Online Appendix for "Don't Call It a Comeback: Autocratic Ruling Parties after Democratization"

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The following pages display additional information and robustness checks referenced in the text. For convenience, I list a summary of these checks:

- **Table A1** lists all of the autocratic ruling parties in the sample, including the year of democratization, whether there was a violent break before transition, and the party's outcomes within democracy.
- **Figure A1** displays the shift in the fraction of regimes with compulsory voting and independent judiciaries from before to after democratization, dividing by whether the parties acceded to democratization. As seen, parties that held power up to democratization were less likely to adopt both institutions, as they tended to make their continued dominance less likely.
- **Table A2** shows the main models, additionally controlling for modal regime types from the autocratic period (coded by Geddes et al. 2014). As shown in the paper, pure party regimes are strongly positive for success in democracy. More surprisingly, military parties (all regimes coded as military or military hybrids) are also positive, whereas personalist regimes (hybrids or pure) are negative for success. This captures the fact that personalist regimes tend to create relatively powerless, dependent parties that struggle to persist past the founding leader (Geddes 1999; Svolik 2012).
- **Table A3** shows the ordered logit models predicting *Party Success* (Table 2, Model 3), stratifying by modal regime type within autocracy. The four models in succession are limited to pure party regimes, not pure party regimes, military hybrids, and personalist hybrids. Although small sample sizes make comparisons difficult, most results are stable across

samples. An interesting difference is that *Party Years in Power* is significantly positive only for pure party regimes. The democracy's age is also negative for success, except for pure party regimes.

- **Table A4** shows several robustness checks for models predicting *Party Success*. Model 1 includes ruling parties that were not last in the autocratic spell as separate observations. Unsurprisingly, the number of years out of power prior to democratization is strongly negative for later success. Models 2-4 restrict the sample to democratic election years only, parties that were in power in autocracy at least five years, and democracies 10 years old or less. Results are highly robust across the samples. Models 5 and 6 stratify by whether the party was violently ousted prior to democratization. Party years in power and opposition freedom are positive for later success only when the party was ousted.
- **Table A5** shows robustness checks for models predicting *Party Success*, limiting the sample using alternative democracy measures. For comparison, Model 1 shows the full sample (Model 3, Table 2), which uses the Boix et al. (2013) measure. Model 2 further restricts the sample to countries with a Polity score 6 or above (Marshall and Jaggers 2017), the typical threshold for democracy. Model 3 requires the Freedom House (2016) rating for both political rights and civil liberties to be at 3 or below. Model 4 requires the V-Dem rating for polyarchy to be above 0.5 (on a 0-1 scale), the value that roughly makes the BMR coding more likely than not to be a democracy. Thus, Models 2-4 apply more demanding requirements for being included in the democracy sample. Results are highly robust.
- **Table A6** shows the results for the instruments in the first stages of the instrumental variables models (Table 5). Across the three endogenous (instrumented) variables, the party's average economic growth, freedom from repression, and provision of equal resources is positive for later democratic success, whereas average corruption is negative. The averages are all taken from the party's autocratic ruling period. Current values of each variables are controlled for in the democracy sample to maintain the exclusion restriction.
- **Table A7** shows several robustness checks for the instrumental variables models, adapting the models shown in Table 5. Separate checks are between the dashed lines, with the coefficients shown for the endogenous variables, as well as additional controls for some checks.
  - The first two checks vary the length of the lagged DV control for the liberal index models. Instead of five years, it uses two or ten years. The results are robust.

- The next three checks use alternative measures of democracy. As described above, it limits the sample to democracies that also meet requirements for Polity, Freedom House, and V-Dem. This is used to define democratic survival and to restrict the sample. Results are robust, with the exception of results narrowly missing significance for the liberal index in the Freedom House alternative. This is partly because this is the smallest sample, increasing the standard errors.
- The next check restricts the sample to democracies at least five years old. This ensures that the five-year lag for the liberal index comes from the democratic period. These results are robust. The results for democratic survival remain negative, but now miss significance.
- The next check adds dummies for the holding of a legislative election and executive election. As seen, the results for party performance remain significantly negative. Legislative election years have no effect, but years with executive elections are more likely to see improved democratic quality and chances for survival.
- The penultimate check only counts autocratic parties that ruled in the immediately prior autocratic spell, whereas the other models use the most recent autocratic ruling party. Results are very similar.
- The final check includes all democratic years, even without prior autocratic parties. To allow the IV setup to run, the instruments are set at the average values for the sample for the non-party observations. Party success remains negative. However, having an autocratic party in the past is positive for democratic survival, indicating the benefit of electoral experience.

Table A1: Autocratic Ruling Party List

Country	Party	Year of Dem.	Break Before Dem.	Party Remains	Party Competitive	Party Gains Power
Cuba	Liberal Party	1940	1	1	1	1
Uruguay	Colorado Party	1942	0	1	1	1
Guatemala	Liberal Progressive Party	1945	1	0	0	0
Austria	Fatherland Front	1946	1	0	0	0
Italy	National Fascist Party	1946	1	0	0	0
The Philippines	Nacionalista Party	1946	1	1	1	1
Ecuador	Conservative Party	1948	1	1	1	1
Costa Rica	(Ind.) National Republican Party	1949	1	1	1*	1*
Panama	Liberal Union	1950	1	0	0	0
Panama	Authentic Revolutionary Party	1952	0	1	1	0
Indonesia	Indonesian National Party	1955	0	1	1	1
Honduras	Party of National Unity	1957	1	0	0	0
Argentina	Justicialist Party	1958	1	0	0	0
Guatemala	National Democratic Movement	1958	0	1	1	1
Colombia	Popular Action Movement	1958	1	0	0	0
Venezuela	Frente Electoral Independiente	1959	1	0	0	0
South Korea	Liberal Party	1960	0	1	0	0
Turkey	Democrat Party	1961	1	0	0	0
Dominican Republic	Dominican Party	1966	1	0	0	0
Guatemala	Institutional Democratic Party	1966	0	1	1	1
Ghana	Convention People's Party	1970	1	0	0	0
Honduras	National Party	1971	0	1	1	1
Thailand	United Thai People's Party	1975	1	0	0	0
Portugal	National Union	1976	1	0	0	0
Spain	Falange	1977	0	0	0	0
Ecuador	Velasquista National Federation	1979	1	0	0	0
Bolivia	Popular Christian Movement	1979	1	0	0	0
Uganda	Uganda People's Congress	1980	1	1	1	1
Grenada	New Jewel Movement	1984	1	0	0	0
Nicaragua	Sandinista National Liberation Front	1984	0	1	1	1
El Salvador	Nationalist Republican Alliance	1984	0	1	1	1
Brazil	National Renewal Alliance	1985	0	1	1	0
The Philippines	New Society Movement	1986	0	1	0	0
Sudan	Sudanese Socialist Union	1986	1	0	0	0
South Korea	Democratic Justice Party	1988	0	1	1	1
Poland	Polish United Workers' Party	1989	0	1*	1*	1*
Czechoslovakia	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	1990	0	1*	1*	0
Mongolia	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party	1990	0	1	1	1
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Communist Party	1990	0	1	1	1
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party	1990	0	1*	1*	1*
Benin	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin	1991	0	1*	0	0
Cape Verde	Afr. Party of Indep. of Cape Verde	1991	0	1	1	1
São Tomé & Príncipe	Movement for the Liberation of S.T. & P.	1991	0	1	1	1
Bangladesh	Jatiya Party (Ershad)	1991	0	1	1	0

Table A1: Autocratic Ruling Party List (cont.)

Country	Party	Year of Dem.	Break Before Dem.	Party Remains	Party Competitive	Party Gains Power
Sri Lanka	United National Party	1991	0	1	1	1
Suriname	National Democratic Party	1991	0	1	1	1
Romania	Romanian Communist Party	1991	1	0	0	0
Panama	Democratic Revolutionary Party	1991	1	1	1	1
Guyana	People's National Congress	1992	0	1	1	1
Albania	Party of Labour of Albania	1992	0	1	1	0
Lithuania	Communist Party of Lithuania	1992	0	1	1	1
Mali	Democratic Union of the Malian People	1992	1	0	0	0
Niger	National Movement for the Society of Dev.	1993	0	1	1	1
Madagascar	Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution	1993	0	1	1	1
Latvia	Communist Party of Latvia	1993	0	1*	0	0
CAR	Central African Democratic Rally	1993	0	1	1	0
Malawi	Malawi Congress Party	1994	0	1	1	1
Guinea-Bissau	Afr. Party for the Indep. of Guinea and C.V.	1994	0	1	1	1
South Africa	National Party	1994	0	1	1	0
Mozambique	Mozambique Liberation Front	1994	0	1	1	1
Taiwan	Kuomintang	1996	0	1	1	1
Ghana	National Democratic Congress	1997	0	1	1	1
Albania	Democratic Party of Albania	1997	1	1	1	1
Indonesia	Golkar	1999	0	1	1	1
Niger	Rally for Democracy and Progress	1999	1	1	1	0
Mexico	Institutional Revolutionary Party	2000	0	1	1	1
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union	2000	0	1	1	1
Senegal	Socialist Party of Senegal	2000	0	1	1	0
Serbia	Socialist Party of Serbia	2000	0	1	1	0
Peru	Cambio 90 / Peru 2000	2001	0	1	0	0
Lesotho	Lesotho Congress for Democracy	2002	0	1	1	1
Kenya	Kenya African National Union	2002	0	1	1	0
Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone People's Party	2002	0	1	1	1
Paraguay	Colorado Party	2003	0	1	1	1
Ecuador	Popular Democracy	2003	0	1	0	0
Antigua	Antigua Labour Party	2004	0	1	1	1
Georgia	Union of Citizens of Georgia	2004	1	0	0	0
Burundi	Front for Democracy in Burundi	2005	0	1	1	0
The Comoros	National Rally for Development	2006	1	1*	0	0
Liberia	National Patriotic Party	2006	1	1	0	0
Solomon Islands	People's Alliance Party	2006	0	1	1	0
Zambia	Movement for Multi-party Democracy	2008	0	1	1	1
Pakistan	Pakistan Muslim League–PML(Q)	2008	0	1	1	0
The Maldives	Maldivian People's Party	2009	0	1	1	1

Notes: The table lists the 84 ruling parties in this paper's main sample. Each is the last ruling party in the autocratic spell before democratization. Also shown is the year of democratization, whether there was a violent break between party control and democracy, and whether the party remained, was competitive, and regained power at any point in the following democratic spell. Parties with name changes are considered a continuation. A * indicates that the original party does not qualify, but an altered form of the party does.





Figure A1: The figures show the prevalence of compulsory voting and independent judiciaries five years before democratization and following democratization, divided by whether an autocratic ruling party was in power at democratization or was first ousted and replaced by an intervening regime. The comparison shows that both political rules were much less common if the ruling party had leverage over the transition process.

Table A2: Additional Models of Ruling Party Success after Democratization (Regime Types)

	Logit / Ordered Logit			Heckman Selection Models		
DV =	(1) **Party Competitive**	(2) **Party In Power**	(3) **Party Success**	(4) **Party Competitive**	(5) **Party In Power**	(6) **Party Success**
Pure Party Regime	2.591***	0.866*	1.307***	1.170***	0.531*	0.631***
	(4.91)	(2.43)	(4.57)	(5.12)	(2.55)	(6.11)
Pure Party Regime	3.574***	1.055*	1.507***	1.451***	0.622*	0.719***
	(4.34)	(2.31)	(4.15)	(4.03)	(2.36)	(4.53)
Party Hybrid	2.159***	1.025*	1.164**	0.927**	0.626*	0.482*
	(3.54)	(2.13)	(3.12)	(3.25)	(2.28)	(2.39)
Pure Party Regime	2.982***	1.075*	1.400***	1.113***	0.579*	0.644***
	(4.66)	(2.49)	(4.10)	(4.33)	(2.36)	(4.50)
Military Hybrid	1.507**	1.123**	1.086**	0.723***	0.697***	0.418**
	(3.16)	(3.15)	(3.02)	(3.95)	(3.64)	(3.15)
Pure Party Regime	2.593***	0.949**	1.378***	1.169***	0.559**	0.647***
	(4.91)	(2.61)	(4.74)	(5.12)	(2.64)	(6.26)
Pure Military Regime	0.025	0.718	0.725	0.025	0.381	0.253
	(0.04)	(1.33)	(1.06)	(0.07)	(1.06)	(0.74)
Pure Party Regime	2.167**	−0.123	0.391	0.968**	0.003	0.455*
	(3.01)	(−0.24)	(0.86)	(3.25)	(0.01)	(2.13)
Personalist Hybrid	−0.688	−1.172**	−1.052**	−0.254	−0.645**	−0.229
	(−1.68)	(−3.09)	(−2.61)	(−1.22)	(−2.79)	(−1.03)
Pure Party Regime	1.920***	0.557	0.999**	0.868***	0.337	0.497***
	(3.63)	(1.46)	(3.14)	(3.72)	(1.55)	(4.51)
Pure Personalist Regime	−1.487***	−0.801*	−0.760**	−0.730***	−0.486*	−0.330*
	(−3.98)	(−2.25)	(−2.62)	(−3.60)	(−2.32)	(−2.52)

Notes: The table displays models predicting autocratic party success in democracy from the modal regime type in autocracy. Each distinct model (divided by dotted lines) adds variables to the model shown in Table **??**. Years are 1940–2015. t statistics (based on robust standard errors clustered by electoral period) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A3: Models of Party Success Stratified by Regime Type

DV = *Party Success*	**Pure Party** (1)	**Not Pure Party** (2)	**Military/ Hybrid** (3)	**Personalist/ Hybrid** (4)
Party Violent Ouster	-8.999^{***}	-2.008^{***}	-8.352^{***}	-2.045^{***}
	(-3.44)	(-4.44)	(-5.07)	(-3.31)
Party Opposition Freedom	0.855	0.029	-12.490^{**}	-1.014
	(0.66)	(0.02)	(-3.00)	(-0.53)
Party Age	-0.039	0.042^{***}	0.675^{***}	0.106^{***}
	(-1.83)	(4.14)	(4.59)	(4.87)
Party Years in Power	0.070^{**}	-0.063^{*}	-0.918^{***}	-0.113^{*}
	(3.09)	(-2.13)	(-4.67)	(-2.01)
Party Average Growth	-0.035	-0.007	-1.608^{***}	-0.080
	(-0.54)	(-0.29)	(-4.01)	(-1.11)
Party Territorial Loss	-1.572^{*}	-2.869^{***}		-3.882^{***}
	(-1.97)	(-4.75)		(-3.45)
GDP/capita (ln)	0.414	0.590^{**}	8.189^{***}	-0.337
	(0.96)	(2.62)	(4.93)	(-0.70)
Economic Growth	0.029	0.051	-0.056	0.019
	(1.12)	(1.94)	(-0.93)	(0.38)
Regional Democracy	-1.449	-1.528	-11.918^{***}	1.547
	(-1.13)	(-1.65)	(-4.43)	(0.60)
Democracy Age	0.136^{*}	-0.115^{***}	-0.933^{***}	-0.221^{***}
	(2.15)	(-4.23)	(-4.68)	(-4.45)
Previous Democratic Spells	-0.240	-0.092	3.823^{***}	0.799
	(-0.42)	(-0.38)	(5.08)	(1.38)
Year	-0.156^{**}	0.016	0.056	0.038
	(-2.77)	(1.05)	(1.06)	(1.62)
Post-Cold War	0.409	1.009	1.606	1.474
	(0.58)	(1.78)	(1.46)	(1.57)
N	389	1,062	291	613
Countries	19	49	15	34
Pseudo R^2	0.290	0.312	0.659	0.411

Notes: The table displays ordered logits predicting *Party Success* in democracy, stratified by regime type. Models 1 and 2 stratify by whether the party's regime was a pure party regime, as coded by Geddes et al. (2014). Model 3 uses regimes coded as military or military hybrids. Model 4 uses regimes coded as personalist or personalist hybrids. Years are 1940–2015. t statistics (based on robust standard errors clustered by electoral period) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A4: Robustness Checks Predicting Ruling Party Success after Democratization

DV = *Party Success*	**All Parties** (1)	**Election Years** (2)	**In Power** ≥ 5 **Years** (3)	**Dem Age** ≤ 10 **Years** (4)	**No Violent Ouster** (5)	**Violent Ouster** (6)
Years Out of Power at Democratization	-0.078^{***}					
	(-5.91)					
Party Violent Ouster	-1.984^{***}	-3.140^{***}	-2.219^{***}	-2.705^{***}		
	(-5.31)	(-6.63)	(-3.46)	(-4.82)		
Party Age	0.029^{***}	0.024^{**}	0.016^{*}	0.036^{***}	0.018^{*}	0.084^{***}
	(8.72)	(3.09)	(2.31)	(4.08)	(2.02)	(3.94)
Party Years in Power	-0.012	0.004	0.031^{*}	-0.016	-0.007	0.166^{***}
	(-1.68)	(0.35)	(2.13)	(-1.08)	(-0.42)	(3.76)
Party Opposition Freedom	1.754^{***}	2.153^{***}	1.623^{*}	1.220	0.286	9.635^{***}
	(3.92)	(3.47)	(2.14)	(1.62)	(0.38)	(6.10)
Party Average Growth	0.080^{***}	0.051^{**}	0.046^{**}	0.065^{**}	0.034^{*}	0.015
	(4.83)	(3.20)	(2.89)	(2.94)	(2.20)	(0.19)
Party Territorial Loss	-0.723^{*}	-1.751^{***}	-2.186^{***}	-1.366^{**}	-1.712^{***}	-39.828^{***}
	(-2.13)	(-5.11)	(-4.84)	(-2.79)	(-3.62)	(-29.49)
GDP/capita (ln)	-0.200	0.354^{*}	0.389^{*}	0.124	0.451^{*}	-0.524
	(-1.78)	(2.18)	(2.09)	(0.49)	(2.49)	(-0.69)
Economic Growth	0.027	0.038^{*}	0.044^{*}	0.006	0.043	0.019
	(1.94)	(1.96)	(2.02)	(0.25)	(1.80)	(0.45)
Regional Democracy	-0.922	-1.248	-2.782^{***}	-1.461	-1.298	-1.355
	(-1.94)	(-1.84)	(-3.61)	(-1.68)	(-1.63)	(-0.62)
Democracy Age	-0.052^{***}	-0.059^{***}	-0.065^{**}	-0.079	-0.065^{*}	-0.116^{***}
	(-4.53)	(-3.59)	(-3.21)	(-1.59)	(-2.33)	(-4.33)
Previous Democratic Spells	-0.270	-0.404	0.319	-0.087	-0.622^{**}	3.397^{***}
	(-1.52)	(-1.90)	(0.86)	(-0.34)	(-3.29)	(3.72)
Year	-0.001	-0.020	-0.012	-0.009	0.009	0.056
	(-0.15)	(-1.50)	(-0.77)	(-0.61)	(0.46)	(1.64)
Post-Cold War	0.351	0.881^{*}	1.274^{**}	0.884	0.139	0.133
	(1.24)	(2.23)	(2.60)	(1.37)	(0.26)	(0.10)
N	2,221	471	1,132	663	812	639
Countries	66	66	54	66	47	27
Pseudo R^2	0.236	0.311	0.321	0.220	0.086	0.483

Notes: The table displays robustness checks for models predicting the success of former autocratic ruling parties in democracy. All predict *Party Success* and use ordered logit. Model 1 includes all parties from the previous autocratic spell as separate observations. Models 2-4 restrict the sample to election years only, parties in power in autocracy at least five years, and democracies 10 years or younger, respectively. Models 5-6 alternately limit the sample to parties not ousted and ousted violently. t statistics (based on robust standard errors clustered by electoral period) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A5: Robustness Checks Using Alternative Measures of Democracy

DV = *Party Success*	**BMR** (1)	**Polity** (2)	**Freedom House** (3)	**V-Dem** (4)
Party Violent Ouster	-2.284^{***}	-2.748^{***}	-1.889^{**}	-2.551^{***}
	(-5.36)	(-4.98)	(-2.97)	(-4.72)
Party Opposition Freedom	1.133	0.657	1.115	1.144
	(1.82)	(0.94)	(1.19)	(1.58)
Party Age	0.022^{***}	0.015	-0.026^{*}	0.016^{*}
	(3.30)	(1.83)	(-2.21)	(2.19)
Party Years in Power	0.001	-0.002	0.048^{*}	0.005
	(0.07)	(-0.14)	(2.50)	(0.32)
Party Average Growth	0.036^{*}	0.025	0.013	0.036^{*}
	(2.45)	(1.58)	(0.75)	(2.31)
Party Territorial Loss	-1.975^{***}	-2.103^{***}	-2.292^{***}	-2.031^{***}
	(-5.21)	(-5.14)	(-5.70)	(-4.92)
GDP/capita (ln)	0.318^{*}	0.577^{***}	1.018^{***}	0.486^{**}
	(1.97)	(3.35)	(4.68)	(2.87)
Economic Growth	0.030	0.044	0.037	0.040
	(1.66)	(1.89)	(1.47)	(1.70)
Regional Democracy	-1.287^{*}	-0.411	-1.398	-1.270
	(-2.03)	(-0.56)	(-1.77)	(-1.73)
Democracy Age	-0.070^{***}	-0.078^{***}	-0.088^{**}	-0.069^{***}
	(-4.07)	(-3.56)	(-3.26)	(-3.48)
Previous Democratic Spells	-0.064	-0.235	-0.313	-0.097
	(-0.27)	(-0.80)	(-0.95)	(-0.34)
Year	-0.004	0.020	0.052	0.010
	(-0.33)	(1.25)	(1.71)	(0.63)
Post-Cold War	0.896^{*}	0.873^{*}	1.309^{**}	1.063^{*}
	(2.06)	(2.02)	(2.81)	(2.48)
N	1,451	1,215	909	1,173
Countries	66	56	53	55
Pseudo R^2	0.269	0.318	0.328	0.309

Notes: The table displays ordered logits predicting *Party Success* in democracy, using different measures of democracy. Model 1 replicates Model 3 from Table 2 for comparison. Models 2-4 limit the sample to meet requirements on Polity, Freedom House, and V-Dem. Years are 1940–2015. t statistics (based on robust standard errors clustered by electoral period) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A6: First Stages of IV Models Predicting Democratic Survival

	Party Competitive (1)	**Party in Power** (2)	**Party Success** (3)
Party Average Growth	0.019^{***}	0.009^{**}	0.023^{**}
	(5.19)	(3.25)	(2.76)
Party Average Freedom from Repression	0.413^{**}	0.078	0.757^{*}
	(3.02)	(0.47)	(2.14)
Party Average Corruption	-1.184^{***}	-0.538	-2.414^{***}
	(-4.68)	(-1.85)	(-3.82)
Party Average Equal Resources	0.731^{***}	0.618^{***}	1.916^{***}
	(4.53)	(3.51)	(4.68)
Other Controls?	Y	Y	Y
N	1,644	1,644	1,644
Countries	66	66	66
Kleibergen-Paap F (1st stage)	32.45	8.04	19.74
Overid. Test (Hansen J p-value)	0.14	0.58	0.57

Notes: The table displays coefficients on the four instruments from the first stages of the IV models in Models 1-3 of Table **??**. The second-stage controls are included, but not shown. Years are 1940–2012. t statistics (based on robust standard errors clustered by electoral period) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A7: Robustness Checks for IV Models Predicting Democratic Survival and Liberalism

DV =	Democratic Survival			Liberal Index (V-Dem)		
Endogenous Variable =	**Party Competitive** (1)	**Party in Power** (2)	**Party Success** (3)	**Party Competitive** (4)	**Party in Power** (5)	**Party Success** (6)
2-year DV Lag				-0.046^{***}	-0.090^{***}	-0.024^{***}
				(-3.49)	(-3.30)	(-3.73)
10-year DV Lag				-0.100^{***}	-0.199^{***}	-0.050^{***}
				(-4.17)	(-3.87)	(-4.39)
Alt Dem: Polity	-1.169^{*}	-1.862^{**}	-0.570^{*}	-0.080^{**}	-0.187^{**}	-0.046^{***}
	(-2.28)	(-2.82)	(-2.39)	(-3.22)	(-3.00)	(-3.46)
Alt Dem: Freedom House	-1.214^{*}	-1.987^{***}	-0.577^{**}	-0.030	-0.051	-0.017
	(-2.38)	(-4.42)	(-2.63)	(-1.82)	(-1.50)	(-1.86)
Alt Dem: V-Dem	-1.197^{*}	-1.977^{***}	-0.610^{**}	-0.072^{**}	-0.154^{**}	-0.041^{**}
	(-2.45)	(-4.07)	(-2.96)	(-2.87)	(-2.58)	(-3.04)
Dem. Age $\geq$ 5	-0.899	-0.394	-0.361	-0.079^{***}	-0.138^{**}	-0.038^{***}
	(-1.49)	(-0.21)	(-1.24)	(-3.58)	(-3.14)	(-3.39)
Election Control	-0.998^{**}	-1.613^{**}	-0.488^{**}	-0.090^{***}	-0.178^{***}	-0.046^{**}
	(-2.72)	(-2.98)	(-2.80)	(-4.10)	(-3.88)	(-4.31)
Legislative Election	-0.088	-0.042	-0.079	-0.002	0.004	-0.000
	(-0.50)	(-0.25)	(-0.45)	(-0.60)	(0.67)	(-0.06)
Executive Election	0.591^{*}	0.591^{*}	0.593^{*}	0.015^{**}	0.023^{**}	0.016^{**}
	(2.32)	(2.56)	(2.40)	(2.72)	(3.19)	(2.96)
Party in Previous Spell	-1.188^{*}	-1.776^{*}	-0.577^{*}	-0.121^{***}	-0.207^{**}	-0.068^{***}
	(-2.55)	(-2.00)	(-2.29)	(-3.57)	(-3.00)	(-3.63)
All Dem. Years	-1.503^{***}	-2.165^{***}	-0.710^{***}	-0.067^{***}	-0.104^{***}	-0.037^{***}
	(-5.67)	(-8.52)	(-5.80)	(-4.35)	(-3.76)	(-4.82)
Past Autocratic Party	0.606^{**}	0.593^{***}	0.814^{***}	0.004	0.002	0.018
	(3.24)	(4.27)	(4.20)	(0.35)	(0.23)	(1.51)

Notes: The table displays robustness checks for the IV models testing how autocratic ruling party success influences democratic survival (Models 1–3) and quality (Models 4–6). The endogenous variables that are instrumented also vary by model. Different checks are listed at left and separate IV results are shown for each check, endogenous variable, and dependent variable. Years are 1940–2012. t statistics (from robust standard errors clustered by electoral period) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$