Appendix

This document provides further information about the data and results from "Exiting the Coalition: When Do States Abandon Coalition Partners during War?" The first section substantiates several claims about the robustness of the results that are made in the main text. The second section discusses and presents alternate versions of several figures, in particular to graph confidence intervals that are omitted for various reasons in the figures in the main text. The third section contains two tables that list the cases used in the analysis, along with codings for the dependent variable.

Robustness Checks

In the article, I note that the results are robust to making the following changes:

1. Recoding cases in which a country's withdrawal from its coalition coincided with war termination as non-abandonment.
2. Dropping the one coalition (between Russia and Germany in the War of Latvian Liberation) in which there was no evidence of policy coordination among members.
3. Dropping countries who made only a minor contribution to the coalition war effort.
4. Inserting additional controls for war aims, country battle deaths, and whether or not the country intervened in the conflict after it was already underway.
5. Measuring a coalition member's importance to the coalition through share of troop commitments rather than share of capabilities (CINC scores).
6. Replacing the democracy dummy variable with the country's Polity score.
7. Using a different measure of recent war exit.
8. Substituting alternate specifications of the alliance variable.

In addition, I briefly note that allies are more likely to include no separate peace stipulations in their agreements when they are fighting on separate fronts; I thus provide evidence to substantiate that claim.

Table 1 addresses the first three points above. In model 1, I recode three cases in which a country informed its alliance partners that it was withdrawing and thereby precipitated war termination—the Austro-French War of Italian Unification, the Crimean War, and the Sinai War/Suez Crisis—as non-withdrawal. Results are substantively identical to those reported in the paper. In model 2, I

drop the one coalition—that between Germany and Russia in the War of Latvian Liberation—in which the historical record gives no indication that coalition members attempted to coordinate policy or military efforts.[1] Again the change has no substantive effect on the results. Model 3 turns to the claim that the results are robust to excluding minor participants. For this regression, I excluded all observations in which a country is contributing less than 10% of the soldiers who are actively fighting on behalf of the coalition (using the underlying troop contribution data used to construct the *Common Front* variable). The results for the key independent variables are quite stable, demonstrating that these findings are not being driven by the activities of relatively marginal war participants. This change does, however, result in differences for several control variables. Leadership turnover is now substantively and statistically more strongly associated with withdrawal; by contrast, democracy is now associated with if anything quicker abandonment of coalition partners. This finding thus raises the possibility that prior results for this variable are being driven by the low-level involvement of democracies in conflicts like the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars, as well as the involvement of minor democracies like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in World War II. Finally, the variable capturing recent coalition partner withdrawal also is substantively weaker, though still statistically significant, suggesting unsurprisingly that demonstration effects are stronger for minor participants (who cannot expect to fight a war successfully without stronger allies) than for stronger or more committed members.

Table 2 demonstrates that the results are stable when including additional plausible control variables. Model 1 adds controls for country war aims, which capture major goals of the participant in a given war. Countries are coded as having territorial aims when they seek to acquire territory from an opponent or when an opponent seeks to take it from them. They are coded as having regime aims when they seek to overthrow the government of an enemy state or when an enemy

[1]This conflict was really a three-way war among Russia, Germany, and the Baltic States, though Germany and Latvia coordinated policy in the opening months of the war when Russia was a significant common threat to the interests of both in the region. Once the Russians had been pushed back, the Germans attacked the Latvians; at this point COW codes Germany as switching to Russia's side, though German and Russian war aims remained mutually exclusive. There is thus a reasonable case to be made for excluding this coalition from the analysis. I do not do so to avoid the appearance of arbitrariness in the identification of the universe of cases and because its inclusion does not significantly influence the overall results.

seeks to do the same thing to them.[2] We might expect that countries with territorial war aims will be more likely to defect, as it is easier to imagine striking a separate peace deal when pursuing parochial interests. The results, however, give no indication that territorial war aims are associated with defection, though regime-related aims are associated with a reduction in the probability of defection at a marginally significant level.[3] The more important question is whether controlling for war aims affects the battlefield results, as might be the case if countries with territorial aims tended to fight separately and were more likely to defect. The results indicate that this possibility should not be a concern.

Model 2 adds a control equal to the log of a country's total battle deaths, while model 3 substitutes the population-adjusted log of total battle deaths. If countries are more likely to withdraw from wars as total suffering increases, whether because the accumulation of deaths produces domestic hostility toward the war effort or because fighting simply reveals information that leads to decisions to exit ongoing wars, then we would expect this variable to be associated with quicker abandonment of coalition partners. In this case, battle deaths turn out to be uncorrelated with decisions to withdraw, while the battlefield variables retain significance.[4] Model 4 introduces a control for the timing of a country's entrance into a war. We might reasonably expect that countries that join wars after they have already started will have a better sense of how the war is likely to unfold and hence will be less likely to defect. If this variable is correlated with the battlefield variables, for example because intervention tips the military balance in favor of the side that gains a new coalition partner, then failure to control for intervention might bias results. *Late Joiner* is a dummy variable that takes a value of zero if a country enters in the first month of a war and one otherwise. Again, this variable is statistically insignificant, while results for the main battlefield

[2]These war aims are not mutually exclusive, nor does a war participant necessarily need to espouse either one. Thus, during the Paraguayan War Argentina and Brazil both sought to take territory from Paraguay and to overthrow Francisco Solano López, while in the Boxer Rebellion coalition participants sought neither to take territory from China nor to overthrow the Chinese government. Note also that this variable is coded on the basis of the country's aims, which may not correspond to ultimate outcomes. In the Franco-Prussian War, for example, the capture of Louis Napoleon at the Battle of Sedan precipitated regime change in France, but because the German states did not go to war intending to bring about such change they are not coded as having those aims.

[3]This result vanishes, however, when omitting the World War II Allied coalition, whose demands for unconditional surrender were motivated by strong desires for regime change in Germany and Japan. Given the unrepresentativeness of this coalition, any relationship between war aims and coalition reliability should be treated with great caution.

[4]This result contrasts with the finding that higher battle deaths predict war termination, as I report in a forthcoming paper in *International Organization*.

variables are stable. Finally, model 5 substitutes a different control for importance to the coalition from the one used in the main analysis. The primary variable is the share of total coalition capabilities, where capabilities are measured with CINC scores. In some cases, however, this measure could be misleading if a powerful country made a minor contribution to a coalition effort. An alternate approach is to substitute the country's military commitment, measured in terms of total military personnel fighting on active fronts, as a share of total coalition commitments. While the variable is no longer in the incorrect direction from the perspective of collective action arguments, its coefficient is substantively very close to zero and it is far from statistical significance.

Table 3 presents results using alternate specifications for control variables to demonstrate both that results for the variable are not driven by measurement decisions and that results for the key independent variables are robust to changing the specification of the controls. Model 1 of table 3 substitutes a country's Polity score for the democracy dummy used in the main analysis. This change results in the loss of several cases of withdrawal among minor European states in the 19th century for whom Polity data is unavailable (all of whom were clearly undemocratic), but has only a limited influence on the results: the variable shifts from $p = 0.074$ to $p = 0.058$, in both cases marginally statistically significant, while results for the battlefield variables are stable. Model 2 replaces the control for recent exit used in the paper (which takes a value of 1 immediately after withdrawal and then declines at a constant rate over three months to 0) with an alternate measure that takes a constant value of 1 for the three months following withdrawal. This variable remains highly correlated with abandonment of coalition partners, while results for other variables are stable.

The remaining specifications in table 3 explore the effects of changing the coding of alliance variables. The primary analysis uses a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country has at least one formal alliance with another coalition member that prohibits separate peace agreements. Model 3 substitutes an alternate measure that is equal to the proportion of coalition members with whom the country has such an agreement. Under this variable, a country who has a no separate peace provision with only one of a number of coalition partners, such as Japan in earlier stages of World War I, is coded as less committed to reaching no separate peace than is a country than

has such an agreement with every coalition partner. Models 4 and 5 shift the focus from separate peace provisions to the existence of a formal alliance. While the existence of an alliance does not guarantee that withdrawing from an ongoing conflict will violate an established agreement, it does constitute a formal institution to manage cooperation, and hence might be expected to reduce the probability of defection. Model 4 uses a dummy variable that captures the existence of a formal offensive or defensive alliance with at least one other coalition member, while model 5 substitutes the proportion of coalition members with whom a country has such an agreement. The alliance variable is consistently negative but generally statistically insignificant, though it reaches marginal significance ($p = 0.081$) in model 4.

Finally, table 4 substantiates the claim that countries have been more likely to reach alliances containing separate peace provisions when fighting on different fronts (and hence facing an increased probability of defection). This claim does not follow from the theoretical arguments advanced in the paper, but it does provide one possible explanation for the relatively weak finding for no separate peace provisions. This analysis uses probit regression to examine whether countries fighting on separate fronts are more likely to have formal alliances with no separate peace provisions on either the first day (Model 1) or the last day (Model 2) of coalition involvement.[5] These results suggest that selection effects may be responsible for the weak findings for alliance variables, especially those with no separate peace provisions.

Figures with Estimated Confidence Intervals

Figure 3 in the main text presents predicted survival rates (i.e. non-abandonment of coalition partners) over time for countries that are fighting on a common front and that are fighting on an entirely separate front, demonstrating that the latter group are expected to abandon their partners far more quickly. The figure omits confidence intervals around the survival estimates, which are non-trivial to estimate. The analysis for the paper was conducted in Stata 11, which does not permit the calculation of such confidence intervals. An extension, survci, does permit such calculations, but

[5]The two analyses are not identical because the alliance variables (and also the common front variable) are time-varying: the alliance measure can change either because a country's ally enters or exits the war or because the country signs a new alliance with its coalition partners.

Table 1: Robustness Checks Related to DV/Universe of Cases

	(1) No WD. if War Ends	(2) No Non-Coord.	(3) No Minor Participants
Common Front	-2.42**	-2.11*	-1.87*
	(0.93)	(0.84)	(0.85)
War Worsening	6.24*	7.30**	6.84**
	(2.83)	(2.64)	(2.28)
Relative Capabilities	-0.063	0.18	0.57
	(1.24)	(1.24)	(0.93)
Importance	0.26	0.62	-0.37
	(0.49)	(0.57)	(0.92)
Recent Ally Exit	2.32**	2.23**	0.87*
	(0.76)	(0.66)	(0.43)
Democracy	-0.75†	-0.71†	0.085
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.59)
New Leader	1.13*	0.85†	2.14**
	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.52)
No Separate Peace	-0.92*	-0.65	-1.03
	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.65)
Observations	96850	96672	38354
Countries	204	202	116
Failures	37	39	22

Standard errors clustered by coalition. † $p < .1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Robustness Checks Related to Additional Possible Control Variables

	(1) War Aims	(2) Battle Deaths	(3) Alt. Deaths	(4) Late Joiner	(5) Alt. Impt.
Common Front	-2.20*	-2.25*	-2.10*	-2.16**	-2.14**
	(1.06)	(1.04)	(1.01)	(0.78)	(0.81)
War Worsening	7.46*	6.74**	6.83**	6.96**	6.79**
	(3.00)	(2.45)	(2.44)	(2.49)	(2.52)
Relative Capabilities	0.43	0.15	0.34	0.23	0.16
	(1.09)	(0.91)	(0.85)	(1.08)	(1.14)
Importance	0.66	0.78	0.73	0.63	
	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.49)	(0.50)	
Importance (Soldiers)					-0.015
					(1.01)
Recent Ally Exit	2.31**	2.28**	2.29**	2.31**	2.23**
	(0.69)	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.70)
Democracy	-0.88	-0.83	-0.72	-0.78†	-0.68
	(0.70)	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.43)	(0.47)
New Leader	1.22**	1.02*	0.98*	1.00*	0.96*
	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.46)
No Separate Peace	-0.76*	-0.60	-0.71	-0.71†	-0.60
	(0.38)	(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.48)
Territorial War Aim	0.028				
	(0.92)				
Regime War Aim	-0.87†				
	(0.52)				
log(Battle Deaths)		-0.044			
		(0.13)			
log(Battle Deaths/Pop.)			0.026		
			(0.14)		
Late Joiner				-0.16	
				(0.43)	
Observations	96850	96850	96850	96850	96850
N_sub	204	204	204	204	204
N_fail	40	40	40	40	40

Standard errors clustered by coalition. † $p < .1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Robustness Checks Related to Alternate Measures of Controls

	(1) Polity	(2) Alt. Recent Exit	(3) % Sep. Pce.	(4) Alliance	(5) % Allied
Common Front	-2.28*	-2.12**	-2.09**	-2.01**	-1.99*
	(0.97)	(0.78)	(0.78)	(0.76)	(0.78)
War Worsening	6.72**	6.53**	7.09**	6.85**	7.18**
	(2.33)	(2.46)	(2.52)	(2.53)	(2.57)
Relative Capabilities	0.81	0.19	0.21	0.30	0.25
	(1.47)	(1.13)	(1.16)	(1.13)	(1.25)
Importance	1.16†	0.69	0.58	0.71	0.63
	(0.67)	(0.49)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.55)
Democracy		-0.73†	-0.74†	-0.67†	-0.72†
		(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.43)
Polity Score	-0.084†				
	(0.044)				
New Leader	1.04*	0.97*	1.03*	0.86†	0.97*
	(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.46)
Recent Ally Exit	2.36**		2.24**	2.35**	2.30**
	(0.54)		(0.74)	(0.71)	(0.75)
Alt. Recent Exit		1.54**			
		(0.52)			
No Separate Peace	-1.08*	-0.71†			
	(0.46)	(0.41)			
% No Sep. Peace			-0.76		
			(0.77)		
Alliance Agreement				-0.67†	
				(0.39)	
% Allied					-0.45
					(0.60)
Observations	95269	96850	95981	94735	94735
Countries	197	204	204	203	203
Failures	38	40	40	40	40

Standard errors clustered by coalition. † $p < .1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Common Front as a Determinant of Separate Peace Agreements

	(1) First Day	(2) Last Day
Common Front	-0.79†	-0.75†
	(0.42)	(0.39)
Constant	-0.44	-0.31
	(0.27)	(0.24)
Observations	205	205

Standard errors clustered by coalition. † $p < .1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

only for single-record duration data and only when using the standard variance-covariance matrix. It thus cannot be used in combination with time-varying variables or when clustering observations by coalition, as I do in the main analysis.

That said, it is possible to give some sense of the precision of the estimate by conducting an alternate analysis that throws out the time-varying data. Specifically, I use a model in which there is a single observation per coalition participant, using either the observed value on the final day of the war (figure 1) or the median value over the course of the country's involvement in the coalition (figure 2). As before, the two lines represent the predicted survival functions with control variables held at median values and the common front measure set to values that capture either an entirely common front or a country fighting entirely independently. In each case, it is clear that the difference between the two predicted effects is not only substantively but also statistically significant.

Figure 4 in the main text presents predicted hazard rates for a range of independent variables. While confidence intervals can be more easily calculated for predicted hazard rates than for predicted survival functions, including confidence intervals would have rendered figure 4 unreadable. The original figure also omits the effect of recent coalition member exit, which is large enough that including it on a common axis would have made comparisons among other variables difficult. For interested readers, however, figure 3 compiles graphs of predicted hazard rates, including confidence intervals, for all variables used in the analysis. For continuous variables, the x axis displays percentiles in the observed values for the variable in question; for dichotomous variables, I simply report report results at the two possible values for the variable.



Figure 1: Predicted Survival Function for Common Front Variable (final day values)



Figure 2: Predicted Survival Function for Common Front Variable (median values in war)

Figure 3: Marginal Effects with Confidence Intervals for All Variables

List of Coalition Members

This section contains two tables that provide information about the cases the comprise the dataset. Table 5 lists only those countries that are coded as abandoning coalition partners under at least one coding rule, and reports the war in which the country participated, the year of defection, and the coding under different coding rules. **Withdraw** is the coding under the primary coding rule; **Volunt.** omits cases in which the country was incapable of further conventional resistance at the time that it withdrew; and **Pre-Peace** omits cases that are coded as abandonment under the primary coding rule in which abandonment coincided with war termination. Table 6 lists all coalition participants. The table lists the war, the country, the year in which it entered the war, the side on which it fought, which appearance in the war this case captures (to distinguish among cases, such as France in World War II, in which a country exits the war and then reenters, triggering a new observation), and whether the country is coded as abandoning its coalition partners under the primary coding rule.

Table 5: Cases of Coded Coalition Abandonment

War Name	Country	Year of Exit	Withdraw	Volunt.	Pre-Peace
Austro-Sardinian	Papal States	1848	1	1	1
Austro-Sardinian	Two Sicilies	1848	1	1	1
Roman Republic	Two Sicilies	1849	1	1	1
Crimean	France	1856	1	1	0
Italian Unification	France	1859	1	1	0
Seven Weeks	Germany	1866	1	1	1
Seven Weeks	Mecklenburg Schwerin	1866	1	1	1
Seven Weeks	Hanover	1866	1	0	1
War of the Pacific	Bolivia	1880	1	1	1
World War I	Austria-Hungary	1918	1	1	1
World War I	Bulgaria	1918	1	1	1
World War I	Turkey	1918	1	1	1
World War I	Montenegro	1916	1	0	1
World War I	Romania	1917	1	1	1
World War I	Russia	1917	1	1	1
Latvian Liberation	Germany	1919	1	1	1
Latvian Liberation	Germany	1919	1	1	1
Hungarian Adversaries	Czechoslovakia	1919	1	1	1
World War II	Bulgaria	1944	1	1	1
World War II	Finland	1944	1	1	1
World War II	Germany	1945	1	0	1
World War II	Hungary	1945	1	0	1
World War II	Italy	1943	1	1	1
World War II	Romania	1944	1	1	1
World War II	Belgium	1940	1	1	1
World War II	France	1940	1	1	1
World War II	Greece	1941	1	1	1
World War II	Netherlands	1940	1	0	1
World War II	Norway	1940	1	0	1
World War II	Poland	1939	1	0	1
World War II	Yugoslavia	1941	1	0	1
Arab-Israeli	Iraq	1948	1	1	1
Arab-Israeli	Jordan	1948	1	1	1
Arab-Israeli	Lebanon	1948	1	1	1
Arab-Israeli	Syria	1948	1	1	1
Sinai War	United Kingdom	1956	1	1	0
Vietnam War	Australia	1972	1	1	1
Vietnam War	Philippines	1973	1	1	1
Vietnam War	South Korea	1973	1	1	1
Vietnam War	Thailand	1973	1	1	1
Vietnam War	USA	1973	1	1	1

Table 6: List of All Coalition Members

War Name	Country	Entry Year	Side	Appear	Withdraw
Austro-Sardinian	Italy	1848	1	1	0
Austro-Sardinian	Modena	1848	1	1	0
Austro-Sardinian	Papal States	1848	1	1	1
Austro-Sardinian	Tuscany	1848	1	1	0
Austro-Sardinian	Two Sicilies	1848	1	1	1
Roman Republic	Austria	1849	1	1	0
Roman Republic	France	1849	1	1	0
Roman Republic	Two Sicilies	1849	1	1	1
Crimean	France	1854	1	1	1
Crimean	Italy	1855	1	1	0
Crimean	Turkey	1854	1	1	0
Crimean	United Kingdom	1854	1	1	0
Italian Unification	France	1859	1	1	1
Italian Unification	Sardinia/Piedmont	1859	1	1	0
Second Schleswig-Holstein	Austria	1864	1	1	0
Second Schleswig-Holstein	Germany	1864	1	1	0
Lopez	Argentina	1865	2	1	0
Lopez	Brazil	1865	2	1	0
Lopez	Uruguay	1865	2	1	0
Naval War	Chile	1866	2	1	0
Naval War	Peru	1866	2	1	0
Seven Weeks	Germany	1866	1	1	1
Seven Weeks	Italy	1866	1	1	0
Seven Weeks	Mecklenburg Schwerin	1866	1	1	1
Seven Weeks	Austria	1866	2	1	0
Seven Weeks	Baden	1866	2	1	0
Seven Weeks	Bavaria	1866	2	1	0
Seven Weeks	Hanover	1866	2	1	1
Seven Weeks	Hesse Electoral	1866	2	1	0
Seven Weeks	Hesse Grand Ducal	1866	2	1	0
Seven Weeks	Saxony	1866	2	1	0
Seven Weeks	Wuerttemburg	1866	2	1	0
Franco-Prussian	Baden	1870	2	1	0
Franco-Prussian	Bavaria	1870	2	1	0
Franco-Prussian	Germany	1870	2	1	0
Franco-Prussian	Hesse Grand Ducal	1870	2	1	0
Franco-Prussian	Saxony	1870	2	1	0
Franco-Prussian	Wuerttemburg	1870	2	1	0
First Central American	Guatemala	1876	1	1	0
First Central American	Honduras	1876	1	1	0
War of the Pacific	Bolivia	1879	2	1	1
War of the Pacific	Peru	1879	2	1	0

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Table 6: List of All Coalition Members (continued)

War Name	Country	Entry Year	Side	Appear	Withdraw
Boxer Rebellion	Austria-Hungary	1900	2	1	0
Boxer Rebellion	France	1900	2	1	0
Boxer Rebellion	Germany	1900	2	1	0
Boxer Rebellion	Italy	1900	2	1	0
Boxer Rebellion	Japan	1900	2	1	0
Boxer Rebellion	Russia	1900	2	1	0
Boxer Rebellion	United Kingdom	1900	2	1	0
Boxer Rebellion	USA	1900	2	1	0
Third Central American	El Salvador	1906	2	1	0
Third Central American	Honduras	1906	2	1	0
Fourth Central American	El Salvador	1907	2	1	0
Fourth Central American	Honduras	1907	2	1	0
First Balkan	Bulgaria	1912	1	1	0
First Balkan	Greece	1912	1	1	0
First Balkan	Montenegro	1912	1	1	0
First Balkan	Yugoslavia	1912	1	1	0
Second Balkan	Greece	1913	1	1	0
Second Balkan	Montenegro	1913	1	1	0
Second Balkan	Romania	1913	1	1	0
Second Balkan	Turkey	1913	1	1	0
Second Balkan	Yugoslavia	1913	1	1	0
World War I	Austria-Hungary	1914	1	1	1
World War I	Bulgaria	1915	1	1	1
World War I	Germany	1914	1	1	0
World War I	Turkey	1914	1	1	1
World War I	Belgium	1914	2	1	0
World War I	France	1914	2	1	0
World War I	Greece	1917	2	1	0
World War I	Italy	1915	2	1	0
World War I	Japan	1914	2	1	0
World War I	Montenegro	1914	2	1	1
World War I	Portugal	1916	2	1	0
World War I	Romania	1916	2	1	1
World War I	Russia	1914	2	1	1
World War I	United Kingdom	1914	2	1	0
World War I	USA	1917	2	1	0
World War I	Yugoslavia	1914	2	1	0
Estonian Liberation	Estonia	1919	1	1	0
Estonian Liberation	Finland	1919	1	1	0

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Table 6: List of All Coalition Members (continued)

War Name	Country	Entry Year	Side	Appear	Withdraw
Latvian Liberation	Estonia	1919	1	1	0
Latvian Liberation	Germany	1918	1	1	1
Latvian Liberation	Latvia	1918	1	1	0
Latvian Liberation	Germany	1919	2	2	1
Latvian Liberation	Soviet Union	1919	2	1	0
Hungarian Adversaries	Czechoslovakia	1919	1	1	1
Hungarian Adversaries	Romania	1919	1	1	0
Nomonhan	Mongolia	1939	2	1	0
Nomonhan	USSR	1939	2	1	0
World War II	Bulgaria	1941	1	1	1
World War II	Finland	1941	1	1	1
World War II	France	1940	1	2	0
World War II	Germany	1939	1	1	0
World War II	Germany	1940	1	2	1
World War II	Hungary	1941	1	1	1
World War II	Italy	1940	1	1	1
World War II	Japan	1941	1	1	0
World War II	Romania	1941	1	1	1
World War II	USSR	1939	1	1	0
World War II	Australia	1939	2	1	0
World War II	Belgium	1940	2	1	1
World War II	Brazil	1944	2	1	0
World War II	Bulgaria	1944	2	2	0
World War II	Canada	1939	2	1	0
World War II	China	1941	2	1	0
World War II	Ethiopia	1941	2	1	0
World War II	Finland	1944	2	2	0
World War II	France	1939	2	1	1
World War II	France	1944	2	3	0
World War II	Greece	1940	2	1	1
World War II	Italy	1943	2	2	0
World War II	Mongolia	1945	2	1	0
World War II	Netherlands	1940	2	1	1
World War II	New Zealand	1939	2	1	0
World War II	Norway	1940	2	1	1
World War II	Poland	1939	2	1	1
World War II	Romania	1944	2	2	0
World War II	South Africa	1939	2	1	0
World War II	USSR	1941	2	2	0
World War II	USSR	1945	2	3	0
World War II	United Kingdom	1939	2	1	0

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Table 6: List of All Coalition Members (continued)

War Name	Country	Entry Year	Side	Appear	Withdraw
World War II	USA	1941	2	1	0
World War II	Yugoslavia	1941	2	1	1
Arab-Israeli	Egypt	1948	1	1	0
Arab-Israeli	Iraq	1948	1	1	1
Arab-Israeli	Jordan	1948	1	1	1
Arab-Israeli	Lebanon	1948	1	1	1
Arab-Israeli	Syria	1948	1	1	1
Korean	China	1950	1	1	0
Korean	North Korea	1950	1	1	0
Korean	Australia	1950	2	1	0
Korean	Belgium	1951	2	1	0
Korean	Canada	1950	2	1	0
Korean	Colombia	1951	2	1	0
Korean	Ethiopia	1951	2	1	0
Korean	France	1951	2	1	0
Korean	Greece	1951	2	1	0
Korean	Netherlands	1951	2	1	0
Korean	Philippines	1950	2	1	0
Korean	South Korea	1950	2	1	0
Korean	Thailand	1951	2	1	0
Korean	Turkey	1950	2	1	0
Korean	United Kingdom	1950	2	1	0
Korean	USA	1950	2	1	0
Sinai War	France	1956	1	1	0
Sinai War	Israel	1956	1	1	0
Sinai War	United Kingdom	1956	1	1	1
Ifni War	France	1958	2	1	0
Ifni War	Spain	1958	2	1	0
Vietnam War	Australia	1965	2	1	1
Vietnam War	Philippines	1966	2	1	1
Vietnam War	South Korea	1965	2	1	1
Vietnam War	South Vietnam	1965	2	1	0
Vietnam War	Thailand	1967	2	1	1
Vietnam War	USA	1965	2	1	1
Six Day War	Egypt	1967	2	1	0
Six Day War	Jordan	1967	2	1	0
Six Day War	Syria	1967	2	1	0
Yom Kippur War	Egypt	1973	1	1	0
Yom Kippur War	Iraq	1973	1	1	0
Yom Kippur War	Jordan	1973	1	1	0
Yom Kippur War	Saudi Arabia	1973	1	1	0
Yom Kippur War	Syria	1973	1	1	0

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Table 6: List of All Coalition Members (continued)

War Name	Country	Entry Year	Side	Appear	Withdraw
Turco-Cypriot	Cyprus	1974	2	1	0
Turco-Cypriot	Greece	1974	2	1	0
War over Angola	Congo (DRC)	1975	1	1	0
War over Angola	South Africa	1975	1	1	0
War over Angola	Angola	1975	2	1	0
War over Angola	Cuba	1975	2	1	0
Ogaden War	Cuba	1977	2	1	0
Ogaden War	Ethiopia	1977	2	1	0
Ogaden War	South Yemen	1977	2	1	0
Ugandian-Tanzanian	Libya	1979	1	1	0
Ugandian-Tanzanian	Uganda	1979	1	1	0
Gulf War	Canada	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	Egypt	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	France	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	Italy	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	Kuwait	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	Morocco	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	Oman	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	Qatar	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	Saudi Arabia	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	Syria	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	United Arab Emirates	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	United Kingdom	1991	2	1	0
Gulf War	USA	1991	2	1	0
Bosnian Independence	Bosnia	1992	1	1	0
Bosnian Independence	Croatia	1992	1	1	0
War for Kosovo	France	1999	1	1	0
War for Kosovo	Germany	1999	1	1	0
War for Kosovo	Italy	1999	1	1	0
War for Kosovo	Netherlands	1999	1	1	0
War for Kosovo	Turkey	1999	1	1	0
War for Kosovo	United Kingdom	1999	1	1	0
War for Kosovo	USA	1999	1	1	0
Invasion of Afghanistan	Australia	2001	1	1	0
Invasion of Afghanistan	Canada	2001	1	1	0
Invasion of Afghanistan	France	2001	1	1	0
Invasion of Afghanistan	United Kingdom	2001	1	1	0
Invasion of Afghanistan	USA	2001	1	1	0
Invasion of Iraq	Australia	2003	1	1	0
Invasion of Iraq	United Kingdom	2003	1	1	0
Invasion of Iraq	USA	2003	1	1	0