Supporting appendix

to the paper

International Conflict, International Security Environment, and Military Coups

(not for publication)

This document presents the results of statistical models that I conducted but, due to space constraints, was not able to report in the paper.

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Variables	Definition/operationalization	Data Source
Interstate Conflict Events		
MID participation	hostility level of dispute $>$ 1 (No militarized action), $t-1$	Revised MID4 data (Gibler, Miller, and Little, 2016)
Force MID	hostility level of dispute $>=$ 4 (Use of force), $t-1$	Revised MID4 data (Gibler, Miller, and Little, 2016)
Fatal MID	fatality level $>$0, $t-1$	Revised MID4 data (Gibler, Miller, and Little, 2016)
ICB crisis	The extent of violence $>$ 1 (No violence), $t-1$	ICB data
Interstate war	dummy for ongoing interstate war, $t-1$	Revised war data (Reiter, Stam, and Horowitz, 2016)
Conflict duration	counter variable beginning at the first year of a MID and ending in the last year that a given country is coded as engaged in a MID involving the use of force.	Revised MID4 data (Gibler, Miller, and Little, 2016)
Interstate Conflict Events		
Interstate relationship	averaged peace scale with neighbors, $t-1$	Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016)
Geopolitical competition	continuous measure of geopolitical competition, $t-1$	Markowitz and Fariss (2017)
Strategic rivalries	dummy for ongoing strategic rivalries, $t-1$	Thompson and Dreyer (2011)
Interstate rivalries	dummy for ongoing interstate rivalries, $t-1$	Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006)
Spatial rivalries	dummy for ongoing spatial rivalries, $t-1$	Thompson and Dreyer (2011)
Territorial claims	dummy for ongoing territorial claim rivalries, $t-1$	ICOW data
Territorial disputes	dummy for ongoing territorial dispute, $t-1$	Huth and Allee (2002) & Gibler and Tir (2014)
Dependent or control variables		
Coup attempt	dummy for coup attempts in a country-year	Powell and Thyne (2011)
Successful coups	dummy for successful coup attempts in a country-year	Powell and Thyne (2011)
Past coups	the number of coup attempts in the last ten years	the author's calculation using Powell and Thyne (2011)
Civil conflict	dummy for ongoing civil conflict, $t-1$	the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002)
Democracy	dummy for democracy , $t-1$	Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013)
GDP per capita	Log-real GDP per capita , $t-1$	Graham and Tucker's (2017) dataset combining the World Development Indicators with from the Penn World Tables.
GDP growth	GDP per capita growth (annual %) , $t-1$ of	Graham and Tucker's (2017) dataset combining the World Development Indicators data with data from the Penn World Tables.
Post-Cold War	dummy for years $>$ 1991	the author's calculation
t	the number of years since the last coup	the author's calculation

Table A1. List of variables.

Variables	Justification for the inclusion
Past coups	Previous studies have documented that coups are more likely to occur in countries with a previous history of coups, a phenomenon called as the "coup trap" (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Belkin and Schofer, 2003).
A cubic polynomial of year since the last coup in the country	The same reason as above and to control for duration dependence (Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 1998).
Civil conflict	civil conflicts may be correlated with coups as well as interstate conflict.
GDP per capita & GDP growth	The level of economic development and economic growth are also known as significant determinants of coups (Kim, 2016; Londregan and Poole, 1990).
Democracy	A country's political regime type is also known as an important factor (Bell, 2016).
Post-Cold War	Western powers began to promote free elections and democracy and became less tolerant of coups since the end of the Cold War (Marinov and Goemans, 2014).

Table A2. Justification for control variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	P50
Interstate relationship	7197	.51	.1	.04	.92	.5
Geopolitical competition	5619	.48	.25	.12	1.17	.6
Strategic rivalry	7945	.37	.48	0	1	0
KGD rivalry	6261	.45	.5	0	1	0
Spatial rivalry	7945	.3	.46	0	1	0
Nonspatial rivalry	7945	.15	.35	0	1	0
Territorial claim	6261	.58	.49	0	1	1
Territorial dispute	7545	.35	.48	0	1	0
MID	7945	.31	.46	0	1	0
Force MID	7945	.26	.44	0	1	0
ICB crisis	7945	.1	.3	0	1	0
Interstate war	7945	.03	.17	0	1	0
Force MID duration	7945	1.69	5.18	0	62	0
Past coups	7945	.05	.12	0	1.1	0
Civil War	7945	.04	.19	0	1	0
Democracy	7945	.48	.5	0	1	0
ln(GDP per capita)	7945	7.88	1.55	3.91	11.98	7.8
GDP growth	7945	3.91	7.15	-59.69	57.82	4.09
Post-Cold War	7945	.46	.5	0	1	0
Military regime	6509	.07	.26	0	1	0
Military spending/soldier	5697	15.83	38.6	-.01	1871.43	5.12
ln(Military personnel	6034	3.35	1.91	0	8.47	3.37
Years since the last coup attempt	7945	18.51	15.71	0	61	14
Years since the last coup attempt (squared)	7945	5.9	8.41	0	37.21	1.96
Years since the last coup attempt (cubed)	7945	2.35	4.48	0	22.7	.27
Years since the last coup	7945	21.01	15.95	0	61	17
Years since the last coup (squared)	7945	6.96	8.83	0	37.21	2.89
Years since the last coup (cubed)	7945	2.81	4.77	0	22.7	.49

Table A3. Summary statistics

Variables	Relationship	Geopolitical competition	Strategic rivalry	KGD rivalry	Spatial rivalry	Nonspatial rivalry	Territorial claim	Territorial dispute
Relationship	1.000							
Geopolitical competition	0.351	1.000						
Strategic rivalry	0.518	0.230	1.000					
KGD rivalry	0.470	0.113	0.446	1.000				
Spatial rivalry	0.384	0.199	0.795	0.339	1.000			
Nonspatial rivalry	0.448	0.153	0.535	0.348	0.103	1.000		
Territorial claim	0.369	0.153	0.433	0.318	0.407	0.203	1.000	
Territorial dispute	0.365	0.158	0.545	0.344	0.473	0.310	0.504	1.000

Table A4. Cross-correlation table

	All coup attempt		Successful coup	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MID	-0.07		-0.33*	
	(0.12)		(0.16)	
ICB crisis		0.01		-0.05
		(0.15)		(0.21)
Past coups	1.89**	1.88**	1.96**	1.89**
	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.37)
Civil War	-0.05	-0.08	-0.56	-0.66
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.41)	(0.42)
Democracy	-0.10	-0.09	0.01	0.03
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.22)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.33**	-0.33**	-0.44**	-0.45**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
GDP growth	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.69**	-0.69**	-0.88**	-0.87**
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Constant	0.24	0.23	0.26	0.22
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.57)	(0.58)
N	7945	7945	7945	7945
Log-Likelihood	-1145.7	-1145.9	-721.9	-723.7

Table A5. Using a indicator for any MID (or any ICB crisis). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt				Successful coup			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MID	-0.04				-0.57^{+}			
	(0.17)				(0.29)			
MID victory	-0.88				0.10			
	(0.79)				(0.77)			
MID defeat	-0.13				-0.05			
	(0.47)				(0.75)			
MID other	0.01				0.38			
	(0.21)				(0.32)			
Force MID		-0.38*				-0.74**		
		(0.16)				(0.28)		
Force MID victory		-1.17				-0.23		
		(1.09)				(1.04)		
Force MID defeat		-0.09				-0.60		
		(0.54)				(1.02)		
Force MID other		0.39^{+}				0.60		
		(0.23)				(0.39)		
ICB crisis			0.01				0.02	
			(0.16)				(0.23)	
ICB crisis victory			0.20				0.03	
			(0.42)				(0.51)	
ICB crisis defeat			-0.70				-1.03	
			(0.67)				(1.02)	
ICB crisis other			-0.54				-1.79^{+}	
			(0.40)				(1.00)	
Interstate war				-0.14				-1.02
				(0.64)				(1.23)
War victory				-0.06				1.27
				(1.21)				(1.51)
War defeat				-0.21				0.57
				(1.01)				(1.59)
War other				...				...
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	7945	7945	7945	7908	7945	7945	7945	7908
Log-Likelihood	-1144.8	-1142.1	-1143.8	-1143.5	-721.2	-719.1	-719.9	-721.6

Table A6. Adding conflict outcomes together. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
MID	-0.05	-0.07	-0.09									
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.18)									
MID victory	-0.87											
	(0.75)											
MID defeat		-0.10										
		(0.49)										
MID other			0.03									
			(0.21)									
Force MID				-0.18	-0.20	-0.43*						
				(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)						
Force MID victory				-1.30								
				(1.05)								
Force MID defeat					-0.11							
					(0.55)							
Force MID other						0.42+						
						(0.22)						
ICB crisis							-0.08	-0.04	-0.01			
							(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)			
ICB crisis victory							0.14					
							(0.37)					
ICB crisis defeat								-0.72				
								(0.61)				
ICB crisis other									-0.55			
									(0.40)			
Interstate war										-0.44	-0.41	-0.20
										(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.38)
War victory										0.20		
										(1.11)		
War defeat											-0.01	
											(0.87)	
War other												...
												...
Constant	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.23
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)
N	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7908
Log-Likelihood	-1144.8	-1145.7	-1145.7	-1143.6	-1144.7	-1142.9	-1145.7	-1145.0	-1144.7	-1145.2	-1145.2	-1143.6

Table A7. Adding separately conflict outcomes to models of coup attempts. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
MID	-0.33^{+}	-0.33^{+}	-0.57*									
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.28)									
MID victory	0.02											
	(0.75)											
MID defeat		-0.10										
		(0.74)										
MID other			0.38									
			(0.32)									
Force MID				-0.41*	-0.41*	-0.78**						
				(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.29)						
Force MID victory				-0.43								
				(1.05)								
Force MID defeat					-0.65							
					(1.03)							
Force MID other						0.62^{+}						
						(0.33)						
ICB crisis							-0.14	-0.10	-0.02			
							(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)			
ICB crisis victory							-0.10					
							(0.53)					
ICB crisis defeat								-1.08				
								(1.02)				
ICB crisis other									-1.81^{+}			
									(1.01)			
Interstate war										-1.06	-0.91	-0.56
										(0.72)	(0.72)	(0.60)
War victory										1.36		
										(1.26)		
War defeat											0.52	
											(1.26)	
War other												...
												...
Constant	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.28	0.27	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.20	0.21
	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)
N	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7945	7908
Log-Likelihood	-721.9	-721.9	-721.2	-721.0	-720.8	-719.3	-723.5	-722.8	-720.6	-722.1	-722.5	-722.0

Table A8. Adding separately conflict outcomes to models of successful coups. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt		Successful coup	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Force MID	-0.33^{+}	-0.13	-0.55**	-0.37*
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Interstate war	-0.26	-0.22	-0.46	-0.38
	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.65)	(0.65)
Force MID duration	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
KGD rivalry	0.50**		0.57**	
	(0.13)		(0.16)	
Territorial dispute		0.32**		0.50**
		(0.11)		(0.14)
Past coups	1.81**	1.77**	1.75**	1.76**
	(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Civil War	-0.02	0.01	-0.58	-0.55
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.41)	(0.38)
Democracy	-0.07	-0.07	0.03	0.05
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.22)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.31**	-0.32**	-0.42**	-0.44**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
GDP growth	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.49**	-0.65**	-0.77**	-0.77**
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.19)
t	-0.18**	-0.18**	-0.10	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)
t^2	0.95**	0.85**	0.44	0.27
	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.46)	(0.33)
t^3	-1.71*	-1.48*	-0.91	-0.45
	(0.75)	(0.61)	(0.84)	(0.56)
Constant	-0.01	0.14	0.00	0.08
	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.60)	(0.56)
N	6261	7545	6261	7545
Log-Likelihood	-1044.41	-1116.72	-645.85	-703.05

Table A9. Using Alternative measures of threat environments. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt	Successful coup
	(1)	(2)
Fatal MID	-0.13	-0.20
	(0.16)	(0.20)
Past coups	1.88**	1.90**
	(0.33)	(0.37)
Civil War	-0.05	-0.64
	(0.21)	(0.42)
Democracy	-0.10	0.03
	(0.19)	(0.22)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.33**	-0.45**
	(0.06)	(0.08)
GDP growth	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.69**	-0.87**
	(0.16)	(0.20)
t	-0.13**	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)
t^2	0.41	0.06
	(0.28)	(0.23)
t^3	-0.52	-0.03
	(0.50)	(0.34)
Constant	0.25	0.24
	(0.43)	(0.58)
N	7945	7945
Log-Likelihood	-1145.57	-723.33

Table A10. Using Fatal MIDs. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt	Successful coup	Military coups
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Major crisis defeat/stalemate (last 5 yrs)	-0.13	-0.12	-0.17
	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.36)
Ongoing major crisis	-0.49	-0.53	-0.18
	(0.38)	(0.58)	(0.52)
Past coups	1.66**	1.80**	2.16**
	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.39)
Civil War	0.03	-0.58	-0.15
	(0.21)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Democracy	-0.03	0.18	0.01
	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.31)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.30**	-0.38**	-0.34**
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)
GDP growth	-0.02+	-0.02	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.60**	-0.76**	-0.91**
	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Constant	0.12	-0.08	-0.47
	(0.45)	(0.59)	(0.60)
N	6150	6150	6150
Log-Likelihood	-922.0	-590.2	-577.2

Table A11. Effect of defeat/stalemate in major international crises. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

White (2017) coded a major international crisis as one if a country experienced an international ICB crisis that ended in defeat or stalemate where the level of violence reached "Serious clashes" or the gravity of the crisis rose to the threat of "Grave damage" or a "threat to existence." He also included interstate wars that ended in stalemate or defeat, according to the COW data, in the coding.

	All coup attempt				Successful coup					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Force MID	-0.18	-0.00	-0.11	-0.09	-0.10	-0.42*	-0.23	-0.33+	-0.34+	-0.31+
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Interstate war	-0.28	-1.01	-0.27	-0.29	-0.36	-0.50	-0.96	-0.48	-0.47	-0.58
	(0.51)	(0.67)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.70)	(0.78)	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.68)
Force MID duration	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Interstate relationship	3.27**					3.63**				
	(0.83)					(1.01)				
Geopolitical competition		1.66**					1.32**			
		(0.38)					(0.49)			
Strategic rivalry			0.40**					0.49**		
			(0.13)					(0.16)		
Spatial rivalry				0.44**					0.50**	
				(0.14)					(0.17)	
Nonspatial rivalry				0.02					0.31	
				(0.17)					(0.22)	
Territorial claim					0.50**					0.56**
					(0.14)					(0.17)
Military spending/soldier	-0.02+	-0.01	-0.02+	-0.02+	-0.02+	-0.04*	-0.06*	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ln(Military personnel	-0.06	-0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Past coups	1.70**	1.36**	1.66**	1.64**	1.72**	1.70**	1.73**	1.63**	1.60**	1.68**
	(0.33)	(0.44)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.51)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Civil War	0.05	-0.06	0.08	0.17	0.19	-0.53	-0.39	-0.48	-0.46	-0.35
	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.39)	(0.59)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.38)
Democracy	0.04	0.39*	0.02	0.01	-0.03	0.20	0.50*	0.18	0.19	0.14
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.22**	-0.30**	-0.23**	-0.24**	-0.25**	-0.35**	-0.40**	-0.36**	-0.37**	-0.38**
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
GDP growth	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.32	-0.20	-0.33	-0.35+	-0.37+	-0.53+	-0.28	-0.52+	-0.53+	-0.58*
	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
t	-0.19**	-0.24**	-0.19**	-0.19**	-0.19**	-0.10	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.10
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
t^2	0.99**	1.23**	0.97**	1.00**	0.97**	0.50	0.55	0.52	0.52	0.50
	(0.36)	(0.43)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)
t^3	-1.74*	-2.07*	-1.71*	-1.75*	-1.69*	-1.00	-1.04	-1.03	-1.03	-0.99
	(0.74)	(0.88)	(0.74)	(0.75)	(0.73)	(0.83)	(0.90)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.84)
Constant	-1.88**	-0.72	-0.25	-0.18	-0.29	-1.90*	-0.60	-0.13	-0.05	-0.12
	(0.69)	(0.71)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.90)	(0.94)	(0.65)	(0.63)	(0.65)
N	5530	4288	5530	5530	5530	5530	4288	5530	5530	5530
Log-Likelihood	-983.35	-731.89	-984.39	-983.23	-982.55	-610.80	-454.89	-610.70	-609.87	-609.95

Table A12. Adding military size and military spending per soldier. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt				Successful coup					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Force MID	-0.16	-0.03	-0.13	-0.11	-0.09	-0.40*	-0.26	-0.36+	-0.37+	-0.28
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Interstate war	-0.32	-1.00	-0.25	-0.26	-0.33	-0.53	-0.95	-0.42	-0.42	-0.54
	(0.52)	(0.68)	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.70)	(0.81)	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.67)
Force MID duration	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Interstate relationship	2.95**					3.53**				
	(0.84)					(0.95)				
Geopolitical competition		1.56**					1.48**			
		(0.36)					(0.44)			
Strategic rivalry			0.33*					0.42**		
			(0.13)					(0.16)		
Spatial rivalry				0.37**					0.44**	
				(0.13)					(0.15)	
Nonspatial rivalry				0.00					0.27	
				(0.16)					(0.21)	
Territorial claim					0.39**					0.49**
					(0.15)					(0.17)
Military regime	0.50**	0.54**	0.47**	0.46**	0.47**	0.68**	0.81**	0.68**	0.68**	0.62**
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Past coups	1.59**	1.24**	1.59**	1.57**	1.68**	1.60**	1.50**	1.56**	1.52**	1.57**
	(0.31)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.52)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Civil War	-0.11	-0.15	-0.11	-0.04	0.04	-0.73+	-0.60	-0.74+	-0.75+	-0.55
	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.40)	(0.60)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.40)
Democracy	0.14	0.50**	0.13	0.12	0.09	0.36+	0.70**	0.37+	0.38+	0.29
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.32**	-0.43**	-0.35**	-0.35**	-0.34**	-0.50**	-0.64**	-0.54**	-0.55**	-0.52**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
GDP growth	-0.01+	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02+	0.00	-0.02+	-0.02+	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.63**	-0.43+	-0.62**	-0.63**	-0.60**	-0.85**	-0.65**	-0.81**	-0.81**	-0.92**
	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.30)
t	-0.16**	-0.20**	-0.16**	-0.16**	-0.16**	-0.09	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
t^2	0.79*	0.99**	0.75*	0.76*	0.80*	0.44	0.29	0.23	0.23	0.44
	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.47)
t^3	-1.38*	-1.61*	-1.30*	-1.33*	-1.46*	-0.90	-0.42	-0.40	-0.40	-0.91
	(0.60)	(0.66)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.69)	(0.74)	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.86)
Constant	-1.44*	-0.03	0.22	0.28	0.00	-1.36+	0.45	0.59	0.64	0.41
	(0.66)	(0.60)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.81)	(0.71)	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.55)
N	6069	4956	6509	6509	5343	6069	4956	6509	6509	5343
Log-Likelihood	-978.12	-745.72	-1008.77	-1007.85	-939.14	-599.85	-461.34	-625.36	-624.46	-573.83

Table A13. Adding military regimes. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt				Successful coup					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Force MID	-0.08	0.12	-0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.22	-0.02	-0.14	-0.15	-0.08
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Interstate war	-0.06	-0.81	-0.04	-0.07	-0.13	-0.04	-0.52	-0.02	-0.03	-0.17
	(0.53)	(0.70)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.64)	(0.75)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.62)
Force MID duration	-0.08**	-0.05	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.16**	-0.11*	-0.13**	-0.14**	-0.13**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Interstate relationship	3.51**					4.34**				
	(0.82)					(1.12)				
Geopolitical competition		1.57**					1.51**			
		(0.38)					(0.47)			
Strategic rivalry			0.40**					0.52**		
			(0.14)					(0.17)		
Spatial rivalry				0.41**					0.47**	
				(0.14)					(0.17)	
Nonspatial rivalry				0.03					0.36	
				(0.19)					(0.27)	
Territorial claim					0.47**					0.62**
					(0.14)					(0.18)
Inequality	1.81**	1.67**	1.76**	1.78**	1.91**	0.88	0.05	0.83	0.82	0.96
	(0.62)	(0.63)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.63)	(0.82)	(0.76)	(0.79)	(0.80)	(0.83)
Inequality (squared)	-0.18**	-0.17*	-0.18**	-0.18**	-0.19**	-0.08	0.00	-0.08	-0.07	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Past coups	1.66**	1.54**	1.60**	1.60**	1.71**	1.61**	1.68**	1.51**	1.50**	1.53**
	(0.35)	(0.50)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.62)	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.48)
Civil War	-0.12	-0.21	-0.07	0.00	0.04	-0.77+	-0.64	-0.69	-0.70	-0.52
	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.44)	(0.73)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.42)
Democracy	-0.01	0.32	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05	0.15	0.44*	0.15	0.16	0.11
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.31**	-0.37**	-0.33**	-0.34**	-0.34**	-0.46**	-0.52**	-0.48**	-0.49**	-0.48**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
GDP growth	-0.02*	-0.00	-0.01+	-0.01+	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.56**	-0.40	-0.59**	-0.61**	-0.58**	-0.77**	-0.62+	-0.78**	-0.80**	-0.91**
	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.30)
t	-0.18**	-0.23**	-0.18**	-0.18**	-0.17**	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
t^2	0.97**	1.23**	0.95**	0.96**	0.89*	0.40	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.35
	(0.36)	(0.43)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.45)
t^3	-1.73*	-2.10*	-1.68*	-1.70*	-1.56*	-0.80	-0.71	-0.79	-0.79	-0.74
	(0.74)	(0.88)	(0.72)	(0.73)	(0.69)	(0.70)	(0.72)	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.80)
Constant	-6.00**	-4.42**	-4.02**	-3.98**	-4.54**	-4.14*	-0.51	-1.72	-1.65	-2.22
	(1.32)	(1.43)	(1.28)	(1.27)	(1.35)	(1.80)	(1.80)	(1.63)	(1.64)	(1.72)
N	5810	4356	5810	5810	5381	5810	4356	5810	5810	5381
Log-Likelihood	-947.34	-699.92	-949.08	-948.47	-925.77	-585.17	-431.78	-585.90	-585.71	-565.64

Table A14. Adding inequality and its squared term. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt				Successful coup					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Force MID	-0.24^{+}	-0.10	-0.14	-0.13	-0.09	-0.47**	-0.23	-0.31^{+}	-0.33^{+}	-0.25
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Interstate war	-0.55	-0.73	-0.39	-0.39	-0.48	-1.11	-1.16	-0.90	-0.91	-1.01
	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.72)	(0.78)	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.68)
Force MID duration	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Interstate relationship	4.57**					5.33**				
	(0.72)					(0.84)				
Geopolitical competition		1.05**					1.00**			
		(0.25)					(0.34)			
Strategic rivalry			0.49**					0.53**		
			(0.12)					(0.15)		
Spatial rivalry				0.49**					0.55**	
				(0.13)					(0.16)	
Nonspatial rivalry				0.18					0.31	
				(0.17)					(0.19)	
Territorial claim					0.52**					0.60**
					(0.14)					(0.18)
Past coups	1.85**	1.76**	1.94**	1.90**	1.90**	2.03**	2.04**	2.11**	2.05**	2.02**
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.29)
t	-0.19**	-0.15**	-0.15**	-0.15**	-0.20**	-0.10^{+}	-0.06	-0.07	-0.07	-0.11^{+}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
t^2	0.89**	0.45	0.40	0.42	0.97**	0.47	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.50
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.43)
t^3	-1.62*	-0.59	-0.56	-0.58	-1.81*	-1.02	0.01	-0.09	-0.09	-1.10
	(0.64)	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.75)	(0.69)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.79)
Constant	-4.62**	-2.77**	-2.44**	-2.43**	-2.49**	-5.80**	-3.62**	-3.25**	-3.26**	-3.31**
	(0.43)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.53)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.24)
N	8284	6458	9059	9059	7323	8284	6458	9059	9059	7323
Log-Likelihood	-1332.24	-1045.63	-1390.91	-1389.68	-1287.10	-846.43	-667.09	-893.70	-891.93	-815.32

Table A15. Excluding most control variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt					Successful coup				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Force MID	-0.10	0.02	-0.09	-0.08	-0.09	-0.32	-0.19	-0.30	-0.32	-0.30
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Interstate war	-0.16	-0.87	-0.17	-0.20	-0.18	-0.35	-0.73	-0.35	-0.41	-0.32
	(0.41)	(0.56)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.65)	(0.79)	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.65)
Force MID duration	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Interstate relationship	5.75**					6.47*				
	(1.98)					(2.77)				
Geopolitical competition		1.09**					1.16*			
		(0.40)					(0.57)			
Strategic rivalry			0.22					0.12		
			(0.23)					(0.32)		
Spatial rivalry				0.20					0.37	
				(0.23)					(0.33)	
Nonspatial rivalry				-0.20					-0.26	
				(0.30)					(0.40)	
Territorial claim					0.42					0.73+
					(0.26)					(0.39)
Past coups	-0.54	-0.45	-0.27	-0.34	-0.44	-0.18	0.27	-0.00	-0.06	-0.24
	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.60)	(0.70)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.61)
Civil War	-0.11	-0.30	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.42	-0.13	-0.37	-0.38	-0.32
	(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.51)	(0.62)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.52)
Democracy	-0.01	0.22	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01	-0.12	0.18	-0.14	-0.13	-0.12
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.59**	-0.91**	-0.70**	-0.72**	-0.60**	-0.57*	-0.87**	-0.77**	-0.78**	-0.67*
	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.27)
GDP growth	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01+	-0.01+	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.81**	-0.84**	-0.91**	-0.92**	-0.79**	-1.19**	-1.18**	-1.28**	-1.27**	-1.31**
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)
t	-0.18**	-0.15**	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.18**	-0.07	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
t^2	1.06**	0.65*	0.54*	0.54*	1.14**	0.55	0.03	0.10	0.13	0.60
	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.42)
t^3	-1.53*	-0.65	-0.54	-0.54	-1.75*	-0.75	0.18	0.07	0.03	-0.76
	(0.64)	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.73)	(0.70)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.80)
N	3681	2992	4009	4009	3271	2849	2397	3143	3143	2518
Log-Likelihood	-841.64	-656.84	-885.20	-885.04	-798.21	-498.00	-390.34	-525.78	-524.97	-467.70

Table A16. Estimating fixed-effects logit models. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt					Successful coup			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Force MID	-0.19	-0.10	-0.17	-0.13	-0.15	-0.29	-0.39*	-0.32^{+}	-0.40*
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Interstate war	-0.29	-0.94	-0.21	-0.32	-0.23	-0.86	-0.41	-0.55	-0.41
	(0.52)	(0.67)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.77)	(0.64)	(0.65)	(0.64)
Force MID duration	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Interstate relationship	3.53**								
	(0.90)								
Geopolitical competition		1.55**				1.38**			
		(0.35)				(0.43)			
Strategic rivalry			0.40**				0.45**		
			(0.14)				(0.15)		
Territorial claim				0.54**				0.62**	
				(0.15)				(0.17)	
Spatial rivalry					0.43**				0.46**
					(0.14)				(0.15)
Nonspatial rivalry					0.02				0.29
					(0.18)				(0.23)
Past coups	1.34*	1.53**	1.49**	1.50**	1.51**	1.84**	1.82**	1.75**	1.79**
	(0.61)	(0.43)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.51)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.38)
Civil War	-0.03	-0.14	-0.03	0.12	0.04	-0.52	-0.62	-0.39	-0.60
	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.58)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.41)
Democracy	-0.06	0.26	-0.11	-0.10	-0.11	0.34	0.02	0.01	0.03
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.33**	-0.34**	-0.36**	-0.35**	-0.37**	-0.45**	-0.44**	-0.43**	-0.45**
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
GDP growth	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.62**	-0.40^{+}	-0.65**	-0.58**	-0.66**	-0.56*	-0.79**	-0.85**	-0.80**
	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.20)
t	-0.18**	-0.16**	-0.13**	-0.18**	-0.13**	-0.05	-0.05	-0.10	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)
t^2	0.92**	0.53	0.39	0.97**	0.40	0.02	0.04	0.46	0.05
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.46)	(0.24)
t^3	-1.60*	-0.66	-0.51	-1.75*	-0.53	0.03	-0.02	-0.94	-0.02
	(0.65)	(0.57)	(0.50)	(0.76)	(0.51)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.86)	(0.35)
Constant	-1.57*	-0.55	0.29	0.10	0.33	-0.61	0.09	-0.10	0.13
	(0.72)	(0.62)	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.82)	(0.56)	(0.59)	(0.55)
N	7197	5619	7945	6261	7945	5619	7945	6261	7945
Log-Likelihood	-1093.17	-841.48	-1138.62	-1042.72	-1137.85	-529.44	-716.99	-644.48	-715.96

Table A17. Estimating random-effects logit models. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

	All coup attempt				Successful coup					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Interstate relationship	1.04					0.87				
	(0.73)					(0.91)				
Geopolitical competition		1.02**					0.68+			
		(0.34)					(0.41)			
Strategic rivalry			0.19+					0.23+		
			(0.11)					(0.13)		
Spatial rivalry				0.24*					0.26+	
				(0.12)					(0.14)	
Nonspatial rivalry				-0.17					-0.03	
				(0.15)					(0.19)	
Territorial claim					0.31*					0.40**
					(0.12)					(0.15)
Past coups	0.97**	0.75	1.01**	1.03**	0.99**	0.87*	0.87	0.85*	0.84*	0.79*
	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.53)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.38)
Civil War	-0.17	-0.31	-0.21	-0.11	-0.10	-0.74+	-0.71	-0.82*	-0.76+	-0.67+
	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.41)	(0.60)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.40)
Democracy	0.21	0.37*	0.16	0.14	0.20	0.33	0.45*	0.30	0.29	0.31
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.18**	-0.22**	-0.20**	-0.21**	-0.20**	-0.26**	-0.30**	-0.29**	-0.30**	-0.29**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
GDP growth	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Cold War	-0.71**	-0.58*	-0.71**	-0.72**	-0.58**	-0.79**	-0.65**	-0.80**	-0.80**	-0.77**
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.27)
t	-0.19**	-0.17**	-0.14**	-0.14**	-0.20**	-0.12*	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07	-0.12+
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
t^2	1.02**	0.64+	0.53+	0.52+	1.08**	0.60	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.60
	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.43)
t^3	-1.58**	-0.70	-0.60	-0.58	-1.72*	-1.05	-0.03	-0.11	-0.11	-1.05
	(0.59)	(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.74)	(0.66)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.78)
Constant	-0.95+	-0.78	-0.39	-0.33	-0.51	-1.00	-0.88	-0.53	-0.48	-0.60
	(0.57)	(0.60)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.75)	(0.84)	(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.58)
Force MID										
Interstate war										
Force MID duration										
N	3818	3145	4170	4170	3379	3818	3145	4170	4170	3379
Log-Likelihood	-1016.91	-791.35	-1058.71	-1057.63	-967.52	-641.15	-500.55	-671.25	-670.96	-605.57

Table A18. Only countries having experienced coups. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

Figure B1. Annual probability of coup attempts by external threat type. The vertical line segments associated with each dot present the 95% confidence intervals. Hostile relation and geopolitical competition is originally a continuous measure. Thus, "Yes" indicates their values being greater than their means, and "No" means being lower than their means. Prolonged MID is a binary indicator for whether conflict duration is longer than four years (the 90th percentile of the variable) or not.

Figure B1 examines the bivariate relationship between each measure of external threats and the unconditional probability of coup attempts: The top graphs look at immediate and acute threats posed by militarized conflict or interstate wars, while the bottom graphs look at sustained and chronic threats driven by the structural external environment. The figure presents prima facie evidence that the two types of external threats differently affect coups. Ongoing militarized conflict does not significantly affect coup risk, and interstate wars or prolonged MIDs reduce it. Contrarily, hostile security environments consistently heighten coup propensity regardless of how I measure the international security environment.

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