Appendix 2: Dataset construction explanations & replication materials

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1. Cases of U.S. And USSR/Russian Partisan electoral Intervention, 1946-2000

Target	Intervener	Year/Election	Assisted Party/Candidate[b]	Covert/overt
Argentina	U.S.	1946	Jose P. Tamborini	Overt
Hungary	USSR	1947	MKP	Overt
Italy[a]	U.S.	1948	DC	Overt[c]
Italy[a]	USSR	1948	PCI	Covert
U.S.	USSR	1948	Henry A. Wallace	Overt
Israel	U.S.	1949	Mapai	Overt
Finland	USSR	1950	*	Overt
Japan	U.S.	1952	Liberal Party	Overt
West Germany	U.S.	1953	CDU	Overt
Italy[a]	U.S.	1953	DC	Overt[c]
Italy[a]	USSR	1953	PCI	Covert
Japan	U.S.	1953	Liberal Party	Overt[c]
Philippines	U.S.	1953	Ramon Magsaysay	Covert
Brazil	U.S.	1955	Juarez Tavora	Covert
Indonesia	U.S.	1955	Masjumi	Covert
Laos	U.S.	1955	NPP	Covert
Finland	USSR	1956	Urho Kaleva Kekkonen	Overt
Iceland	U.S.	1956	Independence Party	Overt
Sri Lanka	U.S.	1956	UNP	Overt
West Germany	USSR	1957	SPD	Overt
Lebanon	U.S.	1957	Supporters of Camille Chamoun	Covert
Philippines	U.S.	1957	Jose Yulo	Covert
Greece[a]	U.S.	1958	ERE	Covert
Greece[a]	USSR	1958	EDA	Overt
Guatemala	U.S.	1958	Jose Luis Cruz Salazar	Covert
Italy	U.S.	1958	DC	Covert
Japan	U.S	1958	LDP	Overt[c]

Laos	U.S.	1958	NPP	Overt[c]
Venezuela	USSR	1958	Wolfgang Larazabal	Covert
Malaysia	U.S.	1959	UNMO	Covert
Nepal	U.S.	1959	Nepali Congress Party	Covert
San Marino	U.S.	1959	PDCS	Covert
Democratic Republic of the Congo	USSR	1960	MNC	Covert
Japan	U.S	1960	LDP	Covert
Laos	U.S.	1960	CDNI	Covert
Sri Lanka	U.S	1960 (March)	UNP	Covert
Sri Lanka	U.S	1960 (July)	UNP	Covert
Greece	U.S.	1961	ERE	Covert
Philippines	U.S.	1961	Diosdado Pangan Macapagal	Covert
South Vietnam†	U.S.	1961	Ngo Dinh Diem	Covert
Brazil	U.S.	1962	**	Covert
Canada	USSR	1962	Liberal Party	Overt
Finland	USSR	1962	Urho Kaleva Kekkonen	Overt
Peru	U.S	1962	Victor Raul Haya De La Torre	Covert
Italy	U.S	1963	DC	Covert
Japan	U.S	1963	LDP	Covert
Bolivia†	U.S.	1964	Victor Paz Estenssoro	Covert
Chile[a]	U.S	1964	Eduardo Frei Montalva	Covert
Chile[a]	USSR	1964	Salvador Allende Gossens	Covert
Somalia	U.S.	1964	***	Covert

Sri Lanka	U.S.	1965	UNP	Covert
Bolivia	U.S.	1966	Rene Barrientos Ortuno	Covert
Costa Rica	U.S.	1966	Daniel Oduber Quiros	Covert
Dominican Republic	U.S.	1966	Joaquin Beleaguer	Covert
India	USSR	1967	CPI	Covert
Laos	U.S	1967	****	Covert
Finland	USSR	1968	Urho Kaleva Kekkonen	Overt
Guyana	U.S.	1968	PNC	Covert
Italy	U.S.	1968	DC	Covert
West Germany	USSR	1969	SPD	Overt
Thailand	U.S.	1969	UTPT	Covert
Chile[a]	U.S.	1970	Radomiro Tomic & Jorge Allesanderi	Covert
Chile[a]	USSR	1970	Salvador Allende Gossens	Covert
Costa Rica	USSR	1970	Jose Figueres Ferrer	Covert
Pakistan	USSR	1970	Awami League	Covert
Malta	U.S.	1971	PN	Covert
Uruguay	U.S.	1971	Colorados/Juan Maria Bordaberry	Covert
South Vietnam †	U.S.	1971	Nguyen Van Thieu	Covert
West Germany	USSR	1972	SPD	Covert
Italy[a]	U.S.	1972	DC	Covert
Italy[a]	USSR	1972	PCI	Covert
Japan	USSR	1972	JCP	Covert
Bangladesh	USSR	1973	Awami League	Covert
Denmark	USSR	1973	DKP	Covert
France	USSR	1974	Francois Mitterrand	Covert
Greece	USSR	1974	United Left	Covert

Denmark	USSR	1975	DKP	Covert
Italy[a]	U.S.	1976	DC	Overt[c]
Italy[a]	USSR	1976	PCI	Covert
India	USSR	1977	Congress party (I)	Covert
West Germany	USSR	1980	SPD	Covert
Iran	U.S.	1980 (Jan.)	Ahmad Madani	Covert
Jamaica	U.S.	1980	Jamaican Labor Party	Covert
El Salvador	U.S.	1982	Christian Democratic Party/Duarte	Overt
Mauritius	U.S.	1982	Labor Party	Covert
West Germany	USSR	1983	SPD	Overt
Italy	U.S	1983	DC	Covert
El Salvador	U.S	1984	Jose Napoleon Duarte	Covert[c]
Grenada	U.S.	1984	New National Party	Overt[c]
Panama	U.S.	1984	Nicolas Ardito Barletta	Covert
U.S.	USSR	1984	Walter F. Mondale	Covert
Costa Rica	U.S.	1986	Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier	Covert
U.K	U.S.	1987	Conservatives	Overt
Chile†	U.S.	1988	‘No’ Campaign	Overt
France	USSR	1988	Andre Lajoinie	Covert
Panama	U.S.	1989	Guillermo Endara	Covert
Bulgaria	U.S.	1990	UDF	Overt
Czechoslovakia	U.S	1990	OF-VPN	Overt
Haiti	U.S.	1990	Marc Louis Bazin	Covert
Nicaragua	U.S.	1990	Violeta Barrios de Chamorro	Overt[c]
Romania	U.S.	1990	PNL	Overt
Albania	U.S.	1991	PDSH	Overt
Bulgaria	U.S	1991	UDF	Covert

Albania	U.S.	1992	PDSH	Covert
Israel	U.S.	1992	Labor	Overt
Lithuania	Russia	1992	LDDP	Overt
Romania	U.S.	1992	CDR	Covert
Yugoslavia/Serbia	U.S.	1992	Milan Panic	Overt
Cambodia	U.S.	1993	FUNCINPEC	Covert
Belarus	Russia	1994	Vyacheslav F. Kebich	Overt
Ukraine	U.S.	1994	Leonid Kravchuk	Overt
Israel	U.S.	1996	Shimon Peres/ Labor	Overt
Russia	U.S.	1996	Boris N. Yeltsin	Overt[c]
Latvia	Russia	1998	TSP	Overt
Slovakia	U.S.	1998	SDK	Covert
Israel	U.S.	1999	Ehud Barak/One Israel	Covert
Yugoslavia/Serbia	U.S	2000	Vojislav Kostunica	Overt

Notes:

[a] Double interventions (the U.S. backing one side while the USSR/Russia backing another side during the same election).

[b] Name of candidate in presidential elections, name of party in parliamentary elections. Main candidate/ party only.

[c] Overt intervention also included significant covert component.

† Cases of partisan electoral interventions in elections which weren't competitive following my criteria usually due to last moment boycotts of the elections by one of the major sides which were widely expected to contest them or (in the 1988 Chilean case) a rare example of a relatively competitive plebiscite. Accordingly, although noted in the dataset these cases (except for Chile) are excluded from the analysis.

* Identity of aided candidate in this election not fully certain, besides being a competitor to Pres. Paasikivi, given available data (although probably Urho Kekkonen).

** Identity of aided candidate/party in this election, besides being part of the opposition to Pres. Goulart, unknown given available data.

*** Identity of aided candidate/party, besides being among the losers of this election, unknown given available data.

**** Identity of aided candidate/party unknown given available data.

2. Definition & operationalization of the main variables

2.1 Definition & operationalization of partisan electoral intervention

As noted in the main text, a partisan electoral intervention is defined as a situation in which one or more sovereign countries intentionally undertakes specific actions to influence an upcoming election in another sovereign country in an overt or covert manner which they believe will favor or hurt one of the sides contesting that election and which incurs, or may incur, significant costs to the intervener(s) or the intervened country.

For the purpose of constructing the dataset, I operationalized such interventions as follows: in order to be coded as an electoral intervention, the acts done by the intervener need to get a 'yes' answer to two questions: 1.Was the act *intentionally* done in order to help or hurt one of the sides contesting the election for the executive? 2. Did the act clearly carry significant costs which were either (a) immediate (cost of subsidizing the preferred candidate's campaign/a covert intervention) and/or (b) longer-term/potential (loss of prestige/credibility if a public intervention fails and/or long-term damage to the relations once act is done or exposed).[1] Each case which was found to fit to these criteria between January 1,1946 and December 31,2000 was then coded as to other relevant aspects (covert/overt, intervener, party/candidate supported, etc.).

For an example of the way my definition was applied in practice, in the previously noted case of the 1969 Thai elections (see section 2 in main text), the evidence from U.S. primary documents indicated that the U.S. gave millions of dollars[2] in covert party funding to the UTPT party prior to the elections (i.e. a costly act). According to the records of the U.S. government body which made the decision on approving this covert funding (the 303 committee), this funding was provided by the U.S. government in order to improve the UTPT's electoral chances in the upcoming parliamentary elections (i.e. partisan and intentional).[3] Given that this particular act fits all of the criteria noted above, it was coded as a case of a covert U.S. electoral

[1] For the way that public acts of this type, like other kinds of coercive diplomacy, can have significant reputational costs if they fail and/or the intervener is caught bluffing, see George (1991) and Sartori (2005). For some of the ways that damage to the relations between two states can be costly to an intervener even if immediate military retaliation/war is not feasible for the target, see (Trager 2010).

[2] Frus 1969-1976 20: document 3 "Memorandum prepared for the 303 committee" February 7,1969. The exact sum has not yet been declassified but based on the context it was clearly significant.

[3] Frus 1969-1976 20: document 3 "Memorandum prepared for the 303 committee" February 7,1969

intervention in the 1969 Thai elections.[4] Examples of acts done prior to an election which would fit this definition of partisan electoral intervention are listed in the left column of the table below. Acts of a Great Power which do not fit one (or more) of the components of this definition are listed in the right column of table 1.

Table 1: Examples of Activities Coded or Excluded as Significant Electoral Interventions

GP activities coded as interventions	Excluded Great Power activities
Covert provision of campaign funds to the favored side either directly (to candidate/party coffers) or indirectly (secret agents buying votes etc.)	Invitation of preferred candidate to international conferences, IOs, a visit to another country (unless includes concrete concessions/promises, etc. as well)
Training locals (of the preferred side only) in advanced campaigning and get out the vote (GOTV) techniques	Photo-ops/meetings of candidate with world leaders/official representatives of the intervener with no concrete results otherwise
Covert dissemination of scandalous exposes/ disinformation on rival candidates	Provision of foreign aid of various types in order to enable the holding of free elections and/or improve their quality (without subsequent attempts to affect the results)
Efforts to covertly physically harm/destroy the 'unwanted' party/candidates HQ, campaigning materials or their candidates contesting the election	Generic/neutral statements of support for the proper conduct of the electoral process (with no endorsements of a particular candidate/side)
Public & specific threats or promises by an official representative of intervening country	Secret/open refusal of leader/officials of the intervener to publicly meet with a candidate or his/ her representatives
"Symbolic" military exercises by the intervener before an election	Positive/negative things said about a candidate/party by the intervener before an election with no concrete threats/promises
Creation (for the preferred side only) of campaigning materials/ sending campaigning experts to provide on-the-spot aid	Leaks to the press of reports of disagreements between the intervener and the target, etc.
Sudden new provision of foreign aid or a significant increase in existing aid	"Regular" election monitoring

[4] I then examined secondary sources on this intervention as well as preelection media sources and both indicated that this covert intervention was not exposed to the Thai public prior to the elections.

Withdrawal of part or whole of aid, preferred trading conditions, loan guarantees, etc.	

This definition excludes activities which are unintentional interventions- i.e. various acts by decision-makers in one country done with little to no regard to an upcoming elections in another country which may have, nevertheless, influenced those elections. Likewise excluded are acts done "automatically" by other countries bureaucracies etc. (say regulations on visa requirements, tariff definitions etc.) which coincidentally coincided with another countries election effecting it (unless of course significant evidence exists that decision makers manipulated such a usually automatic decision for this purpose).

In a world in which significant interconnections of various kinds exists (and long existed) between many countries, each with its own decision-makers and bureaucracy which create and execute policies on their own schedules with little regard to the scheduled events in the rest of the world, the number of significant unintentional interventions which may have occurred is nearly endless and therefore of limited interest. Furthermore, the intention by the decision-makers in the intervener to intervene in a particular foreign event and/or through the use of a certain policy tool is a central component of the definition of intervention in virtually all studies of other types of interventions (interventions in civil war, FIRCs, humanitarian interventions etc.) known to the author.[5]

This definition also excludes acts which were done at a given timing, form, etc. in order to use the possible window of opportunity that such an election in another country may have created (through distracting the decision-makers in that other country, etc.) but that weren't done in order to influence the results of those elections. For example, the 1956 Suez crisis (or Sinai War) was clearly timed by the three attacking countries (the U.K, Israel and France) to start in the run up to the 1956 U.S elections in order to lower the chances that the U.S will attempt to stop it (Kyle 2003:317,324-325). However, given that all of the available evidence suggests that none of the attacking countries launched this war in order to (directly or indirectly) affect the

[5] Some studies assume it to be such an obvious component of their intervention type of interest (i.e. the U.S. military wouldn't say invade another country and depose its leader unless ordered to do so by the president etc.) that they don't even note this issue and/or just use an off the shelf dataset of the intervention type of interest that uses, in some form, a component of decision-makers intent for coding this phenomenon.

results of the 1956 U.S. election, this case wouldn't count as an electoral intervention- even if it may have (unintentionally) affected the final results.

Also excluded from being counted as an electoral intervention are the very rare cases, such as the U.S. in the 1984 Nicaraguan elections (Blum 2005:229) or Russia in the May 2014 Ukrainian election,[6] in which the great power is trying to actively disrupt an election in another country. In such cases the intervener is trying to harm the political system as a whole and/or deprive it of legitimacy- not to affect the election's results. In other words, these cases are more akin to acts of warfare against the target hatched at a convenient opportunity (with the election coincidentally found to be creating such a moment) rather then attempts to manipulate the identity of those in power using the elections as a tool for that purpose.

Likewise, to be coded as an intervention under this definition there also had to be some kind of concrete action on the side of the would be intervener in regard to the election in question beyond what was already planned anyway due to other, unrelated reasons.[7] Defining 'doing nothing' as to a particular election as intervention on the side of the great power would lead, among other things, to rather ludicrous coding decisions. For example, it could lead to a coding of every election in which a somewhat unfriendly candidate to a particular great power ran but the great power did not intervene against it as the great power basically intervening in its favor.

This definition also excludes intervention conducted only in the immediate aftermath of an election (disputed or not) in another country. Post-election interventions, instead of trying to affect the decision by the electorate at the ballot box (as in electoral intervention) attempt to manipulate the post-election situation resulting from this decision by the voters (and/or efforts by the incumbent to negate the voters decision). Accordingly, post -election interventions by a great power are an altogether different phenomena then the one discussed here. For example, they are (unlike electoral interventions) quite frequently an impromptu, unplanned activity by the great power, the result of an unexpected instability in another country due to post-election protests,

[6] Some observers of the recent events in Ukraine believe that this may have been one of the goals of Putin's intervention following the overthrow of Yanukovich in February 2014 "Ukraine Poised for Uncertain Elections" *Council on Foreign Relations* May 19,2014.

[7] If the intervener had a wider foreign policy agenda in regard to that country (i.e. besides removing/maintaining a given leader/party) it had to be doing some additional activities beyond those already enacted or already planned to be enacted under this general policy etc..

'surprise' election results etc.[8] As a result of these theoretical and empirical differences such interventions are excluded.

Some may wonder whether purely neutral tools couldn't be also used, on their own, for blatant partisan purposes. In other words, in theory an intervener may be able to use in some situations only a seemingly fully neutral intervention as a way to get rid of an 'undesired' leader. For example, an intervener could pressure an unpopular authoritarian or a quasi-authoritarian incumbent to hold a competitive election (where none were being held before) or send election observers to an upcoming election (in countries with serious past record of election fraud) so as to reduce her ability to commit fraud. Enabling the opposition to compete and/or leveling the playing field only through such neutral measures could accordingly be sufficient to enable the opposition to remove the unwanted unpopular leader without any need for any 'partisan' measures on the side of the intervener.

In practice, however, when states do such neutral acts, affecting who is in power in another country in the short/medium term isn't one of their goals. For example, in the famous case of the Philippines in 1986 the evidence indicates, some later claims notwithstanding, that the U.S., in quietly pressuring Marcos to conduct a free election, had no desire to see Ferdinand Marcos lose power as a result. Indeed, Reagan liked Marcos and seemed to have thought that Marcos would win such a competitive election. That would, in turn, strengthen the Marcos regime's overall legitimacy while reducing domestic criticism within the U.S. as to the Reagan administration's foreign policy towards the Philippines. The Reagan administration's shift to trying to force Marcos to surrender power came only in the post-election period and was largely due to the (entirely domestic in nature) post-election mass street demonstrations (Bonner 1987)- a very different phenomenon then that which is studied here.[9] Research on other cases where the U.S. and other democratic countries pressured incumbents in both the pre and post-cold war era to hold competitive (or more competitive) elections have likewise found little to no evidence of

[8] Of course in a few cases a post-election intervention followed a (pre-election) electoral intervention by the same great power -such as Nixon's infamous track 1 and track 2 efforts in the immediate aftermath of the 1970 Chilean election and the failed U.S. attempt to prevent Allende's victory in this election (Gustafson 2007). However, that fact doesn't mean that post-electoral intervention are the same theoretical phenomena as a partisan electoral intervention- in the same manner that the fact say that state building operations sometimes follow a regime change operation by the same great power does not mean that the these two types of interventions are identical in their nature.

[9] The call by this post-election stage by the U.S. government for a new election was of course proforma in nature

such partisan motives being involved (Brown 2001; Brown 2005; Kim & Biak 2011: chp 2)). Likewise, most research on election observation notes the usually neutral goals of the providers of election observation (Hyde 2011).[10]

Furthermore, while collecting the data for this dataset of electoral interventions, it became clear that when states do want to remove a particular leader/party from power they don't seem, in practice, to limit themselves to using such usually neutral means. In other words, a more 'level playing field' isn't seen as sufficient to reliably guarantee the "preferred" results for the preferred side. Indeed, in the few cases in which an intervener also used, for example, election observation for this purpose (such as in the 1953 Philippine elections or the 1998 Slovakian election) this 'neutral' measure was only one component of an intervention which included also multiple clearly partisan measures (covert funding to the preferred side etc.) as well (authors dataset).

Further notes on the operationalization:

1. Acts done by private citizens of a great power on their own volition, such as American campaign consultants hired for pay by a candidate/party in another country to give it campaigning advice etc., were excluded.

2. Electoral interventions done by non-state actors (NGOs, transnational terrorist groups, IOs, global media conglomerates etc.) were usually excluded as well. The main exception is if such non-state actors are directly controlled by an intervening great power (via funding etc.) or clear evidence exists that their intervention was done on the request of, or due to the pressures upon by, such an intervening state.

Accordingly, for example, the IRI (International Republican Institute) and the NDI (National Democratic Institute) are NGOs who get virtually all of their funding via the U.S. government (via the National Endowment for Democracy or the NED) as well as frequently following secret directives from it in regard to many of their operations (see, for example, Smith 2013). As a result, acts by these NGOs which would otherwise fit the definition of a partisan electoral

[10] Likewise the exact ability, if any, of election monitoring to reduce election fraud is still a highly debated within the academic literature on this topic (Kelly 2008: 222-223,249; Hyde 2011:chp.4)

intervention are coded here as U.S. interventions- unless the acts in question are fully and openly repudiated by U.S. government officials prior to the elections (in a manner similar to point 3 below). In contrast, similar activities done by, for example, the Soros foundation, which (Russian and Syrian conspiracy theories aside) gets virtually all of its funding and directives from private individuals (George Soros etc.), are not coded as electoral interventions.

3. The few cases in which an act that would usually be coded as an overt electoral intervention (say a threat to cut off aid by the U.S. ambassador) which were later (but prior to election day) fully repudiated by a higher level official of the great power were excluded. In such cases the act in question is usually completely unintended by the top decision-makers in the great power- so it fails of course the first criteria.

4. Acts which would have usually been coded as an electoral intervention but the evidence available about them indicates that they were, in practice, acts of outright coercion by the aided side towards the 'intervener' were excluded. Examples of acts which lead to the exclusion of such cases include, for example, outright threats by the local leader not to let the great power use bases that it has in its country or to immediately leave an alliance if the great power doesn't help the local leader. The few rare situations where acts of this type had occurred are, in reality, cases of successful coercion on the side of a government/faction in the target rather then an intervention by the great power in the domestic politics of that country.

5. At least some of the acts in question had to occur within twelve months of the expected election day in the target in order for them to be counted as an intervention. Earlier acts are assumed to have other goals (generic country/regime support etc.) and/or that the intervener changed its mind in this regard.[11]

6. Planned electoral interventions that never occurred in practice because that the would be intervened election did not eventually occur for various reasons (a domestic coup etc.) were excluded.

[11] Likewise in some cases parties received regular yearly funding (or subsidies) to enable various regular (non-electoral) day to day party operations etc.. Such funding, if occurring as usual on an election year, wasn't counted as an electoral intervention unless clear evidence existed that at least part of the funding of that year (usually involving an increase in funding) was given by the great power in order to explicitly aid the party in the upcoming elections.

7. Evidence from secret U.S. government/CIA sources/agents in regard to covert electoral activities by the KGB wasn't sufficient for coding a Soviet intervention unless some evidence was also available from reliable Soviet/Russian sources of such a Soviet/Russian intervention was indeed occurring.

8. As for coding particular features of a confirmed electoral intervention, to examine whether a certain known intervention was overt, I examined the preelection mass media descriptions of these acts (and/or reliable secondary sources describing these reactions). If these acts are described by the media as being part of such a foreign electoral intervention then it is assumed that the average voter knew about this intervention. Given that overt interventions are designed to affect public opinion in the target there was rarely any ambiguity in this regard in practice as to the main components of these interventions. The identification of the electoral intervention as being on the side of the incumbent or the challenger was done using the DPI data coding for those supported actors or elections (see also section 2.3 in this appendix).

2.2 Definition and coding of overt interventions with a covert component

Some interventions include both significant covert and overt components (say a public threat/ promise as well as covert campaign aid[12]). Accordingly for tests of the second hypothesis I also include a control variable for such cases.

To code this variable I carefully examined all overt interventions with more than one known component. In those cases I examined pre-election mass media descriptions of these additional components (and/or reliable secondary sources describing these reactions). If these additional acts are not described by the media as being part of such a foreign electoral intervention then it is assumed that those components were not known (or meant to be known) to the target's public. As an additional check, I also examined in this regard, where available, any archival or secondary sources as to the way these additional components were designed to be executed by the intervener and/or the domestic actor. In practice, I found that if one of the components of an intervention is clearly overt, that usually leads the media (and the target's public) to very carefully examine all other recent pre-election acts by the relevant great power

[12] Ten of the overt interventions (23.8% of all overt interventions) in the dataset fall into this category.

for evidence of any other acts designed to help one of the sides contesting that election. Accordingly, when the intervener (and/or the local actor) want to keep a certain component of the otherwise overt intervention a secret from the target's general public they make sure to do it in an obviously covert manner (such as by utilizing the intervener's intelligence agencies) leaving little ambiguity in this regard. That usually enables the intervener to hide such covert components from the voters in the target prior to the elections- although (as in fully covert interventions) it is usually unable/unwilling to hide it from later investigations/scholars etc. in the years following the intervened elections.

2.3 Definition of Incumbent and Challenger

In this and other variables where this distinction is used, an incumbent is defined as the party and/or candidate which held the highest elected executive position (President in Presidential and Semi-Presidential systems, Prime Minister in parliamentary systems) in the period preceding the elections and/or received the endorsement or backing of the holder of the highest executive position during that period.[13] A challenger is a party and/or candidate which doesn't fall under these criteria.

In countries in which it is common to install a neutral non-partisan caretaker government in the runup to the elections (like Greece or post-1996 Bangladesh), I code the party of the last pre-caretaker executive as the incumbent.

2.4 Definition of an interveneable/competitive election

As noted in the main text, I define an intervenable/competitive election, or the universe of cases in which electoral interventions can potentially occur, as one that receives 7 out of 7 on the 2010 DPI's (Database of Political Institutions) executive electoral competiveness index (Beck et.al 2001) with a small modification. For an election to get that score, multiple parties (in parliamentary systems) won seats in the election and the largest party received less than 75% of the vote, or, in presidential or semi-presidential systems, multiple candidates ran and the winning

[13] As some researchers on the economic vote have noted, while voters can also hold (in multiparty parliamentary systems etc.) other coalition partners accountable for the executives performance, the evidence seems to show that, in most cases, the party/candidate which holds the top executive position prior to the election receives nearly all of the credit and/or blame for the executives performance (Duch and Stevenson 2008:59).

candidate won less than 75% of the vote. Although rarely used in IR, this is a frequently used measure in Comparative Politics (for examples see Brownlee 2009; He 2007;Triesman 2007).

As with other important concepts, other definitions (or operationalizations) of competitive elections exist of course in the comparative politics literature besides that of the DPI. These alternative definitions may have significant utility in investigating other important phenomenon (for studies in comparative politics on other phenomenon which use different criteria for electoral competitiveness see for example Rosseler and Howard 2009:110-111; Gandhi and Reuter 2013:146-147). The definition used here was chosen, besides its widespread use, due to the fact that it was judged by the author to be as close a reflection as possible of the available information to a would be intervener about the competiveness of an upcoming election in a would be target. The DPI's criteria was also seen by the author, based upon research (in other studies) into cases in which an electoral intervention was seriously considered, as reflecting the process and major criteria by which decision-makers in the would be intervener usually judges whether an election is intervenable or not.

Of course, it is possible in theory that an intervened election became competitive only because of the partisan intervention. However given that, with four exceptions, the incumbent vote share in all of the intervened elections is 10% or more below the 75% cutoff (or a much larger margin then any of the effects by an electoral intervention found in this study) this is highly unlikely to have been usually the case. Likewise, in the very few cases in which such an intervention had occurred in a non-competitive election (according to the DPI's definition), the non- competitiveness of the election was usually due to a last moment, unexpected shift in its competitiveness (such as a last moment mass boycott of the election by the opposition parties/candidates etc.).

3. The dataset construction process

The dataset of U.S. and Soviet/Russian electoral interventions used in this paper was constructed by the author over the course of a whole year of work during parts of 2011 and 2012. The method for collecting this data depended on its type (covert or overt) as well as whether it was a Soviet/Russian or an American intervention.

For each intervener the data collection process began by generating a list of candidate electoral intervention cases. For **American electoral interventions** I used two sources as a starting point. The first was a list of such interventions constructed for a critique of post-WW2 U.S. foreign policy by Blum (2005:Chp 18). The second was CIAbase, a reference dataset of alleged CIA activities, created in the mid to late 1990s by Ralph McGehee, a former CIA employee. The dataset was kindly provided to the author by the holder of McGehee's papers and research John Judge.[14] These two lists, although quite useful as a starting point, were nevertheless constructed by non-academics with clear policy biases who, in some cases, utilized sources which were of dubious reliability or somewhat outdated. Accordingly each candidate case which fits the operationalization above of electoral interventions which was generated from these two sources was carefully crossed-checked with more reliable and up to date sources.

I then added to this initial list of electoral interventions other possible cases noted in reliable sources each carefully crossed-checked. The main types included:

1. Various formal Congressional investigations of CIA activities such as the Pike and Church Committees' Reports.
2. Declassified internal secret CIA histories (See, for example, Darling 1953; Jackson 1973;Montague [1971] 1992).
3. Reliable histories of the CIA and of U.S. covert operations in particular as well as diplomatic histories on the American side of the Cold War in general (see, for example, Rabe 2005; Gustafson 2007; Weiner 2007).
4. Academic research in intelligence studies on U.S. covert activities (see, for example, Treverton 1987;Johnson 1989; Prados 2006; Daugherty 2004).

[14] All entries listed under the key word "elections"

5. Memoirs by former CIA officials in particular and U.S. government officials in general (see, for example, Gates 1996; Smith 1976; Clarridge 1997; Ross 2004).
6. Histories or academic research on various U.S. democracy promotion activities since the end of ww2 as well as on "electoral authoritarianism" (see, for example, Lowenthal 1991; Levitsky and Way 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2011).

Finally, as a supplement and a check on this list's inclusiveness, I conducted a keyword search of all of the State Department's FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) volumes which cover the years since 1946 which were made publically available by December 31,2011. The online searchable versions of the FRUS volumes were available through the website of the Office of the Historian in the State Department[15] and, for the older volumes, the University of Wisconsin digital collections.[16]

For the **Soviet/Russian interventions** (especially the covert), the primary source for cases of electoral intervention was the Mitrokhin Archive. This is a remarkable, relatively complete, archive composed of summaries describing Soviet secret activities and covert interventions of various kinds (including electoral interventions) during most of the twentieth century. It was created by a disgruntled KGB archivist named Vassili Mitrokhin over the course of twelve years and then smuggled it to the West after the end of the Cold War (Andrew & Mitrokhin 1999,2006: Introduction). This source was then supplemented by other sources which were the result of the plethora of new sources on Soviet activities which became available following the end of the Cold War.

One important supplementary source for candidate electoral intervention cases was that of Riva (1999)[17] which constructed, based upon the primary archival Soviet sources which became available after the end of the Cold War, a small dataset of the covert financial support

[15] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments

[16] http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS . A small number of FRUS volumes which were originally published in microfische format were not available online during the period of the data collection. Those volumes instead were selectively checked by the author focusing only on reading the documents created within 12 months of a competitive election in a particular country noted in these volumes (as listed by the DPI measure- see description of the creation of competitive elections list).

[17] I thank Renata Redford for her assistance with this Italian language source.

provided by the Soviet Communist Party (the CPSU) to some likeminded parties around the world during the Cold War. This funding was provided, in some cases, in order to intervene in an upcoming election in the target. Pavel Stolisov was also kind enough to carefully search through his collection of archival documents on Soviet high level decision-making (smuggled by him to the West from the Gorbachev Library) and provide the author select documents which were of relevance. Also of use was the set of Soviet government documents secretly scanned during the early 1990s and then made available online by Soviet dissident Valdimir Bukovsky.[18] For the Post Cold War era cases I utilized the existing research on Russian foreign policy and Russian activities during the 1990s (see, for examples, Hill & Jewett 1994; Henderson 2002;Bugajski 2004) which was then carefully crossed-checked.

Other types of useful sources included:

1. Memoirs of former KGB agents and defectors to the west (see, for example, Andrew and Gordievsky 1990; Levchenko 1988; Womack 1998).
2. Histories of the Cold War from (among other things) the Russian side as well as Russian activities during the Cold War in particular countries using the very selective and partial access sometimes granted to scholars to other Soviet archives during the 1990s (see, for example, Westad 2005; Zubok 2007; Haslam 2011).
3. CWIHP bulletins. These bulletins publish newly available primary sources coming from Soviet (and E. European) archives.[19] Also useful was the collection of research papers based on these sources at the above website.
4. A keyword search of the three main historical journals which are the most likely to publish new research of relevance to this dataset coming from the Soviet archives- the Journal of Cold War Studies (1998-2010), the Journal of Cold War History (2000-2010) and Diplomatic History (1991-2010).

In order to find additional candidate cases of overt electoral interventions by both powers, I used, as is common for the collection of overt acts, numerous keyword searches with the relevant terms in three online newspaper archives which cover the entire period (1946 to 2000):

[18] Available at http://bukovsky-archives.net/ . I thank Lev Uchitel for his assistance with Russian language sources.

[19] http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication-series/cwihp-bulletin

The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Guardian (UK) (with its weekly companion paper the Observer). The archives of the first two newspapers were available at the Proquest historical newspapers.[20] The archive of The Guardian and Observer was available at the Guardian website.[21] Overt interventions, to be effective, must be known to the target public prior to the election. As a result, they usually receive significant journalistic coverage and are unlikely to be missed.[22] As a further check in this regard, one of the newspaper archives which was utilized for this purpose was from outside of the U.S. (The Guardian & Observer) in order to protect the results from a possible U.S.-centric bias which American newspapers are sometimes claimed to have.

Once the list of candidate intervention cases was completed I began to carefully cross-check the evidence for each one. In many cases the coding decision (especially for the overt interventions) based on the operationalization in the previous section was very clear cut. Where evidence was nevertheless missing for a particular candidate intervention case and/or particular features of it, further data was collected utilizing the types of sources noted. Also used were scholarly/historical descriptions of the elections/country in question, the Declassified Documents Reference System website (DDRS)[23] and, for overt interventions, Lexis-Nexis and Keesing indexes.[24]

Wrong or spurious public accusations of the U.S. or the USSR/ Russia for conducting electoral interventions which they did not actually do in practice were not an uncommon phenomena during the period covered by the dataset. Accordingly for a particular candidate case to be eventually included in the dataset the evidence for an electoral intervention occurring had to be quite reliable. For example, for a particular candidate case of a *covert* intervention to be included in the dataset evidence from at least one of the following sources was required:

1. An official admission by the intervener in question that it had meddled in that election (via a statement, government/congressional report etc.).

[20] http://www.proquest.com/products-services/pq-hist-news.html
[21] http://www.theguardian.com/info/2012/jul/25/digital-archive-notice
[22] For the definitions of covert and overt interventions see chp.2
[23] http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS

[24] www.keesings.com

2. Primary archival governmental documents and/or reliable secondary research based on these sources.
3. The testimony of reliable former officials (in the intervener and/or target side) who participated in the decision-making or the execution of this intervention and/or was a witness to these activities in person (a former government official, CIA/KGB agent etc.).[25]
4. An account of this intervention by journalists known for having good government sources in the intervener and for very high-quality reporting (such as Bob Woodward).

Any candidate intervention cases for which doubts still existed as to their coding (or evidence either way was still insufficient) were further checked by consulting the relevant primary documents over the course of two extended research trips to the U.S. National Archives at College Park, Maryland. For that purpose I examined the diplomatic documents related to the country and period in question and, where relevant, also the CIA's Crest system terminal as to potentially useful declassified CIA documents (at the time available only at this location). In such cases I also consulted (especially for such Soviet/Russian cases) with experts on the relevant country/intervener.[26]

A few final additional precautionary steps were then done. First, in order to allow sufficient time for evidence on recent covert interventions to come to light the dataset stops at the end of 2000. Second, several, additional precautionary searches for possible cases of electoral intervention were conducted. For example, some scholars who study other types of external interventions argue that an intervention by one power frequently leads to an intervention by other (frequently rival) powers. Accordingly in every case in which a U.S. or Soviet intervention was confirmed I made a special effort to check as to the activities of the other great power in regard to that election.

Likewise, elections in countries which were past/subsequent targets of other non-electoral interventions by the U.S. or the USSR/Russian (such as Guatemala, S. Korea, Iran, S. Vietnam etc.) received special and careful attention. Similar attention was also given to other elections in countries in which an electoral intervention was found in the initial list of cases. For example,

[25] Or of course academic/reliable secondary research based, among other things, upon interviews with such officials.
[26] Special thanks in this regard (as to particular unclear cases) is due to Krishna Kumar, Wolfgag Mueller, Jan Willem Stutje, Marc Trachtenberg, Daniel Triesman, Odd Westad and former U.S. Ambassador Avis Bohlen.

following clear evidence of electoral interventions in some of their elections, I eventually examined each one of the competitive elections conducted in the Philippines and in West Germany/Germany during the period covered by the dataset.[27]

[27] At an advanced stage of the construction of this dataset two measures from NELDA dataset (Hyde & Marinov 2012) for two types of overt foreign interventions in elections (public threats/promises and aid cutoffs) were brought to my attention. These two measures, unlike the dataset created here, are a mixture of neutral and partisan (overt only) preelection foreign interventions, activities by foreign powers which happened to coincide with a preelection period in the target, as well as of various kinds of post-election meddling. Even in regard to overt interventions many cases are missing given this criteria. These NELDA measures are, accordingly, far less useful for investigating partisan electoral interventions then the dataset created here and may lead to highly biased results. Nevertheless, given the potential relevance of some of the cases noted by these measures, I had also carefully examined and cross checked all of the cases noted by it. Happily all of the cases of partisan electoral interventions noted by these two NELDA measures that would fit under my operationalization for inclusion were also already included in the dataset.

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5. Codebook

Variable	Description
country	Name of country where election occurred.
year	Year of election.
year 1	Year of election adjusted to account for cases of 2nd elections that year.
ccodewb	World Bank country code.
ccodecow	Correlates of War country code.
observationid	The ID number of that election given by the author.
incumbent_vote	The vote share of the incumbent's party (in parliamentary elections) or the incumbent's presidential candidate (in presidential elections).
prev_vote	The incumbent's party/candidates vote share in the previous election. Vote share from previous uncompetitive elections (if any such occurred) is excluded.
rgdplpcgw	The real GDP per capita growth rate.
elect_int	Election experienced a partisan electoral intervention. Coded as 1 if the intervention is for the incumbent, -1 if it is for a challenger, and 0 when no intervention occurs.
elect_overt	Election experienced an overt electoral intervention. Coded in same manner as elect_int.
elect_covert	Election experienced a covert electoral intervention. Coded in same manner as elect_int.
covertpart	Election experienced an overt electoral intervention which also included significant covert components. 1 yes 0 no.
com_openk	Trade as a percentage of GDP in constant terms.
growthtrade	An interaction between the economic growth rate and trade as a percentage of GDP.
prezelection	Was this a presidential election. 1 yes 0 no.

growthprezelect	An interaction between the economic growth rate measure and the presidential election measure.
reelection_prez	A president is running for reelection in this election. 1 yes and 0 no.
lfrag_com	The effective number of parties or candidates contesting the election, logged.
lgcm_rgdpl_pc	Real GDP per capita in thousands of 2005 constant U.S dollars, logged.
africa	Africa
asia	Asia- Including the Middle East east of Egypt, excluding Australia and New Zealand.
eastcentraleurope	Eastern and Central Europe.
lamericacarribean	Latin America and the Caribbean.
glob_rgdpl_100gw	Real median global growth rate.
lcl_rgdpl_100gw	Real local economic growth rate.
lmad_pop	Population size, logged.
fraud	Significant electoral fraud is known to have occurred during the election. 1 yes, 0 no.
int_repeat	This electoral intervention is a repeat intervention on the side of that intervener (who also intervened in the previous election). 1 yes, 0 no.
us_elect_int	Election experienced a partisan electoral intervention by the U.S..
rus_elect_int	Election experienced a partisan electoral intervention by the USSR/Russia.
us_overt	Election experienced an overt electoral intervention by the U.S..
us_covert	Election experienced a covert electoral intervention by the U.S..
rus_overt	Election experienced an overt electoral intervention by the USSR/Russia.
rus_covert	Election experienced a covert electoral intervention by the USSR/Russia.
empwar3	A civil war occurring during the election year. 1 yes, 0 no.

interstate_war	An interstate war was fought during the election year. 1 yes, 0 no.
crisesicb	A significant foreign policy crisis occurred during the election year. 1 yes, 0 no.
lp_polity	The combined the polity 2 score, logged.
int_polity	An interaction between the polity 2 score and the electoral intervention measure.
int_povert	An interaction between the polity 2 score and the overt intervention measure.
int_pcovert	An interaction between the polity 2 score and the covert intervention measure.
covertexposed	The covert electoral intervention was exposed, becoming public knowledge prior to the election.
lcinc	A state's Cinc (Composite Index of National Capacity) score, logged.
clarity	Clarity of responsibility measure. 1 if a single party controls both the executive and has a majority in the legislature prior to the election and 0 otherwise.
clr_int	An interaction between the clarity of responsibility measure and the electoral intervention measure.
clr_int_overt	An interaction between the clarity of responsibility measure and the overt intervention measure.
clr_int_covert	An interaction between the clarity of responsibility measure and the covert intervention measure
sanction	Significant economic sanctions were in effect on that country during election day. 1 yes 0 no.
coldwar	A dummy variable for the Cold War period. Coded as 1 for years prior to 1989 and 0 afterwards
int_coldwar	An interaction between the Cold War dummy and the electoral intervention measure.

int_overt_cw	An interaction between the Cold War dummy and the overt intervention measure.
int_covert_cw	An interaction between the Cold War dummy and the covert intervention measure.
year46as1	The measure of election year used for the statistical analysis. 1946 is coded as 1, 1947 as 2, 1948 as 3, etc.
yr_elect_int	An interaction between year46as1 and the electoral intervention measure.
yr_int_overt	An interaction between year46as1 and the overt intervention measure.
yr_int_covert	An interaction between year46as1 and the overt intervention measure.
obs_int	International election observers were present in the preelection period. 1 yes, 0 no.
obs_west	Western election observers were present in the preelection period. 1 yes, 0 no.
corr_found_elec	Election was a founding election. 1 yes, 0 no.
cem_weights	The main output of the CEM matching method utilized in the diagnostics section in the main paper. For use in the matching models.

6. Replication code for models in paper

Note: Commands are in Stata 11

After dataset is loaded:

*To turn string into a numeric variable (which Stata can then identify as a country code)

encode ccodewb, generate(ccodewb1)

*Settings of panel variables (corrected year1 used in order to enable of any 2nd elections in same year)

tsset ccodewb1 year1

**** Table 1.1 Hypothesis1: Electoral Interventions Effects in HS Model

*Table 1.1 model 1

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean, vce(r)

*Table 1.1 model 2 fixed effects

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean,fe vce(r)

*Table 1.1 model 3 no HS interactions

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk prezelection reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean, vce(r)

*Table 1.1 model 4 fraud limit

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean if fraud==0,vce(r)

*Table 1.1 model 5 & repeat intervention variable

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean int_repeat, vce(r)

*Table 1.1 model 6 & Foreign Policy controls

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean empwar3 interstate_war crisesicb, vce(r)

***Table 1.2 Hypothesis 1: Electoral Interventions Effects- Various Controls

*Table 1.2 model 7 Polity control

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean lp_polity, vce(r)

*Table 1.2 model 8 Interaction with polity

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int int_polity prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean lp_polity, vce(r)

*Table 1.2 model 9 Cold War control

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean coldwar, vce(r)

*Table 1.2 model 10 International election observers

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean obs_int, vce(r)

*Table 1.2 model 11 Clarity of responsibility interaction

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int clr_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean clarity, vce(r)

***** Table 1.2 model 12 Separate U.S. & USSR/Russia intervention variables

xtreg incumbent_vote us_elect_int rus_elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean, vce(r)

***Table 1.3 Hypothesis 1: Electoral Interventions Effects (in KP)

*Table 1.3 model 13 KP (model 4) & electoral interventions

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote glob_rgdpl_100gw lcl_rgdpl_100gw lfrag_com lmad_pop year46as1, vce(r)

*Table 1.3 model 14 KP (model 7) & electoral interventions

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote glob_rgdpl_100gw lcl_rgdpl_100gw lfrag_com lmad_pop year46as1,fe vce(r)

*Table 1.3 model 15 KP (model 4) & fraud limit

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote glob_rgdpl_100gw lcl_rgdpl_100gw lfrag_com lmad_pop year46as1 if fraud==0, vce(r)

*Table 1.3 model 16 KP (model 7) & fraud limit

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote glob_rgdpl_100gw lcl_rgdpl_100gw lfrag_com lmad_pop year46as1 if fraud==0,fe vce(r)

****Table 2 Hypothesis 2: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions

*Table 2 model 1 HS with covert & overt electoral intervention variables

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert covertpart prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean, vce(r)

*Table 2 model 2 HS covert/overt & fixed effects

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert covertpart prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean,fe vce(r)

*Table 2 model 3 HS covert/overt & fraud limit

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert covertpart prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean if fraud==0,vce(r)

*Table 2 model 4 KP (model 4) & covert/overt elect

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert covertpart prev_vote glob_rgdpl_100gw lcl_rgdpl_100gw lfrag_com lmad_pop year46as1, vce(r)

*Table 2 model 5 KP (model 4) covert/overt & fraud limit

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert covertpart prev_vote glob_rgdpl_100gw lcl_rgdpl_100gw lfrag_com lmad_pop year46as1 if fraud==0, vce(r)

*Table 2 model 6 KP (model 7) covert /overt

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert covertpart prev_vote glob_rgdpl_100gw lcl_rgdpl_100gw lfrag_com lmad_pop year46as1,fe vce(r)

* Table 2 model 7 HS covert /overt elect & excluded exposed covert intervention

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert covertpart prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean if covertexposed==0, vce(r)

*Table 2 model 8 no interventions both overt & covert

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean, vce(r)

*** Table 3.1: Matching results Hypothesis 1- main models

* Replication in Matching of Model 1 in Table 1.1

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean if cem_weights==1, vce(r)

* Replication in Matching of Model 12 in Table 1.3

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_int prev_vote glob_rgdpl_100gw lcl_rgdpl_100gw lfrag_com lmad_pop year46as1 if cem_weights==1, vce(r)

***Table 3.2: Matching results Hypothesis 2- main models

*Replication in Matching of model 1 in Table 2

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert covertpart prev_vote rgdplpcgw com_openk growthtrade prezelection growthprezelect reelection_prez lfrag_com lgcm_rgdpl_pc africa asia eastcentraleurope lamericacarribean if cem_weights==1, vce(r)

* Replication in Matching of model 4 in Table 2

xtreg incumbent_vote elect_overt elect_covert covertpart prev_vote glob_rgdpl_100gw lcl_rgdpl_100gw lfrag_com lmad_pop year46as1 if cem_weights==1, vce(r)