Appendix
Chinese Economic Sanctions: Rhetoric and Behavior Dataset

Utilizing existing studies on Chinese economic sanctions, extensive Factiva search of China's sanctions behavior, as well as primary sources from agencies such as the MFA, I created a new dataset on Chinese economic sanctions episodes from 1990 to 2023, focusing on China's behavior and rhetoric regarding these sanctions. This appendix includes the full list of Chinese economic sanctions and the specific rhetoric.

First, I build on the cases already documented in the following policy reports (which have the richest descriptive information on China's economic sanctions): the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) 2020 report on China's economic sanctions[1], the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) 2022 report on China's economic coercion[2], a 2023 Congressional hearing on China's coercive economic tactics,[3] and the 2021 Congressional Research Service report on China's trade measures.[4]

Second, I utilized Factiva search to make sure that I am not missing episodes of Chinese economic sanctions, using keywords such as China, economic coercion, economic sanctions, Taiwan, Tibet, Dalai Lama, Huawei, THADD, COVID, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong.

Third, I utilize information available on the MFA website, the Ministry of Commerce dataset, and the *People's Daily* dataset to examine the rhetoric and behavior regarding China's economic sanctions. Finally, I cross check my dataset against existing datasets on China's economic sanctions, which tend to cover a much shorter period of time (e.g., 2010 to 2023). Two policy reports from the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) yield drastically different data. One MERICS report noted that between 2012 and 2023, there were 28 cases of unilateral Chinese sanctions.[5] Another MERICS report, however, argued that it identified 123 cases of Chinese economic coercion from 2010 to 2022.[6] Unfortunately, neither of the two reports provided the actual dataset, making it impossible to examine which cases were included and whether they should be included. The discrepancy between these two MERICS reports has to do with how cases are measured. The former report most likely counts China's sanctions episodes including diplomatic sanctions, even though it does not specify how cases are measured, nor does it indicate whether tit for tat trade disputes are included. The latter report treats sanctions on

---

[1] Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter E. Harrell, and Ashley Feng, "A New Arsenal for Competition: Coercive Economic Measures in the U.S.-China Relationship," CNAS, April 2020, https://www.cnas.org/explicitations/reports/a-new-arsenal-for-competition.

[2] Marcin Szczepański, "China's economic coercion Evolution, characteristics and countermeasures," EPRS, November 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)738219.

[3] *Examining China's Coercive Economic Tactics*, *Hearing Before the Committee on Rules*, U.S. House of Representatives, May 10, 2023.

[4] Karen M. Sutter, *China's Recent Trade Measures and Countermeasures: Issues for Congress,* Report No. R46915, Congressional Research Service, December 10, 2021.

[5] Francesca Ghiretti, "How China imposes sanctions: A guide to the evolution of Beijing's new policy tool," MERICS, June 2023, https://merics.org/en/report/how-china-imposes-sanctions.

[6] Aya Adachi, Alexander Brown, and Max J. Zenglein, "Fasten your seatbelts: How to manage China's economic coercion," *MERICS China Monitor*, August 25, 2022.

each sector as a separate case.[7] For example, if China bans both pineapples and durians in a sanctions episode over issues regarding Taiwan, it is counted as two cases in the latter MERICS report. Cross checking my dataset against these two MERICS reports suggests that my dataset is relatively consistent with the existing datasets, with the difference possibly explained by how each episode or case is calculated, not by missing episodes entirely. I include below the specific description for each case.

France 1992

On January 31, 1992, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas raised the issue of selling Mirage-2000 jet fighters to Taiwan when meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting.[8] Qian said that if France gave up on this deal, China could "do something significant to improve bilateral trade relations" to address the trade imbalance between China and France.[9] France refused Qian's carrot and officially confirmed that it had approved this arms deal on December 22, 1992, selling 60 Mirage-2000 jet fighters to Taiwan.[10] China imposed harsh economic sanctions on France in 1992. Qian noted that China had banned French wheat export and the French bid for a subway contract in Guangzhou, China while stopping negotiation of new trade projects with France.[11]

China also imposed diplomatic sanctions. According to then deputy Foreign Minister Jiang Enzhu, China closed the French consulate in Guangzhou – established just in 1991 specifically to facilitate trade relations – immediately after the weapons sale.[12] Also, China began to impose strict restrictions on visits to and communications with French officials at the deputy ministerial level and above.[13] Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's memoir also corroborated Jiang's accounts.[14] Diplomatic relations did not return to normal until 1994.

On November 27, 1992, the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) stressed that from January to September 1992, Chinese imports from Europe had increased by 10.9% compared to the last year, yet France had lagged behind "because of the arms sales to Taiwan." More serious sanctions started in 1993. The front page of the People's Daily on January 22, 1993 stated that due to the French decision to sell Mirage-2000 to Taiwan, bilateral trade and economic relations had been affected. It is interesting that China never explicitly stated or announced that it would impose sanctions on France. Instead, it just went ahead to impose sanctions on France in 1992 and 1993 while making a vague link that bilateral economic relations were impacted because of the weapons sales. As such, the characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions are vague and executed.

---

[7] Ibid., p. 16, endnote 1.
[8] Qian Qichen, *Waijiao Shiji* [Ten Episodes in Foreign Policy] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 2004).
[9] Ibid., pp. 300-301.
[10] Cai, "Walking out of the valley and cooperating comprehensively: A recap of Sino-French relations in 1989-1997."
[11] Qian, *Ten Episodes in Foreign Policy.*
[12] Jiang Enzhu, *Daguo Jiaoliang: Zhongou Guanxi Yu Xianggang Huigui Qinli* [Maneuver Among Great Powers — Personal Experience Regarding Sino-Europe Relations and the Return of Hong Kong] (Beijing: Zhongxin chubanshe [Citic Press], 2016).
[13] Ibid., p. 43.
[14] Qian, *Ten Episodes in Foreign Policy.*

Taiwan 2000

As Scott Kastner notes, in the months following both the 2000 and 2004 Taiwan presidential elections, China targeted "green" Taiwanese businesses – those that supported Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) – for harassment.[15] In spring 2000, several prominent businesses that had supported Chen in the election faced unexpected audits and surprise inspections in China.[16] As Kastner notes, the KMT-centered alliance in Taiwan politics is called the pan-blue coalition because the KMT's flag is blue; the DPP-centered alliance, meanwhile, is called the pan-green coalition because the DPP's flag. There wasn't, however, any explicitly stated announcements of economic sanctions. As such, China's economic sanctions exhibited similar characteristics: vague and executed.

Mongolia 2002

When the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia in November 2002, China imposed a swift but comprehensive two-day sanction by closing the Sino-Mongolian border and essentially cutting trade with Mongolia. The Dalai Lama visited Mongolia on Monday, November 4, 2002. According to the Mongolian Embassy in Beijing, on Tuesday morning, China closed parts of the roads and railways that connected the Sino-Mongolian border without warning, allowing only international passenger and cargo trains.[17] This partial closure of the border lasted for two days. Railroad transportation resumed on Thursday morning. The Chinese MFA spokesperson denied that this closure had to do with the Dalai Lama and stated that some trains were halted because of "technical issues."[18]

Yet the timing of this "technical issue" was interesting – it happened to take place *during* the visit by the Dalai Lama. And according to BBC reporters, one Chinese businessman in the copper mine industry told them that the Chinese government demanded that all imports from Mongolia be stopped and that the Ministry of Railway stop [copper mine import from Mongolia].[19] Copper mine constituted more than half of Mongolia's total export, and China was among the largest export destinations of Mongolian copper. The Chinese MFA did not explicitly state that China imposed economic sanctions. The MFA spokesperson only stated on November 5 that China demanded that other countries "do not offer a platform for the Dalai Lama to engage in secessionist actions around the world" (中国政府要求各国政府不要为达赖喇嘛以宗教为外衣，到世界各国从事分裂祖国的行动提供讲台).[20] As such, China's economic sanctions exhibited similar characteristics: vague and executed.

---

[15] Scott L. Kastner, "Does Economic Integration Across the Taiwan Strait Make Military Conflict Less Likely?," Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2006), pp. 319-346.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Radio Free Asia, November 7, 2002, http://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/92679-20021107.html, accessed December 10, 2013.
[18] MFA Press Conference, November 7, 2002, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjdt_611265/fyrbt_611275/t3509.shtml, accessed December 10, 2013.
[19] See BBC Chinese, November 7, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_2410000/newsid_2418000/2418025.stm, accessed December 10, 2013.
[20] http://news.sohu.com/34/64/news204136434.shtml.

North Korea 2003

In March 2003, China suspended oil supplies to North Korea for three days after Pyongyang fired a missile into waters between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.[21] The Chinese reportedly told the North Korean government that the suspension was necessary for technical reasons.[22] The Chinese foreign ministry has not commented on the report and the state-owned oil supply company denied any halt of exports to North Korea in the past two months.[23] As such, China's economic sanctions exhibited similar characteristics: vague and executed.

Taiwan 2004

Again, following both the 2004 Taiwan presidential elections, China targeted "green" Taiwanese businesses.[24] After Chen's win in the 2004 election, Chinese officials noted that China "does not welcome" green businesses, while attacking one such business by name: the Chi Mei Corporation of prominent Chen supporter Hsu Wen-lung.[25] There wasn't, however, any explicitly stated announcements of economic sanctions. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce denied that Taiwanese businesses in China were targeted, reassuring Taiwan businesses operating in China.[26] As such, China's economic sanctions exhibited similar characteristics: vague and executed.

North Korea 2006

According to the *New York Times*, China cut off oil exports to North Korea in September 2006 during the heightened tension over North Korea's nuclear programs. Chinese trade statistics show that China sold no crude oil at all to its neighbor in September 2006. North Korea depends on China for up to 90% of its oil supplies, much of which is sold on credit or for bartered goods, according to Chinese energy experts. According to the *New York Times*, any sustained reduction could cripple its isolated and struggling economy. The timing of this unannounced reduction was interesting – it was right between North Korea's missile tests in July and the nuclear test in October.[27] China supported a United Nations resolution condemning the missile tests, and urged that North Korea not take any steps that might "worsen tensions."[28] Chinese officials at the China National Petroleum Corporation, which sells oil and manages an oil pipeline to North Korea, declined to comment.[29] As such, China's economic sanctions exhibited similar characteristics: vague and executed.

Canada 2007

---

[21] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/01/northkorea.china.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Scott L. Kastner, "Does Economic Integration Across the Taiwan Strait Make Military Conflict Less Likely?"
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., https://www.dw.com/zh/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%95%86%E5%8A%A1%E9%83%A8%E6%BE%84%E6%B8%85%E7%BB%BF%E8%89%B2%E5%8F%B0%E5%95%86%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98/a-1237998.
[27] See http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/world/asia/31korea.html?_r=2&.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.

China also picked on Canada when the Canadian Premier received the Dalai Lama in 2007 and awarded him the honorary citizenship status. China reacted by putting off the Canadian request for the Approved Tourist Destination status, which was somewhat like the MFN in the tourism realm. This status would allow Canada to benefit from the booming Chinese tourist market by enabling Chinese travel agents to organize tours to Canada easily. China had already granted the status to 134 countries, including the United States, which was why the Canadian International Trade Minister called the Chinese exclusion of Canada from this status "discriminatory."[30] When relations became better and when Premier Stephen Harper, the one who received the Dalai Lama, visited Beijing in December 2009, China finally granted Canada's 10-year bidding for this status, making Canada the last major developed country to gain such status and meaning Canada would expect many more Chinese travelers – who already had the longest average stay and spent the most in Canada.[31]

The Chinese MFA did not explicit state that China imposed coercive economic measures. During the October 30, 2007 MFA press conference, spokesperson Liu Jianchao stated that China was "strongly dissatisfied with and resolutely opposed" the meeting and that Canada should correct is wrongdoing so as to avoid further damage to Sino-Canada relations (中方要求加方认省和纠正在达赖问题上的错误行径，立即采取有效措施消除恶劣影响，停止纵容和支持"藏独"势力反华分裂活动，停止干涉中国内政，以免给中加关系造成进一步损害).[32] As such, the characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions are vague and executed.

Germany 2007

In November 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel met with the Dalai Lama. Former diplomats indicated China also imposed soft economic sanctions such as disrupting German investment in China.[33] Also, when Chancellor Merkel received the Dalai Lama in early September 2007, German aircraft exports to China in the fourth quarter dropped by 34% compared to the last quarter and 40% compared to the fourth quarter of 2006.[34] The decline continued for a year until September 2008, when Germany reaffirmed that Tibet is part of Chinese territory and China deemed that Sino-German relations had "comprehensively recovered."[35]

---

[30] Joy C. Shaw, "Oh Canada, Here Come the Chinese Tourists," December 4, 2009, *The Wall Street Journal,* http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/12/04/oh-canada-here-come-the-chinese-tourists/?mg=blogs-wsj&url=http%253A%252F%252Fblogs.wsj.com%252Fchinarealtime%252F2009%252F12%252F04%252Foh-canada-here-come-the-chinese-tourists, accessed December 10, 2013.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] MFA press conference, October 30, 2007, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/chn/fyrth/200710/t20071030_1740367.htm.

[33] Interview KZ-#22, Beijing, China, December 15, 2015.

[34] Data comes from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce Country Report at http://countryreport.mofcom.gov.cn/record/index.asp?p_coun=%B5%C2%B9%FA, accessed February 17, 2014. German aircraft exports to China in the fourth quarter – from September to December – were $465 million in 2005, 714 in 2006, 431 in 2007, 632 in 2008, 526 in 2009, 533 in 2010, and 942 in 2011, respectively. Data adapted from Ketian Zhang, "Calculating Bully: Explaining Chinese Coercion," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018, https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/122472.

[35] Zhao Ke and Lu Ruijun, "Jiangjiao sishinian laide zhongde zhengzhi guanxi" [Sino-German relations in the past 40 years], in Gu Junli, ed. *Zhongde jianjiao sishinian, huigu yu zhanwang,* p. 241. Data adapted from Ketian Zhang, "Calculating Bully: Explaining Chinese Coercion."

The Chinese MFA did not explicit state that China imposed coercive economic measures. Similar to the Canada case above, the spokeswoman for the Chinese MFA immediately responded by saying that Angela Merkel was "interfering with domestic Chinese affairs" and that "Germany should take measures to improve Sino-German relations as soon as possible" (中国外交部新闻发言人姜瑜对德国总理默克尔在总理府会见达赖喇嘛表示了强烈不满。姜瑜称默克尔会见喇嘛是"严重干涉了中国内政"，"损害了中国人民感情"，"严重影响了中国和德国的两国关系"。姜瑜要求柏林采取行动，以"避免两国关系受到不必要的损害"。她说："我们要求德国采取具体的和有效的行动来消除负面后果).[36] As such, the characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions are vague and executed.

France 2009

On December 6, 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy — then rotating Chair of the EU — met with the Dalai Lama.[37] The Chinese MFA immediately responded, blaming France for interfering with China's internal affairs and urging the French to "take concrete measures to correct its mistakes."[38] China canceled senior diplomatic exchanges between China and France, engaging in a "tour de France," that is, meeting and signing commercial contracts with all other countries surrounding France, but not France. China also imposed economic sanctions, in particular, by "freezing" and "delaying" Airbus orders from France.[39] Again, the Chinese MFA did not explicit state that China imposed coercive economic measures. As such, the characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions are vague and executed.

Japan 2010

Both China and Japan claim the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese, hereafter Senkaku) Islands in the East China Sea as their respective territory. On September 7, 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with a patrol boat of the Japanese Coast Guard around the disputed waters of the Senkaku Islands. Japan subsequently detained the Chinese fishermen while trying to have the captain of the trawler go through a domestic trial. According to the Japanese diplomat based in Beijing, China imposed a ban on its rare earth export to Japan for two months, which in particular, affected Japanese IT firms.[40]According to the *New York Times*, industry officials said that China's customs agency had notified companies that they were not allowed to ship to Japan – China's main buyer – any rare earth oxides, rare earth salts, or pure rare earth metals, although these shipments are still

---

[36] https://www.dw.com/zh/%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E6%8A%97%E8%AE%AE%E9%BB%98%E5%85%8B%E5%B0%94%E8%A7%81%E8%BE%BE%E8%B5%96%E9%9B%B7%E5%A3%B0%E8%BF%87%E5%90%8E%E9%9B%A8%E7%82%B9%E5%B0%8F/a-2797120

[37] Matthew Day, "Defiant Nicolas Sarkozy meets Dalai Lama despite China's trade threat," *Telegraph*, December 6, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/3629865/Defiant-Nicolas-Sarkozy-meets-Dalai-Lama-despite-Chinas-trade-threat.html, accessed November 20, 2017.

[38] MFA, December 7, 2008, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/t525253.shtml, accessed November 20, 2017.

[39] Interview #38, Beijing, China, January 20, 2016; Interview #43, Beijing, China, January 28, 2016.

[40] Interview, Beijing, China, July 15, 2014; confirmed also by an U.S. policy analyst and former U.S. officials, Interview #109, Washington D.C., USA, December 5, 2016; Interview #118, Washington D.C., USA, February 13, 2017; Interview #119, Washington D.C., USA, February 16, 2017.

allowed to go to Hong Kong, Singapore, and other destinations.[41] Many Chinese government policy analysts also admitted that China used economic sanctions via the export ban on rare-earth materials.[42] One former Chinese diplomat based in Japan at that time indicated that although China had reduced its rare-earth export due to environmental concerns since summer 2010, the timing of the complete ban of rare-earth export to Japan – September 2010 after Japan did not give in – proved that this was an economic countermeasure for the boat clash incident.[43]

Just like the French cases, Chinese sanctions – especially the rare earth ban – were unannounced and executed. In the WTO lawsuit that Japan subsequently filed regarding the rare-earth embargo, Japan listed "the imposition and administration of restrictions through unpublished measures" as one area where China did not conform to the WTO, indicating that there indeed was an export ban, but one that was unannounced.[44] In Japan's WTO lawsuit, Japan did not link the Senkaku boat clash incident with China's rare-earth ban, nor did Japan accuse China of imposing economic sanctions. Moreover, Japanese diplomats based in Beijing admitted that Japanese companies, especially IT companies, complained about the impact due to the ban on rare-earth materials.[45] Again, the Chinese MFA did not explicit state that China imposed coercive economic measures. In the MFA press conference, spokesperson Jiang Yu said that "China is resolute in defending sovereignty and territorial integrity" and that "Japan should take measures to remove the obstacles in Sino-Japan relations" (目前日方还非法扣押着中国渔船船长，这是当前中日关系的突出障碍，日方应采取切实行动，消除这一障碍。她表示，在钓鱼岛问题上我们的立场是一贯和明确的，中国政府和人民维护国家主权、领土完整的决心和意志也是坚定不移的).[46]

Norway 2010

China imposed sanctions on Norway after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chinese political dissident Liu Xiaobo, who has been imprisoned due to his activism. Immediately after the award, China canceled exchange visits between the two sides, terminated trade negotiations, and froze the negotiation on free-trade treaties.[47] A former Norwegian Prime Minister was also denied a visa to visit China.[48] Despite the Norwegian government's explanation that the prize was independent of government decisions, China imposed sanctions on Norwegian Salmon export to China – Norway's market for fresh salmon in China fell from about 90% percent in 2010 to under 30% in the first half of 2013.[49] In addition, China excluded Norway from the beneficiary of the policy of non-visa transit, starting from January 2013.[50] The beneficiaries are able to stay in

[41] Keith Bradsher, "Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan," September 22, 2010, *New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&, accessed December 10, 2013.
[42] Interview #41, Beijing, China, January 22, 2016; Interview #67, Shanghai, China, May 4, 2016.
[43] Interview #66, Shanghai, China, May 4, 2016.
[44] "DS431: China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum," WTO Dispute Settlement, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds431_e.htm, accessed May 9, 2018.
[45] Interview, July 14, 2014, Beijing, China.
[46] *People's Daily*, September 17, section 3.
[47] http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4ccad73e0102dvli.html
[48] http://www.360doc.com/content/12/0614/01/5646261_218019392.shtml
[49] See http://www.tnp.no/norway/economy/3936-salmon-norway-penetrates-china-blockage-through-vietnam, accessed December 10, 2013.
[50] http://www.voachinese.com/content/beijing-to-allow-visa-free-transit-trips-20121206/1559981.html.

Beijing for up to 72 hours without a visa. All European countries were given this policy of non-visa transit except Norway. Officials in Beijing stated that these decisions were made by the MFA.

Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. China never linked the salmon ban with the Liu Xiaobo Nobel peace prize. Instead, China cited issues regarding parasites. Bilateral relations did not warm up until Norway promised that it would support the one-China policy and would not support any policies that harmed China's core interests in 2016. Again, the Chinese MFA did not explicit state that China imposed coercive economic measures. In the December 10, 2010 MFA press conference, spokesperson Jiang Yu stated that "we are against any countries or individuals using the Nobel Peace Prize to meddle with China's internal affairs" and that "some people's conspiracies won't succeed (我们坚决反对任何国家、任何人利用诺贝尔和平奖干涉中国内政，侵犯中国司法主权。这一正义立场得到世界上１００多个国家和重要国际组织理解与支持。"姜瑜说，事实充分说明，挪威诺贝尔委员会的决定不能代表世界上大多数人，特别是广大发展中国家的意愿。偏见和谎言站不住脚，冷战思维不得人心。她说："这场政治闹剧丝毫动摇不了中国人民坚持走中国特色社会主义道路的决心和信心，一些人的图谋是不会得逞的).[51]

US 2010

In 2010, the United States sold weapons to Taiwan. Unlike the above cases, China issued explicit threats of sanctions. MFA spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu stated explicitly that U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan "gravely harmed China's national security" and that "China will impose economic sanctions on relevant U.S. companies that sold weapons to Taiwan" (外交部发言人马朝旭举行例行记者会，就美国对台军售问题回答记者提问。他指出，美国有关公司不顾中方坚决反对，执意向台湾出售武器，中方将对参与售台武器的美国公司实施相关制裁。我们强烈敦促美国有关公司停止推动和参与售台武器。马朝旭指出，美方不顾中方的严正交涉，执意宣布售台武器计划，严重违反了中美三个联合公报特别是"八·一七"公报原则，严重危害了中国国家安全，损害中国和平统一大业。中方对此坚决反对。美方的错误行径势必损害中美关系，给两国诸多领域的交往与合作造成严重消极影响。马朝旭指出，美方不顾中方坚决反对，执意宣布对台军售计划。美方行径严重损害了中方的核心利益，严重损害了中美关系，中美在有关重要国际与地区问题上的合作将会不可避免地受到影响，其责任完全在美方。美国有关公司不顾中方坚决反对，执意向台湾出售武器，中方将对参与售台武器的美国公司实施相关制裁。我们强烈敦促美国有关公司停止推动和参与售台武器).[52]

Estonia 2011

In August 2011, the Dalai Lama was received by the Estonian president in Estonia. China banned Estonian dairy imports after the Dalai Lama visited Estonia, for about five years.[53] The

[51] *People's daily*, December 10, 2010, section 3.
[52] MFA Press Conference, February 2, 2010, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2010/02-02/2105704.shtml.
[53] https://news.err.ee/1037000/expert-we-should-not-surrender-our-values-in-china-relations ; https://www.voachinese.com/a/baltic-countries-see-china-threat-bai-hua-20191229/5224065.html.

Chinese MFA did not explicit state that China imposed coercive economic measures.[54] As such, the characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions are vague and executed.

Japan 2012

In September 2012, the Senkaku island dispute became heated again with the Japanese government nationalizing three of the five islands. Small-scale economic sanctions also ensued. For one, the Chinese Customs increased the inspection of exports to and imports from Japan.[55] For another, some Japanese companies had complained about being precluded from the bidding or contracting processes with Chinese counterparts, with the Chinese side citing "administrative guidance."[56] One Japanese scholar who interviewed Chinese enterprises and local officials in northern China confirmed that these inspections and exclusions were not decisions made by localities – local Chinese governments, in fact, would like to strengthen economic ties with Japan because they were beneficiaries, indicating that the instructions came from the central government.[57] Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. In the MFA press conference, spokesperson Hong Lei noted that "China is resolute in defending its sovereignty" and "will take necessary measures to defend its sovereignty," but did not specify what those measures would be (洪磊重申，日方对钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿采取的任何单方面措施都是非法、无效的。中国政府捍卫钓鱼岛领土主权的决心和意志是坚定不移的。中方正密切关注事态发展，采取必要措施维护国家领土主权).[58]

Philippines 2012

China and the Philippines have regular disputes in the South China Sea. In April 2012, after the Philippines decided to arrest Chinese fishermen fishing in the disputed Scarborough Shoal, China imposed a fruit quarantine against Philippine fruit exports to China, and especially bananas, during the Scarborough standoff. It is true that China's General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) issued warning No. 49 on March 5, 2012, but it limited the warning to bananas from Philippines' Sumifru Corporation: The warning explicitly stated that pests were found in bananas from Sumifru Corporation and stipulated a suspension of Sumifru bananas starting from March 6.[59] In particular, the warning demanded more inspections and stated that Philippine banana exports in inspection were not allowed to enter before the results of inspection, but implied that those that were pest-free would be allowed in. The Philippine Bureau of Plant Industry immediately conducted an investigation on March 10 and informed China's AQSIQ of the implemented corrective measures on March 27, 2012.[60] It is interesting that

[54] https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/201409/t20140925_5433589.shtml.
[55] MFA Press Conference, September 24, 2012
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t972832.shtml, accessed April 24, 2018.
[56] Interview, Beijing, China, July 15, 2014.
[57] Interview #107, Washington D.C., USA, September 28, 2016.
[58] *People's Daily,* September 6, 2012, section 3.
[59] See AQSIQ warning No. 49, available here at
http://dzwjyjgs.aqsiq.gov.cn/rdgz/201203/P020120307581874591305.pdf.
[60] Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, "Philippine Banana Exports to China: Dealing with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Concerns," June 11, 2015,
http://appfi.ph/images/2015/presentations/6_Pres_PBGEA_Philippine_Banana_Exports_to_China.pdf.

the Chinese AQSIQ seemed satisfied, as it did not raise the issue of Philippine bananas at all in April.

During the height of the Scarborough standoff, however, China issued another much more stringent warning No. 108 on May 2, which stated that China would strengthen inspections of all Philippine fruit exports to China and that Philippines fruit exports would not be allowed to enter China "during this period."[61] The wording of the second warning is particularly vague. The first warning in March stated that Philippine bananas were not allowed to enter while they were being inspected, but the second warning used the curious wording of "during this period" (*zaici qijian*) without an explicit instruction regarding what "this period" meant. Furthermore, the March warning only singled out a specific company: Sumifru Corporation. However, the May warning extended the inspection to all Philippine fruit exports – not just Sumifru bananas – without any specific evidence that fruits from sources other than Sumifru contained pests.

Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. In all of the MFA press conferences as well as publicly available announcements, there was no mentioning of the banana ban. MFA spokesperson kept urging the Philippines to "return to the correct path of diplomatically solving the Scarborough incident" and that "the Scarborough Shoal is China's territory," while implying that China was ready and prepared to "counter the Philippines' escalation" but did not specify what those countermeasures would be (黄岩岛是中国固有领土, 中方强烈敦促菲方回到外交解决黄岩岛事件的正确轨道上来, 中方也做好了应对菲方扩大事态的各种准备).[62]

UK 2012

British Prime Minister David Cameron met with the Dalai Lama in May 2012, and China warned Britain that there would be "serious consequences." The Chinese canceled several high-level meetings that were originally planned.[63] According to British newspaper the *Daily Telegraph*, China's sovereign wealth fund will not invest in originally-planned long-term British projects until a solution to the diplomatic stand-off, caused by David Cameron's meeting with the Dalai Lama last year, has been reached. The Beijing government believes that Britain needs to make amends before relations can return to normal. According to the *Daily Telegraph*'s sources, "any good business relationship relies on a good political relationship for the long-term" and that "[f]avorable political conditions would help with that." The source continues, "China is very willing to participate in infrastructure projects, but to invest, there needs to be a strong relationship." The *Daily Telegraph* indicates that future projects such as the High Speed 2 rail network and the UK's nuclear investment program could be starved of capital from China Investment Corporation (CIC), its sovereign wealth fund.[64] Relationships started to improve this

[61] See AQSIQ warning No. 108, available here at http://www.aqsiq.gov.cn/xxgk_13386/jgfl/dzwjyjgs/tsxx/201210/t20121017_279773.htm.
[62] People's Daily, May 7, 2012, section 21; People's daily, May 9, 2012, section 3; People's daily, may 25, 2012, section, 17.
[63] *BBC News,* September 26, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2013/09/130926_china_uk_relationship.shtml, accessed December 10, 2013.
[64] James Quinn and Malcolm Moore, "UK projects at risk after China funding threat," May 6, 2013, *The Daily Telegraph*, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/10040398/UK-projects-at-risk-after-China-funding-threat.html, accessed December 10, 2013.

October 2013, with the two sides holding the fifth Sino-British economic and finance dialogues in Beijing.[65]

Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. In all of the MFA press conferences as well as publicly available announcements, there was no mentioning of economic sanctions. MFA spokesperson Hong Lei stated on May 15 that the meeting with the Dalai Lama "was a serious meddling of China's internal affairs" and China expressed strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition (中国外交部发言人洪磊 15 日表示，中方对此表示强烈不满和坚决反对，要求英方停止纵容和支持"藏独"反华势力，以实际行动维护中英关系的发展大局。在当日下午举行的外交部例行记者会上，洪磊说，日前，英方无视中方多次交涉，执意安排卡梅伦首相等英方领导人会见达赖。这是对中国内政的严重干涉，伤害了中国人民感情，向"藏独"势力发出了错误信号，中方对此表示强烈不满和坚决反对。中国外交部和驻英使馆已经在北京和伦敦向英方提出严正交涉).[66]

US 2015

In 2015, the United States sold weapons to Taiwan again. Just as the 2010 case, China issued explicit threats of sanctions. MFA spokesperson Hong Lei stated explicitly that U.S. companies that sold weapons sales to Taiwan "gravely harmed China's national security" and that "China will impose economic sanctions on relevant U.S. companies that sold weapons to Taiwan" (外交部发言人洪磊在 17 日的例行记者会上表示，要求美国恪守三个联合公报精神，撤销本次对台军售计划，多做利于中美两国关系以及两岸关系和平发展的事情。"任何人都不能动摇中国政府和人民维护国家主权和领土完整，抵御外来干涉的坚定决心。我们要求美方切实恪守中美三个联合公报精神，撤销这次对台军售计划。多做有利于中美关系大局和两岸关系和平发展的事情。" 此外，此次涉及对台出售武器的美国企业，中方表示也将采取制裁措施。洪磊表示，"美国企业参与对台售武严重损害中国主权和安全利益。中国政府和企业不会与这类公司开展合作和商业往来).[67]

Mongolia 2016

The Dalai Lama was received in Mongolia in 2016 again. Just as the 2002 case, China implicitly imposed economic sanctions against Mongolia by charging extra port entry fees while indefinitely pushing off bilateral meetings regarding loans to Mongolia.[68] Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. MFA spokesperson denied that China charged extra port entry fees to Mongolia. When asked whether this was a reaction to the Dalai Lama visit, spokesperson Geng Shuang said that "he didn't know the relevant information" and that "Mongolia needed to take relevant measures to reduce the negative impact of the Dalai Lama's visit to Mongolia" without specifying what those negative impacts were (在星期三的中国外交部新闻发布会上，有记者问到中国开始加征口岸通道费是否与中方不满达赖喇嘛访问蒙古

[65] See the Chinese MFA, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1089016.shtml, accessed December 10, 3013.
[66] *People's Daily*, May 16, 2012, section 21.
[67] MFA Press Conference, December 17, 2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1217/c70731-27943084.html.
[68] https://www.voachinese.com/a/news-china-mongolia-dalailama-20161201/3618724.html.

有关。外交部发言人耿爽说，他不了解有关情况。耿爽上月曾称，蒙古需要采取有效措施消除达赖访问蒙古的负面影响).[69]

South Korea 2016

In 2016, South Korea decided to allow the United States to install U.S. ballistic missile defense systems in South Korea (THAAD). China imposed economic sanctions on South Korea. For example, China blocked the streaming of the latest South Korean music and dramas on Chinese websites and TV channels.[70] K-pop stars had to cancel their concerts in China. The ban was not lifted until November 2017. Similarly, by March 2017, China had closed more than 20 stores of "Lotte Mart," a South Korea supermarket chain that operated stores in China and other Asian countries.[71] China cited "fire safety concerns" as the reason for the closure.[72] By April 2017, about 90 percent of the Lotte Mart in China had been closed. Lotte was eventually forced to abandon and sell all of its Lotte Mart stores in China.

Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. In all of the MFA's press conferences and announcements, there was no mentioning of economic sanctions. For example, in MFA spokesperson Geng Shuang's press briefing, he denied that Lotte's experience in China had anything to do with THAAD, stating instead that "China will take resolute measures to defend its security interests" without specifying what those measures were (关于你提到乐天在华经营问题，我们曾多次表示，中方欢迎外国企业来华投资兴业，同时依法保证有关企业在华合法权益，但有关企业在华经营必须依法合规。我们还说过，外国企业在华经营成功与否，最终要由中国的市场和中国的消费者来决定。中方将坚决采取必要措施维护自身安全利益，由此产生的一切后果由美韩承担。我们强烈敦促有关方面停止相关部署进程，避免对中韩关系以及两国经贸合作和人文交流造成进一步的负面影响).[73]

US 2019

In 2019, the United States sold weapons to Taiwan again. Just as the 2010 case, China issued explicit threats of sanctions. MFA spokesperson Geng Shuang stated explicitly that U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan "gravely harmed China's national security" and that "China will impose economic sanctions on relevant U.S. companies that sold weapons to Taiwan" (耿爽说，美方向台湾出售武器严重违反国际法和国际关系基本准则，严重违反一个中国原则和中美三个联合公报的规定，损害了中国主权和国家安全。为了维护国家利益，中方将对参与售台武器的美国企业实施制裁).[74]

Australia 2019

---

[69] Ibid.
[70] Ketian Vivian Zhang, "Chinese non-military coercion—Tactics and rationale," Brookings, January 22, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-non-military-coercion-tactics-and-rationale/.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] MFA Press Conference, March 2, 2017, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/fyrbt/201703/t20170302_8522667.htm.
[74] MFA Press Conference, July 15, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2019-07/15/c_1124756622.htm.

In response to Australia's banning of Chinese telecoms giant Huawei Technologies from supplying equipment to Australia's 5G broadband network in August 2018, China imposed a ban on coal imports from Australia beginning February 2019.[75] Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Geng Shuang, denied that the ban was to respond to the Huawei ban, and said instead that the ban was made on environmental grounds and described it as "completely normal."[76] "China's customs assesses the safety and quality of imported coal, analyses possible risks, and conducts corresponding examination and inspection compliant with laws and regulations," he said.[77] "By doing so, it can better safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese importers and protect the environment."[78]

US 2019

After Daryl Morey, General Manager of National Basketball Association (NBA) team the Houston Rockets, tweeted an image with the caption "Fight for Freedom. Stand with Hong Kong," the PRC consulate in Houston demanded the team "correct the error" and "eliminate the adverse impact."[79] Soon thereafter, Chinese brands suspended cooperation with the team. China Central Television, China's state broadcaster, stopped broadcasting NBA preseason games in China and did not resume them until October 10, 2020, more than a year later.[80] ESPN reported in September 2020 that the NBA had incurred "at least $200 million" in estimated losses from the China market as a result of the controversy.[81]

Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. When asked about this incident, MFA spokesperson Geng Shuang stated on October 8, 2010 that "China's position has been pretty clear" but did not mention what China had done (外交部发言人耿爽 8 日就不久前美国休斯敦火箭俱乐部总经理涉港错误言论及此后 NBA 总裁相关言论作出回应。耿爽在例行记者会上介绍，中国驻休斯敦总领馆已经就休斯敦火箭俱乐部有关人士的错误言论向对方提出了严正交涉。中国篮球协会以及休斯敦火箭队的中方合作伙伴也都相继发表了声明。"我想中方的立场已经非常清楚了。"他说。"另外，我建议你去关注一下普通中国民众对此事的反应和他们的态度。"耿爽说，"跟中方开展交流与合作，却不了解中国的民意，这是行不通的。" 有记者问及，NBA 未来在华前景如何？如想恢复同中方的关系，他们应该怎么做？"NBA 与中国开展交流合作已经有相当长的时间了，下一步应该怎么说、怎么做，他们心里最清楚。"耿爽说).[82]

Canada 2019

[75] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/feb/22/china-coal-import-ban-may-not-be-tied-to-australia-diplomatic-tensions-frydenberg-says.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-basketball-nba/nba-stirs-u-s-hornets-nest-faces-china-backlash-over-hong-kong-tweet-idUSKCN1WL04T.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] MFA Press Conference, October 8, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2019-10/08/c_1125080228.htm.

In August 2018, a New York court issues an arrest warrant for Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou to stand trial in the United States. Meng was arrested by Canadian police in Vancouver in December 2018. On March 1, 2019, Canada approved the extradition order of Meng to the United States. On March 6, China said it found "hazardous pests" in Canadian canola samples and blocked most shipments of the crop. On June 25, China blocked all pork shipments from Canada.[83] In November 2019, Justin Trudeau, Canada's prime minister, announced on Twitter: "Good news for Canadian farmers today: Canadian pork and beef exports to China will resume."[84] The policy reversal ends a four-month-long trade dispute with Beijing that many believe stemmed from Canada's arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on US fraud charges. Beijing has yet to lift its restrictions on other Canadian agricultural products, including canola seed and soyabeans.[85]

Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. When asked about whether the ban on Canadian pork products was related to the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, Chinese MFA spokesperson Geng Shuang insisted that the ban had to do with the fact that China discovered falsified export certificates for Canadian meat as well as safety concerns.[86] When pressed whether this was related to the Meng Wanzhou case, Geng vaguely said that "our position was very clear" without specifying what was meant (耿爽表示，中国驻加拿大大使馆已经发表了声明，介绍了有关情况。我这里可以再跟大家简要地介绍一下，近期中方的海关部门在检验一批加拿大输华猪肉产品时，验出莱克多巴胺的残留，因此中方立即暂停了涉事企业的猪肉产品输华，并要求加拿大方面进行调查。调查发现，该批输华猪肉随附的官方兽医卫生证书是伪造的，并发现共有 188 份伪造证书，这些伪造的肉类卫生证书，通过加官方证书通报渠道发往中国的监管部门，反映加方输华肉类体系存在明显的安全隐患。保障中国消费者安全，维护中国食品安全是中国政府的职责所在，中方有关部门依法依规行事，我们希望加方高度重视此次假证书的事件，尽快完成调查，并采取有效的整改措施，确保输华食品的安全。至于你刚才提到孟晚舟案，我想我们的立场非常清楚，我们要求加方严正对待中方的关切，立即释放孟晚舟女士，让她平安回到中国).[87]

US 2020

In 2019, the United States sold weapons to Taiwan again. Just as the 2010 case, China issued explicit threats of sanctions. MFA spokesperson Geng Shuang stated explicitly that China will "take measures to defend its national security" and that "China will impose economic sanctions on relevant U.S. companies that sold weapons to Taiwan" (中国外交部本周一在例行记者会上回答了中方是否就对台军售采取措施的问题。发言人赵立坚说，"将对参与此次对台军售的洛克希德·马丁、波音防务、雷神等美国企业，以及在售台武器过程中发挥恶劣作用的美国有关个人和实体实施制裁。" 中国外交部发言人赵立坚还强调，中方再次敦

[83] The entire timeline in this paragraph comes from https://www.reuters.com/technology/key-events-huawei-cfo-meng-wanzhous-extradition-case-2021-08-11/.
[84] Jason Kirby, "China lifts ban on Canadian pork and beef exports," *Financial Times*, November 5, 2019, https://www-ft-com.mutex.gmu.edu/content/be42bd22-0010-11ea-b7bc-f3fa4e77dd47.
[85] Ibid.
[86] MFA Press Conference, June 26, 2019, https://m.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKl9Qn.
[87] Ibid.

促美方恪守一个中国原则的承诺和中美三个联合公报的规定，停止售台武器和美台任何军事联系。他说，”我们将继续采取必要措施捍卫国家主权和安全利益).[88]

Australia 2020

Relations between Canberra and Beijing have chilled since the initial onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, following Australia's policymakers calling for an independent investigation into the origins of the virus and China's initial handling of the outbreak in Wuhan.[89] In response, China imposed economic sanctions, such as suspending Australian beef imports and banning timber imports from Australian states.[90] Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. The MFA denied that China utilized economic coercion. When asked about whether China imposed economic sanctions against Australia during the MFA press conference, spokesperson Geng Shuang stated that he "didn't know why economic coercion would be discussed" and denied that there was any "problem" (路透社记者：澳大利亚日前召见中国驻澳大使，要求其解释中方之前就澳大利亚推动开展病毒溯源和扩散国际调查作出的”经济胁迫”威胁。中方是否有限制对澳贸易的正式计划？对澳大利亚外交部称中方行为构成”经济胁迫”有何回应？耿爽：中方始终坚持在相互尊重、平等相待的基础上，发展同其他国家的友好合作关系。建议大家仔细阅读一下中国驻澳大利亚大使接受采访的原文。中国大使的有关表态是对澳方近来的一些错误言行引起中国人民不满的担忧，也是对两国关系可能受到影响的担忧。这有什么问题吗？不知”经济胁迫”这种说法从何谈起？ 在当前新冠肺炎疫情对世界经济造成全面冲击的情况下，中国愿同世界各国加强合作，守望相助、共克时艰，为了全人类的健康福祉作出贡献。我们也希望其他国家能够同中方一道，多做有利于国际合作和增进互信的事情，而不是说一套做一套).[91]

Sweden 2020

Swedish PEN announced in early November 2019 that kidnapped Swedish publisher Gui Minhai will receive the Tucholsky Prize – an annual award to writers and publicists living under threat or in exile.[92] Chinese Ambassador Gui Congyou stated that if the Swedish minister of culture were to attend the award ceremony, China would "surely take countermeasures."[93] In his earlier radio interview, Gui Congyou denied to specify what consequences he had in mind should Swedish government representatives attend the award ceremony. "You are smart enough to know what I mean by consequences," he told the reporter when pressed on the issue.[94]

---

[88] https://www.dw.com/zh/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%A3%E5%B8%83%E5%88%B6%E8%A3%81%E5%AF%B9%E5%8F%B0%E5%86%9B%E5%94%AE%E7%9A%84%E7%BE%8E%E5%9B%BD%E4%BC%81%E4%B8%9A/a-55401168.

[89] Chris Beckley, "After Years of Acrimony, China and Australia Cautiously Reach Out," New York Times, June 27, 2022, https://cn.nytimes.com/asia-pacific/20220627/china-australia-ties/dual/.

[90] Ibid.

[91] MFA Press Conference, April 28, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/zcjd/202004/t20200428_9712287.shtml;

[92] https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/china-tries-to-put-sweden-on-ice/.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Ibid.

In early 2020 Swedish battery-makers noticed something alarming. Their Chinese suppliers were no longer able to sell them graphite, a mineral crucial to the production of lithium-ion cells. The Swedes assumed the problem would pass. Yet three years on, as Chinese investments in the battery industry have surged in Europe, Swedish firms are still largely cut off. In 2020 China's exports to Sweden of two types of graphite nearly disappeared. In 2021 and 2022 they vanished completely. Although China's commerce ministry has issued no formal ban, many Chinese graphite exporters face a prohibition in all but name. One company was told that licenses to export graphite to Sweden were no longer being issued by Chinese regulators. Given that China supplies more than 60% of the world's natural graphite and almost all the man-made version, the situation alarms producers that rely on China for the graphite anodes used in their cells. A halt in supplies from China can upset supply chains, raise costs and disrupt production.[95] As such, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed.

US/Sweden/Spain 2021

In June 2021, China's General Administration of Customs confiscated, destroyed, or returned several imported shipments of H&M, Gap, and Nike products that it claimed posed a potential health hazard to consumers, following statements released by Nike, H&M, and other companies regarding forced labor in Xinjiang.[96] Although this episode involves multiple countries (that house the headquarters of these clothing companies), because these restrictions stemmed from the same issue, forced labor in Xinjiang, it is counted as one episode.

A warning notice on China's customs administration website listed 81 items imported by companies including Nike, H&M and Zara.[97] In March, China targeted foreign clothes retailers as an international backlash grows over claims of abuses in the cotton-growing Xinjiang region. Included items like children's clothing, shoes, toys, toothbrushes and baby bottles that were spotted during examinations from June 2020 to May 2021. Nine batches of H&M girls' cotton dresses were said to contain "dyes or harmful substances [that] may be absorbed by the body through the skin, mouth, etc. and endanger health."[98] The same issue was raised for children's clothes imported by Zara, Nike boys' t-shirts and batches of Gap boys' cotton pajamas.[99] Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. The MFA denied that these restrictions were actually economic sanctions, stating that "consumers have the right to make choices" while ignoring the fact that it was the Chinese customs that restricted imports of Nike, H&M, and Zara clothing (关于 H&M 和新疆棉花这个问题，这几天中国人民的感情、想法和立场表达得非常清楚了，我不再重复。我们也注意到有不少企业做出了澄清，包括 BCI 上海代表处也发表了声明。这件事情的是非曲直非常清楚。你在中国，应该认识到中国消费者有权利做出自己的选择).[100]

---

[95] This paragraph is from https://www.economist.com/business/2023/06/22/why-is-china-blocking-graphite-exports-to-sweden.
[96] https://www.bbc.com/news/business-57339758.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid. See also, https://www.dw.com/zh/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%A7%B0%E8%BF%9B%E5%8F%A3%E5%84%BF%E7%AB%A5%E7%94%A8%E5%93%81%E6%9C%89%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98-hm%E8%80%90%E5%85%8B%E7%AD%89%E8%A2%AB%E7%82%B9%E5%90%8D/a-57769932.
[100] MFA Press Conference, March 30, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202103/t20210330_9171237.shtml.

Lithuania 2021

In November 2021, Lithuania decided to allow Taiwan to establish the Taiwanese Representation Office in Lithuania. In December 2021, China imposed harsh economic sanctions on Lithuania, secretly telling many multinational companies not to do business with Lithuania, essentially cutting it off from the global production and supply chains.[101] In addition, Lithuanian exports to China could not clear customs, with the Chinese Customs citing COVID issues. Similar to previous Chinese sanctions episodes, the Chinese foreign ministry denied that China imposed economic sanctions on Lithuania. Statements made by Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin were telling. Wang denied that China imposed sanctions and stated on December 9, 2021 that China "had always been adhering to WTO rules" and that what Lithuania did "set an extremely bad precedent internationally." The Chinese MFA spokesperson stated that China would "take all necessary measures to defend its sovereignty" but did not specify what those measures were (发言人说，立陶宛政府不顾中方强烈反对和多次劝阻，批准台湾当局设立所谓"驻立陶宛台湾代表处"。此举在世界上制造"一中一台"，公然违背一个中国原则，背弃立方在两国建交公报中的政治承诺，损害中国主权和领土完整，粗暴干涉中国内政，性质极为恶劣。中国政府表示强烈抗议和坚决反对，将采取一切必要措施，捍卫国家主权和领土完整。由此产生的一切后果由立方负责。发言人说，世界上只有一个中国，台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国的唯一合法政府。我们要求立方立即纠正错误决定。我们也正告台湾当局，妄图挟洋谋"独"是打错了算盘，注定逃脱不了失败的下场).[102] Again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed.

Taiwan 2021

In early 2021, China banned Taiwanese pineapple imports, citing the risk of "harmful creatures" that could affect its own crops. The move infuriated Taiwan's leaders, who said the move had nothing to do with bugs, and was instead an example of China ramping up political pressure on the island, which Beijing considers a province of China. China insists the pineapples were blocked because its customs authorities had repeatedly detected pests on fruit coming from Taiwan. Ma Xiaoguang, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, described it as a normal biosafety precaution measure.[103] Likely a response to Taiwan's efforts in constitutional revision, Ma Xiaoguang, the spokesperson for the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office, stated that "China will take all the necessary countermeasures" but did not specify what these measures were (新华社北京 2 月 24 日电（记者查文晔、刘欢、陈舒）针对台立法机构将启动所谓"修宪工程"，国台办发言人马晓光 24 日在例行新闻发布会上应询表示，我们高度关注有关动向，坚决反对台湾任何"修宪谋独"行径，包括为谋"独"打开方便之门。这一立场态度是一贯的、明确的。有记者问，据报道，台立法机构将启动所谓"修宪工

[101] "China Pressures Germany's Continental to Cut out Lithuania - Sources | Reuters," accessed October 20, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-china-asks-germanys-continental-cut-out-lithuania-sources-2021-12-17.
[102] *People's Daily*, November 19, 2021, section 3.
[103] This paragraph is from https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56353963.

程”，民进党党团表示，如涉及敏感议题，民进党不会走”极端主张”。请问有何回应？马晓光答问时作上述表示。马晓光说，”台独”分裂活动严重破坏两岸关系和平发展，严重威胁台海地区和平稳定，严重损害两岸同胞共同利益和中华民族根本利益。我们将采取一切必要措施坚决予以反制).[104] As such, again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed.

Taiwan 2022

Starting from August 2022, China suspended imports from 35 Taiwanese exporters of biscuits and pastries since Monday, in a warning salvo to the self-governed island ahead of a visit to Taiwan by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi.[105] Following Pelosi's visit, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said on August 3 that it would suspend imports of grapefruit, lemons, oranges and other citrus fruits, as well as chilled white striped hairtail and frozen horse mackerel from Taiwan.[106] In a separate statement, Chinese customs officials said the import suspension of citrus fruit is a result of "pest control" and "excessive pesticide residues," and cited "Covid prevention" for the suspension on seafood imports.[107] As such, again, in this case, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. When asked about what China would do in response to Pelosi's visit, the MFA stated that "China will take all necessary measures" without specifying what these measures were, only vaguely suggesting that "what's needed will be there" (中方将采取一切必要措施，坚决捍卫国家主权和领土完整”在回答关于反制措施的提问时，华春莹表示，中方将采取一切必要措施，坚决捍卫国家主权和领土完整，由此产生的一切后果都由美方和”台独”分裂势力负责，我们说到做到。”至于具体反制措施，该有的都会有，有关措施将是坚决有力和有效的，美方和'台独'势力会持续感受到的).[108]

Taiwan 2023

Immediately following the overt military pressure demonstrated by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) exercises encircling Taiwan after President Tsai Ing-wen met US Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California during a transit through the United States, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued a public notice on April 12, 2023 that Beijing was initiating a trade barrier investigation into Taiwan's alleged restrictive trade measures against China. Specifically, the investigation will involve 2,455 products, mainly including agricultural, mineral, and chemical products, as well as textiles.[109] Just as the 2021 and 2022 Taiwan cases, Chinese sanctions were vague and executed. When asked about what the visit, the MFA stated that "China will take resolute measures" without specifying what these

[104] State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office Press Conference, February 24, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/tw/2021-02/24/c_1127134009.htm.
[105] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-bans-35-taiwanese-food-exporters-warning-ahead-pelosi-visit-2022-08-02/.
[106] https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/03/economy/china-suspends-imports-taiwan-products-intl-hnk/index.html.
[107] Ibid.
[108] *People's Daily*, August 4, 2022, section 17.
[109] This paragraph is from https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/04/china-ramps-up-economic-coercion-on-taiwan-ahead-of-2024-elections/.

measures were (中方对此坚决反对，强烈谴责。台湾问题是中国核心利益中的核心，是中美关系第一条不可跨越的红线。”台独”与两岸和平稳定水火不容，也是死路一条。针对美台勾连的严重错误行径，中方将采取坚决有力措施捍卫国家主权和领土完整).[110]

[110] MFA Press Conference, April 6, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/202304/t20230406_11054879.shtml.