Supplementary materials

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1. Secondary laws of the National Anticorruption System

Secondary laws of the National Anticorruption System (SNA):

These were 7 laws, published on July 18, 2016:

1. *General Law of the National Anti-corruption System*. Established the bases for coordination between the Federation, the states, municipalities, and the City Halls of Mexico City for the operation of the SNA.
2. *General Law on Administrative Responsibilities*. Establishes the responsibilities and obligations of public servants. Includes sanctions whenever public officials incur for omissions and wrongdoing.
3. *Organic Law of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice*. Establishes the integration, organization, attributions, and functioning of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice (FCAJ). The FCAJ is a jurisdictional body with the autonomy to issue its rulings and with full jurisdiction.
4. *Law on Control and Accountability of the Federation*. Establishes the bases for the review and inspection of the Public Account and strengthens the role of the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF).
5. *Organic Law of the Attorney General*. This existing law was reformed to establish the functions and powers of the Specialized Prosecutor's Office in matters of crimes related to corruption.
6. *Federal Criminal Code*. This existing law was reformed to harmonize the penal code with the SNA, now including the Code of Crimes for acts of corruption.
7. *Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration*. This existing law was reformed to establish the role of the Ministry of Public Administration as a fundamental part of the fight against corruption.

2. State legislatures in Mexico

State-level legislative power in Mexico is deposited in local unicameral congresses. These bodies are in charge of legislating on all matters that are not exclusive to the federal jurisdiction and approve budgets and state and municipal expenditures. Local legislatures also have the faculty to introduce legislative initiatives to the federal Congress, and to approve constitutional reforms previously approved by the federal Congress. Local legislatures are comprised of deputies elected through single-member districts (SMD) or proportional representation (PR) rules, and the number of representatives is proportional to the number of inhabitants in the state. Table A.1 shows the composition of state legislatures by district type. Deputies are elected for three year terms and, after the reelection reform, can be in office up to 4 terms (12 years). Deputies fulfill several roles: proposing and voting for legislative initiatives, revising and approving budgets, overseeing and monitoring public spending through the Vigilance Committee, and appointing officials to government agencies.

While there is variation in procedures and capacities, lawmaking in state legislatures mimics the structure of lawmaking at the federal level. Deputies and other actors (governors, ministers, and citizens) can introduce legislative initiatives, which are sent to committees by the "*Mesa Directiva*" to wait for a decision ("*Dictamen*"). There is wide variation in the number of days state legislatures have for reaching a decision, but most states have a 30 day deadline for deciding whether to endorse or reject a bill. If the committee report is positive, the initiative is sent back to the "*Mesa Directiva*" and a floor reading is scheduled. Generally, legislative initiatives all have to include legal foundations, the name of sponsors, motivation ("*Exposicion de motivos*"), and clarify the proposed changes.

Subnational legislatures in Mexico started to receive more attention after the transition to democracy, but research is still limited. Historically, lack of reelection has leads to high turnover rates, legislators with limited political experience, low specialization in committees, and subordination to local party leaders. Parliamentary groups have great power, since they can appoint committee members and bureaucratic officials in the legislature. However, recent studies have found that the reelection reform led to increases in the amount of attention legislators devote to legislative particularism (Motolinia 2021).

Table A.1 Composition of state legislatures

State	SMD	PR	Total
Aguascalientes	18	9	27
Baja California	17	8	25
Baja California Sur	16	5	21
Campeche	21	14	35
Coahuila	16	9	25
Colima	16	9	25
Chiapas	24	17	41
Chihuahua	22	11	33
Ciudad de México	33	33	66
Durango	15	10	25
Guanajuato	22	14	36
Guerrero	28	18	46
Hidalgo	18	12	30
Jalisco	20	19	39
México	45	30	75
Michoacán	24	16	40
Morelos	18	12	30
Nayarit	18	12	30
Nuevo León	26	16	42
Oaxaca	25	17	42
Puebla	26	15	41
Querétaro	15	10	25
Quintana Roo	15	10	25
San Luis Potosí	15	12	27
Sinaloa	24	16	40
Sonora	21	12	33
Tabasco	21	14	35
Tamaulipas	22	14	36
Tlaxcala	15	10	25
Veracruz	30	20	50
Yucatán	15	10	25
Zacatecas	18	12	30

References:

Gamboa Montejano, Claudia and Miriam Gutiérrez Sánchez. 2006. "Estudio Comparativo de los Reglamentos Internos y/o Leyes Orgánicas de los 31 Congresos Estatales y de la Asamblea Legislative del Distrito Federal." Centro de Documentación, Información y Análisis de la Cámara de Diputados.

Pérez Vega, Moisés. 2009. "La debilidad institucional de los congresos locales. Límites de la democratización mexicana y de la transformación de las relaciones Ejecutivo-Legislativo." Andamios. Revista de Investigación Social 5 (10): 253–78.

Reveles Vázquez, Francisco. 2011. "Los estudios sobre los congresos locales en México. Temas y problemas." Estudios Políticos 23: 11–30.

Motolinia, Lucia. 2021. "Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico." *American Political Science Review* 115(1), 97-113.

3. Examples of anticorruption appeals by deputies

Below, I show several examples of local deputies publicizing their track record of legislative anticorruption work in social media (a), personal websites (b), and local news outlets (c). For convenience, local news outlet examples were translated using Google Translate's option to translate entire websites.

(a) Twitter (X)

(b) Personal websites

Source: https://waldofernandez.com/

(c) Local news

Deputy Eva Diego promotes the creation of the State Anti-Corruption System

e February 23, 2017 , 15:04

q Statement | PRD

OAXACA, Oax. February 23, 2017.- The local PRD deputy and president of the Surveillance Commission of the Superior State Audit, Eva Diego Cruz, when leading the work of the parliamentary and citizen forums, pointed out that Oaxaca requires a comprehensive reform to create the State System to Combat Corruption.

Source: https://oaxaca.quadratin.com.mx/impulsa-diputada-eva-diego-creacion-del-sistema-estatal-anticorrupcion/

LOCAL / THURSDAY JUNE 29, 2017

Laffitte asks for autonomy for the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office

Enrique Javier Laffitte Bretón, president of the Commission on Constitutional Points and Legislation.

Source: https://www.elsoldecuernavaca.com.mx/local/pide-laffitte-autonomia-para-fiscalia-anticorrupcion-1203593.html

4. Details on data coverage

For 26 out of 32 states I managed to find the entirety of anticorruption initiatives in the legislatures before and after the reelection reform. For Coahuila there was no data on the names of sponsors for bills after 2016. For the state of Mexico there was not available data on bills before 2014. For Morelos, the period before 2015 did not include the exact date when the initiative was introduced, and therefore could only be used for legislature-level models. Finally, the states of San Luis Potosí, Veracruz, and Yucatán did not provide data prior to 2015.

Table A.2 Data coverage

State	Data collection status
Aguascalientes	Complete
Baja California	Complete
Baja California Sur	Complete
Campeche	Complete
Coahuila	Partial (no data on sponsor names after 2016)
Colima	Complete
Chiapas	Complete
Chihuahua	Complete
Ciudad de México	Complete
Durango	Complete
Guanajuato	Complete
Guerrero	Complete
Hidalgo	Complete
Jalisco	Complete
México	Partial (missing before 2014)
Michoacán	Complete
Morelos	Partial (no information on dates available)
Nayarit	Complete
Nuevo León	Complete
Oaxaca	Complete
Puebla	Complete
Querétaro	Complete
Quintana Roo	Complete
San Luis Potosí	Partial (missing before 2015)
Sinaloa	Complete
Sonora	Complete
Tabasco	Complete
Tamaulipas	Complete
Tlaxcala	Complete
Veracruz	Partial (missing before 2015)
Yucatán	Partial (missing before 2015)
Zacatecas	Complete

5. Anticorruption dictionary

Table A.3 Anticorruption dictionary

English	Spanish
Corruption	Corrupcion|corrupcion|Corrupción|corrupción|Corrupt*|corrupt*
Anticorruption	Anti-corrupcion|anti-corrupcion|Anti-corrupción|anti-corrupción|Anticorrupción|anticorrupción
Transparency	Transparencia|transparencia
Impunity	Impunidad|impunidad
Opacity	Opacidad|opacidad
Bribery	Soborno*|soborno*|Soborna*|soborna*
Audit	Auditor*|auditor*
Irregularity	Irregularidad*|irregularidad*
Influence peddling	Tráfico de influencia*|tráfico de influencia*
Nepotism	Nepotismo|nepotismo
Clientelism	Clientelismo|clientelismo
Vote buying	Compra de voto*|compra de voto
Fraud	Fraude|fraude
Illegitimate	Ilegítimo|ilegítimo
Blackmail	Chantaje|chantaje
Embezzling	Malversación|malversación|desvio|desvío|desvio de recursos|peculado
Cronyism	Compadrazgo|compadrazgo
Co-opt	Cooptación|cooptación|Cooptar|cooptar
Money laundering	Lavado de dinero|lavado de dinero
Offshore	Offshore|offshore
Shell companies	Empresas fantasma|empresas fantasma|empresa fantasma|Empresa fantasma
Sanctions	Sanciones|sanciones|Sanción|sanción|Sancionar|sancionar
Gifts	Regal*

6. Details on anti-corruption legislation

Figures A.1-A.2 showcase the wide variation on data quality by state. Some states had more informative content and included access to source documentation, such as Sonora and Chihuahua in Figure A.1. The initiative on the left (a) aims to incorporate a monitoring system for government spending into the local anticorruption system, and the one on the right (b) introduces fines for political parties whose members engage in acts of corruption. Most initiatives follow a standard format, starting with a general motivation ("*Exposición de motivos*") followed by a summary of the proposal, the modifications or additions to existing legal codes, and the signature of sponsoring deputies. Other states only provided blurry PDFs and incomplete information. In cases such as Tlaxcala (A.2), source documents only provided one or two sentences on the content of the initiative.

Figure A.1 Example of a high quality data sources

(a) Sonora



C. DIP. LUIS ARMANDO COLOSIO MUÑOZ: *(Este día vengo a plantear mi primera iniciativa, en estos 6 meses que tenemos como legislatura, y considero que hemos tenido buenas iniciativas por parte de muchos, pero creo que esta es muy importante y trascendente para la vida del Congreso, y me gustaría que la escucharan con atención, porque tiene mucho que ver con lo que nos sucedió el 13 de agosto de 2018, antes de tomar posesión, la anterior legislatura nos arrancó un pedazo del alma, y con esto podemos recuperar un poquito de esa esencia que tiene el Congreso, de fiscalizar puntualmente los recursos públicos, y tiene que ver con la honestidad, la transparencia, y la anticorrupción).*

HONORABLE ASAMBLEA:

El suscrito, **LUIS ARMANDO COLOSIO MUÑOZ**, diputado integrante del Grupo Parlamentario de Morena de esta Sexagésima Segunda Legislatura, en ejercicio de las atribuciones previstas por los artículos 53, fracción III de la Constitución Política del Estado de Sonora y 32, fracción II de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Legislativo del Estado de Sonora, presento a la consideración de esta Asamblea Legislativa, **INICIATIVA CON PROYECTO DE DECRETO QUE REFORMA Y ADICIONA DIVERSAS DISPOSICIONES DE LA LEY DEL SISTEMA ESTATAL ANTICORRUPCIÓN**, misma que sustento bajo el tenor de la siguiente:

EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS

A lo largo del tiempo, los organismos encargados del control y la fiscalización de la gestión pública han estado presentes dentro o fuera de la estructura gubernamental de nuestro país, con el principal objetivo de promover acciones relacionadas con la redición de cuentas de los gobernantes en turno, buscando con esto garantizar la correcta aplicación de los recursos públicos.

La supervivencia histórica de estos organismos, incluso sobre otros considerados esenciales para el desarrollo social y económico del país y, pese a los ajustes y desequilibrios que ha sufrido el gobierno, se debe, en estricto sentido, a la estructura organizacional que debe distinguir a nuestro sistema democrático y no por el valor que le pueda otorgar a la gestión gubernamental.

En esencia, los órganos de control y fiscalización son los pilares que sostienen el principio de legalidad en cada uno de los tres poderes y de los tres niveles de gobierno; por ello, su ausencia o debilidad está directamente relacionada con los niveles de discrecionalidad, opacidad y corrupción de un gobierno.

Actualmente existe un amplio andamiaje regulatorio y estructural de control y fiscalización, tanto al interior como al exterior de los distintos órganos que desempeñan funciones de gobierno. A nivel federal se encuentra la Auditoría Superior de la Federación, la Secretaría de la Función Pública, las Contralorías de las entidades

(b) Chihuahua



"2018, Año del Centenario del Natalicio de José Fuentes Mares"
Grupo Parlamentario del Partido Verde Ecologista de México

H. CONGRESO DEL ESTADO DE CHIHUAHUA

H. CONGRESO DEL ESTADO.
PRESENTE.

Los Suscritos, Alejandro Gloria González y Hever Quezada Flores, en nuestro carácter de Diputados de la Sexagésima Quinta Legislatura e integrantes del Grupo Parlamentario del Partido Verde Ecologista de México, con fundamento en lo dispuesto por los artículos 1 y 68, fracción I, de la Constitución Política del Estado de Chihuahua; los artículos 57, 167 fracción I, 168 y 169 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Legislativo, así como 13 fracción IV, 75, 76 y 77 fracción I, del Reglamento Interior y de Prácticas Parlamentarias del Poder Legislativo, es que nos permitimos someter a la consideración de esta Soberanía, iniciativa con carácter de DECRETO, a fin de añadir un artículo 48 BIS a la Ley de Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado de Chihuahua, en materia de responsabilidad solidaria de los partidos políticos ante hechos de corrupción cometidos por servidores públicos.

Lo anterior, sustentado en la siguiente:

EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS

Los dos grandes problemas de México y las dos grandes preocupaciones de los ciudadanos son la inseguridad y la corrupción, ambos tienen una misma causa, un mismo origen: la ausencia de estado de derecho. También, ambas problemáticas comparten una similitud que permite su subsistencia: la impunidad.

Figure A.2 Example of a low quality data source (Tlaxcala)

5	29-I-15	Iniciativa con proyecto de Decreto, por el que se adiciona la fracción XII al artículo 48 de la Ley de Comunicaciones y Transportes del Estado de Tlaxcala; que presentan los Diputados Julio César Hernández Mejía y Tomas Federico Orea Albarràn.	Dip. .Julio César Hernández Mejía Dip. Tomas Federico Orea Albarràn. Ya tiene iniciativa
6	29-I-15	Iniciativa con proyecto de Decreto, por el que se Crea la Ley Anticorrupción en Contrataciones Públicas para el Estado de Tlaxcala; que presenta la Diputada Patricia Zenteno Hernández.	Dip. Patricia Zenteno Hernández. Ya tiene iniciativa
7	29-I-15	Iniciativa con proyecto de Acuerdo, por el que se solicita al Gobernador del Estado, la comparecencia del Secretario de Gobernación, de la Procuradora del Estado y del Secretario de Seguridad Pública, así como a la Comisión de Protección Civil, Seguridad Pública, Prevención y Readaptación Social del Congreso haga las investigaciones a los elementos policiacos caídos: que presenta la Diputada Evangelina Paredes Zamora.	Dip. Evangelina Paredes Zamora. Ya tiene iniciativa
8	29-I-15	Iniciativa con proyecto de Acuerdo, por el que se declara los días 26 de cada mes del año como el “Día en demanda de justicia para los jóvenes estudiantes de la normal rural de Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, y sus familias”; que presenta la Diputada Eréndira Elsa Carlota Jiménez Montiel.	Dip. Eréndira Elsa Carlota Jiménez Montiel. Ya tiene iniciativa

7. Treatment status

Table A.4 reports the pre (last legislature with term-limits) and post treatment (first legislature with reelection incentives) legislatures for each state. The earliest legislatures started in 2011 and the latest ended in 2021.

Table A.4 Legislatures before/after treatment

State	Pre-treatment	Post-treatment
Aguascalientes	2013-2016	2016-2018
Baja California	2013-2016	2016-2018
Baja California Sur	2011-2015	2015-2018
Campeche	2012-2015	2015-2018
Coahuila	2015-2017	2018-2020
Colima	2012-2015	2015-2018
Chiapas	2012-2015	2015-2018
Chihuahua	2013-2016	2016-2018
Ciudad de México	2015-2018	2018-2021
Durango	2013-2016	2016-2018
Guanajuato	2012-2015	2015-2018
Guerrero	2012-2015	2015-2018
Hidalgo	2013-2016	2016-2018
Jalisco	2012-2015	2015-2018
México	2012-2015	2015-2018
Michoacán	2012-2015	2015-2018
Morelos	2012-2015	2015-2018
Nayarit	2014-2017	2017-2021
Nuevo León	2012-2015	2015-2018
Oaxaca	2013-2016	2016-2018
Puebla	2014-2018	2018-2021
Querétaro	2012-2015	2015-2018
Quintana Roo	2013-2016	2016-2019
San Luis Potosí	2012-2015	2015-2018
Sinaloa	2013-2016	2016-2018
Sonora	2015-2018	2018-2021
Tabasco	2013-2015	2016-2018
Tamaulipas	2013-2016	2016-2019
Tlaxcala	2014-2016	2017-2018
Veracruz	2013-2016	2016-2018
Yucatán	2012-2015	2015-2018
Zacatecas	2013-2016	2016-2018

Table A.5 reports the states in each treatment group for the multiple periods *difference-in-differences* strategy. The period indicates the moment when the first deputies with reelection incentives took office in the state.

Table A.5 Treatment groups for the multiple period DID approach

Period when treated	**States**
2015 (Aug-Dec)	Baja California Sur, Campeche, Colima, Chiapas, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan, Morelos, Nuevo Leon, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Yucatan
2016 (Jan-Jul)	Tabasco
2016 (Aug-Dec)	Aguascalientes, Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Zacatecas
2017 (Jan-Jul)	Tlaxcala
2017 (Aug-Dec)	Nayarit
Never-treated	Coahuila, Mexico City, Puebla, Sonora

8. Summary statistics

Table A.6 reports the summary statistics for the models in Tables 1-2 in the main document (2015-2017). Table A.7 reports the summary statistics for the models that compare deputies between full legislative terms (last legislatures with term-limits and first legislatures with reelection eligible deputies, 2011-2021).

Table A.6 Summary statistics (2015-2017 models)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
SNA-related ACIs	6,929	0.076	0.434	0	9
ACIs	6,929	0.114	0.530	0	9
Reelection incentives	6,956	0.563	0.496	0	1
President's coalition	6,956	0.421	0.494	0	1
Governor's coalition	6,948	0.491	0.500	0	1
Margin of victory	6,956	14.95	14.05	0.12	49.73
Population (log)	6,956	15.05	0.78	13.48	16.60
Rural population (%)	6,956	24.57	14.59	0.50	52.70
Corruption victims (%)	6,956	88.37	5.16	73.30	96.29
Deputy budget (log)	6,604	16.082	0.564	14.801	17.177

Table A.7 Summary statistics (full legislative term models)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
ACIs	2,096	0.545	1.257	0	11
Reelection incentives	2,299	0.505	0.500	0	1
SMD	2,300	0.605	0.489	0	1
PR	2,300	0.394	0.489	0	1
Governor's coalition	2,298	0.511	0.500	0	1

9. Descriptive plots for anticorruption initiatives

Figure A.3 shows the total ACIs sponsored per year, and Figure A.4 compares ACIs introduced to the last legislature with term limits (light gray) and the first legislature with reelection-eligible deputies (dark gray). I exclude states that had missing values at any point.

Figure A.3 Anticorruption initiatives (ACIs) in time



Figure A.4 Anticorruption initiatives (ACIs) and term limit status



I develop an original coding scheme for classifying anticorruption initiatives based on their subject matter (definitions in the following page). Figure A.5 plots the number of unique anticorruption initiatives sponsored by local deputies the legislatures before/after the reelection reform (2011-2021).

Figure A.5 Subject matter of anticorruption initiatives



Note: Unique anticorruption initiatives sponsored by local deputies for legislatures between 2011-2021.

Coding of initiatives

SNA-related: Initiatives that specifically address the harmonization requirements of the SNA reform. These include efforts to harmonize and create the secondary laws of the SNA at the state level (*General Law of the National Anti-corruption System*, *General Law on Administrative Responsibilities*, *Organic Law of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice*, *Law on Control and Accountability of the Federation*, *Organic Law of the Attorney General*, *Federal Criminal Code*, *Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration*).

Audits and investigations. Initiatives that increase monitoring through audits or investigations. These include requests for auditing suspicious government activity, measures that expand the capacities of actors to conduct investigations or audits, or that aim to improve the effectiveness of audits/investigations.

Transparency and open government. Efforts aimed at improving transparency in government, such as making public information more accessible, establishing transparency requirements for government agencies or public officials, or increasing oversight into finances or administrative procedures where corruption could happen.

Sanctions and incarceration. Initiatives centered on raising penalties for crimes of corruption, such as fines, prison, destitutions, and the removal of parliamentary immunity.

Normativity. Initiatives that create new regulations, update existing legislation, define key terms, clarify or establish new responsibilities for actors in charge of fighting corruption, or that regulate anticorruption and monitoring procedures.

Awareness. Measures that aim to reduce corruption by raising awareness, such as anticorruption campaigns, calling out suspicious government activity, educational campaigns, or proposals to establish anti-corruption awareness day/week/month/year.

Public procurement. Initiatives that aim to prevent corruption in public procurement processes.

Trading in influence. Initiatives that tackle the use of political influence in exchange for money and favors, such as influence peddling and nepotism.

Misappropriation and financial corruption. Initiatives aimed at preventing corruption with public funds or financial crimes. Examples include embezzling public funds or their deviation, and financial crimes such as bribery, money laundering, shell companies, and offshore accounts.

Appointments and background checks. Requirements and backgrounds checks for important positions in anticorruption institutions.

Anticorruption institutions. Initiatives that aims to create or empower anticorruption institutions. This includes expanding their powers, creating mechanisms for inter-institutional cooperation, introducing changes to rules and/or procedures to improve their efficiency, or creating new institutions.

Electoral malfeasance. Procedures, penalties, or actions against clientelism, vote-buying, and/or election fraud.

Whistleblower protections. Initiatives that seek to empower/protect individuals that report misconduct and corruption by public officials or to punish politicians that harm them.

Financial disclosures. Measures that have public officials disclose information on their assets or conflicts of interest.

10. Multiple periods difference-in-differences

Tables A.8 reports the overall and treatment group estimates of the effect of reelection for the multiple periods *difference-in-differences* strategy ("*never-treated*" units in the control group), finding consistent results.

Table A.8 Estimates of the effect of reelection on SNA bill sponsorship

Overall effect				
	ATT	St. Error	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Reelection incentives	0.057**	0.013	0.0314	0.0833
Group estimates				
	ATT	St. Error	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Treated in 2015 (Aug-Dec)	0.051**	0.014	0.0224	0.0802
Treated in 2016 (Jan-Jul)	-0.032	0.020	-0.0720	0.0087
Treated in 2016 (Aug-Dec)	0.073**	0.021	0.0298	0.1153
Treated in 2017 (Jan-Jul)	0.241**	0.100	0.0438	0.4390
Treated in 2017 (Aug-Dec)	0.051	0.050	-0.0472	0.1498

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on treatment group. Upper panel shows the overall effect, and lower panel the treatment effects by group (*never-treated* control group as baseline. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

The following figures explore the treatment effect across group and time (A.6 using *not-yet-treated* units in the control group and A.7 *never-treated*). States are divided into groups and compared with the never treated control group in time. Time periods correspond to the year halves, starting in Jan-Jun 2015 and ending in Jul-Dec 2017. Each grid presents deputies in one of our different treatment groups. The y-axis presents the estimate of reelection incentives on SNA-sponsorship, relative to the control group. Consistent with the group effects in the main text, I find that the groups with the largest and most diverse samples of states (those treated in the latter half of 2015 and 2016), drive the overall effect of reelection incentives.

Figure A.6 Group-time average treatment effects (*not-yet-treated*)



Figure A.7 Group-time average treatment effects (*never-treated*)



11. Additional regression tables

Table A.9 reports the results of running the models from Table 2 in the main text with binary versions of the outcome variables. Both the *SNA-related* and ACI now code as "1" cases where a deputy sponsored one or more initiatives in a given period. Results are consistent results.

Table A.9 Reelection incentives, district type, and membership to the governor's coalition (binary outcomes)

	ACI	SNA	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Reelection incentives	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Reelection X SMD					0.02**	0.02		
					(0.01)	(0.01)		
Reelection X Governor's							0.03**	0.01
							(0.01)	(0.01)
SMD					0.00	0.00		
					(0.01)	(0.01)		
Governor's coalition			0.02***	0.01	0.02***	0.01	0.01	0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
President's coalition			-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Margin of victory			-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Population (log)			0.41***	0.37***	0.42***	0.38***	0.41***	0.37***
			(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Rural population (%)			-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Victims of corruption			-0.01***	-0.00**	-0.01***	-0.00**	-0.01***	-0.00**
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Deputy budget (log)			0.05	-0.00	0.05	-0.01	0.05	-0.01
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	6,902	6,902	6,569	6,569	6,566	6,566	6,569	6,569
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.13

Note: OLS regressions predicting ACI and SNA-related sponsorship. Standard errors clustered on state. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.10 reports the results of running the models from Table 2 in the main text with negative binomial specifications, finding additional support for the *electoral incentives* hypothesis.

Table A.10 Reelection incentives, district type, and membership to the governor's coalition (negative binomials)

	ACI	SNA	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Reelection incentives	1.90***	1.30***	1.82***	1.19***	1.89***	1.23***	1.82***	1.26***
	(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.43)	(0.29)	(0.41)	(0.28)
Reelection X SMD					-0.11	-0.07		
					(0.34)	(0.25)		
Reelection X Governor's							0.01	-0.15
							(0.34)	(0.25)
SMD					0.18	0.15		
					(0.32)	(0.23)		
Governor's coalition			-0.06	-0.13	-0.10	-0.17	-0.07	-0.01
			(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.32)	(0.23)
President's coalition			-0.36***	-0.41***	-0.36***	-0.42***	-0.36***	-0.43***
			(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Margin of victory			-0.17**	-0.12***	-0.17**	-0.12***	-0.17**	-0.12***
			(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Population (log)			8.10***	5.99***	8.13***	6.02***	8.10***	6.00***
			(2.03)	(1.38)	(2.03)	(1.38)	(2.03)	(1.38)
Rural population (%)			-0.06	-0.07*	-0.06	-0.07*	-0.06	-0.07*
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Victims of corruption			0.00	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.04
			(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Deputy budget (log)			2.63***	0.65	2.64***	0.65	2.63***	0.66
			(0.82)	(0.55)	(0.82)	(0.55)	(0.82)	(0.55)
Observations	6,902	6,902	6,569	6,569	6,566	6,566	6,569	6,569
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-1,313.64	-1,828.76	-1,272.85	-1,780.04	-1,272.18	-1,778.93	-1,272.85	-1,779.87
theta	0.57***	0.48***	0.60***	0.49***	0.61***	0.50***	0.60***	0.50***
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,697.27	3,727.51	2,625.71	3,640.08	2,628.36	3,641.85	2,627.71	3,641.74

Note: Negative binomial regressions predicting ACI and SNA-related sponsorship. Standard errors clustered on state.

12. Full legislative term models

Table A.11 reports the estimates for the effect of reelection incentives on ACI sponsorship for models considering the full legislative term. Models (1-2, 7-8) include the full sample of deputies, and models (3-4) and (5-6) divide the sample into SMD and PR deputies, respectively. I find consistent results for the effect of reelection incentives. While coefficients for reelection are larger for SMD deputies (compared to PR deputies), the interaction between reelection incentives and SMD is not significant at the 95% level.

Table A.11 Reelection incentives, district type, and governor's coalition (full legislative terms)

	ACIs							
	Full sample		SMD		PR		Full sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Reelection incentives	0.66***	0.74***	0.72***	0.82***	0.56***	0.63***	0.63***	0.70***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Reelection X SMD							0.18*	
							(0.09)	
Reelection X Governor's								0.08
								(0.09)
SMD							-0.07	
							(0.07)	
Governor's coalition								-0.07
								(0.07)
Observations	2,096	2,096	1,270	1,270	825	825	2,095	2,095
State FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.07	0.31	0.08	0.36	0.06	0.27	0.31	0.31

Note: OLS regressions predicting ACI sponsorship in a full legislative term. Columns 1-2 and 7-8 consider all deputies. Columns 3-4 only SMD deputies, and columns 5-6 only PR deputies. Standard errors clustered on state. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

13. Party analysis

Figure A.8 breaks down anticorruption bill sponsorship by party and co-sponsorship status. The unit of analysis is a deputy in a legislative term, and the co-sponsorship categories are: total anticorruption initiatives ("ACIs"), ACIs sponsored by all party members ("All party"), and ACIs sponsored by a single deputy ("Single sponsor"). Overall, in 20.9 percent of cases deputies that sponsored ACIs did so individually, in 44.4 percent the initiative was co-sponsored (excluding cases with all party members), and in 34.6 percent the initiative was sponsored by all party members. PAN, PRI, and PRD had deputies that sponsored most initiatives, and PAN was the party that engaged in more party-level co-sponsorship.

Figure A.8 Anticorruption sponsorship by party and co-sponsorship status



Figure A.9 reports the estimates of reelection incentives for split-sample models by party. Models predict ACI and SNA-related sponsorship and the unit of analysis is a deputy-period (2015-2017). I find that the effect was present in a wide range of parties such as PAN, PRI, and PRD. Reelection-eligible deputies in Morena were more likely to sponsor ACIs generally, but not SNA-related bills. For MC the opposite was true.

Figure A.9 Estimates of reelection incentives and anticorruption sponsorship by party



Note: Estimates of split-sample models predicting ACI sponsorship, 95% CIs.