Statistical Appendix for USIP Special Report: "The Mind of the Movement: Exploring the Psychosocial Dynamics of Algeria's Nonviolent Resistance."

Summary of Study Design and Methods	
Sample:	Recruited participants were 200 Algerians involved in the Herak protests in Algiers over the age of 18 (mean age - 36.6, n(f)=88, n(m)=101), between February and March 2020, before the imposition of Covid-19 related movement restrictions in Algeria. There were no exclusion criteria enforced during recruitment, except that participants be 18 years of age or older and able to speak, read and write in Arabic, French, or English.
Procedure:	All participants were recruited by trained enumerators immediately after *Herak* protests in Algiers, near the *Place de la Grande Poste*. In most cases, enumerators conducted the survey as an interview; however in exceptional cases, participants answered questions directly on a tablet.
Measured variables:	**Demographic Information; Individual-level factors:** movement membership (frequency, activities, rituals, motivations); feelings experienced during protests; perceived social status; perceived agency; willingness to sacrifice for the *Herak*; identification with group; Identity Fusion; intragroup fit/cohesion; sacred values; patriotism; victimhood; trust (in group, movement leaders, media, international community, national government, security services); **Group-level factors:** entitativity of group; perceived group agency; perceived efficacy (of the Herak, the government, the military, and youth); shared grievances; centrality of group identity in self identity; group Characteristics/Membership permeability (7 Items); meta-patriotism (3 Items); shared mission among group members; meta-perceptions; perceived essentialism (of security services, military)
Collection & Analysis Plan:	The survey was taken on Qualtrics offline. The data was exported into R for analysis. Participants were excluded from analysis if they did not consent to the use of their data or if they were under 18. Otherwise, no participants required removal. There were participants who had unexpectedly long survey participation time. Enumerators confirmed that this stemmed from pauses in survey taking and incorrect initiation in the Qualtrics software on the tablet in anticipation of the next participant. All outliers in survey time were accounted for. There was a blank question at the end of the survey which served as an attention check, which was consistently passed by enumerators. When participants took the survey directly on the tablet, due to lack of instruction, it was filled out. The population is a convenience sample of those at the protest willing to participate in questioning, so we will attempt to assess the degree of variation and representation within our sample using demographic factors.[1] We used simple observation of the respondent movement population's psychological motivations and compared it to both known psychological findings in the field of violent extremism and existing theoretical models for nonviolent movement participation. Correlational patterns and mean differences between demographics within the sample would be used to identify influential identity factors for further research. The *p*-values reported are significance measures.

[1] For a discussion of this methodology, see Dana R. Fisher et al., "The Science of Contemporary Street Protest: New Efforts in the United States," *Science Advances* 5, no. 10 (2019).

In-Depth Statistical Analysis

We assessed several variables, from demographic information to family history of nonviolent action to individual perceptions and intergroup perceptions. By assessing multiple factors, we sought to capture multiple facets of what it means to participate in the movement and how membership and participation may affect views of self, others in the movement, and other groups.

We break our analysis of the findings down into four sections, focusing on (1) demographic and personal details of the sample, (2) movement participation and group identification, (3) individual-level psychosocial factors related to movement participation, and (4) intergroup perceptions related to movement participation. This results framework enables us to return to our hypotheses in the discussion section.

1. The sample: demographics, personal details

After excluding incomplete responses, the sample included 189 individuals with a mean age of 36.3 years (range 18-78; 101 male, 88 female). Of the sample, at least 81% percent were from urban areas (18 individuals did not report their location of residence); 48% reported to be of Berber/Amazigh ethnicity. Tables 1 and 2 describe the sample.

TABLE 1				
Mean Age	**Mean Age (F)**	**Mean Age (M)**	**Min Age**	**Max Age**
36.3	35.5	37.0	18	78

TABLE 2		
Category	**Item**	**Count**
Sex	Female	88
	Male	101
Residence	Algiers	143
	Béjaïa	1
	Blida	13
	Bouïra	1
	Boumerdes	2
	Chlef	1
	El Bayadh	1
	Jijel	1
	Tipaza	1
	Tizi Ouzou	25
	Urban	153

Urban / Rural	Rural	18
Marital Status	Divorced	6
	Married	90
	Never Married, Single	75
	Separated	5
	Widowed	9
Education	Completed graduate school	21
	Some graduate school	7
	Completed University	33
	Some University	49
	Completed upper secondary education	36
	Some upper secondary education	28
	Completed primary school	13
	Some primary school	2
Religion	Muslim	184
	Christian	2
	Other	1
	Prefer not to answer	2
Ethnicity	Amazigh/Berber (including sub groups)	101
	Arab	72
	Turk	2
	Other	2
Student Status	Current Student	35
	Not Student	153
Employment	Employed	96
	Partially Employed	51
	Informal Labor	4
	Unemployed	14
	Retired	16

Importantly, according to enumerator reports, the Tuesday protests are heavily composed of university students, while the Friday protests attract a more diverse crowd. While enumerators collected data at both Tuesday and Friday protests, only 35 reported to be currently studying in a university or postgraduate education. Thus, our results may be under-emphasizing dynamics specific to students.

2. Movement participation and explicit motivations

Most of those surveyed reported significant involvement with the *Herak*, with **134 (71%) reporting that they participate at least once per week in protest activity**. This high level of participation appears to be rooted in multi-generational activism. 167 individuals (88%) reported that there is a history of activism in their families, particularly involvement in movements in 1988 (40%) and the late 1990s (25%).

152 participants (80%) stated that they participate in the movement for social, political or other principles. Furthermore, only 9 individuals (5%) *disagreed* that participants in the *Herak* have a shared mission (i.e. disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that "*I think all people in the movement share the same ultimate goals as me*"), further suggesting popular support and relative consensus of mission and goals among participants. Table 3 explores the details of movement participation and explicit motivations for involvement.

Table 3

Category	Item	Count
Identify as Activist	Activist	156
	Not activist	31
If not an Activist, Reason	I am not interested in the movement	12
	I do not have the means of transportation to the movement	1
	I do not support the goals of the movement	2
	I have difficulties with mobility	1
	I have too many personal obligations	8
	Time of the protests are not convenient	7
Reason for Activism	because of encouragement from friends	9
	for economic reasons	7
	for political reasons	57
	for social reasons	19
	for the principles	76
	I don't know	7
	Other	8
Movement participation frequency	Multiple times per week	24
	Every Tuesday	16
	Every Friday	94
	Every two weeks	10
	Every month	6

	Every two months	13
	Multiple times per year	6
	Once or twice per year	2
	Never	15
Family Activism History	Yes	167
	No	3
	I don't know	17
Family Activism History, If Yes	Late 90s	47
	Oct 1988	76
	Other	43
Family Activism current	Yes	170
	No	3
	I don't know	16

Most participants reported that they **engage in singing, changing, and coordinated movements during protests**. The vast majority also reported that they feel **strength and pride** while engaging in protest activity. Only 82 participants (43%) reported feeling anger during protests, surprising considering the prominent role of anger in the social movement literature's accounts of the emotional motivations of protest.[2]

3. Psychological factors of membership and intergroup perceptions

While there is broad support for the *Herak*, and explicit motivations and goals among participants are clear, it is unclear how movement participation plays a role in individuals' identity or sense of self, or how nonconscious motivations may attract people to participate.

Identification with the movement is a prominent feature in the social psychology of VEOs, as concepts such as identity fusion[3] affect willingness to sacrifice for the group and general devotion to a group cause, especially when the cause is deemed to be of existential, sacred, or spiritual importance.[4] Similarly, social movement scholars have explored the importance of group identification as a motivator for participation in

[2] Martijn Van Zomeren et al., "Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is! Explaining Collective Action Tendencies through Group-Based Anger and Group Efficacy.," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 87, no. 5 (2004): 649; Colin Wayne Leach, Aarti Iyer, and Anne Pedersen, "Anger and Guilt about Ingroup Advantage Explain the Willingness for Political Action," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 32, no. 9 (2006): 1232–1245.
[3] William B Swann Jr. et al., "Identity Fusion: The Interplay of Personal and Social Identities in Extreme Group Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96, no. 5 (2009): 995–1011.
[4] William B. Swann Jr et al., "Contemplating the Ultimate Sacrifice: Identity Fusion Channels pro-Group Affect, Cognition, and Moral Decision Making.," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 106, no. 5 (2014): 713; Ángel Gómez et al., "The Devoted Actor's Will to Fight and the Spiritual Dimension of Human Conflict," *Nature Human Behaviour* 1, no. 9 (2017): 673–679.

protest.[5] Yet identity fusion and other axes of group belonging remain unexplored in the civil resistance literature, and we know very little about how identification with nonviolent resistance movements may affect other facets of members' social psychology and devotion behaviors.

Herein lies a key distinction between VEOs and nonviolent movements that likely has psychosocial implications. While there are a range of types of participation in violent extremism, most VEOs have more rigid boundaries than nonviolent resistance movements. In a VEO, one is typically clearly in or out. There is only limited possibility of peripheral or passive participation. In contrast, while some organizations within movements have more formal membership criteria,[6] movements tend to be more diffuse, without strict membership criteria, formalized onboarding processes, or minimum requirements for continued participation. Membership in nonviolent movements is often porous and flexible. Peripheral participation is possible, and thus group boundaries may be more loosely defined. Indeed, the availability of lower-cost avenues for participation for the less than fully committed is a key advantage of nonviolent resistance over violent resistance.[7]

Overall then, while nonviolent movements tend to be more inclusive and may promote wider appeal and recruitment than VEOs, their porousness and accommodation of peripheral participation *may reduce* individual members' identification with the movement which could in turn affect devotion, continued engagement, and willingness to endure hardships for the sake of the group. We expand upon how our findings lead us to these claims below:

3.1 Membership, Identity and Group Belonging

To explore the possible distinctions between VEOs and nonviolent movements, we assessed *Herak* participants' perceptions of group cohesiveness, their degree of identification with the movement, the role of participation and shared experiences in their group identification.

Respondents acknowledged the relative porousness of group boundaries and membership in the *Herak*. Specifically, respondents indicated that the movement has unclear leadership; that one can participate to varying degrees and still be considered a member; and that joining and leaving are easy. Table 4 summarizes these responses:

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[5] Marga de Weerd and Bert Klandermans, "Group Identification and Political Protest: Farmers' Protest in the Netherlands," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 29, no. 8 (1999): 1073–95, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199912)29:8<1073::AID-EJSP986>3.0.CO;2-K; Sheldon Stryker, Timothy Joseph Owens, and Robert W. White, eds., *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*, vol. 13 (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota Press, 2000).
[6] Jessica Maves Braithwaite et al., "Introducing the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) Dataset," *NTNU Working Paper*, 2020.
[7] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 37–39.

Table 4 - Group Porousness and Cohesion			
Item	**Mean**	**SD**	**Scale Range**
The movement has clear leaders	2.22	1.08	Strongly disagree-1 Strongly agree-7
Membership to the movement is definite, you are either in or out	2.89	1.12	Strongly disagree-1 Strongly agree-7
A person can be less active in the movement and still a member	5.23	1.36	Strongly disagree-1 Strongly agree-7
Once you are part of the movement, you are a member for life	3.10	1.28	Strongly disagree-1 Strongly agree-7
It is hard to become a member of the movement	2.74	1.16	Strongly disagree-1 Strongly agree-7
It is hard to leave the movement	2.00	1.08	Strongly disagree-1 Strongly agree-7

While group boundaries are clearly flexible, and membership is not rigid, we found that a large percentage of respondents strongly identify with the *Herak*, as measured along the dimensions listed in Table 5.

Table 5			
Item	**Mean**	**SD**	**Scale Range**
Identification with Group	5.40	0.84	Strongly disagree-1 Strongly agree-7
Identity Fusion (Algeria)	4.94	0.40	no fusion -1 complete fusion-5
Identity Fusion (*Herak*)	4.36	0.56	no fusion -1 complete fusion-5
Intragroup Fit	5.23	0.84	Low fit-1 High fit-7
Centrality of Group ID	5.14	1.04	Not Central-1 Central-7

Respondents reported a high degree of identification with the *Herak* across all measures. Of note, respondents demonstrated even greater *fusion* with the country of Algeria than with the *Herak* (4.94 vs 4.36), though fusion with both Algeria and the *Herak* were high.

Identity fusion with the *Herak* correlated with the various other group identification measures. Fusion with the *Herak* positively correlated with **in-group identification** (r = 0.63, p = 1.39e-33), **perceived fit** within the movement (r = 0.53, p = 2.69e-26), and more weakly with the **centrality of the Herak in personal identity** (r = 0.39, p = 8.40e-17). Overall then, the measures used to assess group identification correlated neatly amongst each other, suggesting that **it is possible for a nonviolent movement like the *Herak* to play an important and central role in personal identity of members, even though membership is loosely defined and peripheral participation is possible.**

Other research has suggested that participation in collective *activities*, especially risky activities, may increase individual identification with a specific group.[8] Given that the *Herak*'s activities are not counter-normative, are easy to join, and are lower risk (though not without any risk), it is possible that participation in group activities may not have a significant identity-consolidating effect in the same way that initiation rites or ritualized violence may catalyze identification within a VEO. However, we hypothesized that participation in *Herak* activities would correlate with group identification nonetheless.

Of note, among those surveyed, **frequency of protest participation did not correlate with group identification** measures, and **experience of police brutality at protests was negatively correlated with group identification**.[9] We will explore that relationship in greater detail below.

3.2 Nonconscious Drivers

Shared mission, shared grievance, and participation in protests may not comprehensively capture the drivers of involvement or identification with the *Herak*. VEO research suggests that unconscious psychosocial factors such as disempowerment, low agency, isolation, victimhood, psychological trauma, or sacred values, push people towards extremist groups, and that these drivers may be more important than explicit motivations or expressed grievances, even if not explicitly expressed or acknowledged.

As mentioned, many of the psychosocial factors that often encourage participation in VEOs are quite common. And while these factors alone do not necessarily or consistently increase risk of recruitment into

[8] Littman, R. (2018). Perpetrating violence increases identification with violent groups: Survey evidence from former combatants. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *44*(7), 1077-1089.
[9] This relationship fits well with findings from a similarly repressive context in post-2013 coup Egypt. See Arin H. Ayanian and Nicole Tausch, "How Risk Perception Shapes Collective Action Intentions in Repressive Contexts: A Study of Egyptian Activists during the 2013 Post-Coup Uprising," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 55, no. 4 (2016): 700–721.

violent extremism, they may affect individuals' attraction to collective action generally. Simply, discontent and perceived relative deprivation often fuels interest in collective action either violent or nonviolent.[10]

We sought to assess some of these unconscious psychosocial factors among *Herak* participants, to develop a more comprehensive picture of the psychosocial context of individuals who identify strongly with the movement and who may be most devoted to the cause. Specifically, we explored perceptions of status, agency, self-efficacy, victimhood, sacred values and patriotism to create a better understanding of implicit factors that may contribute to attraction, identification, and devotion to the *Herak*. Table 5 lists some of the initial findings among the respondents.

Table 6 - Contributing Psychosocial Factors

Item	Mean	SD	Scale Range
Perceived Social Status (of those in movement)	7.47	1.67	High status - 10 Low status - 1
Personal Agency	2.63	0.46	High -1 / Low - 5
Victimhood	4.97	0.79	Low - 1 / High - 7
Patriotism	6.48	0.46	Low - 1 / High - 7
Sacred Values (democracy)	5.38	0.89	Low val - 1 High val - 7

Social status, personal agency, and victimhood means on their own did not suggest anything noteworthy about the sample. Those surveyed reported that they are highly patriotic and place a high value on democracy--both factors possibly playing a role in participants identification with and devotion to the movement. Importantly, democracy served as the focus of our *sacred value* measure, as our research partners in Algeria suggested it is the core value of the *Herak*.

3.3. Al-Herak versus other groups

On their own, the variables measured suggest that *Herak* members report high identification with the group and place a high value on both Algeria and democracy. Furthermore, members do not necessarily consider themselves different in status from others in the society, and many of them have already

[10] William A. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, vol. 1 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 53–76; Dominic Abrams and Georgina Randsley de Moura, "The Psychology of Collective Political Protest," in *The Social Psychology of Politics: Social Psychological Applications to Social Issues*, ed. Victor C. Ottati et al. (Boston, MA: Springer, 2002), 193–214; Diana D. Van Bergen et al., "Collective Identity Factors and the Attitude toward Violence in Defense of Ethnicity or Religion among Muslim Youth of Turkish and Moroccan Descent," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 47 (2015): 89–100.

endured adverse experiences in the name of the cause. We have a somewhat clear picture of who is part of the *Herak*, their core values, and some possible implicit motivations beyond the stated cause.

It is well documented that perceptions of in-group members differ from perceptions of out-group members.[11] Identification with the in-group often influences perception of members of other groups, and psychology of intergroup conflict research suggests that group identification may affect meta-perceptions (i.e. what you think members of the other group think of you and your group),[12] perceived essentialism[13] (i.e. the sameness and alikeness of out-group members) and trust,[14] among other variables.

To explore these issues, we assessed mean differences between respondents' perceptions of *Herak* members and members of other groups relevant and adversarial to the Herak, focusing on the psychosocial features listed above. As a second step, we assessed the relationship between **the degree of in-group identification with the *Herak* and out-group perceptions.**

First we assessed perceptions of **efficacy** (e.g. effectiveness at achieving stated aims) among various groups in Algeria: the *Herak*, the government, the military, and Algeria's youth. Figure 2 illustrates that respondents viewed Youth and the Herak as most effective among the four groups proposed.

[11] Linda W. Chang, Amy R. Krosch, and Mina Cikara, "Effects of Intergroup Threat on Mind, Brain, and Behavior," *Current Opinion in Psychology* 11 (2016): 69–73; Emile G. Bruneau, Mina Cikara, and Rebecca Saxe, "Parochial Empathy Predicts Reduced Altruism and the Endorsement of Passive Harm," *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 8, no. 8 (2017): 934–942.
[12] Samantha Moore-Berg et al., "The Partisan Penumbra: Political Partisans' Exaggerated Meta-Perceptions Predict Intergroup Hostility," 2020.
[13] Maykel Verkuyten and Peary Brug, "Multiculturalism and Group Status: The Role of Ethnic Identification, Group Essentialism and Protestant Ethic," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 34, no. 6 (2004): 647–661.
[14] Michael A. Hogg, "Social Identity Theory," in *Understanding Peace and Conflict through Social Identity Theory*, ed. Kelley McKeown, Reeshma Haji, and Neil Ferguson (Springer, 2016), 3–17; Carsten KW De Dreu, Daniel Balliet, and Nir Halevy, "Parochial Cooperation in Humans: Forms and Functions of Self-Sacrifice in Intergroup Conflict," in *Advances in Motivation Science*, vol. 1 (Elsevier, 2014), 1–47.

Figure 2: Average Levels of Perceived Efficacy Across Groups



Columns are average response to question "How effective is the following group in achieving its goals?"
Responses measured on a 1-7 scale from "extremely ineffective" to "extremely effective."
Errors bars are a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.

All category response distributions were found to be significantly different ($p<0.01$) by paired sample Wilcoxon test. Perceived efficacy of youth was statistically significantly greater than perceived efficacy of the Herak, which was significantly greater than perceived efficacy of the military, which was greater than perceived efficacy of the government which was seen as the least effective.

Second we assessed **trust** in various groups relevant to Algeria, in this case 1) participants in the *Herak*, 2) organizers of the *Herak*, 3) the government, 4) the military, 5) local media, and 6) other countries who may involve themselves in Algeria's affairs. As seen in Figure 3, people trust *Herak* members and organizers most, while they trust the media and government least. All category response distributions were found to be significantly different ($p<0.01$) by paired sample Wilcoxon test except for trust in government versus trust in Algerian media, meaning that mean levels of trust in various groups were significantly different from each other.

Figure 3: Average Levels of Trust Across Groups



Columns are average response to question "Indicate how much you agree with the following statement: I trust this group" for each of the groups mentioned. Responses measured on a 1-7 scale from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree." Errors bars are a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.

Third we assessed respondents' **meta-perceptions** of various groups. We focused on patriotism and nationalism, exploring respondents' perceptions of other groups' thoughts about the *Herak's* love for Algeria. Specifically, we asked protesters to what extent the government, military, and other countries think *Herak* protesters love their country. Figure 4 shows that *Herak* members think that the military has the highest perception of protesters' love for Algeria (1 indicating positive meta-perception). The military meta-perceptions mean was found to be significantly different ($p<0.01$) by paired sample Wilcoxon test.

Figure 4: Meta-Perception of Patriotism Across Groups



Columns are average response to: "Indicate how much you agree with the following statement: This group thinks that people in my movement love Algeria" for each of the groups mentioned. Responses measured on a 1-7 scale from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree." Errors bars are a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.

Interestingly, when *Herak* participants were asked directly if they think the government and military love Algeria, there was consensus that both the government and the military also love Algeria. **There was no significant difference between in-group perceptions and meta-perceptions with respect to love of country.**

Fourth and finally, we assessed **perceptions of out-group essentialism.**[15] Essentialism refers to belief in the existence of underlying natures that constitute and differentiate social categories. In this case we focused on homogeneity and uniformity of the *Herak*, the police and the military. Police and military were divided as separate referent groups given that the police and military have different interactions with protestors and may thus be quite distinct categories. Of note, **responses did not suggest significant essentialism of out-groups** among members of the *Herak*, nor did they endorse high in-group homogeneity, suggesting that members of the *Herak* see both themselves and the security forces as complex, heterogenous groups.

3.4. Group identification and intergroup perceptions

Participants of the Herak generally have greater trust in their own group than they have in out-groups, and see their group as more efficacious than the military or government. These findings make sense considering the *Herak's* popularity and relative success. It is important to note that we saw limited significant difference in perceived patriotism, meta-perceptions, and essentialism among the groups studied.

We also sought to assess how **identification with the Herak interacts with intergroup perceptions as well as devotion to the cause**. Previous studies of VEOs suggest that degree of identification differs among group members and plays a crucial role in directing devotion and behavior; however, scholars have not assessed the extent to which degree of group identification plays the same role among members of nonviolent action movements in non-democracies.

First, we assessed correlations **between identity fusion with the *Herak* and various social perceptions**. Observed correlations were as follows:

- Identity fusion was moderately positively correlated with the perception that Herak members all have **shared grievances** (r=0.45, p=2.29e-09)
- Identity fusion was moderately positively correlated with the perception that Herak members are "**members for life**." (r=0.43, p=1.11e-06)
- Identity fusion was moderately positively correlated with **perceived patriotism** of Herak members (r=0.35, p=3.89e-04)

[15] Vincent Ed Yzerbyt, Charles M. Judd, and Olivier Ed Corneille, *The Psychology of Group Perception: Perceived Variability, Entitativity, and Essentialism.* (Psychology Press, 2004).

- Identity fusion was moderately positively correlated with **essentialist views of the police** (r=0.39, p=1.18e-05)
- Identity fusion was moderately positively correlated with **essentialist views of the military** (r=0.37, p=9.96e-05)
- Identity fusion was moderately negatively correlated with **trust in government** (r=-0.46, p=1.82e-10)
- Identity fusion was moderately negatively correlated with **trust in Algerian media** (r=-0.36, p=1.35e-04)

Second, we assessed correlations **between in-group (Herak) identification and various social perceptions**. Observed correlations were as follows:

- In-group identification was strongly positively correlated with the perception that *Herak* members all have **shared grievances** (r=0.61, p=2.06e-16)
- In-group identification was moderately positively correlated with **perceived patriotism** of the Herak (r=0.48, p=4.17e-06)
- In-group identification was moderately positively correlated with **essentialist views of the police (**r=0.57, p=2.51e-12)
- In-group identification was moderately positively correlated with **essentialist views of the military** (r=0.53, p=3.73e-10)
- In-group identification was moderately negatively correlated with **trust in government** (r=-0.40, p=5.53e-06)

Third, we assessed correlations **between perceived entitativity (e.g. the degree to which members of a group are a homogeneous unified entity) of the Herak and various social perceptions**. Observed correlations were as follows:

- Entitativity was moderately positively correlated with experiences of **police brutality** (r=.56, p=3.54e-14)
- Entitativity was moderately positively correlated with subjective **social status of members** of the movement (r=.56, p=9.13e-16)
- Entitativity was moderately positively correlated with **centrality of group identity** (r=.46, p=1.29e-10)
- Entitativity was moderately positively correlated with **willingness to sacrifice** for the Herak (r=.46, p=4.14e-06)
- Entitativity was moderately negatively correlated with perceived **efficacy of the government** (r=-.56, p=1.55e-15)
- Entitativity was weakly negatively correlated with **meta-perceptions** of the government (r=-.32, p=8.53e-06), the military (r=-.27, p=2.22e-02), and other countries (r=-.34, p=1.30e-06)

Overall, we see that degree of identification with the Herak was associated with strong positive feelings about the in-group, as well as greater essentialist views of security services and lower trust in government and media. Entitativity in particular also correlated with perceptions of efficacy as well as meta-perceptions of government and security actors.

3.5. A closer look at victimhood and sacrifice

Devotion and sacrifice are hallmarks of both violent extremist organizations and nonviolent resistance movements. Those who are most devoted to a cause are typically those most willing to sacrifice for it. Furthermore, it is intuitive that devotion would be driven by existential and sacred concerns, or a sense of victimization at the hands of a powerful perpetrator. As such, devotion, sacrifice and perceived victimhood appear frequently in studies that explore the motivations and psychosocial dynamics of VEOs. However, much less is known about these social psychological issues among participants in nonviolent collective action movements.

In Table 6 we noted that *Herak* participants placed a high value on democracy when framed as a sacred value. They also indicated a high level of perceived victimhood which included four components: (1) the need for recognition, (2) moral elitism, (3) lack of empathy, and (4) rumination. Additionally, a large number of respondents reported adverse experiences with the security services.

Degree of perceived **victimhood** was related to several other variables. Perceived victimhood was moderately positively correlated with **in-group identification** (r=0.51, p=1.96e-10), perceived **patriotism** (r=0.47, p=3.28e-03), **essentialist views of the police** (r=0.45, p=9.75e-08), **essentialist views of the military** (r=0.39, 5.33e-05), and interestingly, perceived **efficacy of the government** (r=0.37, p=6.84e-07). Additionally, victimhood moderately negatively correlated with **experiences of brutality** (r = 0.37, p = 2.18e-05) and of note, victimhood was ***negatively associated with willingness to sacrifice for the Herak*** (r = -.23, p = 2.28e-02).

Willingness to sacrifice was positively correlated with **perceived entitativity of the Herak** as a group (r = 0.43, p = 4.14e-06), but was moderately negatively correlated with **trust in the military** (r = -0.44, p = 7.99e-10), perceived **efficacy of the government** (r = -0.53, p = 2.38e-13), perceived essentialism of both police (r=-0.41, p=6.43e-09) and military (r=-0.44, p=5.85e-08), and as mentioned, victimhood (r = -.23, p = 2.28e-02).

Lastly, experiences of **security service brutality** during protests was moderately *negatively* associated with **victimhood** (r = -0.37, p = 2.18e-05), and strongly negatively associated with **perceived essentialism of the military** (r = -0.67, p = 5.26e-25) and the **police** (r = -0.70, p = 6.54e-27).

Furthermore, experience of brutality was strongly *negatively* associated with perceived **efficacy of the government** (r = -0.69, p = 1.24e-30), and moderately *positively* associated with the entitativity of the Herak (r = 0.56, p = 3.54e-14) and willingness to sacrifice for the Herak (r = 0.51, p = 1.76e-12)