APPENDIX 1

Construction of Cross-National Data on Revolutionary Episodes

A CENTRAL EMPIRICAL strategy of this study was the creation of a cross-national dataset on revolutionary episodes for understanding global patterns of revolutionary contention since 1900 and the structural forces that have shaped these trends. I defined a revolutionary episode as a mass siege of an established government by its own population with the aim of displacing the incumbent regime and substantially altering the political or social order—irrespective of whether the opposition successfully gained power.

To identify possible episodes that fit this definition, a team of research assistants and I scoured a large variety of sources. In all, eight published encyclopedias,[1] nine existing global datasets on wars, civil wars, ethnic conflict, and instances of nonviolent resistance,[2] nine online encyclopedias and databases of conflict events,[3] and all files of Keesing's *World News Archive* from

1. These included Minahan 2002; Ness 2009; Phillips and Axelrod 2005; Creveld 1996; Colby 1908; Kohn 1999; Goldstone 1998b; and various editions of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (including the classic 1910–11 edition).

2. These were: Correlates of War Dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010); Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson 2015); Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009); the "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War" dataset (Fearon and Laitin 2003); Minorities at Risk Dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009); Political Instability Task Force Dataset (Goldstone et al. 2010); Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes Dataset (Chenoweth and Shay 2020); Uppsala Conflict Dataset (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015); and the "From Empire to Nation-State" Dataset (Wimmer and Min 2006).

3. These included: Armed Conflict Events Database (https://www.onwar.com/#gsc.tab=0); Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project (https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/); Global Nonviolent Action Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/); GlobalSecurity.org (https://www.globalsecurity.org/); International Center on Nonviolent

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1931 to the present were examined in their entirety. Moreover, 135 other occasional sources (newspapers, websites, and online encyclopedias) and over eight hundred scholarly books and articles were consulted on specific episodes in order to identify whether an episode qualified for inclusion. The sources consulted for each episode are documented in the full dataset available from the author. (Unless directly cited in the book, they are not represented in this book's references.)

Short narratives were composed on each potential case, and at weekly meetings of the research team, each episode was discussed to determine whether it met the criteria of the definition and should be included in the dataset. In all we identified 345 episodes. (For a full listing of the episodes, see Appendix 2.) Episodes that fell close to but short of the definition for one reason or another (as detailed below) were tracked (131 cases in all). A list of these cases and the reasons why each was rejected are included in the full dataset.

To ensure the mass character of revolutionary episodes and to distinguish them from terrorist actions, coups d'état, and small armed mutinies, I required that each revolutionary episode have, at a minimum, a peak mobilization of at least a thousand civilian participants. The threshold measures the highest number of participants directly engaged in revolutionary action during any event of the episode (or in the case of civil wars, the highest total size of rebel forces).[4] This threshold was chosen after extensive examination of episodes above and below this cut-off point. Many of the episodes examined in this study were able to mobilize very large numbers of participants, with 10 percent mobilizing over five hundred thousand, 25 percent over a hundred thousand, 45 percent over fifty thousand, 64 percent over twenty thousand, and 81 percent over ten thousand. But there are obviously many episodes that do not meet the thousand-person cut-off. According to Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), the median level of mobilization in civil wars from 1945 to 2011 was four thousand armed participants, with 25 percent of civil wars involving fewer than a thousand participants.[5] However, only three out of the

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Conflict (https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource-library/); the Modern Conflicts Database (https://www.peri.umass.edu/modern-conflicts); Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence (https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/en/ouvrage/oemv); and Wikipedia.

4. As noted in chapter 7, revolutions involve participation by civilians in various ways. But direct participation is central to the disruption that revolutionary action seeks to generate, and so I use it for identifying the mass character of mobilization.

5. Of civil wars with less than a thousand participants, 42 percent were classified as ethnic, secessionist, or autonomy conflicts, 11 percent as coups, and 9 percent as terrorist actions.

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ninety-one civil wars identified by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan with fewer than a thousand participants ended in victory for the opposition, and two of these three cases were classified by them as coups d'état. Moreover, a number of these cases were not aimed at regime-change. By contrast, seven out of the 110 civil wars they identified that involved between one thousand and four thousand participants ended in opposition victory, and none of these cases were classified by them as a coup d'état. I collected information on episodes that met my definition but had fewer than a thousand participants and placed them on my alternative list. In all, thirty-one episodes fit this description, including such cases as the 1904 Liberal Revolt in Paraguay, the 1915 Chilembe Revolt in British Nyasaland, the Tallin Uprising in 1924, the 1935 Fier Uprising in Albania, the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War, the 1959 Mosul Uprising in Iraq, the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution, the 1979 Granadan Revolution, the 1996 Popular Revolutionary Army Uprising in Mexico, and the 2004 Central African Bush War. All of these episodes were small armed uprisings, and only three involved the opposition gaining power. Their inclusion would not have affected this study's substantive arguments.

I included anti-colonial and separatist mobilizations aimed at independence in the dataset, as these sought regime-change within a portion of a country's territory. Indeed, many of the major revolutions of history have been anti-colonial or separatist revolts, including the Vietnamese Revolution (1945–54), the Algerian Revolution (1954–62), and the Estonian Singing Revolution (1987–91).[6] But I excluded irredentist conflicts that sought to detach a particular territory from one state and place it within the boundaries of another state (such as the Northern Ireland Civil War of 1969–98, the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict of 1988–94, and the Bosnian Civil War of 1992–95) on the grounds that these conflicts were better understood as instances of switching allegiances from one state to another rather than regime-change per se.[7] Irredentist conflicts also frequently involve significant participation and intervention by an external national homeland, to the point that it is often difficult to identify the strength and degree of autonomy of local actors.

6. Many scholars have noted the fundamental similarities between revolution and secession. For a discussion, see Buchanan 1991. In all, 18 percent of the sample consisted of revolutionary episodes that solely articulated demands for independence without articulating other revolutionary goals, while another 17 percent of the sample consisted of episodes in which demands for independence were made alongside other revolutionary goals.

7. On the distinctiveness of irredentist conflicts and how the politics of irredentism differs in fundamental ways from other separatist conflicts, see Chazan 1991.

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I also excluded resistance to foreign invasions or foreign-imposed regime-change (such as the Moroccan Wars against Spain and France in 1908–12, the large number of partisan wars and resistance movements against Nazi occupation across Europe during World War II, and the so-called Forest Brotherhoods in the immediate aftermath of Soviet occupation of the Baltic following World War II). These mobilizations were not oriented toward the overthrow of an established government, but rather were a direct consequence of invasion. They sought to evict an occupying army in wartime or a domestic regime directly imposed by a foreign power. Similarly, I excluded instances of resistance to the imposition of colonial rule (what Terence Ranger called "primary resistance" to colonialism[8]) and included only those cases of resistance to established colonial governments.

Finally, if an opposition came to power through the ballot box or through elite negotiations without engaging in a mass siege of government (even if it perpetrated extensive violence against opponents, as the Nazis did in Germany in 1932–33), these cases also were excluded. By contrast, Mussolini's March on Rome in October 1922 and Hitler's 1923 Beer Hall Putsch were included in the dataset, as they constituted mass sieges of government with the intent of imposing regime-change.

For each of the 345 episodes that qualified by these criteria, a narrative was composed that described the causes and major events of the episode, how it unfolded, and how it ended using a variety of secondary sources. The episode narratives and the sources on which they were based were used throughout this study as case material to illustrate patterns and trends and to examine in more depth the processes that occurred within specific episodes.

Information on each episode was coded for a wide variety of fields: the timing of the episode's beginning and end; its outcome; features of the incumbent regime prior to onset of the episode; the goals and grievances articulated by revolutionary oppositions; the peak size of civilian mobilization involved; the class and ethnic characteristics of participants; tactics of revolutionary resistance and forms of revolutionary organization; how the episode began and how it ended; how long the government in place at the end of the episode lasted in power; the number of deaths that occurred during the episode; features of government, society, and economy during the decade following the episode; whether the episode was part of a revolutionary wave and which prior revolutionary episodes were related to the episode and in what way; and the sources consulted for each case. All this information was tied together in a relational database available from the author in spreadsheet form.

8. Ranger 1968.

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Of course, it is difficult to assess how comprehensive the data are, since there are no other datasets on revolutionary episodes that are completely comparable. There are, however, two datasets that are somewhat analogous: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig's "Historical Regimes Data" on instances of regime-change from 1789 to 2016;[9] and the NAVCO 1.3 data on so-called maximalist campaigns from 1900 to 2019.[10] Unlike the data on revolutionary episodes in this book, the Historical Regimes Data do not include cases of failed revolutions. For the 1900–2014 period covered by my revolutionary episodes data, they do, however, include 126 civil wars or popular uprisings that led to regime-change—the equivalent of successful revolutionary episodes within my data. The sample used in this book found 123 successful revolutionary episodes over the same time span. The NAVCO 1.3 data cover what Chenoweth and Shay call "maximalist campaigns" (campaigns over regime-change, secession, self-determination, and major social change) that involved at least a thousand participants. For the 1900–2014 period, their data include 550 campaigns, compared to the 343 episodes that I identified as revolutionary over the same time span. However, a closer examination reveals that a large proportion of the "maximalist" campaigns in the NAVCO data involved instances of resistance to foreign invasions or foreign occupations, were irredentist in character, or were quasi-revolutionary episodes, reformist campaigns, or non-revolutionary sieges of government as outlined by my definitions in chapter 1. There are also 106 cases in the revolutionary episodes dataset used this book (31 percent of all episodes) that do not appear in NAVCO dataset.

Because I was interested in identifying changing patterns of revolution over time, I was acutely aware of the potential biases that could be introduced by relying only on more contemporary sources, which would likely have thinner coverage of earlier episodes and over-represent more recent ones. I took particular care to ensure coverage of revolutionary episodes during the first half of the twentieth century. This was reflected in the substantial variety of sources that were consulted. The result is a far more representative sample of revolutionary episodes than appears in comparable sources. Thus, sixty-five revolutionary episodes in the dataset that occurred from 1900 through 1950 (53 percent of all episodes in the dataset during these years) are not represented in the NAVCO 1.3 dataset of maximalist campaigns.

No dataset provides complete coverage, and readers will undoubtedly identify particular episodes that they believe qualify as revolutionary by the definition

9. Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig 2020.
10. Chenoweth and Shay 2020.

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used in this book and that should have been included. They may disagree with my definition of revolution, with my interpretation of particular cases, or the inclusion of a particular case in the analysis. Such differences of opinion are inherent to an enterprise of this kind. But for the goals of this study, the revolutionary episodes included in the dataset provide a reasonable representation of how revolutionary contention evolved around the world since 1900—the main purpose for which the data were created.

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