Term Limits, Leader Preferences, and Interstate Conflict: Supplementary Appendix

Jeff Carter
Department of Political Science
The University of Mississippi
jcarter3@olemiss.edu

Timothy Nordstrom
Department of Political Science
The University of Mississippi
tnordstr@olemiss.edu

November 12, 2016

This appendix consists of five sections. The first reports robustness checks regarding the unconditional relationship between term limits and conflict initiation. The second section reports robustness checks regarding the conditional relationship between term limits, leaders' preferences, and conflict initiation. The third contains a table of the countries included in our data set. The fourth contains a set of summary statistics and cross-tabs between leaders' lame duck status and our three indicators of leaders' preferences. The fifth provides information about our post-estimation simulations.

1 Unconditional Models

1.1 Additional Control Variables

Table SA-1: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Term Limited	-0.48*	-0.50*	-0.59*
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.15		
	(0.10)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.08	
		(0.11)	
Military Service			-0.06
			(0.21)
Rival	1.36**	1.36**	1.38**
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Number of Borders	0.12**	0.12**	0.13**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliament System	-0.34+	-0.34+	-0.37+
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Female Leader	0.58+	0.52+	0.44
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Civil War	0.32	0.35	0.36+
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
GDP per capita	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Economic Growth	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Major Power	0.44+	0.50*	0.54*
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Military Mobilization	-0.22	-0.22	-0.19
	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.57)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.24**	-0.25**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00+	-0.00+	-0.00+
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-3.01**	-2.94**	-2.85**
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)
N	2208	2208	2146
χ^2	261.73	260.02	260.00
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
ll	-632.60	-633.46	-624.41

Logit models with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.

1.2 Conflict Severity

Table SA-2: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Term Limited	-0.63**	-0.67**	-0.66**
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.30**		
	(0.09)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.23*	
		(0.10)	
Military Service			0.44**
			(0.17)
Rival	1.44**	1.46**	1.51**
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Number of Borders	0.08**	0.08**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.21	-0.19	-0.16
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Female Leader	0.54+	0.47+	0.44
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.25**	-0.24**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01*	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00	-0.00+	-0.00+
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
α_1	2.31**	2.19**	2.21**
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)
α_2	3.84**	3.71**	3.74**
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)
N	2245	2245	2180
χ^2	221.91	217.58	222.12
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
ll	-812.77	-815.38	-804.45

Ordered logit models with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.



Figure SA-1: Term Limits and the Probability of Conflict Initiation - Low Intensity. Based on models in Table SA-2.



Figure SA-2: Term Limits and the Probability of Conflict Initiation - High Intensity. Based on models in Table SA-2.

1.3 Multiple Initiations

Table SA-3: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Term Limited	-0.52 *	-0.58 *	-0.54 *
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.29 *		
	(0.07)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.16 *	
		(0.08)	
Military Service			0.39 *
			(0.14)
Rival	1.27 *	1.30 *	1.32 *
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Number of Borders	0.05 *	0.06 *	0.06 *
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.28	-0.29	-0.24
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Female Leader	0.27	0.19	0.17
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Peace Years	-0.26 *	-0.27 *	-0.27 *
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01 *	0.01 *	0.01 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00 *	-0.00 *	-0.00 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(Intercept)	-2.14 *	-1.97 *	-2.03 *
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)
θ	3.85	2.73 *	3.53 *
	(2.52)	(1.37)	(2.13)
N	2245	2245	2180
AIC	1632.63	1643.43	1619.90
BIC	1884.16	1894.96	1870.13
$\log L$	-772.32	-777.72	-765.95

Negative binomial models with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed: $*$: $p \leq 0.05$

1.4 Single vs. Multiple Mandates

Table SA-4: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Lame Duck - Single	-0.80**	-0.86**	-0.85**
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Lame Duck - Multiple	-0.22	-0.07	-0.17
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.27**		
	(0.10)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.20*	
		(0.10)	
Military Service			0.36*
			(0.17)
Rival	1.42**	1.44**	1.48**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Number of Borders	0.08**	0.08**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.28	-0.26	-0.24
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Female Leader	0.59*	0.53†	0.50†
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Peace Years	-0.23**	-0.23**	-0.23**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-2.27**	-2.18**	-2.17**
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
N	2245.00	2245.00	2180.00
χ^2	217.86	216.22	219.17
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Log pseudolikelihood	-664.29	-666.38	-656.06

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: $\dagger$: $p \leq 0.1$; $*$: $p \leq 0.05$; $**$: $p \leq 0.01$.

1.5 Time Trend

Table SA-5: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Lame Duck	-0.73**	-0.76**	-0.73**
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.32**		
	(0.09)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.27**	
		(0.10)	
Military Service			0.59**
			(0.18)
Rival	1.47**	1.50**	1.55**
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Number of Borders	0.06†	0.06†	0.06†
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.24	-0.21	-0.16
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Female Leader	0.63*	0.58†	0.58†
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.25**	-0.25**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00†	-0.00†	-0.00†
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time Trend	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-53.88**	-56.11**	-61.31**
	(11.89)	(12.02)	(12.40)
N	2245.00	2245.00	2180.00
χ^2	247.01	243.54	249.40
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	< 0.00	<0.01
Log pseudolikelihood	-656.73	-659.07	-646.79

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.

1.6 Year-Fixed Effects

Table SA-6: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Lame Duck	-0.68**	-0.72**	-0.67**
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.33**		
	(0.10)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.28**	
		(0.11)	
Military Service			0.64**
			(0.20)
Rival	1.46**	1.49**	1.56**
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Number of Borders	0.06†	0.06†	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.18	-0.15	-0.10
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Female Leader	0.63*	0.58†	0.60†
	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.33)
Peace Years	-0.27**	-0.27**	-0.27**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00*	-0.00**	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	2245	2245	2180
χ^2	248.64	277.72	274.96
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Log pseudolikelihood	-561.78	-564.16	-552.58

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.

1.7 Decade-Fixed Effects

Table SA-7: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	
Lame Duck	-0.73**	-0.77**	-0.74**
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.19)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.33**		
	(0.09)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.27**	
		(0.09)	
Military Service			0.61**
			(0.17)
Rival	1.45**	1.49**	1.56**
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Number of Borders	0.06	0.06†	0.06†
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.22	-0.19	-0.14
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Female Leader	0.63**	0.58**	0.59**
	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.25**	-0.24**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	2245	2245	2180
Log pseudolikelihood	-637.59	-640.16	-627.44

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: $p \leq 0.1$; $*$: $p \leq 0.05$; $**$: $p \leq 0.01$.

1.8 Region Fixed Effects

Table SA-8: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	
Lame Duck	-1.19**	-1.26**	-1.26**
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.26**		
	(0.10)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.13	
		(0.11)	
Military Service			0.23
			(0.20)
Rival	1.30**	1.32**	1.35**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Number of Borders	0.09**	0.10**	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.34	-0.36	-0.35
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Female Leader	0.65*	0.56†	0.52†
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Peace Years	-0.23**	-0.24**	-0.23**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00†	-0.00†	-0.00†
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	2245	2245	2180
χ^2	181.33	175.57	178.89
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	<0.01	< 0.01
Log pseudolikelihood	-643.86	-646.74	-636.74

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.

1.9 Variation in Military Service

Table SA-9: Term Limits, Military Service, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	
Lame Duck	-0.65**	-0.65**	-1.26**
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.30)
Combat	0.34†		
	(0.20)		
Noncombat	0.62*		
	(0.26)		
Military Career		0.33	
		(0.35)	
Military Noncareer		0.46*	
		(0.18)	
Military Service			0.23
			(0.20)
Rival	1.46**	1.46**	1.35**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Number of Borders	0.09**	0.08**	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.20	-0.19	-0.35
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.23)
Female Leader	0.50†	0.50†	0.52†
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.24**	-0.23**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00†	-0.00†	-0.00†
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-2.18**	-2.18**	
	(0.22)	(0.22)	
N	2175	2180	2180
χ^2	212.20	210.74	178.89
pr $> \chi^2$	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01
Log pseudolikelihood	-656.79	-657.93	-636.74

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: $p \leq 0.1$; $*$: $p \leq 0.05$; $**$: $p \leq 0.01$.

2 Conditional Models

2.1 Additional Control Variables

Table SA-10: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Term Limited	-0.53+	-0.48+	-0.61*
	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.14		
	(0.11)		
Term Limited*Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.06		
	(0.24)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.09	
		(0.13)	
Term Limited*Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		-0.03	
		(0.31)	
Military Service			-0.08
			(0.22)
Term Limited*Military Service			0.13
			(0.57)
Rival	1.36**	1.36**	1.38**
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Number of Borders	0.12**	0.12**	0.13**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.34+	-0.33	-0.38+
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Female Leader	0.58+	0.53+	0.44
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Civil War	0.32	0.34	0.37+
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
GDP per capita	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Economic Growth	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Major Power	0.43+	0.50*	0.54*
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.27)
Military Mobilization	-0.22	-0.23	-0.19
	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.57)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.24**	-0.24**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00+	-0.00+	-0.00+
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-2.99**	-2.94**	-2.84**
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)
N	2208	2208	2146
χ^2	262.13	259.94	260.60
pr $> \chi^2$	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01
ll	-632.57	-633.46	-624.39

Logit models with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.



Figure SA-3: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation. Based on models in Table SA-10.

2.2 Conflict Severity

Table SA-11: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Term Limited	-0.72*	-0.55*	-0.69**
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.27**		
	(0.10)		
Term Limited*Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.11		
	(0.22)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.29*	
		(0.12)	
Term Limited*Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		-0.26	
		(0.26)	
Military Service			0.41*
			(0.19)
Term Limited*Military Service			0.20
			(0.47)
Rival	1.44**	1.46**	1.51**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Number of Borders	0.08**	0.08**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.22	-0.17	-0.17
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Female Leader	0.53+	0.49+	0.44
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.25**	-0.24**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01*	0.01**	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00	-0.00+	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
α_1	2.29**	2.23**	2.20**
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
α_2	3.81**	3.75**	3.73**
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)
N	2245	2245	2180
χ^2	224.35	216.64	223.19
pr $> \chi^2$	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01
ll	-812.62	-814.85	-804.37

Ordered logit models with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.



Figure SA-4: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation - Low Intensity. Based on models in Table SA-11.



Figure SA-5: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation - High Intensity. Based on models in Table SA-11.

2.3 Multiple Initiations

Table SA-12: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Term Limited	-0.56 *	-0.54 *	-0.61 *
	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.28 *		
	(0.08)		
Term Limited*Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.04		
	(0.17)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.18 *	
		(0.09)	
Term Limited*Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		-0.09	
		(0.21)	
Military Service			0.34 *
			(0.16)
Term Limited*Military Service			0.31
			(0.38)
Rival	1.27 *	1.30 *	1.32 *
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Number of Borders	0.05 *	0.06 *	0.06 *
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.29	-0.29	-0.26
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Female Leader	0.27	0.20	0.17
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Peace Years	-0.26 *	-0.27 *	-0.26 *
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01 *	0.01 *	0.01 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00 *	-0.00 *	-0.00 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(Intercept)	-2.13 *	-1.98 *	-2.01 *
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
θ	3.83	2.72 *	3.56 *
	(2.51)	(1.36)	(2.16)
N	2245	2245	2180
AIC	1634.57	1645.26	1621.25
BIC	1908.96	1919.65	1894.23
$\log L$	-769.29	-774.63	-762.62

Negative binomial models with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed: $*$: $p \leq 0.05$



Figure SA-6: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Expected Number of Conflict Initiations. Based on models in Table SA-11.

2.4 Single vs. Multiple Mandates

Table SA-13: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Lame Duck - Single	-0.82**	-0.77**	-0.84**
	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Lame Duck - Multiple	-0.29	0.05	-0.14
	(0.57)	(0.42)	(0.48)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.26**		
	(0.10)		
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.05		
	(0.26)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.25*	
		(0.11)	
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		-0.22	
		(0.27)	
Military Service			0.37*
			(0.18)
Lame Duck * Military Service			-0.07
			(0.57)
Rival	1.42**	1.44**	1.48**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Number of Borders	0.08**	0.08**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.28	-0.24	-0.24
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Female Leader	0.59†	0.55†	0.50†
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Peace Years	-0.23**	-0.24**	-0.23**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00	-0.00†	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-2.26**	-2.20**	-2.17**
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
N	2245	2245	2180
χ^2	218.48	216.12	219.08
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Log pseudolikelihood	-664.27	-665.98	-656.05

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.



Figure SA-7: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation - Single Mandate. Based on models in Table SA-13.



Figure SA-8: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation - Multiple Mandates. Based on models in Table SA-13.

2.5 Time Trend

Table SA-14: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Lame Duck	-0.81**	-0.66**	-0.76**
	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.30**		
	(0.10)		
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.10		
	(0.23)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.32**	
		(0.11)	
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		-0.21	
		(0.24)	
Military Service			0.56**
			(0.19)
Lame Duck * Military Service			0.16
			(0.49)
Rival	1.47**	1.50**	1.55**
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Number of Borders	0.06†	0.06†	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentarey System	-0.24	-0.19	-0.17
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Female Leader	0.63*	0.59*	0.57†
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Time Trend	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.25**	-0.25**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00†	-0.00*	-0.00†
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-53.59**	-56.62**	-61.03**
	(11.93)	(12.10)	(12.43)
N	2245.00	2245.00	2180.00
χ^2	249.15	243.22	250.07
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Log pseudolikelihood	-656.62	-658.67	-646.74

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.



Figure SA-9: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation. Based on models in Table SA-14.

2.6 Year-Fixed Effects

Table SA-15: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Lame Duck	-0.75*	-0.63*	-0.69*
	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.30**		
	(0.12)		
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.10		
	(0.25)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.32*	
		(0.14)	
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		-0.19	
		(0.29)	
Military Service			0.61**
			(0.24)
Lame Duck * Military Service			0.14
			(0.54)
Rival	1.46**	1.50**	1.56**
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Number of Borders	0.06†	0.06†	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.19	-0.14	-0.10
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Female Leader	0.63†	0.59†	0.60†
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.33)
Peace Years	-0.27**	-0.27**	-0.26**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00*	-0.00**	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	2245	2245	2180
χ^2	252.03	285.30	277.29
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Log pseudolikelihood	-561.68	-563.86	-552.55

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: p $\leq$ 0.1; $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.



Figure SA-10: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation. Based on models in Table SA-15.

2.7 Decade-Fixed Effects

Table SA-16: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	
Lame Duck	-0.81*	-0.68**	-0.77**
	(0.34)	(0.24)	(0.22)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.30**		
	(0.08)		
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.11		
	(0.20)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.32**	
		(0.10)	
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		-0.21*	
		(0.10)	
Military Service			0.58**
			(0.14)
Lame Duck * Military Service			0.16
			(0.24)
Rival	1.45**	1.49**	1.56**
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Number of Borders	0.06	0.06	0.06†
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.22	-0.17	-0.14
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Female Leader	0.63**	0.59**	0.58**
	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.25**	-0.24**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	2245	2245	2180
Log pseudolikelihood	-637.47	-639.79	-627.39

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: $p \leq 0.1$; ∗: $p \leq 0.05$; ∗∗ : $p \leq 0.01$.



Figure SA-11: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation. Based on models in Table SA-16.

2.8 Region Fixed Effects

Table SA-17: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Lame Duck	-1.41**	-1.22**	-1.39**
	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.19†		
	(0.11)		
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.27		
	(0.22)		
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		0.15	
		(0.13)	
Lame Duck * Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$		-0.08	
		(0.26)	
Military Service			0.13
			(0.22)
Lame Duck * Military Service			0.63
			(0.52)
Rival	1.29**	1.33**	1.34**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Number of Borders	0.09**	0.10**	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.36†	-0.35	-0.39†
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Female Leader	0.63*	0.56†	0.51†
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Peace Years	-0.23**	-0.24**	-0.23**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00†	-0.00†	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	2245	2245	2180
χ^2	182.72	175.66	180.31
pr $> \chi^2$	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Log pseudolikelihood	-643.16	-646.69	-636.03

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: $\dagger$: $p \leq 0.1$; $*$: $p \leq 0.05$; $**$: $p \leq 0.01$.



Figure SA-12: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation. Based on models in Table SA-17.

2.9 Military Service

Table SA-18: Term Limits, Military Service, and Interstate Conflict Initiation, 1960-2001

	Model 1	Model 2
Term Limited	-0.70**	-0.70**
	(0.24)	(0.24)
Combat	0.37+	
	(0.21)	
Term Limited*Combat	-0.51	
	(0.84)	
Non-Combat	0.42	
	(0.30)	
Term Limited*Non-Combat	0.94	
	(0.66)	
Career		0.22
		(0.40)
Term Limited*Career		0.47
		(0.78)
Non-Career		0.42*
		(0.19)
Term Limited*Non-Career		0.28
		(0.62)
Rival	1.47**	1.46**
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Number of Borders	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliamentary System	-0.22	-0.20
	(0.18)	(0.18)
Female Leader	0.50+	0.49
	(0.30)	(0.30)
Peace Years	-0.24**	-0.24**
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Peace Years^2	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Peace Years^3	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-2.18**	-2.17**
	(0.22)	(0.22)
N	2175	2180
χ^2	213.75	212.06
pr $> \chi^2$	< 0.01	< 0.01
ll	-655.61	-657.67

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed: †: $p \leq 0.1$; ∗: $p \leq 0.05$; ∗∗ : $p \leq 0.01$.



Figure SA-13: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation. Based on Model 1 in Table SA-18.



Figure SA-14: Term Limits, Leaders' Preferences, and the Probability of Conflict Initiation. Based on Model 2 in Table SA-18.

3 States in Data Set

Table SA-19: States Included in Data Set

Argentina*	Haiti*	Peru*
Armenia	Honduras*	Phillipines*
Australia	Hungary	Poland*
Austria	India	Portugal*
Bangladesh	Ireland	Romania
Belarus	Israel	Russia
Belgium	Italy	Senegal
Bolivia*	Jamaica	Singapore
Botswana	Japan	Slovak Republic
Brazil*	Latvia	Slovenia*
Bulgaria	Lesotho	Somalia*
Canada	Lithuania	South Africa
Chile*	Madagascar*	South Korea*
Colombia*	Malaysia	Spain
Costa Rica*	Mali	Sri Lanka
Croatia	Mauritius	Sudan
Cyprus	Mexico*	Sweden
Czech Republic	Moldova*	Switzerland*
Czechoslovakia	Mongolia*	Taiwan*
Denmark	Myanmar	Thailand
Dominican Republic *	Netherlands	Trinidad and Tobago
Ecuador*	New Zealand	Turkey
El Salvador*	Nicaragua*	Uganda
Fiji	Niger	Ukraine*
Finland*	Nigeria*	United Kingdom
France	Norway	United States*
Gambia	Pakistan	Uruguay*
Germany	Panama*	Venezuela*
Greece	Papua New Guinea	Yugoslavia
Guatemala*	Paraguay*	

*:state had a term limited leader at some point between 1960 and 2001.

4 Summary Statistics

Table SA-20 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our primary specifications.

Table SA-20: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Observations
Conflict Initiation	0.11	0	1	2245
Lame Duck	0.23	0	1	2245
Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$	0.60	-1	3	2245
Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$	0.31	0	3	2245
Military Service	0.16	0	1	2180
Rivalry	0.29	0	1	2245
Number of Borders	2.95	0	14	2245
Parliamentary System	0.60	0	1	2245
Female Leader	0.04	0	1	2245
Peace Years	8.8	0	41	2245

Tables SA-21, SA-22, and SA-23 report a set of cross tabs between *Term Limited* and our three indicators of leaders' preferences, with the number of conflicts initiated given each respective combination of values in parentheses.

Table SA-21: Distributions of *Term Limited*, *Hawkish Index*$_{Empirical}$, and *Conflict Initiation*

	Hawkish Index$_{Empirical}$					
	-1	0	1	2	3	Total
Re-Electable	48	829	611	243	8	1,739
(Initiations)	(1)	(81)	(73)	(46)	(4)	(205)
Term-Limited	6	274	174	47	5	506
(Initiations)	(1)	(24)	(17)	(6)	(4)	(52)
Total	54	1,103	785	290	13	2,245
	(2)	(105)	(90)	(52)	(8)	(257)

Table SA-22: Distributions of *Term Limited*, *Hawkish Index*$_{Theoretical}$, and *Conflict Initiation*

	Hawkish Index$_{Theoretical}$				
	0	1	2	3	Total
Re-Electable	1,358	246	120	15	1,739
(Initiations)	(140)	(38)	(23)	(4)	(205)
Term-Limited	396	82	11	17	506
(Initiations)	(37)	(12)	(1)	(2)	(52)
Total	1,754	328	131	32	2,245
	(177)	(50)	(24)	(6)	(257)

Table SA-23: Distributions of *Term Limited*, *Military Service*, and *Conflict Initiation*

	Civilian	Military	Total
Re-Electable	1,366	310	1,676
(Initiations)	(152)	(53)	(205)
Term-Limited	461	43	504
(Initiations)	(44)	(8)	(52)
Total	1,827	353	2,180
	(196)	(61)	(257)

5 Post-Estimation Simulations

All of the post-estimation quantities presented here and in the manuscript were calculated using simulations. For a given model, the simulations were conducted as follows. We took 10,000 draws from a multivariate normal distribution based on the estimated coefficient and variance-covariance matrices of the mode This was done with the "drawnorm" command in Stata. We then calculated the probability of conflict initiation for each of the 10,000 vectors of simulated coefficients given 1) a democratic leader when she was electorally accountable; and 2) a democratic leader when she was term limited. For our conditional analyses, we calculated 1) and 2) across the range of the relevant indicator of leaders' preferences. We then calculated the difference between 1) and 2). The point predictions reported in the manuscript and in this appendix represent the mean quantity yielded by the simulations. The lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals represent the 2.5^{th} and 97.5^{th} percentile values yielded by the simulations. The post-estimation simulations based on models that included control variables assumed the control variables took on the mean values of continuous variables and median values of ordinal or nominal variables, with one exception. The exception was the variable *Parliamentary System*, which was set to represent a presidential system as binding term limits are typically a characteristic of presidential systems.