Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project

Version 2.1
Campaign-Year Data

Codebook

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Introduction to NAVCO v2.1

The updated version of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes dataset (NAVCO 2.1) compiles annual data on 384 nonviolent and violent mass movements for regime change, anti-occupation, and secession from 1945 to 2013. This version of the dataset corrects known coding errors and omissions in NAVCO 2.0, adds news cases (including the Arab Uprisings), and codes attributes for each campaign year (such as participation size and diversity, the behavior of regime elites, repression and its effects on the campaign, support or lack thereof from external actors, and progress toward the campaign outcomes). In addition, NAVCO 2.1 adds several new attributes to each campaign-year, including more precise participation figures, more nuanced data about the scope, intensity, and degree of violent flank behavior and state repression, and further information about the parallel or alternative institutions developed by the campaign.

Whereas NAVCO 2.0 provides data on 250 campaigns disaggregated to 1,726 campaign-years, NAVCO 2.1 includes 384 campaigns disaggregated to 2,717 campaign-years. This constitutes a 54% increase in the number of campaigns and a 56% increase in the number of observations (campaign-years). The expansion in NAVCO 2.1's temporal coverage from the years 1945-2006 to 1945-2013 accounts for much of the increase in observations by adding 52 new campaigns that began after 2006. However, we also added 86 new campaigns during the 1945-2006 period that were discovered through new research.

Unit of Analysis and Inclusion Criteria

Whereas the unit of analysis for NAVCO v1.0 was the campaign as a whole, NAVCO v2.0 and 2.1 focus on the campaign-year. This project collects yearly data on several hundred nonviolent and violent insurrections between 1945 and 2013. The original list of campaigns from NAVCO 2.0 constituted a consensus population of known cases between 1945-2006 that at one time or another held "maximalist" goals of overthrowing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupations, or achieving self-determination. These campaigns are also "mature" campaigns, in the sense that they mobilize at least 1,000 observed participants in at least one calendar year, and a coherent organization linking episodes of activities to one another over time.

NAVCO 2.1 expands on the original 2.0 list of campaigns systematically, by searching for social movements that potentially qualify as NAVCO campaigns. Each social movement was treated as a candidate case and researched by coders. Candidates found to meet NAVCO definitional requirements were coded into the data, while all others were excluded. To assemble lists of candidate cases, two different methods were used.

A list of 109 nonviolent candidate cases was developed by drawing on recently published data, specifically those identified by MEC (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017), SCAD (Salehyan et al. 2012), ACLED (2018), and the Swarthmore Nonviolent Action Database. Additionally, candidate cases were added based on consultations with many social movement experts. Feedback from NAVCO 2.0 users, who had noted several absent campaigns, was also used. Subsequently, the list of candidate cases was submitted to a panel of five experts in nonviolent research. Each expert evaluated each campaign according to NAVCO inclusion criteria, leading us to disqualify about 25% of the candidates. In addition to these candidate cases, several social movements were also discovered by coders in the course of their research. These discoveries were also coded into the data when the coder, project manager, and principal investigator all agreed that definitional requirements were met.

To compile a list of violent candidate cases, all armed conflicts documented by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset[1] were considered for inclusion. This generated a list of 196 armed conflicts disaggregated into 990 conflict-years (of which 319 were found to already be captured in NAVCO 2.0 data). An RA investigated each conflict, coding it as a NAVCO 2.1 campaign (and constituent campaign-years) when at least 1,000 people were observed participating in the resistance in at least one calendar-year of the conflict in question (making the conflict a 'mature' movement by NAVCO standards). Additionally, RAs ensured that the conflict was fought over maximalist goals. By definition, most UCDP/PRIO conflicts are maximalist because non-state actors must have an 'incompatibility' with a state, either over the sitting government's right to control the state or over the state's right to control a subset of territory. Most, but not all incompatibilities over territory entail secessionist goals, but a subset of rebel actors never go beyond demands for greater autonomy. RAs included UCDP/PRIO conflicts over territory only when the relevant non-state actors demanded full secession in at least one-calendar year of the conflict.

Why were so many more violent campaigns considered for inclusion (and eventually included) in NAVCO 2.1 compared to its predecessor? NAVCO 2.0 relied primarily on Kristian Gleditsch's 2004 updates to the Correlates of War (CoW) database[2] (though other databases were also used and are described in subsequent sections). This source only coded conflicts that generated at least 1,000 battle-deaths. The UCDP/PRIO data, however, include conflicts that generated as few as (and at least) 25 battle-deaths in at least one calendar-year. Using the UCDP/PRIO data, therefore, introduces many low-intensity armed conflicts into the NAVCO 2.1 data as campaigns as long as the number of observed participants in the campaign was at least 1,000.

Defining and Delimiting Campaigns

We define a campaign as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective. Tactics must be extra-institutional in the sense that they are outside the scope of normal politics, and challenge or undermine the authority and legitimacy of a regime and its institutions. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics used are overt and documented. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are also purposive, meaning that they consciously act to achieve a specific objective, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic regime. Campaigns have discernable leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts. Other scholars often use campaigns as their units of analysis, such as Robert Pape's analysis of suicide bombing campaigns (2005), Horowitz and Reiter's analysis of aerial bombing campaigns (2001), and Ackerman and Kruegler's study of strategic nonviolent conflict (1995). In such studies, campaigns usually have distinguishable beginning and end points, as well as discernable events throughout the campaign. In the case of resistance campaigns, beginning and end points can be difficult to determine, and we have developed specific coding criteria to aid in the process of delimiting campaigns.

There are good reasons to analyze campaigns rather than events. First, events data are so difficult to

[1]Allansson, Marie, Erik Melander & Lotta Themnér (2017) Organized violence, 1989-2016. Journal of Peace Research 54(4).

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002) Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 39(5).

[2] Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press.

gather—especially nonviolent events data—that making generalizations about nonviolent conflict is virtually impossible. By analyzing campaigns (or campaign-years, specifically) rather than individual events, we are able to make some general observations about campaigns that can be explored further through in-depth case studies. Moreover, resistance campaigns involve much more than just discreet events; they involve planning, recruiting, training, intelligence, and other operations besides their most obvious disruptive activities. Using events as the main unit of analysis ignores these other operations, whereas analyzing campaign-years allows us to consider the broader spectrum of activities as a whole.

In order to identify a campaign's onset, we looked for the earliest instances of mobilization connected with the campaign, and encoded a campaign-year for each calendar-year in which mobilization was observed. This means that we coded the entire life-span of each NAVCO 2.1 campaign, including early years (if any are observed) when the campaign attracted fewer than 1,000 participants. Three guidelines were used to manage this process, and to prevent research assistants from treating unrelated social unrest or mobilization as part of a given campaign. First, there must be temporal continuity between the earliest and latest campaign-year, in that campaign activity must be observed in all campaign-years without significant gaps. Second, there must be continuity in leadership cohorts between early mobilization and subsequent mobilization, meaning that the organizers of early campaign activity must be observed participating in the campaign during subsequent years (when the campaign is more obviously identifiable). Third, the early mobilization must be 'extra-institutional' in that it deliberately challenges or undermines the authority of regime-sponsored institutions, departing from 'normal politics'. Most extra-institutional tactics are illegal. In the case of violent mobilization, this often entails recruiting, arming, and training participants in preparation for an armed conflict with the regime. Nonviolent mobilization also typically takes the form of recruitment and training, though arms are not sought. Early nonviolent campaign activity often resembles (tactically) subsequent activity but draws fewer participants. This criterion entails that campaigns can emerge out of pre-existing organizations and groups which did not formerly undertake extra-institutional methods. The campaign would not be treated as active until the pre-existing group transitions from normal politics to extra-institutional methods.

Campaign termination was easily delineated in those cases where the campaign achieved a maximalist goal. However, campaigns which never achieve their stated goal (or which do not do so before the end of 2013) do not necessarily have clear termination points. Though credible sources sometimes affirm the disintegration of a campaign during a calendar-year, at other times we used the absence of observed campaign activity to identify campaign termination. This approach parallels the Armed Conflict Termination Dataset,[3] which shows that armed conflicts often end without a decisive victory/defeat or negotiated settlement. Terminations for both violent and nonviolent campaigns can be especially difficult to observe given that state repression often forces campaigns to conceal their activities, leading to instances in which research assistants are confident that the campaign has survived despite observing no activity during a calendar-year. We have employed several guidelines when determining campaign terminations. First, campaigns can be coded as ongoing during calendar-years in which little or no activity is observed if campaign activity is observed in subsequent years. However, campaign activity must be observed within three calendar years. Campaigns must be coded as terminated whenever three consecutive years of inactivity are observed. In such cases, the last calendar-year in which campaign activity is observed will be designated the end-year. Second, campaigns can be terminated when there is strong evidence to suggest campaign activity ceased. In such cases, the research assistant must be

[3] Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 243–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309353108.

confident that campaign activity would have been observed had any actually occurred. In such instances, a campaign can be coded as terminated even if related activity is observed subsequently (within the 3-year limit). The new activity would have to be considered for inclusion into NAVCO as a new campaign.

Distinguishing Nonviolent and Violent Methods of Resistance

Admittedly, there are difficulties with labeling one campaign as "violent" and another as "nonviolent" (see Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, p. 9). In many cases, both nonviolent and violent campaigns exist simultaneously among different competing campaigns, as with Palestinian campaigns. Alternatively, some campaigns use both nonviolent and violent methods of resistance over the course of their existence, as with the ANC in South Africa.

To address these difficulties, scholars have addressed this dilemma by characterizing campaigns as "primarily nonviolent" or "primarily violent" based on the primacy of resistance methods employed. We have established some standards of inclusion in each of these categories.

- Nonviolent resistance does not directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of the opponent. Sharp (1973) has identified nearly 200 nonviolent resistance tactics, such as sit-ins, protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, and strikes, among many others. When a campaign relies primarily on nonviolent methods such as these as opposed to violent or armed tactics, the campaign can be characterized as nonviolent.
- The nonviolent campaigns identified in NAVCO 1.0 and 2.0 were initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. The primary sources were Karatnacky and Ackerman (2005), Carter, Clark, and Randle (2007), and Schock (2005). Then these data were corroborated with multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies, and sources from a comprehensive bibliography on nonviolent civil resistance by Carter, Clarke, and Randle (2007). These cases were circulated among approximately a dozen experts in nonviolent conflict. These experts were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized as major nonviolent conflicts, whether their outcomes had been appropriately characterized, and whether any notable conflicts had been omitted. Where the experts suggested additional cases, the same corroboration method was used. The resultant list includes major nonviolent campaigns that are primarily or entirely nonviolent.
- We replicated the latter part of the process to include candidate cases identified through additional research. We drew a number of new candidate cases from the Major Episodes of Contention Data Project. In that project, a team of researchers reviewed existing data sets and news sources to identify nonviolent and violent episodes of mass or popular contention, using a highly systematic (and perhaps more easily replicable) review of a broad set of source materials. We also added cases based on several additional source, including Dawn Brancati's pro-democracy protest database, the Swarthmore Global Nonviolent Action Database, and Maciej Bartkowski's book *Recovering Nonviolent History* (2013). We then circulated the campaigns to six subject experts to review each candidate case for inclusion, assessment of its nonviolent character, its level of coordination, and its outcome.
- Campaigns where a significant amount of violence occurred are characterized as "violent." Violent resistance involves the use of force to physically harm or threaten to harm the opponent, and the campaign organizes itself around the use of force. Violent campaign data for NAVCO 2.0 were primarily derived from Kristian Gleditsch's 2004 updates to the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars (COW), Clodfelter's encyclopedia of armed conflict (2002), and Kalev Sepp's list

of major counterinsurgency operations (2005). NAVCO 2.1 expanded on the original list of violent campaigns by examining all cases of armed conflict or civil war occurring between 1945-2013 listed in the PRIO/UCDP Armed Conflict Database (2009, 2017) where there were at least 1,000 observed participants.

Crucial Caveats: What You Need to Know about NAVCO

1. **Complexity regarding primary method of resistance**. The NAVCO v1 data include a variable that identifies the primary resistance method as either nonviolent or violent, as described above. That variable is included in the v2 dataset but is static even though the primary resistance type may vary by campaign year. We therefore constructed a new variable, called "prim_method," which can vary from year to year.
2. **Ambiguity on outcomes**. Researchers who coded the cases for NAVCO v2 often found it difficult to distinguish between values for the variable "progress." Many would code campaigns as having achieved "significant concessions" (3) where NAVCO v1.1 coded such cases as a full success (4). Conversely, some cases that were coded as full successes (4's) in NAVCO v2 were coded as partial successes in NAVCO v1.1. Inter-coder reliability on whether a campaign was a 3 or a 4 was also somewhat weak, whereas coders were much better able to distinguish the other outcomes from one another. As a consequence, researchers might consider creating a dichotomous "strategic success" variable in which values of 3 and 4 indicate a strategic success and values of 0, 1, & 2 indicating otherwise if the observation occurs in the final year of the campaign. In ongoing campaign years, however, researchers should not view a progress value of 3 as equivalent to full success, since the campaign has not yet concluded.
3. **A consensus data set.** The data do not necessarily include all nonviolent campaigns during the time period 1945-2013, because many unobserved campaigns were unknown to researchers prior to 2014 (when the data collection began). Therefore, when researchers make claims based on the data, they should do so by arguing that those claims apply when drawn from a consensus list of mature, maximalist campaigns. Further iterations of the project will likely expand the number of campaigns covered during historical periods because of the discovery of new records.
4. **Replicability of the data construction.** Because of the nature of the data collection process (where a vast literature review was combined with expert surveys) and the consensus nature of the NAVCO data list, it may be difficult for researchers to rebuild the data from scratch and produce an identical list of campaigns. For the release of NAVCO v2.1, we created a more structured (and, we hope, transparent) inclusion process for campaigns that will (a) add in campaigns that were missing in NAVCO v2.0 because information on these campaigns was not yet available; and (b) allow for more transparent procedures that improve the replicability of the data construction process.
5. **We welcome additions and corrections.** Please submit your feedback to Erica Chenoweth.

A Note on Underreporting Bias

Especially among the nonviolent campaigns, there is real concern that the campaigns included are biased toward success, since it is the large, mature campaigns that are most commonly reported. Other would-be nonviolent campaigns that are crushed in their infancy (and therefore fail) will not be included in this dataset. This is the major limitation in this study, and it is difficult to avoid. However, we did attempt to mitigate the effects of underreporting bias in several ways. First, we chose to compare nonviolent campaigns with their comparable counterparts in violent campaigns rather than to view nonviolent

campaigns in isolation. We did this because there are many "non-starters" among violent campaigns as well as nonviolent ones, and the same underreporting bias exists within the study of violent insurgencies as with nonviolent insurrections. Therefore, we only investigate the outcomes of *major* nonviolent and violent campaigns—those that are already "mature" in terms of objectives and membership. We only included cases where the objective was at some point maximalist (i.e. regime change, secession, or self-determination) as opposed to limited (i.e. greater civil liberties or economic rights). Such limited goals (greater autonomy and significant institutional reform) are coded only when campaigns' goals were less than maximalist for certain campaign years. Additionally, we only include nonviolent and violent campaigns where we were certain that more than 1,000 people were actively participating in the struggle (in at least one year of the campaign). For the nonviolent campaigns, we gleaned this information from the sources mentioned above. For violent campaigns, the information was implied from the 1,000 battle-death criteria for inclusion in the various datasets we accessed. Using these strict criteria or comparing major campaigns allows us to address questions of the relative effectiveness of resistance type among comparably developed mass movements. Critics may still be skeptical of the case selection, especially in the case of nonviolent conflict. Most concerning is the potential omission of failed nonviolent campaigns, which may not be captured in the dataset due to extreme repression or poor news sources. To address this concern, we made certain that the dataset reflects a consensus sample, which was circulated among the world's leading authorities on nonviolent conflict to make sure we accounted for known failed campaigns. Unknown, failed, nonviolent campaigns are necessarily omitted from the dataset, just like unknown, failed, violent campaigns.

A Note on Missing Data

Following standard database practice, there are two categories of "missing" observations. A coding of "-99" (unknown) means that although the data are missing, a concerted effort was made to find the data to no avail. A code of -99 should therefore be interpreted as "missing and unlikely to be found in future iterations." A code of "." (missing) in the Stata .dta file or blanks in the Excel file means that the data are not applicable. For instance, primarily violent campaign-years are not assigned violent flank intensity data because there is no violent flank to code.

When using the data to perform analyses, researchers must remember to replace all "-99" values with missing values. Otherwise, results will be badly skewed.

Potential Research Uses

Researchers can use the NAVCO v2.1 database to evaluate questions such as:

- How does the choice of nonviolent or violent tactics impact the course of an opposition's campaign?
- How do campaign tactics interact with different forms of state repression or conciliation?
- Are there particular opposition strategies that are more likely to be successful?
- How do diverse groups maintain unity during the course of the conflict?
- Which organizational structures are most resilient in the face of repression;
- Under what conditions does backfire occur (whereby regime repression recoils against it)?
- How do different types of international actors time their assistance to resistance groups and/or sanctions against regime?
- Do campaign outcomes impact long-term political, economic, and social conditions within each case?

Variables

The following is a table listing the variables used in this project and their descriptions.

Table 1: List of Variables

*indicates new variable for NAVCO v2.2

Variable Name	Variable Description
id	Unique campaign ID
campyearid	Unique campaign-year identifier (combines campaign ID and campaign year)
camp_name	Campaign name
location	Country in which the campaign takes place
year	Calendar year
cyear	Denotes the status of the campaign in that year. 0=onset 1=ongoing 2=end year 3=post campaign
loc_iso	Location country ISO3N code
loc_cow	Location country Correlates of War code (where applicable)
loc_vdem	Location country Varieties of Democracy country code (where applicable)
territory	Disputed territory (where applicable)
terr_iso	Disputed territory ISO3N code (where different than location and where applicable)
terr_cow	Disputed territory Correlates of War country code (where different than location and where applicable)
terr_vdem	Disputed territory Varieties of Democracy country code (where different than location and where applicable)
target_country	The country targeted by the campaign (where different from location)
targ_iso	The target country's ISO3N code (where different from location)
targ_cow	The target country's Correlates of War country code (where different from location)
targ_vdem	The target country's Varieties of Democracy country code (where different from location)
status	Censor variable denoting whether campaign was ongoing after the end of 2017, the limit of the time-period under study. 0=ended 1=ongoing
start_date	First date on which campaign activity is observed (dd/mm/yyyy)
start_year	First year in which campaign activity is observed
end_date	Last date on which campaign activity is observed (31/12/2017 if status=1)
end_year	Last year in which campaign activity is observed
camp_beyear	Denotes whether start year and end year are the same

	0=no 1= yes
prim_method	Denotes the primary type of resistance method used in a campaign year. 0=primarily violent campaign 1=primarily nonviolent campaign
navco1designation	Denotes the type of resistance method designated for the campaign in the NAVCO v1.1 dataset, based on an "ideal types" criterion. Note that this variable refers to the campaign's coding from NAVCO v1.1. In NAVCO v2.0 this variable is static even though campaigns can change their primary resistance method. (0=primarily violent campaign 1=primarily nonviolent campaign -99=The campaign was not in navco1)
camp_orgs	Number of new named organizations involved in the campaign in that particular year. 0-10=number of new named campaign organizations in a particular year 11=more than 10 new named organizations -99=unknown
camp_size	Indicator of the general size of the campaign. 0=1-999 1=1000-9,999 2=10,000-99,999 3=100,000-499,999 4=500,000-1 million 5>=1 million -99=unknown
camp_size_cat	Estimated campaign size. 0=small (hundreds to thousands) 1=medium (tens of thousands) 2=large (above one hundred thousand) 3=extremely large (above one million) -99=unknown
camp_size_n2	Indicator of the general size of the campaign as recorded in NAVCO 2.0.
camp_size_cat_n2	Indicator of the estimated campaign size as recorded in NAVCO 2.0.
total_part	Estimate of total number of campaign participants during the year (integer)
camp_conf_intensity	Degree of unity amongst opposition groups. 0=seemingly united 1=cooperation with moderate disunity (i.e. ideological or policy disagreements) 2=verbal or active competition among discrete groups, short of physical violence 3=active competition among groups with violence -99= unknown
violent_flank	Whether a violent flank exists within the opposition movement. 0=primarily violent campaign 1=no violent flank 2=violent flank -99=unknown
flank_intensity	The intensity of the violence emerging from within the opposition movement. 0=no violent flank 1=property damage 2=non-lethal violence 3=lethal violence -99=unknown (left blank if campaign-year designated primarily violent)
flank_scope	Whether the violent flank was incidental/improvised/isolated to specific incidents, or whether it was a routine part of the opposition movement. 0=no violent flank 1=incidental/isolated 2=routinized/institutionalized 3=ambivalent -99=unknown (left blank if campaign-year designated primarily violent)
flank_response	Whether the campaign displayed a commitment to nonviolent discipline in response to the violent flank's actions. 0=no violent flank 1=campaign signaled clear commitment to nonviolent discipline 2=campaign signaled clear toleration of violent flank 3=campaign signaled internal disagreement about whether to disavow, tolerate, or embrace the violent flank -99=unknown (left blank if campaign-year designated primarily violent)

resis_meth	Change in primary method of resistance 0=no change 1=change from nonviolent to violent 2=change from violent to nonviolent -99=unknown
camp_goals	Stated goals of the campaign. 0=regime change 1=significant institutional reform 2=policy change 3=territorial secession 4=greater autonomy 5=anti-occupation -99=unknown
goalschange	0=no change in goals 1=shift in stated goals -99=unknown
camp_structure	0=consensus-based participatory campaign structure 1=hierarchical command and control campaign structure -99=unknown
media_outreach	Whether there is evidence that the campaign spends resources on public relations, publicity and traditional media coverage. 0=none 1=information campaign -99=unknown
cdivers	Denotes whether campaign participation was diverse along any dimension of inclusion 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
div_gender	Indicates whether campaign participation exhibited gender diversity. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
div_age	Indicates whether campaign participation exhibited age diversity. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
div_class	Indicates whether campaign participation exhibited social class diversity. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes -99=unknown
div_urban_rural	Indicates whether campaign participation included both urban and rural populations. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
div_ideology	Indicates whether campaign participation exhibited diversity of political ideologies. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
div_party	Indicates whether multiple political parties participated in the campaign. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
div_regional	Indicates whether multiple regions participated in the campaign. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
div_ethnicity	Indicates whether campaign participation exhibited ethnic diversity. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
div_religion	Indicates whether campaign participation exhibited religious diversity. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
parall_instit	Denotes whether the campaign was observed to use any type of parallel institution during the year 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
pi_education	Indicates whether the campaign had parallel educational institutions. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
pi_soc_welfare	Indicates whether the campaign had institutions for social welfare provisions. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes

pi_trad_media	Indicates whether the campaign had parallel traditional media institutions. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
pi_new_media	Indicates whether the campaign had parallel modern media institutions. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
pi_police	Indicates whether the campaign had parallel policing institutions. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
pi_armed_wing	Indicates whether the campaign had an armed (primarily violent) institution. (Primarily nonviolent campaigns-years only) 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
pi_courts	Indicates whether the campaign had parallel judicial institutions. 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
pi_pol_party	Indicates whether the campaign had a parallel political party (including pre-existing political parties that join the campaign and depart from normal politics). 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
pi_pol_wing	Indicates whether the campaign had a political leadership institution, separate from its militant organization (violent campaign-years only). 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
pi_nv_mobiliz	Indicates whether the campaign used nonviolent resistance in addition to its violent method (violent campaign-years only). 0=no (none discovered) 1=yes
repression	The degree of state repression in response to campaign activity. 0=none; 1=mild repression; 2=moderate repression; 3=extreme repression -99=unknown
indiscrim	Whether state repression is indiscriminate. 0=discriminate 1=indiscriminate -99=unknown
fatalities_high	Highest credible estimate of regime-inflicted fatalities during the year.
fatalities_low	Lowest credible estimate of regime-inflicted fatalities during the year.
fatalities_range	Range of estimated fatalities among protestors / dissidents / fighters. 0 = no known fatalities 1 = 1-10 fatalities 2 = 11-25 fatalities 3 = 26-100 fatalities 4 =101-1,000 fatalities 5 = 1,001-10,000 fatalities 6 = 10,001+ fatalities -99 = unknown
ab_domestic	Domestic audience backlash denotes whether significant backlash to the regime's use of repression was observed among domestic audiences. 0= no observed backlash 1= state repression results in domestic condemnation
ab_internat	International audience backlash denotes whether the regime's use of repression spurred significant backlash among international state actors. 0= no observed backlash 1= state repression results in condemnation by international actors

ab_int_mat	International audience material backlash denotes whether the regime's use of repression spurred material backlash among international state actors. 0= no observed backlash 1= state repression results in international material repercussions (e.g. sanctions)
camp_backlash	What was the effect of state repression on the campaign: 0=no visible effect 1=movement suppressed 2=decreased domestic mobilization 3=increased domestic mobilization -99=unknown
sec_defect	The regime loses support from the military and/or security forces through major defections or loyalty shifts 1=yes 0=no -99 unknown
state_defect	The regime loses support from the civilian bureaucrats and/or civilian public officials through major defections or loyalty shifts 0=no 1=yes -99 unknown
regime_support_	Regime has formal support from other states 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
wdrwl_support	Former state supporters have explicitly withdrawn support from the regime as a result of state repression. 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
camp_support_	Campaign has formal overt support from other states 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
ingo_support	Campaign has formal support from international NGOs and societal actors 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
dias_support	Campaign has support from diaspora communities living in countries other than the target state 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
sdirect	International sanctions in place on the regime for cracking down on opposition 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
slifted	International sanctions are lifted from the regime 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
in_media	Extent of international traditional media coverage of the campaign 0=little to none 1=moderate 2=high -99=unknown
dom_media	Extent of domestic traditional media coverage of the campaign 0=little to none 1=moderate 2=high -99=unknown
success	Campaign's maximalist goal ultimately achieved as a direct result of the campaign. 0=not successful 1= successful
progress	Campaign progress during the year 0=status quo 1=visible gains short of concessions 2=limited concession achieved 3=significant concessions achieved 4=complete success 5=ends in failure

	-99=unknown
pub_opinion	Denotes whether or not public opinion polling is available during the conflict in the country in which the campaign is taking place, or the country of the target regime. 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
reliability	Measure of how reliable the source material was in terms of availability, scope and accuracy. 1=low confidence 2=moderate confidence 3=high confidence

Variable Descriptions, Inclusion Criteria and Coding Rules

*indicates new variable for NAVCO 2.2

Many of the variables coded by NAVCO 2.1 are more difficult to disconfirm than confirm. For this reason, some variables are coded along an 'absence of evidence is evidence of absence' (AEEA) guideline. This means that, when a campaign is otherwise well-documented or publicized, RAs can use the absence of documentation of a particular issue to code a given variable in the negative. The variable *campaign conflict intensity*, which codes the degree of disunity within a campaign (for a given year), serves as a good example. Finding evidence of intra-campaign disputes justifies affirming disunity, and so the RA can assign a non-zero value between 1 (moderate disagreements over tactics or ideology) and 3 (active competition with violence). When an RA finds no direct evidence of unity (such as an assessment that specifically remarks on the campaign's unity during the year), but also finds no evidence of disunity, then coding the campaign-year as 0 (campaign is seemingly united) is more appropriate than coding it as -99 (unknown). It is worth repeating, however, that the AEEA guideline only holds when campaign-years are well-documented. When little information about a campaign-year can be found, in general, absence of evidence does not justify coding a particular variable in the negative.

In some instances, RAs may also infer (at the discretion of the project manager) variable values. Coding via inference entails assigning a variable's value based on knowledge of relevant information in years preceding or following the given campaign-year. This may be done when direct evidence pertaining to a variable is not forthcoming, and when no additional evidence suggests that the variable's value may have changed. Assigning a value via inference is only permissible when relevant campaign-years are otherwise well-documented. Consider the total participation variable. It is often difficult to find information on participation for all years within a campaign, especially armed insurgencies (even when the given campaign is otherwise well-documented). If there is direct evidence that a campaign had 2,000 participants in 1986 and 1988, the coder may infer that 2,000 participants were also present in 1987, so long as there is no additional evidence suggesting that 1987's total participation likely deviated from this number. That is, the RA must have confidence that no other developments in 1987 would likely have caused a significant (short-term) drop or rise in participation compared to the 1986 and 1988 estimates. If, for instance, the RA knows that the campaign suffered significant setbacks in 1987, or that (in the case of a violent campaign) fighting was particularly fierce in 1987, the inference of stable participation would not be made and a -99 would have been assigned.

Primary Resistance Method

prim_method

Description: Denotes the primary type of resistance method used in a campaign year.

Coding rules: Coding is based on a judgment of whether the campaign relied primarily on nonviolent or violent resistance in a given year. The prevalence of armed violence used during the year relative to unarmed nonviolent resistance is key to making this delineation. The number of campaign-inflicted deaths often serves as a useful indicator.

Coding: 0=primarily violent campaign 1=primarily nonviolent campaign

New Named Campaign Organizations

camp_orgs

Description: Number of "new" (i.e. not previously accounted for in the dataset) named campaign organizations that join the opposition movement in a particular year.

Coding rules: This variable focuses only on those organizations that are named in news reports or research materials. RAs should seek out information about the structure of the campaigns and the number of organizations involved. Coding is based on an estimated count of the organizations that appeared in that particular year. New organizations must be new to the campaign, but need not be newly formed.

Coding: 0-10= number of "new" named organizations that appear in a given year; 11= new organizations greater than 10; -99=unknown

Campaign Size

camp_size

Description: Approximate number of people taking part in the opposition campaign.

Coding rules: The size of the campaign may be determined from scholarly estimates, histories or news reports. It is likely impossible to precisely gauge the size of the movement at any particular point in time, so this coding relies on "peak events" and secondary estimates. Peak events often indicate the maximum size of the movement. Estimates incorporate the total number of people that have taken part in any aspect of the campaign ranging from active organizing to popular participation in large-scale street protests.

Coding: 0=1-999; 1=1000-9,999; 2=10,000-99,999 3=100,000-499,999, 4=500,000-999,999,999, 5>=1 million, -99=unknown

Campaign Size Category

camp_size_cat

Description: A rougher estimate of the overall size of the opposition campaign.

Coding rules: Given that a precise accounting of the number of campaign participants may be difficult to determine, this variable captures a much rougher estimate of the overall size of the campaign. This is an indicator of the basic size of the campaign as derived from the secondary literature.

Coding: 0=small (hundreds to thousands) 1=medium (tens of thousands) 2=large (above one hundred thousand) 3=extremely large (above one million) -99=unknown

Total Participation*

total_part

Description: Total reported participation during the year.

Coding rules: Identifies the estimated number of participants engaging in active conflict. This can be the highest recorded / estimated participation at a peak event. If the reported number is vague (e.g. "hundreds of thousands,") we code it as 200,001 in accordance with similar practices adopted by Ron Francisco in his data on European Protest and Coercion.

Coding: Integer.

Intensity of Conflict Within the Campaign

camp_conf_intensity

Description: Looks not at just the existence of conflict within the campaign but also the nature and degree of conflict amongst groups, factions or leaders.

Coding rules: Identify the nature of disagreement and conflict within the campaign based on narratives and histories of the campaign and important events, such as attacks on other organizations, that clearly indicates the extent of conflict. While multiple codes may apply during each year, RAs should select the highest code that applies for that particular year of the campaign.

Coding: 0=seemingly united; 1=cooperation with moderate disunity (i.e. ideological or policy disagreements); 2=verbal or active competition among discrete groups, short of physical violence; 3=active competition among groups with violence; -99= unknown

Existence of Violent Flank

violent_flank

Description: Codes whether or not there is a "violent flank" (referred to in previous iterations of NAVCO as a "violent flank") in a movement that is primarily nonviolent. A violent flank is defined as a group, informally or formally organized, that adopts violent strategies to pursue their goals. They represent a faction within the broader opposition movement. They often participate in events organized by the broader campaign, i.e. when some protesters begin throwing stones at police during an otherwise nonviolent demonstration. Violent flanks, when formally organized, often manifest as terrorist cells or guerilla fighters, although in some instances the violence is spontaneous and disorganized even if it become fairly routine. This concept excludes predominantly violent campaigns or other violent groups within the country that are pursuing different political objectives.

Coding rules: Identifies whether a violent flank exists within the campaign.

Coding: 0=primarily violent campaign; 1=no violent flank; 2=violent flank; -99=unknown

***Intensity of Violent Flank Activity**

violent_flank_intensity

Description: Identifies the highest reported level violence used by the violent flank during the year.

Coding rules: The highest level of reported violence (i.e. peak level) committed by the violent flank within the opposition movement.

Coding: 0=no violent flank; 1=property damage; 2=non-lethal violence; 3=lethal violence; -99=unknown

***Scope of Violent Flank**

violent_flank_scope

Description: Identifies whether the violent flank's activity occurs infrequently and/or on the movement's fringes, or whether the violent flank activity becomes a normalized part of the opposition movement's overall repertoire.

Coding rules: Whether the violent flank was incidental/improvised/isolated to specific incidents, or whether it was a routine part of the opposition movement. For nonviolent campaigns, the variable defaults to incidental and improvised (1), meaning that events clearly take place where the violent flank is absent and/or the movement does not use violence; violent flank activity is fairly infrequent compared with nonviolent events; and violent flank activity is limited to a small fringe group and does not diffuse to other participants. Indicators that the violent flank is routinized/normalized include: (a) events no longer take place without some movement members provoking violence; (b) violent flank activity is more frequent than purely nonviolent events; and (c) violent flank activity is no longer limited to a small fringe group, but instead diffuses to other erstwhile nonviolent participants. For a coding of 2, two of elements [a,b, or c] must be present. In other words, to code a violent flank as having become routinized/institutionalized, the coder needs to show that violent flank activity has diffused (c) AND has become a mainstay in movement actions (b). If only one of the elements is met (e.g. violent flank activity has become diffused but nonviolent activity still remains the norm in events), the variable would be coded as 1. If the coder is unsure about these because of ambiguity in the reporting on the campaign, the variable should be coded as "3." If information cannot be found, the variable is coded as -99.

Coding: 0=no violent flank; 1=incidental/isolated; 2=routinized/institutionalized; 3=ambiguous; -99=unknown

***Violent Flank Response**

Description: Identifies the movement's response to the violent flank.

Coding rules: Whether the campaign displayed a commitment to nonviolent discipline in response to the violent flank. The variable is coded as 1 if the campaign (a) releases a statement articulating clear commitment to nonviolent action; (b) disavows the violent flank; or (c) reportedly initiates training or regrouping to attempt to recapture nonviolent discipline. The variable is coded as 2 if the campaign (d) releases a statement supporting or praising the violent flank; (e) invites the violent flank to join the movement; or (f) begins to coordinate actions with the violent flank. The variable is coded as 3 if the campaign demonstrates internal ambivalence about how to react, through (g) releasing conflicting statements about whether the movement welcomes or disavows the violent flank; (h) reported internal

disagreement, conflict, or argument about the violent flank's position in the movement and signaled no clear position (i.e. disavowal or toleration) on the violent flank.

Coding: 0=no violent flank; 1=campaign signaled clear commitment to nonviolent discipline; 2=campaign signaled clear toleration of violent flank; 3=campaign signaled internal disagreement about whether to disavow, tolerate, or embrace the violent flank; -99=unknown

Change in Primary Resistance Method

resis_meth

Description: This variable codes whether there is a change in the campaign's primary method of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent) in a given year.

Coding rules: A change in primary resistance method is coded when there is evidence that a campaign switched its strategy from one based primarily on nonviolence to one based on violence, or vice versa. Note that once a change has been made (from nonviolent to violent, indicated by a "1", for example), researchers should consider that campaign violent until it changes back to nonviolent (indicated by a "2") in a subsequent year.

Coding: 0=no change; 1=change from nonviolent to violent; 2=change from violent to nonviolent; -99=unknown.

Campaign Diversity Variables

Description: This is a series of dummy variables that looks at whether a campaign contains "diversity" by spanning two or more sub-categories of the population.

Coding rules: Variables are coded as "diverse" when there is evidence that the campaign spans the socio-demographic categories outlined below. These are not mutually exclusive categories, so all categories that apply should be coded as diverse.

Coding: 0=not diverse 1=diverse -99=unknown

Variable Series:

Gender	Age	Class	Urban/ Rural
cdivers_gender	**cdivers_age**	**cdivers_class**	**cdivers_urbrural**

Ideology	Party	Regional	Ethnic
cdivers_ideol	**cdivers_party**	**cdivers_regional**	**cdivers_ethnic**

Religious
cdivers_religious

Campaign Goals

camp_goals

Description: This variable looks at the political goals of the campaign. Campaign goals are determined to be the stated political intentions of the primary group or groups in the campaign.

Coding rules: This variable captures the differences in campaign goals over time by allowing for variation amongst campaign depending on the type of conflict. "Regime change" indicates a goal of overthrowing the state or substantially altering state institutions to the point that it would cause a de facto shift in the regime's hold on power. In contrast, "significant institutional reform" looks at the goal of changing fundamental political structures to alleviate injustices or grant additional rights. "Policy change" refers to a goal of changes in government policy that fall short of changes in the fundamental political structures, including changes in a state's foreign policy. "Territorial secession" denotes the goal of agitating for complete independence from a state, while "greater autonomy" refers to campaign goal of achieving greater political independence short of complete legal independence. Finally, "anti-occupation" captures those conflicts waged against a foreign power. Campaigns may espouse multiple of these goals. In these cases, the most maximalist goal takes precedence. *Coding:* 0=regime change; 1=significant institutional reform; 2= policy change 3=territorial secession; 4=greater autonomy; 5=anti-occupation;

-99=unknown

Change in Campaign Goals

goalschange

Description: Denotes whether a campaign has changed its goals during a particular calendar year.

Coding rules: This is based on the stated goals of the leading groups of the non-state campaign. This does not include the goals of formal opposition parties within the state. Coders should focus on the movement as a whole or the organizations that represent the majority of the campaign (i.e. not those fringe organizations that do not speak for the movement as a whole). Coders should also employ a "high threshold" for coding a shift, such that only clearly visible and public shifts in the campaign's position. For example, if a campaign shifts its focus from an event-centered campaign to one seeking broader institutional change, or if the campaign transitions from advocating policy change to regime change, then it is coded as a shift.

Coding: 0=no change in goals; 1=shift in stated goals; -99=unknown

Campaign Leadership Structure

camp_structure

Description: This variable analyzes the structure of campaign organization and leadership, in particular the extent to which there is a clear hierarchical structure to campaign decision-making.

Coding rules: If there is a clear centralized leadership structure, hierarchically organized and with clear lines of authority—often but not necessarily focused on a single leader—then this variable is coded a one. If campaign leadership is spread across multiple groups or individuals, each of which has influence over

tactics and strategy, then it is coded a zero. If parallel political parties or "shadow governments" exist, "camp_structure" should be coded as 1, with a note that the campaign contained a shadow government as part of its political organization.

Coding: 0=diffuse, consensus-based and participatory campaign structure; 1=centralized and hierarchical command and control campaign structure; -99=unknown

Media and Public Relations Campaign

media_outreach

Description: Whether there is evidence that the campaign spends *significant* resources on public relations, publicity and traditional media coverage.

Coding rules: Variable is coded as an "information campaign" when opposition campaigns employ a concerted strategy to garner traditional media attention. This can range from activities to publicize their efforts to the media to hiring a spokesperson to developing and disseminating their own media content.

Coding: 0=none; 1=information campaign; -99=unknown

Discriminating State Targeting

indiscrim

Description: This variable focuses on how blunt or precise state repression is in its targeting the opposition.

Coding rules: First, one must determine whether the state responded with repression. If no repression was used, then it is coded a zero. If state repression narrowly targeted the opposition, for example, shutting down opposition organizations or arresting its leaders, then it is considered discriminatory. Indiscriminate repression is that which does not distinguish between opposition members and the general citizenry, such as widespread state violence against the population or actions that threaten force against all citizens.

Coding: 0=no indiscriminate repression observed 1=indiscriminate repression observed -99=unknown

State Repression Episode(s)

repression

Description: This variable measures the most repressive episode or activity perpetrated by the state in response to campaign activity.

Coding rules: This variable looks at repression from the perspective of the opposition campaign, not the state. Focusing on peak events, coders should measure the extent to which the government uses the coercive apparatus of the state, including security agencies, economic fines and taxes and the justice system, to quell opposition. If the state does not respond, or responds in a conciliatory manner, this variable is coded as "none."

Coding:

0=none

- few or no actions taken on the part of the state

- appeasing or surrendering to campaign
- making full concessions according to opponent's demands
- making material concessions
- taking action that signals intention to cooperate or negotiate with opponent
- expressing intention to cooperate or showing support

1=mild repression

- verbal or threatening action short of physical action
- express intent to engage in conflict or threaten
- use of economic fees and levies to increase costs on opposition
- decline to cease ongoing conflict; maintain the status quo during conflict

2=moderate repression

- physical or violent action aimed at coercing opponent
- harassment and imprisonment of campaign members
- no apparent intention to kill

3=extreme repression

- physical action exhibiting intent to kill and violently silence opponents
- torture or severe violence (such as severe beatings), which could easily kill someone
- mass violence

-99=unknown

High and Low Estimates of Fatalities*

Description: Highest and lowest creditable estimates of fatalities directly inflicted by the state in its efforts to suppress the campaign during the year.

Coding rules: Identifies the highest and lowest reliable estimates of fatalities among campaign participants and nonparticipants killed by state repression relating to an ongoing campaign. This variable aggregates all those killed by the incumbent regime and its agents or allies as a result of their efforts to suppress the campaign. Thus, nonparticipants (civilians, in the case of primarily violent campaigns) killed accidentally by the state as it attempts to suppress the campaign are included in this estimate. Similarly, nonparticipants killed by the state during indiscriminate violence are also included. Consistent with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Geo-referenced Events Database (GED), fatalities must be directly and violently inflicted by state agents; deaths caused indirectly (i.e. by famine or associated epidemics) are not counted.

When a NAVCO campaign is associated with one or more state-based or one-sided armed conflicts in the GED (typically entailing that the NAVCO campaign is primarily violent and takes place after 1988), the GED's death estimates are always considered by the coder. These figures are used to create the high and low death estimates depending on contextual information. Often, to create the low estimate, the coder will use the sum of all side B deaths from all associated state-based dyads in the GED (side B deaths are always rebel deaths in dyads where one actor is a state and the other a non-state group). Similarly, a high

estimate can be created by summing side B deaths together with civilian and unknown deaths, representing the maximum possible number of GED-documented fatalities that could have been inflicted by the state. These practices can and must be amended, however, where the NAVCO campaign-year poorly overlaps with associated GED dyads or where GED coding is highly ambiguous (for instance, when most fatalities are labelled 'unknown' rather than attributed to civilians or one of the dyad actors). The coder must often use geographical data (provided by the GED) to filter out deaths associated with concurrent but separate one-sided conflicts in different parts of a given country.

When a NAVCO campaign is not associated with GED armed conflicts (usually entailing that it is primarily nonviolent or that it takes place prior to 1989), or when GED coding is particularly ambiguous, other sources must be used to compile fatality estimates. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are always consulted. Reports from other NGOs, such as the Jamestown Foundation, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the International Crisis Group, are consulted as needed. News reports, US Department of State reports and press releases, and scholarly articles are also consulted as needed.

Sources sometimes use ambiguous language to report fatality estimates. If the reported number is vague (e.g. "dozens," "score," "hundreds," or "thousands") we code these categories as "36," "60," "201," and "2001" respectively, in accordance with similar practices adopted by Ron Francisco in his data on European Protest and Coercion.

Coding: Integer.

Parallel Institution (PI) Variables

Description: This is a series of dummy variables that looks at whether a campaign establishes institutions that provide alternatives to official state institutions.

Coding rules: Variables are coded as "parallel" when there is evidence that the campaign has established (or is continuing to use) the relevant institutions listed below. These are defined as institutions that the campaign establishes itself—not those institutions that used to belong to the state but were taken over by the campaign (for this scenario see "regime defection"). Traditional media encompasses newspapers, television, and broadcast radio. New media is any publicly available internet source of information, including news websites, news blogs, and online radio/video feeds. This variable excludes parallel political parties or "shadow governments" that do not provide any additional services. If those exist, "camp_structure" should be coded as 1, with a note that the campaign contained a shadow government as part of its political organization. If that government provides services, however, those should be noted in the various parallel institution variables describes below.

Coding: 0=none; 1=parallel institution present; -99=unknown

Variable Series:

Education	Social Welfare	Traditional Media	New Media
pi_educ	**pi_socwel**	**pi_tradmedia**	**pi_newmedia**

Police	Armed Wing	Courts
pi_police	pi_army	pi_courts

Audience Backlash Against State Repression

ab_domestic

ab_internat

ab_int_mat

Description: Denotes whether audience costs arise as a result of state repression against the campaign. Three types of audience costs are considered: domestic audience costs, international audience costs, and international material audience costs.

Coding rules: "Domestic condemnation" is coded if prominent individuals or organizations within the country not directly associated with the campaign publically express disapproval of repressive state tactics. "International condemnation" refers to the publicly stated disapproval of politically relevant states (defined as major allies of the target regime) or international organizations. "International material repercussions" concern a range of economic and military activities that raise the costs of repression for the state. This can range from the imposition of formal economic sanctions by IGOs such as the UN to more targeted constraints on material resources such as arms embargoes, withdrawal of international investors, or active military aid or intervention against the regime.

Coding: 0=no visible audience costs; 1=audience costs observed).

Campaign Backlash Against State Repression

camp_backlash

Description: Focuses on the impact of state repression on the campaign.

Coding rules: This ordinal variable gauges the impact of state repression on the degree of popular mobilization associated with the campaign. If there is no substantial campaign activity following repressive action, then the movement is considered suppressed. If there are still some opposition activities, but they are fewer and have smaller numbers of participants, then mobilization is considered decreased. For example, public protests do not have as many participants as prior to the repression. Conversely, if state repression if followed by larger, more prominent opposition activities, then backlash has occurred in the form of "increased domestic mobilization."

Coding: 0=no repression; 1=movement suppressed; 2=decreased domestic mobilization; 3=increased domestic mobilization; -99=unknown

Security Defections

regime_defect

Description: A dummy variable that looks at whether security forces (internal security forces, police, or military) associated with the state break with it to publically announce their support for the opposition movement.

Coding rules: "Defectors" are defined as those people formerly associated with the state, who publically announce their support for the campaign. "Security officials" are those associated with the official police or military apparatus. Often they are generals or military leaders, but this could also be police that decide to not act on state directives to crackdown. The concept of "security defections" does not include other non-state actors that may have been previously loyal to the state. It only refers to those with formal affiliations with the government.

Coding: 0=none; 1=defection; -99=unknown

State Defections

state_defect

Description: A dummy variable that looks at whether leaders associated with the state break with it to publically announce their support for the opposition movement.

Coding rules: "Defectors" are defined as those people formerly associated with the state, who publically announce their support for the campaign. This means that former state officials formally or tacitly support the campaign. This does not include state officials that switch parties but remain committed to the current system. "State officials" refers primarily to the top non-military leadership of the state, such as prominent politicians or cabinet ministers. This can also include prominent officials in various labor, education and regulatory departments of the government that choose to no longer perform their official duties in order to support the campaign. The concept of "state defections" does not include prominent economic elites or other non-state actors. It only refers to those with formal affiliations with the government.

Coding: 0=none; 1=defection; -99=unknown

Regime Support

regime_support

Description: Whether or not the target regime has support from other states. The general focus on here is major powers and regional powers. RAs make note of the top three most important state supporters.

Coding rules: If other states have voiced their confidence in the target regime, defended it from criticism abroad, vetoed or opposed resolutions in the UN Security Council, then the regime is considered to have state "support." If the regime has support, up to three state supporters should be listed. Where the regime has more than three state supporters, the three most globally or regionally important supporters should be listed.

Coding: 1= regime has formal support from other states; 0=otherwise

Withdrawal of State Support for the Regime

wdrwl_support

Description: Whether prominent allies of the target regime explicitly withdraw support from the regime as a signal of disapproval of the regime's actions regarding the campaign.

Coding rules: This is coded a one, only if a state is known to have previously been a close and prominent ally of the targeted regime but rescinds its public support for the government. The absence of continued overt support is insufficient to code the presence of support withdrawal.

Coding: 1=other states have withdrawn support for regime; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

State Support for Campaign

camp_support

Description: Whether or not the campaign has support from other states.

Coding rules: If other states have voiced their support for the opposition campaign, provided arms to insurgents or provided them with other material resources and support, then the campaign is deemed to have state support. If the campaign has support, up to three state supporters should be listed. Where the campaign has more than three supporters, the three most globally or regionally important supporters should be listed.

Coding: 1= campaign has support from other states; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

INGO Support for Campaign

ingo_support

Description: Whether or not the campaign has support from prominent non-governmental organizations.

Coding rules: International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are societal organizations that are not affiliated with any particular state or inter-governmental organization. Prominent examples include Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Doctors Without Borders. As coding of 1 indicates that the campaign has received substantial material support from prominent INGOs, include resources spent advocating on behalf of the campaign specifically, and material resources, training and personnel provided to the campaign.

Coding: 1= campaign has support from INGOs; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Diaspora Support

dias_support

Description: Whether or not the campaign has support from diaspora communities living in countries other than the location country.

Coding rules: A diaspora is defined as those that share the same ethnic, religious or national identity as those in the target country, but who live abroad (for example, Palestinian refugees living in places like Jordan). This variable only includes material support from a diaspora. It does not include other groups or organizations from other countries that support the domestic opposition campaign.

Coding: 1=campaign has support from diasporas living in countries other than the target state; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Direct Sanctions

sdirect

Description: Dichotomous variable indicating whether international sanctions targeted the regime for its behavior vis-à-vis the resistance campaign. Sanctions against individuals and firms do not count as sanctions against the regime.

Coding Rules: Any formal sanctions imposed or sustained against the regime as a consequence of its actions toward the campaign.

Coding: 1=yes; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Lifted Sanctions

slifted

Description: Dichotomous variable indicating whether the international sanctions that targeted the regime for its behavior vis-à-vis the resistance campaign were lifted.

Coding Rules: Lifting of any formal sanctions imposed against the regime as a consequence of its actions toward the campaign.

Coding: 1=yes; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Extent of International Media Coverage

in_media

Description: This variable measures the degree to which the international traditional media covered the campaign.

Coding Rules: If there is evidence that the international media did not cover or sparsely covered the campaign, this should be coded as zero. If the international media provided extensive coverage of the campaign, this variable should be coded as two. Middling amounts of coverage should be coded as one.

Coding: 0=little to none; 1=moderate; 2=high; -99=unknown

Extent of Domestic Media Coverage

dom_media

Description: This variable measures the degree to which domestic traditional media sources covered the campaign.

Coding Rules: The rules are the same as for the extent of international media coverage, but with respect to media sources in the country where the campaign is taking place.

Coding: 0=little to none; 1=moderate; 2=high; -99=unknown

Success

success

Description: Dichotomous variable identifying whether the campaign achieved at least one stated, maximalist goal within 1 calendar year of its end date.

Coding Rules: In most cases, outcome was achieved within a year of the campaign's peak. Some campaigns' goals were achieved years after the "peak" of the struggle in terms of membership, but the success was a direct result of campaign activities. When such a direct link can be demonstrated, these campaigns are coded as successful. This variable will always be coded as a "1" when the "progress" variable is coded as a "4."

Coding: 1=yes; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Strategic Progress

progress

Description: Ordinal variable identifying whether the campaign achieved some or all of its stated overall political objectives. This refers solely to progress toward overthrowing or receiving political concessions from the regime, depending on the campaign's goal. It does not refer to "tactical or operational progress" which focuses on whether the campaign was successful in garnering broader support, conducting particular resistance actions, or immediate tactical effectiveness.

Coding Rules: This variable focuses on whether the campaign as effective in achieving political objectives in terms of changes in the policy position and actions of the target regime. If the state has not changed its position at all, then it is considered to be the status quo. If the state does not make formal or public concessions, but nonetheless changes its behavior to accommodate the opposition, for example by allowing greater protest or political openness than was allowed in the past, it should be coded as "visible gains short of concessions." Verbal statements of conciliation or changes in the stated position of the regime without additional action constitute limited concessions. Real actions short of ultimate capitulation, such as policy changes, the removal of state leaders or the instigation of negotiations with the opposition, constitute significant concessions. Coders should make judgments based on the most significant achievement of the campaign in a particular year.

Coding: 0=status quo; 1=visible gains short of concessions; 2=limited concession achieved; 3=significant concessions achieved; 4=complete success; 5=campaign ends in failure; -99=unknown

Note: Campaign end-years must be coded 5 if status is coded as 1.

Existence of Public Opinion Polling

pub_opinion

Description: This dummy variable indicates whether or not public opinion polling is available during the conflict in the country in which the campaign is taking place, or in the country of the target regime in the case of anti-occupation campaigns. This data is used for future reference and investigation into public views of the campaign.

Coding Rules: Public opinion polling refers to publically available survey data that measures the political views of average citizens in the country in which the campaign is taking place. This may including measures of their support for the government, the opposition campaign, their trust in state institutions or the course of the country.

Coding: 0=no public opinion polling; 1=public opinion polling exists; -99=unknown

Reliability

reliability

Description: In the most basic sense, this variable measures how confident coders are in the accuracy and reliability of the data they submitted.

Coding Rules: After having completed coding for a series of variables for each campaign-year, coders should record how reliable they believe the results are based on two factors: first, the general availability of information used to conduct the research and, second, the perceived credibility of the source material. Data from peer-reviewed journals and published materials are considered highly credible and reliable, while un-referenced web sites are of lower reliability.

Coding: 1=low confidence in the reliability of the data; 2=moderate confidence; 3=high confidence