Lost in Transmission: Bureaucracy, Noise, and Communication in International Politics

Supplementary Appendix

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1 Document Collection Procedure

The case studies in this paper apply traditional process tracing techniques to analyze international communication processes. As visualized in Figure A1, our model implies four general stages: (1) encoding of a message by country A's leader; (2) broadcast of the message by country A's bureaucracy (or directly by the leader); (3) collection of the message by country B's bureaucracy (or directly by the leader); and (4) decoding/processing of the message by country B's leader and bureaucracy.

Figure A1: A Model of Interstate Communication with Divided Labor



Our theory has two empirical implications: (1) the substantive content of messages can change during the transmission process (i.e., during encoding and broadcast) in country A; and (2) changes to substantive content degrades the accuracy of decision-maker perceptions of leader A's meaning. Demonstrating each implication of our theory requires collection of data on both sides of the signaling process — and at both the leader and bureaucratic level of each country.

In our paired comparison between India-China talks in 1962 and India-Pakistan negotiations in 1965, we collected primary source documents — meeting transcripts, diplomatic cables, memoirs, and government reports — that would help us to draw inferences about each step of the signaling process. These documents fell into two categories. The first were primary sources from the sender and receiver countries themselves. In our case, this was India, China, and Pakistan. For each country, we were interested in documents at both the leader level (Jawaharlal Nehru, Mao Zedong, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Ayub Khan), as well as at the level of their bureaucratic advisers (e.g., Krishna Menon, Zhou Enlai, Y. B. Chavan, and Altaf Gauhar). The second category of documents were primary sources from three major powers — the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States — that had privileged access to the leaders and bureaucrats in the participant countries.

Tables 3a and 3b in the main text summarizes the primary sources that we collected to support our analysis. As illustrated by the tables, our collection process was able to identify multiple document sources for each step of the signaling process. In total, documents in our analysis span archives and document collections released from six countries, including documents that we collected on-site from the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Library in New Delhi. While we do not claim to have collected the full range of documents that may exist in each country, we believe our document collection is exhaustive of presently available records.

2 Excerpts from Key Primary Sources Referenced in Manuscript

We analyzed the documents in our collection drawing on principles outlined in the Annotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI), an approach to qualitative research designed to increase transparency and replicability when qualitatively evaluating documentary records. Below, we provide the surrounding primary source passage from the key documents on which our analysis builds. Unclear characters from archival documents are marked with an asterisk.

2.1 India-China Communications, 1962

CIA Summary of Geneva Talks

Source citation: Central Intelligence Agency *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, April 17, 1987.

Source excerpt: Cooperating with R.K. Nehru, Krishna Menon continued to act on his own initiative and without majority cabinet concurrence. The talks he began with Chen Yi in Geneva in late July had not been discussed with the prime minister prior to Menon's departure for the conference, according to a reliable source. Only after arriving in Geneva did Menon cable Nehru; he received only reluctant approval to talk with Chen coupled with a warning to make no commitments to the Chinese foreign minister.

The approach to Chen Yi was doomed to failure because Menon had no authority to present a new Indian position. He repeated New Delhi's view on Chinese "occupation" of Indian territory, refusing to say whether talks could begin prior to Chinese withdrawals. Chen made no concession, but finally suggested that neither country should call the other an "aggressor." Menon refused to comply on the grounds that he had no authority to issue a joint communique. [...] Following his return to New Delhi on the 25th, Menon recommended that India's 26 July note to China avoid raising the withdrawal precondition for talks. The note in fact avoided the precondition and stated only that "as soon as tensions have eased and an appropriate climate is created," India would be ready to negotiate.

[...]

Despite such opposition, Nehru tried to press forward along Menon's line favoring negotiations, but the Chinese, too, made his progress difficult. They were willing to begin negotiations but, unfortunately for Nehru, they were obsessively concerned with the possibility of Indian duplicity and with avoiding any impression of weakness and without equivocation that there should be no preconditions. [...] Since Nehru found no softening of the Chinese position in Peiping's note of 4 August, he had no choice (given domestic pressure on him) but to note that its tone was "rather disappointing" (speech to Parliament on 6 August).

Memoirs of Arthur Lall, Indian diplomat who accompanied Defence Minister Krishna Menon in talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Geneva

Source citation: Arthur Lall, *The Emergence of Modern India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, 155–158.

Source except: What was needed was a forum for serious negotiations. But for reasons of prestige, neither country was willing to take definitive steps to provide such a forum. However, in the summer of 1962, it appeared that such a forum had fortuitously been found, at least for initial exchanges, on the occasion of the signing of the agreements on Laos at the end of the Geneva conference on Laos in July 1962.

[...]

In Geneva, a series of three very important meetings took place between Chen Yi, Chang Han-fu, and Ch'iao Kuan-hua (until recently foreign minister of China) and, on the other side, Krishna Menon and me. At these meetings there were both cordiality and serious exploration of the border dispute.

[...]

The Chinese soon made it clear to us that they were not thinking of disturbing the McMahon Line (though their large paper claims were in the area). What was important to them was to gain clear title to the territory through which they had modernized the road to Sinkiang. For Krishna Menon and myself the issue was a more delicate one. The Indian government and the Indian public were strongly opposed to the surrender of any territory. But in the Aksai Chin region, where the road was, some deal had to be worked out. The Chinese had already strengthened their position by setting up posts to the west of the road, thereby extending the area in their possession. In the discussions, our strategy was to negotiate with the Chinese an agreement providing that both sides could set up posts in this area as long as they observed the rule that where one side had set up a post the other side would not attempt to set up a post on the same mountain feature. After each morning we sent a telegram to Nehru to be sure we were not putting ourselves out on a limb. At the third meeting Chen Yi informed us that the proposal for intertwining posts was acceptable to them, provided restraint was exercised by each side. This implied that both sides would claim possession of some of the Aksai Chin, and that the territory would have to be divided, leaving the road on the Chinese side. But this would not sit well with Delhi, unless we could show some counteroffer for the territory which would have to be ceded by India. We raised the question of some small adjustment elsewhere along the border, in favor of India. Chen Yi did not reject this suggestion, but no specifics were mentioned.

At the end of the final meeting, Chen Yi surprised us with his proposal that a communique be issued to the press. He suggested the following language: "Two senior Ministers of the Governments of the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of India have met and discussed the border situation between the two countries. These discussions have been constructive and fruitful, and it is in the intention of the two governments that they should lead to further talks in the near future." On the face of it, this brief communique was not only acceptable but to be welcomed. However, in view of the delicacies involved we had to seek instructions from Nehru. We told Chen Yi that we would seek urgent instructions. He understood our position, and the parting was both cordial and hopeful. Alas, sometimes fortune does not favor peace. We were unaware that Nehru was not in Delhi, but somewhere in south India. Our telegram seeking instructions was delaying in reaching him, although the situation was desperately urgent.

[...]

But there was no reply from Nehru before the departures. The day following these departures, a brief reply came from Nehru: "I agree. Issue communique." I tried to contact the Chinese, but it was too late; the constructive proposal in the draft communique, for the continuance of negotiations, was left hanging in the air.

Still, the situation might have been saved, but on Krishna Menon's return to Delhi there as an outcry in the Indian Parliament against his negotiations with Chen Yi. [...] At that point Nehru, already a sick man, denied that there had been any negotiations at all, which was far from the truth. [...]

The Chinese naturally took Nehru's remarks to be a repudiation of the process of negotiation between the two countries. He did not mean to go that far, and after a few weeks he would have come around to a more sensible position; but as we have seen, he was his own foreign minister. If only the parliamentary furor had been handled by another minister, and then, if Nehru, as the head of government, had assessed the effects of the exchange in Parliament, he might have realized, sick man though he was, the urgent need to be conciliatory and to resume negotiations with the Chinese. Unfortunately, negotiations were never resumed, and the groundwork which had been so carefully laid by Krishna Menon and myself at Geneva was washed away.

I am confident that, if there had been another round of discussions with Marshal Chen Yi, armed conflict between India and China could have been averted. [...] In the absence of negotiations, relations between India and China were drifting toward war over the border in the second half of 1962. There is some evidence that by about the middle of August the Chinese decided that the Indians did not mean to negotiate, and that they would have to resort to arms to press their point of view.

Interview of Krishna Menon (Indian Defence Minister) by Michael Brecher

Source citation: Michael Brecher, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*. London: Oxford University Press, 1968, 170.

Source excerpt: B[recher]: If you will forgive me for pressing these points, may I ask what transpired during your conversations two years later in Geneva with the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi? There was a great deal of speculation then.

M[enon]: [...] It was not an organized formal conversation or anything like that. At these conferences people meet. Chen Yi was most anxious to meet me, so I invited him to breakfast. I called on him too. He called on me three or four times. At that time we had not reached the stage when one could have said we were in conflict, though the Chinese were pushing into what they choose now to call 'the line of actual control'!

Cable from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to the PRC Foreign Ministry

Source citation: Note Given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, July 26, 1962, in Bhasin, Avtar Singh ed., *India-China Relations 1947–2000: A Documentary Study*, Vol. 4. New Delhi: Geetika, 2018, doc. 1783

Source excerpt: The Chinese government have, in their note of 21st July, stated that China is not willing to fight with India and the Sino-Indian border question can be settled only through negotiations. The Government of India fully reciprocate this desire for settlement by peaceful negotiations.

[...]

The Government of India are prepared, as soon as the current tensions have eased and the appropriate climate is created, to enter into further discussions on the India-China boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials as contemplated during the meetings of Prime Minster Chou En-lai with the Prime Minister of India in 1960.

Cable from PRC Foreign Ministry to Indian Ministry of External Affairs

Source citation: Note Given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, August 1, 1962, in Bhasin, India-China Relations 1947–2000, Document 1788.

Source excerpt: Following the armed attack on Chinese border post in Chip Chap River valley area in Sinkiang, China, on July 21, 1962, the Indian troops which have intruded into this area have set up a new strongpoint for aggressive purposes [...]. At 14.00 hours on July 27, 14 Indian soldiers from the said strongpoint pressed forward to a place about 700 metres west of the Chinese post and fired two shots at it provocatively. [...] Two more aggressive strongpoints have been established by Indian troops, one in the area south of the Chip Chap valley and the other near the source of the Karakash River both, in Sinkiang, China.

Cable from PRC Foreign Ministry to Indian Ministry of External Affairs

Source citation: Note Given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, August 4, 1962, *India–China Relations*, Document 1791.

Source excerpt: What is particularly grave is that the intruding Indian troops [...] recently again fired provocatively at Chinese frontier guards on two successive occasions. The first occasion took place at around 12.10 hours on July 31, 1962, at which time one shot was fired. The second occasion took place around 20.10 hours on August 1, at which time seven shots were fired. The bullets all struck the site where the Chinese frontier guards were located.

Meeting between P.K. Banerjee (Indian diplomat in Beijing) and Chen Yi

Source citation: P.K. Banerjee, *My Peking Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India.* New York: Clarion Books, 1990, 51–52.

Source excerpt: When I returned to Peking, I received a rather unusual telegram from New Delhi. It had the highest marking for top security and was personally addressed to me. Usually, such a telegram would be addressed in this manner, "P.K. Banerjee from M.J. Desai". This one was unusual in not having the sender's name. The message indicated that I should immediately see Chou and inform him that the Government of India would be prepared to send a ministerial-level delegation to Peking to discuss, without preconditions, all bilateral problems and disputes.

I knew that the Chief of Protocol would not allow me to see Chou at my own request. Nevertheless, I put in my request for an interview with Chou. I was also puzzled that we had changed our policy and were going to negotiate without preconditions. The Government of India had declared many times, up till then, that no negotiation would take place unless the Chinese withdrew to borders as defined by our maps. I therefore sent a similar top security telegram to New Delhi stating that I had requested to see Chou though I had my doubts that this would be granted because of current Chinese protocol and the practice of reciprocity. I did not think that our Indian protocol would allow the Chinese head of Mission to see our Prime Minister. I also asked for a clarification for my own guidance as to when and why our Government had changed our previous conditions for negotiations with the Chinese.

[...]

I sent another telegraph to New Delhi containing China's reply to our proposal but never received a reply. Neither did I ever again hear or see any reference to this exchange of telegrams, in particular about the 'new' proposal. Though I had no evidence, I had a fairly accurate idea as to who was behind the proposal and playing this game.

[...]

On my side, I had difficulty in understanding what was in the minds of our policy-makers, especially in view of the repeated and clear rebuffs and rejections we had received from the Chinese.

Meeting between P.K. Banerjee (Indian diplomat in Beijing) and Zhou Enlai

Source citation: P.K. Banerjee, *My Peking Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India*, 53–54.

On 4 August, just before midnight, I received a message that Prime Minister Chou En-lai would like to receive me within an hour at his residence in the Forbidden City. When I met him, he referred to my discussions with Chen Yi and the latest note of [26] July. He looked tired and agitated. He said that China would agree to meet India and hold such talks but entirely on China's terms. He added that China would reply to India's note accordingly. I asked him if negotiation was not the solution, what did he think would defuse the increasing tension and deteriorating situation? He replied that India should withdraw from Chinese territory and not make further excuses.

[...]

Chou looked more upset. Even in moments of tension, he had been able to joke but not this time. He said that India had not only inherited Britain's imperialistic legacy but had adopted similar imperialistic claims, tactics and attitudes. [...] He even had evidence that American CIA were financing, arming and guiding these heinous anti-Chinese activities. Chou said he though that Mr. Nehru was either not aware or pretended not to know about such activities against China.

[...] He went on to say that it was unfortunate that Mr. Nehru had lost control over his government and the people in India had lost faith in their government. [...]

In the Rajya Sabha: Chinese Incursions in the North, June 20, 1962.

Source citation: In the Rajya Sabha, Chinese Incursions in the North, June 20, 1962, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru [SWJN]*, Second Series, Vol. 77. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2018, Document 396.

Source excerpt: (Nehru) As for the other matters about Ladakh about which the answer has been given, the correspondence itself states the position. It should be realised that there is a particular position where we are making certain advances. It is a game of military chess that is going on in the wide expanses and a few persons, about a dozen or so, come and make a patrol post as it is called or our people go and make a post endangering their positions.

[...]

We are making military preparations too but we would like a settlement. ... However, what I said [at a New Delhi Press Conference on June 13] was not based on any precise fact but an impression I had got that the Chinese would like a settlement. That does not help very much because the kind of settlement that they may like maybe completely objectionable to us. That is a different matter. But I guessed that the mood of the Chinese was in favour of a settlement, which would not involve too considerable a loss of face to them."

To V.K. Krishna Menon: Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting, July 16, 1962

Source citation: *SWJN*, Vol. 77, Document 403.

Source excerpt: I have just received your letter of 15th July. I suppose you have to go to Geneva for the Laos Conference, although the Ladakh situation would indicate your staying on here. I see that the Chinese Foreign Minister is also going to Geneva.

I suppose you will come back soon from Geneva as the meeting is not likely to last long after the signature. You will thus be away from Delhi about four or five days. The sooner you come back, the better.

As for the meeting of the DCC, I do not like the idea of our showing any kind of panic. I do not think a few days' delay should make any difference.

In the Lok Sabha: Ladakh Situation, August 6, 1962.

Source citation: *SWJN*, Vol. 78, Document 401.

Source excerpt: (Nehru) We in India are by our background and temperment peaceful by nature. We earnestly believe in settlement of differences by peaceful discussions and negotiations. The unwarranted Chinese aggression on our territory came, therefor, as a shock and surprise to us. Despite the Chinese aggressive behaviour and the inconsistency between their professions and practice, we still desire to settle our differences with China by peaceful discussions and negotiations.

In the Lok Sabha: India–China Border – II, August 14, 1962.

Source citation: *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vol. 78, Document 405.

Source excerpt: (Nehru) We can increase our capacity to solve it militarily or otherwise. I do think and I am quite right in saying that our capacity to deal with this situation politically and militarily has grown in the last two years or so. Shri Anthony asked me whether our position was better now than a year or two ago. I say it is definitely better both militarily and politically. But, nevertheless, I cannot guarantee."

[...]

Somebody said that we have allowed nine new Chinese posts. That is true, and yet it gives a completely wrong idea of what the position is. If they have got nine posts, we have got 22 or 23 or 24. I do not know how many, three times the number. These posts of theirs are projections, patrol projections of their own posts. They have not gone very far. In fact, it might be said the ever since we got there with our posts, it has been exceedingly difficult for them to advance further.

[...] I sent for the Chinese ambassador here. He was going away. I gave him a farewell lunch. He came to my house. And it was said, 'Oh, see how his relationship with the Chinese is; he has given lunch. That is an advice which I am never going to follow so long as I am in authority. About that I am quite clear. [...] I make it perfectly clear. It is my practice to invite every retiring Ambassador to a meal. This Ambassador was the doyen of the [Indian diplomatic] corps for sometime and I invited him and his wife to a meal. During the meal and afterwards I talked to him about the frontier situation. I did. Why should I be afraid of it? I told him that it was drifting badly and the least he could do was to avoid incidents. He could not settle it with me. I told him that otherwise it would be drifting to war. What effect it had, whether it had any effect on him is a different manner. He has no doubt reported it to his Government. That is a thing which is always done. The Defence Minister went to Geneva where there was also the Chinese Foreign Minister. It was his absolute duty, I told him so, to meet him and talk to him. He could not negotiate. There is no question of any negotiation. At that time some little firing had taken place in the Galwan Valley. I told him that he must tell them that this thing was drifting and if they were not careful there would be war. He did so, quite rightly; he told them this when they met; there is very little time; the only time they

meet in these places is at lunch or dinner. In Geneva he met the Chinese Foreign Minister once at breakfast and once at dinner. The others were present in these meetings.

PRC record of Chen Yi's talks with Indian delegation in Geneva

Source citation: 刘树发 [Liu Shufa], ed., 陈毅年谱 [Chronicle of Chen Yi], Vol. 2 (北京: 人民出版社, 1995)

Source excerpt: 7月22日: 下午，会见出席扩大的日内瓦会议的印度代表团团长、国防部长梅农。

7月23日: 上午，在会见出席扩大的日内瓦会议的印度代表团团长、国防部长梅农。

Instructions to Chen Yi for talks with the Indian delegation in Geneva

Source citation: 力平 [Li Ping] and 马芷荪 [Ma Zhisun], eds., 周恩来年谱, 1949–1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976], Vol. 2 (北京: 中共中央文献出版社, 1997).

Source excerpt: 凌晨，向毛泽东报告印度军队向我进攻的情况。二十三日，起草中央致陈毅并中国参加日内瓦会议代表团电，指出；"中印边界问题是一个长期斗争。现在边界上特别是西段边界上，是一个犬牙交错、长期武装共处的局面。"指示陈毅利用这次日内瓦会议的机会，约见印度国防部长梅农，说明中国政府历来主张谈判解决边界问题，并商定恢复谈判的有关事宜。要陈毅暗示梅农："中印边界问题。只能由中印双方直接会谈来解决。"本月底，再次向毛泽东汇报这一问题。

Summary of meeting between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on the Geneva talks with India

Source citation: 逄先知 [Pang Xianzhi] and 冯惠 [Feng Hui], eds., 毛泽东年谱, 1949–1976 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976], Vol. 5 (北京: 中央文献出版社, 2013).

Source excerpt: 7月22日晨一时半，在中南海菊香书屋听取周恩来报告二十一日印度军队侵入中国新拙奇普恰普河谷地区向中国边防哨所突然发动进攻的情况。本日，中国政府对印军的严重军事挑衅提出强烈抗议。二十三日，周恩来根据同毛泽东商定的内容，起草中央致在瑞士出席日内瓦会议的陈毅并中国代表团的电报。电报指出：应当抓住印度总理尼赫鲁有恢复双方谈判意向的这一时机，约见印度国防部部长梅农，说明恢复谈判是中国政府历来的主张。最好能同梅农商定恢复谈判的手续、时间、地点和人员级别等有关事宜。当晚，毛泽东审阅了这个电报，同意发出。

Details regarding PRC escalation along the Sino-Indian border

Source citation: 姜思毅 [Jiang Siyi] and 李惠 [Li Hui], eds., 中印边境自卫反击作战史 [An operational history of the China-India border counterattack in self-defense] (北京: 军事科学出版社, 1994), p. 470.

Source excerpt: 8月底印军在中国境内部署了100余个据点。其中有9个在东端"麦克马洪线"以北的扯冬地区，有43个设在西段的中国领土上。这些据点，有的距离中国边防哨所正面只有几十米甚至几米远，有的插入中国边防哨所之间，有的甚至插到中国边防哨所后。这一个多月中，对中方开枪挑衅甚至发动武装攻击达16起，中国边防部队始终保持最大克制。印机侵入中国领空达每天平均4架次。

Summary of meeting with Ye Chengzhang (PRC diplomat in New Delhi) on the persistence of strained relations between China and India

Source citation: 与中国驻印度临时代办叶成章的会谈记录 [Record of talks with Chinese Chargé d'Affairs in India Ye Chengzhang], July 2, 1962, in Shen, *Eluosi jiemi dang'an xuanbian: ZhongSu guanxi [Selection of declassified Russian archival documents: Sino-Soviet relations]*

Source excerpt: 叶成章指出，中国使馆和中国外交部原以为，中印之间的紧张关系会迅速平息的。叶成章认为，中印两国间现有这种紧张状态持续相当长一段时间。原因在于：其一，印度政府希望以此来保证自己能够从西方国家得到所需要的援助；其二，印度为自己所设定的目标是：将中国边防巡逻兵从本属中国的领土上排挤出去。叶成章通报，目前中国与印度的贸易和文化交流实际上业已中断，因此中国驻印度使馆人员将压缩到最低编制。他还补充道，前不久全印和平大会主席松杰尔拉特曾得到了中国的邀请，他本人也已同以前住。但印度外交部就是不让他去。

Summary of meeting between R.K. Nehru (Ministry of External Affairs Secretary General) and Pan Zili (PRC ambassador in Beijing), in which India expresses interest in diplomatic talks

Source citation: 与拉. 库. 尼赫鲁谈中印关系问题 [Discussion of Sino-Indian relations with R. K. Nehru], July 5, 1962, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, file 105-01807-01

Source excerpt: 谈到中印关系时，他［印外交部秘书长拉.库.尼赫鲁］表示尼赫鲁总理最近在记者招待会上所谈不反对和平谈判，建议双方在西段阿克塞钦后撤，中国可为和平运输继续使用公路。我［中国驻印大使潘自力］当即指出印方建议实际上是要中国撤出大片自己的领土而印方则几乎不撤，而且建议只适用于西段，不适用于整个边界，这是不公平不合理的，而公路是在我领土以内。他反复辩解说现在不要谈是谁的领土，在该地区存在着军事冲突的危险，为避免此危险应制造和平气氛以便进一步谈判。

[...]

他继续辩称，两国总理在60年不能达成协议才派专家会晤，现在双方的报告尚未做联合审查。尼赫鲁总理想根据事实和平谈判加以解决。现在阿克塞钦地区有冲突危险，故双方应在该*地区后撤，以便讨论整个的边界问题。我说军事冲突的根源主要是印方新建哨所和不断向前推进。打起来对双方都没有好处，而且有可能不会停止在边境。

[...]

他表示希望能在日内瓦见到陈副总理［陈毅］和章副部长［章汉夫］，请我转告。又说他可能很忙，也许能在一些招待会上晤面。

PRC Foreign Ministry to Pan Zili (PRC ambassador in New Delhi) on the possibility for diplomatic negotiations with India

Source citation: 请澄清潘大使与尼赫鲁的谈话 [Requesting clarification on Ambassador Pan's conversation with Nehru], July 15, 1962, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, file 105-01807-01

Source excerpt: 7月13日同尼赫鲁德赛谈话的两电均悉。请澄清两点：（一）尼表示可以官员报告为基础进行讨论时，是否未重提所谓"互撤"的建议？果如此，我对谈判问题似须考虑。（二）你有未向他们指出，加勒万河的严重局势是由于印军切断我哨所的后路而引起的责任，责任在印方?

Pan Zili (PRC ambassador in New Delhi) to PRC Foreign Ministry on the possibility for diplomatic negotiations with India, the mixed nature of India's position, and the opportunity for diplomatic talks in Geneva

Source citation: 外交部收电 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Inbound Cable], July 16, 1962, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, file 105-01807-01

Source excerpt: (1) 在这几天接触中，觉得印度由于经济困难，与中国在政治，军事上陷入僵持状态，与四邻国家关系不佳，内部派别斗争剧烈，特别环绕尼赫鲁继承人问题上斗争紧张。在此情况下，印度似想在中印关系上采取和谈方法松动一下，特别是梅农表现较明显，似考虑如军事冲突失利，对自己的地位将发生严重影响。(2) 印方现在还是两手做法，

一方面表示愿意和谈，另一方面尽量在西段钻空子，向我边境推，多设哨所，占地方，造成既成事实，以便讨价还价。(3) 我方应加强在西段军事斗争，制止印方继续推进，但注意不主动挑起军事冲突。此外亦可考虑增加一些接触，小尼赫鲁已去日内瓦，行前曾*对我说希望见到张副部长。梅农如去日内瓦，我方亦可相机与之接触。尼赫鲁14日离德里，20日返。我们考虑，如我行前再去找梅农，但表现我有些急，目前以不去较好。

PRC Foreign Ministry report on Indian peace initiatives on July 2, 1962

Source citation: 印报评尼赫鲁6月13日的讲话 [Indian newspapers comment on Nehru's June 13th speech], July 2, 1962, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, file 105-01638-01

Source excerpt: 尼赫鲁在6月13日新德里记者招待会上提到中印边界问题时说："我的确认为,我所得到的印象是中国人愿意同印度解决。至于可能会是什么样的解决办法，我说不上。但是他们对于我们目前的关系并不愉快"。对此德里各大报均以头版报道了相关的内容。所用标题是中国想解决边界问题[...]

印度时报德里版主编帕带亚在6月19日的一篇评论中，谈到了美英最近在安理会对克什米尔问题和印向苏联买米格式飞机问题上对印施加压力。

PRC Foreign Ministry report on Indian peace initiatives on August 28, 1962

Source citation: 印度政府在边界谈判问题上的动向 [Trends in the Indian government stance on border negotiations], August 28, 1962, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, file 105-01638-01

Source excerpt: 印度政府8月22日关于谈判边界问题的复照态度恶劣，提出谈判"并不可少的预备步骤"，即规定采取什么措施来"恢复"所谓"近五年来用武力改变了的"边界现状，实际上仍是要我撤退作为谈判的先决条件。这次之印方7月26日照会以及7月间尼赫鲁、梅农与潘大使和陈毅副总理的谈话大大后退了一步。在印方复照前，尼赫鲁8月13日和14日在议会的讲话尽管仍在谈不排除与我进行集中会谈以清除紧张局势和创造谈判的适宜气氛等，但已提到要首先讨论我撤退的问题，否则不可能在官员报告的基础上谈判，调子已经有所转变。

Zhou Enlai assessment of India's willingness to talk and the role of the Geneva talks

Source citation: 关于中印边境自卫反击战的十个问题 [Ten questions on the Sino-Indian border counterattack in self-defense], November 24, 1962, in 刘武生, ed., 周恩来军事文选 [Zhou Enlai's Selected Works on Military Affairs] (北京: 人民出版社, 1997), p. 471.

Source excerpt: 第三个问题，有人问，不打只谈行不行？就是说，不要跟印度打，就是谈谈。它不跟你谈嘛！怎么办呢！我们试验过多次了，不行。

Source citation: Neville Maxwell, "The Afterthoughts of Premier Chou," *The Sunday Times*, London, December 19, 1971.

Source excerpt: I can provide you with a piece of information [about the Sino-Indian dispute]. On July 13, 1962, when our ambassador paid a farewell call on Nehru, Nehru told him our two sides could hold discussions on the basis of the report of the meetings of the officials of the two sides [i.e., renew negotiations]. On July 23, Comrade Chen Yi [then Foreign Minister] who was attending the Geneva Conference on Laos, proposed to Krishna Menon [the Indian Defence Minister] that the ministers of the two sides [i.e. Menon and himself] issue a communiqué in Geneva stating that the two sides would hold negotiations on the prevention of border conflicts. Menon stated that there wasn't enough time to work out such a communiqué in Geneva, that he must immediately return to Delhi and that after he reported to his Government, such a communiqué could be issued by the two governments.

But after Menon returned to Delhi nothing came of it. There must have been some external cause for this—it was not due to Menon himself.

Foreign Minister Chen Yi's assessment and Mao's approval in mid-September 1962

Source citation: 在中共八届十中全会华东组情况简报上的批语 [Comment on the brief by the East Group of the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee], September 1962, Central Committee Archives Research Office, ed., 建国以来毛泽东文稿, Vol. 10. 北京: 中央出版社, 1996, pp. 188–189.

Source excerpt: 其中一件是中共中央办公厅机要室一九六二年九月十六日印发的八届十中全会简报华东组第20号刊登的中共中央政治局委员、国务院副总理兼外交部部长陈毅九月十四日下午在华东组的发言。陈毅说，现在有一股风，叫"三面和一面少"。意思是说我们对美国斗得过分了，对修正主义斗得过分了，对尼赫鲁斗得过分了，要和缓一点。一少，是指我们对亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲支持太多了，要少一点。这种"三和一少"的思想是错误的。大量的事实说明我们同肯尼迪、赫鲁晓夫、尼赫鲁联合战线的斗争是躲不掉的，是非常必要的，但是我们的斗争又都是有分寸、有约束的，不能说已经斗过分了。

Note: the source indicates that Mao encouraged others to read the document describing it as "very good."

2.2 India-Pakistan Communications, 1965

Diary entries by Y. B. Chavan, Indian Minister of Defence (1962-1966), September 12-15, 1965.

Source citation: Pradhan, R.D. 2007. *1965 War: The Inside Story. Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War.* New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2007.

Source excerpt: On 12 September 1965 Chavan recorded: *U Thant has come today. Meet PM at 4 p.m. Meeting with PM at 7 p.m. He told details to me and Sardarji (Swaran Singh, the Foreign Minister) of his talks with U Thant.* U Thant briefed the prime minister about discussions in Rawalpindi. Pakistan Government had admitted that its forces had crossed the Indian territory. They also spelt out conditions for ceasefire. Shastri rejected Pakistan's terms straightaway.

Recollections by C.P. Srivastava, Joint Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office (1964-1966).

Source citation: Srivastava, C.P. *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics.* Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1996.

Source excerpt 1: Shastri was now availing himself of every opportunity and every forum of importance to reiterate India's determination to maintain its territorial integrity and to emphasize the fact that Jammu and Kashmir was part of India. He had already written on these lines specifically to Johnson and Kosygin. The purpose was to tell them in advance that in any future negotiations between India and Pakistan, India's sovereignty over Kashmir would not be negotiable. While both these leaders were promoting a meeting between Shastri and Ayub, neither had written back contesting India's stand. If they had, Shastri would have declined to join any meeting. Clarity on this point was essential to avoid the build-up of pressure.

Source excerpt 2: Back in Delhi he said: "If Pakistan made sincere and honest attempts at Tashkent to settle the problem, there is a chance that both countries can live as peaceful neighbours. But if President Ayub takes a rigid stand, I am afraid an excellent opportunity that has come our way will be lost and the consequences will be dangerous and disastrous."

Source excerpt 3: From this point, Prime Minister Shastri was engaged almost continuously in wide-ranging consultations about the issues likely to come up for discussion in Tashkent. In addition to his cabinet colleagues and other Congress Party leaders, he consulted leaders in opposition. He had detailed personal talks with editors of leading newspapers in New Delhi. He made assessments of the military situation in talks with Chaudhuri and Arjan Singh. He asked Chavan, the defence minister, and Sardar Swaran Singh, the foreign minister, to accompany him to Tashkent. At the official level, the prime minister decided the foreign secretary, C.S. Jha, the home secretary, L.P. Singh, and the vice-chief of the army staff, General P.P. Kumaramangalam were included. The Indian ambassador to the USSR, T.N. Kaul, and the Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, Kewal Singh, were in as well. From the prime minister's secretariat, L.K. Jha and I were included in the party as members of the delegation. Several senior officers of the external affairs and defence ministries—K.S. Bajpai, R. Jaipal, D.R. Khli and others completed the prime minister's team.

Source excerpt 4: The fact was that the Indian delegation had arrived in Tashkent with the draft text of a comprehensive declaration based on India's own ideas. Kosygin's views had also been taken carefully into account. This text had been passed on to Kosygin and to Gromyko and became the basis of their detailed clause-by-clause talks with the Pakistanis. In his long conversations with Ayub, both Kosygin and Gromyko had used all their persuasive abilities to secure his agreement to most of the clauses. Whatever ideas had then emerged for some drafting modifications here and there were passed on by Kosygin and Gromyko to the Indian delegation, often through Ambassador Kaul, who was fluent in Russian. Taking all these comments and suggestions of Kosygin and Gromyko into account, a complete agreement was drafted by C.S. Jha and revised in some important respects by Shastri himself. This draft contained texts on the question of Kashmir which conformed to Shastri's views but which were, at that point in time, wholly unacceptable to Ayub.

Source excerpt 5: Ayub of Pakistan was making his own preparations for Tashkent. He was determined to pursue the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir within a specified period of time. Failing an intermediate agreement on this question, he wanted some "self-executing machinery" to be set up to resolve the Kashmir question. However, from Shastri's numerous pronouncements Ayub knew that India was equally determined to maintain its position that India's sovereignty not negotiable.

Source excerpt 6: According to what Shastri told me, Ayub had not by any means given up Pakistani ambitions over Kashmir. He could not possibly have done that. What Shastri regarded as a breakthrough was, in his judgement, a genuine change of heart on the part of Ayub with regard to the basis on which he would conduct Pakistan's relations with India in future. By Shastri's transparency sincerity and humility as well as by his persuasive manner, which was remarkably effective in one-to-one conversations, Ayub seems to have been convinced that the Bhutto line of hatred, clandestine terrorism, use of force and the threat of a thousand years' war against India was not going to enable Pakistan to seize Kashmir. Ayub knew that the recent war had proved an unmitigated disaster. In this context, it is not difficult to understand why Ayub decided to make a new start on the basis of his unwritten but still genuine personal compact with Shastri.

Letter from Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to the Soviet Premier Alex Kosygin, December 3, 1965.

Source citation: Bhasin, Avtar Singh, ed. *India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007: A Documentary Study.* New Delhi: Geetika, 2012, Document 2237.

Source excerpt: I note that Pakistan is not laying down any conditions to the talks. Nor are we. I have said that certain basic positions of ours in regard to Kashmir and the present armed conflict are well known and in any discussions it will not be possible for us to deviate from such positions. The reaffirmation of our views is not to lay down preconditions but merely to make our position clear. Having said this, however, I would add that at the summit meeting it would be open to the two sides to suggest any matters in the context of the totality of the relations between India and Pakistan. Naturally, as you have pointed out to the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan, who seems to have agreed, in the course of the meeting the two sides will engage themselves in a discussion only of issues agreeable to both. The emphasis on the talks should be on seeking ways and means for establishing amicable relations between India and Pakistan.

Meeting Meetings of the Executive Committee of the Congress Party, January 1, 1966.

Source citation: File 7, Papers of L. B. Shastri, J. Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi.

Source excerpt: The Leader gave a talk on his ensuing visit to Tashkent Conference. He said he fully realized the feelings of the people. It was a good offer extended by the Soviet Leaders that the disputed matters be settled and discussed peacefully by himself and President Ayub Khan. He said India was already ready to discuss and settle the matters with a peaceful approach and had offered 'No-War Pact' to Pakistan. He said that he would listen to them and try to find out some solution to these ticklish problems. Sardar Swaran Singh, Indian Foreign Minister, had gone to the Soviet Union and talked with the Soviet Leaders there. They appreciated India's position and her approach of peaceful co-existence. The Leader made it categorically clear that he would not at all discuss the question of Kashmir or any internal matter. Besides this, there were other matters to be discussed at the Conference, although no specific agenda had been drawn up, like Indo-Pak conflict, withdrawal of armed forces etc. etc. He said that he would judge President Ayub's mind where he really wanted to keep friendship with India ? He said the withdrawal of armed forces could only be undertaken, if Pakistan vacated the area occupied by her in the Chham-Jaurian, Khemkaran and Rajasthan Sectors. So far as the question of withdrawal from the Haji Pir Pas was concerned, it would be on a condition that there would no infiltration from these Passes in the future.[1]

Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, September 11, 1965.

Source citation: *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–1968*, Vol. 25, South Asia, ed. Gabrielle S. Mallon and Louis J. Smith. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000, Document 201.

Source excerpt: Radhakrishnan replied that he personally could see no objection to this suggestion although he did not think that it was possible to agree to the Kashmir adjustments that Pakistan has in mind. Best solution would be changes in present ceasefire line, but even this could not be tackled in present heated atmosphere; no Indian govt could survive that agreed to give up any Kashmir soil under these conditions.

Brief prepared by the British Commonwealth Relations Office for the Secretary of State for the Cabinet meeting on Kashmir, September 12, 1965.

Source citation: Bhasin, Avtar Singh, ed. *India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007: A Documentary Study*, Vol. 2, New Delhi: Geetika, 2012, Document 2202.

[1]Due to Nehru Library restrictions on photocopying or scanning documents, we are unable to provide an original image or scan of this quotation.

Source excerpt: The Indians will claim that their objective is to remove the military threat to Kashmir. They have made it plain, however, that they will not agree to a cease fire without a return to the previous cease fire line and frontiers and without a guarantee from Pakistan that it will not use military force against the cease fire line. This would mean in effect an acceptance by Pakistan that the cease fire line is permanent and unchangeable; they will be giving up their claim for a settlement of the Kashmir problem. The Pakistanis said that they will not stop fighting unless it is agreed that there are negotiations for a final settlement of the Kashmir problem. The line taken by both sides will, of course, depend very much on military developments.

Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, New Delhi, September 21, 1965.

Source citation: *FRUS, 1964–1968*, Vol. 25, Document 221.

Source excerpt 1: India is worried about Chinese, wants nothing from Paks and is anxious to stop present fighting. Therefore it will agree to an immediate cease fire if the Paks will stop shooting at same time.

Source excerpt 2: However Shastri was hesitant to go the whole way. Just as we have shunned summit meetings for which there has been inadequate preparation so he feels confrontation with Ayub Khan in his present mood could not be expected to produce much. Nonetheless Shastri would like to say to the Soviets tomorrow (a) that he accepts in principle but that (b) he would like to carry discussions with Security Council in regard to a settlement somewhat further (c) reserving Kosygin's proposal for a later stage if needed.

Record of a Conversation, November 5, 1965.

Source citation: Record of a Conversation, November 5, 1965, DO 133/180, National Archives, London, UK (UKNA).

Source excerpt 1: Mr. Patel told the Prime Minister that he had been asked by Mr. Shastri to visit Latin America, the United States and Britain in order to explain the Indian case over Kashmir. He said that the Indians were not a war-like people: they were men of peace. But when the infiltrations had started over the Kashmir cease-fire line, at the very moment when the negotiations over the Rann of Kutch were being brough to a successful conclusion, India had felt this to be a stab in the back. This had come after the treacherous Pakistan attitude at the time of the Chinese invasion of India in 1962. At that time Pakistan had lost a great opportunity to win support in India; all that they had to do was for President Ayub to have said, at that time, that whatever the differences between India and Pakistan might be, Pakistan would never add to India's difficulties with China. Tempers were therefore very high in India, although they were cooling; nevertheless, the power of what might be termed "the Russian lobby" should not be underestimated.

Source excerpt 2: What was more difficult for India was, however, the paragraph 4 of the United Nations Resolution about a political settlement. By linking the cease-fire with this paragraph 4 Pakistan was in fact trying to convert a military defeat into a political success. On principle, India thought it quite wrong to encourage military aggression in this way. But there were other difficulties in the way of a political settlement of the Kashmir problem. At the time of the last plebiscite, a hundred thousand people had lost their lives and India wanted no repetition of this. Moreover, if there were to be a large-scale refugee movement, this would have its repercussions on the 50 million Moslems living in India now. Mr. Patel thought that the only solution was a gradual one and in this Britain would have an important role to

play. It was essential that Pakistan should be convinced that India wanted peaceful relations. Furthermore, it was essential that, whatever happened about military supplies, economic aid to India should continue. In this respect, the visit of Mr. Shastri to Washington towards the end of the year would be very important. Mr. Shastri had asked him to tell the Prime Minister that the resentments of the past few weeks were now dying down in India and that Mr. Shastri very much hoped that he would be able to call in on London on his way to Washington.

Meetings with Various Indian Ministers, November 12, 1965.

Source citation: DO 133/181, UKNA.

Source excerpt: During the last week, I have seen a number of key Ministers - Defence, Finance, Agriculture, Broadcasting - and talked with President Radhakrishnan, with the Prime Minister and with Mr. L.K. Jha. A good deal of the talk turned on the Kashmir issue and the problem of future relations with Pakistan. Without exception, the Ministers stated their acceptance of the need to "live with Pakistan." I found no bellicosity and very little resentment. Mrs. Gandhi said she thought Indian public opinion had calmed down a good deal and even though the Moslems were apprehensive, no incidents had occurred.

Indo-Pakistan Relations, January 8, 1966.

Source citation: DO 133/181, UKNA.

Source excerpt: Following the visit of the Minister of External Affairs, Sardar Swaran Singh, to Moscow on 23-24 December (my Summary No. 214), speeches by Indian leaders and press comments indicated that India's approach to the Tashkent meeting would be "flexible." This contrasted with the earlier, more rigid note that the Indians had been striking. On 3 January Mr. Shastri accompanied by Sardar Swaran Singh, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Cavan, the Vice-Chief of Army Staff and senior officials, travelled by air to Tashkent for talks with President Ayub under Russian auspices. The Indian press noted that Mr. Kosygin had also taken a strong team to Tashkent, and interpreted this to mean that the Soviet leader intended to play a more active part in the talks than previously expected. Subsequent Indian press reports from Tashkent have struck a note of subdued optimism. Many well-informed commentators take the view however that little more is likely to emerge from the meeting than minor agreements than minor agreements on the lines indicated by the Indian Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Kaul, at a press conference held on 29 December. Mr. Kaul suggested that the kind of results which could be achieved at Tashkent would be:- (a) Agreement to correct border demarcation between East Pakistan and West Bengal and Assam; (b) an end to the propaganda campaigns by the press and radio of both countries - a mixed committee could be set up for this purpose; (c) normalization of diplomatic relations; (d) resumption of communications and reciprocal authorisation of overflights which have been suspended since hostilities and; (e) normalization of economic relations.

New York to Foreign Office, January 4, 1966.

Source citation: DO 133/181, UKNA.

Source excerpt: A further report on observance of the cease-fire (S/6710/ADD 13 of 30 December) circulated today, refers to a meeting in New Delhi on 15 December at which the Indian Chief of Army Staff informed the Chief Military Observers of UMOGIP and the Chief Officer of UNIPOM of his intention to order a unilateral cessation of firing by all formations

effective 26 December at 17.00 hours, unless actually under attack. The report states that the Pakistan Chief of General Staff agreed on 22 December to take similar action, and in a confirmatory letter of 24 December, stated that Pakistan had had no intention in the past of disturbing the cease-fire except in self-defense and that in view of the Indian decision he would issue fresh orders in order to re-emphasise his stand. Following a message from the Acting Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP to the Indian Vice Chief of Staff expressing regret at a contravention in the Kotli Naushera sector on 27 December, responsibility for which was attributed by Observers in the area to the Indian side, the Indian Vice Chief of Staff undertook to confirm the agreement to issue no-firing orders, and on 29 December Observers on the Indian side reported that no-firing orders had been received "by the respective formations."

Introduction, "Looking Back"

Source citation: Chakravorty, B.C., ed. *History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965.* New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992)

Source excerpt: In the high realm of politico-military interface, the Indian performance was indeed laudable, due mainly to the unique qualities of Lal Bahadur Shastri. There was complete understanding and trust between the civil Govt. and the military establishment. The Home Front stood solidly behind the armed forces, and the civil population identified itself with the war effort to a degree unexcelled before or since then. International diplomacy was handled competently, as evidenced in dealing with China, the USA and the USSR. However, Inter Services cooperation was far from satisfactory. The institutional framework for it was rudimentary, and the situation on the ground left much to be desired. The Indian Navy was given the minimum role in the war. Army-Air cooperation was primitive and ineffective. Many senior army officers had no experience of modern war and a very inadequate appreciation of the potentialities and limitations of air power.

Recollections by Altaf Gauhar, Information Secretary

Source citation: Gauhar, Altaf. *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler.* Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1993.

Source excerpt 1: Ayub had a meeting with his ministers on 31 December, 1965 in Rawalpindi, on the eve of his departure for Tashkent via Kabul. All the ministers were present as were the Governor of West Pakistan, Nawab Kalabagh, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Musa, and the Speaker of the National Assembly, Abdul Jabbar. The only minister absent was Altaf Hussein, who was away in Manila to represent Pakistan at the swearing-in ceremony of President Marcos. Ayub started by saying that he did not know what to expect of Tashkent. The first hurdle would be to get an agreed agenda and that was not going to be easy. The issues of prime importance for Pakistan were, and this was the order in which Ayub listed them: withdrawal of forces, settlement of Kashmir, proportionate reduction of forces, and adoption of a no-war declaration once there was agreement on the first three items. After that a permanent mechanism could be established to resolve other problems. In his judgment, the Indians might agree to withdrawal of forces but would not yield on Kashmir. He asked: Where do we go from there? Should we break all contact with India?

Source excerpt 2: Before Ayub took off from Peshawar for Kabul en route to Tashkent on 1 January 1966, Averell Harriman, US special envoy, called on him and conveyed a message from President Johnson wishing him good luck. Ayub told him that he as going with an open mind: "I don't think much can come out of it. The Indians are in no mood to be reasonable."

Source excerpt 3: Two days after the cease-fire Ayub wrote to Kosygin that a meeting with India in Tashkent would not be productive and urged the Soviet Union to use its influence in the Security Council to adopt "a meaningful resolution that can lead to an honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute."

Source excerpt 4: While he allowed his Foreign Minister to talk about carrying on the war to the bitter end he was being told by his Commander-in-Chief that the Indians were continuing to improve their position in Pakistan territory by violating the cease-fire. For Ayub, Tashkent had become the only hope of military disengagement though there was always the possibility that something might turn up at Tashkent to help resolve the Kashmir problem. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed kept nudging him in that direction.

Source excerpt 5: But Shastri kept talking of his domestic problems and how much he was answerable to public opinion. Ayub's impression was that there was no possibility of Shastri yielding on Kashmir, despite Soviet pressure, but he would probably agree to the withdrawal of forces.

Source excerpt 6: Ayub said that he had gone to Tashkent without any hope that the problem of Kashmir would be resolved, but there was always the possibility that Tashkent might provide an opening for co-existence with India. India might realise the cost of continuing the Kashmir dispute.

Telegram from the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State, Rawalpindi, September 29, 1965.

Source citation: *FRUS 1964–1968*, Vol. 25, Document 226.

Source excerpt: Pres Ayub commented didn't think Indians for their part would actually withdraw, rather, intended stay in positions in Kashmir. Repeated present need is for cooling off arrangement alongside withdrawal. I asked Pres if he meant Indians would refuse withdraw from wrong side cease fire line. He replied, "Not in a hurry. They are diseased people, and I wouldn't put anything past them." I asked Ayub if he considered withdrawal from occupied national territory and from disputed territory (Kashmir) were separate questions. He replied, "Undoubtedly." I asked if he could envisage a phased withdrawal, and he replied, "That might well be so." I suggested Indians might well insist on single continuous procedure. Ayub replied, "That is why I said political and military must be side by side so both parties will know what is intended. After all, political and military aspects are combined and not separate watertight compartments. Without political arrangement India will not give up its military vantage points, and we will not give up our vantage points either." I remarked this could be interpreted by Indians as holding threat of force over any negotiations. Ayub replied GOP should be using that argument. "Said, I wouldn't be a bit surprised if meaning of these Indian cease fire violations is that GOI seeking to preclude political arrangements. Both we and they have to be reasonable." I interjected there must be concessions each side and Ayub agreed. I pointed out this always had been U.S. position and cited 1963 Ministerial discussions this regard. Ayub agreed and observed that with negotiated settlement one can't have all one wants. "That's why one negotiates." I stressed U.S. has no favorite solution Kashmir problem and Ayub replied, "We do hope you will stick to that position. We also hope you realize your objectives cannot be realized on the subcontinent without a settlement, and we hope you will help bring that about."

Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State, Rawalpindi, , September 20, 1965.

Source citation: *FRUS 1964–68*, Vol. 25, Document 217.

Source excerpt: He reaffirmed his deep conviction U.S. must play decisive role in surmounting present crisis and thereafter. Said Russians have been trying to seize settlement initiative, which should and still can belong to U.S. Thought U.S. actions recently have weighed heavily against Pakistan, although he knew it was not always intended that way. U.S. silence and inaction at various critical moments had also hurt. Chinese Communists expressing sympathetic sentiments in crisis which Paks do not want from ChiComs, and which had been expected from U.S. after events of Sept 6. Pak people bound to be somewhat influenced by contrasting ChiCom and Pak [U.S.?] records last two weeks despite their instinctive aversion for Communists. He said "Hindus" with their usual clever trickery and self-righteousness had given ChiComs opportunity to exploit tragic hostilities—opportunity which would never have arisen if Indians had not opened up international aggression for first time two weeks ago. Indians had again put Paks, rather than themselves, on spot with U.S. He regretted it had not been made clear to all before Sept 6 that international aggression was entirely different and more serious thing from clashes in disputed territory of Kashmir resulting from Kashmiri resistance to Indian oppression. If U.S. had warned early that any crossing of international boundary into territory proper of other by either India or Pakistan would not be tolerated, present dangerous opportunity opened up for Chinese Communists would never been created.

Rawalpindi to CRO, November 25, 1965.

Source citation: Folder DO 133/181, UKNA.

Source excerpt: The President was despondent about the Indians. They were in a reckless mood and Mr. Shastri appeared to be as extreme as the majority of Indian leaders. It was said that the Indians were taking their hard line in order to divert the people's attention from international troubles. He did not know about that. He could not see how the Indians could consider Pakistan a threat to them. Why were they raising more divisions? They said their object was to destroy the power of the Pakistan army. This was madness. He said, "I don't say that we have been angels, I admit that, but they are absolutely reckless." Kashmir was not an insoluble problem. There seemed to be no-one to counsel the Indians correctly. He hoped that Mr. Chester Bowles was doing so.

Karachi to CRO, October 25, 1965.

Source citation: Folder DO 133/180, UKNA.

Source excerpt: The Pakistani reading of these indications was that the Indians were not (repeat not) preparing for a peaceful withdrawal and settlement of the Kashmir dispute, but for a "second round." Indian preparations meant that the Pakistanis must also prepare, and they were doing so, while recognising that next time it might not end with the second round, but continue through other rounds until there was a world war.

Karachi to CRO, January 14, 1966.

Source citation: Folder DO 133/181, UKNA.

Source excerpt: Why did Ayub sign? He has been telling us privately for some time that he accepted our advice there could be no real progress on Kashmir until troops had been withdrawn and normal relations with India restored. Having now accepted this position publicly at Tashkent he must believe he is capable of containing resulting discontent at home.

New Delhi to CRO, January 10, 1966.

Source citation: Folder DO 133/181, UKNA.

Source excerpt: It is, however, of some interest that the press today, 8 January, contains a substantial number of photographs of General Bakhtiar Rana and General Harbaksh Singh greeting each other, or in conversation at Amritsar. All the pictures indicate an extremely genial atmosphere. It is not possible to imagine such pictures appearing a month ago. This must be taken to indicate the willingness to ease relationships on the part of the Indian authorities.

Rawalpindi to CRO, January 11, 1966.

Source citation: Folder DO 133/181, UKNA.

Source excerpt: General situation along cease-fire line Gauthier said there had recently been a considerable decline in the number of incidents. He attributed this to further cease-fire orders issued by both sides on 26 December (New York Tel. 8) and to talks under Marambio and at Tashkent.

Telegram from the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State, Rawalpindi, January 19, 1966.

Source citation: *FRUS 1964–68*, Vol. 25, Document 284.

Source excerpt: Pres Ayub said Prime Minister Shastri had realized necessity of peace for both India and Pakistan, and Ayub thought Shastri had also realized need for some resolution of Kashmir dispute. According Ayub, at Tashkent Shastri initially suggested freezing the Sept 23 cease-fire line but Ayub has opposed this as lacking in principle and had emphasized that this and other aspects Indo-Pak relations must be based on recognized principle.

3 Capacity of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs

Table A1: Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 1961–66

	1961–62	1962–63	1963–64	1964–65	1965–66
Number of Missions and Posts	89	88	90	95	96
Total Foreign Service Personnel	2,619	2,795	2,875	2,856	2,285

Source: Archived Annual Reports, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, `https://mealib.nic.in/?2386?005`