Appendix: The Determinants of Insurgent Gender Governance

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[1] All models included in appendix include country level and decade fixed effects

Table A: Determinants of Change Gender Status Quo: Models 1 and 2

	Dependent variable:	
	Change Gender Status Quo	
	(1)	(2)
Challenge Combined	0.364***	
	(0.108)	
Pure Challenge		0.275
		(0.165)
Partial Challenge		0.388***
		(0.114)
No Contact	−0.226**	−0.230**
	(0.113)	(0.114)
Leftist	0.149	0.167
	(0.119)	(0.122)
Islamist	0.218	0.231
	(0.158)	(0.160)
Secessionist	−0.033	−0.036
	(0.099)	(0.100)
Female Participants	0.238**	0.232**
	(0.107)	(0.107)
Territorial Control	−0.051	−0.051
	(0.086)	(0.087)
Foreign Support	0.014	0.006
	(0.089)	(0.090)
Rebel Strength	−0.289**	−0.307**
	(0.144)	(0.146)
Constant	0.181	0.197
	(0.198)	(0.200)
Observations	105	105
R^2	0.674	0.677
Adjusted R^2	0.523	0.520
Residual Std. Error	0.342 (df = 71)	0.344 (df = 70)
F Statistic	4.456*** (df = 33; 71)	4.311*** (df = 34; 70)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B: Determinants of Gender Governance Extent: Models 3 and 4

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Governance Extent	
	(1)	(2)
Challenge Combined	1.659**	
	(0.676)	
Pure Challenge		1.980*
		(1.031)
Partial Challenge		1.573**
		(0.711)
No Contact	−0.039	−0.025
	(0.707)	(0.712)
Leftist	1.300*	1.238
	(0.744)	(0.764)
Islamist	2.805***	2.760***
	(0.985)	(0.997)
Secessionist	0.467	0.479
	(0.618)	(0.622)
Female Participants	1.665**	1.687**
	(0.664)	(0.670)
Territorial Control	0.373	0.372
	(0.539)	(0.542)
Foreign Support	0.204	0.233
	(0.557)	(0.565)
Rebel Strength	0.821	0.883
	(0.897)	(0.915)
Constant	−0.879	−0.933
	(1.234)	(1.249)
Observations	105	105
R^2	0.641	0.641
Adjusted R^2	0.473	0.467
Residual Std. Error	2.134 (df = 71)	2.147 (df = 70)
F Statistic	3.834*** (df = 33; 71)	3.683*** (df = 34; 70)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C: Determinants of Change Gender Status Quo: Logit Models

	Dependent variable:	
	Change Gender Status Quo	
	(1)	(2)
Challenge Combined	3.094**	
	(1.431)	
Pure Challenge		2.660
		(2.209)
Partial Challenge		3.251**
		(1.594)
No Contact	−3.270*	−3.187*
	(1.754)	(1.777)
Leftist	1.141	1.184
	(1.487)	(1.497)
Islamist	2.536	2.472
	(2.579)	(2.583)
Secessionist	−0.793	−0.825
	(1.360)	(1.374)
Female Participants	3.415*	3.402*
	(1.870)	(1.842)
Territorial Control	−1.300	−1.253
	(1.262)	(1.272)
Foreign Support	−0.784	−0.780
	(1.314)	(1.310)
Rebel Strength	−2.184	−2.377
	(2.001)	(2.157)
Constant	−1.546	−1.440
	(2.417)	(2.445)
Observations	105	105
Log Likelihood	−20.595	−20.562
Akaike Inf. Crit.	109.189	111.125
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table D: Determinants of Reinforce Gender Status Quo

	Dependent variable:
	Reinforce Status Quo
Cooperate	0.159**
	(0.078)
No Contact	0.042
	(0.085)
Leftist	−0.027
	(0.086)
Islamist	0.039
	(0.114)
Secessionist	−0.018
	(0.071)
Female Participants	−0.0001
	(0.077)
Territorial Control	−0.047
	(0.062)
Foreign Support	−0.022
	(0.064)
Rebel Strength	0.244**
	(0.104)
Constant	−0.070
	(0.157)
Observations	105
R^2	0.476
Adjusted R^2	0.233
Residual Std. Error	0.246 (df = 71)
F Statistic	1.955*** (df = 33; 71)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E: Determinants of Change Gender Status Quo: Removing No Contact groups

	Dependent variable:		
	Change Gender Status Quo		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Challenge Combined	0.340**		
	(0.135)		
Pure Challenge		0.204	
		(0.215)	
Partial Challenge		0.369**	
		(0.140)	
Cooperate			−0.340**
			(0.135)
Leftist	0.178	0.221	0.178
	(0.166)	(0.175)	(0.166)
Islamist	0.258	0.255	0.258
	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.217)
Secessionist	−0.078	−0.080	−0.078
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Female Participants	0.307*	0.271	0.307*
	(0.165)	(0.172)	(0.165)
Territorial Control	−0.087	−0.073	−0.087
	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.121)
Foreign Support	−0.135	−0.149	−0.135
	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.134)
Rebel Strength	−0.232	−0.258	−0.232
	(0.196)	(0.200)	(0.196)
Constant	0.278	0.311	0.618**
	(0.243)	(0.247)	(0.271)
Observations	69	69	69
R^2	0.683	0.688	0.683
Adjusted R^2	0.432	0.427	0.432
Residual Std. Error	0.373 (df = 38)	0.374 (df = 37)	0.373 (df = 38)
F Statistic	2.723*** (df = 30; 38)	2.633*** (df = 31; 37)	2.723*** (df = 30; 38)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Supplementary Material

In this manuscript I use my original 'Gender and Rebel Governance Dataset', the first dataset to systematically document rebel group regulation of civilian gender customs. Using a sample of 137 African rebel groups fighting in civil conflicts between 1950 and 2019, I record rebel group interventions on marriage, divorce, inheritance and domestic violence, as well as rules on dress and female civilian participation in public life. I also use my original 'Rebel Approach to Local Elites' Dataset, the first dataset to document rebel group interactions with traditional leaders.

My data collection relied on desk-based research, particularly secondary case histories that detail civil wars, rebel organizations and the use of gendered governance strategies by armed groups. Other sources include historical documents produced by rebel groups themselves, reports from NGOs such as International Crisis Group and the Clingendael Institute, local and international news sources, policy briefs, ethnographic research, qualitative database codebooks and secondary interviews.

I eventually collected data on 19 separate strategies of insurgent gender governance covering the spheres of marriage, divorce, domestic violence, inheritance, freedom of movement, as well as specific roles for men and women. Every category of intervention is assigned a binary measure which documents its presence or absence. As part of this process, I also amalgamated the 19 gender governance variables into a binary *Change Gender Status Quo* variable as well an additive index entitled *Gender Governance Extent*.

Coding procedures: Al-Shabaab

The following section provides an overview of how I coded each variable using the example of al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is well documented for its extensive provision of Insurgent Gender Governance. This included extensive governance regarding gender roles. For example, Al-Shabaab forced women to wear a specific type of robe called a Jilbaab made of heavy black fabric and arrested women for wearing colorful Somali dresses (Speckhard and Shajkovci 2019; Donnelly 2019, 89–90). The group also banned women from wearing bras, using tampons, going to hair salons or using bleaching creams (Donnelly 2019). Men were required to have short hair and banned from having moustaches (Donnelly, 2019, pp. 89–90). These rules are often enforced with brutal punishments including beatings and jail time (Stern 2020).

The group also banned women from travelling without a male escort who was a relative (a mahram), forbid women from operating businesses or engaging in small sales activities (Donnelly 2019; Stern 2020) and declared women were "not allowed to loiter in public" (Donnelly 2019). Interactions between men and women were also restricted (Donnelly 2019). The group was therefore assigned a '1' on *Restrict Female Freedom of Movement*, and a '1' on *Dress Code*.

There is evidence that women are highly involved in al-Shabaab in non-combatant roles including recruitment, fundraising and smuggling weapons (International Crisis Group 2019; Donnelly 2019; Stern 2019), although they only occasionally participate in combat (International Crisis Group 2019; Loken and Matfess 2022a). Beyond these supportive roles, there are many reports of female civilians being given roles in civilian governance structures. Stern (2019) reports that the organization has a women's police group which is run by women themselves and plays a crucial role in investigating women for al-Shabaab courts. Reports also document that woman, including "engaged women supporters", are involved in the shadow subnational administrative units (waliyats), who go door to door and organize lectures and discussions for neighborhood women (International Crisis Group 2019). I therefore give the group a '1' on *Women in civilian governance*.

The group is also well known for its extensive regulation of civilian marriage. Donnelly describes how the group banned traditional wedding ceremonies (2019, 90) and bride price, placing limits on how a marriage could be celebrated by banning the slaughtering of a camel for the event (Donnelly 2019, 107). As one interviewee described how the group removed "all the traditional burdens such as paying camel, bringing many vehicles…marriage was as a result made easy and simple" (Donnelly 2019, 107). The group also got rid of parental consent in marriage, with Donnelly reporting that "one of the most common sentiments voiced by interview participants about Al-Shabaab's marriage system was that it broke with tradition and was problematic, in particular because of the lack of parental consent" (Donnelly 2019, 108). As one former member explained, "it is cheaper for them to marry under the rule of the group. The group tells parents not to make marriages to the group expensive." (Stern 2019). Importantly, these "cheap marriages" were required for all marriages and weddings in Kismayo, not just for Al-Shabaab members.

The group is also documented as financing wedding costs for members (Stern 2020). However, there is no evidence that they do so for civilians. The group also kept records on civilian marriage status (Donnelly 2019, 105) with al-Shabaab courts issuing divorce letters which are recognized by the government (Stern 2020). The group would therefore be given a "1' on *Restrict Wedding Ceremonies*, '1' on *Limit Wedding Costs*, '1' on *Limit Bride Price or Dowry*, a '1' on *Oppose Parental Consent*, '1' on *Keep Marriage Records*. However, the group is given a '0' on *Finance Wedding Costs* as there is no evidence that they did this for civilians.

The group is widely reported as forcing civilians into marriage (Stern 2019; Donnelly 2019; Benstead and Van Lehman 2021), with the level of force ranging from abduction to more subtle coercion (Stern 2020). The group even annulled existing marriages in order to do so, with one former combatant explaining "you cannot refuse your daughter to be married to al-Shabaab" (Stern 2019). The group reportedly encouraged polygamy (Donnelly 2019, 106) and also used

marriage as strategy to infiltrate local populations, with one interviewee explaining that "in order to increase their supporters they married many women hailing from different clans" (Donnelly 2019, 114). Many of the women who marry al-Shabaab members are under the age of 18 – with some as young as 12. There is no evidence of a minimum age requirement. The group therefore would be given a '1' for *Force Civilians into Marriage* a '1' for *Marry Local Strategy*, a '0' for *Minimum Age Enforce*, a '0' for *Female Consent Enforce* and a '0' on *Polygamy Oppose*.

With regard to legal discrimination against women, it is notable that women are able to initiate divorce in al-Shabaab's courts and that the group's clerics are willing to grant divorce when men fail to provide for their wives as well as in cases of abandonment and domestic abuse (Stern 2020; International Crisis Group 2019). The justice system is often seen as favorable compared to the status quo. As one interviewee explained "you remember also that Somalis were not good in giving women their share of the inheritance. Under Al-Shabaab, all these rules have changed. They give them their fair share of the inheritance… It was really different from other periods" (Donnelly 2019, 101). Another interviewee explained: "Al-Shabaab's courts offer women the sole means of getting their just due from ex-husbands or male relatives" (International Crisis Group 2019). However, there is no evidence that the group distributed land to women. The group is given a '1' for *Improve Divorce Rights* and a '0' for *Distribute Land to Women*.

Studies also show domestic violence is disapproved of by the organization (International Crisis Group 2019), particularly where a woman has shown herself able to bear children (Khadija and Harley 2019). Some women are said to support al-Shabaab's justice system, because it provides more justice for women on issues of domestic violence. For example, survey results reported by Stern (2020) note that, "multiple interviewees noted that AS (al-Shabaab) courts generally dole out capital sentences for perpetrators of gender-based violence and rape, while FGS (state) courts have often declined to punish similar crimes" (The Stabilisation Network 2018; Stern 2020). Interestingly, although not captured in the database, reports document that female genital

mutilation (FGM) is not practiced in al-Shabaab territory, with the tradition viewed as a "barbaric superstition from Somalia's history" (Khadija and Harley 2019). The group also implemented harsh punishments for adultery, with reports of women stoned to death by al-Shabaab for adultery (Stern 2020; Bwire 2019). The group is given a '1' for *Ban Adultery* , a '1' for *Domestic Violence Punish*. Al-Shabaab would therefore be assigned a '1' on *Change Gender Status Quo*. The group is given a score of 13 for *Gender Governance Extent*.

Finally, I assessed the group's approach to Local Elites, classifying the group as 'Partial Challenge'. As discussed in Chapter 2, the group's leadership was initially planning to completely destroy the traditional leadership in an attempt to transform Somali society. In reality they assassinated some, while others decided to flee the area. Those who stayed had their responsibilities eroded (Skjelderup, 2020) while those who fled were replaced by the group's own "bush elders" who exerted less legitimacy and authority over the local population. At the same time, however, the organization did utilize some existing leaders for tax collection efforts, ultimately deciding to keep the overall system of elders in place rather than destroy it all together (Skjelderup, 2020).

Challenges and Potential Limitations

This process is what Hoover, Green and Cohen (2021) and Loken and Matfess (2022a) label as "desk research", data which is collected and coded from existing secondary sources and does not require direct contact between researchers and participants. This offers the ethical benefit of not relying on the emotional labor of victims, perpetrators and witnesses of political violence (Hoover Green and Cohen 2021). At the same time, desk data are inevitably "very rough measures of complex phenomena" (ibid) and rely on secondary sources which have the potential to contain their own inaccuracies or gaps. Some rebel groups have been the subject of extensive scholarly

research, yet at the same time these rebels may have incentives to manipulate information (Hoover Green and Cohen 2021) or exaggerate the success or nature of their Insurgent Gender Governance programs. Other groups are less well studied, meaning that their use of Insurgent Gender Governance may go underreported.

My datasets therefore reflect the visibility of Insurgent Gender Governance and Approach to Local Elites in available sources rather capturing all instances of these phenomena. In line with these challenges, the collection of reliable time-series data on these topics is not currently feasible, as available sources frequently lack specificity regarding variation over time.

Due to the nature of this data, I will not be able to make confident causal claims based on my quantitative results alone (Gerzso and Riedl 2024). I therefore choose to use a mixed-method approach, which allows me to trace the causal process in a particular time and place while representing broader patterns through statistical analysis (Gerzso and Riedl 2024). Triangulating my findings using qualitative case studies allows me to draw stronger conclusions regarding my mechanisms as well as trace the main mechanisms of competing theories at a micro level.