Supplementary Material for "The duration of government formation processes in Europe"

Table 1A Alternative measure for the complexity of bargaining situations

	WE pooled	CEE pooled	WE inter-election	WE post-election	CEE inter-election	CEE post-election
Post-election	-1.637***	-0.915***				
	(-6.52)	(-4.91)				
Type A (Party controlling absolute majority of seats)	*Reference category*		*Reference category*		*Reference category*	
Type B	-0.615*	0.029	-0.716	-0.631	0.242	0.018
	(-2.23)	(0.10)	(-1.44)	(-1.88)	(0.53)	(0.04)
Type B*	-0.482		-0.0709	-0.666		
	(-1.06)		(-0.07)	(-1.31)		
Type C	-1.132**	-0.235	0.275	-1.668**	-0.237	2.243**
	(-2.69)	(-0.41)	(0.39)	(-3.22)	(-0.29)	(2.59)
Type D	-0.909**	0.243	-0.634	-1.175**	0.617	-0.068
	(-2.90)	(0.78)	(-1.11)	(-3.10)	(1.26)	(-0.16)
Type E	-1.399***	0.008	-0.684	-1.997***	0.359	-0.537
	(-4.33)	(0.03)	(-1.31)	(-4.68)	(0.80)	(-1.18)
Early election	-0.256	-0.038		-0.309		-0.086
	(-1.09)	(-0.08)		(-1.30)		(-0.18)
Observations	137	142	46	91	81	61
Wald test: complexity	21.02	1.58	4.02	26.37	2.68	10.69
χ^2(p-value)	<0.001	0.812	0.547	<0.001	0.613	0.030
AIC	1,039.6	1,127.8	288.1	632.0	576.0	390.5
BIC	1,060.0	1,145.5	297.2	647.1	585.6	401.0
Time at risk	3,815	4,068	216	3,599	1,462	2,606
Log-likelihood	-512.8	-557.9	-139.0	-310.0	-284.0	-190.2

Note: Cox proportional-hazard models with bargaining duration as dependent variable. Ties handled via Breslow method. Cell entries report proportional hazard rates; positive coefficients expedite formation, negative coefficients delay formation. t statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table 2A Lower threshold for data on the ideological position of political parties (including parties jointly holding at least 50 per cent of the parliamentary seats)

	WE unconditional effects (1)	WE conditional effects (2)	CEE unconditional effects (3)	CEE conditional effects (4)
Post-election	-1.638***	-1.223	-0.862***	-0.504
	(-6.51)	(-1.75)	(-4.80)	(-0.92)
Effective number of parl. parties	-0.154*	0.026	0.005	0.048
	(-2.27)	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.85)
Polarization	0.131	-0.191	-0.085	-0.223
	(0.90)	(-0.68)	(-0.46)	(-0.87)
Majority situation	0.537	0.619*	-0.040	-0.116
	(1.83)	(2.11)	(-0.13)	(-0.36)
Early election	-0.241	-0.226	-0.008	-0.014
	(-1.05)	(-0.97)	(-0.02)	(-0.03)
Post-election x Effective number of parl. parties		-0.272*		-0.162
		(-2.21)		(-1.47)
Post-election x Polarization		0.431		0.376
		(1.33)		(1.00)
Observations	137	137	145	145
AIC	1,041.0	1,039.2	1,156.4	1,158.0
BIC	1,055.6	1,059.7	1,171.3	1,178.8
Time at risk (in days)	3,815	3,815	4,143	4,143
Log-likelihood	-515.5	-512.6	-573.2	-572.0

Note: Cox proportional-hazard models with bargaining duration as dependent variable. Ties handled via Breslow method. Cell entries report proportional hazard rates; positive coefficients expedite formation, negative coefficients delay formation. t statistics in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3A Alternative model specifications using effective number of parliamentary parties as only measure for bargaining complexity

	WE unconditional effects (1)	WE conditional effects (2)	CEE unconditional effects (3)	CEE conditional effects (4)
Post-election	-1.637***	-0.614	-0.768***	-0.098
	(-6.62)	(-1.12)	(-4.46)	(-0.20)
Effective number of parl. parties	-0.139*	0.026	0.002	0.043
	(-2.11)	(0.26)	(0.05)	(0.83)
Majority situation	0.662*	0.736**	-0.093	-0.216
	(2.36)	(2.63)	(-0.30)	(-0.68)
Early election	-0.194	-0.199	-0.224	-0.238
	(-0.86)	(-0.88)	(-0.56)	(-0.59)
Post-election x Effective number of parl. parties		-0.251*		-0.141
		(-2.12)		(-1.44)
Observations	139	139	158	158
AIC	1,059.5	1,057.1	1,286.1	1,285.9
BIC	1,071.3	1,071.8	1,298.3	1,301.2
Time at risk (in days)	3,820	3,820	4,631	4,631
Log-likelihood	-525.8	-523.6	-639.0	-637.9

Note: Cox proportional-hazard models with bargaining duration as dependent variable. Ties handled via Breslow method. Cell entries report proportional hazard rates; positive coefficients expedite formation, negative coefficients delay formation. t statistics in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 4A Alternative model specifications accounting for unobserved heterogeneity via shared frailties

	WE unconditional effects (1)	WE conditional effects (2)	CEE unconditional effects (3)	CEE conditional effects (4)
Post-election	-1.705***	-0.148	-0.892***	-0.381
	(-6.26)	(-0.18)	(-4.86)	(-0.66)
Effective number of parl. parties	-0.122	0.265	0.009	0.069
	(-1.05)	(1.70)	(0.14)	(1.00)
Polarization	-0.063	-0.455	-0.020	-0.132
	(-0.37)	(-1.44)	(-0.10)	(-0.47)
Majority situation	0.254	0.231	0.001	-0.086
	(0.70)	(0.60)	(0.00)	(-0.25)
Early election	-0.027	-0.066	0.0422	0.023
	(-0.10)	(-0.25)	(0.09)	(0.05)
Post-election x Effective number of parl. parties		-0.542***		-0.184
		(-4.05)		(-1.61)
Post-election x Polarization		0.411		0.327
		(1.13)		(0.85)
$\hat{\theta}$	0.374	0.675	0.035	0.036
Std. Err ($\hat{\theta}$)	0.211	0.322	0.056	0.057
Likelihood-ratio test $\hat{\theta} = 0$ (p-value)	<0.001	<0.001	0.214	0.210
Observations	137	137	142	142
AIC	1,028.9	1,017.7	1,126.6	1,127.8
BIC	1,043.5	1,038.1	1,141.4	1,148.5
Time at risk (in days)	3,815	3,815	4,068	4,068
Log-likelihood	-509.5	-501.8	-558.3	-556.9

Note: Cox proportional-hazard models with bargaining duration as dependent variable and shared-frailties at the country level. Ties handled via Breslow method. Cell entries report proportional hazard rates; positive coefficients expedite formation, negative coefficients delay formation. t statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table 5A Alternative model specifications accounting for violations of proportional hazard assumption

	CEE unconditional effects (3)	CEE conditional effects (4)
Post-election	-2.420***	-0.250
	(-5.56)	(-0.42)
Effective number of parl. parties	-0.034	0.038
	(-0.61)	(0.42)
Polarization	0.0335	-0.135
	(0.18)	(-0.52)
Majority situation	-0.125	-0.098
	(-0.39)	(-0.30)
Early election	-0.005	-0.019
	(-0.01)	(-0.04)
Effective number of parl. Parties x ln(Analysis time)		0.002
		(0.54)
Post-election x ln(Analysis time)	0.051***	
	(4.15)	
Post-election x Effective number of parl. parties		-0.198
		(-1.68)
Post-election x Polarization		0.279
		(0.73)
Observations	142	142
AIC	1,104.9	1,130.2
BIC	1,122.6	1,153.9
Time at risk (in days)	4,068	4,068
Log-likelihood	-546.4	-557.1

Note: Cox proportional-hazard models with bargaining duration as dependent variable. Ties handled via Breslow method. Cell entries report proportional hazard rates; positive coefficients expedite formation, negative coefficients delay formation. t statistics in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.