Appendix to "The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits"

Standard Stories and Social Network Analysis

"The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits" engages with Charles Tilly's notion of standard stories in two ways. However, due to space constraints, we could not fully develop his argument in the main manuscript. Standard stories are "the sequential, explanatory recounting of connected, self-propelled people and events" (1999:257). They typically "start with a limited number of interacting characters, individual or collective… [who possess] specific motives, capacities, and resources" (1999:257). The story is set in motion and the actors "follow… rules of plausibility and produce effects on others that likewise follow… rules of plausibility" (1999:257). The effects of these actions are linked to some outcome and the story is complete.

The problems with standard stories are at least threefold. First, as Tilly notes, standard stories tend to posit very simple cause-effect relationships. "[They] ignore the intricate webs of cause and effect that actually produce human social life" (2008a:21) and "omit a large number of likely causes, necessary conditions, and especially, competing explanations of whatever happened… [omitting] indirect, incremental interactive, unintended, [and] collective" factors (2008b:70). The standard story therefore belies the complexity of social and political interactions embedded in social structures. Second, standard stories tend to over-privilege dispositional accounts of action. "[Stories] treat characters as independent, conscious, and self-motivated" (1999); "[they] trot out a few actors whose dispositions and actions cause everything that happens within a limited time and place" (2008a:21). Finally, individuals have a tendency to fit their thinking and past experiences into coherent sequential narratives that posit these relatively straightforward accounts. "Indeed, humans are so good at making sense of social processes after the fact by means of standard stories that skilled interviewers must spend much of their energy prodding, checking, looking for discrepancies, and then reconstructing the accounts their respondents offer them" (1999:258). In sum, standard stories maintain the following elements: "1) limiting number of interacting characters; 2) limited time and space; 3) independent, conscious, self-motivated actions; and 4) with the exception of externally

generated accidents, all actions resulting from previous actions by the characters" (1999:261). And, as Tilly argues, these stories may "work that way, but on the whole social processes do not" (1999:261). Social life typically falls into the realm of nonstory, replete with interactive, indirect, and relational causes (1999:262).

These problems with standard stories manifest for both participants in policy-making, such as a peace summit negotiations, as well as analysts of those negotiations. With respect to the former, and as mentioned in the paper, one critique of oral history and interviewing methods is that they fall prey to precisely these three problems. Even if participants attempt to downplay their own importance and causal effect, there may be a tendency to represent complex outcomes in straightforward causal structures. Indeed, this may be largely unavoidable from the participant's perspective based on how the human brain categorizes information. In other words, by piecing together actors, events, dispositions, etc. into a coherent narrative, complex relationships, indirect causes, and contexts give way to relatively simple sequential stories. In such cases, actors no doubt *believe* that the narrative they have constructed is a valid representation of reality, but the belief is based on a coherent story in the mind.

This brings us to the problem of analysis. Standard stories privilege dispositional accounts of conscious actors taking meaningful and purposeful actions. Operating under such a framework, the analyst simply needs to "look inside the head" of an actor to see what was going on at the moment of action. This is "smoking gun" evidence in an analysis where actions are actor-driven and dispositions matter quite a bit. The problem with this is not that dispositions do not matter or that uncovering what actors were thinking at the time is irrelevant, but that other factors that are often outside of an actor's control, or do not affect beliefs that reside in the mind, matter a great deal as well. Therefore, smoking gun evidence of a belief in the mind only provides an account of the standard story, which is likely highly implausible to begin with. As such, a purely actor-centric dispositional account which privileges the beliefs of actors in their analysis causes us to miss significant sources of causation. This is not to say that we do not think that actor accounts are not worthwhile; indeed, we use them ourselves in the paper, but that a fuller explanation should include both dispositional and relational accounts.

Given these problems with standard stories, our relatively limited aim is to problematize the standard story of peace summits by bringing in some of the factors that make the story more complex, by taking the relations and interactions of the actors seriously. For example, we problematize the Telhami standard story by pointing out, as Tilly (1999:266) suggests, "the existence of social processes, configurations, or outcomes for which available standard stories offer implausible explanations, demonstrably false explanations, contradictory explanations, or no explanations at all and for which coherent sociological explanations exist." In Telhami's case, the standard story of power and interests motivating purposeful behavior among the actors at Camp David 1 cannot be used to also explain very different behaviors in Camp David 2. To improve upon this explanation, we bring in a relational component that moves the explanation slightly more toward what Jackson and Nexon (2013) term a "social-relational" family of international theory from the more standard story "choice-theoretic" family or theory. That is, whereas Telhami's choice-theoretic account focuses on a relatively limited number of actors who have dispositions that are affected by the context (i.e. balance of power) and the cause-effect relationship is straightforward, our more social-relational account focuses on the positions of particular actors in the negotiation setting and views the structure of interpersonal relations (particularly the position of the mediator vis-à-vis disputants) affecting what the actors say, do, and decide. The choice-theoretic and social-relational families are ideal-types and our theory shares many characteristics of both. The aim is to produce a more satisfying and convincing explanation of the summits while creating a transposable theory of relations that is generalizable beyond a single case or two. The drawback of this approach is that there is not necessarily "smoking gun" evidence one can point to, such as belief or statement in the mind of an actor, but that, in some ways, is precisely the point. Relations, not just dispositions and beliefs, matter.

In the end, we essentially combine the dispositional, actor-centered account with a new social relational perspective.[1] This, we argue, allows us to see causation in the

[1] We are not the first to do this. Indeed recent work combining psychology and social network analysis has sought to combine dispositions and relations in a very systematic way. One such area of research, triadic closure and psychology, involves empathy directly. Triadic closure refers to the tendency for transitivity to

network and relations of actors that the traditional standard story has missed, such as the importance of position in the network and the ability to build relational empathy. This combination of disposition and relations might also be congruent with the way Tilly himself suggested improving upon standard stories. As Lynn Eden (2008:1) argues, "a more dispositional—or, more precisely, actor-centered—account is not inconsistent after all with Tilly's deep orientation, at least not inconsistent with his later writings." As we discuss below, combining psychological principles with network analysis is one way that researchers are making inroads with the search for causation in complex social environments.

Observable Indicators of Empathy, Deception Issues, and Future Research

There is a large and thriving literature on empathy in the psychology discipline. In addition to outlining the causal effects of empathy on a variety of outcomes, from financial negotiations to patient health in a clinical setting, over the last several years there has been significant attention paid to how to *observationally measure* empathy and empathic interactions, as well as how to conceptualize the relationship between empathy and deception.

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occur in social networks (originally described by Simmel, more recently in Granovetter 1973; Coleman 1990). This suggests that "[i]ndividuals may benefit from cooperative relations, and hence that individuals may choose new acquaintances among their friends' friends" (Estrada and Arrigo 2014:1). To use a simplified example, if A and B are friends, and B and C are friends, triadic closure suggests that a new social relation between A and C may be created, thus "closing" the triangle of nodes in the network. Recent work suggests that those who are *perceived* as being highly empathic possess a greater ability to forge social ties relative to those who are perceived as being less empathic (Kleinbaum et al. 2015). Driving this is the simple notion that "[e]mpathic people make others feel understood in their company… [f]eeling as if one's perspectives and feelings are understood by someone else is thought to make people feel 'that they are worthy of respect, of being heard, and that their feelings and behaviors make sense,' providing a sound basis for an interpersonal relationship" (Kleinbaum et al. 2015:3, inner citation to Greenberg et al. 2001:382-383). The upshot of this is that triadic closure in networks is predicted "if the addition of a new link *enhances* significantly the communication between the nodes," or "the new link is added because of the highly *empathic* relations existing between the nodes" (Estrada and Arrigo 2014:3). For example, in CD1 a close friend of Begin who worked for him beginning in 1977, characterized the relationship between Sadat and Begin as a very special one that would grow over time, with Begin eventually referring to Sadat as a friend (Hurwitz 2004:176-177). Yehuda Avner, Begin's ministerial advisor argues (2010:535) that this was not diplomacy-speak but rather represented a "genuine liking," a stark change from the early days of the Summit.

By combining survey measures and self-reports with theoretically-deduced observable indicators of empathy, researchers can correlate, and provide a causal mechanism for, the link between observable empathy and empathy outcomes. For example, one study (Montague et al. 2013) analyzed videotaped interactions between doctor/patient and then asked patients how empathic the doctor seemed, why they felt that way, and so forth. The study showed that responses could be predicted based on specific behavioral indicators of empathy, such as eye gaze and length of eye contact. Other observable indicators, such as facial and behavioral mimicry (behavior synchrony), also reveal empathy. Individuals who possess high levels of trait empathy demonstrate high levels of mimicry of the emotional facial expressions of others (cf. Sonnby-Borgstrom 2002; Sonnby-Borgstrom, Jonsson, & Svensson, 2003; Harrison et al. 2010).

An additional area of research concerns deception in face-to-face interactions. Since empathic capacity is a signaling tool that allows leaders to sort good-faith negotiators from bad-faith ones, exploitation and deception are potential risks. Given the significance leaders intuitively attach to empathic signals, it is entirely possible for a well-trained or experienced-leader to project empathy insincerely. Indeed, the value-neutral nature of empathy (versus sympathy) implies that highly empathic leaders may use their ability for entirely non-cooperative purposes. We argue deception might be of a greater concern in some instances versus others. The capacity to detect deception is a manifestation of emotional and social intelligence (cf. O'Sullivan 2005:237). This type of intelligence refers to the ability to understand one's own, and others', emotional states and the capacity to successfully navigate social relationships. Indeed, the best individuals at detecting deception are those that score highly on emotional intelligence measures and consequently are able to interpret non-verbal cues accurately (ibid:248). Interestingly, some studies suggest that successful leaders in general possess high levels of emotional intelligence (Goleman 2002). All of this suggests that there is variation in deception detection and there is reason to believe that leaders, all else being equal, may be in a better position than most to pick up on it. At the policy level, the best recommendation for states engaged in a summit is to deploy their most empathic, and emotionally intelligent, leaders to the negotiating table.

In reviewing the psychological evidence, we believe that the dangers of deception and use of empathic capacity to enact bad-faith intentions are most acute when the following conditions are present. First, the existence of leaders or mediators who arrive to the summit in bad-faith (i.e. those who try to squeeze concessions out of the other side not in order to get an agreement but only to embarrass the other side, see how far they are willing to go, or reach an agreement only to cheat at the implementation stage) who are high on empathic capacity so that they are skillful to know how to use empathy, who recognize the value of their skills to get desirable results, and who face good-faith leaders who cannot detect his or her deception. Under these conditions, all else being equal, bad-faith negotiators or mediators may be particularly problematic for cooperation and the success of summits.

Bringing these strands of insights together, future research can propel empathy research forward by examining both visual and linguistic indicators of conveyed empathy. For instance, a particularly promising research design would be one where face-to-face negotiations were available in two forms: video presentation and transcript. Coding of behavior indicators and linguistic markers would allow researchers to create a measurement of conveyed empathy of each of the actors and build upon the theory and hypotheses that have been tested in this paper. While peace summits are typically characterized by their behind-closed-doors nature, this is not true of many other types of negotiations, such as those that occur in Track 1.5 diplomacy initiatives or other institutional settings, where workshops and other mediated interactions are commonplace. Evaluating the causal effects of relational empathy in lower level negotiations will likely yield more and better observational evidence with which to work and thereby generate theoretical improvements in explaining high-level negotiations between leaders. Similarly, the use of interviews or oral histories of decision-makers right after leaving the negotiation room would be invaluable. Scholars able to get access to decision-makers in the moments after a negotiation will be able to gather important data that might well be lost, either forgotten or believed to be irrelevant, as time progresses. This information is also, at least theoretically, less susceptible to post-hoc rationalization and fitting into a linear "standard story" than information gathered well after the event in

question has taken place. This type of data-gathering will ultimately make it easier to ground theory about the role of face-to-face dynamics in concrete discursive evidence.

Triangulation Strategy

Our empirical approach necessarily engages with the question of how trustworthy post-hoc narratives, where the ultimate outcome has long since been determined, and coherence may be imposed in order to craft a causal "standard story" (Tilly 1999), should be viewed. We deal with this in two ways. First, we adopt a position, dominant in historiography, of "scholarly skepticism" (Ritchie 2014:118) when dealing with oral history. As Ritchie notes, skepticism is crucial but "does not justify a blanket dismissal of the memories and opinions of the bulk of participants in the actual events" (2014:22). To not take what the actors have to say seriously is to be in the uncomfortable methodological position of having to argue that the interpretation of events on the ground by actors involved are not relevant. We argue instead that they should be viewed as a source of data. And, as we discuss in the paper, we find that the actors' self-assessments of their summit performances are remarkably forthcoming about their own inadequacies and mistakes they made, as well as mistakes that others (even superiors) made, both in post-hoc interviews as well as contemporaneous memoirs and diaries. Though we do note the difficulty of only having available limited materials written contemporaneously (essentially what was written down at the time), which makes causal inference difficult to the limitations of what actors reported at the time. With respect to memoirs and diaries in particular, we argue, following Bennett and Elman (2007:183) that these can be useful data sources when appropriate attention is paid to motivation and potential bias.

As we elaborate below, these documents are often highly nuanced, self-critical, and above all, often resist the urge for a simple narrative in favor of highlighting the latent uncertainty and relative chaos of the negotiations themselves. When used as part of a triangulation strategy we believe that the bias problem can be successfully minimized. Finally, we attempt to supplement what actors say regarding their dispositions and beliefs

with an analysis of the relations, interactions, and contexts in which action takes place, since causal forces may be at work of which actors are unaware.

Piecing together evidence that points to the emergence of relational empathy is difficult. The reason relates to relationalism's overarching perspective. As Tilly suggests in critiquing the actor-centric model, and others in IR have argued, the notion that we can explain action by looking inside the heads of individuals right before they perform an action is unsatisfying (Nexon 2010:102; Krebs and Jackson 2007). Yet, this is precisely the type of evidence we normally look for in diplomatic studies, the "smoking gun" from memoirs, meeting minutes, or contemporaneous diaries. Such evidence is more compelling for establishing the existence or lack of empathy from a social neuroscientific perspective, such as in the dyads or between the mediator and each of the disputants; it is less satisfying when it comes to relational analyses where the product is often the process. As such, the task before us is a difficult one. We therefore use a plausibility probe as a first cut at understanding a potential causal pathway that is evidenced in dispositions and relations. In some cases, a new type of social relationship between the two rivals may emerge based on their new understanding of the other. Indicators of successful relational empathy may be interactional and include variation in discourse between the protagonists—for example, going from non-conciliatory to conciliatory language. Evidence of a continued lack of understanding, such as recurring proposals that the other side finds unacceptable, continued use of language that conveys the lack of a social relationship between the two disputants, or conveying antipathy, would indicate that the mediator has been unsuccessful at building relational empathy. Because these types of indicators also correlate with traditional bargaining success or failure, discourse analysis focused on the importance, or lack thereof, of empathy becomes crucial in disaggregating evidence of our causal mechanism from evidence of alternate arguments.

By triangulation strategy we therefore refer not only to the method of using multiple sources for comparison purposes, but also to what Deborah Larson (2001:343) refers to as an assessment of the document's "historic, situational, and communication contexts." This is a version of Alexander George's (1973) dictum that "requires… each document be evaluated relative to what is known about the actors, their intentions, their

interactions, and the situation they found themselves in" (Thies 2002:357). This requires placing the memoir or other document within the greater social context and set of relationships in which it was created. In the cases we are interested in finding evidence of the causal mechanism and observable behavioral implications of the theory. To that end, we first look for co-variation between behavioral and verbal indicators of the mediator's empathic capacity (or lack thereof) and others' perceptions of good-faith/bad-faith intentions received through expressive behaviors during the negotiations. We then examine the effects of the mediator's ability to convey empathic capacity toward both participants on their decisions to continue or end the negotiations, highlighting divergence between observable implications of our theory against implications of traditional bargaining models.

Additional Camp David Counter-Explanations

Before turning to counter-explanations of the two summits, two important points are necessary. First, in the paper we focus on cases of mediated summits where there was an opportunity for a mediator to build empathy between protagonists who could not build it themselves. We therefore do not examine a case of protagonists building empathy with each other directly in this paper. Second, various factors suggest that CD2 was more likely to succeed than CD1. First, CD2 featured unprecedented concessions from a left-wing Israeli PM, whereas CD1 featured a right wing PM who was perceived as hawkish and stubborn. Second, unlike CD1, the United States was the sole superpower capable of pressuring both sides to reach an agreement at CD2. Third, while Carter and Clinton staked political capital in pursuing agreement, Clinton was at the end of his presidency and presumably highly motivated to achieve success before leaving office. Fourth, unlike CD1, Israel and the PLO had a history of successful negotiations; members of both delegations had known each other prior to CD2. Finally, with CD2 the costs of non-agreement were high for *both* Israelis and Palestinians. These are important points to keep in mind when comparing the two summits.

As mentioned in the paper, there are several counter-explanations for Camp David 1. Recalling the discussion in the paper, the U.S. had three main issues that it sought to resolve: Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist, Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories stemming from the Six-Day War of 1967 (including the West Bank and Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula), and an undivided Jerusalem (Carter 2003; Wright 2014). Due to space constraints we could not engage with one of the more prevalent explanations in the literature, specifically the "costly signal" of Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, which many interpret as a strong Egyptian signal that they were ready to negotiate and move towards peace. As we elaborate here, we are skeptical of this reading for several reasons. First, the speech was not received particularly positively by leaders in Israel. For instance, Begin said at the time: "This is an ultimatum" (Morris 2001:453). Weizman wrote, "The words surprised me by their intransigence. There was a menacing undertone I didn't like." Weizman passed a note to Dayan that stated, "We have to prepare for war" (Weizman 1981:32-33). Dayan reflected that Sadat's speech was a long list of "Noes," or the "things he and Egypt would not do" (Dayan 1981:81). Weizman notes at dinner later that night the mood was unpleasant; Weizman likened it to having just returned from a funeral (Weizman 1981:56). The speech was not received overly favorably by American leaders either. In the words of Vance, the speech had failed "to produce the basic shifts in Israeli… positions that [Sadat] was seeking" (Vance 1983:195). Sadat may have been attempting to send a signal with the trip, but neither the Israelis nor the Americans received it in the way Sadat intended. Finally, Carter's reservations about the success of the summit belies the notion that Sadat's trip made a peace agreement inevitable. As Brzezinski (1985:254) records, "on the eve of the summit, Carter confided to me for the first time his sense of uneasiness about the prospects for success."

Further, as mentioned in the paper, if unilateral conciliatory gestures and costly signals revealed preferences in such a way that agreement could be reached, then it is difficult to explain why the early negotiations between Sadat and Begin were particularly unproductive and Carter needed to separate the two parties. Carter observed that the "atmosphere between the two [leaders] is not conducive to any agreement" (Carter

1995:367), "the chemistry was so unworkable that each meeting became less and less promising, and more and more explosive (Rosenbaum and Ugrinsky 1994:155). The protocols of Camp David thus suggest that contrary to conventional wisdom, the costly signaling of Sadat's Jerusalem trip does not adequately explain the outcome of the summit.

It is also important to note that the agreement at CD1 was not without its problems. Linking the return of Sinai to Egypt with the creation of a large demilitarized zone essentially enlarged the pie such that both sides could attain beneficial outcomes – more security for Israel and the return of territory for Egypt. Important problems remained, however. Begin was furious to see East Jerusalem described as a "conquered territory" and instructed his delegation to "pack our bags and go home without another word." The Americans changed the letter only slightly, but before delivering it to Begin engaged in the gesture of signing the photograph of the grandchildren. Similarly, one key shortcoming was that Carter did not confirm in writing Begin's prolonged freeze on settlements in the West Bank and Gaza promise.

Moving to Camp David 2, some have argued that the parties entered into the negotiations knowing fully well that the summit would fail. Thus, leaders' interaction during the summit could not have had an independent causal role. We believe that this reading is misleading. As Kenneth Stein (1999) has argued with respect to CD1, "[u]nder the auspices of an American president, the prize for succeeding was much greater than the price for failing." We argue the same is true for CD2. Barak, Arafat and Clinton had much to gain by finding a compromise, and as we note earlier they all "lost" as a result of the failed summit. More specifically, some have suggested that rather than Arafat, it was Barak who never wanted to reach an agreement. Rather, his goal in the negotiations was to "unmask" Arafat and reveal to the world that the Palestinian leader had no interest in reaching a long lasting peace agreement with the Jewish State. This alternative explanation has received much attention in various post-mortems on CD2. Significantly, in an interview with Barak after the summit, Barak himself hinted that this was his goal in the negotiations all along. If this was indeed Barak's strategy, some may argue that it

was a rational way to lead world leaders to question Arafat's intentions toward the peace process, as well as to demonstrate his value as a leader of the Palestinian people.

We argue, however, that this explanation suffers from two significant limitations. First, as scholars and members of the delegations pointed out, the notion that the summit was a sham, designed to show Arafat's deceptive intentions, only came up after the summit had failed and Barak was accused of offering unprecedented concessions without reaching an agreement. Barak's self-proclaimed goal thus seems as a post-hoc justification for the failed summit. Indeed, there is no evidence from participants from any of the delegation that support Barak's assertion, either because it was not true or because they were not in on the secret intention.

Second, and more importantly, even if Barak's intentions were not to reach an agreement and simply "unmask" Arafat, this perspective sheds little light on how he was able to achieve this goal. What is required to get from "intentions" to "outcome" is an explanation about the interaction during the summit itself. Conveyed apathy during the negotiations, we argue, provides an important casual mechanism. There are two plausible versions of how empathy affected the negotiations. According to one interpretation, even when Barak offered generous concessions, his expressive behavior and the type of concessions he was willing to offer signaled to Arafat and members of the Palestinian delegation that he was not genuinely interested in a peace agreement, leading them to reject these concessions and viewing the summit as it actually was, "a trap." Leaving money of the table, consequently, allowed Barak to claim the he successfully "unmasked" the adversary. In this interpretation, Barak's lack of empathy was calculated, designed to instill doubt in the minds of the other side, while he appeared to negotiate in good-faith in terms of making unprecedented concessions. According to an alternative interpretation, Barak was simply unwilling or incapable to convey empathy to members of the Palestinian delegation, and this (unintended) aspect of his behavior affected the inferences others drew about the significance of his concessions. Regardless of which of these interpretations one chooses to adopt, both point to the role of lack of empathy as a key mechanism connecting Barak's bad faith intentions and the failed outcome of the summit.

Additional Relevant Literatures

Due to space constraints in the main text we were unable to include several important references related to the theoretical section of the paper. Here we will discuss some of the issues that require more space for discussion:

The Neuroscience of Empathy: Recent neuroscientific imaging studies suggest that while different brain areas process affective and cognitive empathy, the two are connected, involve significant overlap, and implicate an array of brain regions. Differentiating between affective and cognitive therefore is more of an organizing heuristic than strict dichotomy (Decety 2011). Additionally, empathy has a strong emotional component. While there is disagreement regarding whether empathy constitutes a discrete emotion, emotion is implicated in its functioning. Decety (2011), a leader in studying empathy from a social neuroscientific perspective, suggests we should model empathy as a construct that includes "bottom-up processing of affective arousal, emotion awareness and understanding," combined with "top-down processing in which the perceiver's motivation, memories, intentions, and attitudes influence the extent of an empathic experience." This model combines the affective and cognitive without reducing empathy to either of those ideal-types.

Face-to-Face Interactions and IR: The notion that face-to-face interactions can reveal intentions is not new. Goffman's 1950s work suggests that such interactions are particularly important to social life because they provide unusual glimpses to the "backstage," the area where secrets and intentions normally reside. Social interactions provide direct opportunities for individuals to both guide the impression that they are giving off on the "frontstage," while allowing one to gain glimpses into the backstage in order to determine true intentions and motivations. These glimpses happen for two reasons, as modern psychology and neuroscience research confirms. First, individuals slip-up and provide insight into their sincere thoughts and feelings even if they do not want to. Second, individuals find it difficult to control their facial expressions, which tend to reveal true feelings. Indeed, some expressive behaviors, such as microexpressions, are

virtually uncontrollable. In diplomatic negotiations, this provides the self with an ability to understand if the other is sincere in their positions as well as whether they are at the negotiating table in good faith or not. Thus, face-to-face interactions become the source of not just a signaled intention, but what Jervis (1970) terms an "index," due to the inherent credibility attached to the uncontrollable signal.

Emotions and IR: With respect to emotion scholarship in international politics, there has been a proliferation in recent years. Bleiker and Hutchison (2008, 2014) provide a recent review of the literature. Particularly important for our purposes is the link between emotion and relations/practices (cf. Bially-Mattern 2011) as well as empathy (cf. Mercer 2014; Crawford 2014) and the neuroscientific findings that continue to refine our understanding the link between affect, emotions, and empathy (cf. Jeffery 2014).

Sympathy vs. Empathy: Related to emotions and the affective, there has been significant attention paid recently to the sympathy/empathy distinction that we make in the paper. Our conceptualization is borrowed from neuropsychology (Decety 2011; Burton 2015), where anatomical and processing distinctions help to differentiate concepts, though we recognize that colloquially empathy and sympathy are often not separated by a bright line but rather may blur together.

Perspective-taking vs. Empathy: Empathy is closely related to perspective-taking. (Decety et al. 2013). Empathy, however, does not necessarily require conscious exercise, as most conceptualizations of perspective-taking and usage in experimental settings (i.e. "Put yourself in the shoes of a high ranking official") do, though it may certainly include it. Similarly, some individuals can take the perspective of others without empathizing with them and different neural substrates are engaged in each activity. See Decety et al. 2013 for more development of this discussion.

Empathy and the Security Dilemma: There has been a significant amount of work linking empathy to security and, in particular, the security dilemma. As Lebow (2005:42) argues, "empathy… encourages us to see others as our ontological equals and to recognize the self-actualizing benefits of close relationships with others." Conversely, White (1966) argues that a lack of empathy can contribute to the creation of "the

diabolical enemy-image," fueling war. This is not to say that creating empathy is simple, easy, or a foolproof method for solving all conflicts. On this point see: Booth and Wheeler 2008; Head 2012; Toros 2012; Baker 2014. There are various other strands of research in IR linking empathy to security, broadly understood, including feminist approaches (cf. Sylvester 1994; Sjoberg 2006), reconciliation theory (cf. Cameron 2011; Hutchison and Bleiker 2008; Bleiker and Hutchison 2013), and the nature of sovereignty in the international system (cf. Zarakol 2008). Neta Crawford (2014) has relatedly argued that empathy can also be scaled up beyond the individual level of analysis, which is our concern here, to the institutional level, increasing its relevance for scholars who study the politics of international organizations (IOs).

Empathy and Negotiation Biases: One of the critical reasons why empathy is required for successful negotiations is that without it negotiators often suffer from "negotiation myopia" (Mansbridge and Martin 2013:73), which manifests when individuals are unable to see ways that sharing information and thinking together can result in creative problem-solving since they are focused on their own self-serving interests. The negotiation literature notes that because negotiations are often characterized by uncertainty, a number of biases and heuristics often manifest. For instance, the anchor effect refers to the tendency of first offers to have a strong pull throughout the negotiation, even with experienced or expert negotiators. Empathy lessens the effect because negotiators understand the interests of their negotiating partners and therefore understand their reservation price or best-alternative-to-negotiated-agreement (BATNA). Empathy allows negotiators to focus on the information that may imply a value that is far removed from the first offer, negating the effect of the anchor. Another bias that empathy helps to minimize is the self-serving fairness bias, the tendency for negotiators to believe that what is beneficial to them is also fair. This can lead to impasses since both sides in the negotiation will believe that their interests are fair. By taking the interests and positions of the other into account through empathy, this bias is reduced because negotiators actively assess fairness dyadically rather than monadically. Finally, the fixed-pie or zero-sum perception bias leads negotiators to believe that the negotiation is over a fixed value of resources, where in reality this is often incorrect since

negotiator interests are typically not diametrically opposed. The strongest form of this is the incompatibility bias where negotiators believe that their interests are not compatible and therefore agreement is impossible despite the possibility of an objectively beneficial outcome for both. Empathy minimizes this perceptual bias by causing negotiators to consider the interests of others and find creative ways to satisfy both parties' interests. See, for example: Drolet, Larrick, and Morris 1998; Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin and White 2008; Trötschel et al. 2011.

There is also an important distinction between fixed-pie and expanded-pie negotiations mentioned above. This distinction is sometimes referred to as value-claiming and value-creating which is best captured by Lax and Sebenius (1986:32). With value-claiming negotiators, "start high, concede slowly, exaggerate the value of concessions, minimize the benefits of the other's concessions, conceal information, argue forcefully on behalf of principles that imply favorable settlements, make commitments to accept only highly favorable agreements, and be willing to outwait the other fellow." In contrast, value-creating is characterized by an effort to find ways to increase the amount, or number, of beneficial goods that can be divided, thereby increasing the size of the pie and increasing the chance that both sides will be able to benefit (a "win-win" solution). Value-creating is also often characterized as cooperative problem-solving. See also: Galinsky et al. 2008.

Role of Conveyed Empathy in Health Outcomes: Empathy has also been studied in the medical field because of the understanding that a physician conveying empathy for the patient not only is perceived as possessing a more positive "bedside manner," but medical outcomes, such as duration of the common cold, improve when empathy is present as well. See, for example, Hojat et al. 2011; Rakel et al. 2011; Neumann et al. 2007.

Relationalism References: Loïc Wacquant (1992:15) sums up the perspective succinctly. The "stuff of social reality – of action no less than structure, and their intersection as history – lies in relations." In IR this "relational turn" has been prolific in recent years (cf. Nexon 2010 for an overview, and Jackson and Nexon 1999; Tilly 2003;

Bially Mattern 2004; Goddard 2006; Sending and Neumann 2006; Jackson 2006; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Nexon and Wright 2007; Pouliot 2008; Goddard 2009; Nexon 2009; Bially Mattern 2011; Montgomery Forthcoming for recent exemplars).

Additional Work on Psychology and Nature of Negotiations in the Peace Process: There has been a significant amount of attention paid to psychological principles involved in the Middle East peace process, both in terms to the lead-up to CD1/CD2 as well as more generally between participants on both sides. See, for example, Aronoff 2014; Eisenberg and Caplan 2010; Indyk 2009; Kelman 1982; Kelman 1986; Kelman 1987; Kelman 2007; Kurtzer et al. 2008; Kurtzer et al. 2013; Miller 2005; Miller 2008; Saunders 1991; Stein 1982; Stein 1989.

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