Birth Legacies, State Making, and War: Supplementary Appendix

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1 Overview

This document provides a detailed description of how we coded states' birth types and the results of all robustness checks and diagnostic tests discussed but not presented in the main manuscript. Additionally, we present figures of the difference across birth type in predicted probabilities and expected values in cases where we cannot directly test our hypotheses using standard results tables (e.g., war outcomes from censored probit models and models with interaction terms). The results of our analyses overwhelmingly support our argument. Including those reported in the manuscript, we conducted 164 tests of our hypotheses. The results of all 164 tests were in the direction predicted by our argument. The results of 150 of the 164 tests were statistically significant at the 0.05 level using two-tailed tests. Using one-tailed tests, the results of 154 of the 164 tests were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In addition to our robustness checks and diagnostic tests, this appendix describes the simulations used to calculate the predicted probabilities and expected values presented in the manuscript and here. We will make available the data and code necessary to replicate all of our analyses upon publication.

2 Supplemental Material for Coding of Birth Types

We have attempted to make our coding of a country's birth legacy as objective as possible. When uncertainty exists, we have attempted to code the state in ways that minimize the probability of supporting our hypotheses. Some examples are given in the details provided below.

The actual coding process involves reading about each state's formative experience. We begin with the date of independence and consider the circumstances attendant upon that emergence. If a state's independence occurred before 1816, and specifically if it occurred so long ago that there is debate among historians about when it emerged, we code it as an indigenously generated state. If the state emerged as the result of a successful war of independence (either from colonialism or from within the homeland territory of an existing state), we code it as a violent secession. If the state emerged non-violently from an existing state, we code its birth as a peaceful secession. If a state was a former colony but gained independence without resort to violence, we consider how well the metropole prepared the polity for self-governance. If the process was drawn out over several years during which a plan for developing local administrative capacity was implemented, we code the state's emergence as a birth by agreement. Other births by agreement occur when a state's independence is the resurrection after conquest and occupation by other states (we do not distinguish between states that were occupied for long periods of time, such as Poland from the 1790s to 1919, and those whose loss of independence was short, such as Belgium during WWII). Finally, we code states purposefully created by other states, usually to serve as buffers between rivals (such as Uruguay's construction in the 1820s by France, Britain, Argentina and Brazil), as Births by Agreement. States that gain independence when a central government disintegrates, and that were not colonies but instead were considered part of the prior state, are coded as births by Imperial Fragmentation. Finally, former colonies that were granted independence by the metropole either abruptly or without any concerted effort to develop local administrative capacity, and without any ongoing war of independence, are coded as instances of birth by Derelict Decolonization.

Our intention in creating the birth legacy variable is to offer a measure that indicates increasing capacity and legitimacy as we move from worse (e.g., Derelict Decolonization) to better (e.g., Indigenous Generation) birth types. The validity of our measure is demonstrated by the correlations

reported in the body of the paper between birth legacy and states' first year values of pre-existing measures of capacity and legitimacy. In addition, here we provide discussion of why we think different birth types correspond with different levels of capacity and legitimacy, and specifically why we think better births generate, or at least are associated with, higher capacity and legitimacy.

When states came into existence through an indigenous process, one not involving foreign conquest or colonialism, the state and nation have a greater chance to evolve together. This enhances legitimacy, because the process of settling what Wimmer (2002) calls the "cultural compromise" or put otherwise, of deciding who is and who is not a member of the nation, is worked out without external interference. By the time an indigenously generated state has emerged as a member of the international system, it has addressed questions of who belongs, who leads, and whether citizens/subjects are loyal. Such births are expected to experience the highest legitimacy and capacity, because in settling the cultural compromise, and in establishing the state, sources of division among the population and threats to the leaders have to be addressed as part of the process. Overwhelmingly violence is an important part of this birth process, because those opposed to the creation of the state resist and have to be suppressed. The few examples of states in the modern international system that were born by peaceful indigenous generation seem very idiosyncratic. Examples include Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino, which were too small to threaten external state makers, and small enough not to contain disparate populations. Their initial emergence (and continued survival) are not the norm, which is that Indigenous Generation states have settled their internal nation-building debates with violence.

When violent secession leads to the creation of a new state, legitimacy and capacity are both expected to be relatively high. The reasons for this are straightforward. For the secessionists to prevail, they have to defeat an existing state. They have to win their war of national liberation. In order to do this the population of the secessionist or anti-colonial area has to support the secession. If they don't, the rump or colonizer will be able to play one part of the population off against another, enjoying an enhanced probability of defeating the independence movement by dividing and conquering. Similarly, the leadership of the independence movement has to have high capacity in order to prevail against an already existing state. The already existing state has the benefit of

a military, a government, tax structures, and the other characteristics of established government. At least at first, the existing state's government is both more capable and more legitimate than the secessionists. In short, the secessionists have to earn their freedom by governing their claimed territory and population well enough to be able to draw from it the resources necessary to prevail in their independence struggle.

Peaceful Secession does not contribute as much to the development of capacity, though states born in this way might enjoy substantial legitimacy. In order to be granted a non-violent exit from an existing state, the secessionists have to convince the existing state that it would be better off without them. This could arise in at least two ways. First, it could be that the group that wants independence is so different from the population in the rump that their continued union is unattractive. But, this alone is unlikely if there are other different types of populations within the remainder of the state, as a dangerous precedent would be set by letting the first different population secede non-violently (this reasoning is developed at greater length by Barbara Walter [2006]). More likely is a second scenario, one in which the group desiring independence is able to convince the existing state government that suppressing their secessionist impulse violently will be too costly. This is most likely when the group seeking to secede is not only different (and thus internally coherent and unified and thus its leaders enjoy greater legitimacy) but also capable. The capability of the resulting new state will be reasonably high by connection, but we would argue less high than would be the case in instances where the independence movement has to fight to win its freedom. In violent secessions the government of the new state is tested by the war. In peaceful secessions, that capacity is suspected, rather than tested. Considering all of the factors that influence whether an existing state will permit part of its territory to secede non-violently, it is not surprising that this is, by far, the most rare form of state birth.

Births by agreement come in three types. A first type is states re-born after conquest and occupation by other states. Often in the wake of general wars the victors force the losers to free subject peoples conquered earlier. The resurrection of Poland at the Treaty of Versailles, or the liberation of conquered and occupied European states in World War II, are good examples. In these instances there is a basis for legitimacy in the earlier existence of a coherent Poland, which

the government of a newly re-born Poland might enjoy. But, that legitimacy is tarnished by the fact that the original state was not strong enough, perhaps not unified and coherent enough, to withstand foreign conquest and occupation. The capacity of such states is moderate at best, because while the pre-existence of an indigenous government means there are groups of people who know how to run a state (and this is particularly true when the re-born state was not occupied for very long), they did not run the state well enough to stave off conquest by the foreign foe.

A second type of birth by agreement occurs when a colonizer sets out deliberately to liberate one of its colonies, and puts in place a process of gradually relinquishing power as the indigenous administration matures. Such deliberate decolonization likely produces states with moderate levels of legitimacy and capacity. The legitimacy lies in the reasoned, patient construction of a new indigenous government. But that might only go so far, because many of the instances of deliberate decolonization are of so-called settler colonies, colonial possessions in which a substantial number of metropole citizens migrated to the colony. In states built from such colonies, the settlers might constitute a source of divided loyalty by remaining more loyal to the former colonizer than to the new indigenous government. It is also the case that colonies often have artificial borders, grouping together populations of disparate ethnic, religious and linguistic peoples. The differences among these groups can challenge the legitimacy of the new states government. In terms of capacity, while states born by deliberate decolonization have far better prospects than do states decolonized precipitously and without prior planning, it is still likely the case that there is a capacity deficit due to the fact that the new government is supported substantially by the outgoing and then former colonial state. This crutch may smooth the transition to independence, but it does not force the new state to stand fully on its own two legs.

A third and final form of birth by agreement occurs when existing states agree to the creation of a new state, usually as a buffer between rivals. These states have only moderate capacity and legitimacy because they are often artificial nations, cobbled together in order to create some breathing room between rivals and thereby hopefully avoid wars between them. The creation of these states does not serve an internal purpose, since it is unlikely an indigenous state would have arisen within this territory. More likely the rivals would have fought over it until one defeated

the other, and then absorbed and forcibly assimilated the inhabitants. While it is clearly more pleasant for the people in these areas to have a state given to them by foreign interference, the process does not promise high levels of either legitimacy or capacity. Like states born by deliberate decolonization, these states likely depend to a large extent on their foreign patrons for assistance once independent.

Imperial Fragmentation and Derelict Decolonization are the final two birth types. States born in these ways are not expected to enjoy much capacity or legitimacy, because the process of their formation does not require the succeeding administrations to be capable and the context of their emergence does not incentivize their leaders to make the hard choices to promote capacity and legitimacy. In both instances states are born because an existing administration abandons the territory in question. With Imperial Fragmentation the central government loses control of some or all of its territory; and these territories were considered to be part of the original state. With Derelict Decolonization, the metropole essentially abandons a colonial territory by dismantling its colonial administration, granting the territory independence, and doing so in a short time period without adequate preparation of the new indigenous administrators who will succeed the colonial government. While the two types look similar, states born by Imperial Fragmentation will generally have higher legitimacy and capacity than will states born by Derelict Decolonization because the states that emerge from the dissolution of an imperial center (as happened when the Austro-Hungarian empire was dissolved after WWI, or when the Soviet Union disintegrated at the end of the Cold War) were almost always first order administrative units of that empire (Roeder (2007) discusses the prospect for state emergence from the population of first order administrative units). They were a local administration, and thus had some administrative experience and thus likely some political capacity. They existed for some time as a recognizable subset, and thus have some claim to legitimacy with and loyalty from their citizens. In contrast, when colonies are abandoned by the metropole, the colonial administrators generally go home too, and historically rarely took the trouble to develop indigenous administrative capacity. Further, many of these former colonies did not exist as recognizable, coherent polities prior to colonization, instead being myriad chiefdoms, and other small-scale polities combined into colonies to advance the economic and/or military

interests of the colonizers. Hence, while neither birth type is auspicious, Imperial Fragmentation probably generates slightly better states than does Derelict Decolonization.

As can be seen from this discussion, the process of coding a state's birth type is not as subjective as might be feared at first blush. The characteristics of a state's emergence rather easily fall into one of the categories described above. If an independence movement involved violent struggle, it was either an Indigenous Generation or a Violent Secession. Where the initial emergence of the state was not marked by conflict, it was most likely a Peaceful Secession, Birth by Agreement, or emergence through Imperial Fragmentation or Derelict Decolonization. Another clear characteristic of a state's emergence is what it was, politically, before emergence. If it was a part of an existing state, its birth type is either Violent Secession, Peaceful Secession, or Birth by Agreement. If it was a first order administrative unit of an existing state, its birth was either one of the Secession types, or Imperial Fragmentation. If it was a colony, its birth was either a Violent Secession, a Birth by Agreement, or an instance of Derelict Decolonization. In instances other than Indigenous Generation, what the existing state did is also generally quite clear. If it was granted independence without conflict, the birth was a Peaceful Secession, a Birth by Agreement, Imperial Fragmentation or Derelict Decolonization. If the existing state helped the new state into existence, the birth was either Peaceful Secession or Birth by Agreement. In short, it is relatively straightforward to apply the coding scheme developed here to the historical record in a reliable way.

Validity is more of a concern. We have attempted in this section to explain why we think that capacity and legitimacy vary systematically with birth types. Our correlational analysis in the main body of the paper supports our claim by showing close associations between birth legacy and established measures of capacity and legitimacy. But what about grey areas where coding a specific case is not terribly clear? In truth, there are some threats to the validity (and reliability) of our birth legacy coding which we detail here in the interests of full disclosure. Subsequent scholars interested in further developing data about birth legacies might make substantial contributions by devising better coding schemes to defend against the following threats.

A first type of validity concern arises when external support causes the birth and thus, at least partially, reflects the capacity of the intervening state. An example is provided by Bangladesh's

birth in 1971. Bangladesh emerged from a conflict that began as an especially bloody civil war within Pakistan. India became involved as refugees from East Pakistan began to flood into India. Pakistan panicked, attacked India pre-emptively, and India took this now-interstate war as an opportunity to weaken permanently its rival. It then fought Pakistan to a standstill, prevented forces from West Pakistan from reaching East Pakistan, and thus permitted the Bengali rebels in East Pakistan to win their civil war. As a component of the ceasefire ending hostilities between India and Pakistan, the government in Islamabad had to recognize Bangladesh's independence. In our dataset Bangladesh is coded as a favorable birth, one by violent secession. But in reality, Bangladesh was not likely to have emerged absent Indian intervention. (COW intrastate war 782, and interstate war 178 are the relevant conflicts, introductions to these conflicts are provided by Sarkees and Wayman (2010), pages 162-3 and 427). In instances like this we have coded the births as though they required capacity and legitimacy in the emergent state. We ignore the foreign interference, and thus introduce a conservative bias against finding support for our hypotheses.

A second sort of validity concern arises when a birth appears to be non-violent only because a few years of truce intercede between violence and independence. In such instances, it may well have been the severity of the violence the would-be new state was able to generate that convinces the colonizers (for example) that they cannot continue long term to control the territory. An example is offered by Kenya's birth. Kenya officially was born in 1963 when the British colonial administration departed after extremely limited preparation. We code Kenya as a birth by derelict decolonization. However, from 1952 to 1956 COW codes a war between indigenous Kenyan forces (the Mau Mau) and British colonial administration that resulted in over 17,000 battle deaths (this is COW extra-state war 464; Sarkees and Wayman 2010:316-317). This war clearly indicated to the British that continued occupation of Kenya was going to be far too costly, and thus this war convinced them to leave. Because the British were worried about demonstration effects in other colonial possessions, however, they did not leave immediately. This delay does not mean that Kenya's new government had neither legitimacy nor capacity. In fact, it clearly had a lot of capacity as Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first president and a leader of the Kikuyu community that produced the Mau Mau uprising, enjoyed the highest of legitimacy and approval within the new

country. It is also possible that Kenyatta's Kenya African Union developed administrative capacity during the insurgency. Thus, Kenya was probably in much better shape administratively in 1963 than its coding as a derelict decolonization would indicate. Again, our coding decision introduces a conservative bias against finding support for our hypotheses.

It is likely that other instances of births not fully representing the intention of our coding scheme could or have occurred. One hypothetical that occurs to us is the possibility of a peaceful secession that succeeded only because the secessionists secured their independence while the rump was engaged in a war with another country or elsewhere within the country. In such an instance the inherent legitimacy or capacity of the new state born by allegedly peaceful secession would not have caused the rump to permit the seceding entity to leave; rather it would have been the preoccupation of the rump with a larger, separate war that created ideal conditions for the seceding entity to sneak out of the state and gain independence. No instances of this occur in our dataset and so there are no actual validity concerns on this point.

We have presented these elaborations and commentaries on our coding scheme in hopes of providing more transparency about how we have coded our primary independent variable. We believe our birth legacy variable reliably and validly represents the initial endowments of capacity and legitimacy it is intended to represent, and thus fairly represents the theoretical concept at the heart of our argument. The logic and examples presented here, and the correlations presented in the body of the paper, certainly support our assertion. Subsequent research may further substantiate our concept and variable.

3 Results Table for Primary Censored Probit Models

The main manuscript does not contain the results table of our primary set of censored probit models. Standard results tables of censored probit models do not allow one to assess whether the joint probability of a state fighting and winning a war in a given year varies as a function of birth type. Because of its limited utility and our desire to stay under the journal's page limit, we present the results here in Table SA-1 instead of in the main manuscript.

Table SA-1: Censored Probit Model with Birth Legacy Measured as Six-Point Scalar

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Y2: Win War			
Birth Legacy	0.049	0.049	0.036
	(0.042)	(0.073)	(0.048)
Age	-0.050	0.011	-0.075
	(0.049)	(0.084)	(0.059)
Europe	0.200	0.179	0.433*
	(0.135)	(0.196)	(0.188)
Africa	-0.086	0.045	-0.206
	(0.171)	(0.464)	(0.178)
Constant	0.996*	0.164	1.660***
	(0.489)	(1.147)	(0.481)
Y1: War Participation			
Birth Legacy	0.080***	0.078***	0.071***
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Age	0.028	0.008	0.073**
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Europe	-0.283***	-0.158*	-0.368***
	(0.055)	(0.067)	(0.073)
Africa	0.003	-0.384**	0.113
	(0.069)	(0.127)	(0.076)
Number of Neighbors	0.031***	0.040***	0.019*
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Time	-0.041***	-0.016**	-0.042***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.903***	-2.376***	-2.098***
	(0.084)	(0.111)	(0.102)
ρ	-0.495*	-0.192	-0.747*
	(0.244)	(0.430)	(0.295)
N	13209.000	13210.000	13209.000
chi2	6.769	2.065	12.416
p	0.149	0.724	0.015
ll	-2208.432	-1090.747	-1440.167

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4 Primary Models with Alternative Birth Legacy Variables

Our first set of robustness checks re-estimated our primary censored probits with our alternative measures of a state's birth legacy. Table SA-2 reports estimates of models that use a dichotomous measure of birth legacy while Figure SA-1 reports the difference in the joint probability of states fighting and winning a war across birth type. Table SA-3 reports estimates of models that use a dichotomous measure of birth legacy while Figure SA-2 reports differences in the joint probability of fighting and winning a war across birth type. Importantly, our results hold with these alternative measures of a state's birth legacy.

Table SA-2: Censored Probit Model with Birth Legacy Measured as Dichotomous Indicator

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Y2: Win War			
Good Birth	0.123	0.246	0.005
	(0.147)	(0.255)	(0.160)
Age	-0.038	-0.001	-0.055
	(0.048)	(0.083)	(0.056)
Europe	0.220	0.175	0.461*
	(0.131)	(0.192)	(0.180)
Africa	-0.118	0.054	-0.251
	(0.167)	(0.469)	(0.168)
Constant	1.122**	0.300	1.798***
	(0.423)	(1.040)	(0.392)
Y1: War Participation			
Good Birth	0.297***	0.288***	0.268***
	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.058)
Age	0.025	0.004	0.072**
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Europe	-0.265***	-0.142*	-0.350***
	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.072)
Africa	-0.047	-0.435***	0.073
	(0.067)	(0.124)	(0.073)
Number of Neighbors	0.032***	0.042***	0.019*
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Time	-0.041***	-0.015**	-0.042***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.744***	-2.219***	-1.960***
	(0.073)	(0.097)	(0.089)
ρ	-0.518*	-0.210	-0.795**
	(0.242)	(0.422)	(0.291)
N	13209.000	13210.000	13209.000
chi2	6.040	2.455	12.291
p	0.196	0.653	0.015
ll	-2205.399	-1088.019	-1439.158

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-1: Difference across Birth Type in Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

Table SA-3: Censored Probit Model with Birth Legacy Measured as Trichotomous Indicator

	War	Interstate	Civil
Y2: Win War			
Trichotomous Legacy	0.09	0.15	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.09)
Age	-0.04	0.00	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Europe	0.22	0.18	0.45*
	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Africa	-0.10	0.06	-0.22
	(0.17)	(0.47)	(0.17)
(Intercept)	1.07*	0.16	1.75***
	(0.43)	(1.06)	(0.41)
Y1: War Participation			
Trichotomous Legacy	0.13***	0.13**	0.11**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.04	0.02	0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Europe	-0.25***	-0.13	-0.33***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Africa	-0.03	-0.41**	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Number of Neighbors	0.03***	0.04***	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time	-0.04***	-0.02**	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time^2	0.00***	0.00	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time^3	-0.00**	-0.00	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(Intercept)	-1.79***	-2.27***	-1.99***
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)
ρ	-0.51*	-0.18	-0.77**
	(0.23)	(0.41)	(0.28)
N	13209.00	13210.00	13209.00
aic	4460.79	2216.98	2919.63
ll	-2215.396	-1093.489	-1444.813

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-2: Difference across Birth Type in Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

5 Sartori Estimator

As discussed in the manuscript, poorly identified censored probits can produce biased estimates and lead to incorrect substantive inferences (e.g., Brandt and Schneider 2007). We therefore used Sartori's selection model to jointly estimate war participation and outcomes as a robustness check against the possibility our inferences were driven by poor identification. The models reported in this section include as explanatory variables in both the selection and outcome equations a measure of birth legacy, a state's logged age, whether it is located in Europe or Africa, and the cubic polynomial of the number of years since its last war. Models that include a state's number of neighbors and exclude the cubic polynomial of time lead to the same results reported here.

Table SA-4: Sartori Selection Models with Birth Legacy as Six-Point Scale

	War	Interstate	Civil
Y2: Win War			
Birth Legacy	0.10***	0.08**	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age	0.04	0.06	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Europe	-0.14*	-0.02	-0.22**
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Africa	-0.01	-0.36*	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.10)
Time	-0.04***	-0.02**	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$Time^2$	0.00	0.00	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Time^3$	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(Intercept)	-2.16***	-2.64***	-2.36***
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Y1: War Participation			
Birth Legacy	0.08***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.06**	0.06*	0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Europe	-0.21***	-0.07	-0.33***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Africa	0.01	-0.37**	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Time	-0.04***	-0.02***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$Time^2$	0.00***	0.00	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Time^3$	-0.00**	-0.00	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(Intercept)	-1.83***	-2.30***	-2.04***
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)
N	13214.00	13215.00	13214.00
aic	4464.15	2232.18	2909.81
ll	-2216.077	-1100.088	-1438.906

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-3: Difference across Birth Type in Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

Table SA-5: Sartori Selection Models with Good Birth Dummy

	War	Interstate	Civil
Y2: Win War			
Good Birth	0.33***	0.31***	0.31***
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Age	0.05	0.06	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Europe	-0.11	-0.00	-0.20*
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Africa	-0.07	-0.40*	0.00
	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.09)
Time	-0.04***	-0.02**	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$Time^2$	0.00	0.00	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Time^3$	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(Intercept)	-1.96***	-2.46***	-2.17***
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Y1: War Participation			
Good Birth	0.28***	0.26***	0.26***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age	0.06**	0.06*	0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Europe	-0.19***	-0.05	-0.31***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Africa	-0.03	-0.41***	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.07)
Time	-0.04***	-0.02***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$Time^2$	0.00***	0.00	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Time^3$	-0.00**	-0.00	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(Intercept)	-1.68***	-2.14***	-1.91***
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)
N	13214.00	13215.00	13214.00
aic	4459.99	2228.76	2909.72
ll	-2213.994	-1098.378	-1438.860

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$



Figure SA-4: Difference across Birth Type in Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

Table SA-6: Sartori Selection Model with Birth Legacy as Trichotomous Indicator

	War	Interstate	Civil
Y2: Win War			
Trichotomous Legacy	0.16***	0.15*	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Age	0.06*	0.08	0.10**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Europe	-0.10	0.01	-0.18*
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Africa	-0.05	-0.38*	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.10)
Time	-0.04***	-0.02**	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$Time^2$	0.00	0.00	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Time^3$	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(Intercept)	-2.02***	-2.53***	-2.21***
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Y1: War Participation			
Trichotomous Legacy	0.12***	0.11**	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.07***	0.08*	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Europe	-0.17***	-0.04	-0.30***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Africa	-0.02	-0.40**	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Time	-0.05***	-0.02***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$Time^2$	0.00***	0.00	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Time^3$	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(Intercept)	-1.72***	-2.19***	-1.94***
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)
N	13214.00	13215.00	13214.00
aic	4477.82	2237.90	2920.20

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-5: Difference across Birth Type in Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

6 Competing Risks Models

We also estimated the relationship between birth legacy and war outcomes using a set of competing risks models via multinomial logit estimators that account for duration dependence with the cubic polynomial of the number of years that a state has been at peace (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Diagnostics indicated that our specifications did not violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. These models assumed a baseline category of peace and that a state could "fail" in a given year either fighting a war and winning or fighting a war and not winning. This modeling set-up allows us to identify both the probability of a state being at peace or war in a given year (H1) and the probability of a state winning a war in a given year (H2).

Table SA-7 reports our models that use the six-point scale *Birth Legacy* to measure a state's birth legacy. In order to ease interpretation, Figure SA-6 reports the difference across birth type in the probabilities of a state being at peace (dashed blue line) and a state fighting and winning a war (solid red line) in a given year. As the confidence interval around the dashed blue line remains below the zero-line and the confidence interval around the solid red line remains above the zero-line in all three panels, Figure SA-6 tells us that a good birth state has a higher probability of winning a war in a given year and a lower probability of being at peace in a given year. These relationships are consistent with our argument about war participation and outcomes across birth type and hold for war in general, interstate wars, and civil wars.

Table SA-7: Competing Risks Models with Six-Point Birth Legacy Measure

	War		Interstate War		Civil War	
	Win	$NotWin$	Win	$NotWin$	Win	$NotWin$
(Intercept)	-4.19^{**}	-3.98^{**}	-5.59^{**}	-4.83^{**}	-4.63^{**}	-4.60^{**}
	0.25	0.28	0.42	0.39	0.31	0.37
Birth Legacy	0.25^{**}	$0.09^{\dagger}$	0.25^{**}	$0.12^{\dagger}$	0.25^{**}	0.06
	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.06
Age	0.11^{*}	0.14^{*}	$0.17^{\dagger}$	0.13	0.18^{**}	0.24^{**}
	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.10
Europe	-0.34^{*}	-0.62^{**}	-0.03	-0.34	-0.55^{**}	-1.24^{**}
	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.21	0.31
Africa	-0.03	0.08	$-0.97^{\dagger}$	-1.09^{*}	0.14	$0.43^{\dagger}$
	0.22	0.22	0.53	0.49	0.24	0.25
Time	-0.10^{**}	-0.09^{**}	-0.05^{**}	-0.05^{**}	-0.10^{**}	-0.10^{**}
	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Time^2	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}	0.00	0.00	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Time^3	-0.00^{*}	0.00^{*}	-0.00	0.00	$-0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00^{**}
	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
N	13215		13215		13214	
AIC	4465.49		2230.99		2908.18	
$\log L$	-2216.74		-1099.50		-1438.09	

Baseline category is peace.

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$



Figure SA-6: Difference across Birth Type in Probabilities of Being at Peace and Winning a War

Table SA-8 reports our models that use the dummy variable *Good Birth* to measure a state's birth legacy. In order to ease interpretation, Figure SA-7 reports the difference across birth type in the probabilities of 1) a state being at peace in a given year (dashed blue line); and 2) a state fighting and winning a war in a given year (solid red line). As the confidence interval around the dashed blue line remains below the zero-line and the confidence interval around the solid red line remains above the zero-line in all three panels, Figure SA-7 tells us that a good birth state has a higher probability of winning a war in a given year and a lower probability of being at peace in a given year. These relationships are consistent with our argument about war participation and outcomes across birth type and hold for war in general, interstate wars, and civil wars.

Table SA-8: Competing Risks Models with Good Birth

	War		Interstate War		Civil War	
	Win	$NotWin$	Win	$NotWin$	Win	$NotWin$
(Intercept)	-3.66^{**}	-3.82^{**}	-5.08^{**}	-4.56^{**}	-4.08^{**}	-4.54^{**}
	0.21	0.24	0.35	0.33	0.26	0.33
Good Birth	0.80^{**}	0.41^{**}	0.88^{**}	0.41^{*}	0.80^{**}	0.40^{*}
	0.15	0.16	0.24	0.23	0.18	0.21
Age	0.12^{*}	0.13^{*}	0.17^{*}	0.13	0.19^{**}	0.21^{*}
	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.10
Europe	-0.26^{*}	-0.60^{**}	0.04	-0.30	-0.45^{*}	-1.25^{**}
	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.21	0.31
Africa	-0.17	0.05	-1.10^{*}	-1.17^{**}	-0.01	0.46^{*}
	0.22	0.21	0.53	0.48	0.24	0.24
Time	-0.10^{**}	-0.09^{**}	-0.05^{**}	-0.05^{**}	-0.11^{**}	-0.10^{**}
	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Time^2	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}	0.00	0.00	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Time^3	-0.00^{*}	0.00^{*}	-0.00	0.00	-0.00^{*}	0.00^{**}
	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
N	13215		13215		13214	
AIC	4462.97		2227.70		2908.05	
$\log L$	-2215.49		-1097.85		-1438.02	

Baseline category is peace.

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$



Figure SA-7: Difference across Birth Type in Probabilities of Being at Peace and Winning a War

Table SA-9 reports our models that use the variable *Trichotomous Legacy* to measure a state's birth legacy. In order to ease interpretation, Figure SA-8 reports the difference across birth type in the probabilities of a state being at peace (dashed blue line) and a state fighting and winning a war (solid red line) in a given year. As the confidence interval around the dashed blue line remains below the zero-line and the confidence interval around the solid red line remains above the zero-line in all three panels, Figure SA-8 tells us that a good birth state has a higher probability of winning a war in a given year and a lower probability of being at peace in a given year. Again, these relationships are consistent with our argument about war participation and outcomes across birth type and hold for war in general, interstate wars, and civil wars.

Table SA-9: Competing Risks Models with Trichotomous Indicator

	War		Interstate War		Civil War	
	Win	$NotWin$	Win	$NotWin$	Win	$NotWin$
(Intercept)	-3.82^{**}	-3.83^{**}	-5.29^{**}	-4.60^{**}	-4.22^{**}	-4.52^{**}
	0.23	0.25	0.39	0.35	0.28	0.35
Trichotomous Legacy	0.41^{**}	0.12	0.46^{**}	0.13	0.39^{**}	0.10
	0.10	0.10	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.13
Age	0.15^{**}	0.16^{*}	0.21^{*}	0.17	0.22^{**}	0.24^{**}
	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.09
Europe	-0.23	-0.57^{**}	0.05	-0.28	-0.43^{*}	-1.22^{**}
	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.21	0.31
Africa	-0.11	0.03	$-1.02^{\dagger}$	-1.19^{**}	0.04	$0.41^{\dagger}$
	0.22	0.21	0.54	0.48	0.24	0.25
Time	-0.11^{**}	-0.09^{**}	-0.06^{**}	-0.05^{**}	-0.11^{**}	-0.10^{**}
	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Time^2	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}	0.00	0.00	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Time^3	-0.00^{*}	0.00^{*}	-0.00	0.00	-0.00^{*}	0.00^{**}
	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
N	13215		13215		13214	
AIC	4479.68		2236.017		2919.10	
$\log L$	-2223.84		-1102.01		-1443.55	

Baseline category is peace.

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$



Figure SA-8: Difference across Birth Type in Probabilities of Being at Peace and Winning a War

7 Interaction with Age

There are multiple reasons why the relationship between a state's birth legacy and war participation and outcomes might vary over time (see the main manuscript for a discussion of a few of these scenarios). To account for this possibility, we estimated a set of models that interacted a state's birth legacy with its (logged) age. The results of these models are reported in Table SA-10. Our use of a multiplicative interaction term limits limits the inferences we can draw about the relationship between birth legacy, a state's age, and war participation. Accordingly, Figure SA-9 reports the difference in the probability of war participation across birth type in Row 1 and the difference in the joint probability of fighting and winning a war in Row 2. From Column 1, we see that, on average, states with positive birth legacies are statistically more likely to fight and fight and win a war during the 200 years after their births. Pooling interstate and civil wars together, though, masks important dynamics. From Column 2, we see that, as they get older, states with positive birth legacies are increasingly likely to fight and win interstate wars than states with negative birth experiences (differences become significant at age 12). In contrast, Column 3 indicates that states with positive birth experiences are more likely to fight and win civil wars than states with poor birth legacies for their first 111 years, but not after. We are hesitant to engage in too much post-hoc theorizing, but these results suggest states with positive birth legacies might have a harder time credibly committing to interstate bargains but are able to consolidate control over domestic politics more quickly than states with negative birth legacies. Regardless of the reason, though, it does appear that a state's age influences its involvement and the outcomes of interstate and civil wars.

Table SA-10: Censored Probit Model with Interaction between Birth Legacy and Age

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Birth Legacy	0.120	0.077	0.096
	(0.091)	(0.173)	(0.106)
Age	0.045	0.052	0.000
	(0.117)	(0.243)	(0.127)
Birth Legacy*Age	-0.023	-0.010	-0.019
	(0.026)	(0.055)	(0.030)
Europe	0.228	0.182	0.469*
	(0.137)	(0.200)	(0.190)
Africa	-0.078	0.057	-0.199
	(0.169)	(0.473)	(0.176)
Constant	0.791	0.092	1.472*
	(0.534)	(1.093)	(0.588)
War Participation			
Birth Legacy	0.059	-0.068	0.108*
	(0.038)	(0.054)	(0.045)
Age	0.000	-0.192*	0.118*
	(0.050)	(0.075)	(0.059)
Birth Legacy*Age	0.007	0.046**	-0.012
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Europe	-0.284***	-0.165*	-0.369***
	(0.055)	(0.067)	(0.073)
Africa	-0.002	-0.426***	0.121
	(0.070)	(0.129)	(0.077)
Number of Neighbors	0.030***	0.037***	0.020*
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Time	-0.041***	-0.013*	-0.043***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.819***	-1.786***	-2.241***
	(0.162)	(0.222)	(0.193)
ρ	-0.539*	-0.211	-0.775**
	(0.249)	(0.471)	(0.292)
N	13209.000	13210.000	13209.000
chi2	7.502	2.121	13.154
p	0.186	0.832	0.022
ll	-2207.939	-1086.437	-1439.388

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-9: Difference across Birth Type in Probability of Fighting and the Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

8 Regime Type

As noted in the paper, our primary models do not control for a state's regime type because it represents an intervening variable between a state's birth type and war participation (see more on this in Section 18.1). However, we recognize the importance of regime type to our understanding of conflict onset and outcomes. We therefore estimated a set of models that control for a state's regime type using the 21-point *Polity2* index (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). Importantly, we continue to find that states with positive birth legacies are more likely to fight wars (bottom half of Table SA-11) and fight and win wars (Figure SA-10) than states with negative birth legacies.

Table SA-11: Censored Probit Models with Control for Regime Type

	War	Interstate	Civil
Birth Legacy	0.061	0.103	0.033
	(0.043)	(0.079)	(0.048)
Age	-0.050	-0.007	-0.066
	(0.051)	(0.093)	(0.062)
Europe	0.180	0.067	0.441*
	(0.136)	(0.208)	(0.190)
Africa	-0.041	0.149	-0.173
	(0.169)	(0.464)	(0.181)
Regime Type	0.017	0.045**	-0.008
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Constant	0.971*	-0.118	1.660***
	(0.469)	(1.199)	(0.470)
War Participation			
Birth Legacy	0.072***	0.073***	0.059***
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Age	0.015	-0.004	0.059*
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Europe	-0.272***	-0.151*	-0.351***
	(0.057)	(0.071)	(0.075)
Africa	-0.042	-0.400**	0.047
	(0.071)	(0.129)	(0.078)
Number of Neighbors	0.027***	0.039***	0.015
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Regime Type	-0.009*	-0.005	-0.010*
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Time	-0.039***	-0.014*	-0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.736***	-2.285***	-1.883***
	(0.094)	(0.126)	(0.112)
ρ	-0.582*	-0.264	-0.730*
	(0.264)	(0.461)	(0.312)
N	12084.000	12085.000	12084.000
chi2	9.614	10.578	10.940
p	0.087	0.060	0.053
ll	-2104.476	-1003.807	-1403.194

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-10: Difference across Birth Type in the Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

9 Capabilities

As with regime type, our primary analyses do not control for capabilities because a state's capabilities represent an intervening variable between birth type and war participation and outcomes (more on this in Section 18.1). Here, we report results that add a state's CINC score (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972) to the participation and outcome stages of the censored probit models. As the bottom half of Table SA-12 and Figure SA-11 indicate, we continue to find that states with positive birth legacies are more likely to fight and fight and win wars than states with negative birth legacies even after we control for a state's capabilities.

Table SA-12: Censored Probit Models with Control for Capabilities

	War	Interstate	Civil
Birth Legacy	0.029	0.035	0.015
	(0.042)	(0.071)	(0.048)
Age	-0.066	-0.028	-0.079
	(0.053)	(0.091)	(0.064)
Europe	0.118	0.131	0.357
	(0.153)	(0.205)	(0.214)
Africa	-0.047	0.038	-0.169
	(0.178)	(0.482)	(0.187)
Capabilities	3.884*	3.528	4.127
	(1.785)	(2.459)	(2.472)
Constant	0.841	-0.213	1.533**
	(0.571)	(1.333)	(0.556)
War Participation			
Birth Legacy	0.065***	0.061**	0.057**
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Age	0.019	-0.008	0.070*
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.028)
Europe	-0.319***	-0.183**	-0.401***
	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.075)
Africa	0.001	-0.386**	0.115
	(0.070)	(0.127)	(0.076)
Number of Neighbors	0.026***	0.035***	0.014
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Capabilities	2.103***	1.991***	2.024***
	(0.478)	(0.590)	(0.597)
Time	-0.040***	-0.014**	-0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.835***	-2.289***	-2.046***
	(0.085)	(0.114)	(0.103)
ρ	-0.374	0.001	-0.639*
	(0.276)	(0.517)	(0.319)
N	13209.000	13210.000	13209.000
chi2	9.869	3.895	13.024
p	0.079	0.565	0.023
ll	-2194.347	-1084.112	-1431.545

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-11: Difference across Birth Type in the Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

10 Regime Type and Capabilities

We also estimated three sets of models that include measures of a state's regime type and capabilities in the selection and outcome equations of the censored probits. Table SA-13 reports the estimates from models using our six-point measure of a state's birth legacy. Figure SA-12 reports the difference in the joint probability of fighting and winning a war across birth type. These models are consistent with our primary analyses: states with positive birth legacies are statistically more likely to fight and fight and win wars than states with less positive birth legacies.

Table SA-13: Censored Probit Model with Controls and Birth Legacy Measured as Six-Point Scale

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Y2: Win War			
Birth Legacy	0.042	0.091	0.013
	(0.043)	(0.076)	(0.048)
Age	-0.071	-0.050	-0.076
	(0.056)	(0.102)	(0.066)
Europe	0.090	0.010	0.363
	(0.157)	(0.221)	(0.216)
Africa	-0.004	0.123	-0.137
	(0.176)	(0.496)	(0.189)
Capabilities	3.894*	3.679	4.011
	(1.879)	(2.752)	(2.492)
Regime Type	0.017	0.044**	-0.006
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Constant	0.841	-0.574	1.553**
	(0.554)	(1.413)	(0.537)
Y1: War Participation			
Birth Legacy	0.057***	0.056*	0.046*
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Age	0.009	-0.017	0.058*
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Europe	-0.308***	-0.176*	-0.385***
	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.077)
Africa	-0.045	-0.404**	0.048
	(0.071)	(0.130)	(0.078)
Number of Neighbors	0.022**	0.034***	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Capabilities	2.061***	1.957**	1.893**
	(0.494)	(0.612)	(0.619)
Regime Type	-0.010**	-0.006	-0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Time	-0.038***	-0.012*	-0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.660***	-2.189***	-1.828***
	(0.096)	(0.130)	(0.114)
ρ	-0.459	-0.027	-0.633
	(0.300)	(0.57)	(0.337)
N	12084.000	12085.000	12084.000
chi2	12.381	12.485	11.689
p	0.054	0.052	0.069
ll	-2091.130	-997.764	-1395.894

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-12: Difference across Birth Type in Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

Figure SA-13 reports the joint probability of a state fighting and winning a war in a given year based on the models reported in Table SA-14, which uses the dichotomous *Good Birth* to identify a state's birth type. As the confidence interval remains above the zero-line across the range of all three graphs, Figure SA-13 implies that the joint probability of fighting and winning a war in general (Panel A) and in the cases of interstate and civil war (Panels B and C, respectively) is higher given a good birth than it is given a bad birth.

Table SA-14: Censored Probit Model with Controls and Birth Legacy Measured with Dummy Variable

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Y2: Win War			
Good Birth	0.130	0.409	-0.051
	(0.148)	(0.259)	(0.162)
Age	-0.065	-0.061	-0.064
	(0.055)	(0.101)	(0.064)
Europe	0.098	0.011	0.378
	(0.154)	(0.217)	(0.211)
Africa	-0.028	0.113	-0.162
	(0.173)	(0.502)	(0.182)
Capabilities	4.050*	3.545	4.308
	(1.885)	(2.758)	(2.493)
Regime Type	0.016	0.043**	-0.008
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Constant	0.921	-0.322	1.629***
	(0.506)	(1.337)	(0.477)
Y1: War Participation			
Good Birth	0.201***	0.191**	0.173**
	(0.052)	(0.072)	(0.061)
Age	0.009	-0.016	0.058*
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Europe	-0.293***	-0.161*	-0.373***
	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.076)
Africa	-0.080	-0.443***	0.025
	(0.069)	(0.126)	(0.075)
Number of Neighbors	0.023**	0.035***	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Capabilities	2.081***	1.972**	1.903**
	(0.488)	(0.607)	(0.610)
Regime Type	-0.010**	-0.006	-0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Time	-0.038***	-0.012*	-0.040***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.550***	-2.076***	-1.744***
	(0.083)	(0.111)	(0.100)
ρ	-0.455	-0.052	-0.650
	(0.299)	(0.561)	(0.335)
N	12084.000	12085.000	12084.000
chi2	12.056	13.024	12.084
p	0.061	0.043	0.060
ll	-2090.385	-996.828	-1395.409

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-13: Difference across Birth Type in Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

Figure SA-14 reports the joint probability of a state fighting and winning a war in a given year based on the models reported in Table SA-15, which uses *Trichotomous Legacy* to identify a state's birth type. The 95% confidence interval remains above the zero-line across the ranges of Panel A and B, indicating that the probability of fighting and winning a war in general (Panel A) and in the case of interstate civil war (Panel B) is higher given a good birth than it is given a bad birth. The confidence interval includes the zero-line in Panel C, indicating that good birth states are not statistically more likely to fight and win a civil war in a given year than are bad birth states. However, this relationship is statistically significant at the 90% level.

Table SA-15: Censored Probit Model with Controls and Birth Legacy Measured with Trichotomous Variable

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Y2: Win War			
Trichotomous Legacy	0.094	0.237	0.021
	(0.085)	(0.152)	(0.093)
Age	-0.070	-0.058	-0.074
	(0.055)	(0.100)	(0.065)
Europe	0.100	0.019	0.369
	(0.153)	(0.216)	(0.211)
Africa	-0.002	0.134	-0.138
	(0.175)	(0.503)	(0.187)
Capabilities	4.035*	3.841	4.134
	(1.893)	(2.759)	(2.499)
Regime Type	0.017	0.044**	-0.007
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Constant	0.885	-0.520	1.577**
	(0.509)	(1.343)	(0.489)
Y1: War Participation			
Trichotomous Legacy	0.088**	0.084	0.069
	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.037)
Age	0.018	-0.007	0.065*
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Europe	-0.283***	-0.152*	-0.365***
	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.076)
Africa	-0.073	-0.433***	0.024
	(0.071)	(0.129)	(0.077)
Number of Neighbors	0.021**	0.033***	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Capabilities	2.263***	2.143***	2.080***
	(0.483)	(0.599)	(0.604)
Regime Type	-0.011**	-0.007	-0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Time	-0.039***	-0.013*	-0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.564***	-2.094***	-1.747***
	(0.087)	(0.118)	(0.104)
ρ	-0.460	-0.016	-0.636
	(0.294)	(0.560)	(0.330)
N	12084.000	12085.000	12084.000
chi2	12.662	13.413	11.810
p	0.049	0.037	0.066
ll	-2094.006	-998.800	-1397.501

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-14: Difference across Birth Type in Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

11 Residualization

As discussed in the main manuscript, we used the process of "residualization" to identify the effect of *Birth Legacy* on war outcomes independent of the effects of *Capabilities* and *Regime Type*. The results of these models are reported in Table SA-16. We again use a figure to report the joint probability of a state fighting and winning a war in a given year. Our results are reported in Figure SA-15. As the 95% confidence interval remains completely above the zero-line across all of the graphs, Figure SA-15indicates that good birth states are more likely to fight and win a war in general (Panel A) and in the specific cases of interstate wars (Panel B) and civil wars (Panel C) than are bad birth states.

Table SA-16: Censored Probit Model with Controls and Birth Legacy

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Y2: Win War			
Birth Legacy*Residualized*	0.042	0.091	0.013
	(0.043)	(0.076)	(0.048)
Age	-0.071	-0.050	-0.076
	(0.056)	(0.102)	(0.066)
Europe	0.090	0.010	0.363
	(0.157)	(0.221)	(0.216)
Africa	-0.004	0.123	-0.137
	(0.176)	(0.496)	(0.189)
Capabilities	4.494*	4.977	4.197
	(2.039)	(2.975)	(2.587)
Regime Type	0.017	0.044**	-0.006
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Constant	0.995*	-0.240	1.601***
	(0.475)	(1.319)	(0.459)
Y1: War Participation			
Birth Legacy*Residualized*	0.057***	0.056*	0.046*
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Age	0.009	-0.017	0.058*
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Europe	-0.308***	-0.176*	-0.385***
	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.077)
Africa	-0.045	-0.404**	0.048
	(0.071)	(0.130)	(0.078)
Number of Neighbors	0.022**	0.034***	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Capabilities	2.869***	2.755***	2.547***
	(0.486)	(0.609)	(0.604)
Regime Type	-0.010**	-0.006	-0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Time	-0.038***	-0.012*	-0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.452***	-1.983***	-1.660***
	(0.081)	(0.108)	(0.097)
ρ	-0.459	-0.027	-0.633
	(0.300)	(0.570)	(0.337)
N	12084.000	12085.000	12084.000
chi2	12.381	12.485	11.689
p	0.054	0.052	0.069
ll	-2091.130	-997.764	-1395.894

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-15: Difference across Birth Type in Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

12 Time Periods

While successful state making in the past often involved war, some scholars question the role it plays in the contemporary interstate system (e.g., Herbst 2000, Centeno 2002). The end World War II and the end of the Cold War are often cited as important events that influence patterns of state development. We therefore estimated a set of models that control for these two time periods. Our results are presented in Table SA-17 and Figure SA-16. Importantly, our substantive findings continue to hold when we control for these two variables. Further, we find evidence that war (in all forms) has been less common in the post-1945 period and that states have been less likely to win wars and civil wars in the post-1989 period.

Table SA-17: Censored Probit Model with Time Periods Dummies

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Birth Legacy	-0.002	0.065	-0.039
	(0.041)	(0.076)	(0.043)
Age	-0.025	0.002	-0.039
	(0.048)	(0.086)	(0.056)
Europe	0.216	0.195	0.598**
	(0.138)	(0.209)	(0.189)
Africa	0.080	0.013	0.070
	(0.177)	(0.467)	(0.189)
Post-1945	-0.192	0.074	-0.255
	(0.143)	(0.236)	(0.179)
Post-1989	-0.396*	0.087	-0.647**
	(0.190)	(0.377)	(0.212)
Constant	1.358**	0.034	2.173***
	(0.431)	(1.137)	(0.366)
War Participation			
Birth Legacy	0.053***	0.047*	0.048*
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Age	0.029	0.012	0.071*
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.028)
Europe	-0.365***	-0.233**	-0.445***
	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.078)
Africa	0.054	-0.342**	0.158*
	(0.071)	(0.129)	(0.078)
Number of Neighbors	0.043***	0.052***	0.031***
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Post-1945	-0.229***	-0.202*	-0.215**
	(0.060)	(0.080)	(0.072)
Post-1989	-0.049	-0.164	0.015
	(0.068)	(0.105)	(0.078)
Time	-0.043***	-0.015**	-0.043***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000***	-0.000	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.728***	-2.197***	-1.945***
	(0.094)	(0.126)	(0.114)
ρ	-0.572*	-0.173	-0.900**
	(0.238)	(0.423)	(0.296)
N	13209.000	13210.000	13209.000
chi2	12.846	2.478	22.846
p	0.046	0.871	0.001
ll	-2192.442	-1084.377	-1423.809

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-16: Difference across Birth Type in the Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

13 GDP per Capita

A variable commonly included in models of war onset, especially in models of civil war onset, is GDP per capita. Our analyses did not include this variable because 1) reliable, cross-national GDP per capita data is sparse prior to 1950 and 2) one could argue that it represents an intervening variable.[1] However, we feel it is worth estimating a set of models that include GDP per capita as an explanatory variable given its prominence in quantitative studies of civil war onset. We use Maddison's (2008) data as they are available for a longer period of time, with observations for some countries that go back to the beginning of our data set. Even Maddison's data, though, has problems. Most notably, it is missing observations for almost over 28% of our cases (data for 9487 of 13215 cases). Importantly, these data are not missing randomly: states with poor birth legacies and older observations are more likely to be missing. This means the non-random estimation sample has less variation in our key concept of interest. With these points in mind, the first two columns in Table SA-18 and first row of Figure SA-17 indicate that our findings continue to hold when controlling for a state's (logged) GDP per capita. However, the third column of Table SA-18 and Panel C in Figure SA-17 suggest that there is no significant relationship between birth legacy and civil war participation and outcomes. The results are in the predicted direction, but the confidence interval overlaps zero in Panel C and the parameter estimates are not significant in Table SA-18. These results likely are at least partially driven by listwise deletion. To demonstrate this, we estimated a censored probit that did not include a measure of GDP per capita on the sample of cases in which GDP per capita is available. These results are reported in the fourth column of Table SA-18 and Panel D of Figure SA-17. These results suggest that birth legacy is unrelated to either civil war participation or outcomes (again, results in predicted direction but are insignificant). Given that this same specification on the full sample finds statistically significant relationships, this analysis implies the null findings when we control for GDP per capita are at least partially driven by the non-random sample that occurs due to missing observations in the GDP per capita series and the resulting listwise deletion.

[1] For what it is worth, birth legacy is a statistically significant predictor of GDP per capita in a bivariate regression model.

Table SA-18: Censored Probit Model with GDPpc

	War	Interstate War	Civil War	Civil War
Birth Legacy	0.082	0.145	0.045	0.033
	(0.050)	(0.096)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Age	-0.053	-0.127	-0.056	-0.038
	(0.068)	(0.136)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Europe	-0.034	-0.066	0.100	0.091
	(0.176)	(0.260)	(0.233)	(0.227)
Africa	-0.031	0.401	-0.220	-0.227
	(0.211)	(0.564)	(0.216)	(0.180)
GDP per capita	0.133	0.438*	-0.008	
	(0.122)	(0.172)	(0.160)	
Constant	-0.053	-2.521	1.749	1.736***
	(0.727)	(1.334)	(0.959)	(0.459)
War Participation				
Birth Legacy	0.036*	0.056*	0.016	0.033
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age	0.043	0.068	0.062	0.059
	(0.031)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Europe	-0.144*	-0.065	-0.261**	-0.331***
	(0.072)	(0.089)	(0.097)	(0.094)
Africa	-0.221**	-0.567***	-0.141	0.094
	(0.084)	(0.152)	(0.093)	(0.085)
Number of Neighbors	0.040***	0.038***	0.033**	0.027**
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
GDP per capita	-0.292***	-0.213***	-0.320***	
	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.049)	
Time	-0.039***	-0.021**	-0.038***	-0.041***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.272	-0.844*	0.355	-2.005***
	(0.307)	(0.407)	(0.379)	(0.130)
ρ	-0.476	-0.335	-0.852*	-0.876**
	(0.325)	(0.506)	(0.390)	(0.331)
N	9486.000	9487.000	9486.000	9486.000
chi2	7.765	10.968	4.234	3.653
p	0.170	0.052	0.516	0.455
ll	-1416.685	-664.049	-937.775	-962.402

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-17: Difference across Birth Type in the Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

14 Population

A common finding in the quantitative civil war literature is that states with larger populations are more likely to experience civil wars. Although a state's total and urban populations are elements of its CINC score, controlling for capabilities does not explicitly model the direct effect of population on a state's war participation or outcomes. We therefore estimated a set of models that explicitly control for a state's (logged) population. The results of these models are reported in Table SA-19 and Figure SA-18. We continue to find that states with positive birth legacies are more likely to fight and fight and win wars than states with less positive birth legacies once we control for a state's population. Further, it is worth noting that states with larger populations are more likely to fight wars.

Table SA-19: Censored Probit Models with Population Variable

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Birth Legacy	0.042	0.048	0.032
	(0.042)	(0.077)	(0.044)
Age	-0.028	0.025	-0.042
	(0.061)	(0.117)	(0.067)
Europe	0.221	0.182	0.437*
	(0.133)	(0.195)	(0.182)
Africa	-0.066	0.068	-0.189
	(0.166)	(0.503)	(0.171)
Population	-0.013	-0.019	-0.020
	(0.055)	(0.104)	(0.058)
Constant	1.203	0.416	1.851*
	(0.927)	(2.375)	(0.827)
War Participation			
Birth Legacy	0.055***	0.056**	0.043*
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Age	-0.039	-0.063	0.014
	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.029)
Europe	-0.244***	-0.109	-0.325***
	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.074)
Africa	-0.035	-0.418**	0.083
	(0.070)	(0.129)	(0.077)
Number of Neighbors	0.007	0.020*	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Population	0.132***	0.119***	0.133***
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Time	-0.031***	-0.010	-0.034***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.000**	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-2.722***	-3.098***	-2.928***
	(0.130)	(0.171)	(0.158)
ρ	-0.598	-0.244	-0.847*
	(0.341)	(0.682)	(0.355)
N	13208.000	13209.000	13208.000
chi2	7.147	2.687	11.971
p	0.210	0.748	0.035
ll	-2168.490	-1072.377	-1411.118

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-18: Difference across Birth Type in the Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

15 Alternative Measure of Age

Our measure of a states' age count the number of years since a state entered our data set. We code states ages in this manner because it gives us an easy to implement coding rule. However, some states existed before 1816. Scholars often disagree on the founding of older states, so it is not obvious how to code the "right" ages of some states. Instead of using different sources to code the ages of different states, we recoded the ages of our "indigenous generation" states based on the founding dates in Hensel's (2006) Colonial History Data. The results are reported in Table SA-20 and Figure SA-19. Our substantive findings are not altered with this alteranative measure of states' ages: states with positive birth legacies are more likely to fight and fight and win wars than states without positive birth legacies.

Table SA-20: Censored Probit Models with Alternative Age Variable

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
Birth Legacy	0.048	0.139	0.010
	(0.044)	(0.085)	(0.044)
Alternative Age	-0.026	-0.110	0.001
	(0.040)	(0.070)	(0.045)
Europe	0.225	0.202	0.493**
	(0.133)	(0.199)	(0.172)
Africa	-0.088	0.025	-0.195
	(0.168)	(0.473)	(0.165)
Constant	1.016*	0.071	1.681***
	(0.475)	(1.170)	(0.417)
War Participation			
Birth Legacy	0.064***	0.080**	0.044*
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Alternative Age	0.041*	-0.001	0.081***
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Europe	-0.305***	-0.160*	-0.424***
	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.071)
Africa	-0.002	-0.385**	0.105
	(0.069)	(0.127)	(0.076)
Number of Neighbors	0.029***	0.041***	0.016*
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Time	-0.042***	-0.015**	-0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Time^2	0.001***	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time^3	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.888***	-2.368***	-2.053***
	(0.078)	(0.105)	(0.094)
ρ	-0.545*	-0.115	-0.905**
	(0.239)	(0.430)	(0.278)
N	13209.000	13210.000	13209.000
chi2	6.543	4.417	12.548
p	0.162	0.352	0.014
ll	-2206.974	-1089.513	-1436.621

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure SA-19: Difference across Birth Type in the Joint Probability of Fighting and Winning a War

16 Logit Models

We estimated a set of standard logit models of war participation and outcomes using our three measures of a state's birth legacy. We present these results here.

16.1 War Participation

The results of our war participation models are reported in Tables SA-21 - SA-23. The coefficients associated with our various measures of a state's birth legacy are statistically significant at greater than the 0.05 level in all of the models reported in Tables SA-21 - SA-23, implying that, on average, a positive birth legacy increases the probability a state participates in a war in a given year, and that this relationship holds in the context of both interstate and civil wars.

Table SA-21: Logit Models with Birth Legacy Measured as Dichotomous Indicator

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
(Intercept)	-3.60^{***}	-3.40^{***}	-3.40^{***}
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Birth Legacy	0.25^{***}	0.17^{***}	0.17^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	-0.15^{***}	0.13^{**}	0.13^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Europe	-0.72^{***}	-0.46^{***}	-0.46^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Africa	0.03	0.04	0.04
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Time		-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Time^2		0.00^{***}	0.00^{***}
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Time^3		-0.00^{**}	-0.00^{**}
		(0.00)	(0.00)
N	13215	13215	13215
AIC	3983.55	3831.84	3831.84
BIC	4133.33	4071.49	4071.49
$\log L$	-1971.78	-1883.92	-1883.92

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Table SA-22: Logit Models with Birth Legacy Measured as Dichotomous Indicator

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
(Intercept)	-3.04^{***}	-4.13^{***}	-3.57^{***}
	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.21)
Good Birth	0.62^{***}	0.64^{***}	0.63^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.14)
Age	0.13^{**}	0.15^{*}	0.20^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Europe	-0.40^{***}	-0.12	-0.74^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Africa	-0.06	-1.14^{**}	0.20
	(0.15)	(0.35)	(0.17)
Time	-0.10^{***}	-0.05^{***}	-0.10^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time^2	0.00^{***}	0.00	0.00^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time^3	-0.00^{**}	-0.00	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	13215	13215	13215
AIC	3826.45	1947.41	2543.44
BIC	4066.10	2187.06	2783.09
$\log L$	-1881.23	-941.70	-1239.72

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Table SA-23: Logit Models with Birth Legacy Measured as Trichotomous Indicator

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
(Intercept)	-3.14^{**}	-4.24^{**}	-3.64^{**}
	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.22)
Trichotomous Legacy	0.28^{**}	0.29^{*}	0.26^{**}
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Age	0.16^{**}	0.19^{*}	0.23^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Europe	-0.38^{**}	-0.10	-0.72^{**}
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Africa	-0.03	-1.11^{**}	0.21
	(0.15)	(0.36)	(0.17)
Time	-0.10^{**}	-0.05^{**}	-0.11^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time^2	0.00^{**}	0.00	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time^3	-0.00^{**}	-0.00	-0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	13215	13215	13215
AIC	3844.37	1956.03	2555.60
BIC	4084.02	2195.68	2795.25
$\log L$	-1890.19	-946.01	-1245.80

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

16.2 War Outcomes

Table SA-24 reports the results of models that use the dichotomous variable *Good Birth* to measure a state's birth legacy. The coefficients on *Good Birth* are positive and statistically significant across all models. This suggests that, on average, a state with a good birth is more likely to win a war in a given year than a state without a good birth, and that this relationship holds for both interstate and civil wars. We obtain substantively similar findings when we we use *Birth Legacy* and *Trichotomous Legacy* to measure a state's birth legacy. Specifically, the coefficients on *Birth Legacy* and *Trichotomous Legacy* in Tables SA-25 and SA-26, respectively, are positive and significant in models of war outcomes in general, interstate war outcomes, and civil war outcomes; implying that a state with a positive birth legacy is statistically more likely to win a war in a given year than a state without a positive birth legacy.

Table SA-24: Logit Models of War Outcome with Good Birth

	War	Interstate	Civil
(Intercept)	-3.68^{***}	-5.09^{***}	-4.09^{***}
	(0.21)	(0.35)	(0.26)
Good Birth	0.80^{***}	0.87^{***}	0.79^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.18)
Age	0.12^{*}	$0.17^{\dagger}$	0.18^{*}
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Europe	$-0.24^{\dagger}$	0.05	-0.44^{*}
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Africa	-0.17	-1.09^{*}	-0.02
	(0.22)	(0.53)	(0.24)
Time	-0.10^{***}	-0.05^{*}	-0.10^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^2	0.00^{**}	0.00	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time^3	-0.00^{*}	-0.00	$-0.00^{\dagger}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	13215	13215	13215
AIC	2391.67	1128.15	1617.67
BIC	2631.33	1367.80	1857.32
$\log L$	-1163.84	-532.07	-776.84

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table SA-25: Logit Models of War Outcome with Six-Point Scale

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
(Intercept)	-4.21^{***}	-5.60^{***}	-4.64^{***}
	(0.25)	(0.42)	(0.31)
Birth Legacy	0.25^{***}	0.25^{**}	0.25^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Age	$0.11^{\dagger}$	$0.17^{\dagger}$	0.17^{*}
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Europe	-0.33^{*}	-0.02	-0.54^{*}
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Africa	-0.03	$-0.96^{\dagger}$	0.13
	(0.22)	(0.53)	(0.24)
Time	-0.10^{***}	-0.05^{*}	-0.10^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^2	0.00^{**}	0.00	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time^3	-0.00^{*}	-0.00	$-0.00^{\dagger}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	13215	13215	13215
AIC	2390.84	1130.97	1614.84
BIC	2630.49	1370.62	1854.49
$\log L$	-1163.42	-533.49	-775.42

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table SA-26: Logit Models of War Outcome with Trichotomous Indicator

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
(Intercept)	-3.84^{***}	-5.30^{***}	-4.23^{***}
	(0.23)	(0.39)	(0.28)
Trichotomous Legacy	0.41^{***}	0.46^{**}	0.39^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Age	0.14^{*}	0.21^{*}	0.21^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Europe	-0.22	0.06	-0.42^{*}
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Africa	-0.11	$-1.02^{\dagger}$	0.03
	(0.22)	(0.54)	(0.24)
Time	-0.11^{***}	-0.06^{**}	-0.11^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^2	0.00^{**}	0.00	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time^3	-0.00^{*}	-0.00	$-0.00^{\dagger}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	13215	13215	13215
AIC	2403.08	1133.86	1625.46
BIC	2642.73	1373.51	1865.11
$\log L$	-1169.54	-534.93	-780.73

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

17 Cross-Sectional Analyses

17.1 War Participation

As discussed in the manuscript, we can also analyze the implications of our argument in a cross-sectional framework. With respect to our first hypothesis, we could examine whether, on average, states with a positive birth legacy generally fight more wars than states without a positive birth legacy. Doing so implies that the dependent variable is a count of the number of wars a state fought during the period from 1816 to 2002. We analyzed the relationship between birth legacy and the number of wars a state fought using a set of negative binomial models (diagnostics indicated significant overdispersion, making a poisson inappropriate). We included control variables for a state's maximum age (as older states have had more opportunities to fight wars) and whether a state was located in Europe or Africa (as states located in these regions respectively have better and worse birth legacies than states located elsewhere in the world, on average). We estimated models using our three measures of a state's birth legacy. Table SA-27 reports the results of the models using the *Good Birth* dummy variable. Given the statistically significant coefficients on *Good Birth* across models, our results imply that states with a good birth legacy, on average, fight more wars in general, interstate wars, and civil wars, than states without a good birth legacy. We used the parameter estimates reported in Table SA-27 to calculate the difference in the expected number of wars a state fought across birth type. These results are reported in Figure SA-20. We see that, on average, a state with a good birth legacy is expected to fight about 1.3 more wars than a state without a good birth legacy (Panel A). The equivalent statistic for interstate and civil wars is slightly more than 0.5 and 0.7, respectively (Panels B and C). As the various confidence intervals do not contain the zero line, Figure SA-20 indicates that these differences are all statistically significant at greater than the 0.05 level.

Table SA-27: Negative Binomial Models of Wars Fought with Good Birth Dummy

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
(Intercept)	-3.75^{**}	-4.83^{**}	-4.20^{**}
	(0.55)	(0.72)	(0.69)
Good Birth	0.75^{**}	0.79^{**}	0.70^{**}
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Age	1.03^{**}	1.07^{**}	1.03^{**}
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Europe	-0.59^{**}	-0.22	-1.03^{**}
	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.28)
Africa	-0.10	-1.10^{**}	0.24
	(0.24)	(0.42)	(0.27)
θ	1.10^{**}	1.07^{**}	0.89^{**}
	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.20)
N	214	214	214
AIC	717.96	452.34	570.42
BIC	798.75	533.13	651.20
$\log L$	-334.98	-202.17	-261.21

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$



Figure SA-20: Predicted Number of Wars by Birth Type

Table SA-28 reports the results of models with the six-point, *Birth Legacy* measure. The results presented here suggest that, on average, states with better birth legacies fight significantly more wars. This relationship appears to hold in the case of interstate wars, but becomes insignificant in the case of civil wars. Figure SA-21 reports the difference in expected participation by birth type yielded by the models reported in Table SA-28. Figure SA-21 suggests that, compared to states without a good birth legacy, states with a good birth legacy, on average, fight more wars in general and interstate wars in particular, but that there is no statistical difference in the number of civil wars fought.

Table SA-28: Negative Binomials with Birth Legacy Measured as Six-Point Scale

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
(Intercept)	-4.22^{**}	-5.38^{**}	-4.66^{**}
	(0.55)	(0.70)	(0.68)
Birth Legacy	0.13^{*}	0.18^{*}	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Age	1.11^{**}	1.13^{**}	1.11^{**}
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Europe	-0.57^{*}	-0.25	-1.00^{**}
	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.28)
Africa	-0.03	-1.03^{*}	0.30
	(0.26)	(0.43)	(0.29)
θ	1.03^{**}	1.04^{**}	0.86^{**}
	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.20)
N	214	214	214
AIC	725.77	456.25	575.52
BIC	806.55	537.03	656.30
$\log L$	-338.88	-204.13	-263.76

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$



Figure SA-21: Predicted Number of Wars by Birth Type

Table SA-29 reports the results of models with *Trichotomous Legacy* measure. The results presented here suggest that, while the coefficients on *Trichotomous Legacy* are all positive, a state's birth legacy does not significantly influence the number of wars it fights. This inference is consistent with Figure SA-22, which reports the difference in expected participation by birth type yielded by the models reported in Table SA-29.

Table SA-29: Negative Binomial with Birth Legacy Measured as Trichotomous Indicator

	War	Interstate War	Civil War
(Intercept)	-4.18^{**}	-5.37^{**}	-4.65^{**}
	(0.56)	(0.72)	(0.69)
Trichotomous Legacy	0.20	0.29	0.15
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Age	1.15^{**}	1.20^{**}	1.16^{**}
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Europe	-0.50^{*}	-0.19	-0.94^{**}
	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.28)
Africa	-0.07	-1.06^{*}	0.26
	(0.26)	(0.43)	(0.29)
θ	1.00^{**}	0.98^{**}	0.84^{**}
	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.19)
N	214	214	214
AIC	728.08	458.14	577.14
BIC	808.86	538.93	657.92
$\log L$	-340.04	-205.07	-264.57

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$



Figure SA-22: Predicted Number of Wars by Birth Type

17.2 War Outcomes

For our final set of robustness checks, we used a cross-sectional, state-level data set to estimate the relationship between birth legacy and the number of wars a state wins using a set of negative binomial count models (diagnostics indicated the presence of significant overdispersion). Table SA-30 reports the results of models that use the dichotomous variable *Good Birth* to measure a state's birth legacy. The coefficients on *Good Birth* are positive and statistically significant across all models. This suggests that, on average, states with good births won more wars than states without good births, and that this relationship holds for both interstate and civil wars. To provide some greater context to this results, we calculated the difference across birth type in the expected number of wars a state won between the period from 1816 to 2002. These results are presented in Figure SA-23. As the confidence intervals about the respective differences lie completely above the zero line in all three panels, Figure SA-23 offers further support to our argument that states with a good birth legacy should win more wars than states without a good birth legacy, and that this holds for interstate and civil wars.

Table SA-30: Negative Binomial Model of War Wins with Good Birth Dummy

	War	Interstate	Civil
(Intercept)	-5.27^{***}	-5.69^{***}	-6.27^{***}
	(0.74)	(0.95)	(0.97)
Good Birth	0.85^{***}	0.90^{**}	0.74^{*}
	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.31)
Age	1.22^{***}	1.08^{***}	1.36^{***}
	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Europe	-0.58^{*}	-0.09	-0.97^{**}
	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.34)
Africa	-0.11	$-1.03^{\dagger}$	0.22
	(0.31)	(0.58)	(0.36)
θ	1.02^{***}	0.93^{**}	0.76^{***}
	(0.25)	(0.36)	(0.21)
N	214	214	214
AIC	520.38	313.43	407.41
BIC	601.17	394.22	488.19
$\log L$	-236.19	-132.72	-179.70

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$



Figure SA-23: Difference across Birth Type in Predicted War Wins

Table SA-31 reports the results of models that use the six-point scale *Birth Legacy* to measure a state's birth experience. The coefficients on *Birth Legacy* are positive and statistically significant across all models. This suggests that, on average, states with good births won more wars than states without good births, and that this relationship holds for both interstate and civil wars (although the civil war relationship only holds at the 0.10 level). Figure SA-24 reports the difference across birth type in the expected number of wars a state won in our data set. These results suggest that, on average, states with a better birth legacy should win more wars in general and interstate wars in particular than should states without positive birth legacies (confidence intervals in Panels A and B do not contain the zero-line). Figure SA-24 also suggests that the difference in expected civil war wins is not significantly greater at the 0.05 level for good birth states (although it is at the 0.1

level).

Table SA-31: Negative Binomial Model of War Wins with Six-Point Scale

	War	Interstate	Civil
(Intercept)	-5.82^{***}	-6.30^{***}	-6.78^{***}
	(0.71)	(0.92)	(0.94)
Birth Legacy	0.19^{*}	0.24^{*}	$0.16^{\dagger}$
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Age	1.27^{***}	1.11^{***}	1.41^{***}
	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Europe	-0.59^{*}	-0.15	-0.98^{**}
	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.34)
Africa	0.01	-0.91	0.33
	(0.32)	(0.59)	(0.37)
θ	1.01^{***}	0.95^{**}	0.77^{***}
	(0.26)	(0.37)	(0.21)
N	214	214	214
AIC	525.23	315.77	409.78
BIC	606.01	396.56	490.56
$\log L$	-238.61	-133.89	-180.89

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$



Figure SA-24: Difference across Birth Type in Predicted War Wins

Table SA-32 reports the results of models that use *Trichotomous Legacy* to measure a state's birth legacy. The coefficients on *Trichotomous Legacy* are positive and statistically significant in the war and interstate war models, although at only the 0.1 level in the latter. The coefficient is positive and statistically insignificant in the model of civil war wins. This suggests that, on average, states with good births won more wars than states without good births, and that this relationship marginally holds for both interstate but not civil wars. Figure SA-25 reports the difference across birth type in the expected number of wars a state won in our data set. Panel A suggests that, on average, states with a positive birth legacy should win more wars than states without a positive birth legacy (confidence interval about the predicted difference (just barely) lies completely above the zero-line). We find that the positive difference in the number of interstate and civil wars a state with a good birth legacy is expected to win is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The difference in interstate war wins is significant at the 0.1 level.

Table SA-32: Negative Binomial Model of War Wins with Trichotomous Indicator

	War	Interstate	Civil
(Intercept)	-5.81^{***}	-6.26^{***}	-6.83^{***}
	(0.73)	(0.94)	(0.96)
Trichotomous Legacy	0.33^{*}	$0.44^{\dagger}$	0.24
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.20)
Age	1.34^{***}	1.18^{***}	1.50^{***}
	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Europe	-0.52^{*}	-0.08	-0.91^{**}
	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.34)
Africa	-0.01	-0.94	0.30
	(0.32)	(0.59)	(0.37)
θ	0.96^{***}	0.89^{**}	0.74^{***}
	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.20)
N	214	214	214
AIC	527.33	316.81	411.41
BIC	608.11	397.60	492.20
$\log L$	-239.66	-134.41	-181.71

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$



Figure SA-25: Difference across Birth Type in Predicted War Wins

18 Diagnostic Analyses

18.1 Birth Legacies, Regime Type, and Capabilities

Most of our analyses exclude measures of a state's regime type and capabilities despite their ubiquitousness in quantitative models of conflict onset and outcomes because they represent intervening variables between a state's birth legacy and war participation and outcomes. Drawing on the language of Ray (2003, pg. 5), intervening variables in our study would be factors that are (1) a consequence of a state's birth legacy, and (2) have a subsequent impact on war participation and/or war outcomes. Including such variables in our analyses would result in post-treatment bias (e.g., King and Zeng 2007) and lead to incorrect substantive inferences about the relationship between

birth legacy and political failure. These consequences underlie various scholars' recommendation that intervening variables should not be controlled for in a statistical model (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, Ray 2003). The results presented above demonstrate that *Capabilities* and *Regime Type* are significant predictors of war onset and, therefore, meet the second condition for an intervening variable. Table SA-33 reports a set of diagnostic regressions that indicate a state's birth legacy is a significant predictor of *Capabilities* and *Regime Type*.

Table SA-33: Standard Control Variables by Birth Type

	CINC Score	Polity
(Intercept)	0.00^{***}	-0.54^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.09)
Good Birth	0.02^{***}	-0.83^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.13)
N	13018	12150
R^2	0.09	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Given that a state's birth is antecedent to these factors, our analyses imply that *Capabilities* and *Regime Type* are intervening variables with respect to the relationship between a state's birth legacy and war onset and, therefore, should not be included in models of the relationship between a state's birth legacy and war onset.

18.2 Birth Legacies by Region

One possible critique of our argument is that we are simply picking up regional variation in states' birth experiences. To see whether states' birth types systematically vary by regions of the world, we conducted a series of bivariate regressions between *Birth Legacy* and variables that identified whether a country was located in Europe, Africa, the Americas, the Middle East, or Asia (which included Oceania). Table SA-34 reports the results of these analyses. We found that, on average and as one might expect, European states have better birth legacies than non-European states and African states have worse birth legacies than non-African states. We also found that there is no difference, on average, in the birth legacies of states located in the Americas, the Middle East, or Asia than other states. Given these results and the fact that a state's birth legacy does not

influence its regional location, control variables for whether a state is located in Europe or Africa are in all of our statistical models.

Table SA-34: Variation in Birth Legacy by Region

	Legacy	Legacy	Legacy	Legacy	Legacy
Europe	1.17***				
	(0.27)				
Africa		-2.32***			
		(0.31)			
Americas			0.16		
			(0.30)		
Middle East				0.11	
				(0.45)	
Asia					0.09
					(0.52)
(Intercept)	3.42***	4.17***	3.78***	3.81***	3.81***
	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)
N	13215.00	13215.00	13215.00	13215.00	13215.00
r2	0.10	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

18.3 Colonial Legacies

It is possible that states' colonial legacies might systematically influence the level of legitimacy and capacity they are born with.[2] To see if this is the case, we estimated the legitimacy, institutional coherence, and capabilities of those states that were previously colonies in their first year as independent states as a function of the four colonial powers that controlled the most colonies: Great Britain (58 colonies), France (26 colonies), Spain (22 colonies), and Turkey/Ottoman Empire (21 colonies). Data on a state's initial legitimacy, coherence, and capabilities are based on the same sources as discussed in the main manuscript; colonial ruler data was drawn from Hensel (2006). The results of these diagnostics are reported in Table SA-35.

Table SA-35: Colonial Legacies

	Legitimate (Englebert)	Coherent (Polity)	Coherent (Gates)	CINC (COW)
British Colony	-1.073*	1.187**	0.521	-0.001
	(0.522)	(0.423)	(0.480)	(0.001)
French Colony	-2.683**	-0.502	-0.339	-0.003
	(0.611)	(0.509)	(0.532)	(0.002)
Spainish Colony	-0.891	-1.371*	-0.657	-0.002
	(0.649)	(0.628)	(0.563)	(0.002)
Turkish Colony	-0.709	-0.352	0.051	-0.002
	(0.674)	(0.540)	(0.583)	(0.002)
Constant	1.872**	-0.134	0.172	0.003**
	(0.439)	(0.299)	(0.339)	(0.001)
N	172.000	172.000	137.000	171.000
ll	-94.060	-105.402	-91.828	628.233

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Overall, we find little evidence of consistent colonial legacies with respect to former colonies' legitimacy and capacity. On average, former British colonies are less likely to be legitimate, more likely to be coherent with respect to Polity's measure (Marshall and Jaggers 2005), but are no different with respect to the Gates et al. (2006) measure of institutional coherence or capabilities. Former French colonies are also less likely to be legitimate, but are no more or less likely to be coherent or have more or less capabilities than states with other colonial rulers. On average,

[2]We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.

former Spanish colonies are less likely to have coherent institutions according to the Polity measure (Marshall and Jaggers 2005), but we find no difference with respect to legitimacy, capabilities, or Gates et al. (2006) measure of institutional coherence. We find no evidence that former Turkish colonies systematically differ from other former colonies.

19 Simulation Details

All of the post-estimation quantities presented here and in the manuscript were calculated using simulations. For a given model, the simulations were conducted as follows. We took 1,000 draws from a multivariate normal distribution based on the estimated coefficient and variance-covariance matrices of the model. This was done with the "drawnorm" command for analyses conducted in Stata (censored probit and Sartori selection models) and the MSBVAR (Brandt 2012) package for analyses conducted in R (everything else). We then calculated the quantity of interest (e.g., predicted probability of onset, joint probability of fighting and winning a war, expected number of onsets) for each of the 1,000 simulated coefficients for a state with a good birth legacy and a state without a good birth legacy and the difference between these two quantities. The simulations assumed that the state was of the mean logged age observed in the data set (3.45442) and was not located in Europe or Africa. For the censored probit models, the simulations assumed that the state had the median number of directly contiguous neighbors observed in the data set (5). Models with additional control variables use their mean (continuous) or median (nominal or ordinal) value(s) for the simulations. The point predictions reported in the manuscript and in this appendix represent the mean quantity yielded by the simulations. The lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals represent the 2.5^{th} and 97.5^{th} percentile values yielded by the simulations. Upon publication, we will make available all of the code needed to reproduce our simulations.

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