I'll Be Back? Exiled Leaders and Political Instability

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Online Appendix for our *Journal of Conflict Resolution* article

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Table 1: Summary of the Leaders in Exile Dataset, 1946-2010: The table lists the rulers who were in exile for some part of the 1946-2010 period and thus appear in our LIE dataset. We also report the specific years in which each leader's exile started and ended (typically due to death, return, or arrest). Since the temporal coverage of our dataset ends in 2010, we list 2010 as the final year of exile for leaders who were still abroad at that point (i.e., these cases are right-censored).

Leader	Country of Origin	Exile Starts	Exile Ends
Fulgencio Batista (1)	Cuba	1944	1952
Fulgencio Batista (2)	Cuba	1959	1973
Prio Socarras (1)	Cuba	1952	1959
Prio Socarras (2)	Cuba	1961	1977
Élie Lescot	Haiti	1946	1956
Dumarsais Estimé	Haiti	1950	1953
Paul Magloire	Haiti	1956	1986
Léon Cantave	Haiti	1957	1967
Daniel Fignolé	Haiti	1957	1986
Antonio Thrasybule Kébreau	Haiti	1957	1962
Jean Claude Duvalier	Haiti	1986	2010
Leslie Manigat	Haiti	1988	1989
Henri Namphy	Haiti	1988	2010
Prosper Avril	Haiti	1990	1994
Jean Bertrand Aristide (1)	Haiti	1991	1994
Raoul Cédras	Haiti	1994	2010
Jean Bertrand Aristide (2)	Haiti	2004	2010
Joaquín Balaguer	Dominican Republic	1962	1966
Juan Bosch	Dominican Republic	1963	1965
Molina Ureña	Dominican Republic	1965	1966
Carlos Salinas de Gortari	Mexico	1994	2010
Jorge Ubico Castañeda	Guatemala	1944	1946
Federico Ponce Vaides	Guatemala	1944	1954
Juan José Arévalo	Guatemala	1954	1973
Jacobo Árbenz	Guatemala	1954	1971
Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes	Guatemala	1963	1972
Jorge Serrano Elías	Guatemala	1993	2010
Gustavo Espina Salguero	Guatemala	1993	1997
Alfonso Portillo Cabrera	Guatemala	2004	2008
Vicente Mejía Colindres	Honduras	1933	1949
Julio Lozano Díaz	Honduras	1956	1957
Ramón Villeda Morales	Honduras	1963	1964
Manuel Zelaya	Honduras	2009	2010
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez	El Salvador	1944	1966
Óscar Osorio	El Salvador	1960	1962
José María Lemus	El Salvador	1960	1993
Arturo Armando Molina	El Salvador	1977	2010
Carlos H. Romero Mena	El Salvador	1979	1992
Adolfo A. Majano Ramos	El Salvador	1980	2010

Emiliano Chamorro Vargas	Nicaragua	1926	1949
Adolfo Díaz	Nicaragua	1936	1964
Juan Sacasa	Nicaragua	1936	1946
Leonardo Argüello	Nicaragua	1947	1947
Anastasio Somoza	Nicaragua	1979	1980
Teodoro Picado Michalski	Costa Rica	1948	1960
Marco Aurelio Robles	Panama	1968	1990
Arnulfo Arias	Panama	1968	1976
Laureano Gómez	Colombia	1953	1957
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla	Colombia	1957	1958
Isaías Medina Angarita	Venezuela	1945	1952
Rómulo Betancourt	Venezuela	1948	1959
Rómulo Gallegos	Venezuela	1948	1958
Marcos Pérez Jiménez	Venezuela	1958	1963
Carlos Arroyo del Río	Ecuador	1944	1948
José M. Velasco Ibarra (1)	Ecuador	1947	1952
José M. Velasco Ibarra (2)	Ecuador	1956	1960
José M. Velasco Ibarra (3)	Ecuador	1961	1966
Carlos J. Arosemena Monroy	Ecuador	1963	1966
Ramón Castro Jijón	Ecuador	1967	1970
José M. Velasco Ibarra (4)	Ecuador	1972	1979
Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz	Ecuador	1997	2010
Jamil Mahuad	Ecuador	2000	2010
Gustavo Novoa	Ecuador	2003	2005
José L. Bustamante	Peru	1948	1955
Manuel Odría	Peru	1956	1961
Fernando Belaúnde	Peru	1968	1977
Alberto Fujimori	Peru	2000	2007
Jânio Quadros	Brazil	1968	1980
João Goulart	Brazil	1964	1976
David Toro	Bolivia	1938	1977
Mamerto Urriolagoitia	Bolivia	1952	1965
Hugo Ballivián Rojas	Bolivia	1952	1966
Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1)	Bolivia	1964	1971
Víctor Paz Estenssoro (2)	Bolivia	1974	1978
Luis A. Siles Salinas	Bolivia	1969	1978
Alfredo Ovando Candía	Bolivia	1970	1978
Juan José Torres	Bolivia	1971	1976
Hugo Banzer	Bolivia	1978	1979
Lidia Guelier	Bolivia	1980	1982
Luis García Meza	Bolivia	1983	1995
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada	Bolivia	2003	2010
Rafael Franco	Paraguay	1937	1964
Juan Natalicio	Paraguay	1949	1956
Alfredo Stroessner	Paraguay	1989	2006

Raúl Cubas Grau	Paraguay	1999	2002
Carlos Dávila	Chile	1932	1955
Juan Domingo Perón	Argentina	1955	1973
Juan Negrín	Spain	1939	1956
José Miaja	Spain	1939	1958
Marcelo Caetano	Portugal	1974	1980
Mátyás Rákosi	Hungary	1956	1971
Erno Ger´o	Hungary	1956	1960
Shefqet V´erlaci	Albania	1941	1946
Fan Noli	Albania	1924	1965
Ahmet Zogu	Albania	1939	1961
Prince Paul	Yugoslavia	1941	1976
Peter II	Yugoslavia	1941	1970
Konstantinos Karamanlis	Greece	1963	1974
Konstantinos Kollias	Greece	1967	1974
Ferdinand I	Bulgaria	1918	1948
Prince Nicholas	Romania	1930	1978
Carol II	Romania	1940	1953
Michael I	Romania	1947	2010
Zviad Gamsakhurdia	Georgia	1992	1993
Ayaz Mutallibov	Azerbaijan	1992	2010
João B. Vieira	Guinea-Bissau	1999	2005
Dawda Jawara	Gambia	1994	2002
Sidi Ahmed Taya	Mauritania	2005	2010
Henri Konan Bédié	Ivory Coast	1999	2001
Robert Gué´i	Ivory Coast	2000	2001
Dadis Camara	Guinea	2009	2010
Charles Taylor	Liberia	2003	2006
Joseph Saidu Momoh	Sierra Leone	1992	2003
Valentine Strasser	Sierra Leone	1996	2000
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah	Sierra Leone	1997	1998
Kwame Nkrumah	Ghana	1966	1972
Kofi Abrefa Busia	Ghana	1972	1978
Nicolas Grunitzky	Togo	1967	1969
Ahmadou Ahidjo	Cameroon	1983	1989
Yakubu Gowon	Nigeria	1975	1983
Jean-Bédel Bokassa	Central African Republic	1979	1986
Ange-Félix Patassé	Central African Republic	2003	2008
Félix Malloum	Chad	1979	2002
Goukouni Oueddei	Chad	1982	2009
Hissène Habré	Chad	1990	2010
Pascal Lissouba	Republic of Congo	1997	2010
Mobutu Sese Seko	Zaire	1997	1997
Milton Obote (1)	Uganda	1971	1980
Idi Amin	Uganda	1979	2003

Yusuf Lule	Uganda	1979	1985
Godfrey Binaisa	Uganda	1981	2001
Milton Obote (2)	Uganda	1985	2005
Mwambutsa IV	Burundi	1966	1977
Ntare V	Burundi	1966	1972
Michel Micombero	Burundi	1976	1983
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza	Burundi	1987	1994
Théodore Sindikubwabo	Rwanda	1994	1998
Siad Barre	Somalia	1991	1995
Mengistu Haile Mariam	Ethiopia	1991	2010
Tesfaye Gebre Kidan	Ethiopia	1991	2004
Didier Ratsiraka	Madagascar	2002	2010
Marc Ravalomanana	Madagascar	2009	2010
Idris I	Libya	1969	1983
Muhammad Ahmad Mahgoub	Sudan	1969	1976
Gaafar Nimeiry	Sudan	1985	1999
Sadiq al-Mahdi	Sudan	1996	2000
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1)	Iran	1953	1953
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (2)	Iran	1979	1980
Ahmed Arif	Iraq	1968	1979
Farouk I	Egypt	1952	1965
Shukri al-Quwatli (1)	Syria	1949	1955
Shukri al-Quwatli (2)	Syria	1959	1967
Adib Shishakli	Syria	1954	1964
Michel Aoun	Lebanon	1990	2005
Talal bin Abdullah	Jordan	1952	1972
Saud	Saudi Arabia	1964	1969
Abdullah al-Sallal	Yemen	1967	1981
Abdul Rahman al-Iryani	Yemen	1974	1998
Ali Nasir Muhammad Husani	South Yemen	1986	1990
Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah	Kuwait	1990	1991
Said bin Taimur	Oman	1970	1972
Amanullah Khan	Afghanistan	1929	1960
Inayatullah Khan	Afghanistan	1929	1946
Babrak Karmal	Afghanistan	1986	1991
Mohammad Najibullah	Afghanistan	1992	1996
Askar Akayev	Kyrgyzstan	2005	2010
Kurmanbek Bakiev	Kyrgyzstan	2010	2010
Chen Gongbo	China	1945	1946
Chiang Kai-shek	China	1949	1975
Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal	Mongolia	1984	1991
Li Tsung-jen	Taiwan	1950	1969
Syngman Rhee	South Korea	1960	1965
Pervez Musharraf	Pakistan	2008	2010
John Kotelawala	Sri Lanka	1956	1979

Mohan Shumsher Jang Bahadur Rana	Nepal	1951	1967
Phraya Manopakorn Nititada	Thailand	1933	1948
Pridi Banomyong	Thailand	1947	1983
Plaek Phibunsongkhram	Thailand	1957	1964
Thanom Kittikachorn	Thailand	1973	1976
Chatichai Choonhavan	Thailand	1991	1992
Thaksin Shinawatra	Thailand	2006	2010
Norodom Sihanouk	Cambodia	1970	1975
Lon Nol	Cambodia	1975	1985
Norodom Ranariddh	Cambodia	1997	1998
Kong Le	Laos	1966	2010
Souvanna Phouma	Laos	1960	1962
Duong Van Minh	South Vietnam	1964	1975
Nguyen Khánh	South Vietnam	1965	1975
Nguyen Van Thieu	South Vietnam	1975	1975
Ferdinand Marcos	Philippines	1986	1989

Table 2: Exiled Leaders and Civil Conflict: No January 1 Rule. In the results reported in the main text, we took a stringent approach by coding only years that begin with the leader in exile on January 1 as cases of exile (i.e., we excluded partial years at the start of exile from our measure). The purpose of this coding rule was to address concerns about reverse causality. To ensure that our findings do not hing on this decision, the following models reestimate our main models of civil conflict onset (Models 2-5 in Table 3 in the text) using an exile variable that relaxes the January 1 coding rule (i.e., we include partial years at the start of exile in our measure). All of our main findings are consistent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leader in Exile	0.596**	0.989**	0.787**	-0.384
	(0.208)	(0.271)	(0.313)	(0.650)
Excluded Population	0.126**	0.103	0.167*	0.267*
	(0.056)	(0.080)	(0.092)	(0.154)
Center Segmentation	0.057	-0.084	-0.046	0.094
	(0.044)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.069)
Imperial Past	0.537*	-0.104	0.882*	0.817
	(0.289)	(0.470)	(0.475)	(0.841)
Linguistic Fractionalization	0.706**	0.882	0.360	0.438
	(0.315)	(0.544)	(0.546)	(0.849)
GDP pc	-0.099**	-0.046	-0.075	-0.220**
	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.076)	(0.073)
Population Size	0.168**	0.029	0.252**	0.169
	(0.060)	(0.088)	(0.124)	(0.137)
Mountainous Terrain	0.103	0.001	0.031	0.296**
	(0.063)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.147)
Political Instability	0.296*	0.217	0.221	0.230
	(0.178)	(0.342)	(0.249)	(0.453)
Anocracy	0.405**			
	(0.171)			
Oil Production pc	0.016**	-0.000	0.070	0.164**
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.067)	(0.037)
Ongoing War	-0.987**	-0.453	-1.532**	-1.217
	(0.380)	(0.546)	(0.569)	(1.077)
Sample	Global	Autocracies	Anocracies	Democracies
N	6748	2886	1508	2354
AIC	1643.52	713.26	598.73	341.06
BIC	1766.22	814.71	689.15	439.04

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

Time controls included but not reported

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table 3: Exiled Leaders and Civil Conflict: Random Effects. The following models reestimate our main models of civil conflict onset (Models 2-5 in Table 3 in the text) with random country effects included to account for the possibility of unmodeled heterogeneity. All of our main findings are consistent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leader in Exile	0.331*	0.504**	0.766**	-0.663
	(0.184)	(0.224)	(0.314)	(0.625)
Excluded Population	0.137**	0.113	0.200*	0.278*
	(0.058)	(0.077)	(0.107)	(0.151)
Center Segmentation	0.056	-0.059	-0.054	0.094
	(0.046)	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.069)
Imperial Past	0.505	-0.078	0.995*	0.787
	(0.308)	(0.493)	(0.573)	(0.854)
Linguistic Fractionalization	0.687**	0.708	0.539	0.446
	(0.328)	(0.541)	(0.633)	(0.838)
GDP pc	-0.103**	-0.054	-0.056	-0.224**
	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.081)	(0.074)
Population Size	0.153**	-0.001	0.238*	0.171
	(0.058)	(0.082)	(0.143)	(0.134)
Mountainous Terrain	0.117*	0.039	0.035	0.289**
	(0.069)	(0.105)	(0.125)	(0.145)
Political Instability	0.339*	0.301	0.210	0.232
	(0.177)	(0.344)	(0.268)	(0.451)
Anocracy	0.412**			
	(0.173)			
Oil Production pc	0.017**	0.001	0.059	0.170**
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.075)	(0.035)
Ongoing War	-1.035**	-0.432	-1.723**	-1.233
	(0.393)	(0.578)	(0.581)	(1.067)
Sample	Global	Autocracies	Anocracies	Democracies
N	6704	2886	1479	2339
AIC	1638.23	725.71	585.04	340.38
BIC	1767.63	833.13	680.42	438.26

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

Time controls included but not reported

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table 4: Exiled Leaders and Civil Conflict: Count Variable. As described in the paper, we used our LIE dataset to produce a pair of exile variables. The first was a dummy that equals 1 for all years during which a country has at least one ruler in the LIE dataset. The second was a count of how many leaders, if any, are in the LIE dataset during each country-year. In the results reported in the text, we used the dummy variable instead of the count. Our reasoning was straightforward: the count variable was less attractive because we do not have strong theoretical expectations about the additive effect of multiple exiled leaders. Nonetheless, to ensure that the empirical patterns are broadly similar, the following models reestimate our main models of civil conflict onset (Models 2-5 in Table 3 in the text) using the exile count variable. With the exception of the count variable falling just outside of statistical significance in Model 1 (p = .12), our findings are consistent with those reported in the text (the dummy variable).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leader in Exile (Count)	0.165	0.210*	0.366**	-0.077
	(0.107)	(0.127)	(0.135)	(0.649)
Excluded Population	0.132**	0.120	0.169*	0.246
	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.155)
Center Segmentation	0.056	-0.053	-0.052	0.094
	(0.042)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.070)
Imperial Past	0.491*	-0.022	0.825*	0.855
	(0.291)	(0.451)	(0.471)	(0.854)
Linguistic Fractionalization	0.626**	0.652	0.237	0.404
	(0.312)	(0.561)	(0.551)	(0.821)
GDP pc	-0.106**	-0.056	-0.074	-0.214**
	(0.029)	(0.044)	(0.076)	(0.073)
Population Size	0.155**	-0.013	0.239*	0.173
	(0.056)	(0.080)	(0.127)	(0.138)
Mountainous Terrain	0.114*	0.056	0.025	0.303**
	(0.062)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.150)
Political Instability	0.343*	0.331	0.290	0.232
	(0.176)	(0.340)	(0.249)	(0.452)
Anocracy	0.405**			
	(0.166)			
Oil Production pc	0.017**	0.002	0.067	0.157**
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.066)	(0.036)
Ongoing War	-0.986**	-0.435	-1.606**	-1.226
	(0.383)	(0.547)	(0.586)	(1.066)
Sample	Global	Autocracies	Anocracies	Democracies
N	6748	2886	1508	2354
AIC	1652.74	725.36	600.88	341.46
BIC	1775.45	826.81	691.30	439.44

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

Time controls included but not reported

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table 5: Exiled Leaders and Civil Conflict: Count Variable (Logged). The following models are identical to those in the previous table except that we take the log of our count variable for the number of leaders in exile. Given that we do not have strong theoretical expectations about the additive effect of multiple exiled leaders, the goal here is to ensure that both versions of the count variable produce similar results. The models below confirm that is the case (in fact, the results are slightly stronger when using the logged variable).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leader in Exile (Logged Count)	0.342*	0.476**	0.760**	-0.451
	(0.200)	(0.233)	(0.270)	(1.020)
Excluded Population	0.131**	0.117	0.170*	0.260*
	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.155)
Center Segmentation	0.056	-0.057	-0.050	0.095
	(0.042)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.069)
Imperial Past	0.493*	-0.039	0.856*	0.814
	(0.290)	(0.450)	(0.470)	(0.849)
Linguistic Fractionalization	0.638**	0.687	0.260	0.415
	(0.312)	(0.559)	(0.550)	(0.839)
GDP pc	-0.105**	-0.055	-0.074	-0.219**
	(0.029)	(0.044)	(0.076)	(0.073)
Population Size	0.156**	-0.008	0.244*	0.171
	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.127)	(0.136)
Mountainous Terrain	0.112*	0.049	0.026	0.297**
	(0.062)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.147)
Political Instability	0.334*	0.315	0.263	0.235
	(0.176)	(0.338)	(0.249)	(0.452)
Anocracy	0.407**			
	(0.167)			
Oil Production pc	0.017**	0.002	0.067	0.163**
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.067)	(0.038)
Ongoing War	-0.981**	-0.433	-1.583**	-1.231
	(0.381)	(0.546)	(0.579)	(1.068)
Sample	Global	Autocracies	Anocracies	Democracies
N	6748	2886	1508	2354
AIC	1652.23	724.65	600.12	341.16
BIC	1774.93	826.10	690.53	439.15

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

Time controls included but not reported

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table 6: Exiled Leaders and Civil Conflict: Does Time in Exile Matter? In the main text, we explored the relationship between time in exile and civil conflict graphically. The following table reports the underlying regression results. Consistent with the graph reported in the main text, the time in exile variable is negative and statistically significant.

	(1)
Time in Exile	-0.037**
	(0.019)
Excluded Population	0.018
	(0.110)
Center Segmentation	-0.017
	(0.118)
Imperial Past	0.633
	(0.485)
Linguistic Fractionalization	0.299
	(0.789)
GDP pc	0.007
	(0.091)
Population Size	0.078
	(0.083)
Mountainous Terrain	0.075
	(0.132)
Political Instability	0.301
	(0.359)
Anocracy	0.637**
	(0.299)
Oil Production pc	0.002
	(0.023)
Ongoing War	-1.430**
	(0.552)
N	1139
AIC	426.46
BIC	517.14

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
Time controls included but not reported
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table 7: Exiled Leaders and Coup Attempts: Our main analysis focused on civil conflicts, but we also speculated that exiled leaders might be linked to other forms of political instability such as coups. Therefore, the following models replicate and extend Houle's (2016) logit model of coup attempts. The dependent variable is from the Powell and Thyne (2011) Global Coup d'etat Dataset, which defines coup attempts as "illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive" (Powell and Thyne 2011, 252). Houle (2016) includes a sample of 128 developing states from 1960 to 2008 in the analysis. Note that we follow Houle (2016) by including (but not reporting) decade dummies as well as a time since last coup variable and the associated cubic splines. Readers interested in additional details about these models should consult Houle's original article in the *Journal of Peace Research*. Model 1 is a simple replication of Houle's main model of coup attempts (Model 13 of Table 2 in the original paper). Model 2 adds the exile dummy variable from our LIE dataset to the regression. Model 3 uses the exile count variable instead of the exile dummy. The results are consistent with our conclusions from the civil conflict analysis in the paper: exiled leaders increase instability in their home states.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Leader in Exile (Dummy)		0.338**	
		(0.152)	
Leader in Exile (Count)			0.139*
			(0.074)
Capital Shares	0.021**	0.020**	0.021**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
GDP pc (logged)	-0.324**	-0.337**	-0.334**
	(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Growth	-0.031**	-0.033**	-0.034**
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Oil/Gas Income pc (logged)	0.087**	0.096**	0.098**
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Instability	0.291	0.324	0.312
	(0.208)	(0.211)	(0.210)
Trade Openness	-0.004**	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Polity	0.002	0.007	0.006
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Polity Squared	-0.013**	-0.012**	-0.012**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Cold War	0.795**	0.891**	0.874**
	(0.275)	(0.287)	(0.287)
N	5004	4697	4697
AIC	1967.55	1865.36	1867.31
BIC	2084.87	1988.00	1989.95

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table 8: Exiled Leaders and Protests: Our main analysis focused on civil conflicts, but we also speculated that exiled leaders might be linked to other forms of political instability such as protests. Therefore, the following models replicate and extend Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright's (2018) OLS model of protests. The dependent variable in this paper is Chenoweth, D'Orazio, and Wright's (2014) latent protest variable that uses item response theory to combine information from eight extant protest datasets and thereby minimize measurement error. The Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright (2018) analysis includes 102 non-OECD countries during the 1976-2010 period. Note that we follow Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright (2018) by including (but not reporting) country and 5-year period fixed effects. Readers interested in additional details about these models should consult Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright's original article in the *American Journal of Political Science*. Model 1 is a simple replication of Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright's main model of protests (Model 1 of Table 1 in the original paper). Model 2 adds the exile dummy variable from our LIE dataset to the regression. Model 3 uses the exile count variable instead of the exile dummy. The results are consistent with our conclusions from the civil conflict analysis in the paper: exiled leaders increase instability in their home states.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Leader in Exile (Dummy)		0.163**	
		(0.071)	
Leader in Exile (Count)			0.133**
			(0.047)
Remittances	0.036**	0.032*	0.031*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
GDP pc (log)	0.298**	0.322**	0.331**
	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.152)
Population (log)	0.907**	0.918**	0.909**
	(0.278)	(0.274)	(0.272)
Neighbor Protest	0.186	0.196	0.190
	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.175)
Growth	-0.017**	-0.016**	-0.016**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Net Migration	0.053	0.055	0.054
	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Election	0.074**	0.071**	0.071**
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Autocracy	0.192**	0.195**	0.186**
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.081)
N	2429	2429	2429
R^2	0.078	0.085	0.088

Standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table 9: Do Imprisoned Leaders Destabilize? A thoughtful reviewer asked whether our mechanisms linking exiled leaders to political instability could also apply after leaders are arrested. If we consider the mechanisms outlined in Table 1 of our paper, some definitively would not apply, while others might apply. For instance, the direct strategy of leaders returning home to fight certainly would not apply while leaders are imprisoned. But the indirect strategies—mobilizing supporters, financing rivals of the incumbent regime, and rallying international support for a restoration—could theoretically apply. However, we suspect that these mechanisms are considerably less likely to be relevant when leaders are in jail than when they are in exile for a simple reason: imprisoned leaders have far less freedom of action. To evaluate the relationship between imprisoned leaders and political instability, we conducted another test that mimics the logic of the exile vs. death test but instead compares rates of political instability following leader arrests and leader deaths. Relative to leader deaths, leader arrests have a consistently positive but statistically insignificant relationship with political instability. This finding supports our intuition that some of the mechanisms identified in our theory may occasionally apply to imprisoned leaders, even though they generally are more relevant to exiled leaders.

	(1)	(2)
Post-Arrest Period (10 Years)	0.309	
	(0.203)	
Post-Arrest Period (7 Years)		0.281
		(0.214)
N	2702	2020
AIC	1359.76	1065.08
BIC	1371.57	1076.30

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)