Diversionary Desecration?
Regime Instability and Societal Violence against Minority Sacred Spaces

Online Appendix

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Table A1. States with Religious Minorities Experiencing Site Targeting (183 total states)

	1990	2014	Mean, 1990-2014
Minor Vandalism	20 / 10.9%	33 / 18.0%	27.5 / 15.0%
Major Vandalism Minor Violence	22 / 12.0%	47 / 25.7%	36.4 / 19.9%
Major Violence	11 / 6.0%	23 / 12.6%	18.4 / 10.0%
Any Site Targeting	53 / 29.0%	103 / 56.3%	82.3 / 45.0%

Table A2. Distribution of Values on Major Variables

	Percentile					
	25	*50*	*75*	*90*	*95*	*99*
Governmental Religious Discrimination (GRD)	0	2	8	17	24	38
Governmental Religious Support (GRS)	5	7	12	24	29	36
Minority Incitement	0	0	0	0	0	3
V-Dem Polyarchy	0.282	0.532	0.791	0.876	0.892	0.913
Youth Male Unemployment	7.207	13.245	20.834	31.367	39.835	55.099
Maximum Coup Risk	0.0006	0.0017	0.0043	0.0078	0.0119	0.0285

Table A3. Descriptive Statistics on Major Variables (1991-2014)

Variable	*N*	*Mean*	*Std Dev*	*Min*	*Max*
Site Targeting Index	15382	0.308	0.771	0	3
Violence v. Sites	15382	1.111	0.427	1	3
Violence v. Minorities	15382	1.047	0.291	1	3
Governmental Religious Discrimination (GRD)	15382	5.340	8.222	0	52
Governmental Religious Support (GRS)	15417	10.445	8.198	0	46
Minority Incitement	15382	0.094	0.523	0	6
V-Dem Polyarchy	15424	0.559	0.264	0.017	0.924
Youth Male Unemployment	15424	15.651	11.521	0.333	71.654
Maximum Coup Risk	15424	0.003	0.005	0.000	0.078

Table A4. Targeting of Minority Sacred Sites, 1991-2014, Mlogits

	(1)		
	Minor Vandalism	Major Vandalism Minor Violence	Major Violence
Government Religious Discrimination Index	0.058**	0.105***	0.061*
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.031)
Government Religious Support Index	-0.013	-0.023	0.067*
	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Minority Incitement vs Majority Religion	0.442*	0.632***	0.631*
	(0.209)	(0.190)	(0.260)
V-Dem Polyarchy	3.074***	3.107***	2.661**
	(0.766)	(0.794)	(0.906)
Annual % Change in Consumer Price Index	0.000**	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male Youth Unemployment Rate	0.019	0.029**	-0.006
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.018)
REIGN Coup Risk	-50.888	-44.974	64.882***
	(65.400)	(37.700)	(14.297)
State Population	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Majority Religion Population Percentage	0.013	-0.003	-0.012
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Minority Religion Population Percentage	0.010	0.029†	0.027
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Religious Fractionalization	3.382	2.729	-3.158
	(4.308)	(2.939)	(4.273)
Religious Polarization	-1.784	-1.790	1.760
	(2.758)	(1.955)	(2.572)
Religious Similarity	-0.892*	-0.463	0.315
	(0.434)	(0.348)	(0.421)
Constant	-6.236***	-5.270***	-5.707***
	(1.415)	(1.293)	(1.451)
Year Effects	Included	Included	Included
Observations		15,382	
Pseudo R^2		0.120	
Log Pseudolikelihood		-8264.686	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country-minority
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A4a. Targeting of Minority Sacred Sites, 1991-2014, Marginal Effects

Variable	*Minor Vandalism*	*Major Vandalism/ Minor Violence*	*Major Violence*
Governmental Religious Discrimination	0.002 * (0.001)	0.005 *** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Minority Incitement	0.017 † (0.009)	0.031 *** (0.009)	0.019 * (0.009)
% Change CPI	6.82e-06 * (2.68e-06)	7.56e-06 ** (2.66e-06)	-3.77e-06 (9.73e-06)
Male Youth Unemployment	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 ** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Coup Risk	-2.353 (3.076)	-2.525 (2.174)	2.663 *** (0.671)
V-Dem Polyarchy	0.125 ** (0.040)	0.148 *** (0.045)	0.077 * (0.034)
Government Religious Support	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.003 * (0.001)

Table A4b. Targeting of Minority Sacred Sites, 1991-2014, Marginal Probabilities, significant marginal effects only

Variable	Value	*Minor Vandalism*	*Major Vandalism/ Minor Violence*	*Major Violence*
Governmental Religious Discrimination	Min (0)	0.043 ***	0.041 ***	
	Median (2)	0.047 ***	0.049 ***	
	95th Pctile (24)	0.092 **	0.252 ***	
Minority Incitement	Min (0)		0.061 ***	0.038 ***
	99th Pctile (3)		0.208 ***	0.132 *
	Max (6)		0.401 **	0.267
% Change CPI	*5th Pctile (0.060)*	*0.052 ****	*0.065 ****	
	Median (4.827)	*0.052 ****	*0.065 ****	
	95th Pctile (43.073)	*0.052 ****	*0.065 ****	
Male Youth Unemployment	5th Pctile (2.425)		0.045 ***	
	Median (13.245)		0.063 ***	
	95th Pctile (39.835)		0.110 ***	
Coup Risk	5th Pctile (0.0003)			0.035 ***
	Median (0.0017)			0.039 ***
	95th Pctile (0.0119)			0.073 ***
V-Dem Polyarchy	5th Pctile (0.095)	0.013 *	0.022 **	0.019 **
	Median (0.532)	0.042 ***	0.060 ***	0.044 ***
	95th Pctile (0.892)	0.096 ***	0.123 ***	0.077 ***
Governmental Religious Support	5th Pctile (3)			0.022 ***
	Median (7)			0.028 ***
	95th Pctile (29)			0.112 *

Table A5. Attacks against Minority Sacred Sites v. Large-Scale Violence against Religious Minorities, 1991-2014, MLogits

	(2)		(3)	
	Attacks on Minority Sacred Sites		Attacks on Religious Minorities	
	Minor	Major	Minor	Major
Government Religious Discrimination Index	0.049*	0.045	0.131***	0.070*
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Government Religious Support Index	-0.019	0.071**	-0.023	0.054
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Minority Incitement vs Majority Religion	0.726***	0.568*	0.611*	0.793***
	(0.173)	(0.250)	(0.252)	(0.228)
V-Dem Polyarchy	2.601*	2.256**	2.898*	0.032
	(1.179)	(0.859)	(1.283)	(1.269)
Annual % Change in Consumer Price Index	-0.002	0.000	-0.002	0.000***
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Male Youth Unemployment Rate	0.013	-0.010	-0.001	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.039)	(0.029)
REIGN Coup Risk	22.113	67.275***	87.456**	107.124***
	(25.029)	(14.211)	(30.676)	(16.905)
State Population	0.000**	0.000†	0.000	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Majority Religion Population Percentage	0.021†	-0.011	0.030†	0.028†
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Minority Religion Population Percentage	0.013	0.022	0.001	-0.003
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.023)
Religious Fractionalization	4.611*	-3.635	5.821*	4.949
	(1.862)	(4.277)	(2.574)	(3.659)
Religious Polarization	-1.518	2.086	-2.525	0.918
	(1.451)	(2.570)	(2.013)	(2.602)
Religious Similarity	-0.244	0.413	1.398†	0.993†
	(0.497)	(0.415)	(0.790)	(0.575)
Constant	-8.388***	-5.538***	-11.882***	-11.369***
	(1.559)	(1.433)	(2.499)	(1.166)
Year Effects	Included	Included	Included	Included
Observations	15,382		15,382	
Pseudo R^2	0.135		0.299	
Log Pseudolikelihood	-3972.187		-1528.094	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country-minority
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A5a. Major Violence vs. Sacred Sites and Religious Minorities, 1991-2014, Marginal Effects

Variable	*Sacred Sites*	*Religious Minorities*
Governmental Religious Discrimination	0.002 (0.001)	0.0010 † (0.0006)
Minority Incitement	0.019 * (0.009)	0.012 ** (0.004)
% Change CPI	-1.41e-06 (0.00001)	4.49e-06 * (2.12e-06)
Male Youth Unemployment	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
Coup Risk	2.410 *** (0.609)	1.606 *** (0.444)
V-Dem Polyarchy	0.077 * (0.033)	-0.001 (0.020)
Governmental Religious Support	0.003 * (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)

Table A5b. Major Violence vs. Sacred Sites and Religious Minorities, 1991-2014, Marginal Probabilities, significant marginal effects only

Variable	Value	*Sacred Sites*	*Religious Minorities*
Governmental Religious Discrimination	Min (0)		
	Median (2)		
	95th Pctile (24)		
Minority Incitement	Min (0)	0.038 ***	0.015 ***
	99th Pctile (3)	0.137 †	0.091 *
	Max (6)	0.270	0.326
% Change CPI	*5th Pctile (0.060)*		*0.020 ******
	Median (4.827)		*0.020 ******
	95th Pctile (43.073)		*0.020 ******
Male Youth Unemployment	5th Pctile (2.425)		
	Median (13.245)		
	95th Pctile (39.835)		
Coup Risk	5th Pctile (0.0003)	0.035 ***	0.014 ***
	Median (0.0017)	0.039 ***	0.016 ***
	95th Pctile (0.0119)	0.069 ***	0.037 ***
V-Dem Polyarchy	5th Pctile (0.095)	0.020 **	
	Median (0.532)	0.045 ***	
	95th Pctile (0.892)	0.083 ***	
Governmental Religious Support	5th Pctile (3)	0.021 ***	
	Median (7)	0.028 ***	
	95th Pctile (29)	0.116 *	

Robustness Checks

- Robustness Check 1: Concerns could be raised that our consistent results demonstrating that minority sacred site targeting is associated with more democratic regimes are an artifact of the manner in which we have measured democracy. We therefore substitute the V-Dem measure for procedural democracy (v2x_polyarchy) with the also widely used Polity project's democracy scores (polity2). Our results, in Table A6 below, neither deviate in any meaningful degree from our primary findings, nor are significance levels associated with this alternate measure meaningfully different from those in our base model.

- Robustness Check 2: Further concerns could be raised that our results demonstrating that minority sacred site targeting is associated with more democratic regimes may be better explained by the behavior of anocratic regimes, those which fall in the mid-range between fully democratic and fully autocratic. To test this possibility, in Table A7, we include both the polity2 democracy measure and its squared counterpart. Because Polity democracy scores are scaled from -10 to +10, the squared variable reorders the base polity2 measure from anocratic regimes (low values on polity2 whether negative or positive) to more definitively democratic or autocratic (high values on polity2 whether negative or positive). Here again we witness no meaningful derivation from our primary models with the exception that the democracy squared term is negative and significant with 95% confidence for high levels of violence against minority sacred sites. This results does support the validity of this proposed critique at high levels of violence. It is also perfectly consistent however with our theoretical expectations that such violence should occur in periods of higher regime instability, more frequently observed in haltingly democratizing regimes as was discussed in the main text vis-a-vis violence targeting Ahmadis in Pakistan.

- Robustness Check 3: As with our democracy measure, concerns could be raised that our finding that major violence targeting sacred sites is associated with regime instability may be an artifact of the measure employed, namely CoupCast's coup risk measure. To check this possibility, we turn to the Cross-National Time Series (CNTS) dataset's measures for internal unrest, although here we note we only have access to relevant data up to 2009. This data has been widely employed by scholars examining diversionary war theory, as is therefore particularly appropriate to test our argument that societal actors take advantage of regime instability to build and consolidate power via victimizing out-groups. In Table A8, we substitute coup risk for the CNTS's weighted internal conflict measure, which measures eight separate threats to internal stability: assassination attempts, strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises, government purges, riots, revolutions, and demonstrations. This measure also has a very low substantive correlation with our measure for minority incitement (Pearson's R=0.097; Spearman's Rho=0.093). Nonetheless, this substitution in no way meaningfully influences our results on our primary variables, while the effect of the CNTS measure is nearly identical to that of the CoupCast measure.

- Robustness Check 4: As a somewhat stricter or perhaps more precise test of our

hypotheses regarding the interplay of elite interests and regime instability, in Table A9, we use a measure built only on CNTS's count of events categorized as "elite unrest", namely the number of government crises and purges which occur in a given year in a given state. This measure, again, returns substantively similar results to those of both our main model and of the previous robustness check. Somewhat weaker statistical significance on the government religious discrimination and government religious support variables observed here, we suggest, are likely an artifact of the constrained temporal range of the CNTS data available to us.

- Robustness Check 5: In Table A10, we examine what effect, if any, we find when we control for violence targeting religious minorities, our dependent variable in main model 3. We include this control here knowing that violence targeting minority sacred sites and violence targeting minority persons are deeply interrelated phenomena, as is also evident in the correlation between our site targeting measure and RASM's primary measure for violence directed against religious minorities (Spearman's Rho=0.359). If we find results consistent with our theoretical expectations despite this known correlation, our inferences are further confirmed.

As expected, violence targeting minority persons is significantly correlated with all three levels of harassment we measure against minority sacred sites. Nonetheless, for both minor vandalism and major vandalism/minor violence, we observe no meaningful deviation from our primary model for our key variables of interest. Regarding major violence, we in fact do see several deviations, however these tend to confirm our findings drawn from comparative analysis of models 2 and 3. Whereas coup risk, governmental religious discrimination, and minority incitement cease to be significant upon inclusion of the minority-targeted violence control, both democracy and (to a lesser degree) state support for religion remain significant. As these are the two conditions we argue predict violence against minority sacred sites yet not against minority persons themselves, this robustness check and its derivations from our main model in fact confirms rather than challenges our theoretical propositions.

- Robustness Check 6: Finally, in Table A11, we address potential concerns that by combining major vandalism and minor violence into a single conceptual category, we may be incorrectly identifying the distinct causes/correlates of either outcome. In this robustness check, we therefore split major vandalism and minor violence into distinct levels within our ordinal dependent variable. We also provide in Table A11a the marginal effects of each independent variable of concern for our analysis based upon this new, more differentiated measure. As expected and appropriate for multinomial logits, coefficients and marginal effects for the lowest and highest intensity outcomes, minor vandalism and major violence respectively, are identical to those presented in the primary model.

In our now differentiated middling categories, we observe distinctions which nonetheless strongly support our hypotheses and primary analysis. Shared between both new middling categories are our original findings that increasing levels of Governmental Religious Discrimination and democracy are significantly associated with these outcomes. By contrast,

percent change in consumer price index and youth male unemployment, both measures of potential for mass unrest, are now only significantly positively associated with major vandalism and not violence. These findings confirm our prior inferences that mass unrest, absent higher level political threats, should be associated primarily with less reactionary harassment. In turn, minority incitement is now only significant associated with minor violence while coup risk is significantly *negatively* associated with major vandalism. These findings strongly confirm our inferences that increasing severity of minority sacred site targeting is associated with retaliatory dynamics, whereas less violent outcomes should *not* be associated with diversionary dynamics.

Although these new results are somewhat more nuanced than those in our main model, they in no way challenge our central theoretical inferences. As such, we have opted to employ this version as the robustness check and retain the original model as a more parsimonious alternative for an already very multifaceted argument.

Table A6. Model 1, Substitution of Polity2 Democracy Measure for V-Dem

	(1)		
	Minor Vandalism	Major Vandalism Minor Violence	Major Violence
Government Religious Discrimination Index	0.057**	0.108***	0.061†
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.032)
Government Religious Support Index	-0.017	-0.027	0.064*
	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.029)
Minority Incitement vs Majority Religion	0.424†	0.567**	0.637*
	(0.230)	(0.204)	(0.269)
Polity2 Democracy Score	0.128***	0.131***	0.104***
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.032)
Annual % Change in Consumer Price Index	0.000**	0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male Youth Unemployment Rate	0.016	0.027**	-0.013
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.018)
REIGN Coup Risk	-95.181	-79.581†	55.436***
	(80.651)	(41.496)	(14.899)
State Population	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Majority Religion Population Percentage	0.011	-0.003	-0.013
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Minority Religion Population Percentage	0.014	0.035†	0.025
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Religious Fractionalization	3.259	2.822	-4.944
	(4.148)	(2.748)	(4.552)
Religious Polarization	-2.077	-2.239	2.487
	(2.661)	(1.806)	(2.781)
Religious Similarity	-0.918*	-0.554	0.373
	(0.435)	(0.351)	(0.432)
Constant	-4.481***	-3.652***	-4.224***
	(1.145)	(1.060)	(1.280)
Year Effects	Included	Included	Included
Observations		15,097	
Pseudo R^2		0.1175	
Log Pseudolikelihood		-8155.137	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country-minority
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A7. Model 1, Substitution of Polity2 and Polity2-squared for V-Dem

	(1)		
	Minor Vandalism	Major Vandalism Minor Violence	Major Violence
Government Religious Discrimination Index	0.058**	0.109***	0.061*
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.031)
Government Religious Support Index	-0.018	-0.026	0.069*
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.028)
Minority Incitement vs Majority Religion	0.420†	0.559**	0.626*
	(0.227)	(0.203)	(0.259)
Polity2 Democracy Score	0.122***	0.136***	0.124***
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.032)
Polity2 Democracy Score, Squared	0.002	-0.002	-0.010*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Annual % Change in Consumer Price Index	0.000**	0.000***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male Youth Unemployment Rate	0.017	0.027**	-0.011
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.017)
REIGN Coup Risk	-88.546	-83.035*	43.427**
	(75.514)	(35.115)	(14.116)
State Population	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Majority Religion Population Percentage	0.012	-0.003	-0.015
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Minority Religion Population Percentage	0.014	0.035†	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Religious Fractionalization	3.378	2.726	-5.700
	(4.236)	(2.728)	(4.447)
Religious Polarization	-2.140	-2.195	2.719
	(2.687)	(1.782)	(2.711)
Religious Similarity	-0.914*	-0.558	0.356
	(0.433)	(0.349)	(0.421)
Constant	-4.598***	-3.537***	-3.405**
	(1.318)	(1.085)	(1.221)
Year Effects	Included	Included	Included
Observations		15,097	
Pseudo R^2		0.1198	
Log Pseudolikelihood		-8133.304	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country-minority
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A8. Model 1, Substitution of CNTS weighted internal conflict measure for CoupRisk, 1991-2009.

	(1)		
	Minor Vandalism	Major Vandalism Minor Violence	Major Violence
Government Religious Discrimination Index	0.056*	0.114***	0.061†
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.032)
Government Religious Support Index	-0.016	-0.032	0.062*
	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Minority Incitement vs Majority Religion	0.360	0.508*	0.538†
	(0.230)	(0.208)	(0.287)
V-Dem Polyarchy	3.591***	3.416***	2.245*
	(0.863)	(0.803)	(0.935)
Annual % Change in Consumer Price Index	0.000***	0.000**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male Youth Unemployment Rate	0.014	0.030**	-0.027
	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.022)
CNTS weighted internal conflict	0.000	0.000	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
State Population	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Majority Religion Population Percentage	0.023	0.005	-0.020
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Minority Religion Population Percentage	0.006	0.027	0.028
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Religious Fractionalization	3.921	3.770	-7.048
	(6.345)	(3.701)	(4.547)
Religious Polarization	-1.456	-1.815	3.682
	(3.907)	(2.343)	(2.562)
Religious Similarity	-0.737	-0.372	0.262
	(0.471)	(0.372)	(0.478)
Constant	-7.743***	-6.623***	-4.154**
	(1.455)	(1.365)	(1.431)
Year Effects	Included	Included	Included
Observations		11,719	
Pseudo R^2		0.1163	
Log Pseudolikelihood		-6026.820	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country-minority
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A9. Model 1, Substitution of CNTS elite unrest measure for CoupRisk, 1991-2009.

	(1)		
	Minor Vandalism	Major Vandalism Minor Violence	Major Violence
Government Religious Discrimination Index	0.056*	0.113***	0.058†
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.032)
Government Religious Support Index	-0.017	-0.032	0.060†
	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.031)
Minority Incitement vs Majority Religion	0.379†	0.530**	0.597*
	(0.227)	(0.206)	(0.289)
V-Dem Polyarchy	3.515***	3.338***	1.992*
	(0.868)	(0.793)	(0.908)
Annual % Change in Consumer Price Index	0.000**	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male Youth Unemployment Rate	0.014	0.030**	-0.024
	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.020)
CNTS Elite Unrest	0.239	0.237†	0.454***
(count of government crises and purges)	(0.153)	(0.134)	(0.129)
State Population	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Majority Religion Population Percentage	0.023	0.006	-0.018
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Minority Religion Population Percentage	0.005	0.027	0.025
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Religious Fractionalization	3.965	3.792	-7.158
	(6.317)	(3.711)	(4.534)
Religious Polarization	-1.483	-1.810	3.853
	(3.893)	(2.358)	(2.565)
Religious Similarity	-0.730	-0.376	0.284
	(0.471)	(0.373)	(0.482)
Constant	-7.704***	-6.592***	-4.076**
	(1.447)	(1.355)	(1.411)
Year Effects	Included	Included	Included
Observations		11,727	
Pseudo R^2		0.1134	
Log Pseudolikelihood		-6049.725	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country-minority
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A10. Model 1, Control for violence targeting religious minorities (DV in Model 3)

	(1)		
	Minor Vandalism	Major Vandalism Minor Violence	Major Violence
Violence Targeting Religious Minority Group	1.700*	1.451*	2.681***
	(0.721)	(0.625)	(0.583)
Government Religious Discrimination Index	0.051*	0.099***	0.042
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.034)
Government Religious Support Index	-0.016	-0.027	0.057†
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Minority Incitement vs Majority Religion	0.340†	0.530**	0.333
	(0.195)	(0.185)	(0.235)
V-Dem Polyarchy	3.037***	3.038***	2.916**
	(0.774)	(0.794)	(1.091)
Annual % Change in Consumer Price Index	0.000**	0.000**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male Youth Unemployment Rate	0.019	0.029**	-0.004
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.019)
REIGN Coup Risk	-63.234	-54.895	29.260
	(59.601)	(38.264)	(23.583)
State Population	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Majority Religion Population Percentage	0.013	-0.003	-0.014
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Minority Religion Population Percentage	0.009	0.030†	0.035†
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Religious Fractionalization	3.006	2.391	-5.544
	(4.295)	(2.970)	(3.757)
Religious Polarization	-1.631	-1.680	2.292
	(2.730)	(1.965)	(2.205)
Religious Similarity	-0.980*	-0.532	-0.042
	(0.445)	(0.352)	(0.471)
Constant	-7.777***	-6.541***	-7.817***
	(1.626)	(1.482)	(1.720)
Year Effects	Included	Included	Included
Observations		15,382	
Pseudo R^2		0.1690	
Log Pseudolikelihood		-7805.640	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country-minority
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A11. Alternative Model 1 using 5-level Site Targeting Variable, Major Vandalism and Minor Violence as Distinct Levels

	(1)			
	Minor Vandalism	Major Vandalism	Minor Violence	Major Violence
Government Religious Discrimination Index	0.058**	0.131***	0.066**	0.060†
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.031)
Government Religious Support Index	-0.014	-0.030	-0.023	0.067*
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Minority Incitement vs Majority Religion	0.434*	0.140	0.791***	0.630*
	(0.213)	(0.326)	(0.205)	(0.267)
V-Dem Polyarchy	3.049***	2.882**	3.033*	2.627**
	(0.760)	(1.017)	(1.210)	(0.895)
Annual % Change in Consumer Price Index	0.000**	0.000***	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Male Youth Unemployment Rate	0.019	0.036**	0.019	-0.005
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.018)
REIGN Coup Risk	-51.978	-208.072*	18.659	65.340***
	(66.168)	(91.849)	(26.132)	(14.240)
State Population	0.000	0.000	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Majority Religion Population Percentage	0.013	-0.019	0.021†	-0.011
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Minority Religion Population Percentage	0.010	0.039	0.018	0.026
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Religious Fractionalization	3.375	2.100	5.037**	-3.271
	(4.354)	(5.226)	(1.872)	(4.309)
Religious Polarization	-1.780	-2.313	-1.799	1.833
	(2.780)	(3.504)	(1.459)	(2.582)
Religious Similarity	-0.887*	-0.559	-0.353	0.320
	(0.434)	(0.444)	(0.508)	(0.420)
Constant	-6.218***	-3.641*	-8.675***	-5.701***
	(1.428)	(1.566)	(1.599)	(1.460)
Year Effects	Included	Included	Included	Included
Observations	15,382			
Pseudo R^2	0.1337			
Log Pseudolikelihood	-8729.488			

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country-minority
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A11a. Targeting of Minority Sacred Sites, 5-level scale, 1991-2014, Marginal Effects

Variable	*Minor Vandalism*	*Major Vandalism*	*Minor Violence*	*Major Violence*
Governmental Religious Discrimination	0.002 * (0.001)	0.004 *** (0.001)	0.002 * (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Minority Incitement	0.017 † (0.009)	0.001 (0.010)	0.017 *** (0.005)	0.020 * (0.009)
% Change CPI	1.07e-05 * (4.95e-06)	8.58e-06 ** (2.80e-06)	-4.53e-05 (4.71e-05)	-1.58e-07 (1.10e-05)
Male Youth Unemployment	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 ** 0.000)	0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0006)
Coup Risk	-2.054 (3.093)	-6.837 * (3.174)	0.692 (0.643)	2.859 *** (0.703)
V-Dem Polyarchy	0.125 *** (0.039)	0.077 * (0.034)	0.061 * (0.030)	0.077 * (0.034)
Government Religious Support	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 * (0.001)