Additional Files- Appendix 1 (For online publication only)

Note: Appendix 2, which includes a description of the method by which the electoral intervention dataset noted in the main text had been constructed, a codebook and a full listing of the electoral intervention cases is included together with the dataset.

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Part 1: Additional definition & description of variables:

1. The Main control variables for HS & KP - descriptions

As previously noted, in order to assess the impact of electoral interventions we also need a plausible set of control variables for other factors noted in the economic voting literature as having effects on the election results. The first set of controls are variables used as dependent variables in the Hellwig and Samuels (2007) model (henceforth HS) which I then try to replicate here. Given that my time frame is longer than that of HS and the number of countries included is larger, in order to replicate their model I usually needed to use other reliable data sources with better data coverage.

The first variable is the previous vote share of the incumbent (*Previous vote*). This variable is included in order to control for past election outcomes. For this purpose, I use the same data sources and coding as for the incumbent vote share (see description).

The second variable is the real GDP per capita growth rate (*Growth*). This variable is HS's variable for the effect of the "economic vote" and one frequently used in cross-national research on this topic. Following HS, I use the previous year's growth rate for elections occurring during the first six months of the election year and the same year's economic growth rate for elections occurring during the second half of the election year. The real GDP data used to calculate growth rates is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (real GDP per capita in 2005 U.S. dollars (rgdpl)) (Heston et.al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP per capita data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars.

The third variable is trade as a percentage of GDP in constant terms (*Trade Openness*). This variable is included as an indicator of the effects of economic globalization and used in the subsequent interaction term (see further description for the following interaction variable). The data for this variable is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (Openk) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I calculate this variable using Maddison's above-noted GDP data (Maddison 2003) and the Barbieri /COW trade dataset version 3 (Barbieri et al 2009) both adjusted to 2005 constant U.S. dollars.

The fourth variable is an interaction between the economic growth rate and trade as a percentage of GDP (*Growth * Trade Openness*). HS argue that economic globalization reduces the effect of

the "economic vote" and accordingly reduces the executive's accountability to the voters. This interaction replicates one of the main ways by which they try to test this argument, measuring the effects of economic globalization on political accountability.

The fifth variable is a dummy variable measuring whether a particular election is a presidential election (1) or not (0) (*Presidential Election*). This variable is included in order to control for the possible differences in vote share between presidential and parliamentary systems as well as a component of an interaction with growth rate (see next description). To code this variable the data was taken from a DPI measure (System) (Beck et.al 2001) and carefully rechecked. For pre-1975 coding I use Nohlen and Colleagues (1999,2001,2005,2010).

The sixth variable is an interaction between the economic growth rate and presidential elections variables (*Growth*Presidential Election*). This variable is included in order to control for possible differences in the ways voters hold presidents accountable vs. prime ministers.

The seventh variable is whether a president is running for reelection in a presidential or Semi-Presidential system (*Re-election*) with 1 as yes and 0 as no. This variable is included in order to control for the incumbency advantage that sitting presidents usually have. To code this measure I use Nohlen and colleagues (1999,2001,2005,2010) data on elections.

The eighth variable is the effective number of parties or candidates contesting the election (*Effective num. of Parties*). This variable is included in order to control for the differences between political systems as well as possible reduced volatility in the incumbents vote in more fragmented party systems. Ignoring this factor may accordingly lead to a misestimate of the effect of other substantive factors on the incumbents vote share. Accordingly, in parliamentary systems, as well as Presidential and Semi-Presidential systems in which the president is elected by Parliament (such as Post-Apartheid South Africa), I use the effective number of parties while in Presidential and Semi-Presidential systems with direct presidential elections, I use the effective number of presidential candidates.

For most of this data I use Golder's (2005) effective number of parties measure (ENPP) and effective number of presidential candidates measure (ENPRES) obtained via the Quality of Government (QOG) dataset. Data that is missing in Golder's dataset (yet available) is usually calculated using data on election results from Nohlen and colleagues (1999,2001, 2005,2010). This variable is then logged.

The ninth variable is the (logged) GDP per capita in thousands of 2005 constant U.S dollars

(*GDP Per Capita Level*). This variable is included in order to control for the possible effects that a country's overall wealth may have on the vote share that incumbents usually get in elections. The real GDP data is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (real GDP per capita in 2005 U.S. dollars-rgdpl) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP per capita data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars.

Four other variables are regional dummies (*Africa, Asia, Central and E.Europe, L. America and Caribbean*) with the advanced industrial democracies (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand etc.) excluded and serving as a baseline.

For the models replicating Kayser and Peress (2012) models (henceforth KP) four additional control variables are included.

The first variable is the real median global growth rate (*Global Growth*). This variable is included as part of KP's main argument that voters compare (or benchmark) the economic performance of their country to that in other relevant countries. Following KP, to calculate this variable for every year I take the median growth rate of the growth rates of all independent countries for whom data is available for that particular year[1].The real GDP data used to calculate growth rates is largely taken from Penn World tables version 7.1 (real GDP in 2005 U.S. dollars (rgdpl)) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars. Given that KP do not expect this variable to have independent direct effects on the incumbent vote share, it isn't expected to be significant.

The second variable is the real local economic growth rate (*Local Growth*). This variable is included as part of KP's main argument. KP argue that once one takes into account the benchmark of global growth used by voters when evaluating the local incumbent's performance, the effects of the local economic performance on the incumbent's vote share will consistently and significantly be in the expected direction. Following KP, to calculate this variable for every observation I take the overall growth rate for that country and deduct from it the median global

[1] KP also uses two other global growth benchmarks (average of growth rates of trading partners or by principal components). Unfortunately these two measures, which create a separate global growth rate for different countries which have an election in the same year, require data many times missing for countries outside the OECD (KPs dataset) and very complex and time consuming calculations. Accordingly, these two measures could not replicated here.

growth rate (see previous description) for that year. The real GDP data used to calculate growth rates is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (real GDP in 2005 U.S. dollars (rgdpl)) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars. Following KP, I expect this variable to have a positive and significant effect.

The third variable is a logged variable of population size (*Population*). This variable is included in order to control for the possible difficulties a larger population may create to opposition parties efforts to gather votes, thus benefiting the incumbents. This variable is taken from (Maddison 2003) via QOG.

The fourth variable is for a time trend (*Year*).This variable is included in order to control for possible time trends in the election data. For this purpose I use the election year variable used in order to define each case in the dataset.

2. Additional controls for the robustness checks (tables 1-3 & appendix 1)

Beyond these controls "inherited" from the work of HS & KP, I add in some models the following variables for additional robustness checks.

The first three variables are for the effects of various significant national security/foreign policy factors- being a participant in an interstate war, civil war, or an international crises.[2] While the effects of such foreign policy/national security factors are usually ignored in the economic voting literature they can nevertheless have significant influence on the election results as well.[3]

The first of these three variables is a dummy variable (*Interstate War*) for whether the country fought an interstate war (0 no 1 yes) during the election year taken from the Correlates of War (COW) interstate war dataset version 4 (Sarkees and Wayman 2007). The second is a dummy variable (*Civil War*) for whether there was a civil war (0 no 1 yes) occurring during the election

[2] Unfortunately another possible national security variable of this kind, terrorism, couldn't be included. This is due to two main reasons. The first is that all existing datasets on terrorism go back to no earlier than 1970 or 1968 (depending on the subtype). Accordingly, in order to control for this variable I would have to exclude nearly a third of my data- a bias causing effect in and of itself. Even worse, for a cross-national dataset such as this one, it is unclear what exact variables should be included for this purpose given that there are multiple plausible options for different countries: the number of attacks, the number of casualties, the number of high casualty attacks, a weighed version of either of these three by population or country size etc.

[3] For the admission in this regard of some experts on the economic vote see (Duch and Stevenson 2008:86)

year taken from Fearon and Laitin's (2003) article. For that purpose I use the measure of Fearon and Laitin (Empwar) which includes civil wars which at times are also referred to as extrastate/colonial wars. The third is a dummy (*Crisis*) for whether that country experienced a significant foreign policy crisis during the election year taken from the International Crisis Behavior dataset version 10 (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). In all three variables wars or crises which erupted during the election year but only after the conclusion of the elections were excluded.

Of course, the exact effect of a particular civil or interstate war or crisis on an election is probably mediated by numerous factors which couldn't be included here such as the culpability of the leader in power for the conflict (Croco 2011) or whether the relevant Foreign Policy/National Security factor is perceived as a success or a failure on the side of the incumbent. For example, many scholars agree that the Iranian Hostage Crisis was an important factor in Carter's defeat in the 1980 U.S. Presidential elections (Healy 2011:17-21). Nevertheless, had the U.S. hostage rescue mission in April 1980 succeeded rather than failed, this crisis would have probably rebounded in Carter's favor rather than harming him. Accordingly, I have no prediction on the exact effect or significance of any of these variables- I only include them here in order to control for any related variance in the election results.

The fourth robustness check (and control variable), is a dummy variable for a repeat electoral intervention (*Repeat Intervention*). In other words, cases in which the same intervener had intervened in the previous national level executive election as well. Given that 43% of the interventions in our data are repeat interventions, the experience of the intervener in intervening in this manner in that country in the past (or a weakness of the aided candidate/party so severe as to require a second consecutive intervention) may have an effect on how effective its current intervention is.

The fifth robustness check, used here as a restriction, is whether there was significant election fraud. Significant election fraud (such as the stuffing of ballot boxes with fake votes, voters voting "early and often" etc.) may lead the reported election results to differ from what the electorates actual preferences were in practice. Such "measurement error" on the independent variable in such cases in favor of the incumbent (the usual beneficiary of election fraud) may, in turn, affect the reliability of our results. As a precautionary measure, some cases of competitive elections in which the sources used to code the incumbent vote share data indicated that the

available election results are so blatantly or massively fraudulent as to have little to no relationship with the probable true results are already excluded from the dataset. Nevertheless, less severe yet significant fraud may have nevertheless occurred that was sufficient to bias our results.

I accordingly constructed a dummy variable for cases (1 yes, 0 no) in which there is credible evidence that serious election fraud had occurred. As a baseline, I took a measure from the Nelda dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2010) Nelda11 which codes (as yes) all elections in which preelection fears of fraud by domestic actors and/or international observers were known to have existed.[4] To these cases I added a similar measure from the DPI dataset (Fraud) (Beck et al 2001) which codes post-election accusations of fraud as well as evidence of significant fraud. Then elections in which Western election observers were available and reported fraud and/or such observers were denied entry (or refused to come) (Nelda 46 to 49) were coded as cases of significant fraud (1). Elections in which such fears or accusations existed but Western election observers were present and didn't report fraud were coded as 0.

For each one of the remaining possible cases of fraud, i.e. fears or accusations of fraud existed but no western election observers were present, I double checked via various secondary sources from academic articles and monographs about the relevant election (where available) to historical newspaper archives available via Lexis-Nexis and Proquest, to determine whether these fears or accusations of election fraud were justified. If the available evidence justified these claims, I coded the cases as 1 and 0 otherwise. To be on the safe side, the few cases in which no clear evidence could be found either way as to these fears or accusations of fraud were coded as 1 as well.

The sixth control variable is for the Cold War period (*Cold War*). The end of the Cold War was an important watershed event which led to major changes in the international system (such as the transition from bipolarity to U.S. hegemony). Such changes may have also affected the effectiveness of electoral interventions. Accordingly, I include in some models a dummy variable for the Cold War era coded as 1 for years prior to 1989 and 0 afterwards.

[4] For elections missing from the Nelda dataset I used the DPI fraud measure for any reports or accusations of election fraud and then double checked them in the same manner as described above in cases of Nelda 11 in which no Western election observers were present as to whether such accusations were justified. An additional small number of cases were coded as experiencing such fraud based on secondary sources collected for the construction of the electoral intervention dataset.

The seventh control variable is for the level of democracy in the target (*Polity*). The level of democracy in a particular country is, of course, widely believed in both International Relations and Comparative Politics literature to have major effects on numerous aspects of a given country's foreign and domestic policies. Even given our universe of cases which only includes countries with competitive elections, it is nevertheless possible that the level of democracy will also affect how effective electoral interventions are as well. For example, the level of democracy in the target may perhaps affect what means can be used to sway the elections in favor of the preferred candidate, i.e. from how feasible is a covert intervention given the domestic media environment to how receptive is the public in the target to overt foreign interventions in its elections. Accordingly, I include in some models a logged version of the Combined Polity 4 Scale (Marshall and Keith 2002).[5]

The eighth control variable is for the presence of international election observers in the relevant country during the preelection period (*Election Observers*). Some scholars who study international election observation argue that the presence of international election observers, at least in some cases of observed elections, encourages local election officials to follow more carefully the letter of the election laws and discourages the use of various "shenanigans" by the various sides contesting the elections (Hyde 2011). Increasing the quality of the competitive elections may, in turn, affect its outcome in some cases. For this purpose I took a measure from the Nelda dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2010) Nelda coded as 1 if international election observers were present and 0 otherwise.[6]

The ninth robustness check is an interaction between a measure of "clarity of responsibility" and the electoral intervention measure. According to some scholars of economic voting (Powell & Whitten 1993), the extent to which voters hold the incumbent accountable for its performance varies depending upon how the preelection political and institutional context in a given country leads them to believe that it "deserves" to be punished or rewarded for it. These diverging levels of willingness to hold the incumbent accountable for its economic performance etc. may

[5] This variable was rescaled from the original -10 to 10 scale to a 0.01-20 range in order to enable logging and the interaction described in table 1.1 model 8

[6] For elections missing from the Nelda dataset I used Kelly's (2010) three new datasets on election observation. An additional small number of cases for which data was still missing were coded based on descriptions of these elections in historical newspaper archives (available at Proquest, Keesing and other reliable secondary sources about these elections).

similarly lead to a divergence in how effective electoral interventions are. Following Hellwig and Samuels (2007) I create a measure of clarity of responsibility (*Clarity*) coded as 1 if a single party controls both the executive and has a majority in the legislature prior to the election and 0 otherwise and then interact it with my intervention variable.[7]

3.1 Controls for further robustness checks (Appendix only robustness checks)

First such robustness check (see section 5 in this appendix) is the inclusion of a measure for western election observers (*Western Obs.*). Some scholars who study election observation argue that at least some of the non western election observers missions (such as from the African Union the Arab League etc.) are unusually lenient when it comes to election irregularities which they observe. Indeed in some cases such observer mission may exist merely as a "fig leaf" designed to provide a modicum of legitimacy to a "stolen" election (Hyde 2011:169-174). Accordingly, when only non western observers are present prior to a particular election the effect of the election observers may be very different, diluting the measured effect such observer missions may usually have. I accordingly, as a further robustness check, included in a separate robustness checks a measure counting observed elections only those which were observed (also) by at least one western observer mission. This measure was constructed in a manner similar to that of the International election observers -a similar measure from the Nelda dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2010) Nelda coded as 1 if western election observers were present and 0 otherwise.[8]

The second such robustness check (see section 5 in this appendix) is the inclusion of a measure for Economic Sanctions. In other words, whether there were any significant economic sanctions in effect on that country during election day. This is another foreign policy factor which may have (through its effects on the domestic economy etc.) significant effects on election results in the affected countries.[9] Sanctions imposed only on overseas colonial possessions are

[7] In countries in which there is an influential and elected upper house (as in the U.S.), a majority in both houses was required in order to be coded as 1.

[8] As in the case of international observers, for elections missing from the Nelda dataset I used Kelly's (2010) three new datasets on election observation. An additional small number of cases for which data was still missing were coded based on descriptions of these elections in historical newspaper archives (available at Proquest, Keesing and other reliable secondary sources about these elections).

[9] For the use of sanctions as a tool of regime change see for example (Marinov 2005)

excluded. The variable (*Sanctions*) is coded as 1 if such sanctions were in force during election time and 0 if not, utilizing the sanctions dataset of (Hufbauer et.al 2007).

The third such robustness check (see section 5 in this appendix) is the inclusion of a measure for Composite Index of National Capacity (or *Cinc*)- the countries relative power score for that year. Some may argue that the stronger a country is in relative terms the harder it may be for the intervener to meddle in its elections in an effective manner. As the target becomes stronger in relative terms, threats of various kinds may seem less threatening and/or the concessions /promises that the great power needs offer in order to sway the electorate may not be as impressive (or felt as necessary) as they may seem to citizens of a smaller country. Likewise, country strength is many times correlated with multiple factors (geographical size, widespread ownership of T.V.s/electronic media, wealth etc.) that usually increase the costs of election campaigns and therefore of the magnitude covert electoral funding which the intervener needs to give the side it aids to be effective. Indeed, in extermis, it may be impossible for the great power to covertly provide enough resources for the preferred side without running a very high risk of getting caught. This measure is taken from the Correlates of War (Cow) dataset and is an average of a country's relative world share of six factors (military personnel, military budget, population, urban population, Iron and Steel production, Primary Energy Consumption) which I then log.

4. **Addition to the Review of Research on Electoral Interventions**

In a new American Economic Review article Daniel Berger et.al (2013) try to measure the effect of successful U.S. covert operations during the Cold War to remove/maintain leaders (both covert coup/ maintenance and covert electoral interventions) on the subsequent trade relations between the two countries, finding that the imposed leaders increase their trade with the U.S. and do so in a manner unusually favorable to the U.S. economy. Unfortunately, although impressive statistically, the dataset is badly constructed, missing quite a few cases of successful covert electoral interventions and miscoding many cases of covert coups. If to give one example, the authors code the 1967 Greek coup as a U.S. backed coup although most diplomatic historians, following the release of the relevant U.S. government archival documents over the past few years, now agree that the U.S. government had nothing to do with this particular coup (see for example Miller 2009).

Furthermore, they do not make any effort to check for possible differences between the effects of

covert coups and covert electoral interventions- despite the fact that these are operations of a different magnitude and nature and therefore possibly differing effects. For example, covert coups often lead to a full blown violent 'regime change' while successful covert electoral interventions against the incumbent usually lead to peaceful transitions of power with the existing political institutions remaining intact. Due to these serious methodological flaws these results, although interesting, cannot be relied upon.

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Part 2: Tables with additional results and robustness checks

1. Robustness checks for hypothesis 1-2

Enclosed in this section are some of the robustness checks done for Hypothesis 2 (tables 1.1-1.3) which could not be shown in the paper due to space constraints. Also enclosed are robustness checks for the KP models in Hypothesis 1 similar to those done for the HS models.

1.1 Robustness checks for hypothesis 1 (done in KP models)

Table 1.1 appendix Investigation of the 1st Hypothesis: Electoral Interventions Effects- Various Controls (KP)

	(1) Model 4 & FP	(2) Model 7 & fp	(3) Model 4 & Polity control	(4) Model 7 & Polity control	(5) Model 4& interaction w/Polity	(6) Model 7& interaction w/Polity
Electoral Intervention	3.330**	2.897*	3.562**	3.064*	5.690	4.288
	(1.190)	(1.216)	(1.196)	(1.213)	(3.735)	(3.390)
E. Int.*Polity					-0.769	-0.441
					(1.331)	(1.195)
Previous vote	0.399**	0.390**	0.397**	0.392**	0.398**	0.392**
	(0.0518)	(0.0587)	(0.0515)	(0.0588)	(0.0515)	(0.0588)
Global Growth	0.621	0.582	0.605	0.659	0.602	0.658
	(0.395)	(0.411)	(0.397)	(0.415)	(0.398)	(0.415)
Local Growth	0.123	0.156+	0.147*	0.172*	0.149*	0.173*
	(0.0811)	(0.0859)	(0.0695)	(0.0753)	(0.0697)	(0.0755)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.85**	-14.08**	-14.33**	-13.67**	-14.30**	-13.66**
	(1.995)	(2.283)	(2.018)	(2.312)	(2.015)	(2.311)
Population (logged)	0.483	4.636	0.284	4.433	0.289	4.420
	(0.327)	(3.388)	(0.304)	(3.363)	(0.306)	(3.362)
Year	0.0132	-0.0530	0.0192	-0.0375	0.0190	-0.0373
	(0.0340)	(0.0459)	(0.0347)	(0.0491)	(0.0347)	(0.0491)
Civil War	-3.350+	-4.172+				
	(1.751)	(2.278)				
Interstate War	4.727	4.537				
	(3.157)	(3.314)				
Crisis	1.932+	1.642				
	(1.044)	(1.090)				
Polity			-4.595**	-5.021**	-4.644**	-5.056**
			(1.228)	(1.605)	(1.233)	(1.610)
Constant	3.834	98.35	5.697	82.67	6.226	82.57
	(68.27)	(74.73)	(69.36)	(80.39)	(69.31)	(80.33)
Elections (N)	700	700	700	700	700	700
Countries	122	122	122	122	122	122
R-sqr	0.501	0.307	0.487	0.302	0.487	0.303

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.2 appendix Investigation of the 1st Hypothesis: Electoral Interventions Effects- Various Controls (KP)

	(1) Model 4 & cold war	(2) Model 7 & cold war	(3) Model 4 & E.Observers	(4) Model 7 & E.Observers	(5) Model 4& interaction w/clarity	(6) Model 7& interaction w/clarity
Electoral Intervention	3.403**	3.003*	3.408**	2.942*	3.794*	3.423+
	(1.179)	(1.203)	(1.184)	(1.207)	(1.745)	(1.835)
Int.*Clarity					-1.583	-1.979
					(2.745)	(2.731)
Previous vote	0.394**	0.389**	0.393**	0.385**	0.398**	0.393**
	(0.0527)	(0.0595)	(0.0531)	(0.0601)	(0.0577)	(0.0665)
Global Growth	0.634+	0.712+	0.616	0.594	0.598	0.608
	(0.331)	(0.380)	(0.393)	(0.409)	(0.389)	(0.402)
Local Growth	0.147*	0.164*	0.147*	0.174*	0.139+	0.173*
	(0.0725)	(0.0816)	(0.0727)	(0.0792)	(0.0750)	(0.0807)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.76**	-14.14**	-14.73**	-14.04**	-13.28**	-12.69**
	(2.093)	(2.377)	(2.063)	(2.383)	(2.154)	(2.392)
Population (logged)	0.312	1.107	0.317	3.395	0.298	4.170
	(0.309)	(2.434)	(0.309)	(3.294)	(0.310)	(3.414)
Cold War	-0.351	-0.148				
	(0.927)	(0.933)				
Year			0.00130	-0.0503	-0.00518	-0.0549
			(0.0325)	(0.0475)	(0.0338)	(0.0475)
E.Observers			0.445	0.708		
			(1.320)	(1.888)		
Clarity					1.104	1.092
					(1.209)	(1.266)
Constant	31.66**	24.29	28.77	103.8	39.91	104.0
	(4.341)	(22.51)	(65.25)	(76.53)	(67.75)	(77.05)
Elections (N)	700	700	699	699	677	677
Countries	122	122	122	122	119	119
R-sqr	0.487	0.478	0.486	0.360	0.497	0.318

Standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.3 appendix Investigation of the 1st Hypothesis: Electoral Interventions Effects- repeat intervention control (KP)

	(1) Model 4& repeat E.Int	(2) Model 7 & repeat E.Int
Electoral	3.418**	2.968*
Intervention	(1.187)	(1.211)
Previous vote	0.394**	0.386**
	(0.0528)	(0.0600)
Global Growth	0.625	0.596
	(0.401)	(0.416)
Local Growth	0.147*	0.174*
	(0.0714)	(0.0795)
Effective num. of	-14.73**	-13.99**
Parties (logged)	(2.019)	(2.337)
Population (logged)	0.317	3.487
	(0.309)	(3.355)
Year	0.00533	-0.0482
	(0.0349)	(0.0488)
Repeat Int.	0.695	0.735
	(2.654)	(2.508)
Constant	20.86	98.98
	(69.78)	(79.85)
Elections (N)	700	700
Countries	122	122
R-sqr	0.488	0.355

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

1.2 Hypothesis 2 Robustness checks

Table 2.1 Hypothesis 2: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- Further Robustness Checks (HS)

	(1) & Repeat int. control	(2) & FP variables	(3) & Polity Control	(4) &interaction w/Polity	(5) & Cold War control
Overt Int.	5.415*	5.164*	5.516*	14.38	5.422*
	(2.214)	(2.261)	(2.290)	(14.67)	(2.278)
Covert Int.	2.299	2.189	2.404+	4.611	2.263
	(1.455)	(1.399)	(1.406)	(2.889)	(1.428)
Overt Int.*Polity				-3.082	
				(5.294)	
Covert Int.*Polity				-0.817	
				(1.010)	
Previous vote	0.370**	0.377**	0.377**	0.379**	0.371**
	(0.0519)	(0.0508)	(0.0503)	(0.0511)	(0.0516)
Growth	0.551**	0.525**	0.565**	0.574**	0.548**
	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.108)
Covert & Overt	-10.58+	-9.790	-9.589	-9.562	-10.13+
	(6.247)	(6.111)	(5.952)	(6.104)	(6.142)
Trade Openness	0.102	0.0825	0.284	0.270	0.164
	(1.386)	(1.341)	(1.327)	(1.331)	(1.433)
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.266*	-0.239+	-0.297*	-0.314*	-0.266*
	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.146)	(0.134)
Presidential Election	-1.779	-1.629	-1.788	-1.840	-1.844
	(2.015)	(2.011)	(1.932)	(1.948)	(2.012)
Growth*Pres. Election	0.00443	-0.00434	-0.0633	-0.0606	0.00894
	(0.167)	(0.162)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.166)
Re-election	8.651**	8.280**	8.392**	8.347**	8.724**
	(1.607)	(1.638)	(1.606)	(1.608)	(1.603)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.42**	-14.30**	-14.12**	-14.03**	-14.27**
	(1.914)	(1.900)	(1.835)	(1.875)	(1.934)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.860	0.835	1.248+	1.252+	0.836
	(0.754)	(0.726)	(0.704)	(0.726)	(0.732)
Africa	2.677	2.808	1.134	1.151	2.628
	(3.237)	(3.243)	(3.053)	(3.083)	(3.243)
Asia	-3.161	-2.908	-3.755+	-3.751+	-3.160
	(2.034)	(2.057)	(1.972)	(2.008)	(2.086)
Central & E.Europe	-4.493*	-4.498*	-5.526**	-5.474**	-4.451*
	(1.994)	(1.971)	(1.936)	(1.923)	(1.971)
L.America & Caribbean	-1.415	-1.414	-2.036	-1.998	-1.428
	(1.493)	(1.496)	(1.423)	(1.423)	(1.469)
Repeat Int.	1.467				
	(2.013)				
Civil War		-1.519			
		(1.800)			
Interstate War		4.277			
		(2.607)			
Crisis		1.122			
		(1.045)			
Polity			-4.580**	-4.722**	
			(1.301)	(1.337)	
Cold War					0.135
					(0.900)
Constant	29.64**	29.48**	38.90**	39.11**	29.61**
	(7.721)	(7.557)	(8.287)	(8.469)	(7.674)
Elections (N)	698	698	698	698	698
Countries	121	121	121	121	121
R-sqr	0.550	0.554	0.561	0.562	0.549

Standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.2 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- Clarity of responsibility & polity interaction

	(1) HS & interaction w/clarity	(2) KP4 & interaction w/clarity	(3) KP7 & interaction w/clarity	(4) HS & interaction w/Polity	(5) KP 4& interaction w/Polity	(6) KP 7 & interaction w/Polity
Overt Int.	6.456*	5.765+	5.350	14.38	23.95+	20.41
	(3.055)	(3.137)	(3.293)	(14.67)	(13.15)	(17.03)
Covert Int.	2.798	2.973	2.498	4.611	4.255	2.971
	(1.835)	(1.874)	(1.951)	(2.889)	(2.824)	(2.557)
Clarity *Overt Int.	-4.202	-0.588	-0.795			
	(4.147)	(4.408)	(4.253)			
Clarity* Covert Int.	-1.459	-1.107	-1.493			
	(2.922)	(2.613)	(2.640)			
Polity* Overt Int.				-3.082	-6.355	-5.239
				(5.294)	(4.810)	(6.030)
Polity* Covert Int.				-0.817	-0.572	-0.306
				(1.010)	(0.984)	(0.879)
Previous vote	0.369**	0.402**	0.396**	0.379**	0.404**	0.396**
	(0.0595)	(0.0587)	(0.0674)	(0.0511)	(0.0527)	(0.0599)
Growth	0.573**			0.574**		
	(0.120)			(0.113)		
Covert & Overt	-9.993	-10.88	-11.86	-9.562	-9.706	-11.32
	(7.468)	(7.989)	(9.458)	(6.104)	(6.461)	(7.904)
Trade Openness	-0.390			0.270		
	(1.424)			(1.331)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.222			-0.314*		
	(0.146)			(0.146)		
Presidential Election	-1.711			-1.840		
	(2.027)			(1.948)		
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.0580			-0.0606		
	(0.182)			(0.166)		
Re-election	8.585**			8.347**		
	(1.562)			(1.608)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-12.94**	-13.26**	-12.67**	-14.03**	-14.14**	-13.54**
	(1.978)	(2.129)	(2.426)	(1.875)	(2.023)	(2.364)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.799			1.252+		
	(0.728)			(0.726)		
Africa	1.589			1.151		
	(3.228)			(3.083)		
Asia	-2.087			-3.751+		
	(1.802)			(2.008)		
Central & E.Europe	-4.707*			-5.474**		
	(2.048)			(1.923)		
L.America & Caribbean	-1.505			-1.998		
	(1.596)			(1.423)		
Clarity	1.632	1.026	0.988			
	(1.274)	(1.180)	(1.228)			
Global Growth		0.574	0.582		0.570	0.622
		(0.388)	(0.401)		(0.399)	(0.416)
Local Growth		0.131	0.165+		0.141+	0.166*
		(0.0798)	(0.0842)		(0.0737)	(0.0781)
Population (logged)		0.321	4.638		0.297	5.061
		(0.312)	(3.461)		(0.309)	(3.341)
Year		-0.0100	-0.0668		0.0128	-0.0535
		(0.0338)	(0.0479)		(0.0351)	(0.0490)
Polity				-4.722**	-4.824**	-5.210**
				(1.337)	(1.233)	(1.584)
Constant	28.38**	49.36	123.4	39.11**	18.76	109.2
	(7.573)	(67.72)	(77.26)	(8.469)	(70.16)	(80.35)
Elections (N)	675	677	677	698	700	700
Countries	118	119	119	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.562	0.500	0.293	0.562	0.491	0.272

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.3 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- International election observers

	(1) HS	(2) Model KP 4	(3) Model KP 7
Overt Int.	5.436*	5.532*	5.184*
	(2.279)	(2.297)	(2.392)
Covert Int.	2.248	2.538*	1.993
	(1.426)	(1.295)	(1.313)
Previous vote	0.371**	0.396**	0.387**
	(0.0515)	(0.0537)	(0.0607)
Growth	0.543**		
	(0.107)		
Covert & Overt	-10.11+	-10.06	-11.68
	(6.101)	(6.220)	(7.679)
Trade Openness	0.144		
	(1.405)		
Growth*Trade	-0.256+		
Openness	(0.134)		
Presidential Election	-1.850		
	(2.003)		
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0154		
	(0.166)		
Re-election	8.687**		
	(1.595)		
Effective num. of	-14.36**	-14.74**	-14.07**
Parties (logged)	(1.936)	(2.042)	(2.392)
GDP Per Capita	0.783		
(logged)	(0.739)		
Africa	2.402		
	(3.208)		
Asia	-3.307		
	(2.069)		
Central & E.Europe	-4.612*		
	(1.942)		
L.America &	-1.537		
Caribbean	(1.605)		
E.Observers	0.0633	0.616	0.769
	(1.252)	(1.327)	(1.878)
Global Growth		0.581	0.558
		(0.392)	(0.408)
Local Growth		0.137+	0.163+
		(0.0772)	(0.0827)
Population (logged)		0.332	3.717
		(0.313)	(3.335)
Year		-0.00431	-0.0607
		(0.0325)	(0.0484)
Constant	30.34**	39.81	121.7
	(7.641)	(65.37)	(77.94)
Elections (N)	697	699	699
Countries	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.549	0.489	0.344

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.4 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- Further Robustness Checks (KP)

	(1) Model 4 & repeat E.Int	(2) Model 7 & repeat E.Int	(3) Model 4 & FP	(4) Model 7 & FP	(5) Model 4 & Polity control	(6) Model 7 & Polity control
Overt Int.	5.502*	5.181*	5.249*	4.857*	5.640*	5.244*
	(2.254)	(2.346)	(2.316)	(2.422)	(2.336)	(2.412)
Covert Int.	2.597*	2.073	2.568*	2.129	2.706*	2.143+
	(1.308)	(1.321)	(1.310)	(1.335)	(1.280)	(1.289)
Previous vote	0.397**	0.387**	0.402**	0.392**	0.401**	0.394**
	(0.0536)	(0.0609)	(0.0524)	(0.0593)	(0.0521)	(0.0594)
Global Growth	0.596	0.561	0.591	0.547	0.576	0.623
	(0.400)	(0.415)	(0.396)	(0.411)	(0.397)	(0.415)
Local Growth	0.137+	0.163+	0.114	0.147	0.137+	0.162*
	(0.0755)	(0.0826)	(0.0850)	(0.0887)	(0.0738)	(0.0785)
Covert & Overt	-10.34	-12.07	-9.528	-11.38	-9.732	-11.39
	(6.397)	(7.866)	(6.197)	(7.772)	(6.155)	(7.653)
Effective num. of	-14.77**	-14.06**	-14.84**	-14.07**	-14.34**	-13.70**
Parties (logged)	(2.010)	(2.353)	(1.976)	(2.289)	(1.992)	(2.319)
Population (logged)	0.331	3.741	0.494	4.918	0.300	4.758
	(0.313)	(3.389)	(0.333)	(3.432)	(0.308)	(3.380)
Year	0.00173	-0.0566	0.00874	-0.0627	0.0150	-0.0479
	(0.0349)	(0.0493)	(0.0342)	(0.0471)	(0.0348)	(0.0496)
Repeat Int.	1.232	1.297				
	(2.357)	(2.202)				
Civil War			-3.246+	-4.079+		
			(1.782)	(2.301)		
Interstate War			4.632	4.428		
			(3.200)	(3.364)		
Crisis			1.888+	1.618		
			(1.053)	(1.100)		
Polity					-4.584**	-4.954**
					(1.214)	(1.572)
Constant	27.99	113.4	12.73	115.3	13.90	100.3
	(69.78)	(80.52)	(68.74)	(76.60)	(69.64)	(81.14)
Elections (N)	700	700	700	700	700	700
Countries	122	122	122	122	122	122
R-sqr	0.491	0.342	0.503	0.294	0.490	0.287

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.5 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- Further Robustness Checks

	(1) Model 4& interaction w/Polity	(2) Model 7& interaction w/Polity	(3) Model 4 & Cold War control	(4) Model 7 & Cold War control
Overt Int.	23.95^{+}	20.41	5.512*	5.092*
	(13.15)	(17.03)	(2.297)	(2.387)
Covert Int.	4.255	2.971	2.547*	2.153
	(2.824)	(2.557)	(1.285)	(1.300)
Overt Int.*Polity	-6.355	-5.239		
	(4.810)	(6.030)		
Covert Int.*Polity	-0.572	-0.306		
	(0.984)	(0.879)		
Previous vote	0.404**	0.396**	0.397**	0.391**
	(0.0527)	(0.0599)	(0.0533)	(0.0600)
Global Growth	0.570	0.622	0.631^{+}	0.699^{+}
	(0.399)	(0.416)	(0.332)	(0.380)
Local Growth	0.141^{+}	0.166*	0.137^{+}	0.152^{+}
	(0.0737)	(0.0781)	(0.0767)	(0.0856)
Covert & Overt	-9.706	-11.32	-9.937	-11.20
	(6.461)	(7.904)	(6.263)	(7.839)
Effective num. of	-14.14**	-13.54**	-14.80**	-14.19**
Parties (logged)	(2.023)	(2.364)	(2.067)	(2.374)
Population (logged)	0.297	5.061	0.319	0.988
	(0.309)	(3.341)	(0.314)	(2.447)
Year	0.0128	-0.0535		
	(0.0351)	(0.0490)		
Polity	-4.824**	-5.210**		
	(1.233)	(1.584)		
Cold War			-0.344	-0.133
			(0.929)	(0.928)
Constant	18.76	109.2	31.60**	25.41
	(70.16)	(80.35)	(4.362)	(22.53)
Elections (N)	700	700	700	700
Countries	122	122	122	122
R-sqr	0.491	0.272	0.490	0.483

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

2. "Clean" replications of the HS and KP models

These are the "clean" (i.e. without the electoral intervention variables) replications that were referred to in pg 13 (ft 40) in the main text.

Table 4.1 appendix clean replication HS & KP models

	(1) HS original	(2) HS original & fixed effects	(3) KP model 4	(4) KP model 7
Previous vote	0.345**	0.343**	0.371**	0.358**
	(0.0512)	(0.0563)	(0.0528)	(0.0601)
Growth	0.600**	0.557**		
	(0.100)	(0.0952)		
Trade Openness	0.310	-1.840		
	(1.375)	(2.189)		
Growth*Trade	-0.309*	-0.202		
Openness	(0.136)	(0.122)		
Presidential Election	-1.465	-4.897		
	(2.012)	(3.590)		
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.0163	0.0916		
	(0.162)	(0.186)		
Re-election	8.107**	8.577**		
	(1.672)	(1.823)		
Effective num. of	-15.01**	-14.19**	-15.36**	-14.69**
Parties (logged)	(1.919)	(2.227)	(2.033)	(2.346)
GDP Per Capita	0.729	0.928		
(logged)	(0.699)	(1.087)		
Africa	2.420	‡		
	(3.078)			
Asia	-3.326+	‡		
	(2.002)			
Central & E.Europe	-5.145**	‡		
	(1.949)			
L.America &	-1.891	‡		
Caribbean	(1.484)			
Global Growth			0.642	0.614
			(0.402)	(0.416)
Local Growth			0.151*	0.179*
			(0.0647)	(0.0718)
Population (logged)			0.334	3.959
			(0.313)	(3.238)
Year			-0.00148	-0.0585
			(0.0338)	(0.0470)
Constant	32.57**	31.02**	35.84	117.0
	(7.254)	(9.677)	(67.56)	(77.32)
Elections (N)	707	707	709	709
Countries	121	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.535	0.511	0.473	0.314

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Omitted when calculating country fixed effects due to being country invariant

3. Interactions w/ various temporal controls

These are the interactions between the electoral intervention variable(s) and the time trend and/or cold war variable that were referred to in pg 15 in the main text. As noted, the lack of any significant/robust findings in the models here (and in the paper) indicate that, at least as to the post-WW2 era, there is no significant relationship between the time period in which the intervention occurred and the effectiveness of the intervention.

Table 5.1 appendix Time trend interactions w/electoral Int. (hypotheses 1&2)

	(1) HS H1	(2) KP model4 H1	(3) KP model7 H1	(4) HS H2	(5) KP model4 H2	(6) KP model4 H2 & fraud
Electoral Intervention	4.949*	4.567*	4.784*			
	(2.018)	(2.054)	(2.280)			
E.Int *Year	-0.0647	-0.0436	-0.0696			
	(0.0673)	(0.0701)	(0.0826)			
Overt Int.				5.095	4.393	3.500
				(3.415)	(3.852)	(4.039)
Covert Int.				8.512**	8.537**	7.446*
				(3.060)	(2.955)	(2.950)
Overt Int. *Year				0.0156	0.0440	0.0665
				(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.116)
Covert Int. *Year				-0.233+	-0.226+	-0.187
				(0.120)	(0.123)	(0.117)
Previous vote	0.365**	0.395**	0.387**	0.363**	0.392**	0.406**
	(0.0514)	(0.0525)	(0.0595)	(0.0530)	(0.0546)	(0.0605)
Growth	0.543**			0.522**		
	(0.110)			(0.113)		
Trade Openness	0.835			0.659		
	(1.362)			(1.383)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.283*			-0.252+		
	(0.135)			(0.135)		
Presidential Election	-1.299			-1.451		
	(2.017)			(2.063)		
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0367			0.0131		
	(0.162)			(0.167)		
Re-election	8.514**			8.951**		
	(1.672)			(1.611)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-13.96**	-14.67**	-13.89**	-14.11**	-14.85**	-13.37**
	(1.920)	(2.034)	(2.334)	(1.888)	(2.000)	(2.250)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	1.782*			1.631*		
	(0.800)			(0.814)		
Africa	5.221			4.879		
	(3.496)			(3.539)		
Asia	-1.568			-1.607		
	(2.340)			(2.354)		
Central & E.Europe	-3.548+			-3.551+		
	(2.015)			(2.079)		
L.America & Caribbean	-0.687			-0.546		
	(1.578)			(1.597)		
Year	-0.0480	0.00420	-0.0504	-0.0490	-0.00154	-0.0132
	(0.0346)	(0.0336)	(0.0469)	(0.0349)	(0.0343)	(0.0380)
Global Growth		0.630	0.605		0.584	0.438
		(0.399)	(0.414)		(0.404)	(0.430)
Local Growth		0.143+	0.167*		0.141*	0.125+

		(0.0737)	(0.0811)		(0.0712)	(0.0726)
Population (logged)		0.327	3.561		0.318	0.158
		(0.309)	(3.376)		(0.313)	(0.331)
Covert & Overt				-9.616	-9.180	-9.253
				(5.967)	(6.112)	(6.444)
Repeat Int.						0.845
						(2.356)
Constant	21.60**	31.05**	4.334	23.39**	31.88**	31.39**
	(7.773)	(4.655)	(28.89)	(7.921)	(4.781)	(5.029)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	636
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	114
R-sqr	0.552	0.488	0.350	0.554	0.492	0.465

Standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.2 appendix Cold War interaction w/electoral Int. (hypo 1&2)

	(1) HS H1	(2) KP model4 H1	(3) KP model7 H1	(4) HS H2	(5) KP model4 H2	(6) KP model7 H2
Electoral Intervention	4.981*	5.557*	3.813			
	(2.496)	(2.714)	(3.267)			
E.Int* Cold War	-2.185	-2.631	-0.973			
	(2.778)	(3.015)	(3.541)			
Overt Int.				7.210*	7.463*	6.612
				(3.511)	(3.506)	(4.509)
Covert Int.				0.0714	0.818	-2.523
				(5.422)	(6.242)	(5.639)
Overt Int.* Cold War				-2.662	-2.919	-2.171
				(4.734)	(5.057)	(5.909)
Covert Int.* Cold War				2.399	1.896	5.095
				(5.605)	(6.389)	(5.796)
Previous vote	0.368**	0.394**	0.389**	0.367**	0.393**	0.383**
	(0.0516)	(0.0531)	(0.0598)	(0.0529)	(0.0544)	(0.0620)
Growth	0.556**			0.545**		
	(0.108)			(0.110)		
Trade Openness	0.292			0.133		
	(1.430)			(1.442)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.278*			-0.261+		
	(0.135)			(0.134)		
Presidential Election	-1.764			-1.812		
	(2.001)			(2.004)		
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0384			0.00983		
	(0.167)			(0.169)		
Re-election	8.364**			8.751**		
	(1.674)			(1.615)		
Effective num. of Parties	-14.25**	-14.78**	-14.15**	-14.38**	-14.90**	-14.32**
(logged)	(1.956)	(2.098)	(2.380)	(1.943)	(2.079)	(2.388)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.970			0.814		
	(0.726)			(0.742)		
Africa	3.051			2.590		
	(3.216)			(3.264)		
Asia	-3.080			-3.194		
	(2.093)			(2.100)		
Central & E.Europe	-4.425*			-4.561*		
	(1.934)			(1.971)		
L.America & Caribbean	-1.497			-1.425		
	(1.462)			(1.473)		
Cold War	0.177	-0.540	-0.153	0.130	-0.341	-0.150
	(0.901)	(1.027)	(0.935)	(0.901)	(0.928)	(0.938)
Global Growth		0.578	0.705+		0.625+	0.698+
		(0.406)	(0.383)		(0.336)	(0.385)
Local Growth		0.148*	0.165*		0.142+	0.156+
		(0.0724)	(0.0813)		(0.0728)	(0.0813)
Population (logged)		0.307	1.098		0.299	0.849
		(0.305)	(2.433)		(0.316)	(2.454)
Year		-0.00896				
		(0.0389)				
Covert & Overt				-9.595	-9.285	-10.65
				(6.362)	(6.502)	(7.990)
Constant	28.32**	49.82	24.41	30.11**	32.07**	27.11
	(7.683)	(78.48)	(22.50)	(7.847)	(4.474)	(22.64)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	700
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.549	0.488	0.479	0.549	0.490	0.485

Standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

4. Disaggregation by U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions

As noted in the main text, I expect the various great powers to be equally good overall in avoiding giving electoral support to "lost causes". Likewise, I argue that the exact method of intervention is determined by the great power based upon the information it receives from the supported candidate/party. Accordingly, I don't expect the identity of the intervener to matter as to the effects its intervention has on the election results. Nevertheless, some may wonder whether the patterns found in the paper are indeed what one finds as to each intervener interventions given the significant differences between the U.S. and the USSR/Russia on many aspects. Accordingly, I reran my models with disaggregated the Electoral intervention variable by U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions. As can be seen in Model 6 Table 1.1 in the main paper as well as in the models below, the results for the disaggregated Russian and American electoral intervention variables are essentially the same as for the aggregated variable (or variables) although the results for the Russian interventions are not significant in many models. This is probably due to the relatively small number of Russian interventions (as low as 22 cases in some models) which are not dropped due to missing data on some covariates etc..

Table 6.1 appendix Investigation of the 1st Hypothesis: Electoral Interventions Effects- separate U.S. & Russia variables

	(1) HS &fraud	(2) HS &fixed effects	(3) Model KP4	(4) KP4 & fraud	(5) Model KP7
US electoral Int.	3.003**	2.890*	3.487**	3.259**	2.913**
	(1.013)	(1.264)	(1.040)	(1.004)	(1.054)
Rus. electoral Int.	3.313	3.112	3.279	3.231	3.034
	(2.946)	(2.777)	(2.892)	(3.034)	(2.840)
Previous vote	0.389**	0.373**	0.394**	0.409**	0.386**
	(0.0555)	(0.0560)	(0.0527)	(0.0584)	(0.0599)
Growth	0.526**	0.524**			
	(0.140)	(0.100)			
Trade Openness	0.943	-2.065			
	(1.596)	(2.178)			
Growth*Trade	-0.258	-0.184			
Openness	(0.170)	(0.121)			
Presidential Election	-2.919	-5.481			
	(2.143)	(3.369)			
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0485	0.156			
	(0.201)	(0.185)			
Re-election	8.721**	8.730**			
	(1.884)	(1.809)			
Effective num. of	-13.24**	-13.40**	-14.67**	-13.11**	-13.92**
Parties (logged)	(2.129)	(2.240)	(2.044)	(2.272)	(2.341)
GDP Per Capita	0.647	1.227			
(logged)	(0.811)	(1.142)			

Africa	0.122	‡			
	(3.646)				
Asia	-4.457^{+}	‡			
	(2.403)				
Central & E.Europe	-6.217**	‡			
	(2.129)				
L.America & Caribbean	-1.675	‡			
	(1.665)				
Global Growth			0.620	0.479	0.592
			(0.398)	(0.419)	(0.413)
Local Growth			0.146*	0.129^{+}	0.174*
			(0.0723)	(0.0750)	(0.0795)
Population (logged)			0.320	0.173	3.604
			(0.307)	(0.320)	(3.376)
Year			0.00420	-0.00877	-0.0514
			(0.0342)	(0.0362)	(0.0480)
Constant	29.59**	26.52*	23.04	47.58	104.2
	(8.133)	(10.16)	(68.40)	(72.38)	(78.09)
Elections (N)	634	698	700	636	700
Countries	113	121	122	114	122
R-sqr	0.524	0.521	0.488	0.461	0.347

Standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Omitted when calculating country fixed effects due to being country invariant

Table 6.2 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions - separate U.S. & Russia variables

	(1) HS	(2) HS &fraud	(3) HS &fixed effects	(4) Model KP4	(5) KP4 & fraud	(6) Model KP7
US overt Int.	4.645*	4.603*	4.643*	4.534*	4.617**	4.610*
	(1.915)	(1.836)	(2.180)	(1.800)	(1.667)	(1.858)
US covert Int.	2.577	2.513	2.224	3.179+	2.788+	2.025
	(1.824)	(1.734)	(1.855)	(1.627)	(1.664)	(1.656)
Rus overt Int.	6.506	6.070	6.437	6.849	6.186	5.925
	(4.634)	(4.999)	(4.703)	(4.794)	(5.185)	(5.203)
Rus covert Int.	0.462	0.781	0.278	0.0175	0.449	0.388
	(2.458)	(2.420)	(2.220)	(2.200)	(2.275)	(2.251)
Covert & Overt	-9.665	-9.643	-12.77	-9.250	-9.451	-11.59
	(5.889)	(5.932)	(8.518)	(5.968)	(6.062)	(7.677)
Previous vote	0.372**	0.391**	0.373**	0.398**	0.411**	0.406**
	(0.0516)	(0.0560)	(0.0566)	(0.0537)	(0.0594)	(0.0690)
Growth	0.548**	0.508**	0.512**			
	(0.108)	(0.145)	(0.103)			
Trade Openness	0.0912	0.736	-2.023			
	(1.412)	(1.628)	(2.242)			
Growth*Trade	-0.255+	-0.221	-0.156			
Openness	(0.136)	(0.174)	(0.123)			
Presidential Election	-1.890	-3.067	-5.394			
	(2.005)	(2.178)	(3.527)			
Growth*Pres.	-0.00436	0.00898	0.0995			
Election	(0.171)	(0.207)	(0.190)			
Re-election	8.681**	9.130**	9.313**			
	(1.616)	(1.836)	(1.763)			
Effective num. of	-14.30**	-13.30**	-13.40**	-14.64**	-13.15**	-12.10**
Parties (logged)	(1.908)	(2.114)	(2.212)	(2.026)	(2.256)	(2.688)
GDP Per Capita	0.750	0.478	0.873			
(logged)	(0.747)	(0.834)	(1.204)			
Africa	2.407	-0.387	‡			
	(3.248)	(3.699)				
Asia	-3.340	-4.634+	‡			
	(2.057)	(2.414)				
Central & E.Europe	-4.500*	-6.056**	‡			
	(1.989)	(2.233)				
L.America &	-1.540	-1.616	‡			
Caribbean	(1.517)	(1.691)				
Global Growth				0.577	0.438	0.509
				(0.398)	(0.418)	(0.434)
Local Growth				0.137+	0.118	0.135+
				(0.0744)	(0.0779)	(0.0802)
Population				0.339	0.184	5.658
(logged)				(0.312)	(0.328)	(3.597)
Year				-0.00235	-0.0140	-0.0866+
				(0.0347)	(0.0369)	(0.0503)
Constant	30.60**	31.29**	29.64**	35.95	58.10	153.3+
	(7.687)	(8.288)	(10.71)	(69.44)	(73.62)	(82.05)
Elections (N)	698	634	698	700	636	636
Countries	121	113	121	122	114	114
R-sqr	0.549	0.524	0.526	0.491	0.463	0.206

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ ‡ Omitted when calculating country fixed effects due to being country invariant

5. Robustness check (Hypothesis 2)- Exposed covert interventions

Some may wonder, given the results found in the article as to the second hypothesis, whether the differences found in the effectiveness between covert and overt interventions in favor of the latter are simply due to the cases in which the covert interventions were exposed prior to the election and the resulting political 'fallout' . In order to investigate that possibility, I excluded in the table below the small number of cases of U.S. or Soviet/ Russian covert interventions for which clear evidence about this activity was found and became well known to the public of the intervener prior to election day.[10] As can be seen from this table this had little effect on the results. The absolute substantive difference between covert and overt interventions remains unchanged and the variable for covert interventions becomes in some models, as in some models in the article, insignificant nevertheless.

Table 7 appendix Further Robustness Check for Hypo. 2- exposed covert intervention control

	(1) HS	(2) HS& fraud	(3) HS & Fixed effects	(4) KP 4	(5) KP 4 & fraud	(6) KP 7
Overt Int.	5.478*	5.250*	5.454*	5.549*	5.295*	5.215*
	(2.283)	(2.354)	(2.416)	(2.302)	(2.369)	(2.399)
Covert Int.	2.023	2.069	1.676	2.124+	1.991+	1.642
	(1.322)	(1.258)	(1.341)	(1.165)	(1.157)	(1.216)
Covert & Overt	-10.23+	-10.08	-13.50	-10.09	-10.07	-11.81
	(6.086)	(6.157)	(8.684)	(6.217)	(6.321)	(7.671)
Previous vote	0.362**	0.384**	0.359**	0.390**	0.407**	0.375**
	(0.0530)	(0.0581)	(0.0584)	(0.0547)	(0.0610)	(0.0624)
Growth	0.532**	0.489**	0.505**			
	(0.108)	(0.147)	(0.104)			
Trade Openness	-0.105	0.513	-2.199			
	(1.389)	(1.597)	(2.197)			
Growth*Trade	-0.247+	-0.212	-0.157			
Openness	(0.134)	(0.172)	(0.121)			
Presidential	-1.820	-3.027	-5.082			
Election	(1.995)	(2.172)	(3.487)			
Growth*Pres.	-0.00351	0.0170	0.0843			
Election	(0.165)	(0.201)	(0.185)			
Re-election	8.610**	9.023**	9.345**			
	(1.607)	(1.844)	(1.749)			

[10] For example of one such exposed covert operation, in the 1989 Panamanian election, Panamanian strongman, Manuel Noriega, caught a some of the CIA operatives red handed while aiding the Panamanian opposition and they, and their equipment, were shown on the Panamanian TV a few weeks before the elections.

Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.51**	-13.44**	-13.58**	-14.80**	-13.23**	-14.06**
	(1.872)	(2.091)	(2.184)	(1.973)	(2.220)	(2.306)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.763	0.481	0.848			
	(0.730)	(0.819)	(1.169)			
Africa	2.691	-0.0483	‡			
	(3.096)	(3.546)				
Asia	-3.284	-4.558+	‡			
	(2.033)	(2.390)				
Central & E.Europe	-4.346*	-5.850**	‡			
	(1.900)	(2.142)				
L.America & Caribbean	-1.337	-1.404	‡			
	(1.501)	(1.677)				
Global Growth				0.482	0.331	0.470
				(0.417)	(0.439)	(0.432)
Local Growth				0.128+	0.109	0.157+
				(0.0756)	(0.0783)	(0.0821)
Population (logged)				0.335	0.186	3.981
				(0.310)	(0.323)	(3.396)
Year				-0.00709	-0.0201	-0.0696
				(0.0346)	(0.0370)	(0.0487)
Constant	31.24**	31.86**	30.81**	46.36	70.87	138.1+
	(7.646)	(8.261)	(10.46)	(69.50)	(74.10)	(79.60)
Elections (N)	695	631	695	697	633	697
Countries	121	113	121	122	114	122
R-sqr	0.551	0.526	0.528	0.493	0.467	0.325

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Omitted when calculating country fixed effects due to being country invariant

6. Additional robustness checks

6a. Economic Sanctions

In the following tables I examined another foreign policy measure- whether significant economic sanctions were in effect on that country during election day. This is a foreign policy factor which may also potentially have, through its effects on the domestic economy etc., significant effects on election results in the affected countries.[11] No significant effects were found for this measure.

Table 8.1 appendix Further Robustness Checks- economic sanctions (hypo 1&2)

	(1) HS H1	(2) KP model4 H1	(3) KP model7 H1	(4) HS H2	(5) KP model4 H2	(6) KP model7 H2
Electoral Intervention	3.210**	3.431**	2.984*			
	(1.235)	(1.189)	(1.216)			
Overt Int.				5.505*	5.585*	5.252*
				(2.292)	(2.313)	(2.393)
Covert Int.				2.258	2.563+	2.047
				(1.445)	(1.314)	(1.351)
Previous vote	0.369**	0.395**	0.388**	0.373**	0.399**	0.391**
	(0.0509)	(0.0527)	(0.0595)	(0.0513)	(0.0534)	(0.0601)
Growth	0.564**			0.549**		
	(0.105)			(0.107)		
Trade Openness	0.377			0.204		
	(1.390)			(1.392)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.291*			-0.265*		
	(0.133)			(0.133)		
Presidential Election	-1.705			-1.824		
	(1.973)			(2.000)		
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0335			0.00341		
	(0.163)			(0.165)		
Re-election	8.298**			8.694**		
	(1.659)			(1.596)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.35**	-14.70**	-13.92**	-14.38**	-14.71**	-13.95**
	(1.930)	(2.042)	(2.329)	(1.915)	(2.020)	(2.335)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.930			0.786		
	(0.724)			(0.738)		
Africa	2.808			2.365		
	(3.183)			(3.221)		
Asia	-3.256			-3.357+		
	(2.030)			(2.038)		
Central & E.Europe	-4.877**			-4.786*		
	(1.889)			(1.942)		
L.America & Caribbean	-1.666			-1.571		
	(1.487)			(1.507)		
Sanctions	0.828	0.674	1.502	1.125	1.033	1.868
	(1.724)	(1.952)	(2.378)	(1.734)	(1.990)	(2.405)
Global Growth		0.625	0.607		0.595	0.574
		(0.400)	(0.419)		(0.400)	(0.419)
Local Growth		0.146*	0.172*		0.135+	0.160+
		(0.0730)	(0.0798)		(0.0778)	(0.0833)
Population (logged)		0.310	3.324		0.321	3.605
		(0.309)	(3.439)		(0.315)	(3.488)
Year		0.00360	-0.0480		-0.00116	-0.0578
		(0.0336)	(0.0479)		(0.0337)	(0.0488)

[11] For the use of sanctions as a tool of regime change see for example (Marinov 2005)

Covert & Overt				-10.35^{+}	-10.17	-12.00
				(6.167)	(6.288)	(7.835)
Constant	28.83**	24.23	99.54	30.18**	33.61	116.7
	(7.507)	(67.29)	(77.22)	(7.609)	(67.57)	(78.58)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	700
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.549	0.488	0.363	0.550	0.491	0.349

Standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

6b. Western election observers

Some scholars who study international election observation argue that at least some of the non western election observers missions (such as from the African Union, the Arab League etc.) are unusually lenient when it comes to election irregularities in the election that they are observing. Indeed, in some cases such observer mission may exist merely as a "fig leaf" designed to provide a modicum of legitimacy to a "stolen" election (Hyde 2011:169-174). Accordingly, when only non-western observers are present prior to a particular election the effect of the election observers may be very different, diluting the measured effect that such observer missions may usually have. I accordingly, as a further robustness check, included in the following models a measure counting as observed elections only those which were observed (also) by at least one western observer mission. As can be seen in the following tables the results are nevertheless similar to those found for International observers.

Table 8.2 appendix Further Robustness Checks- Western election observers (hypo 1& 2)

	(1) HS H1	(2) KP model4 H1	(3) KP model7 H1	(4) HS H2	(5) KP model4 H2	(6) KP model7 H2
Electoral	3.196**	3.409**	2.953*			
Intervention	(1.226)	(1.183)	(1.209)			
Overt Int.				5.436*	5.502*	5.183*
				(2.278)	(2.292)	(2.392)
Covert Int.				2.256	2.551*	2.013
				(1.428)	(1.295)	(1.314)
Previous vote	0.368**	0.393**	0.385**	0.371**	0.397**	0.387**
	(0.0512)	(0.0531)	(0.0602)	(0.0515)	(0.0537)	(0.0608)
Growth	0.558**			0.542**		
	(0.106)			(0.108)		
Trade Openness	0.349			0.153		
	(1.397)			(1.402)		
Growth*Trade	-0.282*			-0.256^{+}		
Openness	(0.134)			(0.135)		

Presidential	-1.694			-1.823		
Election	(1.989)			(2.013)		
Growth*Pres.	0.0436			0.0155		
Election	(0.164)			(0.167)		
Re-election	8.332**			8.730**		
	(1.667)			(1.604)		
Effective num. of	-14.32**	-14.70**	-14.00**	-14.33**	-14.72**	-14.03**
Parties (logged)	(1.935)	(2.063)	(2.387)	(1.919)	(2.042)	(2.396)
GDP Per Capita	0.919			0.780		
(logged)	(0.728)			(0.740)		
Africa	2.864			2.472		
	(3.172)			(3.212)		
Asia	-3.169			-3.234		
	(2.077)			(2.084)		
Central &	-4.621*			-4.454*		
E.Europe	(1.857)			(1.920)		
L.America &	-1.570			-1.442		
Caribbean	(1.537)			(1.558)		
Western Obs.	-0.166	-0.195	-0.0266	-0.191	-0.0569	-0.0228
	(1.196)	(1.333)	(1.902)	(1.191)	(1.338)	(1.890)
Global Growth		0.627	0.599		0.595	0.563
		(0.396)	(0.414)		(0.395)	(0.414)
Local Growth		0.148*	0.176*		0.138+	0.165*
		(0.0723)	(0.0789)		(0.0768)	(0.0823)
Population		0.322	3.669		0.337	4.011
(logged)		(0.310)	(3.365)		(0.315)	(3.406)
Year		0.00520	-0.0515		0.000107	-0.0619
		(0.0336)	(0.0475)		(0.0338)	(0.0484)
Covert & Overt				-10.11+	-9.938	-11.64
				(6.097)	(6.229)	(7.683)
Constant	29.02**	21.14	103.8	30.33**	31.18	121.6
	(7.567)	(67.42)	(76.84)	(7.666)	(67.69)	(78.21)
Elections (N)	697	699	699	697	699	699
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.548	0.488	0.344	0.549	0.490	0.326

Standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

6c. Cinc

Some may argue that the stronger a country is in relative terms the harder it may be for the intervener to meddle in its elections in an effective manner. As the target becomes stronger in relative terms, threats of various kinds may seem less threatening and/or the concessions /promises that the great power needs offer in order to sway the electorate may not be as impressive (or felt as necessary) as they may seem to citizens of a smaller country. Likewise,

country strength is many times correlated with multiple factors (geographical size, widespread ownership of T.V.s/electronic media, wealth etc.) that usually increase the costs of election campaigns and therefore of the magnitude covert electoral funding which the intervener needs to give the side it aids to be effective. Indeed, in extermis, it may be impossible for the great power to covertly provide enough resources for the preferred side without running a very high risk of getting caught. I accordingly, as a further robustness check, included in the following models a logged Cinc measure as a control and then interacted it with the electoral intervention variables. No significant effects were found for this measure.

Table 8.3 appendix Further Robustness Checks- Cinc as control & interaction w/E.Int (hypo 1)

	(1) HS& Cinc	(2) Model Kp4 & Cinc	(3) Model Kp7 & Cinc	(4) HS& interaction w/Cinc	(5) Model Kp4 & interaction w/Cinc	(6) Model Kp7 & interaction w/Cinc
Electoral	3.075*	3.446**	3.048*	0.378	-0.770	-1.323
Intervention	(1.202)	(1.181)	(1.203)	(2.585)	(2.420)	(2.450)
Cinc *E.Int.				-0.483	-0.755	-0.790
				(0.505)	(0.481)	(0.495)
Previous vote	0.370**	0.394**	0.385**	0.369**	0.394**	0.386**
	(0.0508)	(0.0528)	(0.0599)	(0.0509)	(0.0529)	(0.0598)
Growth	0.557**			0.559**		
	(0.105)			(0.105)		
Trade Openness	1.259			1.284		
	(1.378)			(1.381)		
Growth*Trade	-0.292*			-0.301*		
Openness	(0.134)			(0.133)		
Presidential	-2.165			-2.121		
Election	(2.085)			(2.111)		
Growth*Pres.	0.0456			0.0337		
Election	(0.165)			(0.166)		
Re-election	8.389**			8.359**		
	(1.687)			(1.704)		
Effective num. of	-14.36**	-14.79**	-13.91**	-14.36**	-14.78**	-13.91**
Parties (logged)	(1.943)	(2.034)	(2.345)	(1.955)	(2.048)	(2.366)
Africa	1.394			1.413		
	(2.835)			(2.847)		
Asia	-4.592**			-4.598**		
	(1.545)			(1.556)		
Central &	-5.334**			-5.211**		
E.Europe	(1.847)			(1.885)		
L.America &	-1.670			-1.638		

Caribbean	(1.683)			(1.687)		
Cinc (logged)	0.375	0.640	1.569	1.353	2.143^{+}	3.083^{+}
	(0.279)	(0.569)	(1.384)	(1.020)	(1.120)	(1.619)
Global Growth		0.611	0.567		0.617	0.576
		(0.398)	(0.413)		(0.400)	(0.415)
Local Growth		0.145*	0.175*		0.141^{+}	0.171*
		(0.0730)	(0.0811)		(0.0742)	(0.0825)
Population		-0.406	1.976		-0.375	2.139
(logged)		(0.717)	(3.509)		(0.726)	(3.545)
Year		0.0124	-0.0361		0.0136	-0.0370
		(0.0353)	(0.0481)		(0.0360)	(0.0487)
Constant	39.59**	17.56	98.41	39.65**	15.01	98.31
	(4.054)	(68.08)	(75.77)	(4.063)	(69.23)	(76.61)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	700
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.549	0.494	0.338	0.548	0.495	0.335

Standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 8.4 appendix Further Robustness Checks- Cinc as control & interaction (hypo 2)

	(1) HS& Cinc	(2) Model Kp4 & Cinc	(3) Model Kp7 & Cinc	(4) HS& interaction w/Cinc	(5) Model Kp4 & interaction w/Cinc	(6) Model Kp7 & interaction w/Cinc
Overt Int.	5.380*	5.569*	5.334*	3.043	2.091	2.320
	(2.268)	(2.295)	(2.397)	(4.573)	(4.672)	(4.611)
Covert Int.	2.157	2.568*	2.066	0.507	-1.003	-1.791
	(1.408)	(1.289)	(1.301)	(3.838)	(3.601)	(3.559)
Overt Int.* Cinc				-0.425	-0.633	-0.554
				(0.888)	(0.935)	(0.959)
Covert Int.* Cinc				-0.288	-0.622	-0.678
				(0.675)	(0.630)	(0.626)
Covert & Overt	-10.69+	-9.930	-11.57	-10.15	-9.026	-10.61
	(6.005)	(6.287)	(7.874)	(6.446)	(6.923)	(8.184)
Previous vote	0.373**	0.397**	0.387**	0.372**	0.397**	0.387**
	(0.0512)	(0.0534)	(0.0605)	(0.0516)	(0.0537)	(0.0608)
Growth	0.543**			0.543**		
	(0.107)			(0.110)		
Trade Openness	0.987			0.992		
	(1.385)			(1.394)		
Growth*Trade	-0.267*			-0.271*		
Openness	(0.134)			(0.137)		
Presidential	-2.325			-2.288		
Election	(2.106)			(2.135)		
Growth*Pres.	0.0140			0.00707		
Election	(0.167)			(0.168)		
Re-election	8.832**			8.803**		
	(1.622)			(1.661)		
Effective num. of	-14.38**	-14.80**	-13.94**	-14.39**	-14.81**	-13.97**
Parties (logged)	(1.925)	(2.013)	(2.353)	(1.938)	(2.025)	(2.379)
Africa	1.344			1.372		
	(2.860)			(2.873)		
Asia	-4.390**			-4.414**		
	(1.558)			(1.568)		
Central &	-5.044**			-4.941*		
E.Europe	(1.920)			(1.967)		
L.America &	-1.360			-1.338		
Caribbean	(1.696)			(1.712)		
Cinc (logged)	0.387	0.636	1.564	1.821	3.145	4.003
	(0.281)	(0.579)	(1.425)	(2.060)	(2.233)	(2.544)
Global Growth		0.580	0.531		0.589	0.543
		(0.398)	(0.412)		(0.401)	(0.417)
Local Growth		0.135+	0.165+		0.132+	0.162+
		(0.0775)	(0.0846)		(0.0788)	(0.0858)
Population		-0.386	2.334		-0.366	2.439
(logged)		(0.730)	(3.572)		(0.735)	(3.606)
Year		0.00791	-0.0466		0.00930	-0.0467
		(0.0357)	(0.0495)		(0.0361)	(0.0500)
Constant	39.69**	26.43	116.3	39.76**	23.50	115.2
	(4.064)	(68.54)	(77.38)	(4.089)	(69.28)	(77.88)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	700
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.550	0.496	0.320	0.549	0.497	0.317

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

7. Simulation-description & summary results

As a further test for the effects of selection bias due to possible covert interventions during the period in question which are still secret I conducted a simulation of their possible effects. This simulation was done by dropping up to about 5% of all known cases of covert interventions in my electoral interventions dataset (examining all possible combinations of such "missed" covert interventions) re-estimating my main models for each hypothesis without them and then averaging the results across all possible combinations of "missing" interventions. Approximately 120,000 versions of each model were simulated and then averaged for this purpose for each hypothesis (about 60,000 for the HS model and 60,000 for the KP model).[12] In each of the following tables the simulated averaged results for the main variable of interest for each of the three hypotheses is shown. While, as expected, the standard error for my main explanatory variable(s) became a bit larger on average, the results in each one of them, for each of the hypotheses, remained otherwise the same.

Simulations- Hypothesis 1[13]

	(1) HS	(2) KP
Electoral Intervention (2 drop 2485 models)	3.208**	3.429**
	(1.241)	(1.198)
Electoral Intervention (3 drop 57155 models)	3.218*	3.437**
	(1.248)	(1.21)

Note: The electoral intervention variable, in the two drop simulation (HS model) is significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) in all of the 2485 models run. The electoral intervention variable, in the three drop simulation (HS model), is significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) in the 57,155 models run with one exception (which is significant at 0.0508). In the KP model the electoral intervention variable is significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) under both the two drop and three drop simulations (all 60,000 or so models run).

[12] Simulating the "missingness" of a higher percentage of covert interventions would have required the estimate of a million or more versions of each model. That would have been both computationally prohibitive using conventional computing resources as well as probably larger than the likely amount of missing cases of this type, if indeed any have actually been missed.

[13] The models simulated are Model 1 in Table 1.1 (HS) and Model 12 in Table 1.3 (KP).

Simulations- Hypothesis 2[14]

	(1) HS	(2) KP
Overt Int. (2 drop 2485 models)	5.432*	5.512*
	(2.277)	(2.292)
Covert Int. (2 drop 2485 models)	2.254	2.557+
	(1.444)	(1.314)
Overt Int. (3 drop 57155 models)	5.435*	5.515*
	(2.277)	(2.292)
Covert Int. (3 drop 57155 models)	2.253	2.556+
	(1.454)	(1.326)

Note: The overt electoral intervention variable is, not surprisingly, significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) in all the HS and KP simulations. However in most of the simulated models the covert intervention variable isn't significant. For example, in the three drop simulation of the HS model the covert intervention variable is significant at the 0.05 level in only 3.6% (2063) of the 57,155 models and in only 21.6% (12,357) of the models is it significant even at the 0.1 level.

[14] The models simulated are model 1 (HS) & 4 (KP) in table 2.1.

8. Matching- description & full summary results

As noted in the main text (pg. 21-23), in order to check for possible effects of selection bias as to which competitive elections the great powers chooses to intervene in and/or chooses a particular subtype to intervene with I used Matching (Stuart 2010;Iacus,King and Porro 2011).[15] Matching is a data preprocessing technique designed to bring observational data to approximate, as much as possible, a controlled experiment. Matching techniques can't solve selection effects in and of themselves. Nevertheless Matching allows, by eliminating the impact of the functional form in the regression model, for local comparisons between cases in which electoral interventions had occurred and cases where it had not occurred. As a result, Matching minimizes the risk that my estimate as to the effects of electoral interventions is biased by systematic biases as to where great power chooses to intervene in this manner.[16]

I used here the matching technique known as Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus,King and Porro 2011).[17] This matching technique was chosen for a few reasons. First recent research has found that CEM is superior to most other matching techniques in reducing imbalance, bias, estimation error and model dependence (Iacus,King and Porro 2011). Second, contrary to other matching techniques, such as propensity scores, CEM guarantees that the imbalance between the matched treated and control groups in the sample will be smaller than before matching. Furthermore, it is easy to check the difference between the pre and post-processing samples.

CEM works in a few stages. First the independent variables are coarsened, recoding them, so that very close values are grouped together. The exact matching algorithm is subsequently used to detect the matches within the coarsened data and to put aside the unmatched cases. Finally, the coarsened values are dropped and the original values of the matched data are maintained for the analysis of the causal effect while the unmatched data is excluded.

To perform matching, I used the Stata add-on package CEM (Blackwell et.al 2009).Matching was done using four variables: the real GDP per capita growth rate in the runup to the election, the effective number of parties or candidates contesting the election (i.e. fractionalization), whether the executive election in question was a presidential election or a parliamentary one and

[15] See appendix 1 for a further description of the Matching procedure used as well as the full regression table results.
[16] It also minimizes the effects of most unobserved covariates (Stuart 2010:3).
[17] For a recent application of CEM in IR see (Costalli 2014).

whether the election in question was a founding election or not.[18]

As expected, Matching significantly reduced the imbalance in the post matching sample. An indication of that is the L1 global matching index which is used to measure overall imbalance between the control and treated units in the CEM matching technique. This measure is an index that measures the global imbalance between the treatment and control observations on the matched covariates ranging from 0 (for perfect balance) to 1 (or full imbalance). In this case the L1 measure shows a decline in imbalance from 0.623 to 0.397 (see the tables following table 10.1). Then, following the common methodological advice in regard to Matching (Stuart 2010:2,12-13;Iacus,King and Porro 2011:4-5), I reran the main regression models of the first and second hypotheses using the post-matching sample in order to deal with any remaining imbalance. The full regression results can be seen in Table 10.1 below.

Table 10.1 Appendix: Matching results Hypothesis 1 &2 the full regression tables for results in table 3.1 & 3.2 in the main text[19]

	(1) HS hypo1	(2) KP hypo1	(3) HS hypo2	(4) KP hypo2
Electoral	3.516**	4.128**		
Intervention	(1.349)	(1.331)		
Overt Int.			5.259*	6.894**
			(2.683)	(2.535)
Covert Int.			3.171*	2.847*
			(1.494)	(1.323)
Covert & Overt			-8.287	-10.03
			(7.123)	(7.123)
Previous vote	0.453**	0.402**	0.469**	0.420**
	(0.0887)	(0.104)	(0.0910)	(0.105)
Growth	0.767**		0.730**	
	(0.206)		(0.213)	
Trade Openness	3.290		2.636	
	(2.851)		(2.878)	
Growth*Trade	-0.446		-0.401	
Openness	(0.280)		(0.285)	
Presidential	3.037		2.283	
Election	(4.282)		(4.274)	
Growth*Pres.	-0.528*		-0.584**	

[18] To enable the use of matching in this case the treatment/intervention variable was coarsened temporarily into a 1/0 dichotomous measure.

[19] The models presented here are (for hypo1) Model 1 in Table 1.1 (HS) and Model 12 in Table 1.3 (KP) (and for Hypo2) Model 1 (HS) & 4 (KP) in Table 2.1 all rerun utilizing the post-matching sample.

Election	(0.207)		(0.191)	
Re-election	5.076		6.250	
	(4.701)		(4.856)	
Effective num. of	-11.57**	-12.03**	-11.38**	-12.27**
Parties (logged)	(3.155)	(4.197)	(3.125)	(3.968)
GDP Per Capita	0.646		0.572	
(logged)	(1.139)		(1.152)	
Africa	-8.786		-9.148	
	(7.611)		(7.510)	
Asia	-4.481		-4.056	
	(3.418)		(3.443)	
Central & E.Europe	-11.39**		-11.03**	
	(3.191)		(3.272)	
L.America &	-4.170		-3.324	
Caribbean	(4.348)		(4.353)	
Global Growth		1.258		1.169
		(0.794)		(0.796)
Local Growth		0.0990		0.0611
		(0.127)		(0.133)
Population (logged)		0.362		0.406
		(0.561)		(0.567)
Year		-0.0100		-0.0146
		(0.0731)		(0.0709)
Constant	24.90+	45.48	25.13*	54.36
	(12.78)	(146.6)	(12.61)	(141.8)
Elections (N)	139	139	139	139
Countries	68	68	68	68
R-sqr	0.554	0.437	0.564	0.450

Standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Prematching Imbalance (Multivariate L1 distance: 0.623)

	L1	mean	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Economic growth	0.18815	-1.1317	3.4146	-1.6487	-0.33006	0.95488	-9.507
Pres./Parl Election	0.00879	0.00879	0	0	0	0	0
Effective num. of Parties	0.13077	0.03825	0.0469	-0.00477	0.03747	-0.00548	-0.162
F/N.F. Election	0.06398	0.06398	0	0	0	0	0

Post-matching Imbalance (Multivariate L1 distance: 0.397)

	L1	mean	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Economic growth	0.05102	0.06585	-2.1073	-0.27583	-0.52074	0.07459	-1.8727
Pres./Parl Election	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Effective num. of Parties	0.12327	0.01482	-0.00405	-0.04674	0.08323	-0.00274	-0.19846
F/N.F. Election	0	0	0	0	0	0	0