"Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships"

Online Appendix

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This Appendix is divided up into two sections. Section 1 presents the proof of the results discussed in section 3.2 'Solution' (section 1.1), as well as the formal statement and proof of the lemmas and claims in section 3.3 'Extensions and Discussion' (section 1.2). Section 2 presents quantitative tests on differences between military and non-military leaders, expanding on Table 1.

1 Formal Statements and Proofs

1.1 Proof of the Results in Section 3.2 'Solution'

Proof. (Proof of lemma 1). (a) is straightforward. Consider the expected payoff of any player who was not eliminated in round 1. First assume that the cost of violence is drawn from the cdf $F(c)$. The expected payoff of player i, if she is a leader or a faction, is respectively

$$\pi_i = \frac{\gamma_{i,2}}{\sum_{j:s_{j,2}\neq e}\gamma_{j,2}} + \left(1 - \frac{\gamma_{i,2}}{\sum_{j:s_{j,2}\neq e}\gamma_{j,2}}\right)\left(\int_0^1 c dF(c) + 1 - F(1)\right) \quad (1)$$

$$\pi_i = \frac{\gamma_{i,2}}{\sum_{j:s_{j,2}\neq e}\gamma_{j,2}} \int_0^1 (1-c)\, dF(c) \quad (2)$$

Therefore, expected payoffs in non-democracy reduce to equation (1) in the body of the paper, with $u(l) = 1$, $u(f) = 0$, $\theta_{ND} = \int_0^1 (c-1)\, dF(c) + 1$.

In democracy, the cost of violence is either taken from $F(c)$ or from $F_{con}(c)$. If the cost of violence is taken from $F_{con}(c)$, then the leader gets 1 and any faction gets 0. Therefore, the expected payoff in democracy reduces to equation (1) in the body of the paper, where $u(l) = 1$, $u(f) = 0$, $\theta_D = p_{con} + (1 - p_{con})\theta_{ND}$. ■

Proof. (Proof of lemma 2). Assume that player 1 makes the elimination decision. She receives $\theta_{ND} + (1 - \theta_{ND})\frac{\gamma_t(t_1)+\gamma_s(l)}{\sum_{j=1}^N \gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)}$ if she eliminates no player, and $-c_1 + \theta_{ND} + (1 - \theta_{ND})\frac{\gamma_t(t_1)+\gamma_s(l)}{\sum_{j\neq p} \gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)}$ if she eliminates player p. Eliminating a player with high capacity for violence is more beneficial than eliminating a player with low capacity for violence. Eliminating a player with high capacity for violence is better than not eliminating anyone if and only if the cost of violence is sufficiently low (i.e. condition (3) in the body of the paper holds).

Assume that faction $i \neq 1$ makes the elimination decision. It accepts player 1's offer to remain in office if and only if

$$-c_1 + \theta_{ND} + (1 - \theta_{ND})\frac{\gamma_t(t_i) + \gamma_s(l)}{\sum_{j\neq 1}\gamma_t(t_j) + \gamma_s(l)} \leq (1 - \theta_{ND})\frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^N \gamma_t(t_j) + \gamma_s(l)} \quad (3)$$

which reduces to condition (4) in the body of the paper. It accepts player 1's offer

to step down if and only if

$$-c_1 + \theta_{ND} + (1-\theta_{ND})\frac{\gamma_t(t_i)+\gamma_s(l)}{\sum_{j\neq 1}\gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)} \leq \theta_{ND} + (1-\theta_{ND})\frac{\gamma_t(t_i)+\gamma_s(l)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N}\gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)} \tag{4}$$

which reduces to condition (6), in the body of the paper, failing.

Moving up, player 1 receives $\theta_{ND} + (1-\theta_{ND})\frac{\gamma_t(t_1)+\gamma_s(l)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N}\gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)}$ if she remains in office, $(1-\theta_{ND})\frac{\gamma_t(t_1)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N}\gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)}$ if she becomes a faction and $-k$ if she is eliminated. She prefers to remain in office than to become a faction and fares worst when she is eliminated. Her optimal decision to step down follows. In ordering the cut-off values for c_1, note that $\triangle g_i(1,l) < \triangle g_i(1,f)$. ■

Proof. (Proof of claim 1). Write $\Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_i, ND)$ for the probability that the dictator is eliminated in round 1, conditional on her ouster, her type, the type of the player i who makes the elimination decision in round 1, in non-democracy. We can write:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, ND) &= \sum_{i\neq 1}\frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j\neq 1}\gamma_t(t_j)}\Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_i, ND) \\ &= \sum_{i\neq 1}\frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j\neq 1}\gamma_t(t_j)}\frac{F((1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_i(1,l))}{F(\theta_{ND}+(1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_i(1,f))}\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Now note that

$$\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0}\Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, ND) = \lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0}\Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_H, ND) \tag{6}$$

Also, $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0}\triangle g_i(1,l) = 0$ if $t_1 = t_L$ and $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0}\triangle g_i(1,l) > 0$ if $t_1 = t_H$, so that

$$\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1 = t_L, ND) = 0 < \lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1 = t_H, ND) \tag{7}$$

Condition (7) in the body of the paper follows by continuity of $F(c)$. ■

Proof. (Proof of claim 2). First I show that for any dictator, democratization is associated with a (weak) decrease in the probability of elimination, conditional on ouster, and that this decrease is strict if either the degree of inclusiveness or of contestation is strictly greater in democracy than in non-democracy. Formally, there exists a threshold $\overline{\gamma_t(t_L)} < \gamma_t(t_H)$ such that for any $\gamma_t(t_L) \in \left(0, \overline{\gamma_t(t_L)}\right)$ and for any t_1, then

$$\Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, ND) \geq \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, D) \tag{8}$$

with the inequality strict if either $p_{in} > 0$ or $p_{con} > 0$.

To see this, recall that the probability that the dictator is eliminated, conditional on being ousted in non-democracy, is given by equation (5) above. The probability that the former dictator is eliminated, conditional on being ousted in democracy, is

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, D) &= \sum_{i \neq 1} \delta_i(p_{in}) \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_i, D) \\ &= \sum_{i \neq 1} \delta_i(p_{in})(1 - p_{con}) F((1 - p_{con})(1 - \theta_{ND}) \triangle g_i(1, l)) \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where

$$\delta_i(p_{in}) = \left(p_{in} \frac{\rho(t_i)}{\sum_{j \neq 1} \rho(t_j)} + (1 - p_{in}) \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j \neq 1} \gamma_t(t_j)} \right) \tag{10}$$

First I show that democratization is associated with a (weak) reduction in the probability of elimination, conditional on ouster. Indeed, note that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, ND) &= \sum_{i \neq 1} \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j \neq 1} \gamma_t(t_j)} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_i, ND) \\ &\geq \sum_{i \neq 1} \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j \neq 1} \gamma_t(t_j)} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_i, D) \\ &\geq \sum_{i \neq 1} \delta_i(p_{in}) \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_i, D) \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

The first inequality follows from

$$\Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_i, ND) \geq \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_i, D) \tag{12}$$

given $F(\theta_{ND} + (1 - \theta_{ND}) \triangle g_i(1, f)) \leq 1$ and $p_{con} \geq 0$, and it is strict if $p_{con} > 0$. The second inequality follows from $\frac{\gamma_t(t_H)}{\rho(t_H)} > \frac{\gamma_t(t_L)}{\rho(t_L)}$ and

$$\Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_H, D) \geq \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, t_L, D) \tag{13}$$

This condition itself follows from the fact that for any i' and i'' such that $t_{i'} = t_H$ and $t_{i''} = t_L$, then $\triangle g_{i'}(1, l) > \triangle g_{i''}(1, l)$ for any t_1, and it holds strictly if $\gamma_t(t_L)$ is sufficiently small that $F((1 - p_{con})(1 - \theta_{ND}) \triangle g_i(1, l)) < 1$ for $t_i = t_L$.

Thus, I conclude that there exists a threshold $\overline{\gamma_t(t_L)} < \gamma_t(t_H)$ such that for any $\gamma_t(t_L) \in \left(0, \overline{\gamma_t(t_L)}\right)$ and for any t_1, then

$$\Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, ND) \geq \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1, D) \tag{14}$$

with the inequality being strict if $p_{con} > 0$ or $p_{in} > 0$.

Second I show that the decrease in the probability of elimination, conditional on ouster, that is associated with democratization, is strictly larger for a dictator with type t_H than for a dictator with type t_L.

First note that the decrease in the probability of elimination, conditional on ouster, can be made arbitarily small for a dictator of type $t_1 = t_L$ in any regime R. Indeed, $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L) \to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1 = t_L, R) = 0$ for $R \in \{D, ND\}$, since $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L) \to 0} \triangle g_i(1, l) = 0$ if $t_1 = t_L$.

Second note that the decrease in the probability of elimination, conditional on ouster, is bounded away from zero for a dictator of type $t_1 = t_H$. Indeed, use condition (6) above and note that there is a $\overline{\gamma_t(t_L)} < \gamma_t(t_H)$ such that for any $\gamma_t(t_L) \in \left(0, \overline{\gamma_t(t_L)}\right)$ then

$$\begin{aligned} &\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L) \to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1 = t_H, t_i = t_H, ND) \\ \geq &\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L) \to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1 = t_H, t_i = t_H, D) \\ \geq &\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L) \to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | s_{1,2} \neq l, t_1 = t_H, D) \end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

The first inequality follows from condition (12) above, and is strict if $p_{con} > 0$. The second inequality follows from condition (13) above, and is strict if $p_{in} > 0$. This completes the proof of the claim. ■

Proof. (Proof of claim 3). Write $Eu_{1,t}(t_1, R)$ as the expected utility of player 1, at the start of round t, given her type and the regime. If the consequences of elimination are sufficiently harsh, the optimal regime for the dictator is the regime

that minimizes the probability that she is eliminated.

The unconditional probability that the dictator is eliminated in non-democracy is given by the following:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(s_{1,2}=e|t_1,ND) &= \sum_{i\neq 1}\frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N}\gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)}\Pr(s_{1,2}=e|t_1,t_i,ND)\\ &= \sum_{i\neq 1}\frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N}\gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)}F((1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_i(1,l)) \qquad (16)\end{aligned}$$

The unconditional probability that the dictator is eliminated in democracy is given in equations (9) and (10) above (the unconditional and conditional probabilities are the same, since by democratizating, there is a new leader with probability one).

Note that $\Pr(s_{1,2}=e|t_1,ND)>0$, $\frac{\partial \Pr(s_{1,2}=e|t_1,D)}{\partial p_{con}}<0$ and $\Pr(s_{1,2}=e|t_1,D)=0$ if $p_{con}=1$. Therefore, there is a minimum probability $\underline{p_{con}}(t_1,p_{in})$ such that a dictator democratizes if and only if $p_{con}\geq \underline{p_{con}}(t_1,p_{in})$.

Now consider (a). At $p_{in}=p_{con}=0$, then $\Pr(s_{1,2}=e|t_1,ND)<\Pr(s_{1,2}=e|t_1,D)$, since the dictator may be chosen by Nature to make the elimination decision in non-democracy. Therefore, $\underline{p_{con}}(t_1,0)>0$. Next note that if $\gamma_t(t_L)$ is sufficiently small, so that $F((1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_i(1,l))<1$ for $t_i=t_L$, then condition (13) above holds strictly and $\frac{\partial \Pr(s_{1,2}=e|t_1,D)}{\partial p_{in}}<0$, since $\frac{\gamma_t(t_H)}{\rho(t_H)}>\frac{\gamma_t(t_L)}{\rho(t_L)}$. Therefore, the threshold $\underline{p_{con}}(p_{in},t_1)$ is decreasing in p_{in}.

Now consider (b). Recall from the proof of claim 2 that $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0}\Pr(s_{1,2}=e|s_{1,2}\neq l,t_1=t_L,R)=0$ for $R\in\{D,ND\}$. Therefore, the reduction in the probability of elimination is arbitrarily small, for the dictator with low capacity for violence. The expected utility of the dictator tends to zero in democracy, i.e. $lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0}Eu_{11}(D)=0$. By contrast, her expected utility remains strictly

positive in non-democracy, since she still has a chance to be chosen by Nature in each round and thus claim the spoils of office commensurate with her status as leader, i.e. $lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} Eu_{11}(ND) \geq \left(\frac{\gamma_s(l)}{N_{H,1}\gamma_t(t_H)+\gamma_s(l)}\right)^2 \theta_{ND} > 0$. Therefore, we conclude that $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \underline{p_{con}}(t_1, p_{in}) = 1$ if $t_i = t_L$.

By contrast, the value $\underline{p_{con}}(t_1, p_{in})$ is strictly bounded away from 1 for a dictator of type $t_1 = t_H$, since democratization leads to a strict decrease in the probability of elimination. Indeed, using equation (16) above, I conclude that

$$\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | t_1 = t_H, ND) = \frac{N_{H,1}\gamma_t(t_H)}{(N_{H,1}+1)\gamma_t(t_H)+\gamma_s(l)} \lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} F((1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_i(1,l)) \tag{17}$$

for $t_i = t_H$. By contrast

$$\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e | t_1 = t_H, D) \leq (1-p_{con}) \lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} F((1-p_{con})(1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_i(1,l)) \tag{18}$$

for $t_i = t_H$, using condition (13) above. Therefore, we conclude that $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \underline{p_{con}}(t_H, p_{in}) < \frac{\gamma_t(t_H)+\gamma_s(l)}{(N_{H,1}+1)\gamma_t(t_H)+\gamma_s(l)} < 1$. Claim (b) follows. ■

1.2 Formal Statement and Proof of the Results in Section 3.3 'Discussion and Extensions'

Here we state and prove the results of the game of consolidation discussed in section 3.3. We solve the game by backward induction.

1.2.1 The Division of the Spoils of Office

Lemma 1 in the text still holds and determines the outcome of round 2 and the expected payoff of any player who enters this round without having been elimi-

nated.

1.2.2 Leadership Transition in Dictatorships

First assume that the dictator does not democratize in round 0.

Consider round 1a. Let n be the leader at the start of round 1a. Write $\triangle g_{i,1a}(p,q)$ for the increase in relative capacity for violence of player i who decides in round 1a to eliminate player p, when she would have status of q if she did not eliminate p, and when eliminating player p does not cause a transition from democracy to non-democracy. The latter caveat is added because the decision to eliminate a democratic leader would cause a transition to non-democracy if the democratic leader did not already offer to step down due to the threat of violence. I will return to this possibility in the next subsection. $\triangle g_{i,1a}(p,q)$ can be expressed as follows:

$$\triangle g_{i,1a}(p,q) = \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)+\gamma_s(l)}{\sum_{\substack{j:s_{j,1a}\neq e \\ j\neq p}} \gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)} - \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)+\gamma_s(q)}{\sum_{j:s_{j,1a}\neq e} \gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)} \tag{19}$$

I obtain the following:

Lemma 4 *There is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in round 1a in non-democracy. Let n be the leader at the start of round 1a. If n is chosen to make the elimination decision, she eliminates a faction p with high capacity for violence if*

$$c_{1a} < (1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_{n,1a}(p,l) \tag{20}$$

and she eliminates no player otherwise. If a faction $i \neq n$ is chosen to make the elimination decision, then player n offers to remain in office if

$$c_{1a} \geq \theta_{ND} + (1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_{i,1a}(n,f) \tag{21}$$

She offers to step down if

$$(1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_{i,1a}(n,l) \leq c_{1a} < \theta_{ND} + (1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_{i,1a}(n,f) \tag{22}$$

She makes any offer if

$$c_{1a} < (1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_{i,1a}(n,l) \tag{23}$$

The faction making the elimination decision (player $i \neq n$) accepts player n's offer to remain in office if and only if (21) holds. It accepts her offer to step down if and only if (23) does not hold.

Proof. *The proof follows the logic of the proof of lemma 2.* ■

Now move to round 1. First introduce some notation. Consider a player i who makes the elimination decision in round 1. Write $Eu_{i,1a}(p,q,R)$ for the expected utility of player i at the start of round 1a, as a function of the player p that she eliminated in round 1 (with either $1 \leq p \leq N$, $p \neq i$ or $p = \emptyset$ to denote i's decision not to eliminate any player in round 1) when round 1a is played under regime R and player i would have status q if she chooses not to eliminate any player. Let $f(c)$ be the pdf of $F(c)$ and c_U be the upper bound of the support of $f(c)$, i.e. c_U is the minimum value of c such that $F(c) = 1$. We show the following:

Lemma 5 *There exist $\underline{k}$, $\overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$, $\underline{\gamma_s(l)}$, $\overline{\gamma_t(t_L)} < \gamma_t(t_H)$ such that for any $k > \underline{k}$, $\gamma_t(t_L) \in \left(0, \overline{\gamma_t(t_L)}\right)$ and $c_U \leq \overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$, $\gamma_s(l) > \underline{\gamma_s(l)}$, the following hold:*

There is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in round 1 in non-democracy. If the leader (player 1) is chosen to make the elimination decision, she eliminates a faction p with high capacity for violence if

$$c_1 < Eu_{1,1a}(p,l,ND) - Eu_{1,1a}(\emptyset,l,ND) \tag{24}$$

and she eliminates no player otherwise. If a faction (player $i \neq 1$) is chosen to

make the elimination decision, then player 1 offers to remain in office if

$$c_1 \geq Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, f, ND) \tag{25}$$

She offers to step down if

$$Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND) \leq c_1 < Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, f, ND) \tag{26}$$

She makes any offer if

$$c_1 < Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND) \tag{27}$$

The faction making the elimination decision (player $i \neq 1$) accepts player 1's offer to remain in office if and only if condition (25) above holds. It accepts her offer to step down if and only if condition (27) above does not hold.

Proof. *The proof follows the logic of lemma 2 in the body of the paper.*

The conditions on k, $\gamma_t(t_L)$, c_U are made to establish that the expected payoff of a player who enters round 1a as the leader strictly decreases in the number of factions with high capacity for violence and that this decrease is greater than any decrease associated with the number of factions with low capacity for violence. In this case, then player 1 would prefer to eliminate a faction with high capacity for violence rather than a faction with low capacity for violence.

The additional condition on $\gamma_s(l)$ is made to ensure that the payoff of a player is greater if she starts round 1a as a leader than as a faction, i.e. $Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND) > Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, f, ND)$, so that the interval in condition (26) is non-empty and we have three regions of the parameter space corresponding to the regions in lemma 2 in the text.

We proceed as follows.

Assume that the dictator has a low capacity for violence, $t_1 = t_L$. Note that, as $\gamma_t(t_L)$ tends to zero, her expected utility at the start of round 1a is invariant with $N_{L,1a}$ and strictly decreasing in $N_{H,1a}$. Therefore, the dictator strictly prefers to eliminate a faction with high capacity for violence than a faction with low capacity for violence. She chooses to eliminate a faction with high capacity for violence if and only if the cost of violence is lower than the benefit of elimination (i.e. condition (24) above holds).

Assume that the dictator has a high capacity for violence, $t_1 = t_H$. Note that, as $\gamma_t(t_L)$ tends to zero, her expected utility at the start of round 1a is invariant with $N_{L,1a}$. However, we need to impose additional restrictions to conclude that his expected utility is strictly decreasing in $N_{H,1a}$. This dictator is eliminated with strictly positive probability in round 1a. Her utility is strictly decreasing in $N_{H,1a}$, when k is sufficiently high, if the probability that she is eliminated is strictly decreasing in $N_{H,1a}$. Write $\Pr(s_{1,2} = e|t_1, R)$ for the probability that player 1 enters round 2 as eliminated, as a function of his type t_1 and the regime R in round 1a. We want to show that $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e|t_1 = t_H, ND)$ is strictly increasing in $N_{H,1a}$.

Given lemma 4 above, we have:

$$\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e|t_1 = t_H, ND) = \frac{N_{H,1a}\gamma_t(t_H)}{(N_{H,1a}+1)\gamma_t(t_H) + \gamma_s(l)} \lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} F((1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_{i,1a}(1,l)) \tag{28}$$

where $t_i = t_H$.

Therefore, $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{1,2} = e|t_1 = t_H, ND)$ strictly increases when $N_{H,1a}$ increases from 0 to 1. When there is no faction with high capacity for violence, the dictator is not eliminated. When there is one faction with high capacity for violence, the dictator is eliminated with strictly positive probability.

For $N_{H,1a} \neq 0$, an increase from $N_{H,1a}$ to $N_{H,1a}+1$ has two competing effects on the probability that player 1 is eliminated in round 1a. On the one hand, there are more factions who can eliminate the dictator ($\frac{N_{H,1a}\gamma_t(t_H)}{(N_{H,1a}+1)\gamma_t(t_H)+\gamma_s(l)}$ increases with $N_{H,1a}$). On the other hand, each faction benefits less from eliminating the leader ($\triangle g_{i,1a}(1,l)$ is decreasing in $N_{H,1a}$). Yet if c_U is sufficiently small, (i.e. $c_U < (1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_{i,1a}(1,l)$), then any faction with high capacity for violence would eliminate the dictator with probability one. Therefore, the first effect dominates and the probability that the leader is eliminated is strictly increasing in $N_{H,1a}$.

This completes the proof that if the dictator is chosen to make the elimination decision in round 1, then she strictly prefers to eliminate a faction p with high capacity for violence rather than a faction with low capacity for violence.

Now we establish that the utility of player i is greater if she enters round 1a as a leader rather than as a faction, i.e. $Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND) > Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, f, ND)$.

Assume that player i has a low capacity for violence, $t_i = t_L$. Note that $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, f, ND) = 0$, while $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND) \geq \frac{\gamma_s(l)}{N_{H,1a}\gamma_t(t_H)+\gamma_s(l)}\theta_{ND} > 0$. Therefore, $Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND) > Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, f, ND)$ if $t_i = t_L$.

Assume that player i has a high capacity for violence, $t_i = t_H$. This player is eliminated with strictly positive probability in round 1a. If k is sufficiently large, then player i fares strictly better in round 1a as a leader rather than a faction if she is less likely to be eliminated as a leader than a faction. If c_U is sufficiently small, then any player who makes the elimination decision in round 1a does eliminate another player with high capacity for violence with probability one. Therefore,

$$\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{i,2} = e | s_{i,1a} = l, t_i = t_H, ND) = \frac{N_{H,1a}\gamma_t(t_H)}{(N_{H,1a}+1)\gamma_t(t_H)+\gamma_s(l)} \qquad (29)$$

$$\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{i,2} = e | s_{i,1a} = f, t_i = t_H, ND) = \frac{\gamma_t(t_H) + \gamma_s(l)}{(N_{H,1a}+1)\gamma_t(t_H) + \gamma_s(l)} \frac{1}{N_{H,1a}} \quad (30)$$

so that a leader is less likely to be eliminated if $\gamma_s(l) > \gamma_t(t_H)[N_{H,1a}^2 - 1]$.

The strategies if a faction is chosen to make the elimination decision follow from the usual logic. ■

Given this equilibrium of round 1 in non-democracy, we reiterate the result of claim 1 in the text:

Claim 4 *A dictator with low capacity for violence is least likely to be eliminated, conditional on her ouster. Formally, there exist thresholds* $\underline{k}$, $\overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$, $\underline{\gamma_s(l)}$, $\overline{\gamma_t(t_L)} < \gamma_t(t_H)$ *such that for any* $k > \underline{k}$, $\gamma_t(t_L) \in \left(0, \overline{\gamma_t(t_L)}\right)$ *and* $c_U \leq \overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$, $\gamma_s(l) > \underline{\gamma_s(l)}$, *the following hold:*

$$\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1 = t_L, ND) < \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1 = t_H, ND) \quad (31)$$

Proof. *Consider the equilibrium of round 1 in Non-Democracy as laid out in the previous lemma. Let* n *be the faction chosen to make the elimination decision in round 1 and which enters round 1a as the leader.*

First assume that the dictator is of type $t_1 = t_L$. *Given the logic in the proof of lemma 5 above, as* $\gamma_t(t_L)$ *tends to zero, then* $Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{1,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND)$ *tends to zero and* $\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1 = t_L, ND)$ *can be made arbirarily small.*

Second assume that the dictator is of type $t_1 = t_H$. *Given the logic in the proof of lemma 5 above, then for any* t_n, $Eu_{n,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{n,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND)$ *is strictly positive and* $\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1 = t_H, ND)$ *is strictly positive.*

The conclusion follows. ■

1.2.3 Leadership Transitions out of Dictatorships

Now assume that the dictator democratized in round 0. Consider round 1a. Assume that if there is a coup in round 1a in democracy, then the country reverts to a dictatorship in round 2. Let n be the democratic leader at the start of round 1a. Write $\triangle gt_{i,1a}(n,f)$ for the increase in relative capacity for violence of faction $i \neq n$ who decides in round 1a to eliminate the leader n, when she would be a faction f in democracy if she did not eliminate n. We have

$$\triangle gt_{i,1a}(n,f) = \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)+\gamma_s(l)}{\sum_{\substack{j:s_{j,1a}\neq e \\ j\neq n}} \gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)} - (1-p_{con})\frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j:s_{j,1a}\neq e} \gamma_t(t_j)+\gamma_s(l)} \quad (32)$$

We can show:

Lemma 6 *There is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in round 1a in democracy. If the leader n is chosen to make the elimination decision, she eliminates a faction p with high capacity for violence if*

$$c_{1a} < (1-\theta_D)\triangle g_{n,1a}(p,l) \quad (33)$$

and she eliminates no player otherwise. If a faction $i \neq n$ is chosen to make the elimination decision, then player n offers to remain in office if

$$c_{1a} \geq \theta_{ND} + (1-\theta_{ND})\triangle gt_{i,1a}(n,f) \quad (34)$$

She offers to step down if

$$(1-\theta_{ND})\triangle g_{i,1a}(n,l) \leq c_{1a} < \theta_{ND} + (1-\theta_{ND})\triangle gt_{i,1a}(n,f) \quad (35)$$

She makes any offer if

$$c_{1a} < (1 - \theta_{ND}) \triangle g_{i,1a}(n, l) \tag{36}$$

The faction making the elimination decision (player $i \neq n$) accepts player n's offer to remain in office if and only if (34) holds. It accepts her offer to step down if and only if (36) does not hold.

Proof. *The proof follows the logic of the proof of lemma 2. The only difference is that the decision to eliminate the democratic leader would cause a transition to democracy if the leader did not already offer to step down due to the threat of violence.* ■

Next notice that:

Lemma 7 *There is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in round 1 in democracy. The new leader n eliminates the departing dictator if and only if*

$$c_1 < Eu_{n,1a}(1, l, D) - Eu_{n,1a}(\emptyset, l, D) \tag{37}$$

Proof. *Straightforward.* ■

Now I establish the equivalent of claims 2 and 3 in the text. First, consider the equivalent of claim 2:

Claim 5 *Departing dictators are less likely to be eliminated upon being ousted by a democrat than upon being ousted by a dictator, with the difference being larger for dictators with a high capacity for violence. Formally, there are thresholds $\underline{k}$, $\overline{c_U}(N_{H1})$, $\overline{\gamma_t(t_L)} < \gamma_t(t_H)$ such that for any $k > \underline{k}$, $\gamma_t(t_L) \in \left(0, \overline{\gamma_t(t_L)}\right)$ and $c \leq \overline{c_U}(N_{H1})$, the following hold:*

$$\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1 = t_H, ND) - \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1 = t_H, D)$$
$$\geq \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1 = t_L, ND) - \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1 = t_L, D) \geq 0 \quad (38)$$

where either inequality is strict if $p_{in} > 0$ *or* $p_{con} > 0$.

Proof. *Given lemmas 5 and 7 above, note that the probability that the dictator is eliminated, conditional on ouster, in non-democracy and democracy is, respectively:*

$$\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1, ND) = \sum_{i \neq 1} \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j \neq 1} \gamma_t(t_j)} \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1, t_i, ND)$$
$$= \sum_{i \neq 1} \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j \neq 1} \gamma_t(t_j)} \frac{F(Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND))}{F(Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, f, ND))} \quad (39)$$

$$\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1, D) = \sum_{i \neq 1} \delta_i(p_{in}) \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1, t_i, D) \quad (40)$$

where $\delta_i(p_{in})$ *is given in equation (10) above and*

$$\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e | s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1, t_i, D) = p_{con} F_{con}(Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, D) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, D))$$
$$+ (1 - p_{con}) F(Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, D) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, D)) \quad (41)$$

First notice that democratization is associated with a (weak) reduction in the probability of elimination, conditional on ouster. Formally, there are thresholds $\underline{k}$, $\overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$, $\overline{\gamma_t(t_L)} < \gamma_t(t_H)$ *such that for any* $k > \underline{k}$, $\gamma_t(t_L) \in \left(0, \overline{\gamma_t(t_L)}\right)$ *and*

$c \leq \overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$, the following hold:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(s = e|s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1, ND) &= \sum_{i\neq 1} \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j\neq 1}\gamma_t(t_j)} \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1, t_i, ND) \\ &\geq \sum_{i\neq 1} \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j\neq 1}\gamma_t(t_j)} \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1, t_i, D) \\ &\geq \sum_{i\neq 1} \delta_i(p_{in}) \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1, t_i, D) \quad (42)\end{aligned}$$

The first inequality follows from $F(Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, f, ND)) \leq 1$ and the fact that if k is sufficiently large, $\overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$ is sufficiently small, and $\gamma_t(t_L)$ is sufficiently small, then

$$Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, D) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, D) \leq Eu_{i,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND) \quad (43)$$

with the inequality is strict if $p_{con} > 0$.

The second inequality follows from $\frac{\gamma_t(t_H)}{\rho(t_H)} > \frac{\gamma_t(t_L)}{\rho(t_L)}$ and the fact that if k is sufficiently large, $\overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$ is sufficiently small, and $\gamma_t(t_L)$ is sufficiently small, then for i' and i'' such that $t_{i'} = t_H$, $t_{i''} = t_L$, we have

$$Eu_{i',1a}(1, l, D) - Eu_{i',1a}(\emptyset, l, D) \geq Eu_{i'',1a}(1, l, D) - Eu_{i'',1a}(\emptyset, l, D) \quad (44)$$

with the inequality is strict if $p_{in} > 0$.

To see that condition (43) holds, note that if $p_{con} = 0$, then the condition holds with equality. If the country is democratic in round 1a and the cost of violence is taken from the cdf $F(c)$ in that round, then the leader at the start of the round is eliminated with positive probability, the same probability as if the

country had been a non-democracy (see condition (36). Round 2 will be played as a non-democracy, whether the leader is eliminated or otherwise steps down due to the threat of elimination). As in the proof of lemma 5, the expected utility of the leader is invariant in $N_{L,1a}$ and strictly decreasing in $N_{H,1a}$, for any type of the leader, if k is sufficiently large, $\overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$ is sufficiently small, and $\gamma_t(t_L)$ is sufficiently small.

If the country is democratic in round 1a and the cost of violence is taken from the cdf $F_{con}(c)$ in that round, then violence plays no role in that round, since the cost of violence is greater than the maximum benefit of violence ($F_{con}(1) = 0$). Therefore, the difference in expected utility for the new leader in democracy at the start of round 1a, if the cost of violence is taken from the cdf $F_{con}(c)$ in round 1a, is strictly less than the difference in expected utility in non-democracy.

To see that condition (44) holds, note that if the consequences of elimination are sufficiently harsh (k is sufficiently large), then the effect of the elimination of player 1 on the new leader's utility is determined by its effect on the probability that the new leader is eliminated in round 1a. Given the above, no leader is eliminated if the cost of violence in round 1a is taken from $F_{con}(c)$. As in the proof of lemma 5, the utility of any new leader is invariant in $N_{L,1a}$, when $\gamma_t(t_L)$ is sufficiently small. A leader of type t_L is eliminated with an arbitrarily small probability in round 1a, when $\gamma_t(t_L)$ is sufficiently small. A new leader of type t_H is eliminated with strictly positive probability, which is strictly increasing in $N_{H,1a}$, if $\overline{c_U}(N_{H,1})$ is sufficiently small, and $\gamma_t(t_L)$ is sufficiently small. Therefore, the increase in utility associated with eliminating player 1, is greater for the new leader of type t_H than for the new leader of type t_L.

This concludes the proof that democratization is associated with a decrease in the probability of elimination for a dictator of either type.

Second, note that the decrease in the probability of elimination, conditional on

ouster, is strictly greater for the dictator with high capacity for violence. This follows from the fact that for any R, and any n

$$\lim_{\gamma(t_L)\to 0} Eu_{n,1a}(1,l,R) - Eu_{n,1a}(\emptyset,l,R) = 0 \tag{45}$$

if $t_1 = t_L$, so that the decrease in the probability of elimination of the dictator of type $t_1 = t_L$ is arbitrarily small, while the decrease in the probability of elimination of the dictator of type $t_1 = t_H$ is strictly bounded away from zero. ■

Now I show the equivalent of claim 3 in the text.

Claim 6 *A dictator with high capacity for violence is most likely to democratize. Formally, there exists a $\underline{p_{con}}(t_1, p_{in}) < 1$ such that a dictator democratizes if $p_{con} \geq \underline{p_{con}}(t_1, p_{in})$. There exist $\underline{k}$, $\overline{c_U}(N_{H1})$, $\overline{\gamma_t(t_L)} < \gamma_t(t_H)$ such that for any $k > \underline{k}$, $\gamma_t(t_L) \in \left(0, \overline{\gamma_t(t_L)}\right)$ and $c \leq \overline{c_U}(N_{H1})$, the following hold: (a) $\underline{p_{con}}(t_1, 0) > 0$ and if $\underline{p_{con}}(t_1, p_{in}) > 0$, then $\frac{\partial \underline{p_{con}}(t_1,p_{in})}{\partial p_{in}} < 0$. (b) $\underline{p_{con}}(t_H, p_{in}) < \underline{p_{con}}(t_L, p_{in})$.*

Proof. *The proof follows the same logic as the proof of claim 3.*

The unconditional probability that the dictator is eliminated in non-democracy is given by the following:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|t_1, ND) &= \sum_{i\neq 1} \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} \gamma_t(t_j) + \gamma_s(l)} \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|t_1, t_i, ND) \\ &= \sum_{i\neq 1} \frac{\gamma_t(t_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} \gamma_t(t_j) + \gamma_s(l)} F(Eu_{i,1a}(1,l,ND) - Eu_{i,1a}(\emptyset,l,ND)) \end{aligned} \tag{46}$$

The unconditional probability that the dictator is eliminated in democracy is given in equations (40), (41) and (10) (the unconditional and conditional probabilities are the same, since by democratizating, there is a new leader with probability one).

Note that $\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|t_1, ND) > 0$, $\frac{\partial \Pr(s_{1,1a}=e|t_1,D)}{\partial p_{con}} < 0$ *and* $\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|t_1, D) = 0$ *if* $p_{con} = 1$. *Therefore, there is a minimum probability* $\underline{p_{con}}(t_1, p_{in})$ *such that a dictator democratizes if and only if* $p_{con} \geq \underline{p_{con}}(t_1, p_{in})$.

Now consider (a). At $p_{in} = p_{con} = 0$, *then* $\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|t_1, ND) < \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|t_1, D)$, *since the dictator may be chosen by Nature to make the elimination decision in round 1 in non-democracy. Therefore,* $\underline{p_{con}}(t_1, 0) > 0$.

Next note that $\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|t_1, D)$ *is decreasing in* p_{in}, *given* $\frac{\gamma_t(t_H)}{\gamma_t(t_L)} > \frac{\rho(t_H)}{\rho(t_L)}$ *and condition (44). Therefore, the threshold* $\underline{p_{con}}(p_{in}, t_1)$ *is decreasing in* p_{in}.

Now consider (b). Recall that $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|s_{1,1a} \neq l, t_1 = t_L, R) = 0$ *for* $R \in \{D, ND\}$. *Therefore, the reduction in the probability of elimination is arbitrarily small, for the dictator with low capacity for violence. The expected utility of the dictator tends to zero in democracy, i.e.* $lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} Eu_{11}(D) = 0$. *By contrast, her expected utility remains strictly positive in non-democracy, since she still has a chance to be chosen by Nature in each round and could claim the spoils of office commensurate with her status as leader, i.e.* $lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} Eu_{11}(ND) \geq \left(\frac{\gamma_s(l)}{N_H\gamma_t(t_H)+\gamma_s(l)}\right)^3 \theta_{ND} > 0$. *Therefore, we conclude that* $\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \underline{p_{con}}(t_1, p_{in}) = 1$ *if* $t_i = t_L$.

By contrast, the value $\underline{p_{con}}(t_1, p_{in})$ *is strictly bounded away from 1 for a dictator of type* $t_1 = t_H$, *since democratization leads to a strict decrease in the probability of elimination. Indeed,*

$$\lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} \Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|t_1 = t_H, ND)$$
$$= \frac{N_{H1}\gamma_t(t_H)}{(N_{H1}+1)\gamma_t(t_H)+\gamma_s(l)} \lim_{\gamma_t(t_L)\to 0} F(Eu_{n,1a}(1, l, ND) - Eu_{n,1a}(\emptyset, l, ND)) \quad (47)$$

for $t_n = t_H$, *which is strictly positive. By contrast, at* $p_{con} = 1$, *then* $\Pr(s_{1,1a} = e|t_1 = t_H, D) = 0$. *Claim (b) follows.* ■

2 Quantitative Evidence

2.1 Description of the Variables

In this section I ask whether military leaders experience a larger improvement in their post-tenure fate from democratization than non-military dictators do, testing the statistical significance of the differences outlined in Tables 1 and 2 in the paper.[1]

To answer these questions, I construct the dataset as follows. I take the set of leaders from Archigos[2] and identify their regime type according to the DD typology. DD is a country-year dataset classifying dictatorships based on characteristics of the leader in office on December 31st.[3] It is a monarchy if the leader bears a hereditary title and takes power or is replaced by rules of hereditary succession. Otherwise, it is a military regime if he is or was a member of the institutionalized military prior to taking office. Finally, it is a civilian dictatorship if neither of the previous conditions is met.

I use these coding rules with one modification. In DD, the hereditary title of a leader trumps his military title. Instead, I measure these dimensions separately, coding two dummy variables: one for whether he has a military title prior to taking office ($Military_l$), and another for whether the leader has a hereditary title upon accessing office ($Monarch_l$).[4] The dataset contains 692 dictators who were

[1]The claim that military dictators are quicker to democratize reaches a consensus and taken as given here.

[2]Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009).

[3]As mentioned in the paper, the DD typology best matches my theoretical approach, since it builds on characteristics of the *leader* of a non-democratic regime.

[4]I use indices l, c, t to clarify whether the variable is a function of the leader, country, year. Saying that the non-democratic regime type is the same throughout the tenure of a dictator is a slight abuse of notation, as one leader (Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia) entered office as a

in office at some point between January 1st, 1946 and December 31st, 2004, from 112 countries, for 746 dictatorial spells and 5203 dictator-country-year observations. I focus on the sample on the domestically-ousted dictators, comparing the post-tenure fate of military and non-military dictators, depending on the ensuing political regime.

In each model, I include region- and decade-fixed effects, controlling for unobserved geographic and temporal variation.[5] I also control for the leader's time in office, including the log of the leader's tenure, $Log(Tenure)_{lct}$, for ease of interpretation.

To these basic variables, I add political controls. First, I control for monarchical institutions (through $Monarch_l$). Second, I control for semi-democratic institutions, which may help the survival of the dictatorship, as mentioned above. I include two dummy variables, $One\text{-}party_{lct}$ and $Multi\text{-}party_{lct}$, which indicate whether there is one, or more than one, party in the legislature.[6] Third, I control for the history of coups ($History\ of\ Coups_{lct}$), which some have argued can destabilize a country and lead to further coups.[7] Following the work of Jennifer Gandhi, I define the history of coups as the number of successful coups in a country, divided by the length of time since the last transition from democracy to dictatorship.[8]

king 1953, but abdicated in 1955, continuing to rule as a civilian until 1970.

[5]I code six regions, following the World Bank: Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia. Regressions have Sub-Saharan Africa as the excluded region. I also control for the share of democracies in the region and in the world, as explained below.

[6]I constructed this leader-country-year variable by revising and completing the country-year variable *lparty* of DD (see also Gandhi (2008, 34-39)).

[7]Londregan and Poole (1990).

[8]Gandhi (2008, 174). I constructed $History\ of\ Coups_{lct}$ by adopting Powell and Thyne (2011, 252)'s definition of coup attempts as '*illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive*' (italics in the original) and focus on

Fourth, I control for whether the country is in an ongoing civil war (*Civil War*$_{lct}$).[9] Fifth, I control for the Cold War (*Cold War*$_t$ is 1 between 1946 and 1989, 0 otherwise), since international pressure for democratization have increased since the end of the Cold War.[10] Sixth, to control for waves of democratization, I include the lagged value of the share of democracies in the region and in the world (*Share of Democracies in Region*$_{c,t-1}$ and *Share of Democracies in World*$_{t-1}$, respectively). Finally, when assessing the dictator's post-tenure fate, I control for the type of the next leader. *Next Democrat*$_{l+1}$ is equal to 1 if he next leader is a democrat, 0 otherwise. Models set the excluded category to be the group of military dictators who are replaced by another dictator. For clarity, I write out the four possible permutations, as a function of the type of the dictator and the type of his successor (e.g. *Military Dictator replaced by Dictator* is one if *Military*$_l = 1$ and *Next Democrat*$_{l+1} = 0$).

I also add economic controls. Scholars debate whether development sows the seeds of a democratic transition.[11] To control for such factors, I include the lagged value of the logarithm of the real GDP per capita (*Log (GDP per cap.*$_{c,t-1}$)), measured in thousands of 2000 I$. Moreover, scholars debate whether natural resources, and in particular oil, create a 'resource curse' that stabilizes dictatorships.[12] For that reason, I include a control for the lagged value of total oil income per capita (*Total Oil Inc. per cap.*$_{c,t-1}$), measured in thousands of 2000 I$.[13]

successful coup attempts, which do unseat the executive. I used Powell and Thyne (2011), as well as Archigos and Gandhi (2008) to identify successful coups.

[9] I use the latest, updated, version of the Sambanis (2004) dataset.

[10] See among others Boix (2011); Marinov and Goemans (2014).

[11] Lipset (1959); Przeworski et al. (2000); Boix and Stokes (2003); Acemoglu et al. (2008); Boix (2011); Cheibub and Vreeland (2011).

[12] See for example Ross (2001); Dunning (2008); Morrison (2009); Haber and Menaldo (2011); Ross (2012).

[13] Both economic variables are taken from Haber and Menaldo (2011). See their Appendix for

2.2 Results

Linear probability models estimate the likelihood that a leader is 'eliminated' in a domestic transition. The unit of observation is the dictator, looking at the sample of domestically ousted dictators (results are in Table 3).[14] I consider two possible outcomes, with a leader is eliminated if he is 'Killed' (Models 1-2) or if he is 'Jailed or Killed' (Models 3-4). Models 1 and 3 include the basic variables, Models 2 and 4 add the political and economic controls.

In every specification, military dictators expect a significant improvement in their post-tenure fate from democratization. Controlling for other factors, a transition to democracy reduces the likelihood of being killed by $11.4 - 11.7\%$ and the probability of being jailed or killed by $18.4 - 18.6\%$. This effect is significantly greater than the corresponding decrease for non-military leaders, less than 2% in all the regressions.[15] Given the consequences of a good or bad post-tenure fate, these differences deserve special attention.

Taking stock, I find that military dictators face a greater improvement in their post-tenure fate after a transition to democracy.

details on the construction of these variables.

[14]Linear probability models are especially appealing with categorical variables as the main independent variables, since a coefficient can be easily interpreted as the change in the conditional expectation of the dependent variable associated with a change in the categorical variable.

[15]The effect of democracy on the post-tenure fate of non-military leaders is statistically insignificant in all the regressions. The difference in the effect of democracy between military and non-military dictators is statistically significant in all regressions, at the 1% level in Models 1 through 3 and the 5% level in Model 4.

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Table 3: Likelihood of Being Eliminated in Domestic Ouster [a]

	Killed		Jailed or Killed	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Military Dictator replaced by Dictator (*excluded category*)	–	–	–	–
Non-Military Dictator replaced by Dictator	-0.074^{**}	-0.068^{*}	$-0.088^{\dagger}$	-0.063
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.047)	(0.054)
Military Dictator replaced by Democrat	-0.114^{**}	-0.117^{**}	-0.186^{**}	-0.186^{**}
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.058)
Non-Military Dictator replaced by Democrat	-0.091^{**}	-0.072^{*}	-0.091	-0.079
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Monarch_{l}		-0.061		-0.176^{*}
		(0.050)		(0.080)
One-Party_{lct}		0.021		0.049
		(0.045)		(0.071)
Multi-Party_{lct}		0.014		-0.026
		(0.036)		(0.047)
$\text{History of Coups}_{lct}$		-0.014		0.157^{*}
		(0.043)		(0.077)
Civil War_{lct}		0.026		-0.005
		(0.028)		(0.044)
Cold War_{t}		0.004		0.187
		(0.091)		(0.140)
$\text{Share of Democracies in Region}_{c,t-1}$		-0.203		0.131
		(0.213)		(0.239)
$\text{Share of Democracies in World}_{t-1}$		0.262		-0.227
		(0.461)		(0.563)
$\text{Log(GDP per cap.}_{c,t-1})$		-0.012		-0.018
		(0.019)		(0.030)
$\text{Total Oil Inc. per cap.}_{c,t-1}$		0.019		0.009
		(0.016)		(0.018)
Log(Tenure)_{lct}	0.013^{*}	0.011	0.014	$0.021^{\dagger}$
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.011)
No. Obs. (R^2)	553(0.12)	506(0.12)	553(0.15)	506(0.17)

[a] Results from Linear Probability Models, with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses, including a constant, decade- and region-fixed effects. **: p < .01, *: p < .05, †: p < .1.