Military aid, regime vulnerability, and the escalation of political violence: Appendix

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

Figure 1: Regime typologies, 1950-2010

Descriptive statistics

Table A1 contains descriptive statistics for all covariates used in the main analysis—including those used to construct the instrumental variable—as well as the dependent variables used in both the main text and the supplemental appendix. The cross-national analysis covers the years between 1982 and 2010 (I use the CIRI physical integrity rights index (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014)—which is available from 1981 to 2011—to control for the level of respect for human rights, which has been shown to have a strong violence-reducing effect (Walsh, 2010)). Figure 1 displays the global distribution of regime types over time since 1950. Figure 2 shows that annual levels of fragmentation in the U.S. House of Representatives is highly correlated with levels of military assistance, while Figure 3 demonstrates that a striking feature of U.S. military aid allocation is that countries that receive aid more often also receive larger amounts, on average.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics, 1982-2010

	N	Mean	σ	Min.	Max.
Dependent variables					
ln(domestic attacks)	3,395	1.28	1.60	0	7.04
ln(guerrilla attacks)†	3,395	0.53	1.10	0	5.74
ln(terror attacks)†	3,395	1.05	1.47	0	6.91
ln(transnational attacks)†	3,395	0.47	0.77	0	4.23
Latent protest†	3,377	0.18	1.28	-6.37	3.43
Independent variables					
$\overline{Pr(receive\ U.S.\ mil.\ aid)_i}$	3,395	0.63	0.31	0	1
House frag_t	3,395	88.75	7.45	76.32	97.93
House frag_t*$\overline{Pr(receive\ U.S.\ mil.\ aid)_i}$	3,395	56.46	28.18	0	97.93
New regime	3,395	0.13	0.33	0	1
ln(U.S. military aid)	3,395	11.44	6.54	0	22.68
Phys. int. rights	3,395	4.67	2.30	0	8
Election year	3,395	0.28	0.45	0	1
Coup	3,395	0.04	0.26	0	1
Interstate rivalry	3,395	0.38	0.49	0	1
ln(GDP *per capita*)	3,395	8.29	1.33	4.78	11.16
ln(population)	3,395	16.28	1.37	13.36	21.00
Civil war	3,395	0.19	0.39	0	1
Press censorship	3,395	2.52	1.08	1	4

† = used in appendix only



Figure 2: Fragmentation in the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. military aid allocation



Figure 3: Average U.S. military aid received as a function of country mean probability of receiving U.S. military aid

Full 2SLS-IV regime type models

Table A2 contains the first stages of the regime-type models from the main text.

Instrument with time-varying probability of receiving US military aid

In this section, I employ an alternative instrument constructed using the probability of a country receiving aid that varies over time (the probability used in the paper is the country mean for 1970-2010, which is time-invariant). Results are substantively similar to those presented in the main text.

Leave-one-region-out

Table A4 contains the F-statistics and estimated marginal effects of military aid in new regimes based on replications in which one significant region is omitted in each model. Although the results diminish when North America (including the Caribbean and Central America) and South America are excluded, they remain positive. The estimated effect remains positive and significant in all other models, and the F-statistics are consistently well above the weak ID critical value, indicating a strong instrument.

Table A2: Full results of 2SLS interaction by regime type

	Democracies			Personalist			Party-based			Mil. junta		
	new5Xsecurity	ln_securityMA	ln_attks	new5Xsecurity	ln_securityMA	ln_attks	new5Xsecurity	ln_securityMA	ln_attks	new5Xsecurity	ln_securityMA	ln_attks
Military aid			0.005			0.072*			0.008			-0.033
			(0.028)			(0.0334)			(0.0121)			(0.106)
New regime	8.070***	1.356	-2.688*	7.412**	5.290+	-0.328	0.818	2.009	0.404	4.633+	1.300	-1.180
	(1.530)	(1.868)	(1.114)	(2.694)	(3.118)	(1.039)	(3.494)	(2.453)	(0.699)	(2.619)	(4.313)	(0.950)
New regime *Military aid			0.193**			0.016			-0.016			0.109
			(0.075)			(0.082)			(0.060)			(0.078)
GDP *per capita*	-0.071	-0.573	0.065	0.597+	0.344	-0.209+	-0.003	-0.071	0.154+	-0.396	-0.864	-0.215
	(0.103)	(0.399)	(0.126)	(0.344)	(0.809)	(0.126)	(0.0132)	(0.428)	(0.081)	(0.281)	(0.606)	(0.145)
Population	-0.025	-0.200	0.280***	0.410+	0.155	0.194*	0.0167	0.605+	0.109*	-0.112	-0.591	-0.028
	(0.064)	(0.272)	(0.069)	(0.216)	(0.518)	(0.090)	(0.0143)	(0.314)	(0.052)	(0.279)	(0.885)	(0.157)
Civil war	-0.058	-0.594	1.007***	0.049	0.308	0.589**	-0.084	-0.337	1.058***	0.181	-0.161	1.050***
	(0.182)	(0.666)	(0.261)	(0.268)	(1.504)	(0.179)	(0.054)	(0.817)	(0.191)	(0.412)	(1.362)	(0.263)
Human rights abuse	-0.050	-0.188	-0.149***	0.122	0.231	-0.112**	0.002	0.283	-0.146***	-0.009	0.945***	0.033
	(0.060)	(0.141)	(0.037)	(0.108)	(0.198)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.196)	(0.031)	(0.082)	(0.260)	(0.128)
Coup	-0.033	-0.756+	0.115	0.131	0.495	0.0171	0.065	1.012+	0.011	-0.360	-0.217	0.033
	(0.414)	(0.454)	(0.126)	(0.203)	(0.372)	(0.123)	(0.056)	(0.558)	(0.164)	(0.499)	(0.546)	(0.113)
Election year	-0.094	-0.118	0.004	-0.040	-0.023	0.0701	0.020	-0.291	0.032	0.524*	-0.024	0.241
	(0.066)	(0.126)	(0.041)	(0.188)	(0.417)	(0.072)	(0.032)	(0.265)	(0.057)	(0.224)	(0.535)	(0.172)
Interstate rivalry	0.206	1.699**	0.622**	-0.269	0.455	-0.123	-0.024	-1.020	0.021	-0.288	-0.995	0.560
	(0.175)	(0.578)	(0.233)	(0.316)	(0.712)	(0.159)	(0.049)	(0.858)	(0.112)	(0.632)	(2.098)	(0.363)
Press censorship	-0.038	0.815**	-0.099	-0.189	-0.697	-0.024	0.054	-0.520	-0.072	0.408	-0.501	0.104
	(0.115)	(0.314)	(0.0960)	(0.299)	(0.486)	(0.103)	(0.034)	(0.464)	(0.052)	(0.326)	(0.755)	(0.126)
Instrument	-0.003	0.139***		-0.005	0.149***		0.000	0.191***		-0.015	0.132+	
	(0.002)	(0.011)		(0.011)	(0.029)		(0.001)	(0.020)		(0.026)	(0.068)	
Instrument*New regime	0.088***	-0.027		0.082+	-0.087+		0.202***	0.014		0.149***	0.003	
	(0.019)	(0.023)		(0.048)	(0.052)		(0.060)	(0.047)		(0.036)	(0.065)	
$\beta_{mil.\ aid} + \beta_{mil.\ aid\ X\ new\ regime}$		0.198**			0.088			-0.008			0.054	
		(0.077)			(0.097)			(0.061)			(0.046)	
F-statistic		149.96			13.89			312.11			5.63	
Weak ID critical value		7.03			7.03			7.03			7.03	
N		1,604			567			786			192	

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
Region and year fixed-effects included in all models but not shown
$^{+}\ p < 0.10, ^{*}\ p < 0.05, ^{**}\ p < 0.01, ^{***}\ p < 0.001$

Table A3: 2SLS interaction models using time-varying IV

Dependent variable:	*Mil. aid*New regime*	*ln(mil. aid)*	*ln(domestic attacks)*
New regime*Military aid			0.071**
			(0.025)
Military aid			0.004
			(0.011)
New regime	4.252***	1.410	-0.807*
	(0.956)	(1.075)	(0.351)
GDP *per capita*	0.070	0.124	0.244
	(0.180)	(0.536)	(0.151)
Population	0.462	-0.960	1.056**
	(0.371)	(1.052)	(0.360)
Civil war	0.006	-0.217	1.120***
	(0.153)	(0.366)	(0.132)
Human rights abuse	0.099+	-0.098	0.325***
	(0.053)	(0.104)	(0.039)
Coup	-0.078	-0.071	-0.008
	(0.103)	(0.162)	(0.066)
Election year	-0.040	-0.172*	0.059*
	(0.041)	(0.078)	(0.027)
Interstate rivalry	0.215	0.558	0.365**
	(0.136)	(0.441)	(0.138)
Press censorship	-0.008	-0.021	-0.127**
	(0.069)	(0.161)	(0.043)
Instrument	0.001	0.151***	
	(0.002)	(0.006)	
Instrument*New regime	0.132***	-0.012	
	(0.012)	(0.013)	
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid\ X\ new\ regime}$			0.075**
			(0.027)
F-statistic		1573.94	
Weak ID critical value		7.03	

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

Country and year fixed effects included in all models but not shown

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4: Marginal effects & F-statistics: Leave-one-region-out models

Omitted region:	North America	South America	Europe	SSAfrica	MENA	Asia	SE Asia	Oceania
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid\ X\ new\ regime}$	0.098	0.066	0.267**	0.159*	0.198*	0.211**	0.195*	0.156*
	(0.079)	(0.049)	(0.114)	(0.082)	(0.098)	(0.085)	(0.095)	(0.018)
F-statistic	28.55	52.26	39.22	28.39	23.46	39.98	31.91	44.40
Weak ID critical value	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03
N	3171	3117	2622	2324	2936	3078	3178	3339

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Alternate 'new regime' thresholds

Svolik (2015) finds that democracies do not become "consolidated" until between 17 and 20 years. For the sake of both space and continuity with prominent past research on new regimes (e.g., (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Cook and Savun, 2016)), I present only the five-year threshold in the main text. To see how the main results change when other thresholds are used, I re-estimate the main models using 3-, 5-, 15-, and 20-year thresholds for "new" regimes. Table A5 demonstrates that the main results are substantively similar when using a three-year threshold, diminish a bit in both size and significance at the ten-year thresholds, but disappear entirely at 15 and 20 years. These somewhat complement Svolik's findings regarding regime consolidation (though he focused only on democratic immunity to authoritarian backsliding via either coup or *autogolpe*). This provides additional support for the argument in the main text, which emphasized the idea that there is something unique about newly-established (i.e., less than 6-10 years) regimes which causes military assistance to exacerbate political violence.

Different estimators & error structures

Table A6 contains the second-stage results of a series of robustness checks using alternate estimation methods and error structures. Results are similar when I use random instead of fixed effects; cluster errors on country rather than regime; and when estimating heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) errors.

Table A5: 2SLS IV using alternate new regime threshholds

'New regime' threshhold:	*3 years*	*10 years*	*15 years*	*20 years*
New regime*Military aid	0.091*	0.072**	0.071*	0.031
	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Military aid	0.025	0.010	-0.011	0.014
	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.048)
New regime	-1.074+	-0.750*	-0.606	-0.101
	(0.573)	(0.358)	(0.381)	(0.341)
GDP *per capita*	-0.124	-0.080	-0.051	-0.077
	(0.174)	(0.181)	(0.183)	(0.178)
Population	0.688*	0.563+	0.490+	0.664*
	(0.308)	(0.296)	(0.287)	(0.302)
Civil war	1.014***	1.020***	1.022***	0.989***
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.126)
Phys. int. rights	-0.109***	-0.121***	-0.118***	-0.118***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Coup	0.000	0.003	0.023	0.022
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Election year	0.067*	0.070*	0.068*	0.068*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Interstate rivalry	0.255*	0.234+	0.199	0.222+
	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.131)	(0.129)
Press censorship	-0.040	-0.045	-0.040	-0.036
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid * new\ regime}$	0.117*	0.082+	0.059	0.044
	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.045)
F-statistic	40.08	38.54	40.90	42.27
Weak ID critical value	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A6: Different estimators and error structures

	(1) HAC errors	(2) Random effects	(3) Country-clustered
New regime*Military aid	0.098***	0.079**	0.098*
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.043)
Military aid	0.024	-0.012	0.024
	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.051)
New regime	-1.190**	-0.758*	-1.190*
	(0.387)	(0.341)	(0.583)
GDP *per capita*	-0.124	0.101***	-0.124
	(0.091)	(0.030)	(0.210)
Population	0.674***	0.222***	0.674*
	(0.157)	(0.029)	(0.331)
Civil war	1.027***	1.094***	1.027***
	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.150)
Phys. int. rights	-0.111***	-0.086***	-0.111***
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.026)
Coup	0.009	0.044	0.009
	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.052)
Election year	0.065*	0.061+	0.065*
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.030)
Interstate rivalry	0.247***	0.344***	0.247+
	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.142)
Press censorship	-0.039	-0.090***	-0.039
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.048)
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid * new\ regime}$	0.122**	0.067**	0.122+
	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.077)
F-statistic	37.91		37.91
Weak ID critical value	7.03		7.03

Standard errors in parentheses

First-stage results not reported but available on request

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Placebo test & alternate DVs

The main analysis examines domestic terrorist attacks as the dependent variable. This is the most theoretically appropriate outcome variable, given that the theory predicts U.S. military aid will cause incumbents to inflame armed domestic opposition *against the regime* by marginalizing elite factions more aggressively while simultaneously undermining its own ability to manage such violence. If the argument is correct, we should expect to find similar effects for violence directed at both civilian (e.g., government officials or buildings) and police or military targets. We should also expect an increase in other types of political violence, such as protests. However, we would *not* necessarily expect to observe increases in violence directed at *other* targets within the country. In this section, I replicate the main models using a range of alternative measures of political violence as a further test of the argument (descriptive statistics for all dependent variables shown in Table A1; data on attacks and their targets are constructed from information in U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2017), while the protest data is a latent measure of protest from Chenoweth, D'Orazio and Wright (2014)). Table A7 shows that the main results hold when the targets of attacks are disaggregated between civilians and security forces of the host regime. They also hold when the latent level of anti-regime protest is used as the DV (column 3). In column 4, however, the main result disappears when transnational attacks (i.e., attacks against non-host state targets within the host state) are employed as the DV. This suggests that the results are not driven by general increases in political violence, but rather by increases in violence directed at the regime itself.

Excluding outliers

I still find a positive coefficient on the *New regime*Military aid* interaction term, but the significance of the marginal effect of military aid in new regimes diminishes in significance; the effect is still positive and roughly equal in magnitude, but with larger standard errors (nearly significant at the $p < 0.1$ level). The findings regarding democracies and personalist regimes remain substantively the same as in the main text.

Table A7: 2SLS IV interaction models using alternate dependent variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable:	Terror attacks	Guerrilla attacks	Protest	Transnational (inc. US)
New regime*Military aid	0.106**	0.054*	0.091*	0.024
	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.024)
Military aid	0.022	0.018	0.051	-0.011
	(0.042)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.024)
New regime	-1.313*	-0.726*	-1.120+	-0.266
	(0.520)	(0.335)	(0.650)	(0.324)
GDP *per capita*	-0.041	0.107	-0.134	-0.110
	(0.163)	(0.100)	(0.214)	(0.089)
Population	0.400	0.242	0.892*	0.701**
	(0.255)	(0.174)	(0.356)	(0.233)
Civil war	0.850***	0.812***	0.220**	0.318***
	(0.117)	(0.105)	(0.073)	(0.064)
Phys. int. rights	-0.093***	-0.061***	-0.066***	-0.025^{+}
	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Interstate rivalry	0.205^{+}	0.113	-0.083	0.143^{+}
	(0.115)	(0.070)	(0.099)	(0.081)
Press censorship	-0.009	-0.022	0.098+	-0.075*
	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.031)
Coup	0.022	-0.013	0.080	0.006
	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.038)
Election year	0.068*	0.018	0.047**	0.021
	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Neighbor protest			0.331*	
			(0.162)	
Urban pct.			-0.001	
			(0.015)	
Econ. growth			-0.011**	
			(0.003)	
Infant mortality			-0.588*	
			(0.242)	
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid * new\ regime}$	0.128*	0.072^{+}	0.141+	0.013
	(0.066)	(0.041)	(0.075)	(0.019)
F-statistic	37.91	37.91	25.52	37.91
Weak ID critical value	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03
N	3395	3395	3216	3395

Clustered tandard errors in parentheses
Country and year fixed effets included in all models
First stage results available on request
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8: Main model excluding top decile of aid recipients

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable:	New regime*Military aid	Military aid	Domestic attacks
Military aid			0.018
			(0.067)
New regime*Military aid			0.108*
			(0.051)
New regime	6.951***	3.669*	-1.265+
	(1.040)	(1.522)	(0.678)
GDP *per capita*	-0.0366	2.804**	-0.225
	(0.371)	(1.002)	(0.236)
Population	-0.415	1.250	0.663*
	(0.592)	(2.734)	(0.308)
Civil war	-0.146	-0.969+	0.968***
	(0.100)	(0.519)	(0.138)
Phys. int. rights	0.027	0.299**	-0.097***
	(0.035)	(0.097)	(0.025)
Interstate rivalry	0.219*	-0.799	0.247+
	(0.096)	(0.664)	(0.139)
Press censorship	-0.091	-0.921**	0.036
	(0.095)	(0.285)	(0.063)
Coup	0.031	0.479+	0.004
	(0.141)	(0.265)	(0.066)
Election year	-0.012	-0.167	0.069*
	(0.049)	(0.104)	(0.032)
Instrument	0.000	-0.185**	
	(0.013)	(0.058)	
New regime*Instrument	0.094***	-0.045*	
	(0.014)	(0.020)	
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid\ X\ new\ regime}$			0.126
			(0.105)
F-statistic			12.81
Weak ID critical value			7.03
N			3080

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9: 2SLS IV interaction models with top decile aid recipients excluded

	Democracies			Personalist			Party-based			Mil. junta	
	*New regime*Military aid*	*Military aid*	*Domestic attacks*	*New regime*Military aid*	*Military aid*	*Domestic attacks*	*New regime*Military aid*	*Military aid*	*Domestic attacks*	*New regime*Military aid*	*Military a*
New regime	8.575***	1.795	-3.177*	8.553**	6.787*	0.595	0.849	3.638+	0.482	4.747+	0.806
	(1.424)	(1.933)	(1.296)	(2.880)	(2.934)	(1.031)	(3.473)	(1.962)	(0.706)	(2.806)	(4.830)
New regime*Military aid			0.240**			-0.066			-0.022		
			(0.091)			(0.085)			(0.061)		
Military aid			-0.006			0.072*			0.000		
			(0.029)			(0.032)			(0.012)		
GDP *per capita*	-0.104	-0.856*	-0.008	0.566	0.255	-0.313*	-0.002	0.029	0.171*	-0.042	-0.321
	(0.101)	(0.417)	(0.131)	(0.367)	(0.926)	(0.125)	(0.014)	(0.356)	(0.078)	(0.266)	(0.955)
Population	-0.089	-0.264	0.323***	0.328	-0.230	0.104	0.010	0.176	0.101*	-0.208	0.638
	(0.068)	(0.249)	(0.073)	(0.237)	(0.543)	(0.073)	(0.014)	(0.244)	(0.048)	(0.273)	(0.866)
Civil war	-0.058	-0.881	0.941***	0.039	-0.019	0.508**	-0.087	-0.374	1.104***	0.074	-0.889
	(0.200)	(0.595)	(0.275)	(0.281)	(1.523)	(0.171)	(0.057)	(0.733)	(0.180)	(0.381)	(1.370)
Phys. int. rights	-0.094	-0.197	-0.112**	0.105	0.147	-0.104**	0.001	0.131	-0.158***	-0.055	0.800**
	(0.063)	(0.148)	(0.038)	(0.112)	(0.198)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.161)	(0.031)	(0.083)	(0.287)
Coup	-0.006	-0.611	0.115	0.247	0.569	0.156	0.066	0.984	-0.018	-0.463	0.163
	(0.407)	(0.442)	(0.141)	(0.244)	(0.405)	(0.108)	(0.060)	(0.614)	(0.175)	(0.536)	(0.729)
Election year	-0.098	-0.158	0.008	-0.040	0.004	0.061	0.025	-0.151	0.051	0.083	-0.662
	(0.068)	(0.135)	(0.047)	(0.204)	(0.414)	(0.067)	(0.034)	(0.221)	(0.056)	(0.166)	(0.597)
Interstate rivalry	0.147	1.357**	0.481+	-0.237	0.666	-0.047	-0.027	-1.417*	-0.055	-0.001	-4.646+
	(0.192)	(0.519)	(0.246)	(0.328)	(0.789)	(0.164)	(0.052)	(0.677)	(0.112)	(0.679)	(2.542)
Press censorship	-0.194	0.736*	-0.080	-0.211	-0.776	-0.120	0.060+	-0.247	-0.054	0.518+	-0.780
	(0.139)	(0.360)	(0.102)	(0.306)	(0.504)	(0.098)	(0.036)	(0.389)	(0.047)	(0.279)	(0.706)
Instrument	-0.005+	0.123***		-0.002	0.148***		-0.000	0.160***		-0.029	0.185+
	(0.002)	(0.012)		(0.010)	(0.033)		(0.001)	(0.009)		(0.031)	(0.097)
Instrument*New regime	0.074***	-0.032		0.058	-0.113*		0.202***	-0.015		0.134**	0.023
	(0.017)	(0.023)		(0.052)	(0.050)		(0.060)	(0.038)		(0.041)	(0.077)
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid\ X\ new\ regime}$		0.235**			0.005			-0.022			0.095
		(0.095)			0.091			0.061			0.105
F-statistic		97.21			6.62			213.48			5.69
Weak ID critical value		7.03			7.03			7.03			7.03
N		1,442			535			746			154

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Excluding civil wars

Tables A10 and A11 replicate the main 2SLS results excluding observations in which a civil war was ongoing. This will likely eliminate the most violent observations in the sample, since the vast majority of domestic terrorism occurs in the context of civil war (Stanton, 2013). Results in the main model are similar to the results in the main text. The F-statistic is still larger than the Stock & Yogo weak ID critical value, and the marginal effect is positive and significant. This demonstrates that the findings are not simply driven by disproportionate violence typical of civil conflict. If anything, the results are stronger without these wars. This is consistent with Cunningham (2016), who finds that while membership within the US security hierarchy decreases civil war occurrence—because the US security umbrella gives the governments a free hand to suppress rebel organizations—it increases the occurrence of terrorist attacks, which are supposedly a lower capacity form of violent opposition to the regime. The results in the regime type models are similar, although the marginal effect of military aid in new regimes is now large and significant in the military junta subsample, and significant at the $p < 0.1$ level in the personalist regime subsample. Both of these support the intuition of the main argument. The problem in the regime type models, however, is that the F-statistics for both the personalist and military junta subsamples fall below the critical values for weak identification. This is due to the small number of observations in each subsample. Thus, although results are generally similar to those presented in the main text, these findings must be taken with a grain of salt.

Additional controls

Table A12 reports robustness tests for the two-stage IV model. The first column adds region fixed effects (in addition to country- and year FE) to the model from the main text in order to control for region-level differences in likelihood of political violence. Columns 2 through 6 add additional control variables one at a time: economic growth; urbanization; natural resource (i.e., oil and gas) rents; the number of US troops stationed on a recipient's soil; and military expenditures per soldier as a rough measure of the quality of the security forces in a recipient

Table A10: Excluding ongoing civil wars

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable:	New regime*mil. aid	Military aid	Domestic attacks
New regime	7.231***	2.560	-1.716*
	(0.946)	(1.829)	(0.806)
New regime*Military aid			0.146*
			(0.060)
Military aid			0.081
			(0.067)
GDP *per capita*	0.020	1.472	-0.321
	(0.338)	(1.325)	(0.237)
Population	-0.293	1.522	0.711+
	(0.552)	(2.980)	(0.400)
Phys. int. rights	-0.008	0.353**	-0.099**
	(0.037)	(0.110)	(0.031)
Interstate rivalry	0.156	-0.484	0.113
	(0.101)	(0.786)	(0.144)
Press censorship	-0.062	-0.616+	-0.043
	(0.082)	(0.332)	(0.053)
Coup	-0.212	0.072	0.104
	(0.176)	(0.302)	(0.065)
Election year	-0.068	-0.141	0.104***
	(0.050)	(0.107)	(0.032)
Instrument	-0.002	-0.205***	
	(0.011)	(0.056)	
Instrument*New regime	0.093***	-0.036	
	(0.012)	(0.024)	
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid\ X\ new\ regime}$			0.227*
			(0.103)
F-statistic			20.96
Weak ID critical value			7.03
N		2748	

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A11: Excluding ongoing civil wars: Regime type models

	Democracies	Personalist	Party-based	Mil. junta
New regime*mil. aid	0.163**	0.108	0.0274	0.442*
	(0.0529)	(0.130)	(0.195)	(0.198)
Military aid	-0.003	0.108***	0.017+	-0.193
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.165)
New regime	-2.268**	-1.373	0.426	-5.164*
	(0.772)	(1.584)	(2.411)	(2.561)
GDP *per capita*	-0.006	-0.553**	0.142	-0.813**
	(0.098)	(0.176)	(0.102)	(0.252)
Population	0.275***	0.010	0.175***	-0.047
	(0.056)	(0.094)	(0.050)	(0.139)
Phys. int. rights	-0.100**	-0.118***	-0.144***	0.106
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.120)
Coup	0.271*	0.077	0.018	0.099
	(0.118)	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.251)
Election year	0.022	0.010	0.116*	0.255
	(0.046)	(0.095)	(0.053)	(0.215)
Interstate rivalry	0.571**	-0.000	0.0947	1.146**
	(0.183)	(0.162)	(0.093)	(0.431)
Press censorship	-0.043	0.067	-0.108*	-0.190
	(0.069)	(0.113)	(0.043)	(0.335)
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid\ X\ new\ regime}$	0.160**	0.217+	0.044	0.249**
	(0.054)	(0.135)	(0.195)	(0.080)
F-statistic	129.23	5.37	200.69	1.68
Weak ID critical value	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03
N	1375	406	631	115

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A12: 2SLS IV interaction with additional covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
New regime*Military aid	0.097*	0.119*	0.116*	0.098*	0.111*	0.091*	0.123*
	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.054)
Military aid	0.074	0.075	0.079	0.073	0.072	0.070	0.088
	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.076)
New regime	-1.218^{+}	-1.524*	-1.480^{+}	-1.219^{+}	-1.407*	-1.156^{+}	-1.610*
	(0.671)	(0.750)	(0.759)	(0.671)	(0.642)	(0.626)	(0.754)
GDP *per capita*	-0.140	-0.189	-0.155	-0.129	-0.133	-0.122	-0.132
	(0.210)	(0.239)	(0.230)	(0.216)	(0.208)	(0.231)	(0.274)
Population	0.880*	0.863^{+}	0.855^{+}	0.911*	0.882*	0.770^{+}	0.823
	(0.398)	(0.444)	(0.455)	(0.418)	(0.393)	(0.400)	(0.510)
Civil war	1.273***	1.266***	1.296***	1.272***	1.256***	1.287***	1.300***
	(0.149)	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.164)	(0.171)
Phys. int. rights	-0.165***	-0.172***	-0.165***	-0.165***	-0.166***	-0.161***	-0.172***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Interstate rivalry	0.371*	0.359*	0.369*	0.363*	0.362*	0.290^{+}	0.277+
	(0.153)	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.150)	(0.161)
Press censorship	-0.050	-0.047	-0.038	-0.052	-0.044	-0.043	-0.031
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.056)
Coup	0.000	-0.016	-0.001	0.001	0.011	0.012	0.006
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.085)
Election year	0.077**	0.072*	0.082**	0.077**	0.086**	0.066*	0.071*
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Econ. growth		-0.007					-0.005
		(0.004)					(0.006)
Urban pct.			0.005				0.014
			(0.018)				(0.019)
Resource rents				-0.005			-0.008
				(0.012)			(0.013)
US troop presence					-0.019		-0.085
					(0.056)		(0.071)
Mil. exp. per soldier						-0.053	-0.046
						(0.043)	(0.047)
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid\ *\ new\ regime}$	0.171*	0.194*	0.194*	0.170*	0.183*	0.161+	0.211*
	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.102)
Region fixed-effects	✓						✓
F-statistic	40.95	37.51	30.90	41.05	32.42	27.70	18.45
Weak ID critical value	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03
N	3395	3247	3327	3395	3387	3015	2890

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
Country and year fixed-effects included in all models
First-stage results available on request
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

country. For comparison, the marginal effect estimate for U.S. military aid in new regimes is 0.171. Each of the robustness tests in Table A12 yield a marginal effect of similar size.

Using coup probability as a measure of leader vulnerability

The argument presented in the main text predicts that military aid will inflame political violence in recipient countries when the recipient regime has a more tenuous hold on power. This is because military aid serves as a form of insurance for the recipient, and thus exacerbates the

leader's perceived ability to take aggressive coup-proofing actions. I captured this in the main text by examining the effects of military aid on violence in newly-established regimes, and across regime types. Another way to capture the degree of threat felt by a regime is to simply estimate the relative probability of a successful coup. Talmadge (2015) argues that leaders can change their coup-proofing tactics quickly depending on the degree of threat in the moment.

To capture this fleeting, momentary threat, I estimate—for each country-year—the *probability of a successful coup* using a logistic regression containing a variety of coup-relevant covariates to estimate the probability of a *successful* coup (coup data from (Powell and Thyne, 2011)). I then calculate the country mean of each probability, then arriving at the temporary, relative coup threat by subtracting the annual coup probability from the country mean ($Relative\ coup\ threat = Pr(successful\ coup)_{it} - \overline{Pr(successful\ coup)_i}$[1]). Similar to the main text, I estimate the model using 2SLS with an interaction term between the excluded instrument and relative coup threat. Table A13 displays the results, and demonstrates that the marginal effect of military aid is positive as coup threat increases. Figure 4 shows this graphically. When relative coup threat is negative (i.e., when the momentary threat of a coup is lower than the country mean), the marginal effect of U.S. military assistance on domestic terrorism is negative. When the relative coup threat is 0 (i.e., when the temporary coup threat is at the country mean), the effect of military aid on violence is negative and significant (this would correspond to a negative estimate for $\beta_{mil.\ aid}$ in the main models). As coup threat increases relative to the country mean, however, military aid begins to increase the occurrence of domestic attacks. This finding lends additional support to the theory that military aid may generate a moral hazard when provided to insecure governments, causing them to behave in ways that exacerbate political violence.

[1] This approach is adapted from Sudduth (2017)

Table A13: 2SLS IV: Military aid, coup threat, and political violence

	(1) ln_attks
Relative coup threat*Military aid	0.994*
	(0.404)
Military aid	0.017
	(0.052)
Relative coup threat	-10.424*
	(5.258)
GDP *per capita*	-0.140
	(0.169)
Population	1.171***
	(0.320)
Civil war	1.072***
	(0.139)
Phys. int. rights	-0.104***
	(0.022)
Interstate rivalry	0.284*
	(0.132)
Press freedom	-0.063
	(0.048)
Coup	-0.111
	(0.074)
Election year	0.058+
	(0.030)
$\beta_{mil.\ aid}$+ $\beta_{mil.\ aid * coup\ threat}$	1.010*
	(0.409)
F-statistic	25.96
Weak ID critical value	7.03
N	2914

Country and year fixed effects included but not shown
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure 4: Marginal effect of military aid on political violence as the threat of a coup increases

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