Comparative Tax Preferences: Experimental Evidence *Pre-Analysis Plan*

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1 Background

Comparative research has shown that redistributive preferences vary significantly from country to country. In particular, U.S.-Europe comparisons have shed light on the existence of different "tastes for equality" (Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009; Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005), and shown that these are often correlated with beliefs about the causes of income differences (Piketty, 1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). Wider comparisons have also established the existence of cultural differences in preferences for redistribution (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).

When it comes to fairness preferences regarding taxation however, we know very little about whether and how they vary cross-nationally.[1] Lü and Scheve (2016) provide the only comparative evidence on fairness preferences regarding taxation that I am aware of. They focus on one type of fairness considerations, inequity aversion, and use an experiment to show that self-centered inequity aversion is an important determinant of tax policy preferences in France but not in the U.S.

Otherwise, all that is available from a comparative perspective focuses on preferences for redistribution while taking into account the role of fairness considerations. This work typically relies on survey data[2], which raises the issue of potential confounders, particularly in the presence of very broad measures of fairness and redis-

[1] While Scheve and Stasavage (2016) survey the fairness arguments regarding taxation that have historically been used in the U.S. and Europe, they do not directly examine the fairness preferences of mass publics.

[2] One noteworthy exception is Alesina et al. (2018), which examines the effect of manipulating respondents' perception of social mobility (and the fairness of the economic system) on redistributive preferences in France, Italy, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S.

tributive preferences.[3] Moreover, it focuses on the isolated assessment of particular conceptions of fairness -usually deservingness- (Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Ashok et al., 2015), thus limiting our capacity to identify cross-national variations in the types of fairness preferences exhibited by different individuals or groups. More reliable evidence of cross-national variation in fairness preferences comes from experimental economics research using dictator (Cappelen et al., 2013) or ultimatum games (Heinrich, 2000; Henrich et al., 2006). However, although these games focus on questions of distributive justice, they do so at a high level of abstraction, making it difficult to infer more specific tax preferences from their findings.

Therefore, despite the fact that important cross-national differences in redistributive preferences and policies are well documented, and evidence suggests there is heterogeneity in what different societies consider as fair (Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009; Heinrich, 2000), the relationship between them and the role played by fairness preferences regarding taxation remains unclear. Differences in these fairness considerations could well provide the microfoundations for some of the cultural differences in support for redistribution that have been found elsewhere.

What we do know of fairness preferences regarding taxation, from experimental work in particular, comes mainly from research conducted in the U.S. (Chow and Galak, 2012; Durante et al., 2014; Esarey et al., 2012; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017; Charité et al., 2015). However, given that the U.S. is something of an outlier when it comes to beliefs about deservingness and redistributive preferences (Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009), it is unclear how much we can generalize from these findings.

This project seeks to contribute to filling this gap in the comparative literature by running the same conjoint survey experiment in Chile, Argentina and Australia, in an effort to better understand how fairness preferences regarding taxation vary across countries.

2 Theory and Hypotheses

The research question I intend to answer with this project is the following: does trust in government moderate partisan polarization in fairness preferences regarding taxation?

This project builds on the findings of a conjoint experiment conducted in the US,[4] with the purpose of identifying the causal role ability to pay, deservingness

[3]Explanatory variables often consist of questions regarding the importance of effort or family wealth for getting ahead, and dependent variables commonly used include whether it is the government's responsibility to reduce differences in income, or aggregate levels of social spending (Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009; Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).

[4]This experiment was preregistered in the Political Science Registered Stud-

and compensatory fairness considerations play in determining peoples' preferences for how the tax burden should be distributed. One of its main findings was the existence of a clear partisan polarization, with liberals applying ability to pay while conservatives apply deservingness fairness considerations. My expectation is that trust in government will have a moderating effect only in contexts where -like the US- support for redistribution is low. More specifically, I expect that:

H1: If support for redistribution is low, countries with low trust in government will exhibit more polarized fairness preferences (along ideological lines) than countries with high trust.

The intuition here is that low support for redistribution is driven (at least partially) by conservatives rejecting ability to pay progressive taxes and applying deservingness considerations (which need not lead to progressive taxation[5]). This implies an assumption that support for redistribution is determined (at least partially) by preferences for tax progressivity. That is, people who support redistribution do not expect the government to do it only through spending but also through (progressive) taxes.

Moreover, in conditions of low trust in government this polarization will be furthered by conservatives' opposition to government intervention. However, when trust in government is high this tendency may be tempered, allowing conservatives to trust the government to redistribute (some) income. That is, they will shift towards ability to pay.

H2: If support for redistribution is low and trust in government is high, there will be more agreement on ability to pay: decrease in polarization is driven by conservatives approximating liberals' position.

On the other hand, I expect that high support for redistribution in other countries implies that a portion of conservatives must also support ability to pay progressive taxes, regardless of the level of trust in government.

H3: If support for redistribution is high, trust in government will not have this moderating role on partisan polarization. The distance in preferences between conservatives and liberals will be similar in countries with high and low trust in government.

H4: If support for redistribution is high, everyone (both conservatives and liberals) will exhibit a preference for ability to pay fairness considerations, to the detriment of deservingness and compensatory considerations.

The practical implication of all this is that in countries with high levels of trust in government, it will be easier to reach a consensus regarding preferred tax policies.

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ies Dataverse (doi:10.7910/DVN/QKYQF5) and is available as a working paper at https://unequaldemocracies.unige.ch/files/2515/3484/0657/wp3.pdf.

[5]Deservingness considerations are consistent with progressivity only in the case in which compensatory arguments lead the rich to pay higher taxes.

This may be one of the reasons why countries with high trust also tend to exhibit higher levels of tax compliance (Steinmo, 2018).[6]

In order to test these hypotheses I need to compare the ideological distribution of fairness preferences in countries with different levels of trust in government within different levels of support for redistribution. In order to account for potential confounders, I have chosen countries with similar levels of support for redistribution and similar welfare and tax regimes, but different levels of trust in government. At high levels of support for redistribution I will use Chile and Argentina. At low levels of support for redistribution, I will use Australia and the US.

This pre-analysis plan is being registered prior to the analysis of new survey data from Australia, Chile and Argentina, which will be analyzed for the purpose of hypotheses testing alongside the existing data for the US.

3 Project Description

I will conduct three survey experiments in Australia, Chile and Argentina, equivalent to the one already conducted in the US and referenced above. As in the US case, in each country respondents will be presented with a pair of profiles in which income level, source of income, and proportion of income paid in sales taxes will be randomly varied, and asked to choose which one of these profiles should pay a higher tax rate. This design offers several advantages. The fact that attributes vary randomly will allow me to disentangle the effects of correlated attributes (e.g., wealth and luck). The forced choice component neutralizes attitudes about the overall level of taxation, so I can focus on the attributes that make citizens appear as more or less taxable to the respondent. Furthermore, since the resulting estimates represent effects on the same outcome (in this case, the probability that a profile will be chosen to receive the higher tax rate), they can be compared in order to assess the relative influence of different attributes (and ultimately, fairness considerations). Finally, this design will also allow me to assess the existence of heterogeneity in preferences by respondent characteristics (crucially, ideology).

As mentioned above, respondents will have to choose between a pair of profiles in which income level, source of income and proportion of income paid in sales taxes will vary randomly. In each country income and percentage of income paid in taxes will vary discretely from low to high, while sources of income will represent either effort, luck, social background or state privilege. See table 1 for attribute levels in each country.[7]

[6] I will examine this correlation empirically using the answer to a question about trust in the state and predicted responses from a list experiment on tax evasion.

[7] Sources of income were pre-tested in each country to ensure they are perceived in the way intended.

Attributes	**Attribute Levels**		
	Argentina	**Chile**	**Australia**
Level of income	$25,000	$350,000	$40,000
	$60,000	$800,000	$90,000
	$100,000	$1,500,000	$160,000
Source of income	Receives annuity from lottery prize	Receives annuity from lottery prize	Receives annuity from lottery prize
	Got trained as an engineer and found a job	Got trained as a chemist and found a job	Started own small business
	Got a job through family connections	Got a job through family connections	Appointed by parent in company they direct
	Owns a company that receives government subsidies	Owns a company that receives government subsidies	Owns business that was bailed out by government
% of income paid in sales taxes	5%	5%	1%
	10%	10%	5%
	15%	15%	10%

Table 1: Attributes and Attribute Levels by Country

In terms of presentation, two profiles will be presented side-by-side on the same screen, with the following prelude:

> Many observers have discussed the possibility of changing the federal income tax code to address multiple issues. The design of a new tax system raises a number of questions, including whether and why some people should pay higher rates than others. We are interested in what you think about this.
>
> We will show you profiles of random individuals. You will be shown pairs of individuals, along with several of their attributes. For each comparison we would like to know which of the two individuals you think should pay a higher tax rate. In total, we will show you five comparison pairs.
>
> Bear in mind that when we talk about tax rates we mean the percentage of their income that someone pays in taxes. People with different incomes who pay the same rate actually pay different amounts (i.e., 30% of an income of $100,000 is $30,000, but of an income of $50,000 it is $15,000).

Please take your time when reading the attributes of each individual. People have different opinions about this issue, and there are no right or wrong answers.

This introduction will be followed by a screen like the one presented in figure 1.

Attributes	Individual 1	Individual 2
Source of income	Owns business that was bailed out by government	Appointed by parent in company they direct
Annual income	$160,000	$40,000
Percentage of income paid in sales taxes	10%	10%

Which of the two individuals would you personally prefer to charge a higher tax rate to?

Individual 1 | Individual 2

Figure 1: Example of choice-based conjoint survey

In order to maximize the number of observations and allow respondents to familiarize themselves with the format of the experiment, each subject will see 5 pairs of profiles. After the first pair of profiles, they will be asked to answer the following open ended question, which will provide supplementary information on respondents' fairness preferences:

Why did you choose citizen <chosen citizen>?

Before completing their 5 choice tasks, respondents will have to fill a survey asking for their socio-demographic information (gender, age, education, household income, employment status and zip code of residence). After completing the choice tasks they will respond a battery of questions intended to determine ideology and partisanship,[8] as well as diffuse trust in the state.[9] These answers will be used to

[8]More specifically, they will be asked which party they identify with, which party they voted for in the last federal or national election, left-right self-placement and agreement with the statement that the government is the most responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people.

[9]Question wording is "Most public servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?". Responses measured on a 7 point likert scale.

check for heterogeneous preferences. They will also be asked to answer a question regarding their general preferences for progressivity, which will be used as a validation check, and a question regarding their opinion about current levels of inequality, which will be used to determine whether they are inequity averse:[10]

> Do you think everyone should pay the same share of their income in taxes or some people should pay a higher share than others?
>
> Australian households with incomes in the top 20% have average incomes of $110,000 per year, and households in the bottom 20% have average incomes of $20,000 per year. Should this difference be bigger, smaller, or about what it is now?

Finally, respondents will be exposed to a list experiment including the sensitive item "I have underreported income for tax purposes". This will also be used to assess heterogeneity given high levels of tax evasion particularly in Chile and Argentina.

Although no randomization restrictions will be used, I will test whether responses vary for profiles that might be considered atypical.[11] In order to be able to rule out primacy and recency effects, the order in which the attributes appear in the screen will be randomized between subjects.[12] I will also implement an attention test[13] after 3 of the 5 pairs of profiles have been shown, and record the time it takes each respondent to complete the whole survey and to choose each profile. Both of these strategies will allow me to test whether choices vary on the basis of attention paid.

4 Sample

The conjoint survey experiment will be completed online by samples of 1,500 respondents in each country. Representative samples in terms of age, gender and household income (or social class) will be provided by the market research company Respondi.

US data comes from a sample of 2,000 respondents collected in 2017 from Amazon Mechanical Turk.

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[10] Examples from the Australian version of the survey are used throughout this document. Spanish versions in Argentina and Chile are equivalent.

[11] Atypical profiles would be those combining: "Receives annuity from a lottery prize" or "Owns business that was bailed out by government" as source of income and the lowest level of income.

[12] Not within subjects, to reduce complexity.

[13] Following Bechtel and Scheve (2013), the attention test will involve asking respondents the following question: "We are interested in learning about your preferences on a variety of topics, including colors. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both red and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question below and select both of those options. What is your favorite color?"

5 Models

Outcome data will come from the forced choice made by respondents regarding which profile in each pair should pay a higher tax rate. The unit of analysis is the citizen profile and outcomes will be measured using a dummy variable that will take a value of 1 if a profile is chosen and a 0 if a profile is not chosen.

All results will be illustrated graphically using plots to show the effect of each attribute value on the probability of a profile being chosen to pay the highest rate, relative to the baseline attribute value, with 95% confidence intervals.

For the analyses below I will exclude respondents who completed the survey in less than half of the median time.

The above design allows me to estimate the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for each attribute value. The AMCEs measure the average change in the probability that a profile will be chosen to have the higher tax rate when it includes a given attribute value compared to when it includes the baseline attribute value.[14] AMCEs can be estimated via OLS regression of the outcome variable on dummies for each level of each attribute (excluding a reference category) (Hainmueller et al., 2014).

In terms of my hypotheses, H1 and H2 require me to compare the level of ideological polarization in fairness preferences in the US and Australia, two countries with low support for redistribution and respectively low and high levels of trust in government. In order to do so, I will estimate models of the following form:[15]

$$\begin{aligned} chosen_{cijk} =& \beta_0 + \beta_1 I2_{cijk} + \beta_2 I3_{cijk} + \beta_3 Left_{cijk} + \beta_4 Aus_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_6 I2 * Left_{cijk} + \beta_7 I3 * Left_{cijk} + \beta_8 I2 * Aus_{cijk} + \beta_9 I3 * Aus_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_{10} Left * Aus_{cijk} + \beta_{11} I2 * Left * Aus_{cijk} + \beta_{12} I3 * Left * Aus_{cijk} \\ &+ \varepsilon_{ijk} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

In this model, which focuses on the ability to pay fairness consideration, $I2$ and $I3$ refer to the attribute values with the two highest levels of income in each country (I2 = \$80,000 in US and \$90,000 in Australia and I3 = \$150,000 in the US and

[14] Baseline attribute values will be the lowest level of income, the lowest percentage of income paid in sales taxes and sources of income resulting from effort (i.e., "Started own small business" in Australia and "Got trained as an engineer (chemist) and found a job" in Argentina and Chile).

[15] Subscripts c identify countries (c = US, Australia), i identify respondents, j identify the profile in each pair ($j = 1, 2$), and k identify the choice task or profile pair ($k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$). Results will be estimated through OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by respondent to account for within-respondent correlation.

$160,000 in Australia), Left is a dummy identifying liberal respondents[16] and Aus is a dummy identifying Australian respondents (as opposed to US respondents). H1 requires that for I2 and I3 the difference in the probability of selection between liberals and conservatives is smaller in Australia than in the US. In terms of the model above, this implies that $\widehat{\beta_{11}} < 0$ and $\widehat{\beta_{12}} < 0$.

Similarly for the deservingness fairness consideration, while there is polarization in the effect of the state benefit and luck sources of income between liberals and conservatives in the US, I expect this distance to be smaller in Australia. This means that in equation 2, where S2 is social background, S3 is state benefit and S4 is luck, I expect $\widehat{\beta_{14}} < 0$ and $\widehat{\beta_{15}} < 0$.[17]

$$\begin{aligned} chosen_{cijk} =& \beta_0 + \beta_1 S2_{cijk} + \beta_2 S3_{cijk} + \beta_3 S4_{cijk} + \beta_4 Left_{cijk} + \beta_5 Aus_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_6 S2 * Left_{cijk} + \beta_7 S3 * Left_{cijk} + \beta_8 S4 * Left_{cijk} + \beta_9 S2 * Aus_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_{10} S3 * Aus_{cijk} + \beta_{11} S4 * Aus_{cijk} + \beta_{12} Left * Aus_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_{13} S2 * Left * Aus_{cijk} + \beta_{14} S3 * Left * Aus_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_{15} S4 * Left * Aus_{cijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

H2 on the other hand requires that in equation 1 above, which refers to ability to pay, the effect of the highest levels of income on the probability of selection is larger among Australian conservatives than it is among US conservatives, meaning that $\hat{\beta}_1 < \hat{\beta}_8$ and $\hat{\beta}_2 < \hat{\beta}_9$.

Moving on to H3, this requires a similar comparison between Chile and Argentina, with the expectation that the difference in probability of selection of I2 and I3 between conservatives and liberals will be similar across both countries. Thus, an equivalent model will be estimated:

$$\begin{aligned} chosen_{cijk} =& \beta_0 + \beta_1 I2_{cijk} + \beta_2 I3_{cijk} + \beta_3 Left_{cijk} + \beta_4 Arg_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_6 I2 * Left_{cijk} + \beta_7 I3 * Left_{cijk} + \beta_8 I2 * Arg_{cijk} + \beta_9 I3 * Arg_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_{10} Left * Arg_{cijk} + \beta_{11} I2 * Left * Arg_{cijk} + \beta_{12} I3 * Left * Arg_{cijk} \\ &+ \varepsilon_{ijk} \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

[16] US respondents are coded as liberals if they self describe as liberal or very liberal and as conservatives if they self describe as conservative or very conservative. Australian respondents will be coded as liberal if they place themselves at the centre-left or left of the left/right spectrum, and as conservative if they place themselves at the centre-right or right. Moderates and centrists are excluded. Party identification and vote choice will also be used for robustness.

[17] The social background source of income is included for completeness, though in the US case there is no significant difference in the preferences of liberals and conservatives regarding this attribute value.

Here, the Left dummy identifies leftist voters,[18] and Arg identifies respondents in Argentina. Following the discussion above, I expect that $\hat{\beta_{11}} = 0$ and $\hat{\beta_{12}} = 0$.

Finally, H4 requires a comparison between high and low support for redistribution countries (so, Chile and Argentina vs US and Australia), with the expectation that in high support for redistribution countries respondents will privilege ability to pay over deservingness or compensatory considerations to a greater extent. The following model will be used to test this hypothesis:[19]

$$\begin{aligned} chosen_{cijk} =& \beta_0 + \beta_1 I2_{cijk} + \beta_2 I3_{cijk} + \beta_3 S2_{cijk} + \beta_4 S3_{cijk} + \beta_5 S4_{cijk} + \beta_6 T2_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_7 T3_{cijk} + \beta_8 High_{cijk} + \beta_9 I2 * High_{cijk} + \beta_{10} I3 * High_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_{11} S2 * High_{cijk} + \beta_{12} S3 * High_{cijk} + \beta_{13} S4 * High_{cijk} \\ &+ \beta_{14} T2 * High_{cijk} + \beta_{15} T3 * High_{cijk} + \varepsilon_{cijk} \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

The dummy High identifies respondents in Chile and Argentina, and I expect coefficients associated with ability to pay in these countries (relative to the US and Australia) to be positive ($\beta_9, \beta_{10} > 0$), and coefficients associated with deservingness considerations to be negative ($\beta_{11}, \beta_{12}, \beta_{13}, \beta_{14}, \beta_{15} < 0$).

Following Leeper et al. (2019), diagnostic checks will be run to ensure that subgroup preferences over reference categories are equivalent (and conditional AMCEs across groups are therefore comparable). Moreover, the difference in conditional marginal means will also be estimated and presented graphically for all of the above models and omnibus F-tests conducted to formally test group differences in preferences.[20]

5.1 Heterogeneous effects

In addition to the above, I will also estimate conditional marginal means across different subgroups in an effort to better understand the distribution of fairness preferences in each country.

[18] Respondents will be coded as leftists in Chile and Argentina if they place themselves at the left or centre-left of the left/right spectrum and rightists if they place themselves at the right or centre-right. Centrists are excluded. Because self-placement may not be reliable in these countries, I will also use respondents' position regarding the role of the state in ensuring individual well-being and vote choice to place candidates in the left/right spectrum.

[19] I will also examine this hypothesis by estimating the main effects independently for each country.

[20] More specifically, to test for differences in the effects of attributes between liberals and conservatives in US and Australia (H1) and Chile and Argentina (H3) and between high and low support for redistribution countries (H4).

1. By preferences for progressivity: compare estimates between those who think everyone should pay the same tax rate and those who think people should pay different rates. Describe average respondent who thinks people should pay same rate and average respondent who thinks people should pay different rates. Check if demographic attributes predict responses (regress response on demographics).

2. By inequality aversion: compare estimates between those who think inequality is too high and those who think it is too low or ok.

3. By income level: compare estimates between respondents with low (deciles 1-3), medium (deciles 4-7) and high (deciles 8-10) levels of household income. Also between low (deciles 1-3), medium (deciles 4-7), high (deciles 8-9) and very high (decile 10) levels of household income. For Argentina and Chile, also by socio-economic status, comparing estimates between respondents with social grades ABC1, C2-C3 and DE.

4. By level of education: low education (up to high-school degree) vs high education (above high-school degree).

5. By tax compliance: given high levels of evasion in Chile and Argentina, I will use predicted responses to the list experiment to compare estimates between respondents predicted to be more likely to evade taxes and those who are not, as proposed by Imai et al. (2015).

5.2 Interactions between attributes

I will estimate average marginal interaction effects (AMIEs) to see if an attribute interacts with another attribute to influence responses following Egami and Imai (2019).

- Check for interactions between share of income paid in sales taxes and income level.
- Check for interactions between level of income and source of income.
- Check for interactions between source of income and share of income paid in sales taxes.

5.3 Diagnostic checks

These are intended to check that the conjoint analysis assumptions hold and to probe potential concerns about external validity (row-order effects and atypical profiles). They are all based on Hainmueller et al. (2014).

- Carryover effects: estimate AMCEs separately for each of the 5 rounds of choices. Assumption 1 (stability and no carry-over effects assumption) implies AMCEs should be similar across tasks.
- Profile order effects: estimate AMCEs separately for each profile (1 and 2). Assumption 2 (no profile order effects) implies AMCEs should be similar regardless of whether the attribute occurs in the first or second profile in a given task.
- Row-order effects: estimate row-specific AMCEs and test whether the estimates are significantly different from each other. This is to examine if the AMCE of an attribute depends on the order in which it appears in the conjoint table.
- Atypical profiles: estimate AMCEs separately for profiles including and not including atypical profiles (as described in footnote 9). Note that atypical profiles are included because it is precisely by breaking the correlations that exist in reality that we can separate the isolated effect of each attribute (Hainmueller et al., 2014).

5.4 Robustness tests

- Repeat analyses separately for those who passed and didn't pass the attention screener.
- Check if screening inattentives leads to selection bias.
- Assess results separately by time of survey completion (below and above median).
- Include false discovery rate (FDR) p-value adjustment for multiple testing in analyses of heterogeneous effects.
- Repeat hypotheses tests using alternative measures of ideology:
  - Party identification (see table 2 for coding).
  - Vote choice (see table 3 for coding).
  - Answers to question "The [country] government, more than individuals, is the most responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?". Responses of strongly agree, agree and somewhat agree coded as left and responses of somewhat disagree, disagree and strongly disagree coded as right. Neither agree nor disagree excluded.

Country	Party	Position
Argentina	Partido Justicialista	Left
	Kirchnerismo	Left
	Union Civica Radical	Right
	Partido Socialista	Left
	Propuesta Republicana	Right
	Other or none	(excluded)
Chile	PDC	Center (excluded)
	PS	Left
	PRSD	Left
	PPD	Left
	PCCH	Left
	UDI	Right
	RN	Right
	RD	Left
	EVOPOLI	Right
	Other or none	(excluded)
Australia	Liberal	Right
	Labor	Left
	National Party	Right
	Greens	Left
	Independent or Other	(excluded)
USA	Republican	Right
	Democrat	Left
	Independent or Other	(excluded)

Table 2: Coding of Party Identification by Country

Country	Party	Position
Argentina	Alberto Fernandez	Left
	Mauricio Macri	Right
	Roberto Lavagna	Center (excluded)
	Nicolas del Cano	Left
	Juan Jose Gomez Centurion	Right
	Jose Luis Espert	Right
	Other or did not vote	(excluded)
Chile	Sebastian Pinera	Right
	Alejandro Guillier	Left
	Beatriz Sanchez	Left
	Jose Antonio Kast	Right
	Carolina Goic	Center (excluded)
	Marco Enriquez Ominami	Left
	Eduardo Artes	Left
	Alejandro Navarro	Left
	Other or did not vote	(excluded)
Australia	Liberal Party of Australia	Right
	Australian Labor Party	Left
	National Party of Australia	Right
	Liberal National Party of Queensland	Right
	Australian Greens	Left
	United Australia Party	Right (pop)
	One Nation	Right (pop)
	Other or did not vote	(excluded)
USA	Donald Trump	Right
	Hillary Clinton	Left
	Other or did not vote	(excluded)

Table 3: Coding of Vote Choice by Country

6 Missing data

Observations with missing outcome data (i.e., respondents did not choose any of the two profiles) will be dropped. Observations with missing data on covariates will be kept in the main analyses but dropped in the estimation of heterogeneous effects.

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