.-N. Ireland	1998
Croatia	1998
Croatia	1998
Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1998
Guinea-Bissau	1998
Guinea-Bissau	1998
Central African Rep.	1998
Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1999
Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1999
Guinea-Bissau	1999
Guinea-Bissau	1999
Sierra Leone	1999
Sierra Leone	1999
Congo-Brazzaville	1999
CongoD.R./Zaire	1999
Sudan	1999
Turkey-Kurds	1999
Indonesia-E. Timor	1999
Indonesia-E. Timor	2000
Burundi	2002
Indonesia-Aceh	2002
Ivory Coast	2003
Liberia	2003
Burundi	2003
Nepal-Maoist	2003
Haiti	2004
Haiti	2004
Ivory Coast	2004
Sudan-Darfur	2004
Sudan	2005
Indonesia-Aceh	2005
Sudan-Darfur	2006
Nepal-Maoist	2006
Indonesia-E. Timor	2006
CongoD.R./Zaire	2009
Yemen-Houthis	2010
Sudan	2011
South Sudan	2011

Table A14: Cases used for analyses in Table 1, Model 2

Conflict	Year	Conflict	Year
Liberia	1990	Sierra Leone	1996
Lebanon	1990	Iraq-Kurds	1996
Angola	1991	Haiti	1997
Morocco/WestSah	1991	Liberia	1997
Cambodia	1991	Central African Rep.	1997
Papua New Guinea	1991	Congo-Brazzaville	1997
El Salvador	1992	Angola	1997
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1992	Tajikistan	1997
Rwanda	1992	Papua New Guinea	1997
Somalia	1992	Croatia	1998
Somalia	1992	Croatia	1998
Djibouti	1992	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1998
Mozambique	1992	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Cambodia	1992	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Haiti	1993	Central African Rep.	1998
Liberia	1993	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1999
Rwanda	1993	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1999
Rwanda	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Somalia	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Iraq-Kurds	1993	Sierra Leone	1999
Cambodia	1993	Sierra Leone	1999
Haiti	1994	CongoD.R./Zaire	1999
Croatia	1994	Indonesia-E. Timor	1999
Georgia-Abkhazia	1994	Indonesia-E. Timor	2000
Georgia-Ossetia	1994	Burundi	2002
Rwanda	1994	Ivory Coast	2003
South Africa	1994	Liberia	2003
Tajikistan	1994	Burundi	2003
Croatia	1995	Haiti	2004
Bosnia	1995	Haiti	2004
Bosnia	1995	Ivory Coast	2004
Bosnia	1995	Sudan-Darfur	2004
Liberia	1995	Sudan	2005
Angola	1995	Indonesia-Aceh	2005
Sri Lanka (Tamil)	1995	Sudan-Darfur	2006
Haiti	1996	Indonesia-E. Timor	2006
Guatemala	1996	CongoD.R./Zaire	2009
Croatia	1996	Sudan	2011
Liberia	1996	South Sudan	2011

Table A15: Cases used for analyses in Table 2, Model 1

Conflict	Year
Papua New Guinea	1990
Mali	1991
Somalia	1991
Ethiopia-Eritrea	1991
Ethiopia-ideology	1991
Angola	1991
Morocco/WestSah	1991
India-Assam	1991
India-Assam	1991
Cambodia	1991
Indonesia-Aceh	1991
Papua New Guinea	1991
El Salvador	1992
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1992
Uganda-LRA	1992
Rwanda	1992
Somalia	1992
Djibouti	1992
Mozambique	1992
Afghanistan-Mujahideen	1992
Bangladesh-CHT	1992
Cambodia	1992
Senegal	1993
Liberia	1993
Rwanda	1993
Rwanda	1993
Turkey-Kurds	1993
Iraq-Shia	1993
Israel-Palestinians	1993
Afghanistan-Taliban	1993
India-Sikh	1993
Myanmar-Kachin	1993
Cambodia	1993
Philippines-Mindanao	1993
U.K.-N. Ireland	1994
Croatia	1994
Georgia-Abkhazia	1994
Georgia-Ossetia	1994
Chad	1994
Congo-Brazzaville	1994
Rwanda	1994
Djibouti	1994
South Africa	1994
Yemen	1994
Tajikistan	1994

Conflict	Year
Croatia	1995
Bosnia	1995
Mali	1995
Liberia	1995
Angola	1995
Myanmar-Karen	1995
Sri Lanka (Tamil)	1995
Haiti	1996
Guatemala	1996
Peru	1996
Russia-Chechnya	1996
Russia-Chechnya	1996
Sierra Leone	1996
Philippines-Mindanao	1996
Haiti	1997
Central African Rep.	1997
Congo-Brazzaville	1997
CongoD.R./Zaire	1997
Angola	1997
Algeria-FIS/AIS	1997
Bangladesh-CHT	1997
Papua New Guinea	1997
U.K.-N. Ireland	1998
Croatia	1998
Croatia	1998
Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1998
Guinea-Bissau	1998
Guinea-Bissau	1998
Central African Rep.	1998
Guinea-Bissau	1999
Guinea-Bissau	1999
Congo-Brazzaville	1999
Sudan	1999
Turkey-Kurds	1999
Indonesia-E. Timor	2000
Burundi	2002
Indonesia-Aceh	2002
Ivory Coast	2003
Nepal-Maoist	2003
Sudan-Darfur	2004
Indonesia-Aceh	2005
Nepal-Maoist	2006
Indonesia-E. Timor	2006
Yemen-Houthis	2010
Sudan	2011
South Sudan	2011

Table A16: Cases used for analyses in Table 2, Model 2

Conflict	Year	Conflict	Year
Angola	1991	Sri Lanka (Tamil)	1995
Morocco/WestSah	1991	Haiti	1996
Cambodia	1991	Guatemala	1996
Papua New Guinea	1991	Sierra Leone	1996
El Salvador	1992	Haiti	1997
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1992	Central African Rep.	1997
Rwanda	1992	Congo-Brazzaville	1997
Somalia	1992	Angola	1997
Djibouti	1992	Papua New Guinea	1997
Mozambique	1992	Croatia	1998
Cambodia	1992	Croatia	1998
Liberia	1993	Yugoslavia-Kosovo	1998
Rwanda	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Rwanda	1993	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Cambodia	1993	Central African Rep.	1998
Croatia	1994	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Georgia-Abkhazia	1994	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Georgia-Ossetia	1994	Indonesia-E. Timor	2000
Rwanda	1994	Burundi	2002
South Africa	1994	Ivory Coast	2003
Tajikistan	1994	Sudan-Darfur	2004
Croatia	1995	Indonesia-Aceh	2005
Bosnia	1995	Indonesia-E. Timor	2006
Liberia	1995	Sudan	2011
Angola	1995	South Sudan	2011

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