The Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) Dataset

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APPENDICES

Read in conjunction with this document and cite if using these data:
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You are welcome to also cite this document if relevant. Please email corrections or comments. (The Case Coding Notes—brief version focused on dates and elections—is available from the author by email request. She also has more detailed notes stored, as described in this document.) (Also recommended is to run Replication_Code_MGEP_final.do through line 1088 to clean up the data from the coding, standardizing country names, for example, and fixing a few small coding errors.)

1. MGEP CODEBOOK

The MGEP dataset is a compilation of militant and ex-militant group electoral participation for the period 1970-2010. This codebook summarizes the concepts (drawing on the paper), overviews the variables in the dataset, and then details the coding rules and notes on any anomalies in the cases. The militant group definition is inclusize because it was not clear before the project what type of armed actors might employ electoral participation. The research team—composed of undergraduate and graduate research assistants whom I supervised—followed these rules to compile and check militant groups, and then to identify their electoral participation. Finally, it discusses reliability statistics.

Militant Groups

Militant groups in this project are defined as non-governmental entities using extra-legal violence to achieve political aims. The groups are non-governmental in that they are not paid by the state to use arms to achieve their political aims, though they may be aligned with the government's agenda or even affiliated with an elected party. Professed intent is a crucial consideration: the groups that I include have professed political aims, such as policy or regime change, that are at a minimum stated by the group or the government; otherwise, the groups' violent acts are merely common crime. These criteria are used in many definitions of militancy (for example, see Gleditsch et al., 2002). Most fundamentally, finally, the group must use violence that seeks to destroy property and/or cause casualties. I treat militant groups as unitary actors (until their own declarations or governmental statements indicate that they have split), though they may contain different factions with different policy preferences. The data not only includes those "rebels" or "armed actors" in the main civil war and civil conflict datasets,[1] but also those engaged in conflicts that do not achieve sufficient battle death thresholds to qualify them for these databases.[2] All of these groups, however, do conduct attacks and may employ a range of other tactics and strategies to achieve their aims. The data include the years in which these groups are actively attacking, as well as ten years afterward. See the paper for more

[1] These include what are often called "insurgents" or "guerrillas", armed actors engaged in irregular conflicts, where the government has a relative strength advantage (e.g. Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).
[2] Many low-lever groups have been termed "terrorists" in the existing data sources because the groups may target civilians to achieve their political aims.

detailed explanation on this decision. The armed actor data sources and systematic standards that I used to identify when organizations met the definition of a militant group are in the "Detailed Coding Procedures" (1.2) below.

Electoral Participation

Electoral participation is defined here as presenting a candidate eligible under the established rules to contest a legislative election in the country. Political participation potentially includes many different actions, and militant and ex-militant groups employ a variety of them. This study focuses on a particularly important component of political participation—electoral participation—that fits a minimalist definition of democratic engagement (Downs, 1957). This is a theoretically important component because it is an overt signal of political engagement. I return to the possibilities for other types of participation in the final subsection. Thus, the militant or ex-militant group, or its clearly designated political wing, must present a candidate eligible under the law and electoral rules to contest a legislative election in the country in which it operates, similar to standard definitions of parties (e.g. Sartori, 1976: 54). Independent candidates therefore do not count. I focus on national legislative elections to see if any militant group ran candidates.[3] These contests at the country-level represent the type of overt strategy decision that is of interest.[4] For each active year and for ten years afterward, militant and ex-militant group participation is coded in the official legislative elections held in the country (or countries) in which the group seeks to achieve its political agenda using the sources and rules that are in the "coding rules" below.[5]

Distinguishing between types of militant group participation adds another level of nuance. ***Violent participation*** occurs when the militant group competes against the government, and we cannot identify a peace agreement actively in place (coded from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, the Peace Accord Matrix, and case evidence then marked in the "Case Coding Notes" if present). In this category, the militant group typically actively attacks during the electoral process. ***Peaceful participation*** occurs when the ex-militant group competes against the government after a peace agreement has been signed. The peace agreement typically includes electoral participation provisions that permit ex-militants to stand for office. I believe these represent a theoretically useful in categories, as the latter follows an effort to resolve the incompatibilities of the conflict, while the former does not. But users could easily change peaceful participation to include cases of ceasefires, for example. Finally, ***won participation*** occurs when the ex-militant group holds elections after seizing power through military victory or a peace agreement that splits a state. The ex-militant groups in these cases then hold elections in which the former governments typically do not compete. ***Prior participation*** indicates whether a group participated in elections in the five years before it began fighting.

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[3] Presidential elections almost always coincide with participation in legislative elections so there is little additional variation in those elections.

[4] Local electoral participation may serve different functions, given many different dynamics at work in these contests, especially how little attention surrounds some of them. These data would be a nice addition to this project, however.

[5] In addition to national legislative elections, we also included elections in autonomous regions in which militant groups operates, if these are the highest-level state-organized elections for that area. Thus, the elections in Mindanao and the Palestinian territories are included, for example. These are marked in the "Case Coding Notes," so that they could be dropped from an analysis should someone want to include only elections that are formally national. There are several rebel-held territories that hold elections rejected by the state that we identified, and, while we did not include these in the dataset, we marked them in the country notes, too, in case users should want to include them.

1.1 MGEP VARIABLES

Variable Name	Explanation	Source	Notes
region	Region: Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, and Middle East		Six regions are currently coded.[6]
name	Militant group name	Commonly used name from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict and Non-State Conflict Datasets, the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs), the Terrorists, Insurgencies, and Guerrillas in Education and Research's Terrorist Groups Worldwide (TIGER), or the Minorities at Risk (MAR) (see 1.2 for more detailed source information)	See Coding Procedure (below) to identify militant groups.
year	Year		See Coding Procedure (below) to identify years included.
month	Month	Election World, or the PARLINE database (see 1.2 for more detailed source information)	Only coded for election years; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify elections.
basestate	Name of the state(s) in which the militant group is based.	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict and Non-State Conflict Datasets, the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs), the Terrorists, Insurgencies, and Guerrillas in Education and Research's Terrorist Groups Worldwide (TIGER), and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) + news sources	Usually the same state as the target state; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify militant groups.
targetstate	Name of the state(s) that the militant group targets.	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict and Non-State Conflict Datasets, the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs), the Terrorists, Insurgencies, and Guerrillas in Education and Research's Terrorist Groups Worldwide (TIGER), and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) + news sources	Usually the same state as the base state; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify militant groups.
IDENTIFYING CODES			
countryid	Unique number assigned to each country.	Correlates of War Project. 2011. "State System Membership List, v2011." Online, http://correlatesofwar.org. Modified to reflect Gleditsch, Kristian S. and Michael D. Ward. 1999. "Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816." *International Interactions* 25(4).	

[6] Continental, except the Middle East and North Africa is its own region and Australia/Oceania is included with Asia for coding purposes, but users could easily code different regions and sub-regions using the country IDs.

groupid	Unique number assigned to each militant group in this dataset.		Created using the country ID followed by a sequential number.
ucdpid_con	Unique number assigned to each conflict in the UCDP datasets.	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict and Non-State Conflict Datasets	Only assigned for the UCDP groups.
ucdpid_dyad	Unique number assigned to each dyad in the UCDP datasets.	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict and Non-State Conflict Datasets	Only assigned for the UCDP groups.
neldaid	Unique number assigned to each election in the NELDA dataset.	Hyde, Susan D. and Nikolay Marinov. 2012, "Which Elections Can Be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20(2).	Elections that are not in NELDA are generally identified in the "Case Coding Notes."
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION			
election	Indicator of national legislative elections, or elections in autonomous regions in which militant groups operate, if these are the highest-level state-organized elections for that area (marked in the "Case Coding Notes").	Election World, the PARLINE database; corroborated by NELDA	See Coding Procedure (below) to identify elections.
alias	Alternative names used in a political context.	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict and Non-State Conflict Datasets, the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs), the Terrorists, Insurgencies, and Guerrillas in Education and Research's Terrorist Groups Worldwide (TIGER), or the Minorities at Risk (MAR)	See Coding Procedure (below) to identify militant groups.
part	Indicator of (ex-)militant group electoral participation	Election World, the PARLINE database, alternative sources	Only coded for election years; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify elections.
propart	Source identifying the electoral participation (if part=1).	Election World, the PARLINE database + news sources	Only coded for election years; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify elections.
nopart	Source identifying the electoral participation (if part=0).	Election World, the PARLINE database + news sources	Only coded for election years; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify elections.
viop	Indicator of "violent" participation, which occurs when the militant group competes against the government with no peace agreement in place (and, indeed, the militant group is typically "active" in its attacks around these elections).	Election World, the PARLINE database + news sources	Only coded for election years; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify elections.
peacep	Indicator of "peaceful" participation, which occurs when the ex-militant group competes against the government with a peace agreement in place, typically under electoral	Election World, the PARLINE database + news sources	Only coded for election years; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify elections.

	participation provisions written into the peace agreement.		
winner	Indicator of "won" participation, which occurs when the ex-militant group holds elections after seizing power through military victory or a peace agreement that splits a state. The ex-militant groups in these cases then hold elections in which the former governments typically do not compete.	Election World, the PARLINE database + news sources	Only coded for election years; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify elections.
priorp	Indicator of "prior" participation, which occurs when a political party that becomes a militant group within five years (but is not yet fighting) participates in elections.	Election World, the PARLINE database + news sources	Only coded for election years; see Coding Procedure (below) to identify elections.
CONFLICT			
active	Indicator that the militant group is in the midst of an armed campaign against ("actively fighting") the state.	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict and Non-State Conflict Datasets, the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs), the Terrorists, Insurgencies, and Guerrillas in Education and Research's Terrorist Groups Worldwide (TIGER), and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) + news sources	See Coding Procedure (below) to identify militant groups
ucdp	Indicator that the militant group is active at the UCDP-level.	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict and Non-State Conflict Datasets	These groups also are matched with their UCDP conflict and dyad identifiers.
terr	Indicator of a territorial (as opposed to a center-seeking) conflict	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict and Non-State Conflict Datasets + news sources on group goals	

1.2 MGEP DETAILED CODING PROCEDURES

A. Identifying Potential Militant Groups

In a file called "[Region] Compiled Groups" (Spreadsheet #1), we compiled a list of all of the groups from the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs),[7] the Terrorists, Insurgencies, and Guerrillas in Education and Research's Terrorist Groups Worldwide (TIGER),[8] the armed actors from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset,[9] as well as the Minorities at Risk (MAR) notes.[10] In the MAR set, we read each country description to locate any group that acted as a coherent whole or that was named as representing that ethnicity, *and* that either participated in any protests or other types of violence, or that was repressed by the state using force specifically. If a particular attack was named, but no group was identified as carrying it out, we searched in Google and LexisNexis to see if we could identify one.

In the "Name" category, we listed the main name identified by the source (either the one used in the description, or, if there is no description, the one used first in the listing), then in parentheses any common abbreviation, and then a forward slash with the name's translation (either in the original language or English depending on which is the main name used by the source). Finally, we listed aliases provided by that source after an "OR".

We cross checked to see if similarly-named groups were identified by more than one of these datasets. If two groups had the same name, or similar names with the same location(s) [at least all locations listed by one source are contained in the other] and dates in existence (within 5 years for either the start or end date), we listed them as the same group, and identified any additional aliases from that source after an "OR" in the "Name" category. We noted each dataset in which the group was found in the "Original Source" column (as TOPs, TIGER, UCDP/PRIO, and/or MAR).

We listed all locations that the source identified for the group in the "State" column, beginning with the one in which the group was said to be based, then the one in which it carries out the majority of its attacks, and finally any others (if that information is provided by the source; otherwise, we simply listed alphabetically).

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[7] The Terrorist Organization Profiles, TOPs, are 856 group descriptions created by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). Between 2004 and 2008, the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, hired MIPT to compile existing terrorism knowledge from the RAND terrorism chronology and the American Terrorism Study's indictment database to form the Terrorism Knowledge Database, TKB. As part of the same project, MIPT also partnered with Detica, or DFI International, to research terrorist groups, to generate TOPs. TKB was last updated on March 1, 2008, but it is not clear how long before that research on TOPs ceased. TOPs is now available through another DHS financed project based at the University of Maryland, but without verification of its validity.

[8] TIGER is a project by Gabriel Ben-Dor, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger.

[9] Updated through version 4-2015 of these well-known civil conflict data, see Pettersson, Therése & Peter Wallensteen (2015) Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014. Journal of Peace Research 52(4). Initial data, see Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002) Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5).

[10] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ (Phase IV).

We identified the most inclusive dates given by any source in the "Date Begun" and "Date Ended" columns. (Note that we trace militant groups that are active in 1970 to their start, although users may want to censor those observations, as I do in the figures in 2).

We entered any description given in the source in the "Summary" column, and we noted which source provided it. If the summary contained mention of the group size, specific leaders, and/or allies/adversaries, we noted these in "Strength", "Leaders", and "Related Groups" columns respectively.

B. Vetting for Use of Violence, Dates of Use, and Goals

This section of the data was coded by at least two coders. The first coder of this aspect of the data is listed in the column "Coder"; the second is listed in the column "Checker". Any changes between the two are marked in red in these files. In all cases of disagreement, I acted as the final arbiter.

In order to ensure that the group had actually carried out a violent attack with political aims, we vetted each in news sources. We searched for each group under its primary name in quotation marks in English in the Global Terrorism Database (although we used only sourced articles, which were usually only in GTD2)[11] and Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. We also checked as many as possible in OpenSource, especially those for which the description listed at least two attacks and stated goals, but did not show up in one of the other sources.[12] If the name did not identify a home country, we added each country listed by the sources to the search bar one at a time.

> If this initial search returned over 1000 results in LexisNexis or OpenSource, we also added "attack" to the search.
>
> If the initial search in these news sources did not result in any articles that mention the group, or even any mentions of violence by the group, we substituted the translated name after the "/" in the name column (and used Google Translate where necessary to read the documents produced); if still nothing came up, we also tried the abbreviation and then the aliases.

If any of these searches returned at least one article mentioning a violent attack — including a bombing, a knife/gun attack, a kidnapping, or other damage or destruction of persons or property — we noted the first attack in the "First Attack" column. If there was more than one attack, we listed the last attack in the "Last Attack" column. We cited the full information for the article in those columns (as: Author's Last Name, Author's First Name. Year. "Title of Article." *Title of Source*, Day Month.), and saved a PDF copy of these articles entitled "FirstAttack" and

[11] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2015). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. GTD is a Department of Homeland Security financed project at the University of Maryland. GTD1 (1970-1997) seeks to record "every known terrorist event across nations and over time from multi-lingual news sources" using a broad definition of terrorism: "use of illegal force and violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." The records of 1993 attacks, however, were lost before digitization. START is verifying each incident, and is 45% finished. GTD2 (1997-2003) codes violent attacks from public source newspapers and existing datasets according to several different definitions. START provides extensive coding rules on GTD2.

[12] OpenSource is a database where the FBI translates and compiles local news sources.

"LastAttack" (as well as any ALTAttacks if there were two attacks that were too close to tell which came first) in a folder entitled [Region], and then a subfolder entitled [Group]. In columns entitled "Updated Date Begun" and "Updated Date Ended", we then entered the year of the first attack and the last attack (which could be the same for a group with only one attack, but see below for the criteria on goals that also had to be met for the group to be confirmed as a militant group).

Also note: any fighting with the government or attacks by the government on bases, strongholds, or members that clearly list the group as a participant, we counted as attacks; we counted foiled attacks that specifically detail a plot for the date range *only* if the group also successfully executed attacks (since otherwise significant bias may result across countries with more versus less transparency); finally, we counted ceasefires as last attacks where we could not find mention of other attacks around that time but the text made it clear that there had been (we marked these in the "Case Coding Notes"). We did not count attacks carried out by "former members".

If there was a five-year or longer break in which no attacks are listed at any point between the first and last attacks *and* no action is later mentioned during this period, we listed the two different time periods as two separate rows entitled "[Group] I" and "[Group] II". (We did this to assuage concerns that Group II would be completely different from Group I.)

If the group appeared to be merely an alias for a better established group, or if the group appeared to merely be a name change for a former group (with the same leaders/members, goals, and tactics), we just listed this as an alias (and noted it in the "Case Coding Notes").

If one of these conditions did not hold, so that there was not at least one violent attack listed in a news source, we marked "0" in the "Confirmed" column.

If there was at least one confirmed attack, through the same search procedure, we identified the first article in which the group's goals were mentioned in a statement by their leaders or their spokesmen, or by the government (neither need be a direct quote); we also accepted the government's statement in a trial of former group members, and these need not occur before the last attack (see below). We noted the first such citations in the "Goals" column (again, cited as: Author. Year. "Title of Article." *Title of Source*, Day Month.), and saved a PDF copy of this article entitled "GoalsA" (and then B, C, etc. if others later also contained different descriptions) in the Folder entitled [Region], and then a subfolder entitled [Group].

Also note: if the group appeared to be an armed wing of another group in the set, we noted the original group in the column "Possible Armed Wing." If the group appeared to be a faction of another group, we noted that group in the column, "Possible Splinter"). We treated militant groups as split if their own declaration or a governmental statement supported that coding decision in these militant group data sources. In the case of splinters where the main group already announced its goals, we tried to find a new announcement of goals for the splinter but accepted the original statement if one did not exist. We capture the main goals by quoting the sentence in the identified article or summarizing in a few words what the group's aims are. We also noted the year of the first goal statement in the column, "First Goals Year."

If the statement of goals appeared before at least one attack, or was part of a successful trial of group members, we left the "1" in the "Confirmed" column; otherwise, we marked a "0".

Due to UCDP/PRIO's similar standards to ours, and greater resources than ours, we relied on their coding of attacks in the case that ours could not definitively establish the same facts. If any UCDP/PRIO group could not be confirmed to have attacks through our research, we still listed it as a "1" in the "Confirmed" column, unless the news sources make it clear that this was a single-attack coup group that only stated its goals *after* the attack or an interstate war, usually indicating a coup. Moreover, if the UCDP/PRIO dates for a group extended beyond the news dates found (without any breaks longer than five-years), we used the UCDP/PRIO dates and note this cases.

We then generated a variable for "ucdp" in the "Set", which we marked as a "1" in the years UCDP/PRIO viewed the group as active and "0" otherwise.

Finally, we re-read any description given in the summaries from the initial sources for the locations of the group: if these list only one state in which the group is based and carries out attacks, we corroborated this with the articles on the first and last attacks, and then listed this location in the columns entitled "State Based" and "State Attacked." If either of these locations are considered autonomous territories by the government, are current or former colonies, or are occupied by a foreign presence, we listed as [state occupying or foreign presence]/[home territory or state]. If the summary lists more than one state, we read through the goals and attack articles to see where the group is based and where it attacks most often (we read every fifth article in the search results if it was unclear from the First and Last attack articles). If no base state is listed, we provided the state in which the most attacks are carried out by default. If the location in which the state is based was not listed but it seems to be distinct from the state with the most attacks, we listed the state from which most leaders/members mentioned come from. If the group carries out an approximately equal number of attacks in more than one state, we listed it as "international." In these cases, or where there were a few attacks or a training base in another state, we listed these in a column, "Other States."

3. Identify Electoral Participation

Once we vetted these groups, we began a new dataset for the participation dataset. We copied the primary name (abbreviation)/translation of each CONFIRMED group into a new spreadsheet called "[Regional Abbreviation] Set" (Spreadsheet #2); if the name under which we confirmed the group was an alias, we used that name instead. Based on the entries in the columns "Updated Date Begun" and "Updated Date Ended", we made a row entry in "[Regional Abbreviation] Set" for each year between these dates [including the dates themselves], as well as for five years before and 10 years after these dates. In the column "active", we listed a "1" for any years between the first and last attacks, and a "0" otherwise.

We listed the states identified as the "Base State" in Spreadsheet #1 in the new column entitled "basestate." We also listed the main state attacked in "targetstate". If there were multiple states in which the group was based, we tried to find the largest headquarter/base of leadership in each year; if there were multiple states which the group targeted, we tried to identify the primary state based on the description in the "Goals" documents. If this state becomes a new state or gains

independence, we noted this through the coding of the "countryid" below. If there was a clear base state, we would then search for participation in this state; if there was not a clear base state, we would then search for participation in the targeted state. We noted the chosen state's correlates of war ID in the "countryid" column. For each group moved to Spreadsheet #2, we also then coded a "groupid" column as the COWID and then the next positive, real number beginning with 1 (so the first group identified in Turkey reads 6401, for example). We also coded in the conflict ID, as "conflictid," from UCDP/PRIO, and the election id, as "electionid," from NELDA.

We identified any aliases for the group from the original spreadsheet, as well as by examining the columns in Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger's data that report groups' political wings (generously shared as a working document). We did not count those parties that merely had "ties" to groups as aliases. We listed any of these additional names in the "alias" column in Spreadsheet #2.

We then identified each national legislative and/or parliamentary election in the chosen country for all of the years listed (both in which the group was active and not active), and we attempted to locate *complete* election results for each.

> We did so by going to Election World, [13] which is now available through Wikipedia (and can be easily reached by googling "Elections [State]"), and clicking on the bar at the bottom entitled "Elections and Referendums in [State]". In the "Election" column, we marked a "1" for each year in which there is a parliamentary or general election, and a "0" otherwise. We also added the month in which they took place (a "6" for June, for example).
>
> If there is not a link for that election year, or the results were incomplete, we used the PARLINE database,[14] and then searched Google and then LexisNexis for "Elections Results [State] [Year(s)]" to identify older results preferably in the form of any official election results that the state has posted.
>
> We saved each election record we found as a PDF, and we noted in the country notes whether it was complete or incomplete. If are still unidentified "other" parties that ran in the elections but that are not specifically named in the results, this would be considered incomplete.
>
> When an election was identified, we checked the election years: if NELDA is "1" and we do not have an election in that year, or we have an election and NELDA is not "1", we also noted this in the country notes. Following NELDA, we did not include indirect elections, such as those held at the national level in China, noted in the country notes.

Also note: elections in autonomous regions are included, if they are the highest-level state-organized elections for that area, as recognized by the official state in charge of that territory, according to the Gleditsch and Ward 1999 coding. Thus, the elections in Mindanao and the Palestinian territories are included, for example. These are marked in the "Case Coding Notes."

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[13] Election World was initially collected by Wilfried Derksen, and then he migrated it to Wikipedia; it remains the most comprehensive source for candidate lists, although we used caution given the open editing.

[14] The PARliaments onLINE database is collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which relies on self-reporting by participating parliaments, but cross-checks reports with national electoral commissions and the media. Other well-known databases on elections, such as Adam Carr's Psephos, only report *results*, whereas we sought all parties that ran candidates.

There are several rebel-held territories that hold elections rejected by the state that we identified, and we noted these in the country notes, too, although they are not in the dataset. If the rebel group gains an autonomous region or a new state and then runs in elections in which the former government does not, these are, of course, recognized by the then-state and included.

We figured out whether the group participated in each of these elections by comparing the list of alias (and the original name) to the list of parties reported for each election in these resources.

> If there was no overlap between these lists and the group names, we also Googled each "group alias" + election [year] [state] to identify any connections or results we might have missed (this was especially important in older elections, and in less-developed states). We also searched for these terms in LexisNexis.
>
> If none of these came up with anything, but there were still unidentified "other" parties that ran in the elections, we tried Googling/searching LexisNexis candidates election [state] [year], and then also each "group alias" + elections to see if these more general terms would allow us to rules out or identify any participation in national legislative elections. We also looked for aliases or coalitions under which these groups ran for elections as a part of this process.

If there was overlap in the election results, or after Googling, we marked "1" in the "part" column; we marked a "0" if there was no report of participation, or it was a non-election year. We listed the sources that suggest the group participated, and under what name, in the "propart" column, and the sources examined that suggest it did not in the "nopart" column (one of these is documented for every election year in the dataset). If groups were participating electorally within 10 years of being "active," we then extended their duration for as long as they continued participating (or until 2010). We again saved the PDFs supporting these decisions in a folder entitled [Region] and a subfolder entitled [State].

Finally, we added four columns: "viop," "peacep," "winner," and "priorp". We examined each incident of participation. If it occurred during fighting, or during a short break but without a peace agreement, we marked as a "1" in viop. If it occurred during a break or halt to fighting that followed a peace agreement coded by the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, the Peace Accord Matrix, or case evidence (then cited in the "Case Coding Notes") we marked it as a "1" in peacep. If the rebel group gained an autonomous region or a new state, and then ran in elections in which the former government typically did not, we marked as a "1" in winner (in addition to viop or peacep, depending on which fits). Finally, if it occurred before the group even became active, mark as a "1" in priorp.

While not as systematic in a coding and checking system, in part because these decisions were often clearer (see 1.3), this section of the data was also examined by at least one graduate and undergraduate student, in addition to me, and we all sought to be as inclusive as possible in identifying electoral participation to be sure that we did not overlook difficult cases. Any initially challenged cases between coders are marked in red in the final .xls file compiling these.

1.3 MGEP RELIABILITY STATISTICS

This data collection project evolved through a series of steps, but, at each stage, there were procedures in place to check on the reliability of the data. Coding both militant groups and electoral participation was sometimes complicated, although these statistics indicate that these data are a reliable first cut.

Each militant group was verified by a different coder and checker (both listed in the regional compiled militant group lists, with any changes between the two are marked in red in these files). These regional compiled militant group lists can thus identify any uncertain cases (also marked in the "Case Coding Notes," see below). In most cases, the coder and the checker was a different undergraduate student, overseen by graduate students, and I was the final arbiter in any cases in which their coding diverged. Overall, however, the coder and the checker mainly agreed, as only approximately 10 percent of these case confirmations were challenged and overturned by the checker (and in order to challenge, the checker had to identify new information that overturned a dimension of the initial coding, so most challenges resulted in overturns, although I did not explicitly track those that did not). In some cases, due to resource constraints, I served as the checker. Reliability on the militant group coding is thus quite good given the many sources and steps that coding entailed (again, see 1.2). If I were to redo these data, however, I would have two coders work independently, and then I would compare their coding.

In many ways, electoral participation was often easier to identify. To demonstrate, in approximately 83 percent of cases, the militant group is clearly listed under its own name, or an easily identifiable party of their own, in the election records (see 1.2). While this variable was easier to code, I still had at least one graduate and undergraduate student examine each case, in addition to me, and we all sought to be as inclusive as possible in identifying electoral participation to be sure that we did not overlook difficult cases. Beyond the 109 cases of militant and ex-militant group electoral participation, initially discussed and eventually included 3 additional groups that were only identified in a second or third pass. We also initially discussed but rejected 12 additional groups. These cases seemed initially as though they may have participated but appeared not to do so upon closer examination (usually these groups had names similar to political parties in translation but were actually separate groups). Each of these are identified in red in the final .xls file compiling the regional sets, and also noted in the "Case Coding Notes."

The "Case Coding Notes," a supplementary file to the MGEP data file, details every country and group (although not all of their aliases), and it notes any anomalies or uncertainties in the coding. These (available by email request to the author) and the full coding sets, as well as the articles on the militant groups and the election results, are stored by the author but not posted publically since they are drawn from the sources described above (1.2).

2. MGEP SUMMARY FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure A2.1: Distribution of Militant Group Electoral Participation, 1970-2010



Note: Notice that the map does not include the border between Sudan and South Sudan to be consistent with the time period covered by the data (1970-2010).

Figure A2.2: Militant and Ex-Militant Group Electoral Participation over Time (Group-Years)



Note: This figure shows the percentage of militant and ex-militant groups, by category of participation, as a share of all militant and ex-militant groups in a given year. This is estimated as follows: the numerator corresponds to the number of militant and ex-militant groups that participated in elections (by category) that year; the denominator corresponds to the number of all militant and ex-militant groups that qualified under the coding rules in each year.

Figure A2.3: Militant and Ex-Militant Group Electoral Participation over Time (Election Years)



Note: This figure shows the percentage of militant and ex-militant groups, by category of participation, as a share of all militant and ex-militant groups in a given electoral year. This is estimated as follows: the numerator corresponds to the number of militant and ex-militant groups that participated in elections (by category) that year; the denominator corresponds to the number of all militant and ex-militant groups that qualified under the coding rules in each *electoral* year.

3. MGEP REPLICATION ANALYSIS OF FLORES AND NOORUDDIN 2012

The paper offers a brief and concrete empirical application of MGEP indicators through replication of a post-conflict elections study. The study that I chose was Flores and Nooruddin 2012 (hereafter "F&N") examining the relationships between post-conflict elections, and both economic recovery and conflict recurrence. I chose this article because it is well-cited, well-done, and, unlike many other post-conflict election studies, it examines all of the UCDP/PRIO cases.[15]

While the match between the datasets is good, although not perfect due to somewhat different time horizons and definitions, I am able to replicate their results and show how the addition of my variables modify them. Their coverage is 1960-2002, while mine in 1970-2010, so 34 post-conflict years drop because the conflicts are only fought before 1970. In addition, the MGEP data, as noted, does not cover coups, which F&N does, so an additional 49 post-conflict years drop. Overall, my data match almost 80 percent of the 364 post-conflict years in their baseline analysis.[16]

I am able to replicate F&N's findings, even running their baseline models on this slightly smaller sample that result from the merge due to the temporal differences,[17] and support the claims from their baseline model. As F&N argue, time until economic recovery is longer with post-conflict elections—potentially because investors are wary about the uncertainty that surround elections in these contexts—but that time until conflict recurrence is also longer.

After replicating these models, I modify their post-conflict election indicator. F&N code indicators of any election during these post-conflict periods for their initial models, and, using the MGEP data, I specify whether these elections had *peaceful participation* or *won participation* by any militant groups in that state, leaving the third category as elections that they identify in these post-conflict periods that had no ex-militant group participation (presumably government run after defeat or a deal that did not include ex-militant group participation). Of the 188 post-conflict periods that have elections in the data under analysis, 18 percent have peaceful participation and 20 percent have won participation.[18] I use these data to examine the relationships with time until economic recovery (longer is a worse outcome) and time until conflict recurrence (longer is a better outcome), just as F&N do (see above for their conclusions).

As described in the paper, the results are substantively important (Table A1). In the models with the election variables now refined to reflect categories of ex-militant group electoral participation, I find:

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[15] Brancati and Snyder 2013, for example, only examines civil wars that reach the 1,000 battle death threshold, rather than the 25 battle death threshold

[16] Of course, cases of *peaceful participation* or *won participation* from my data do not match into their data, as well, because F&N do not include any lower-level militant groups than UCDP/PRIO's battle death threshold, which MGEP does, and consistent with other country-level studies, they code "post-conflict" only when the country does not have *any* active UCDP/PRIO armed actors and only until it recovers economically to its pre-conflict level.

[17] See the note in Table A1.

[18] Five cases have both, and I currently code these instances as *won participation*, but changing them to *peaceful participation* or their own category does not substantially alter the results.

- Examining economic recovery, that the estimated coefficient for the *peaceful participation* indicator is large and statistically significant, whereas neither of the others for post-conflict election indicators are.
- Examining conflict recurrence, that the estimated coefficients for the *won participation* and *peaceful participation* indicators are statistically significant, and much larger than that for post-conflict elections without ex-militant group participation.

As also described in the paper, these findings suggest that both *peaceful participation* and *won participation* may be driving much of the result on prolonged peace. But that *peaceful participation*, in particular, may also be driving much of the result on longer time until economic recovery.

The second result especially drives home the importance of adding such variables, given how much work *peaceful participation* is doing. As discussed in the paper, the explanation for this second result could be a refinement of F&N, such as elections in which former militant and governments compete against each other may be more uncertain for investors than those run just by the militant group or the government, *or* it could also point to something besides these investor concerns. A selection effect, for instance, could be at work whereby *peaceful participation* may occur after particularly destructive conflicts to civil society on dimensions that are uncaptured by these models but that make economic recovery harder.

These modified baseline models underscore the importance further study of how ex-militant group participation affects our understanding of the outcomes after post-conflict elections.[19] Such studies could dramatically change the policy implications, for instance, in these contexts.

[19] Much of F&N, for example, is about the timing of elections: they argue that post-conflict elections that occur early in new democracies are especially detrimental, and they show this through interaction effects. As an initial take on this dimension, too, I substituted the *peaceful participation* and *won participation* indicators in place of the overall post-conflict election indicators in those regressions (because the sample sizes are not small to be running these as additional interactions). While not discussed in the paper, due to the space constraints, those additional models suggest that when these electoral indicators are limited to only elections with either *peaceful participation* or *won participation*, the dangerous effects in new democracies in terms of increased risk of conflict recurrence disappear (not shown). This suggests that post-conflict elections without ex-militant group participation may be the most concerning contests to be held in new democracies. Although outside of the scope of this paper, there are a variety of possible explanations for such an association that merit further elaboration.

Table A3.1: Post-Conflict Elections—with MGEP Indicators—and Economic Recovery and Conflict Recurrence

	Replicated Models - Post-Conflict Elections Indicator		New Models – Elections Separated by Ex-Militant Group Participation Categories	
	Recovery [a]	Recurrence [a]	Recovery	Recurrence
Pre-conflict GDP per capita (high)	-0.00 (0.13)	0.15 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)
Official development assistance (log)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.11)
Secessionist conflict	0.36 (0.23)	-0.18 (0.27)	0.44* (0.25)	-0.20 (0.27)
Conflict duration	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Damage	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.00)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Termination: victory	0.39* (0.22)	1.06*** (0.32)	0.35 (0.31)	0.88** (0.34)
Termination: peace agreement	0.43 (0.33)	0.13 (0.37)	0.27 (0.41)	-0.17 (0.35)
Recovery number	0.18 (0.19)	0.28** (0.12)	0.04 (0.19)	0.29*** (0.11)
UN Peacekeeping Forces (Log)	0.01 (0.06)	0.96*** (0.16)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.90*** (0.17)
World Bank project	-0.26 (0.21)	0.04 (0.25)	-0.21 (0.28)	0.09 (0.25)
Election during recovery episode	0.72*** (0.22)	0.76** (0.30)		
Recovery Election - No MG Participation			0.38 (0.29)	0.65** (0.30)
Recovery Election - "Peaceful" MG Participation			1.50*** (0.51)	1.18** (0.53)
Recovery Election - "Won" MG Participation			0.37 (0.61)	1.79*** (0.66)
Constant	1.21 (1.05)	-0.30 (1.02)	2.43** (1.23)	0.15 (1.01)
No. of Cases	364	364	281	281

Note: As described, these baseline data and research design come from Flores and Nooruddin 2012. Robust standard errors by country are in parentheses. Coefficients are from a competing-risks model, wherein larger coefficients indicate a longer time until recovery or recurrence. * p , 0.10, ** p , 0.05, *** p , 0.01.
(a) These models are the exact replication of F&N. Running these models in the same sample of matched data as the new models produces very similar results (281 rather than 364 cases): the estimated coefficient for the election indicator remains negative in both, although it is slightly smaller and only statistically significant at the 0.10 level in the recurrence model.