Online Appendix

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[0]Note that the Supplementary Materials uploaded on the CUP site include appendices A to C.

A Summary Statistics and Balance

Table A1 shows that randomization was effectively implemented, as participants are balanced across treatments on observable characteristics.

Table A1: **Balance Across Treatments**

	(1) **Baseline Treatment**		(2) **Exclusive Treatment**		(3) **Inclusive Treatment**		(4) **T-test Difference**	
Variable	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)
% Female (vs. Male)	532	0.52	526	0.53	534	0.55	-0.02	-0.04
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
Age (avg.)	532	33.27	526	33.24	534	33.59	0.03	-0.32
		(0.42)		(0.46)		(0.44)		
% Muslim (vs. Hindu)	532	0.48	526	0.44	534	0.49	0.04	-0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
% Delhi	532	0.32	526	0.33	534	0.34	-0.02	-0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
% Uttar Pradesh	532	0.24	526	0.23	534	0.21	0.00	0.03
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
% Gujarat	532	0.14	526	0.16	534	0.13	-0.02	0.01
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)		
% Maharashtra	532	0.31	526	0.27	534	0.32	0.04	-0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
% Lower Caste	532	0.43	526	0.39	534	0.42	0.04	0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
% Resident Large City	532	0.78	526	0.77	534	0.81	0.01	-0.03
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
% 12th Grade or Higher	532	0.84	526	0.84	534	0.86	-0.00	-0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		
% Voted BJP	410	0.60	401	0.65	405	0.66	-0.05	-0.06
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
% Homogeneous Group	532	0.40	526	0.44	534	0.36	-0.04	0.04
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
% Hindu Majority	532	0.42	526	0.37	534	0.44	0.05	-0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
% Muslim Majority	532	0.18	526	0.19	534	0.19	-0.01	-0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
Group Consciousness Index (avg.)	532	0.73	526	0.75	534	0.74	-0.01	-0.00
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. T-test values represent the differences in the means across groups.
* indicates $p < 0.05$.

B Full Regression Output

This Section presents the full regression output in table format for all results presented in the main paper.

Table B2: **Treatment Effects on Supply for Leadership**
(Full Regression Output for Figure 4 of the Main Article)

	Dependent variable:					
	Willingness to Lead (1-4)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	*Overall*	*Muslims*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*	*Hindus*
Exclusive	0.044	0.038	0.062	0.051	0.026	0.018
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Inclusive	0.074*	0.073*	0.163***	0.160***	−0.011	−0.015
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Age		0.004**		0.001		0.008***
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Female		−0.002		0.032		−0.026
		(0.033)		(0.048)		(0.047)
Education High		−0.060		−0.064		−0.054
		(0.045)		(0.060)		(0.068)
Uttar Pradesh		−0.020		−0.033		−0.010
		(0.043)		(0.060)		(0.064)
Gujarat		−0.073		0.119		−0.151**
		(0.051)		(0.098)		(0.067)
Maharashtra		−0.047		−0.034		−0.047
		(0.040)		(0.053)		(0.061)
Hindu Majority		−0.012		−0.015		−0.012
		(0.035)		(0.050)		(0.049)
Muslim Majority		−0.054		−0.063		−0.040
		(0.044)		(0.059)		(0.065)
Group Consciousness		0.328***		0.226*		0.475***
		(0.090)		(0.126)		(0.133)
Survey Round		0.042		0.095		−0.038
		(0.047)		(0.059)		(0.078)
Observations	1,592	1,592	753	753	839	839
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.014	0.010	0.013	−0.002	0.023
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B3: **Pro-Hindu Bias among Hindu Respondents in Hindu Majority Groups**
(Full Regression Output for Figure 5 of the Main Article)

	Dependent variable:
	Pro-Hindu Bias (-2 to 2)
Exclusive	−0.126
	(0.153)
Inclusive	0.126
	(0.147)
Observations	367
Adjusted R^2	0.002
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B4: **Group Composition and Willingness to Lead Among Muslims**
(Full Regression Output for Figure 6 of the Main Article)

	Dependent variable:	
	Willingness to Lead (1-4)	
	(1)	(2)
Exclusive	0.088	0.088
	(0.084)	(0.083)
Inclusive	0.052	0.052
	(0.084)	(0.084)
Mixed Groups	−0.082	
	(0.076)	
Exclusive*Mixed	−0.046	
	(0.110)	
Inclusive*Mixed	0.183*	
	(0.108)	
Hindu Majority		0.023
		(0.085)
Muslim Majority		−0.264***
		(0.100)
Exclusive*Hindu Majority		−0.210*
		(0.123)
Inclusive*Hindu Majority		0.085
		(0.119)
Exclusive*Muslim Majority		0.234
		(0.144)
Inclusive*Muslim Majority		0.351**
		(0.141)
Observations	753	753
Adjusted R^2	0.013	0.023
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table B5: **Perceived Centrality**
(Full Regression Output for Figure 2 of the Main Article)

	Dependent variable:											
	Muslim-Hindu Contributions			Muslim Contributions			Hindu Contributions			Self-assessed Prototypicality		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Overall	*Hindus*	*Muslims*	*Overall*	*Hindus*	*Muslims*	*Overall*	*Hindus*	*Muslims*	*Overall*	*Hindus*	*Muslims*
Exclusive	−0.375***	−0.540***	−0.047	0.040	0.028	0.133	0.415***	0.569***	0.180**	0.016	0.038	0.008
	(0.107)	(0.124)	(0.144)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.087)	(0.069)	(0.096)	(0.090)	(0.053)	(0.075)	(0.072)
Inclusive	0.224**	0.077	0.354**	0.347***	0.280***	0.403***	0.124*	0.203**	0.048	0.025	0.034	0.012
	(0.107)	(0.126)	(0.140)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.085)	(0.069)	(0.097)	(0.088)	(0.052)	(0.077)	(0.070)
Observations	1,592	839	753	1,592	839	753	1,592	839	753	1,592	839	753
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.032	0.010	0.023	0.027	0.028	0.022	0.040	0.003	−0.001	−0.002	−0.003
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table B6: **Perceived Entitlement**
(Full Regression Output for Figure 3 of the Main Article)

	Dependent variable:											
	Muslim MLA: Qualified			Muslim MLA: Deserving			Self: Qualified			Self: Deserving		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Overall	*Muslims*	*Hindus*	*Overall*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*	*Overall*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*	*Overall*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*
Exclusive	−0.014	0.157	−0.085	0.002	0.047	0.052	−0.052	−0.068	−0.027	−0.049	−0.019	−0.067
	(0.082)	(0.099)	(0.120)	(0.081)	(0.097)	(0.117)	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.083)
Inclusive	−0.014	0.229**	−0.215*	0.010	0.153	−0.086	−0.003	−0.022	0.011	0.040	0.110	−0.029
	(0.084)	(0.097)	(0.125)	(0.082)	(0.095)	(0.122)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.058)	(0.077)	(0.084)
Observations	829	386	443	829	386	443	1,592	753	839	1,592	753	839
Adjusted R^2	−0.002	0.010	0.002	−0.002	0.002	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002	0.0002	0.002	−0.002
Note:												*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B7: **Treatment Effects on Willingness to Seek Out Information**
(Full Regression Output for Figure 7 of the Main Article)

	Dependent variable:					
	Willingness to Seek Out Information					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	*Overall*	*Muslims*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*	*Hindus*
Exclusive	−0.016	−0.017	−0.039*	−0.041**	0.008	0.005
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Inclusive	0.019	0.015	0.009	0.004	0.028	0.023
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Female		0.033**		0.043**		0.037
		(0.015)		(0.018)		(0.024)
Uttar Pradesh		−0.070***		−0.028		−0.091***
		(0.020)		(0.022)		(0.033)
Gujarat		−0.073***		−0.056		−0.062*
		(0.023)		(0.037)		(0.034)
Maharashtra		−0.070***		−0.042**		−0.092***
		(0.018)		(0.020)		(0.031)
Age		0.004***		0.003***		0.004***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Education High		0.004		−0.015		0.038
		(0.020)		(0.022)		(0.035)
Hindu Majority		0.003		0.011		−0.0004
		(0.016)		(0.019)		(0.025)
Muslim Majority		−0.025		−0.0003		−0.056*
		(0.020)		(0.022)		(0.033)
Observations	1,592	1,592	753	753	839	839
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.042	0.005	0.044	−0.001	0.030
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B8: **Treatment Effects on Politician Evaluations**
(Full Regression Output for Figure 8 of the Main Article)

	Dependent variable:											
	Politician Evaluation											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Overall	*Overall*	*Overall*	*Overall*	*Muslims*	*Muslims*	*Muslims*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*	*Hindus*	*Hindus*	*Hindus*
	Muslim MLA	Muslim MLA	Hindu MLA	Hindu MLA	Muslim MLA	Muslim MLA	Hindu MLA	Hindu MLA	Muslim MLA	Muslim MLA	Hindu MLA	Hindu MLA
Exclusive	−0.042	−0.021	−0.030	−0.060	0.049	0.044	−0.091	−0.103	−0.048	0.001	0.011	−0.020
	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.064)	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.078)
Inclusive	−0.011	0.002	0.069	0.033	0.156**	0.117*	0.026	0.034	−0.139	−0.065	0.079	0.029
	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.095)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.080)	(0.077)
Female		0.206***		0.304***		0.272***		0.395***		0.208***		0.240***
		(0.047)		(0.052)		(0.055)		(0.080)		(0.067)		(0.066)
Age		0.024***		0.017***		0.020***		0.014***		0.020***		0.014***
		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)
Education High		−0.141**		−0.113		−0.059		0.004		−0.155		−0.235**
		(0.062)		(0.071)		(0.068)		(0.102)		(0.095)		(0.096)
Hindu Majority		0.030		−0.020		−0.023		0.027		0.089		−0.037
		(0.051)		(0.055)		(0.059)		(0.084)		(0.073)		(0.070)
Muslim Majority		−0.085		0.021		0.014		0.025		−0.220**		−0.009
		(0.062)		(0.070)		(0.070)		(0.100)		(0.093)		(0.095)
Observations	829	829	763	763	386	386	367	367	443	443	396	396
Adjusted R^2	−0.002	0.169	0.001	0.128	0.008	0.226	−0.001	0.124	0.001	0.133	−0.002	0.096
Note:												*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C Additional Results and Robustness

This Section presents results from additional analyses and robustness tests.

C.1 Additional Results

Table C9 reports results from a regression in which we interact treatment assignment with respondent religion; we find that differences in treatment effects for Hindus and Muslims are statistically distinguishable from zero.

Table C9: **Effect of Historical Representations on Willingness to Lead**

	Dependent variable:	
	Willingness to Lead (1-4)	
	(1)	(2)
Exclusive*Muslim	0.036	0.032
	(0.078)	(0.078)
Inclusive*Muslim	0.174**	0.171**
	(0.077)	(0.077)
Exclusive	−0.011	−0.012
	(0.120)	(0.120)
Inclusive	−0.185	−0.181
	(0.121)	(0.121)
Muslim	−0.038	−0.100*
	(0.055)	(0.056)
Female		−0.003
		(0.033)
Age		0.004***
		(0.002)
Education High		−0.061
		(0.045)
Uttar Pradesh		−0.025
		(0.043)
Gujarat		−0.084
		(0.053)
Maharashtra		−0.046
		(0.040)
Group Consciousness		0.351***
		(0.092)
Survey Round		0.040
		(0.047)
Hindu Majority		−0.013
		(0.035)
Muslim Majority		−0.052
		(0.044)
Observations	1,592	1,592
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.016
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Figure C1 shows how the inclusive and exclusive treatment affect evaluations of the Hindu and Muslim MLA (politician) for each separate dimension among Muslim respondents. We find that inclusive history positively affects perceptions that the Muslim MLA is qualified, deserving, representative of his constituencies and popular.

Figure C1: **Treatment Effects of Historical Representations on Perceptions of Hindu and Muslim MLAs among Muslims**



Notes: Coefficients are based on linear regression models excluding controls (bright colours) and including sociodemographic controls (dim colours). 95% (thin line) and 90% (thick line) confidence intervals are shown. The outcome variable ranges from 1-5. Full regression output can be found in Tables 2 and 3 of the Supplementary Material on Dataverse.

Figure C2 shows effects of our treatments on the perceived entitlement to lead of Hindu MLAs. As expected, we see no significant results among Hindus nor Muslims.

Figure C2: **Treatment Effects on the Perceived Entitlement of Hindu MLA**



Notes: This figure displays the effects of our treatments on the perceived entitlement of Hindu MLAs. Full regression output can be found in Table 1 of the Supplementary Material on Dataverse.

Figure C3 shows no difference in effect sizes of the inclusive treatment on pro-Hindu bias among Hindus with high or low levels of group consciousness.

Figure C3: **Demand for Muslim Leaders among Hindu Respondents with High and Low Levels of Group Consciousness**



Notes: This figure shows expected pro-Hindu bias in the different treatment conditions among Hindus with low (left-panel) and high (right-panel) group consciousness. Above and below median values are used. 95% confidence intervals are shown. Full regression output can be found in Table 4 of the Supplementary Material on Dataverse.

Seeking Out Political Information: We were able to use individuals' randomly generated survey ID codes to track whether respondents visited the website with political information, as they were required to provide this code to enter. Although quite a few respondents visited this website (13%), we find no evidence that our experiment treatments affected their probability of doing so. Table C10 shows that the history treatments did not affect whether or not individuals actually visited the website with information on how to become politically engaged.

Table C10: **Effects of Historical Representations on Behavioral Measure of Willingness to Seek out Information on Citizenship Participation**

	Dependent variable:	
	Visited Website	
	(1)	(2)
	Muslims	*Hindus*
Exclusive	0.010	0.035
	(0.026)	(0.032)
Inclusive	−0.036	−0.005
	(0.025)	(0.033)
Observations	753	839
Adjusted R^2	0.002	−0.0002
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

C.2 Treatment effects with distributions

Figure C4 displays treatment effects of historical representations on Muslim participants' willingness to lead (top left panel), Hindu participants' willingness to lead (top right panel), Hindu participants' pro-Hindu bias (bottom left panel) and Hindu participants' evaluations of the qualification of the Muslim MLA (bottom right panel). Individuals are plotted, along with means 95% confidence intervals. The results show that the lack of an exclusive treatment effect does not appear to be due to an increased number of respondents at high and low values "cancelling each other out," but rather to little movement across outcome categories relative to the baseline condition.

Figure C4: **Treatment Effects (with Distributions)**



Notes: Treatment effects of historical representations on Muslim participants' willingness to lead (Panel A), Hindu participants' willingness to lead (Panel B), Hindu participants' pro-Hindu bias (Panel C) and Hindu participants' evaluations of the qualification of Muslim politicians (panel D). Full regression output can be found in Appendix Tables B2 and B3.

C.3 Analysis of open-ended responses

Figure C5 and Table C11 show results from more systematic analyses of our open-ended responses discussed at the end of section 6.3.1. As shown in Figure C5, the most frequently mentioned words in the open-ended responses relate to the leadership role (e.g., "representative", "leadership", or references to leading a "group") or specific leadership qualities (e.g., "good", "best", "know"). Appendix Table C11 shows that when asked why they wanted to volunteer for the role, 16% of respondents explicitly mentioned the word "leader" or "leadership" in their responses. This is noteworthy as we did not ourselves refer to the word "leadership" in the description of the task. Another 17% mentioned the word "represent". Considerations of suitability were present in many responses. Some elaborated on specific skills making them particularly good or qualified at managing groups, while others elaborated on specific leadership responsibilities they had had in the past. Overall, 19% of respondents mentioned the word "good" in their responses. Another 5% mentioned the word "qualified". Respondents therefore do not appear to view the role as inconsequential but clearly felt that the role of group representative in our lab-like set-up reflected an actual leadership position.

Figure C5: **20 Most Frequently Mentioned Words**



When elaborating on their reasons to volunteer for the group representative role, few respondents mentioned their specific skills in sociology or geography and few referred to strategic incentives to volunteer related to potential earnings. This suggests that respondents appeared to have thought of this leadership position in more general, abstract terms. We therefore do not expect the greater desire among Muslims to take on this role under the inclusive treatment condition to be related to a greater sense of confidence in their subject skills, or even in strategic considerations regarding earnings, but simply a greater sense of "having the right" to take a decision on behalf of Hindus. Note that this interpretation is consistent with our empirical findings presented in Appendix Table C16.

Table C11: **Percentage of Respondents Who Mentioned Words Related to Leadership, Suitability and Alternative Perceptions of the Role**

Word	Percentage
Represent	17
Lead	16
Good	19
Quali	5
Sociology	2
Geography	3
Earn	2

C.4 Alternative explanations

Null Effect on Prototypicality In the context we study, we expected that historical narratives could shape both the perceived historical contributions of different religious groups to the nation and the perceived "prototypical" member of that nation. Our explanation in Section 6.2 for why we observe support for the former expectation but not the latter centers on measurement: while our question on contributions concerned *groups*, our questions on perceived prototypicality focused on the *individual* respondent; participants were asked to what extent they felt a) they could be described as a typical Indian and b) similar to other Indians. We speculate: "Explicit self-assessments might be more difficult to shift in the short-term, and might not fully capture the idea of perceived group-level prototypicality; the personal nature of the questions also may have provoked unexpected responses."

An alternative explanation for why we do not observe a treatment effect as regards an individual's self-assessment of whether they constitute a "typical" Indian is that when thinking about what makes a typical Indian, respondents do not only weigh their religious (in our study, Hindu/Muslim) identity, but also other identity categories (wealth, education, and so on) as well. If, for instance, an individual thinks that their gender is relevant to conceptions of whether they are a "typical" Indian but their religion is not, then we might not observe any treatment effect *even if* our treatments alter individuals' perceptions of their religious group's place in the nation.

While this explanation is very plausible, we nevertheless believe that it is unlikely to fully explain the lack of an observed treatment effect on subjects' self-assessed prototypicality. Most notably, while the degree to which individuals weigh their religious identity may vary, we expect that the high salience of religion in India – and its frequent invocation in politics generally and specifically in debates about who is a true Indian and loyal to the Indian nation – means that it will be weighed at least to some degree by most, and heavily by at least a portion, of our respondent pool. Indeed, when asked at the end of the experiment whether following "Hindu customs and traditions" was important to being a "true Indian", 26% of respondents said it was "very important" and 37% said it was "extremely important" (results are consistent across both Hindu and Muslim respondents and remain unchanged if we limit analysis to the control group only). Our points #1-3 below further indicate that participants highly weighed their religious identity, relying on a pre-treatment identity measure. It is also worth noting that we do not find a treatment effect on *either* of our prototypicality measures – not only self-assessed proximity to the typical Indian but also self-assessed similarity to other Indians. Were the alternative explanation fully responsible for these null results, it would thus have to be the case that respondents placed little weight on their religious identity when thinking both about what makes a typical Indian and what determines their similarity to other Indians. However, as shown in Figure C6 and tables below, respondents did not appear to treat these two measures entirely interchangeably.

That being said, we can investigate if, as the alternative explanation would imply, our treatment has a lesser effect on the self-assessed prototypicality of those who weigh their religious identity comparatively less. We take three approaches:

First, if the alternative explanation is correct, then those who possess characteristics other than religion that they believe make them prototypical Indians should be less responsive to treatments altering the perceived place in the nation of their religious group.

The left panel of Figure C6 displays the association between different demographic variables, elicited pre-treatment, and the degree to which individuals in the control group only said they felt like a) a typical Indian and b) similar to other Indians. While we observe some relationships – older respondents, those from large cities, and those from lower caste background tend to assess themselves as more prototypical – results are sensitive to the set of variables included and to which measure of prototypicality we use, and are of extremely small magnitude when compared to measures capturing religious identification (see right panel of

Figure C6: **Demographic Correlates of Prototypicality (Control Group Only)**



Notes: This figure displays demographic correlates of self-assessed protoypicality for respondents in the control group, excluding (left panel) and including (right panel) a measure for religious group consciousness and separately for each measure of prototypicality: perceived proximity to the "typical" Indian (green) and similarity to other Indians (orange). 95% (thin line) and 90% (thick line) confidence intervals are shown. Delhi is the reference category for state of residence. Full regression output can be found in Table 8 of the Supplementary Material on Dataverse.

Figure C6). More to the point of the exercise, we do not find consistent evidence that the identity categories associated with prototypicality (age, urban residence, caste background), however weakly, interact with our treatment assignment to affect self-assessed prototypicality for either Hindu or Muslim respondents (see Appendix Tables C12 and C13).

Second, if the alternative explanation is correct, we should observe greater treatment effects for those who, pre-treatment, indicated a high degree of religious group consciousness. As reported in Appendix Table C18, we find little evidence that group consciousness meaningfully interacts with treatment assignment when considering our main outcome of interest: willingness to lead. Appendix Table C14 conducts the same exercise but considering Hindu and Muslim respondents' prototypicality: separately for each of our two measures of prototypicality, and averaging across these two measures. As Appendix Table C14 shows, group consciousness does not interact meaningfully with treatment assignment for any of our prototypicality measures for either Muslim or Hindu respondents.

In sum, while plausible, we find little support for this alternative explanation regarding the driver of our null findings on self-assessed prototypicality measures. Our investigation suggests that people highly weigh their religious identity, and that their relative ranking of identity categories does not appear to interact meaningfully with their treatment assignment to affect self-assessed prototypicality.

As a final exercise, we can see whether treatment effects differ for respondents who appear to attach greater weight to religion *relative* to other identity categories. Although we did not explicitly ask respondents to reflect on this question for fear of priming them as to the study's

Table C12: **Demographic Predictors of Prototypicality and Treatment (Muslims Only)**

	Dependent variable:					
	Measure of Prototypicality					
	Typical	Similar	Typical	Similar	Typical	Similar
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Exclusive Trt	-0.02	0.02	-0.23	0.17	-0.20	0.05
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Inclusive Trt	-0.09	0.01	-0.38	0.09	-0.11	0.10
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Low Caste	0.24**	0.15				
	(0.12)	(0.11)				
Low Caste X Excl	0.04	0.01				
	(0.17)	(0.16)				
Low Caste X Incl	0.18	-0.04				
	(0.16)	(0.16)				
Age			0.01*	0.01**		
			(0.01)	(0.01)		
Age X Excl			0.01	-0.00		
			(0.01)	(0.01)		
Age X Incl			0.01	-0.00		
			(0.01)	(0.01)		
Reside Large City					-0.11	0.23*
					(0.14)	(0.13)
City X Excl					0.25	-0.03
					(0.20)	(0.19)
City X Incl					0.17	-0.14
					(0.21)	(0.20)
N	753	753	753	753	753	753
Adjusted R^2	0.02	-0.00	0.03	0.01	-0.00	0.00

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Notes: This table displays results of an interaction between demographics shown to predict perceived prototypicality (see Figure C6) with treatment assignment. We display results for Muslim respondents only and separately for each of our prototypicality measures: perceived proximity to the "typical" Indian (columns 1, 3, and 5) and similarity to other Indians (columns 2, 4, and 6).

focus on religion, we *did* ask them pre-treatment to reflect on whether it would be easier or harder to get along with a new neighbor of a particular religious (Hindu, Muslim, or Christian – answers for the first two groups constitute our measure of group consciousness referenced above), wealth (poor or rich), caste (Dalit), or political party (BJP or Congress) background.

Appendix Figure C7 displays the percentage of respondents saying that it would be either 1) neither easier nor harder, 2) easier or harder, or 3) a lot easier or harder, to get along with a new neighbor of each identity category. Consistent with participants weighing salient (Hindu and Muslim) religions more than other identity categories, we observe that it is Muslims and Hindus that are both least likely to engender neutral responses ("neither easier nor harder") and most likely to engender extreme responses ("a lot easier or a lot harder"). However, consistent with the findings in points #1 and #2 above, we do not observe that an individual's relative identity import ranking interacts meaningfully with their treatment assignment to affect their self-assessed prototypicality. For instance, we find no differences

Table C13: **Demographic Predictors of Prototypicality and Treatment (Hindus Only)**

	Dependent variable:					
	Measure of Prototypicality					
	Typical	Similar	Typical	Similar	Typical	Similar
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Exclusive Trt	0.06	-0.02	0.59*	0.30	0.01	0.34*
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.17)
Inclusive Trt	0.03	0.09	0.13	0.18	-0.15	0.12
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Low Caste	0.02	-0.18				
	(0.14)	(0.13)				
Low Caste X Excl	-0.07	0.20				
	(0.20)	(0.18)				
Low Caste X Incl	-0.18	-0.05				
	(0.20)	(0.18)				
Age			0.02***	0.01*		
			(0.01)	(0.01)		
Age X Excl			-0.02*	-0.01		
			(0.01)	(0.01)		
Age X Incl			-0.00	-0.00		
			(0.01)	(0.01)		
Reside Large City					0.09	0.28**
					(0.16)	(0.14)
City X Excl					0.03	-0.39*
					(0.22)	(0.20)
City X Incl					0.16	-0.04
					(0.22)	(0.20)
N	839	839	839	839	839	839
Adjusted R^2	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.00

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Notes: This table displays results of an interaction between demographics shown to predict perceived prototypicality (see Figure C6) with treatment assignment. We display results for Hindu respondents only and separately for each of our prototypicality measures: perceived proximity to the "typical" Indian (columns 1, 3, and 5) and similarity to other Indians (columns 2, 4, and 6).

between individuals who were more or equally likely to give an extreme response for Hindus or Muslims ("a lot easier or a lot harder") than for other identity categories, as compared with individuals who were not more likely to give such a response for these religious identities (see Appendix Table C15).

Table C14: **Group Consciousness, Treatment, & Prototypicality**

	Dependent variable:					
	Measure of Prototypicality					
	Average	Average	Typical	Typical	Similar	Similar
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Exclusive Trt	-0.21	-0.26	-0.23	-0.15	-0.18	-0.37
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.38)
Inclusive Trt	-0.16	-0.06	-0.33	0.12	0.00	-0.23
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Religious Group Consciousness	1.21***	0.16	1.10***	0.44	1.33***	-0.13
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Consciousness X Excl	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.17	0.27	0.49
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Consciousness X Incl	0.26	0.09	0.42	-0.11	0.10	0.29
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.52)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.44)
N	839	753	839	753	839	753
Adjusted R^2	0.07	-0.00	0.04	0.00	0.06	-0.00
Sample	Hindus	Muslims	Hindus	Muslims	Hindus	Muslims

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Notes: This table displays results of an interaction between religious group consciousness and treatment assignment. We display results separately for Hindu (columns 1, 3, and 5) and Muslim (columns 2, 4, and 6) respondents and separately for each of our prototypicality measures: perceived proximity to the "typical" Indian (columns 3 and 4), similarity to other Indians (columns 5 and 6), and an average of the two (columns 1 and 2).

Table C15: **Relative Importance of Religion, Treatment, & Prototypicality**

	Dependent variable:					
	Measure of Prototypicality					
	Average	Average	Typical	Typical	Similar	Similar
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Exclusive Trt	-0.01	-0.07	-0.05	-0.11	0.04	-0.03
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Inclusive Trt	-0.01	0.06	-0.09	0.08	0.08	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Prioritizes Religious Identity	0.07	-0.06	0.07	-0.07	0.07	-0.06
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Prioritizes X Excl	0.09	0.14	0.18	0.19	0.01	0.09
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Prioritizes X Incl	0.08	-0.09	0.14	-0.10	0.01	-0.09
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)
N	839	753	839	753	839	753
Adjusted R^2	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Sample	Hindus	Muslims	Hindus	Muslims	Hindus	Muslims

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Notes: This table displays results of an interaction between the importance an individual placed on religion *as compared with* other identity categories and treatment assignment. We display results separately for Hindu (columns 1, 3, and 5) and Muslim (columns 2, 4, and 6) respondents and separately for each of our prototypicality measures: perceived proximity to the "typical" Indian (columns 3 and 4), similarity to other Indians (columns 5 and 6), and an average of the two (columns 1 and 2). We count an individual as prioritizing religion comparatively more if they were equally or more likely to provide an "extreme" response ("a lot easier or a lot harder") to the question of whether it would be easier or harder to have a neighbor of Hindu/Muslim identity, as compared with *every other* category (wealth, caste, or political party) in the neighbor question. If a respondent provided a more extreme response to any single alternative identity category, they were thus coded as not prioritizing their religious identity more than other identities. In total, approximately 49% of our sample was coded as prioritizing religion over other identity categories.

Figure C7: **Relative Import Given to Identity Categories**



Notes: This figure displays the percentage of respondents saying that it would be either 1) neither easier nor harder, 2) easier or harder, or 3) a lot easier or harder, to get along with a new neighbor of each identity category.

Overall Engagement and Performance as Alternative Explanations We evaluate alternative explanations for one of our central findings that inclusive renderings of history increase marginalized group members' willingness to take on leadership positions. Two possible alternative mechanisms come to mind. First, inclusive renderings of history may simply improve Muslim respondents' overall experience with – and engagement in – the survey. Second, Muslim respondents may score better in the inclusive history exercise because they are more familiar with the material and/or find the correct responses to be more consistent with their worldview. If this were the case, Muslim minorities may be more likely to volunteer because they believe more strongly in their performance in the exercises. Table C16 shows how the history treatments affect firstly overall engagement with the study measured through an item asking respondents to what extent they were involved with the study, and secondly respondents' score in the history exercises. The findings reveal that the inclusive history treatment does not increase Muslim respondents' overall engagement with the study. Muslim respondents also did not score better in the inclusive history exercises. In light of this evidence, it seems unlikely that engagement or performance could better explain why minorities volunteer more when exposed to inclusive history.

Table C16: **The Effect of Historical Representations on Reported Engagement in the Study and Score in the History Exercises**

	Dependent variable:			
	Engagement		Score	
	Muslims	*Hindus*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Exclusive	0.082	−0.001	−0.213***	−0.058
	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.061)
Inclusive	0.011	−0.044	−0.401***	−0.211***
	(0.065)	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.062)
Observations	753	839	753	839
Adjusted R^2	−0.0003	−0.002	0.039	0.012
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Demand Effects as an Alternative Explanation Another alternative explanation that comes to mind are potential demand effects. Could participants be inferring that the authors of the study hold the view advanced by the narrative they are presented with, and therefore are more likely to give the answers they think the study's authors want to hear? This effect could be exacerbated by the provision of incentives for "correct" answers among respondents who act strategically. When designing the textbook exercises, we took great care to explain that the treatment material (textbook excerpts) was taken from real, state-sponsored textbooks. We explicitly state that "All lessons come from real textbooks, approved by government educational boards in India". When asking participants to answer comprehension questions based on the material, we were also careful to not insinuate that a correct comprehension quiz question is subject to the researchers' beliefs, but should correspond to the state-sponsored narrative. We write: "Please answer the following questions according to what was described in the lesson". Thus, we took special effort to ensure that participants did not feel that we as researchers were pushing a particular narrative. We believe this should reduce the risk of possible demand effects.

Relatedly, we took great care thinking about how to ensure that the goal of the study did

not appear obvious to respondents. The narratives were embedded in a larger experimental set-up in which we believe our reasons to show respondents historical narratives were obfuscated. We introduce our participants to a broader theme – "back to school" – and asked participants to engage with several textbook exercises on different topics (history, geography and sociology). We believe the design choice to embed the historical narratives in a larger set-up – in which they are not presented as the central focus of the exercise – substantially reduced concerns about demand-effects.

When designing our measure capturing respondents' willingness to become group representative, we took great care to ensure that it would be clear to all respondents that the role of the group representative would *not be* to answer comprehension questions for the group, but rather to select which topic – geography or sociology – should count for the group's payment from the upcoming exercises. According to the alternative explanation, participants may infer from the treatment texts whether the researchers hold a more inclusive/exclusive view and, given that correct comprehension responses are incentivized, it becomes more important for participants in the "group" exercises to delegate the answering to those participants who are most likely to be able to give the answers the researchers want to hear. A Muslim participant is therefore thought to be more likely to be able to provide answers the researchers want to hear under the inclusive treatment condition, and a Hindu participant should be more able to provide such answers under the exclusive condition. This could indeed be the case if the role of the group representative were to respond to history questions in the name of the group. However, it is less clear why exposure to the inclusive narrative would make participants feel that Muslims are better able to determine whether the researchers prefer the group to select geography or sociology as the topic which will count for the group's payment. As Blair, Coppock and Moor (2020) highlight in their work on sensitivity bias, social desirability is unlikely to be a meaningful source of error unless respondents perceive a particular answer to be socially desirable by the social referent (i.e., the researchers). We therefore believe that our theorized mechanism – that Muslim minorities exposed to the inclusive historical narrative should come to feel more entitled to take decisions on behalf of Hindus and should therefore become more likely to volunteer for decision-making roles (whatever the decision may concern) – is a more plausible explanation.

Although we do not expect it to be clear to respondents what the socially desirable answer is when deciding between school subjects, we concede that respondents in the inclusive history treatment arm may perceive the researchers as holding more inclusive views, and thereby imagine that there may be some undefined advantage in Muslims taking on the role of group representative. Nonetheless, when considering the possible observable implications of this strategic behavior, we find little support consistent with this alternative explanation:

1. First, if this demand effect indeed played a significant role, we would expect to observe an effect of the inclusive and exclusive history treatments on Hindus' willingness to volunteer. As described in our hypotheses section and pre-analysis plan, we do not expect the historical narratives to affect members of the Hindu community's sense of entitlement to lead – our supply-side expectations apply only to members of the Muslim community. If the type of demand effect played a significant role, we would expect Hindus in the inclusive treatment to become less willing to volunteer (increasing the chances that a Muslim is selected), and Hindus in the exclusive treatment to become more willing to volunteer. We do not observe these outcomes, however.

2. Second, the alternative interpretation also implies that Hindus should show less/more pro-Hindu bias in the inclusive/exclusive treatments in the exercise where they are asked to rank their fellow group members (demand-side channel). However, this is not the case. Although we also expected – for different reasons – to observe these demand-side channel effects, it is important to note that according to our theory, the

demand- and supply-side channels can function independently of each other: Hindus not responding to the inclusive treatment, which we attribute to their resistance to inclusive narratives, does not mean that Muslims' responses to the inclusive treatment are not attributable to our theorized mechanism. While it thus seems entirely plausible to us under our theory that the inclusive treatment may produce these different responses among Hindus and Muslims, it is less clear why the treatment should produce demand effects among Muslims, but not among Hindus.

3. Third, were this alternative interpretation correct, we would also expect to observe more consistent effects of the exclusive history treatment. We proposed that the exclusive history treatment may not have as important an effect as the inclusive treatment, due to the current status quo in India and the salience of exclusionary historical narratives. If, however, results could be explained by strategic behavior due to demand effects, we would expect to see larger effects in the exclusive treatment condition.

If the alternative explanation were to be true, one possible implication could be that the effect of the history treatments should be largest among those respondents more likely to be sensitive to demand effects. Although it is not entirely clear who these respondents might be, we explore whether the effects of the historical representations on participants' willingness to volunteer is conditional on their score in the comprehension questions following the history excerpts. Assuming (as the strategic argument implies) that a high score reflects not only high attention/comprehension, but also strategic behavior/sensitivity to demand effects, the alternative interpretation would suggest that the positive effect of the inclusive treatment observed on Muslims' willingness to volunteer should increase as a function of respondents' score on the comprehension question. Figure C8 shows the conditional effect of the inclusive history treatment on Muslim respondents willingness to lead, given different levels of their comprehension question scores (which range from 1-4). As can be observed in the Figure, treatment effects are significant among respondents who answer correctly to 3 or 4 questions. This should be expected as those with only few points are unlikely to have paid much attention to the treatment texts. However, the positive effect does not increase among respondents with the highest score (respondents who are likely to be sensitive to demand effects) as compared to those with more average scores, but rather reaches a plateau. Put differently, once subjects have surpassed a certain "attention threshold", the effect of the inclusive treatment appears independent of whether the participant received higher scores in the textbook exercise, contrary to what the strategic incentives argument would suggest.

Another potential implication of the strategic argument put forth could be that we should observe evidence of strategic motivations in the open-ended questions in which respondents elaborate on their reasons for volunteering. However, when analysing respondents' open-ended responses on why or why not they volunteered as group representative, we find little evidence in favor of the strategic incentives mechanism. We have added a new analysis of open-ended responses in Section C.3 of the Appendix. As can be observed in Table C11, very few respondents mention strategic considerations – such as their abilities in sociology or geography, or considerations regarding earnings – in these responses. Rather, most respondents choose to elaborate on what makes them good leaders, in more general terms.

Finally, while a large and robust body of work shows the existence of experimenter demand effects in experimental settings, a smaller but growing line of research suggests that while the primary source of demand effects in laboratory experiments tends to be subtle cues offered by researchers in their direct interactions with experimental participants, online survey experiments on the other hand, with their depersonalized interactions between researchers and participants, tend to be considered least-likely cases for the presence of such demand effects (McDermott 2002; Siah 2005). Consistently, studies suggest that experimenter demand appears to play a more limited role in online settings (Chandler et al. 2015; White et al. 2018).

Figure C8: **Conditional Effects of The Inclusive History Treatment on Muslim Respondents' Willingness to Lead Given Comprehension Scores**



Notes: This figure displays the marginal effects of the inclusive history treatment on Muslim respondents' willingness to lead given different scores on the comprehension questions. N=511. The large confidence interval for score category 1 is due to the fact that very few respondents (N=5) received such a low score. Full regression output can be found in Table 5 of the Supplementary Material on Dataverse.

Recent work on the prevalence of demand effects in online survey experiments suggests that research participants generally show a limited ability (or willingness) to adjust their behavior to align with researcher expectations. Mummolo and Peterson (2019) find that even when participants are assigned information about experimenter intent and when financial incentives to respond in line with researcher expectations are provided, participants fail to adjust their behavior to meet these expectations. The authors conclude that online survey experimental designs are often robust to demand effects and that efforts to obfuscate the aim of experimental studies may be unnecessary. While it would be unwise to categorically dismiss the risk of experimenter demand effects – for which we did take several steps to obfuscate the aim of our study – these more recent findings indicate that the risk of demand effects in online experiments such as ours may be smaller than in more traditional settings in the lab.

Interpretations of the heterogeneous treatment effects of the inclusive treatment effect on evaluations of the Muslim MLAs We believe our demand-side measure has merit, as it captures respondents' evaluations of real-world politicians, and thereby complements our "lab-like" behavioral measures. Notably, we find that Muslim respondents who are exposed to the inclusive history treatment are more likely to rate the Muslim MLA positively than other Muslim respondents who are asked about the same MLA. We believe this finding is important, can tell us something about the evaluation of real-world political leaders, and is unlikely to be explained by changes in beliefs about the MLA's constituents.

However, according to our pre-registered hypothesis related to the demand-side channel, we expected both Hindus and Muslims (i.e., "greater society") to evaluate the Muslim politician more positively when exposed to the inclusive treatment. The finding that only Muslims do so therefore provides only partial evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Since we did not expect to observe any difference across Hindu and Muslim respondents, we did not develop and pre-register clear expectations as to why their responses might differ. After analyzing the data, we speculate that Hindus' attitudes towards Muslims may be more difficult to shift (see Section 7).

An alternative explanation is that the inclusive treatment may be affecting how respondents imagine the composition of the MLA's constituents. If this were the case, respondents may view the MLA as more representative of his constituents not because respondents view the MLA as having a greater claim to national identity, but because respondents imagine the MLA's constituents to be largely composed of Muslims. Although we cannot fully dismiss this alternative explanation, it is unclear why the treatment should affect how respondents imagine the MLA's constituents. Were this the case, we would also expect to see the same positive effect of the inclusive history treatment among Hindus.

Additional analyses on perceived centrality Could the results on perceived centrality reflect reading comprehension or faithful reporting of what was contained in the treatment text, rather than an increase in salience of Hindu/Muslim contributions? Figure C9 shows additional results on the perceived centrality of different groups. Certain words (individuals, groups, items) coded as "Hindu" for our outcome measure capturing "perceived Hindu centrality" were not explicitly mentioned in the exclusive history treatment text. Although many groups and individuals coded as "Hindu" – such as "Aryans" and "Maharana Pratap" – were explicitly mentioned in the text, others such as "V.D. Savarkar" and "Raja Ram Mohan Roy" were not. We create a dummy variable capturing whether respondents selected groups or individuals coded as "Hindu" that *were not explicitly mentioned in the text* and examine whether respondents were more likely to mention these groups or individuals when exposed to the exclusive history treatment. As shown in the left-hand panel of Figure C9, Hindu respondents in the exclusive treatment condition were indeed more likely to mention these groups. We believe this indicates that an increase in salience of Hindu groups and individuals (Hindu "heroes"), rather than faithful reporting of groups mentioned in the text, is more likely to explain our findings.

Certain groups explicitly mentioned in the inclusive history treatment text were not coded as "Muslim" for our outcome measure capturing "perceived Muslim Centrality". This relates primarily to groups mentioned in the time period "ancient India", prior to the arrival of Islam to India, such as "Aryans" and "Dasyus". The text elaborates on these groups to show the plural and heterogeneous nature of ancient India. If respondents were simply reporting groups mentioned in the text they read, they should be more likely to mention these non-Muslim groups as well. We create a dummy variable, capturing whether respondents selected these non-Muslim groups included in the inclusive history text, and examine whether respondents in the inclusive history treatment group were more likely to mention these groups, than respondents in the control group. As shown in the right-hand panel of Figure C9, this is not the case. Neither Hindus nor Muslims are more likely to report that these groups contributed to India in the inclusive treatment group. We believe this shows that an increase in salience of Muslim groups and individuals (Muslim "heroes"), rather than faithful reporting of groups mentioned in the text, is more likely to explain our findings.

High baseline level of accepting information on how to become politically involved Could the high baseline levels of accepting information on how to become politically involved suggest that there is a broader issue of social desirability bias in our sample? We do not believe that the high baseline levels necessarily indicate high levels of social desirability in the sample, but rather reveals that saying "yes" to this question is not costly. We base this on the following reasoning:

- People often indicate a willingness to partake in an activity or receive information, but they do not always see that intention through. In part, this is because "stated" preferences are less costly than "revealed" preferences (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In part, this could be because people tend to like to keep their options open and feel reluctant to "close doors" (Shin and Ariely 2004). For instance, if we were to host

Figure C9: **Treatment Effects on Alternative Measures of Perceived Contributions**



Notes: This figure displays the effects of our treatments on (1) a dummy indicating whether respondents selected Hindu words not explicitly mentioned in the exclusive treatment text and (2) a dummy indicating whether respondents selected non-Muslim words included in the inclusive history treatment. Full regression output can be found in Table 6 of the Supplementary Material on Dataverse.

an event providing information to marginalized groups on how to become politically engaged and asked those interested to sign up beforehand, it is likely that quite a few people who signed up would not actually end up showing up to the event. When signing up, many of these people would probably be thinking "perhaps I might want to further down the line" or "better keep that option open". In this sense, even though saying "no" is also easy, doing so would imply foregoing an opportunity. In this sense, saying "no" is not just as easy as saying "yes". It is therefore not surprising to us that many respondents answered "yes" to this question. Indeed, this highlights the value of our incentivized experimental game, which by design makes individuals' decisions costlier.

- We assessed the risk of social desirability bias in our sample by comparing it to other studies on India, concluding that our sample appears similar to other online samples in India recruited through a variety of online platforms such as Facebook, MTurk and Qualtrics. In particular, we added an analysis comparing respondents' pre-treatment stated political interest (using a more traditional, 4-point scale measure that mirrors measures in other studies) with stated political interest among sampled respondents in two other recent studies on India (one by Boas, Christenson and Glick (2020) and one by Guess et al. (2020)). Political interest – measured through this more traditional scale — is not higher in our sample, than in comparable samples. This lends further support to our interpretation that the high proportion of respondents who answered "yes" to this question is likely to be due to the design of the measure, and not due to our sample being particularly prone to giving socially desirable answers.

- While we agree that this type of social desirability is likely to affect behavior in settings in which the host/experiment interacts directly with the participant/subject, it appears much less likely in an anonymous online setting (recent research also supports this notion, see Mummolo and Peterson (2019)). Our preferred interpretation – that respondents with some interest in becoming politically engaged preferred to keep their

options open – appears more plausible to us.

Finally, even if some respondents did answer "yes" to this question because they believe it is the socially desirable answer, this is unlikely to account for our findings on the role of historical narratives on willingness to receive political information. For instance, if demand effects accounted for our findings, and the treatments reveal to respondents what they believe the researchers want to hear, we would expect Hindus to also respond to our treatments by choosing the more socially desirable answer (e.g., show a greater willingness to receive political information under the exclusive treatment condition). However, this is not the case. In sum, although we cannot fully erase this concern, we *do not believe* that the high proportion of respondents answering "yes" to this item can be taken as evidence that (1) there is a problem of social desirability bias in our sample (above and beyond what is normal in surveys of this kind) and (2) demand effects explain our findings on the role of historical narratives in shaping respondents willingness to receive information on how to become politically involved.

C.5 Additional Empirical Expectations

Tables C17-C18 evaluate some of the empirical expectations outlined in Section G.7.[1] We do not observe that treatment effects differ according to respondents' gender or caste. We also observe that exclusive historical representations increase Muslim respondents' willingness to lead among BJP supporters (e.g., among Muslims with low levels of group consciousness).

Table C17: **Heterogeneous Effects Given Gender and Caste Identity**

	Dependent variable:			
	Willingness to Lead			
	Muslims	*Hindus*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Exclusive	−0.160	0.261	0.028	0.005
	(0.281)	(0.284)	(0.079)	(0.066)
Inclusive	0.149	0.313	0.166**	−0.036
	(0.274)	(0.292)	(0.080)	(0.067)
Woman	0.009	0.089		
	(0.075)	(0.079)		
Exclusive*Woman	0.088	−0.093		
	(0.109)	(0.110)		
Inclusive*Woman	0.006	−0.128		
	(0.106)	(0.113)		
Low Caste			0.007	−0.151*
			(0.076)	(0.084)
Exclusive*Low Caste			0.068	0.051
			(0.109)	(0.119)
Inclusive*Low Caste			−0.005	0.056
			(0.107)	(0.123)
Observations	753	839	753	839
Adjusted R^2	0.008	−0.004	0.007	0.002
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

[1]Due to space limitations and because our empirical expectations were exploratory in nature, we do not present analyses for every stated expectation. However, these analyses are available upon request.

Table C18: **Heterogeneous Effects Given BJP Support and Levels of Group Consciousness**

	Dependent variable:			
	Willingness to Lead			
	Muslims	*Hindus*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Exclusive	−0.009	0.240*	0.099	0.170
	(0.076)	(0.127)	(0.258)	(0.231)
Inclusive	0.131*	0.211	0.272	−0.117
	(0.075)	(0.134)	(0.237)	(0.231)
BJP Vote	−0.117	0.106		
	(0.079)	(0.095)		
Exclusive*BJP Vote	0.217*	−0.223		
	(0.115)	(0.141)		
Inclusive*BJP Vote	0.095	−0.194		
	(0.111)	(0.148)		
Group Consciousness			0.299	0.529**
			(0.215)	(0.228)
Exclusive*Group Consciousness			−0.051	−0.221
			(0.318)	(0.323)
Inclusive*Group Consciousness			−0.136	0.142
			(0.296)	(0.324)
Observations	608	608	753	839
Adjusted R^2	0.013	−0.001	0.011	0.013
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C19 shows that the inclusive history treatment positively affects Muslim respondents sense of being deserving to lead among those with high levels of group consciousness.

Table C19: **The Conditional Effect of the Treatments Given Group Consciousness on Feelings of Being Qualified and Worthy to Lead**

	Dependent variable:			
	Qualified		Deserving	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Muslims	*Hindus*	*Muslims*	*Hindus*
Exclusive*Group Consciousness	0.058	0.473	−0.151	0.394
	(0.423)	(0.468)	(0.463)	(0.478)
Inclusive*Group Consciousness	−0.078	0.092	0.869**	−0.239
	(0.394)	(0.471)	(0.431)	(0.480)
Exclusive	−0.118	−0.385	0.102	−0.372
	(0.343)	(0.335)	(0.375)	(0.342)
Inclusive	0.041	−0.067	−0.565	0.122
	(0.316)	(0.335)	(0.346)	(0.342)
Group Consciousness	0.326	1.088***	−0.011	1.170***
	(0.286)	(0.331)	(0.313)	(0.338)
Observations	753	839	753	839
Adjusted R^2	−0.001	0.046	0.009	0.042
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.6 The role of pre-treatment history education

In order to investigate possible pre-treatment effects of real-world exposure to different historical narratives and how they might interact with our experimental treatments, we sampled states with different histories and timings of textbook reforms (see Section 4.1). We calculate the years of education under BJP state governments as a proxy for exposure to an exclusive historical narrative, as it is against these governments that accusations of rewriting history have most recently and often been levied.[2,3] While Gujarat shifted to BJP state-level government control in 1995 and has not changed since, periods of control under BJP and its allies differed in Maharashtra (1995-1999, 2014-present), Uttar Pradesh (1991-1993, 1997-2002, 2017-present), and Delhi (1993-1998). Consistently, as Figure C10 illustrates, estimated years of education under BJP state governments are comparatively higher for respondents from Gujarat.

[2]Specifically, we calculate years of education for which BJP and/or BJP allies held a plurality of the state legislature and the chief minister position, using data from `https://lokdhaba.ashoka.edu.in/` (accessed October 11, 2021), as well as participants' stated ages and educational attainments, and assuming that they began formal state schooling at the age of six.

[3]As noted in Appendix Section E.3, it is widely acknowledged that India today is a one-party dominant system with BJP and its partners at the helm (Chhibber and Verma 2019). Thus, while we might expect some variation in degree across states, most generally we would presume some level of exposure to the Hindutva narrative across most if not all states, and certainly across all four states in our sample – which, as shown in this Section, have all experienced periods of BJP or like-minded party control at the state level. This exercise is thus meant to proxy for differences in degree of exposure, then, with the presumption that most if not all respondents have experienced some minimum amount of exposure.

Figure C10: **Years of BJP Education, Overall and by State**



Notes: This graph displays the densities of participants' estimated years of education under BJP and BJP-allied state governments, overall and by state.

Figure C11 plots treatment effects on Muslims' (left panel) and Hindus' (right panel) willingness to lead, over participants' binned years of estimated exposure to an exclusive historical narrative (as proxied by estimated years of education under a BJP or BJP-allied state government). We observe that the positive effect of the *inclusive* treatment on Muslims' supply of leadership is particularly strong for those Muslim participants with fewer years of education under the BJP. We do not observe a relationship between years of education under the BJP and effects of either the *exclusive* treatment on Muslims' willingness to lead, or the *inclusive* treatment on Hindus' willingness to lead. Lastly, we observe that the *exclusive* treatment has a positive effect on the supply of leadership among Hindus with more years of education under BJP governments.

How should we interpret these results? First, it could be that participants are (at least in the short term) primarily receptive to teachings from versions of history with which they are familiar, so long as that history *contains a positive bias toward their social group*. Such an interpretation could explain why Muslims (Hindus) with lesser (greater) exposure to an exclusive history in the real world increase their supply of leadership comparatively more in response to our *inclusive* (*exclusive*) experimental treatments. It could also explain why Hindu and Muslim respondents register little change in response to treatments that are inconsistent with their real world exposure, or which portray their social group with a comparatively more negative bias. One important implication would be that an exclusive historical telling can decrease receptivity to alternative, inclusive historical narratives *even among minority groups that would seemingly benefit from them.*

A second alternative interpretation is that Muslims with lesser exposure to an exclusive narrative will be more receptive to an alternative (inclusive) narrative that displays their social group positively because they are less likely to have a strong prior as to which narrative is correct. While possible, we think it more likely that educated Muslims with little exposure to an *exclusive* narrative received a comparatively more *inclusive* narrative, as opposed to no

Figure C11: **Treatment Effects by Years of BJP Education, Hindus and Muslims**



Notes: This graph displays treatment effects on willingness to lead for Muslims (left panel) and Hindus (right panel), by the binned number of estimated years of education under BJP or BJP-allied state government. Regressions include controls for age, state, years of total education, and whether the participant attended a public (government) school. Full regression output can be found in Tables 9 (Muslim respondents) and 10 (Hindu respondents) of the Supplementary Material on Dataverse.

narrative at all; this interpretation would also not explain the positive effect of the *exclusive* treatment on supply of leadership among Hindus with high exposure to BJP-led education.

Third, it is possible that *all* participants are familiar with the *exclusive* historical narrative, conveyed through textbooks or some other medium, which reduces the impact of the *exclusive* treatment except for those who most fervently believe the material due to very high levels of exposure and thus reject all alternatives (including the politically neutral *baseline* narrative). In contrast, an *inclusive* narrative might have an impact among those with the greatest reason to be receptive to its teachings (in our study, Muslims).

Fourth, differences across years of exposure to BJP education could be driven by other factors. Although we control for a respondent's age, years of total education, state, and type of education, there may be other, unaccounted-for differences between those receiving more or less BJP or BJP-allied education that drive results. We also have comparatively few participants with a high number of years of BJP schooling, and thus can be less certain of estimates for those at higher levels of exposure. We treat the evidence presented above as largely speculative, and we intend to conduct a follow-up observational study to evaluate the impact of textbook reforms in India on identity.

Despite these latter caveats, we note that the evidence discussed in this section suggests that real world historical narratives *can matter* and interact meaningfully with experimental stimuli, in particular by shaping individuals' perceptions about which historical narratives are valid and which are not.

D Pretest and Pilot Results

D.1 Results from Pretest

We carried out a pre-test (N = 189) between October and November 2020 in order to ensure that individuals from our target groups responded well to both the treatments and the avatars. In terms of the treatments, we were concerned with the possibility that participants might perceive the history texts as false, political propaganda rather than official historical accounts. In order to better understand how our target groups perceive the history texts used in our treatments, we therefore asked a smaller group of respondents to read all our history treatments and answer several questions about them. Results from this pre-test suggest that the vast majority of respondents view the history texts as 'completely correct' or 'mostly correct'. We also asked respondents whether they found the texts easy to comprehend, finding that the majority of respondents find them 'very easy' to comprehend. We also asked respondents about the types of emotions provoked by texts, finding that very few respondents felt strong negative emotions such as feeling offended or angry (see also Appendix Section G.6).

Figure D12: **Perceived Factual Correctness and Ease of Comprehension**



In terms of the avatars, we wanted to make sure that these avatars successfully signal religious identity. We also wanted to make sure that the avatars were popular choices among our respondents, if given the choice to select from a larger pool of avatars. In order to examine whether the avatars signal religious identity, we asked the respondents to indicate from what religious group they perceived the avatar to be. The perceived religion of the different avatars included in our study can be seen in figure D13. We also asked respondents to select an avatar from a large pool of avatars, including identity-incongruent choices. We find that the vast majority of respondents selected identity-congruent avatars (signalling their religious identity). The final selection of avatars to be included in our study was based on both (1) how well the avatar signalled religious identity and (2) how popular the avatar was as a choice among respondents in our pre-test.

Figure D13: **Avatar Evaluations**



Male avatars



Female avatars

(* Female Muslim Choice 2 and 3 were added after our pre-test, in response to our findings.)

D.2 Results from the Pilot

Figure D14 illustrates our central result from the pilot study. The pilot study was carried out between December 2020 and March 2021 and included 402 respondents. The results illustrate a positive effect of the inclusive history treatment on Muslim minorities' willingness to take on the leadership role.

Figure D14: **Treatment Effects of Historical Representations on Willingness to Take on a Leadership Role**



Notes: N=402. Coefficients are based on linear regression models excluding controls (bright colours) and including sociodemographic controls (dim colours). 95% (thin line) and 90% (thick line) confidence intervals are shown. The outcome variable ranges from 1-4. Full regression output can be found in Table 7 of the Supplementary Material on Dataverse.

E Background

E.1 Visual Representations of Theory

Appendix Figure E15 displays the different steps of our theory described in Section 2 and drawing on literatures on social representations of history (Sibley et al. 2008), identity and nationhood (Reicher and Hopkins 2001), entitlement theory (O'Brien and Major 2009) and leader emergence (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Conroy and Green 2020). We theorize that historical representations affect different groups' perceived centrality to the nation, entitlement to speak on behalf and lead its "core" or most central members, and as a result, both their willingness to lead such members and of greater society to accept them as leaders.

Figure E15: **Steps of Theory**



Appendix Figure E16 maps our theory, detailed in Section 2.1. The figure illustrates our conceptualization of the nation, distinguishing between its core, its periphery and its outside boundary. The figure shows how historical representations can shape the perceived centrality of different groups to the nation by constructing the nation's core in more narrow (solid line) or ample (dotted line) terms. For instance, in India, exclusionary historical narratives caste the nation's core as exclusively Hindu, rendering religious minorities to the nation's periphery, while inclusionary historical narratives promote more ample understandings of national identity. The illustration also shows the theorized mechanisms through which historical narratives shape perceptions of core membership. First, through their inclusion or exclusion of certain groups, narratives can define who is a prototypical "in-group member". Second, by highlighting or diminishing groups' historical contributions to the nation, narratives can justify societal and political distributions of power, including who is thought to have a legitimate claim or right to core membership.

Figure E16: **How Historical Narratives can Shape Perceived Centrality to the Nation**



E.2 Exclusive and Inclusive Historical Narratives in India

The contrasting versions of Indian history advocated for by different political entrepreneurs today can largely be traced back to the 1920s-1940s, when leaders in the fight for independence from Great Britain were "immersed in an ideological and ontological conflict as to how to define the impending independent Indian nation state" (Khan et al. 2017: 478). Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru of the INC put forward an inclusive vision of the nation whereby ethnic, and in particular religious, majorities and minorities could be considered equal members of the nation. These political thinkers were well aware that achieving broad acceptance of their vision required the promotion of an inclusive historical narrative (Khilnani 2004; Varshney 2014*a*). Notable Hindu nationalist ideologues V.D Savarkar and M.S Golwalkar provided a strikingly different alternative telling of India's "foundational myths". Their efforts to provide historical accounts that lent legitimacy to the notion that India was and should be a Hindu nation from which non-Hindus such as Muslims and Christians must be excluded were heavily inspired by German ethnic nationalism of the pre-World War II period (Jaffrelot 1999; Kinnvall 2007).

In the following we provide a more detailed summary of the different renderings of historical periods by the Hindu right and the secular left used to design our experimental treatments:

Ancient India

Hindu nationalist identity entrepreneurs use descriptions of *Ancient India* to create a particular "foundational myth", representing the Hindu people as a homogeneous entity, with roots in the subcontinent and claims to the land. Particularly important to Hindu nationalists is the idea that Hindus are indigenous to the subcontinent and constitute a "race" (with shared blood ties). Hindu nationalists explicitly contest traditional theories about Indo-Aryan migration to the subcontinent, arguing instead that the Aryan race was indigenous to the Indian subcontinent (Guichard 2010). Hindu nationalists also heavily emphasize the "glory" of ancient Vedic civilization, depicted as a "golden age", and its many contributions to science and arts (Nussbaum 2009). Identity entrepreneurs defending a secular conception of India depict a very different picture of ancient India, one in which no group has a particularly strong claim to the nation. According to this representation, Aryans came from outside India (and were therefore not fully "indigenous" to the land). Moreover, the inhabitants of ancient India were not a homogeneous people, living in peace and harmony. Rather, conflict was commonplace as a result of social hierarchies and heterogeneity (Flåten 2016).

Medieval India

Depictions of *Medieval India* serves the Hindu nationalist project of excluding Muslims from the national project by describing them as "foreigners" or "the enemy" (Varshney 2014*b*). According to the Hindu nationalist representation of history, the Vedic Hindu "golden age" came to an abrupt end with the Islamic invasions. For instance, in the writings of Golwalkar which are heavily drawn upon by Hindu nationalists today, the "invasions of murdering hordes of mussulman free-booters" is contrasted with the "glorious period of Hindu revival under the great Shiwaji and the whole illustrious line of Hindu warriors" (Khan et al. 2017: 492). Recasting the Muslim as a "foreigner" and an enemy to the nation serves to justify the exclusion of Muslims from ideas of Hindu nationhood. For secular entrepreneurs, on the other hand, Medieval India constitutes an opportunity to elaborate on Muslim contributions to Indian culture. By describing Muslim contributions to architecture, governance, literature, music and city planning, the inclusion of Muslims in the definition of nationhood can more easily be justified. Secular representations of history also emphasize the religious tolerance and syncretic culture among Mughal rulers (Nussbaum 2009).

E.3 Retreat or Mobilization?

Exposure to exclusionary, symbolic nation-building policies does not invariably cause minorities to retreat from politics. In some cases, we may observe completely different responses to exclusion, such as political mobilization or even political radicalization. When are these different responses more likely to take place?

We believe that being excluded from historical representations is less likely to mobilize marginalized groups, than being exposed to other exclusionary policies more directly related to the deprivation of resources or power. As Simonsen (2021: 11) suggests, exclusionary policies can have a mobilizing effect when they appear in "the tangible form of resource deprivation" or where "there is a concrete decision or policy that people can act against". However, policies will be demobilizing when "politics attacks one's worth and status and the material costs are intangible". Policies can send negative signals about minorities' position in society, challenging their sense of belonging and worth. We agree with Simonsen (2021) that while minorities who experience direct material threats (e.g., threat of housing demolition or citizenship threat) may be mobilized into action, because there is a clear issue to mobilize against and a sense of urgency or "need to act", minorities who do not experience direct material threats but feel symbolically targeted by a policy, may be more likely to retreat from politics.

Building on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), our theoretical argument suggests that historical representations that cast marginalized group members as less central to national identity will reduce the impetus for members of such communities to seek out leadership positions to the extent that these narratives are viewed as *legitimate* representations, and group members come to *internalize* their status as peripheral to national identity. As such, the effects of historical narratives on minorities' political aspirations depend on their ability to dismiss these officially endorsed narrative as biased, ideological or factually incorrect. In other words, we do not expect historical representation to negatively affect minorities' willingness to pursue decision-making roles unless minorities indeed internalize these narratives and their second-order status within the nation.

We therefore expect the theoretical mechanism to be more likely to be at work where the advocates of one conception of national identity hold a particularly dominant place in society. To some degree, societies always feature disagreements over national identity; wherever political groupings pursue different political agendas, political elites are likely to disagree over the nature of national identity (Reicher and Hopkins 2001). However, how power is distributed across political camps advocating for different visions of national identity varies widely across contexts. Where the distribution of power is relatively equal, and thus where exclusionary measures taken by one political group may be met with vigorous criticism and reaction by other political groups, we expect that it is *less likely that excluded minorities will internalize their peripheral status within the nation.* Minorities in such contexts are more likely to be able to count on influential political allies who provide counter-narratives or "cognitive alternatives", allowing them to dismiss exclusionary social representations rather than internalize them (Tajfel and Turner 1986). In such contexts, rather than withdraw from decision-making roles, minorities may instead mobilize politically as a response. This means that while being excluded from narratives of nationhood should lead to the political retreat of marginalized groups in contexts such as India, where one political camp – led by the BJP – pushing a narrative is particularly dominant (Chhibber and Verma 2019), this may not be the case in other contexts where contrasting narratives are put forward by multiple, more equally powered, political camps.[4]

[4]It is widely acknowledged that India today, and likely since 2014, is a "one-party dominant system" (Chhibber and Verma 2019: 132). As (Chhibber and Verma 2019: 132) write, "The outcome of 2019 elections cemented the BJP-led dominant party system in which the other national party-the Congress-is largely marginalized, the Left Front decimated, and many regional parties that were hoping to do well lost further ground to the BJP in their respective states."

E.4 The Leaky Representation Pipeline

As noted in the main text, representation outcomes are the result of a complex mix of demand- and supply-side factors. While scholars have argued that increasing marginalized individuals' leadership ambitions may be a necessary step to increasing their descriptive representation, it may accordingly not be sufficient on its own to achieve this outcome. In this Section, we draw on a literature on political underrepresentation – much, but not all, of it concerning women in the United States – to reflect on possible obstacles and solutions to marginalized group underrepresentation at each stage of the so-called "leaky pipeline" (see Appendix Figure E17 for a visual summary). Note that while we detail dominant explanations for each stage in the pipeline, we do not intend to claim that the list is exhaustive, or that a factor viewed as particularly relevant to one stage does not matter at all for another.

We first summarize obstacles highlighted in the literature, before focusing on a select subset – and their possible solutions and associated conditions – that we expect to be particularly relevant as concerns Muslim underrepresentation in India. In our discussion, we distinguish between "nascent ambition" (understood as "a professed desire to hold office") and "expressive ambition" ("actually competing in an election"), as well as whether and under what conditions those ambitions translate into an aspirant being selected as a candidate and winning their election (Bernhard, Shames and Teele 2021:p.380).[5] Finally, we reflect on our experimental findings in light of this discussion on the representation pipeline.

E.4.1 Leaky Pipeline Obstacles

Potential → Nascent Aspirants The literature identifies a number of factors that might lead marginalized individuals who could potentially serve in office to not desire to hold office. As we detail in Section 2.3 of our paper, an individual's perceived entitlement for office – as well as their associated perceived qualifications, competence, and deservingness as leaders – can carry implications for whether they aspire to leadership roles (Fox and Lawless 2005, 2011, 2014; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Critical to this proposed factor is that an individual internalizes or accepts a societal perception that they are less entitled or qualified for office based on virtue of who they are, a point to which we return in our discussion of the conditions under which we should expect this stage in the pipeline to be more or less relevant to representation outcomes.

Other potentially relevant factors at this stage include group differences in preferences for competition, perceptions of politics as designed for "dominant" or comparatively "privileged" groups, and a lack of marginalized group representation in occupations that are "feeders" for elected office. Regarding preferences for competition, there is evidence that groups might differ in their degree of election aversion, though it is unclear whether this effect would generalize to other marginalized groups beyond women (Kanthak and Woon 2015). Regarding perception of politics, scholars have found that a perception of politics as being the domain of dominant groups can suppress marginalized group nascent ambition (Bos et al. 2022; Conroy and Green 2020; Fox and Lawless 2010). Finally, scholars have found that marginalized group underrepresentation in "feeder" professions of elected office may be critical to underrepresentation of the same groups in who aspires to become, and ultimately becomes, an elected leader (Thomsen and King 2020).

Nascent → Expressive Aspirants As Bernhard, Shames and Teele (2021) argue, the factors that shape expressive ambition might differ from those that shape nascent ambition. First, as we acknowledge in our manuscript, it is possible that greater society's demand for

[5]That nascent and expressed ambition are thought to both be conceptually different and informed by different critical obstacles is consistent with our design decision to insulate individuals' professed desire to lead from possible anticipated discrimination concerns, see footnote 23.

and receptivity to marginalized group leadership affects whether marginalized individuals' nascent aspiration is transformed into expressed aspiration. Scholars have argued that aspiring marginalized group members may elect not to run for political office due to the high perceived costs to running due to greater society's discrimination, whether it be anticipated discrimination from the media, public, or other relevant parties (Clayton, O'Brien and Piscopo 2023; Piscopo 2018).[6]

Second and perhaps most frequently cited as a cause for the drop-off between marginalized individuals' nascent and expressed ambition is socio-economic inequality. Thus, Bernhard, Shames and Teele (2021) argue that nascent ambition will be less likely to translate into expressed ambition for women who have less income, who are responsible for a greater portion of a household's income, and who have more dependents and caregiving responsibilities. These socio-economic factors can constrain an aspiring politician's ability or willingness to make the necessary investments in successfully running for office. Other scholars have similarly highlighted how marginalized individuals often face binding resource disadvantages that prevent aspiring candidates from ultimately running: not only in terms of socio-economic resources but also in terms of political capital and connections (Fox and Lawless 2010; Piscopo 2018).

Expressive → Selected Aspirants In predicting which marginalized candidates who formally seek office are chosen to stand as candidates, many scholars emphasize the role of party gatekeepers: most notably, party members and leaders, but also financial supporters and interest groups (Carnes and Lupu 2023; Norris 1997). Where party gatekeepers are biased against marginalized communities, individuals from those communities who formally seek office are thought to be less likely to be chosen to ultimately stand as candidates (Carnes and Lupu 2023). Relatedly, scholars have also argued that changes to electoral and candidate selection rules that alter the composition of party gatekeepers or the degree to which their deliberations are held behind closed doors can have implications for marginalized group representation (Hughes and Pournik 2016; Norris 1997; Piscopo 2018). Even where gatekeepers are not biased, Pate and Fox (2018:p.167) note that "incumbency advantage inhibits electoral opportunities for previously excluded groups."

Selected → Elected Aspirants While theorized by many to occur, scholars have only found inconsistent evidence of voter bias as a key driver of the drop-off from selected to elected political aspirants from marginalized communities (Black and Erickson 2003; Carnes and Lupu 2023; Lawless 2015). Scholars have, however, also posited that the *perception* of marginalized individuals as less likely to win an election can reduce voters' willingness to support them, as well as parties' willingness to invest resources in them (Corbett et al. 2022; Doherty, Dowling and Miller 2019).

E.4.2 Potentially Relevant Factors, Solutions, and Conditions for our Case

Next, we consider a few of the above highlighted obstacles which might theoretically be relevant to the case of Muslim underrepresentation in India.

Entitlement to lead We argue in our paper that lesser perceived entitlement to lead is one key factor that can undermine Indian Muslims' nascent ambition to lead. We also put forward one potential intervention to increase Muslims' perceived entitlement and thus their nascent ambition: state-sponsored inclusive historical narratives that establish Muslims' centrality to the Indian nation. Our theory and intervention bear some similarity to arguments

[6]Whereas Clayton, O'Brien and Piscopo (2023) reference media coverage as a possible barrier to expressive ambition, Haraldsson and Wängnerud (2019) argue instead that it can reduce nascent ambition.

Figure E17: **Visualizing the Representation Pipeline**



Notes: This figure displays theorized a) key steps that determine which individuals in a population end up representing it in elected political office, b) the factors at each step that might contribute to the systematic underrepresentation of certain social groups in office, and c) possible interventions to address those factors.

that education and socialization can affect marginalized individuals' aspirations to lead; notably, while we argue that narratives can have this effect by altering perceived hierarchies of belonging to the nation, other scholars have argued that education and socialization can help to establish certain occupations – including politics – as the domain of comparatively advantaged members of society (Bos et al. 2022; Coffman 2014).

Most generally, then, we would expect that where marginalized individuals perceive themselves as entitled to lead, they will be more likely to aspire to hold political office. We might in turn expect perceived entitlement to be greater where a state and society largely embrace and reinforce through education, citizenship criteria, and socialization an inclusive and civic, as opposed to an exclusive and ethno-cultural, conception of nationalism (Lindstam, Mader and Schoen 2021). We also might expect differences based on the predominant cultural and social attitudes regarding the relevant marginalized community in a given context (Jayachandran 2015). Finally, as discussed in Appendix Section E.3, we might expect individual and group-level differences in whether a perception that one's group is less entitled to lead is internalized. As noted in that Section, we expect marginalized individuals to be more resistant to internalization of such notions where there are more cognitive alternatives on which they can draw – which in turn is more likely where members of their social group possess more positions of power. One might also expect greater resistance where one feels materially threatened by such notions or their consequences (Clayton, O'Brien and Piscopo 2023; Simonsen 2021), or where one possesses membership in a second, higher-status identity category for which perceptions of entitlement differ (Lindstam and Vaidya 2023; Platow, Byrne and Ryan 2005).

Anticipated discrimination, gatekeeping and voter biases In the Indian context, we expect that actual and perceived discrimination and biases against Muslims could also present obstacles to their advancement in the representation pipeline. Scholars have documented discrimination against Muslims in a number of different domains, from private sector hiring, to inter-ethnic trust games and the politician provision of constituency services (Chuah, Fahoum

and Hoffmann 2013; Gaikwad and Nellis 2021; Thorat and Attewell 2007). Many of the ruling BJP's policies are viewed as discriminatory against Muslims, and none of the party's nearly 400 members of parliament – who we might think of as the party's top "gatekeepers" – is Muslim (Kuchay 2022; Rehman 2021).[7] Under these conditions, one might expect real and anticipated discrimination, as well as gatekeeping and voter biases, against Muslim leadership aspirants.[8] Indeed, our theoretical framework, which posits that historical representations can affect greater society's *demand* for Muslim leadership – in addition to Muslims' nascent ambition and *supply* of leadership – relates closely to these factors, where low demand can be reflected in actual and anticipated biases and discrimination against Muslims.

Under what conditions might we expect discrimination and biases against Muslims to act as a lesser or greater barrier to their advancement in the representation pipeline? First, where Muslims constitute a greater proportion of the voting population, party gatekeepers and voters may view them as more electorally competitive and may be more likely to support their candidacy (Farooqui 2020; Heath, Verniers and Kumar 2015). Second and relatedly, where the party system leads parties to engage in greater competition for Muslim voters, we might observe that party gatekeepers are more receptive to Muslim candidates, as compared with a situation where Muslim voters are either a relatively unimportant constituency or where their votes are largely "captured" by one party which faces little real competition (Silva and Skulley 2019). Third, where social attitudes become more favorable toward Muslims – or where the composition of gatekeepers changes such that the attitudes of those with decision-making power becomes more favorable – we should see that discrimination and biases act as less of a barrier to Muslims' advancement (Goyal 2020). Changes in electoral rules could also play a role in affecting Muslim representation through the aforementioned mechanisms. Farooqui (2020) argues that the first-past-the-post electoral system makes party gatekeepers less likely to field ethnic minority candidates, particularly in times of ethnic majoritarianism. The lack of electoral quotas – which have been shown to help marginalized communities advance politically and economically in India, and even to change social attitudes and biases (Beaman et al. 2009; Goyal 2020; Gulzar, Haas and Pasquale 2020) – for Muslims has also been theorized as a factor for their comparative lack of political advancement (Farooqui 2020).

Resource disadvantage A third obstacle that might prevent the advancement of Indian Muslims in the representation pipeline concerns their frequent socio-economic resource disadvantage. The government-ordered Sachar et al. (2006:p.237-8) report on the status of Muslims in India concluded that the "community exhibits deficit and deprivation in practically all dimensions of development". As noted in Appendix Section E.4.1 above, a large literature indicates that socio-economic as well as associated political capital disadvantages can act as key barriers to marginalized individuals' political advancement, and may be especially likely to increase drop-off between nascent and expressed ambition (Bernhard, Shames and Teele 2021). According to this literature, we might expect that where Muslims advance socio-economically – and where specific individuals are expected to shoulder less of the economic burden within households – they will be more likely to advance in the representation pipeline (Bernhard, Shames and Teele 2021).

[7] Other political parties routinely field a higher proportion of Muslim candidates, see Heath, Verniers and Kumar (2015) for example.

[8] It is worth noting, however, that a number of studies do not find evidence of Hindu discrimination against Muslims (Banerjee et al. 2009; Heath, Verniers and Kumar 2015). Findings by Heath, Verniers and Kumar (2015) indicating that Hindu voters do not discriminate against Muslim political candidates is consistent with evidence from other contexts that voters often do not exhibit strong biases against marginalized candidates (Carnes and Lupu 2023). Work by Goyal (2020) also highlights how bottom-up mechanisms can affect nomination decisions even where the composition of gatekeepers is unchanged and where leaders exhibit bias against marginalized groups.

E.4.3 Revisiting Implications of Our Findings for Representation Outcomes

Given the preceding discussion, how should we interpret our experimental findings, namely that while our inclusive treatment increases Muslims' leadership ambitions, it does little to shift Hindu respondents' demand for Muslim leaders?

First, the discussion presented above highlights the importance of increasing Muslim individuals' leadership ambitions, even where those ambitions can be best understood as "nascent" – or a professed desire hold office. As Appendix Figure E17 makes clear, nascent ambition is a critical stage of the representation pipeline; even if it is not a sufficient criterion, it is a necessary one.[9] Consistently, a very large number of scholars take "nascent ambition" as their main dependent variable and argue, implicitly or explicitly, that changes in nascent ambition for marginalized groups are likely to carry implications for their representational outcomes (Bos et al. 2022; Carnes and Lupu 2023; Clayton, O'Brien and Piscopo 2023; Conroy and Green 2020; Crowder-Meyer 2020; Fox and Lawless 2005, 2010, 2011, 2014; Gilardi 2015; Lawless 2015; Norris 1997; Pate and Fox 2018). Indeed, even those scholars who argue for greater attention to structural and institutional barriers to representation, or to different steps along the representation pipeline, nevertheless acknowledge that nascent ambition likely plays at least some role in determining representation outcomes (Bernhard, Shames and Teele 2021; Piscopo 2018). In sum, the extant literature appears to largely be in consensus that the main outcome on which we observe movement due to our treatment – marginalized group nascent ambition – matters for representation outcomes.

Second, findings indicate that possible positive consequences of increasing Muslim individuals' leadership ambitions likely outweigh potential negative repercussions.[10] First, because our overall findings are most consistent with Hindus being unmoved by inclusive narratives as opposed to responding negatively to them. Second, because as detailed in Appendix Section E.4.1, the literature finds only weak evidence of voter backlash against political aspirants from marginalized communities (Black and Erickson 2003; Carnes and Lupu 2023; Lawless 2015). While demand-side factors are likely to impact representation outcomes (see Appendix Figure E17 and associated discussion), such research thus finds little evidence of voter backlash as a central factor driving marginalized group underrepresentation. Most relevant to our study is work by Heath, Verniers and Kumar (2015:p.16) which finds "no evidence of a backlash among Hindus to Muslim candidates" and which concludes that, "given the ethnic advantage that Muslim candidates receive from Muslim voters, and the absence of any backlash or ethnic penalty from Hindu voters, putting forward a Muslim candidate in an area with many Muslims would appear to offer a party a competitive advantage." These findings indicate that inclusive narratives are more likely to increase rather than decrease Muslim representation, even where they centrally alter behavior among Muslims and not Hindus.

Third, our discussion highlights possible conditions under which we might expect Muslim representation in leadership positions to most advance. Here, we focus more squarely on our finding that inclusive narratives can increase Indian Muslims' nascent ambition and ask under what conditions this increase is most likely to translate into greater descriptive representation for the community. As detailed in Appendix Section E.4.2, we expect this to be most likely in regions of India with larger and more socio-economically privileged Muslim populations, more favorable social attitudes toward Muslims, and which feature a greater number of viable political parties vying for Muslims' votes (Bernhard, Shames and Teele 2021; Farooqui 2020; Heath, Verniers and Kumar 2015; Silva and Skulley 2019). Importantly, although Muslims are

[9] As Clifford, Kirkland and Simas (2019:p.1046) write, "General population studies of nascent ambition allow us to understand why citizens develop the interest in running for office in the first place, a necessary condition for any step that leads toward candidacy."

[10] This does not mean that there can be no negative repercussions. As explained in Section 7.3, for example, "Of course, there still may be individuals who perceive negative repercussions from inclusive narratives: for instance, aspirants encouraged by such narratives who subsequently fail to secure leadership positions may become more discouraged than they would have had they never put themselves forward" (pp.37-8).

both a minority population in most constituencies and are on average socio-economically disadvantaged, there is wide variation in the community's population proportion and resources across regions (Farooqui 2020; Sachar et al. 2006). Indeed, Muslims constitute over 20% of the population in approximately 18% of parliamentary constituencies and over 40% in as much as 5% of constituencies (Farooqui 2020). While we theorize that inclusive narratives should increase Muslims' perceived entitlement to speak on behalf of *any* "core" members of the nation, then, we might expect that increases in Muslims' nascent ambition should be particularly likely to translate into greater representation in areas featuring such characteristics.

F Experiment Materials

F.1 Stage 1. Consent, Demographics, Selection of Avatar

Participants' informed consent is obtained prior to the start of the study. Prior to giving their consent, they learn about the different parts of the study, guaranteed and potential earnings, and broadly about the topic of the study: namely, that they will be asked to complete exercises on a number of school topics. We then collect demographic data on participants' gender, religion, caste/community, age, education, political party identification, and income. Participants are screened to continue in the study depending on quotas for Muslim and Hindu respondents, and region of residence. In addition to our screening protocol, only subjects above 18 years of age, who provide their consent, and who pass quality checks will be allowed to proceed. Participants are then be asked to choose an avatar to represent them in Stage 3 of the study. They will have a choice among three identity-congruent avatars. Figure F18 illustrates what these choices look like.

Figure F18: **Avatar Selection**



(a) Muslim Men



(b) Muslim Women



(c) Hindu Men



(d) Hindu Women

F.2 Stage 2. Experiment Treatments

In Stage 2 of the study, participants are randomly assigned an *inclusive*, *exclusive*, or *control* history exercise (see Section 4.2). Participants learn that they have been asked to complete history exercises taken from official Indian state textbooks and that they have the opportunity to earn up to INR 400 for correct answers. Beginning in Stage 2 of the study, participants will see a banner on every page that corresponds to the general theme of the exercises (school) as well as their randomly assigned treatment (*inclusive*, *exclusive*, or *control*). Thus, for an *exclusive* treatment, they see the image which highlights the school theme ("Back to School") along with images of Hindu heroes which are taken from real revised textbooks pushed by the BJP). In the *inclusive* treatment, they see a banner with Mughal rulers and art taken from older history textbooks (see Figure F19.).

Figure F19: **Banners**

(a) Banner, *Inclusive* history treatment

(b) Banner, *Exclusive* history treatment

The following pages contain the text and incentivized follow up questions for the three historical time periods and for our three treatments (see Table 2 for more information).

Inclusive Representation Treatment

Ancient India:

The Aryans: The Aryans came from outside India, from north-eastern Iran and the region around the Caspian Sea. The Aryans came as pastoral nomads, that is, they kept large herds of cattle, which was their means of livelihood, and they wandered from place to place.

The Dasyus: When the Aryans first arrived in India, they had to fight for land with the people already living in India. These people they called the Dasyus. The Dasyus did not worship the same gods as the Aryans. They spoke a language which the Aryans did not understand, because the latter spoke Sanskrit. The Aryans who fought and defeated the Dasyus did not treat them kindly and enslaved many of them.

Religion: Religious ideas from the north, such as the worship of the Vedic gods and doctrines of Buddhism and Jainism were known to the people of the south. Some of them followed these religions, but most people still worshipped their older gods. Traders from western Asia brought with them in the first century A.D. some teachers of a new religion which arose in western Asia. This was Christianity.

Questions:

1. Where did the Aryans live before coming to India?
   (a) Indonesia
   (b) **North-eastern Iran**
   (c) China
2. True or False? There were many religions in ancient India
   (a) **True**
   (b) False

Medieval India

Global India: In the fourteenth century, the subcontinent was part of a global network of communication. Arab merchants, for instance, frequented ports along the western coast in the first millennium CE, while Central Asian people settled in the north-western parts of the subcontinent during the same period. From the seventh century, with the advent of Islam, these regions became part of what is often termed the Islamic world.

The Mughal Empire: The Mughal Empire was established in the sixteenth century. The Mughals came to regard themselves as emperors of not just Muslims but of all peoples. They were concerned with the welfare of India. Mughals were not interested in converting large numbers of Indians to their religion. There were already many Muslims in India. All Mughal emperors gave grants to support the building and maintenance of places of worship. Even when temples were destroyed during the war, grants were later issued for their repair.

Akbar the Great: Akbar was a great ruler not because he ruled a vast empire, but because of his concern for the country and the people. Akbar's great dream was that India should be united as one country. People should forget about their differences about religion and think of themselves only as people of India.

Questions:

1. True or false? The Mughals came to regard themselves as emperors of not just Muslims, but of all people?
   (a) **True**
   (b) False
2. What was Akbar's dream?
   (a) To rule the world
   (b) To convert people to Islam
   (c) **That India should be a united country, irrespective of religion**

Exclusive Representation

Ancient India:

Maharshi Valmiki Mahaishi Ved Vyas

A Glorious Past: Indian civilization and culture, religion, society, art, literature and science has always been great. In ancient times, India had the status of teacher in the world. If we talk about economic prosperity, India was called the sparrow of gold. The greatness of Indian culture and Indian history has not only been mentioned in our own texts but western historians and scholars have also spoken about the greatness of Indian culture.

The Vedas: The Vedas are the oldest texts among Brahman literature. The Vedas have been counted among the greatest literature of the world. This literature was the foundation of the Vedic civilization. Aryans were the founders of this civilization. Vast knowledge has been comprised in the ancient Vedic texts of Aryans. Their language was Sanskrit. Sanskrit language is the glory of Indian civilization. There is no language as enriched as Sanskrit in the whole world.

The Aryans: Although western scholars have identified Aryans as foreign invaders, on the contrary in fact Aryans were natives of India. Nowhere in the Vedic literature have Aryans been called foreigners. Aryans praised their Indian mother land and called the rivers their mother. Aryan did not come from foreign lands, but they went to Iran and Europe from India

Questions:

1. True or False? Sanskrit was spoken in Ancient India
   (a) True
   (b) False
2. Where did the founders of Vedic civilization (the Aryans) live before coming to India?
   (a) Indonesia
   (b) China
   (c) **They were natives of India**

Medieval India:



Muslim Invasions: No country in the world has endured the invasions of Arabs or Turks as long and successful as in the Middle Ages. Islam united the Arab people and ignited a fierce feeling to promote their religion. Much like in other countries, they wanted to promote it in India. This is what motivated them to invade India. After the 8th century Arab invasions, India was safe from Muslim invasions for almost two centuries. It was only in the second half of the 10th century in that Muslim invasion restarted in India.

Akbar and the Attack on Chittor: Babur established the Mughal empire in India in 1526 A.D. He set is eyes on India looking for that stable rule. On 23rd October 1567 AD, during the reign of Uday Singh II, Chittorgarh fort was attacked by the Mughal emperor Akbar. Uday Singh's commanders tried to successfully protect the fort but after being surrounded for 4 long months by the Mughal army, the fort was breached using gunpowder.

Maharana Pratap: Maharana Pratap was the eldest son of Uday Sing. Pratap did not surrender before Akbar and rather gave importance to the independence of his motherland and took the path of struggle, maintaining the prestige and glorious tradition, the way his forefathers did. He was a freedom lover. Despite many hardships, he was not ready to submit to Akbar at any cost. Protector of dharma, Maharana Pratap later became an inspiration for freedom fighters like Shivaji, Chhatrasal and freedom fighters against the British.

Questions:

1. True or False? The Arab people wanted to promote Islam in India
   (a) True
   (b) False
2. Who was Maharana Pratap?
   (a) A Mughal emperor
   (b) **Son of Uday Sing and a resistance fighter against the Mughals**
   (c) Father of Uday Sing and a freedom fighter against the British

Baseline

Ancient India:

A terracotta bull

Diet: People in ancient India ate a wide range of plant and animal products, including fish. Archaeologists have been able to reconstruct dietary practices from finds of charred grains and seeds.

Agricultural practices: While the prevalence of agriculture is indicated by finds of grain, it is more difficult to reconstruct actual agricultural practices. Were seeds scattered on ploughed lands? Representations on seals and terracotta sculptures indicate that the bull was known, and archaeologists extrapolate from this that oxen were used for ploughing.

Drains: One of the most distinctive features of India's ancient cities was the carefully planned drainage systems. Roads and streets were laid out along an approximate "grid" pattern, intersecting at right angles. It seems that streets with drains were laid out first and then houses built along them. If domestic waste water had to flow into the street drains, every house needed to have at least one wall along the street.

Questions:

1. What animal was often represented on seals and terracotta sculptures in ancient India?
   (a) The wolf
   (b) **The bull**
   (c) The alligator
2. True or False: the drainage system in Harappan cities indicates town planning
   (a) **True**
   (b) False

Medieval India:



Agrarian Society in the sixteenth century: The basic unit of agricultural society was the village, inhabited by peasants who performed the manifold seasonal tasks that made up agricultural production throughout the year – tilling the soil, sowing seeds, harvesting the crop when it was ripe.

Agriculture: Seldom did the average peasant of north India possess more than a pair of bullocks and two ploughs; most possessed even less. Cultivation was based on the principle of individual ownership. Peasant lands were bought and sold in the same way as the lands of other property owners. The abundance of land, available labour and the mobility of peasants were three factors that accounted for the constant expansion of agriculture.

Irrigation: Monsoons remained the backbone of Indian agriculture, as they are even today. But there were crops which required additional water. Artificial systems of irrigation had to be devised for this. Irrigation projects received state support as well. For example, in northern India the state undertook digging of new canals and also repaired old ones.

Questions:

1. What three factors accounted for the constant expansion of agriculture in Medieval India?
   (a) **The abundance of land, available labour and the mobility of peasants.**
   (b) The abundance of land, connection to the silk road and the discovery of the wheel.
   (c) The abundance of land, climate change and the availability of elephants.
2. True of False: irrigation projects existed in Medieval India.
   (a) **True**
   (b) False

F.3 Stage 3. Outcomes, Mechanisms, Remaining Exercises

F.3.1 Mechanisms

In Stage 3 of the study, we first ask two questions meant to capture our theorized mechanisms: namely, that historical representations can alter the perceived "prototypical member" of the nation and the perceived contributions of different groups. Our prototypicality question asks participants to what extent they agree with the following two statements: (1) "I think it would be accurate if someone described me as a typical Indian" and (2) "I feel similar to other Indians". To measure perceived contributions, we show participants list of groups, drawing on our treatments.[11] The item asks them the following: "From the list below, please select the 5 groups, individuals, or other items that you believe have most **positively contributed** to the *development of the Indian nation*. Drag the words into the box labeled "India: Historical Contributions". Then rank them from 1-5, where 1 is "most positively contributed" and 5 is "least positively contributed".[12] Figure F20 reproduces the question answer options.

Figure F20: **Perceived Contributions**



[11] The order in which our two mechanism questions appeared was randomized.

[12] The order in which the words appeared was randomized. Words coded as "Hindu" include: Aryans, Hindus*, Brahmins, Sanskrit, Maharana Pratap, V.D. Savarkar*, Raja Ram Mohan Roy* (words with an * were not explicitly mentioned in the text). Words coded as "Muslim" include: Muslims, Arab Merchants, Mughals, Akbar). Note that the selection of words coded as Hindu/Muslim was pre-registered.

F.3.2 Behavioral Outcomes

After completing the two mechanism questions, participants are told that they have been assigned to groups of three and that payoffs will be determined by group performance, with all group members earning an equal share. Participants are told that they will complete two additional exercises, on geography and sociology, however, only one of these two exercises will count for payment, as determined by a group representative. They are then told: "In this part of the study, you have been matched in a group with two other survey participants. Like you, these participants chose to be represented by avatars. Below, you can see yourself and your two partners along with their chosen avatars." Figure F21 provides an example of what this could look like for a Muslim man assigned to a Hindu majority group. Note that this information is displayed to participants while they make each of their decisions regarding who should be group representative.

Figure F21: **Example of Group Composition**



Participants are then asked to make three decisions. First, they select which exercise they would choose to count for payment were they group representative. After stating their choice, participants are asked to state their willingness to be group representative. Willingness is explained in terms of choosing a place in line (Coffman 2014), where choosing 1 means that one wants to be first in line in the group and choosing 4 means that one does not even want to be in line to be group representative (i.e., they do not want to be group representative). Participants are told that the person who is most willing will be chosen as group representative, and they are shown the following text:

"How willing are you to represent the group and to have your choice determine which of the two exercises may count for payment? Please indicate your desired place in line. The person who is first in line will be chosen as group representative. Remember, if you are selected as group representative and your choice is implemented, if affects not only your potential earnings, but potentially the earnings of your partners as well."

After participants answer their willingness to be group representative question, they see the following text:

"In the event that multiple group members are equally most willing to be group representative, we will have a tie. To determine who is representative in the event of a tie, we will now ask you to rank, from 1-3 where 1 is most preferred and 3 is least preferred, how much you prefer that

each of the group members (including yourself) is the group representative. The person who is ranked highest by all group members will become group representative in the event of a tie."

Figure F22 provides an example of what this ranking might look like for a given group:

Figure F22: **Ranking Group Members by Preference: Group Representative**



After indicating their own willingness to become group representative, and after ranking their fellow group members, participants are asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the following statements: "I am qualified to be group representative" and "I am worthy of being group representative".

F.3.3 Political Outcomes

Willingness to Seek Out Information on Citizenship Participation In order to probe whether the treatment affects respondents' sense of *interest in becoming involved in politics* (supply) above and beyond their willingness to be a group leader, we explicitly ask them about their interest in receiving information on how to become more politically active. Specifically we ask them the following question:

"Recent studies on leadership and political engagement in India indicate that people lack information about how to become politically active and influence policy making. A first step to becoming more engaged is to learn more about the many different platforms, organizations and programs that exist in India, which work toward empowering citizens to participate in democratic and governance processes.

Would you like to find out more information about different programs and platforms? Those selecting "yes" will receive information on different programs and platforms promoting citizen engagement in India at the conclusion of this study."

Figure F23: **Evaluation of Politicians**



Hindu MLA



Muslim MLA

Respondents who answer "yes" to this question are provided with a link to a webpage with information on different platforms and programs related to promoting citizen engagement. Respondents who visit the webpage are asked to introduce their unique ID number (assigned to them at the end of the study), allowing us to examine who visited this website during the days and weeks following the completion of the study.

Evaluations of Hindu and Muslim Politicians In order to examine whether the results generalize to perceptions of political candidates, we include an outcome measure where respondents are asked to rate a real politician on a number of dimensions. We show respondents a politician's "report card" published by an independent NGO in Maharashtra. We then ask respondents to rate the politician's performance based on this card. Respondents are randomly assigned either the Muslim MLA's report card *or* the Hindu MLA's report card. Respondents are randomly assigned either a Hindu or a Muslim politician with a similar (mid) ratings. The exercise also helps us distinguish between perceptions of entitlement, quality, popularity etc. Respondents are asked the following question:

"Several non-partisan organizations in India publish "report cards", which rank city councilors and MLAs on their annual performance, with the aim of making elected representatives more accountable for performance of their key duties.

Please read the following description of a real MLA in Maharashtra and answer the follow-up questions." To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- The candidate is qualified for political office
- The candidate is deserving of political office
- The candidate represents the interests of his constituents
- The candidate represents India
- The candidate is likely to be popular among greater society
- I would be comfortable if this MLA represented me in a legislative assembly
- The candidate seems similar to other politicians

Geography:

After subjects have responded to these questions, they complete the geography and sociology exercises:

Population: Patterns of population distribution and density help us to understand the demographic characteristics of any area. The term population distribution refers to the way people are spaced over the earth's surface. Broadly, 90 per cent of the world population lives in about 10 per cent of its land area.

Questions:

1. Which statement is true?
   (a) 10 percent of the world population lives in about 90 per cent of its land area.
   (b) (b) 10 percent of the world population lives in about 10 per cent of its land area.
   (c) **90 percent of the world population lives in about 10 per cent of its land area**.
   (d) 90 percent of the world population lives in about 90 per cent of its land area.

Sociology:

In every society, some people have a greater share of valued resources – money, property, education, health, and power – than others. These social resources can be divided into three forms of capital – economic capital in the form of material assets and income; cultural capital such as educational qualifications and status; and social capital in the form of networks of contact and social associations.

Questions:

1. What constitutes "social resources"
   (a) Economic capital, political capital and social capital
   (b) Social stratification
   (c) **Economic capital, cultural capital and social capital**

F.4 Stage 4. Follow-up Questions and Conclusion

In Stage 4, participants are first asked a few follow up questions. Questions include whether they think certain social groups are better or worse on average at history, geography, and sociology, and to what extent they enjoyed and felt engaged with the study. Participants are then be reminded how payoffs will be calculated and how they will find out, and within what time frame, how much they have earned in additional incentives. They will earn their participation fee immediately.

G Additional Information on Research Design

G.1 Empirical Specification

To estimate our main treatment effect, we first present point estimates of the mean levels of our outcomes of interest across treatment conditions and subsets of the respondent population (most notably, Muslim versus Hindu respondents, and a respondent's randomly assigned group composition).

In our analysis, we also run a series of OLS regressions. In order to examine heterogeneous treatment effects given group composition, we will interact treatment assignment with a variable indicating whether or not the respondent was assigned to a homogeneous or a mixed group. The main empirical specifications are detailed below:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{1,i} + \beta_2 (T_{2,i} + \times Z_i) + \psi \mathbf{x_i} + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{1,i} + \beta_2 T_{2,i} + \beta_3 (T_{1,i} \times Z_i) + \beta_4 (T_{2,i} \times Z_i) + \psi \mathbf{x_i} + \epsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where Y_i is the outcome for individual i, $T_{1,i}$ is a treatment indicator variable that equals 1 if individual i was randomly assigned to the *exclusive* treatment condition and $T_{2,i}$ is a treatment indicator variable that equals 1 if individual i was randomly assigned to the *inclusive* treatment. Z_i represents the value for individual i of a variable that we will interact with treatment assignment, such as a participant's randomly assigned group composition. We control for all constituent terms of interactions in regression models with interactions. $\mathbf{x_{ig}}$ is a vector of control variables for individual i, ϵ_i is unexplained variance, and α is the intercept.

G.2 Power Analysis

We conduct our power analysis using the **power** function in Stata version 16. We determine the sample size needed to obtain a power of 0.8 given an alpha of 0.05. We estimate sample sizes for a two-sample means test. To determine the expected treatment effect size, we draw on two sources of data:

1. In our experiment, we use the same scale for our central outcome of interest as Coffman (2014), where an individual's willingness to put forward their decision on behalf of a group is explained in terms of reserving a "place in line" relative to one's group partners, where "1" means that a respondent wishes to be first in line to be group representative and "4" means they do not even wish to be in line. Although Coffman's research design and question both differ substantially from our own – she evaluates the willingness of women versus men to have their decisions "count" for payment in a group of two on a variety of topics that differed in how male- or female-stereotyped they were – because her outcome is measured on a similar scale as our own, the effect size she observes can be used as a helpful reference point when estimating expected treatment effect sizes for our own study.

2. We piloted our experiment, first with a sample of men from December 7 to December 20, 2020, and then with a sample of women from March 22 to March 29, 2021. 185 men, and 199 women, completed the pilot in its entirety. Although we made some modifications between pilots, and between the pilots and our planned full study, we can nevertheless also use results from these pilots to derive expected treatment effect sizes.

Using the first data source, Coffman (2014: 1640) finds that differences in the average position in line between men and women ranged across the topics from .04 to .58, with an average of .19 pooling across topics ($p < 0.01$, $n = 460$). Using this albeit imperfect measure for our expected treatment effect size, along with the means and standard deviations from the Coffman (2014)

study, indicates that we require a sample size of at least $n = 115$ in each treatment condition, or $n = 345$ across all three conditions. As explained in Appendix Section G.1 and based on our theory, we will investigate treatment effects separately for Hindu and Muslim respondents. A power analysis indicating a required sample size of $n = 345$ across treatments should thus be doubled, which results in a sample of approximately $n = 690$.

Our pilot results should be interpreted with caution, due to the relatively small sample size and because we made some adjustments to our design between our pilot with men and with women; we also do not include any controls in our analysis. However, among Muslim men, we observe a treatment effect size for the *inclusive* treatment of approximately 0.40 on the 1-4 scale: the average place in line is 1.75 in the control group, and 1.37 in the *inclusive* treatment group. Results are thus in the direction predicted by H_{2a}, as Muslim participants in the *inclusive* treatment, as compared with the control group, become more willing to seek out leadership roles.[13] Using means and standard deviations from our pilot and an estimated effect size of 0.375 indicates that we require a sample size of at least $n = 90$ in each treatment condition, or $n = 270$ across all three conditions; this number increases to a total sample size of $n = 540$ when considering both Muslim and Hindu respondents.[14,15]

In addition to the 1-4 place in line measure, we also observed expected effects on a number of other variables. Among Muslims, we observe that the *inclusive* treatment increases self-perceived qualification to be group representative by roughly 0.30 points on a 5 point scale.[16] Using the effect size, means and standard deviations of this variable yields a sample size of at least $n = 64$ in each treatment condition, or $n = 192$ across all three conditions and $n = 384$ when taking into account separate analyses for Hindu and Muslim respondents. We also observe that the *exclusive* treatment decreases Muslim respondents' self-ranking on the 1-3 demand scale by approximately 0.25 points; using these data yields a sample size of $n = 192$ in each treatment condition, or $n = 1,152$ when considering both Muslim and Hindu respondent populations.

Our estimated sample sizes thus range widely, from as little as $n = 384$ total to as many as $n = 1,152$. We take a conservative approach and plan to sample approximately $n = 1,500$ respondents, which should provide us sufficient power to consider our specified interactions. We will also compute post-data collection minimum detectable effect (MDE) sizes.

G.3 Sampling

We chose states based on three criteria: 1) overall population size or the presence of a "mega city", 2) a sizeable Muslim community, and 3) a history of texbook reforms. The first two criteria help to facilitate survey sampling and increase our confidence that our findings would generalize to large parts of the Indian population, and the third criterion helps to ensure that there is within-state variation in the type of history education respondents will have received. Our resultant target population includes residents of the two largest Indian cities (Mumbai and Delhi) as well as the two most populated states (Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra). All states have sizeable Muslim populations (the proportion of Muslims in our target states range from 9.67% (Gujarat) to 19.26% (Uttar Pradesh)), and have undergone important textbook reforms in the past.

[13] For the purposes of our power analysis, we consider here results from the pilots that are in the direction predicted by our theory.

[14] Pooling across our pilots with Muslim men and women, we observe a treatment effect size for the *inclusive* treatment of 0.17, similar to the pooled average of 0.19 in Coffman (2014). Using pooled data results in a larger estimated sample size of approximately $n = 300$ per treatment condition.

[15] Among Hindu women, the *inclusive* decreases willingness to lead, and results in a total estimated sample size – pooling across Muslim and Hindu respondents – of $n = 606$.

[16] We observe similar expected effects, across both the *inclusive* and *exclusive* treatments, when considering evaluations of Hindu and Muslim MLAs among both Hindu and Muslim respondents.

G.4 Attention Checks

As a first check, we inform respondents that careful attention to the survey questions is critical. Only respondents who answer "I understand" to this statement are allowed to proceed to take the survey. Second, at the end of the demographics section of the questionnaire, we include the following item: *"People are very busy these days. We are testing whether people read questions. To show that you've read this much, answer both "extremely interested" and "very interested".* Respondents who do not answer both "extremely interested" and "very interested" are excluded from the survey. Finally, right before assigning respondents to treatments, we include a final attention check. We inform respondents that in the next part of the survey, they have the possibility of earning an additional 400 INR and that whether or not they receive this amount depends both on luck and whether they pay attention to the material. Following this, we ask respondents to indicate how much they have the possibility of earning in the next part of the study. Only respondents who answer "400 INR" are allowed to continue taking the survey.

G.5 Time Outliers

We excluded time outliers based on a literature that has:

1. Identified inattentiveness as a common problem among online survey respondents sampled through platforms such as Lucid (Aronow et al. 2020). Since these online respondents often answer not only one, but many surveys each day/week, they are especially prone to engage in "satisficing" (Read, Wolters and Berinsky 2021) – expending minimum effort on the survey, engaging superficially with question content, guessing, answering randomly, or "straightlining". This type of satisficing can increase the amount of noise in the data, producing inaccurate estimates (Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014; Greszki, Meyer and Schoen 2015; Silber, Danner and Rammstedt 2019), weakening correlations, and increasing the likelihood of type 2 errors (Berinsky et al. 2021).

2. Identified response times – both very long and very short ones – as a "clear indicator of attentiveness, rather than respondent comprehension" (Berinsky et al. 2021:p.4). A number of scholars have tied response times both to respondent inattentiveness and satisficing (Greszki, Meyer and Schoen 2015; Gummer, Roßmann and Silber 2021; Malhotra 2008; Zhang and Conrad 2014).

3. Found that excluding response time outliers is likely to reduce random noise in the data and is very unlikely to affect substantive results (Greszki, Meyer and Schoen 2015; Jedinger 2018).

4. Recommended flagging and removing response time outliers (Leiner 2019), an approach that has been adopted by many researchers as standard protocol (Atzori et al. 2021; Fodeman, Snook and Horgan 2020; Jedinger 2018; Matjašič, Vehovar and Manfreda 2018) alongside other efforts to reduce the effects of inattentive respondents, for instance removing those who fail pre-treatment attention checks (Aronow et al. 2020; Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014) – an approach we also adopt.

Based on this literature, we therefore screened out response time outliers with the understanding that doing so would be likely to reduce measurement error – especially in an online sample like ours which was likely to feature a high degree of inattentiveness – and would be unlikely to affect any substantive results. That being said, as Alvarez et al. (2019) highlight, excluding subjects who are likely to be inattentive may change the sociodemographic characteristics of the sample. In particular, inattentive respondents tend to be younger and less educated than the broader population (Alvarez et al. 2019; Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014). As such,

excluding them may make a sample less representative of the target population and, depending on who was excluded and if it differed across our experimental conditions, could imperil the benefits of randomization.

An analysis of our results indicate that our decision was adequate. First and foremost, regarding our randomization strategy, as shown in Appendix Table A1, our respondents are balanced on sociodemographic characteristics in the control and treatment groups after excluding inattentive respondents. Excluding these respondents therefore should not have sacrificed the benefits of randomization in this case, but improved the accuracy of our estimates, consistent with the findings of Greszki, Meyer and Schoen (2015). Second, when replicating our findings including these speed-outliers, our substantive conclusions remain the same. While effect sizes are smaller (most likely due to increasing the amount of noise in the data) the coefficients remain statistically significant.[17] Finally, regarding our sample representativeness, although excluding speed-outliers could affect sample representativeness, we rely on a non-probability sample and we do not claim that our findings would generalize to the broader Indian population.

G.6 Ethics

We sought in our research design to minimize the likelihood that participants – in particular, those randomly assigned to receive our exclusive historical narrative treatment – were exposed to any psychological costs higher than those that they were likely to face in real life. First, we made sure that all the material used for the study was sourced from official textbook material, published either by the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) or different states' educational boards. For instance, the material used to design the exclusive history treatment is currently in use in history textbooks in Rajasthan. Second, we included a debrief at the end of the study, providing respondents with information about the study's content and purpose. The debrief states clearly that no texts should be taken as fact and that the historical depictions to which they were exposed are contested. The debrief also provides contact information for the main investigators on the project and provides links for interested respondents to learn more about Indian textbook content and the political controversy surrounding it. Third, in order to verify that the study was consistent with local norms, standards, and ethical considerations, we shared our pre-analysis with Muslim and Hindu faculty and Indian institutions to receive their input on the ethical aspects of the study. The study also received IRB approval from the ethical board at Aarhus University.

While not all participants may have been exposed to these or similar textbook materials specifically through their education, it was further our expectation that they had been exposed at some level to similar exclusive *narratives* in the course of their real lives. As we discuss in Appendix Section E.3, it is widely acknowledged that India today can be characterized as a "BJP-led dominant party system in which the other national party-the Congress-is largely marginalized, the Left Front decimated, and many regional parties that were hoping to do well [have] lost further ground to the BJP in their respective states" (Chhibber and Verma 2019: 132). We thus expect that while we might see some variation in degree across states, most generally we would anticipate some level of exposure among all respondents to the Hindutva narrative promoted by BJP and its coalition partners.[18] This expectation certainly applies to the four states in our sample, which, as shown in Appendix Section C.6, all have experienced periods of BJP or like-minded party control at the state level. As we note in that Section, our

[17] Note that we cannot include results based on data including these speed-outliers in our main paper or appendix since these respondents did not receive any remuneration. However, the central findings presented in the main paper (e.g., effects on centrality, entitlement, conditional effect of group composition) are robust to including these speed-outliers.

[18] Indeed, as we reflect on in Section 7, we interpret the lack of an observed *exclusive* treatment effect as likely being attributable to individuals being primarily exposed to this narrative under the status quo.

exploratory analysis of treatment effects by estimated years of education under BJP or allied state government is "thus meant to proxy for differences in degree of exposure, then, with the presumption that most if not all respondents have experienced some minimum amount of exposure."

Results from our pilot and full study indicate that participants did not find our experimental treatments upsetting. First, in a pre-test of our treatment exercises, we asked respondents whether reading each of the different experimental treatment texts (they saw all three treatment texts, presented in a random order) made them feel either positive (proud, happy, patriotic), negative (excluded, uncomfortable, offended, angry), or no emotion. We find that the vast majority (between 92-97%) of respondents across the three treatment texts said that reading the material made them either feel a positive emotion, no emotion, or neutral; a much smaller portion (between 2%-8%) said that they felt a negative emotion.[19] Importantly, two-sample t-tests indicate that respondents were no more likely to state a negative emotion for the exclusive texts than they were for the control (p=0.52) or inclusive (p=0.15) texts; nor were Muslims more likely than Hindus to state a negative emotion in response to the exclusive treatment (p=0.79). Finally, participants in the pre-test did not seem to find the textbook material too distant from their own education: between 72% and 82% said they recalled learning something similar about each topic in school, with no significant differences across treatment texts or by respondent religion.

The degree to which participants said they enjoyed the study further allays concerns that they found it upsetting. 96% of respondents in our full study (N=1,592) said that they enjoyed the survey "a great deal" (87%) or "somewhat" (9%), with only 4% saying that they did not enjoy it. The percentage of respondents randomly assigned to the exclusive treatment who said they enjoyed the survey a great deal or somewhat is not statistically distinguishable from the percentage saying the same in the control (p=0.84 in a two-sample t-test) or inclusive (p=0.71) conditions. Nor are there statistically distinguishable differences in stated enjoyment between Muslim and Hindu respondents (p=0.18). Consistent with these results, in both our pilot and full study we provided participants with the opportunity to provide open-ended answers on their experience, to which we observe there were overwhelmingly positive responses.

We thus believe that our research design, including our exclusive historical treatment text, was unlikely to expose participants to psychological costs higher than those they might experience in real life. Finally, we also aimed to improve the ethical contribution of our study by, through both our theoretical framework and research design, taking into account not only on the possible negative consequences of exclusive historical representations on ethnic minority communities, but also the possible positive consequences of *inclusive historical representations*. We thus view our study as potentially providing policy implications regarding how minority leadership aspirations could be improved, through historical narratives and textbook reforms. Such positive implications suggest that this study may provide clear benefits for members of marginalized communities.

G.7 Pre-specified Empirical Expectations

This section specifies additional empirical expectations not directly derived from our theoretical framework. While support for these empirical expectations is not used as direct evidence in favour of or against our proposed theoretical argument, we take the opportunity to further explore important questions related to factors such as gender, caste, and group consciousness and their potential moderating and conditioning effects. We chose to pre-register these empirical expectations and to use them as a guide for our exploratory analyses.

First of all, we expect that under the status quo in our study location, marginalized group members will already be accustomed to exclusive historical representations, among other

[19] We code as "neutral" those respondents who say that they felt both a positive and negative emotion.

factors, that promote a status hierarchy that distinguishes between an ethnic majority that is perceived as entitled to lead and an ethnic minority that is mandated to follow.[20] Accordingly, we might expect that prior to the administration of any experimental treatments, the demand for and supply of minority individuals in leadership positions might already be lower than for majority members. In sum, *ceteris paribus, the supply of and demand for ethnic minorities in leadership positions will be lower than for ethnic majorities, particularly where such positions require that leaders speak on behalf of members from the ethnic majority group (*$\boldsymbol{E_1}$*)*.[21]

How should we expect historical narratives to affect the supply of and demand for ethnic *majority* individuals in leadership roles? Theoretically, varying historical narratives of minority groups need not have any implications for the narratives surrounding majority groups, or their perceived entitlement to lead. Because history is not zero sum, the greater inclusion or exclusion of minority members does not necessarily imply changes in how majority members are remembered. Similarly, if majority group entitlement is not sourced in a comparison with minority group members, changes in perceived minority group entitlement to lead could have no effect on perceived majority group entitlement.[22] Ultimately, we expect that should historical narratives of minorities matter for majority members, then effects are likely to be symmetric: by undermining the perceived entitlement to lead of minority members, exclusive historical representations might lead majority members to view themselves as the only or primary group entitled to lead. Inclusive historical representations, on the other hand, may increase perceptions that minorities have a similar (if not equal) right to speak on behalf of members of the nation. In sum, we expect that *exclusive (inclusive) historical representations will increase (decrease) the supply of and demand for ethnic majority individuals in leadership positions (*$\boldsymbol{E_2}$*)*.

There are a number of other identities that might shape one's perceived belonging to the nation and entitlement to speak on behalf of others. While our experimental design allows us to abstract away from other considerations to a great degree, one intersecting identity that remains present and which research indicates may be relevant is gender. We posit that our historical representation treatment effects will be lesser among women because gender is a separate status system, legitimized through other system-justifying beliefs (Kray et al. 2017). As a consequence, women tend to feel less entitled than men to an array of outcomes (Major 1993), including a sense of entitlement to exercise power (Liddle and Michielsens 2000). Although inclusive historical representations may enhance women's sense of entitlement as a *minority member*, they are less likely to enhance their sense of entitlement as *women*. This may be so, in particular, because women are largely absent (as compared to men) in most historical narratives – whether they be exclusive or inclusive with regard to ethnicity – in our case study and around the world. Therefore, we expect that *effects of the historical*

[20] In our pre-specified empirical expectations we distinguish between ethnic minorities and majorities under the assumption that ethnic majorities are unquestioned core members of the nation, and ethnic minorities are considered "peripheral". However, our theoretical expectations also apply to other groups that could be considered "peripheral", such as racial minorities or women.

[21] For simplicity, we detail our empirical expectations in this Section with reference to the demand for and supply of individuals in leadership positions; however, we would expect corresponding effects as regards groups' perceived centrality to the nation and entitlement to speak on its behalf (see Section 2). For example, as regards $\boldsymbol{E_1}$, we would similarly expect that, ceteris paribus, minority individuals will be perceived as having lower centrality to the nation and being less entitled to speak on its behalf.

[22] While less descriptive representation for some groups necessarily means more representation for other groups – assuming that the number of leadership positions remains constant – it need not be the case that lower representation for one minority group would translate to greater representation for the majority group. Indeed, some scholars argue that gains in representation for one minority group primarily come at the expense of other minority groups with whom they are in competition, and thus should have little impact on majority group members (Meier et al. 2004; Khosla 2011). Further, even where decreases in minority representation do translate to increases in majority representation, it need to be the case that such changes are accompanied by absolute (but rather relative) shifts for majority members in their perceived belonging to the nation and entitlement to speak on its behalf, or in the supply of or demand for majority members in leadership positions.

*representations on ethnic minorities' willingness to seek out leadership roles will be lesser for women as compared with men (**E_3**).*

Not all minority members may feel equally included by a more inclusive historical narrative. Just as women appear much less frequently in most historical representations, individuals from lower social classes may feel that historical depictions of kings and noblemen from the past do not represent them. Attachments to historical leaders belonging to the royalty and nobility may be especially weak among minority members from lower social classes in contexts where lower and upper social class minority individuals differ on a number of additional salient dimensions which together increase the likelihood that class divisions will extend to associations with historical figures. In India, for instance, upper caste Muslim "Ashrafs" claim to be direct descendants of India's medieval Mughal rulers and take pride in this background. Most of India's lower caste Muslims, however, are Hindu converts and do not share this direct historical link with Muslim political leaders of the past. We therefore expect that *effects of the historical representations on ethnic minorities' willingness to seek out leadership roles will be lesser for individuals from lower social classes/castes as compared with those from upper social classes/castes (**E_4**).*

Finally, we acknowledge the possibility that *inclusive* and *exclusive* historical representations could generate backlash. Contrary to our stated hypotheses, *exclusive* representations might serve to *mobilize* minorities who are outraged or upset by the depiction; on the other end, *inclusive* representations might similarly mobilize majorities. We expect that such an effect would be more likely among participants who have a strong sense of "group consciousness" (i.e., a strong sense of group identity, a sense of being treated unfairly, and a willingness to mobilize politically). Individuals with high levels of group consciousness are expected to be more likely to interpret certain historical representations as *ideology*, rather than as objective historical accounts, and thus to respond quite differently from those with lower levels of consciousness when exposed to the same narratives. This could possibly neutralize the expected effects of the historical representations. We therefore expect that the *effects of exclusive historical representations on ethnic minorities' willingness to seek out leadership roles will be lesser for minority members with high levels of group consciousness (**E_{5a}**).* We also expect that the *effects of inclusive historical representations on ethnic majorities' willingness to grant ethnic minorities leadership roles will be lesser for majority members with high levels of group consciousness (**E_{5b}**).*

Backlash may also occur when individuals are exposed to a historical narrative that is very different from the one they received earlier in life, for instance as children in school. If depictions contrast sharply, individuals are more likely to view historical representations as false.[23] This could also neutralize the expected effects of exposure to different historical representations. For instance, we expect that *the effects of exclusive historical representation on ethnic minorities' willingness to seek out leadership roles will be lesser for minority members who have had an inclusive history education (**E_{6a}**)* and the *effects of inclusive historical representations on ethnic majorities' willingness to grant ethnic minorities leadership roles will be lesser for majority members who have received an exclusive history education in school (**E_{6b}**).*

[23]One could imagine alternatively that effects are greater where a historical narrative constitutes new information, and therefore where it differs from the narrative one learned earlier in life. While possible, we think it more likely that individuals will be comparatively more resistant to a narrative that contrasts with what they have learned beforehand, especially given that participants receive a lesser "dosage" of our treatment as compared against years of formal education and socialization.

H Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan

While our analyses largely adhere to our pre-analyis plan, we nevertheless conducted some additional analyses based on feedback from reviewers and colleagues. In this Section, we detail deviations from our pre-analysis plan so as to be fully transparent about which results were based on analyses that were not pre-registered. Importantly, the hypotheses ($\boldsymbol{H_1}$-$\boldsymbol{H_5}$) that we present and evaluate in the main text remain unchanged from the pre-analysis plan; there are therefore no deviations to share as regards our stated hypotheses or theoretical framework.

Main Paper The following analyses in the main paper, while they evaluated pre-registered hypotheses, were not pre-registered themselves:

1. Pro-Hindu bias (Figure 5, right panel). In our pre-analysis plan, we noted that we would "examine how Hindus in Hindu-majority groups (where Hindus are matched with one Hindu and one Muslim partner) rank their Muslim partner and how this varies across treatment groups" (p.15). When conducting our analysis, we felt that the easiest way to compare Hindu demand for Hindu and Muslim partners in Hindu-majority groups across treatments was to create a "pro-Hindu bias" measure, which we calculate by subtracting the rank given to a Muslim partner from the rank given to a Hindu partner. The right panel of Figure 5 thus performs the same function as described in the pre-analysis plan but using a measure we had not pre-registered, "pro-Hindu bias".

2. Simulated sampling distributions (Figure 6, right panel). We added the analysis in the right panel of Figure 6 based on a suggestion that it could present a clear visual evaluation of $\boldsymbol{H_5}$ and serve as an informative supplement to the pre-registered analysis presented in the left panel of Figure 6.

Importantly, neither of these additional analyses lead us to accept hypotheses that we would not have otherwise, but are largely due to presentational considerations.

Online Appendix A few additional analyses in the Appendix were not pre-registered as they were conducted in order to respond to reviewer and colleague feedback. These include:

1. Appendix Table C19, Appendix Figure C2 and Appendix Figure C3.

2. Appendix Figure C9, which was added in order to address the question of whether our centrality outcomes measure not perceived centrality of different groups to the nation, as we claim, but rather a faithful reporting of which groups were explicitly mentioned in the treatment text.

3. The analysis of open-ended questions presented in Section C.3, conducted to probe some of our assumptions about how the behavioral task was perceived by participants.

4. Analyses in Section C.4 regarding possible alternative explanations for observed results, which were added to explore the observed null effect of our treatments on self-assessed participant protoypicality as well as possible demand effects.

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