Online appendices for

Schakel, W. (2020) *Representing the Rich: Economic and Political Inequality in Established Democracies*. University of Amsterdam: Doctoral Dissertation.

General note: the online appendices are organized by chapter. They are further divided into different sections for each chapter. Chapter 2 has four sections, chapter 3 has five, and chapter 4 has two. (The other chapters have no online appendices.) These sections are labeled with letters, hence chapter 2 goes from 2A to 2D, chapter 3 goes from with 3A and 3E, and chapter 4 consists of 4A and 4B. Within each section, tables and figures are labeled sequentially.

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# Chapter 2

## Online appendix 2A: Alternative dependent variables

The first appendix of chapter 2 explores a range of important alternative specifications of the sample and dependent variables. The first and most extensive issues involve maximizing the sample and focusing on a narrower conception of generosity using the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED). The second, briefer, discussion involves alternative time structures in conceptualizing subsequent policy change.

### *Maximizing country-years in ISSP and CWED data-matching*

The results presented in the body of the article are based on a combination of data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and CWED that, as it were, maximize the number of observations in country-topic-years that these datasets cover with respect to the broad generosity indices. Focusing on particular subcomponents of the data, however, could allow even more country-topic-years. This also entails sensitivity tests with respect to alternative measures of spending and generosity.

First, consider this overview of the countries I could not use for each ISSP wave:

Role of Government I: I use all countries.

Role of Government II: I do not use Northern Ireland and Israel because they are not in the CWED at all. I do not use Hungary because the survey was conducted in 1990 here and the CWED has missing data for Hungary before 1992 (and even after that for the main indices). I do not use Ireland because the spending questions were not asked there. In terms of the OECD spending data, I cannot use these country-years either. Northern Ireland is not in the data, and the data for Israel and Hungary only starts several years after the survey was conducted.

Role of Government III: I do not use Cyprus, Israel, the Philippines and Russia because they are not in the CWED at all. I do not use Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia because the main indices are missing there, although some of the separate indicators are not. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia are in the OECD data as well. So is Israel by the way, but here family income is missing in the ISSP and respondent income has over fifty percent missing values, which is why I do not use it at all.

Role of Government IV: I do not use Chile, Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Israel, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Uruguay and Venezuela because they are not in the CWED at all. I do not use Taiwan because all control variables are missing there. I do not use Poland because the survey was conducted in 2008 there and even the separate indicators are missing after 2010. I do not use the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia because the main indices are missing there, although some of the separate indicators are not. I do not use South Korea for pensions, because the pension-generosity index is missing and so is the replacement rate (some of the other separate indicators are not missing, but I use the replacement rates here because they have the most coverage otherwise). In Denmark, the pension generosity index is only available for two years after the survey, but some of the separate indicators are available for three years. As for the OECD data, I can use Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Israel, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia.

In short, chapter 2 uses all available country-years that match ISSP with CWED. However, there are some country-years from the third and fourth waves where I can use separate indicators instead of the generosity indices. Table 2A.1 below shows in how many country-years each indicator is present in the CWED. This is limited to the fifty-five country-years that are in the ISSP Role of Government waves.

The indicators with the fewest missing values are the replacement rates for single and family households (in the case of pensions, minimum replacement rates), so these are the ones I consider in the sensitivity/robustness discussion of chapter 2. This means that there are two indicators for each policy area. Each of these is standardized before calculating the average.

These new partial generosity indices are positively correlated with the overall generosity indices, but the strength of the correlation varies between sickness (0.87), pensions (0.30) and unemployment (0.75). This might be due to the fact that there are more indicators that make up the pension index than the others. The average change in partial generosity in the four-year period after the survey is correlated at 0.56 with the average change in overall generosity in the same period. There are also sizable differences between sickness (0.03), pensions (0.79) and unemployment (0.55) here.

Table 2A.1: ISSP-CWED combinations by sub-index

| | T | T+1 - T+4 |
|---|---|---|
| Total generosity | 43 | 39 |
| Average production worker wage (gross) | 55 | 55 |
| *Sickness* | | |
| Generosity index | 44 | 44 |
| Replacement rate: single | 55 | 50 |
| Replacement rate: family | 55 | 50 |
| Qualification period | 51 | 24 |
| Duration | 50 | 50 |
| Waiting days | 50 | 29 |
| Coverage | 47 | 45 |
| *Pensions* | | |
| Generosity index | 43 | 43 |
| Minimum replacement rate: single | 54 | 54 |
| Minimum replacement rate: family | 54 | 54 |
| Standard replacement rate: single | 44 | 44 |
| Standard replacement rate: family | 44 | 44 |
| Qualification period | 44 | 37 |
| Ratio of employee to employer pension contributions | 42 | 36 |
| Years of earnings used in the pension calculation | 42 | 33 |
| Coverage/Take-up | 35 | 33 |
| Female retirement age | 44 | 44 |
| Male retirement age | 44 | 44 |
| Life expectancy at age 65 | 44 | 44 |
| *Unemployment* | | |
| Generosity index | 44 | 43 |
| Replacement rate: single | 55 | 55 |
| Replacement rate: family | 55 | 55 |
| Qualification period | 55 | 49 |
| Duration | 55 | 55 |
| Waiting days | 55 | 36 |
| Coverage | 46 | 46 |

Using these partial indices increases the number of country-topic-years in the model from 130 to 161. These thirty-one new observations come from the Czech Republic (6), Hungary (6), Slovenia (6), Latvia (6), Poland (3), Bulgaria (3) and Denmark (1). Table 2A.2 contains the results of the baseline models if I replace the change in the overall generosity indices with the change in the partial generosity indices as the dependent variable. The only other change is that I now control for partial generosity at t instead of overall generosity at t.

Table 2A.2: Changes in replacement rates as alternative dependent variable

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.157*** (0.055) | 0.145*** (0.049) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.141* (0.083) | -0.158* (0.090) | -0.052 (0.068) | -0.165 (0.103) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.245*** (0.079) | 0.270*** (0.087) | 0.172*** (0.064) | 0.280*** (0.102) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -7.784 (18.574) | -6.186 (18.614) | -5.884 (19.242) | -6.725 (18.994) | -6.846 (19.245) | -5.402 (18.994) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 41.79 | 46.73 | 29.53 | 30.56 | 30.93 | 29.95 |
| Observations | 161 | 161 | 161 | 161 | 161 | 161 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

The Table reveals that the main effects stay intact. The same is true if I limit the observations to the 130 in the baseline models, although the effects are slightly weaker there (and not significant at $\alpha = 0.10$ in the quintile model). The effects also stay intact when I run the models separately for the three policy areas, with the notable exception of healthcare, where there is only a significant positive effect for P90 and P95 (Tables 2A.3–2A.5 below). But this is surely related to the fact that change in the partial index is essentially unrelated to change in the overall index in this area.

Table 2A.3: Changes in pension replacement rates as alternative dependent variable

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.391** (0.173) | 0.350** (0.160) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.114 (0.147) | -0.132 (0.161) | 0.081 (0.147) | -0.129 (0.150) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.377** (0.188) | 0.414** (0.207) | 0.236 (0.151) | 0.412** (0.190) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -81.449*** (28.447) | -73.917** (28.930) | -60.489** (26.884) | -63.483** (26.590) | -72.233** (29.541) | -61.546** (27.511) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 22.13 | 22.06 | 22.47 | 23.20 | 20.26 | 21.85 |
| Observations | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2A.4: Changes in unemployment replacement rates as alternative dependent variable

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.182* (0.094) | 0.151** (0.071) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.346* (0.177) | -0.413** (0.207) | -0.337 (0.213) | -0.520** (0.245) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.511*** (0.189) | 0.567*** (0.210) | 0.492** (0.217) | 0.701*** (0.256) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 61.341 (60.221) | 61.967 (60.133) | 40.477 (45.695) | 39.854 (45.023) | 38.325 (45.418) | 46.675 (47.590) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 72.49 | 64.13 | 43.08 | 38.70 | 36.97 | 40.36 |
| Observations | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2A.5: Changes in health/sickness replacement rates as alternative dependent variable

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | -0.000 (0.053) | 0.011 (0.051) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.106* (0.064) | -0.110 (0.071) | 0.076 (0.082) | 0.121 (0.119) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.073* (0.041) | 0.082* (0.047) | -0.091* (0.047) | -0.116 (0.076) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 10.671 (15.563) | 8.512 (14.913) | 4.727 (12.729) | 3.833 (12.678) | 20.735 (17.066) | 17.652 (17.573) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 15.25 | 15.20 | 20.15 | 18.86 | 14.70 | 13.91 |
| Observations | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

As for the spending measures, the results do not change when I use as many of the country-years that are currently in the dataset as possible (see Table 2A.6). The N increases from 130 to 164 in these models. In fact, the low and high-income effects change signs in the hypothesized direction, with the high-income effect now being positive when it was negative before and the low-income effect being negative when it was positive before. But both effects are still far from significant in all models, so this is just a further indication that these are non-findings.

Table 2A.6: Changes in per capita spending as dependent variable (maximizing observations)

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.152 (0.118) | 0.145 (0.116) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.099 (0.317) | -0.114 (0.346) | -0.134 (0.329) | -0.078 (0.384) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.218 (0.227) | 0.238 (0.260) | 0.234 (0.242) | 0.212 (0.308) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 45.128 (50.399) | 45.661 (50.368) | 44.839 (51.679) | 44.246 (51.645) | 47.071 (51.569) | 45.699 (51.285) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 65.14 | 63.38 | 70.61 | 70.33 | 68.05 | 75.24 |
| Observations | 164 | 164 | 164 | 164 | 164 | 164 |

$^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Tables 2A.7–2A.9 contain the results by policy area, again using the four-year change in spending as the dependent variable. That is, they are the equivalent of Tables 2.3–2.5 in the main text, the difference being that those tables had the change in generosity as the dependent variable.

Table 2A.7: Random intercept models of changes in pension spending, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.364$^{***}$ (0.075) | 0.338$^{***}$ (0.081) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | 0.087 (0.139) | 0.077 (0.149) | 0.160 (0.133) | 0.083 (0.173) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.224$^{*}$ (0.116) | 0.244$^{*}$ (0.130) | 0.160 (0.104) | 0.257$^{*}$ (0.147) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -127.246$^{**}$ (61.594) | -117.692$^{*}$ (60.176) | -134.630$^{**}$ (61.388) | -131.896$^{**}$ (61.300) | -134.809$^{**}$ (64.364) | -126.503$^{**}$ (61.272) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 36.63 | 25.32 | 37.65 | 35.68 | 31.14 | 32.93 |
| N | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 |

$^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2A.8: Random intercept models of changes in unemployment spending, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.459 (0.302) | 0.377 (0.266) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | 0.669 (0.540) | 0.684 (0.590) | 0.663 (0.562) | 0.547 (0.637) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.054 (0.374) | -0.027 (0.421) | -0.020 (0.379) | -0.007 (0.476) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 172.824 (184.700) | 179.651 (183.988) | 132.823 (180.398) | 139.276 (182.554) | 156.597 (179.676) | 160.073 (188.220) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 66.40 | 67.79 | 73.32 | 69.63 | 62.95 | 63.25 |
| N | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 |

$^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2A.9: Random intercept models of changes in healthcare spending, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.038 (0.074) | 0.023 (0.074) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | 0.047 (0.110) | 0.043 (0.123) | 0.090 (0.113) | 0.019 (0.148) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.013 (0.089) | 0.010 (0.101) | -0.039 (0.082) | 0.025 (0.113) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -15.733 (28.169) | -15.069 (28.516) | -16.537 (29.434) | -16.503 (29.666) | -17.241 (29.264) | -15.713 (30.797) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 39.02 | 40.54 | 45.44 | 45.06 | 45.97 | 40.28 |
| N | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 |

$^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

*Other Time Periods in the Dependent Variable*

The baseline models in the paper use the change in welfare state generosity in the first four years following the survey as the dependent variables. As indicated, however, this time period is considered to be a rough estimate of the time during which opinions can be expected to percolate through political decision-making and legislative struggle. Tables 2A.10 and 2A.11 below present models where the dependent variable is alternatively measured, as the

average change in welfare state generosity in the first three and five years after the survey, respectively. In all other respects, the models are the same as the baseline models.

In Tables 2A.12 and 2A.13, the dependent variable is the five-year change and three-year change, respectively, in per capita spending on health care, pensions and unemployment.

Table 2A.10: Five-year change in welfare state generosity as alternative dependent variable

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.057*** (0.021) | 0.055*** (0.019) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.038 (0.043) | -0.044 (0.046) | -0.008 (0.030) | -0.068 (0.045) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.086*** (0.033) | 0.093** (0.037) | 0.060*** (0.022) | 0.115*** (0.040) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 24.963 (21.929) | 25.944 (22.115) | 20.682 (20.396) | 20.805 (20.550) | 22.194 (21.388) | 22.460 (21.136) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 65.32 | 52.29 | 49.53 | 47.06 | 76.77 | 57.18 |
| Observations | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2A.11: Three-year change in welfare state generosity as alternative dependent variable

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.036** (0.015) | 0.037*** (0.013) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.024 (0.040) | -0.026 (0.043) | -0.006 (0.033) | -0.035 (0.041) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.051** (0.025) | 0.055* (0.029) | 0.037* (0.020) | 0.064** (0.031) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 20.940 (14.429) | 21.127 (14.600) | 19.993 (12.993) | 19.799 (13.123) | 20.177 (13.762) | 20.572 (13.566) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 70.59 | 62.96 | 91.23 | 89.95 | 103.60 | 79.74 |
| Observations | 131 | 131 | 131 | 131 | 131 | 131 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2A.12: Five-year change in per capita spending as alternative dependent variable

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.194 (0.152) | 0.169 (0.145) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | 0.324 (0.349) | 0.341 (0.378) | 0.261 (0.324) | 0.357 (0.382) |
| High income preferences | - | - | -0.043 (0.211) | -0.071 (0.243) | -0.029 (0.205) | -0.107 (0.263) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 24.968 (92.438) | 29.131 (91.360) | 6.278 (99.971) | 9.131 (99.361) | 19.050 (95.084) | 12.653 (98.157) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 132.79 | 122.96 | 122.75 | 121.90 | 127.47 | 131.58 |
| Observations | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

$^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2A.13: Three-year change in per capita spending as alternative dependent variable

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.156 (0.106) | 0.125 (0.102) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | 0.186 (0.239) | 0.186 (0.259) | 0.119 (0.233) | 0.224 (0.275) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.032 (0.167) | 0.018 (0.190) | 0.064 (0.166) | -0.029 (0.211) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 63.593 (67.696) | 68.636 (66.743) | 50.584 (74.251) | 53.559 (73.502) | 59.085 (70.743) | 55.547 (72.525) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 98.29 | 90.98 | 107.63 | 103.07 | 102.53 | 98.25 |
| Observations | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

$^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Online appendix 2B: Alternative specifications of attitudes of high-income respondents relative to low-income respondents

An additional set of sensitivity and robustness tests focus on alternative modeling of the influence of the attitudes of high-income respondents relative to the influence of the attitudes of low-income respondents. I considered a range of specifications, most importantly the explicit modeling of differences. But first, the roughest alternative.

*Separate models for low and high incomes*

Tables 2B.1 and 2B.2 present separate models for low and high incomes that are otherwise the same as the baseline models. These models do not control for the attitudes of other income groups. The effect of low-income preferences (Table 2B.1) is positive and significant in most models, but the effect of high-income preferences (Table 2B.2) is stronger.

Table 2B.1: Separate models for low incomes of change in welfare state generosity

| | Model 1 (P05) | Model 2 (P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.039 | 0.044* | 0.044* | 0.043** |
| | (0.027) | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.021) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 25.221 | 24.526 | 24.854 | 24.652 |
| | (18.659) | (18.598) | (18.810) | (18.630) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 57.26 | 56.98 | 60.52 | 55.01 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.2: Separate models for high incomes of change in welfare state generosity

| | Model 5 (P95) | Model 6 (P90) | Model 7 (Quint. 5) | Model 8 (Terc. 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| High income preferences | 0.053*** | 0.054*** | 0.050*** | 0.053*** |
| | (0.019) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 19.416 | 19.530 | 20.371 | 20.873 |
| | (17.570) | (17.599) | (17.595) | (17.932) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 53.80 | 51.72 | 58.66 | 53.07 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

*Rich-minus-poor support as alternative independent variable*

Tables 2B.3–2B.12 present models that use the explicit measure of the difference between high-income and low-income preference, *rich-minus-poor*, as an alternative independent variable. The order of the tables corresponds to Table 2.6 in the main body of the text. That is, the first two tables cover all policy areas, with Table 2B.4 also containing median-income preferences. Tables 2B.5–2B.10 do the same but separately for each of the three policy areas. Finally, Tables 2B.11 and 2B.12 use per capita spending as the dependent variable instead of generosity.

Table 2B.3: Rich-minus-poor support and change in welfare generosity, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | 0.073*** | 0.082*** | 0.054*** | 0.100*** |
| | (0.027) | (0.031) | (0.021) | (0.034) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 27.644 | 27.644 | 28.511 | 28.487 |
| | (18.150) | (18.150) | (19.087) | (18.951) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 40.17 | 40.17 | 55.51 | 51.98 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.4: Rich-minus-poor and median support and change in welfare generosity, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | 0.054* | 0.060* | 0.041** | 0.081** |
| | (0.030) | (0.034) | (0.020) | (0.036) |
| Median pref. | 0.042** | 0.042** | 0.046** | 0.043** |
| | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 20.852 | 20.852 | 20.536 | 20.948 |
| | (17.080) | (17.080) | (17.481) | (17.449) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 42.05 | 42.05 | 55.77 | 46.84 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.5: Rich-minus-poor support and change in pension generosity, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | 0.160** | 0.180** | 0.112** | 0.193** |
| | (0.066) | (0.074) | (0.050) | (0.075) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 53.299* | 53.299* | 48.836 | 51.190* |
| | (29.135) | (29.135) | (30.642) | (30.180) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 35.35 | 35.35 | 54.61 | 29.89 |
| Observations | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.6: Rich-minus-poor and median support and change in pension generosity, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | 0.141** | 0.159** | 0.092 | 0.164** |
| | (0.069) | (0.078) | (0.057) | (0.082) |
| Median pref. | 0.067 | 0.067 | 0.077* | 0.071 |
| | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.047) | (0.044) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 38.545* | 38.545* | 34.120 | 37.146 |
| | (23.366) | (23.366) | (24.732) | (24.456) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 48.18 | 48.18 | 35.25 | 48.39 |
| Observations | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.7: Rich-minus-poor support and change in unemployment generosity, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | 0.109** | 0.123** | 0.089 | 0.146** |
| | (0.053) | (0.059) | (0.057) | (0.070) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 34.855 | 34.855 | 36.491 | 38.010 |
| | (35.187) | (35.187) | (36.489) | (36.129) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 35.97 | 35.97 | 36.16 | 36.12 |
| Observations | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.8: Rich-minus-poor and median support and change in unemployment generosity, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | 0.086 | 0.097 | 0.071 | 0.132** |
| | (0.054) | (0.060) | (0.051) | (0.066) |
| Median pref. | 0.061* | 0.061* | 0.066** | 0.068** |
| | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.031) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 26.486 | 26.486 | 26.922 | 27.822 |
| | (34.539) | (34.539) | (34.771) | (34.735) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 57.07 | 57.07 | 46.28 | 56.48 |
| Observations | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.9: Rich-minus-poor support and change in health/sickness generosity, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | 0.063** | 0.071** | 0.064** | 0.088** |
| | (0.031) | (0.034) | (0.027) | (0.035) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -0.479 | -0.479 | -1.174 | 0.339 |
| | (16.524) | (16.524) | (15.735) | (16.293) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 20.65 | 20.65 | 20.78 | 24.20 |
| Observations | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.10: Rich-minus-poor and median support and change in health/sickness generosity, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | 0.078** | 0.088** | 0.072** | 0.107** |
| | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.030) | (0.046) |
| Median pref. | -0.030 | -0.030 | -0.024 | -0.029 |
| | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.031) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 4.519 | 4.520 | 3.073 | 5.550 |
| | (16.035) | (16.035) | (15.403) | (15.601) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 21.95 | 21.95 | 20.61 | 25.82 |
| Observations | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.11: Rich-minus-poor support and change in per capita spending, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | -0.055 | -0.062 | -0.022 | -0.087 |
| | (0.207) | (0.233) | (0.209) | (0.252) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 69.008 | 69.008 | 69.389 | 68.551 |
| | (71.931) | (71.931) | (70.751) | (72.800) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 92.34 | 92.34 | 92.56 | 93.07 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

$^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B.12: Rich-minus-poor and median support and change in per capita spending, t+1 to t+4

| | Model 1 (P95 - P05) | Model 2 (P90 - P10) | Model 3 (Quint. 5 - 1) | Model 4 (Terc. 3 - 1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor | -0.129 | -0.145 | -0.066 | -0.161 |
| | (0.238) | (0.267) | (0.219) | (0.274) |
| Median pref. | 0.180 | 0.180 | 0.167 | 0.174 |
| | (0.141) | (0.141) | (0.134) | (0.134) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 42.699 | 42.699 | 45.723 | 42.796 |
| | (83.970) | (83.970) | (81.272) | (83.899) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 99.67 | 99.67 | 91.18 | 96.66 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

$^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

*Win rates with respect to attitudes of high-income versus low-income respondents*

The so-called win rate is obtained by looking at cases where a majority of one group is on one side of a policy change while the majority of another group is on the other side (Branham, Soroka and Wlezien, 2017). In this case, these are cases where a majority of low incomes wants more spending in a certain area and a majority of high incomes wants less spending, or vice versa.

The first thing to note is that these cases are not common. There are clear preference gaps between the rich and poor, but both are usually on the side of more spending. Out of the 130 observations, there are twenty where groups are on different sides, using the tenth and ninetieth percentiles. (There are twenty-six when using the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles,

twenty-four using quintiles and sixteen using terciles.) All twenty of these are in the area of unemployment and in each case the rich want less spending while the poor want more. In two of these cases, generosity stayed constant after the survey. In nine cases, generosity increased, while generosity decreased in another nine cases. This would imply the poor and rich both 'won' fifty percent of the time. (Using the partial generosity indices, there are twenty-three cases where the two groups are on different sides. Generosity decreased in fourteen of those cases while it increased in nine.)

Another way to look at this is to compare this fifty percent chance to the chance of generosity increasing when both groups either want more or less spending. Here, I just look at unemployment. If both the rich and poor want more spending, generosity increases in fourteen out sixteen cases, or eighty-eight percent of the time. If they both want less spending, generosity increases in three out of nine cases, or thirty-three percent of the time. In other words, the poor being in favor of more spending seems to raise the odds of generosity increasing (from thirty-three percent to fifty percent), but it is still much lower than the odds of generosity increasing when the rich are also in favor (eighty-eight percent). Note that we are working with very few observations here though.

We can also look at the size of the change in generosity after the survey, again just in the area of unemployment, which produces the results shown in Table 2B.13.

Table 2B.13: Four-year change in generosity by preferences of rich and poor

| | Rich want less spending | Rich want more spending |
|---|---|---|
| Poor want less spending | 0.61 (9) | N/A (0) |
| Poor want more spending | -0.01 (19) | 3.64 (16) |

The number between parentheses indicates the number of observations in each cell. If both the rich and poor are in favor of more spending, generosity clearly increases (by 3.64 percent), while there is no clear increase if only the rich are opposed or both the rich and poor are opposed. The figure even seems to be higher if both groups are opposed than when only the rich are opposed, which does not make much sense. I should note that these figures are sensitive to outliers though. For the figures in the Table above, I already removed one extreme outlier (Sweden 2006) where generosity decreased by 22.5 percent after the survey.

(To put that into perspective, the biggest decrease after that in the area of unemployment is 3.88 percent.) Taking this outlier into account would have changed -0.01 percent in the *poor want more / rich want less* cell to -1.13 percent. There are also positive outliers, though not as extreme. There is one country-year (New Zealand 1997) in the *poor want less / rich want less* cell where generosity increased by 7.5 percent after the survey. If all outliers with a change of more than seven percent are removed, we get the numbers shown in Table 2B.14:

Table 2B.14: Four-year change in generosity by preferences of rich and poor after removing outliers

| | Rich want less spending | Rich want more spending |
|---|---|---|
| Poor want less spending | -0.24 (8) | N/A (0) |
| Poor want more spending | -0.01 (19) | 2.25 (13) |

The picture is the same: a clear increase when both groups are in favor and not much of a change when the rich are opposed, regardless of what the poor want.

To sum up the win-rates discussion, both rich and poor are usually on the side of more spending. When the groups are on different sides, the win rates for rich and poor are similar. However, this is kind of an awkward statistic here, because one of the cells (where the poor want less spending and the rich want more) in this calculation is empty. We can also look at how the odds of generosity increasing change when the poor become in favor of more spending and when the rich do. This seems to indicate that the odds especially increase when not just the poor but also the rich are in favor, although again this is hampered by the empty cell. Finally, and unlike in the data of Gilens (2012), we can look at the size of the change, which seems to indicate that what matters is mostly whether the rich are in favor of more spending. Incidentally, all of these findings also apply when we compare the fiftieth to the ninetieth percentile, although the number of observations where the two groups are on different sides is even smaller here (fifteen instead of twenty). However, with the existing data, I suspect that the number of observations is just too low, and the survey questions too limited in variation, for this kind of analysis to be very useful.

Online appendix 2C: Additional control and moderating variables

A major set of sensitivity tests focused on a wide range of alternative controls to those key factors in the baseline that can be expected to be important upstream determinants of welfare-state attitudes and policy change. Particularly important of the alternative controls are those relevant to getting at cross-country differences in political-institutional footholds for citizens. To explore such possibilities, I added a number of contextual variables relevant to such footholds. An overview of these variables is provided in Table 2C.1. The descriptive statistics are calculated for the country-topic-years that make up the models presented below.

Table 2C.1: Descriptive statistics of contextual variables

| | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. | Source | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age of democracy | 107.32 | 88.63 | 0 | 300 | QoG | Top-coded to 300 years because Great Britain is an extreme outlier |
| Effective number of parties | 3.29 | 1.12 | 1.91 | 6.07 | CPDS | - |
| Gallagher index of disproportionality | 1.51 | 0.99 | -0.71 | 3.13 | CPDS | Transformed by taking the natural logarithm |
| Cabinet composition (left-right index) | 2.43 | 1.55 | 1 | 5 | CPDS | - |
| Share of right-wing parties in cabinet | 40.09 | 42.22 | 0 | 100 | CPDS | - |
| Share of left-wing parties in cabinet | 33.52 | 37.87 | 0 | 100 | CPDS | - |
| Federalism index | 3.02 | 1.66 | 1 | 5 | CPDS | - |
| Union density | 33.45 | 18.32 | 7.59 | 85.06 | CPDS | - |

*Note: QoG = Quality of Government Standard Dataset; CPDS = Comparative Political Data Set*

We add these variables to the baseline model, first as control variables. I only control for one variable at a time here, partly because several of them are highly correlated with each other and partly because the different variables have different missing country-years, which would mean a model with several institutional controls at once would have a quite limited number of observations.

With eight variables, there are eight models. These are presented in Table 2C.2 in the model with median income preferences and in Table 2C.3 in the model with the tenth and ninetieth income percentiles. For reasons of space, the other measurements of overall, low- and high-income preferences are not shown here; they produce the same results. None of the contextual variables ever has a significant effect on changes in welfare state generosity. Furthermore, the effects of preferences barely change compared to the baseline models.

Table 2C.2: Random intercept models of changes in welfare state generosity with median preferences and contextual control variables

| | Model 1 (Age of dem.) | Model 2 (Eff. parties) | Model 3 (Gall. index) | Model 4 (Cab. comp.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Median preferences | 0.049*** | 0.046*** | 0.045*** | 0.047*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| Contextual variable | -0.005 | 0.142 | -0.341 | 0.069 |
| | (0.006) | (0.283) | (0.388) | (0.265) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 20.867 | 17.379 | 15.603 | 14.066 |
| | (19.181) | (23.213) | (20.274) | (21.922) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 58.33 | 46.67 | 57.38 | 60.54 |
| Observations | 130 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

| | Model 5 (% Right part.) | Model 6 (% Left part.) | Model 7 (Federalism) | Model 8 (Union dens.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Median preferences | 0.049*** | 0.047*** | 0.045*** | 0.058*** |
| | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.022) |
| Contextual variable | -0.007 | 0.002 | -0.089 | -0.047 |
| | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.257) | (0.034) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 13.665 | 14.654 | 13.867 | 2.621 |
| | (20.638) | (21.549) | (21.375) | (21.410) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 44.99 | 52.54 | 65.79 | 60.66 |
| Observations | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2C.3: Random intercept models of changes in welfare state generosity with low-income and high-income preferences and contextual control variables

| | Model 1 (Age of dem.) | Model 2 (Eff. parties) | Model 3 (Gall. index) | Model 4 (Cab. comp.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | -0.027 | -0.043 | -0.042 | -0.040 |
| | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.040) | (0.041) |
| High income preferences | 0.073** | 0.082*** | 0.082*** | 0.081** |
| | (0.036) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.032) |
| Contextual variable | -0.004 | 0.218 | -0.386 | 0.054 |
| | (0.006) | (0.272) | (0.354) | (0.265) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 18.232 | 18.153 | 14.906 | 13.915 |
| | (17.341) | (21.392) | (18.455) | (19.978) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 66.66 | 79.98 | 61.33 | 72.88 |
| Observations | 130 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

| | Model 5 (% Right part.) | Model 6 (% Left part.) | Model 7 (Federalism) | Model 8 (Union dens.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | -0.036 | -0.041 | -0.044 | -0.037 |
| | (0.038) | (0.042) | (0.041) | (0.049) |
| High income preferences | 0.080*** | 0.081** | 0.081** | 0.086** |
| | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.035) |
| Contextual variable | -0.007 | 0.001 | -0.107 | -0.039 |
| | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.245) | (0.032) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 13.260 | 14.372 | 13.570 | 4.184 |
| | (18.890) | (19.682) | (19.214) | (20.362) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 56.63 | 61.58 | 120.45 | 64.04 |
| Observations | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Next, I add multiplicative interaction terms between the contextual variables and preferences (Tables 2C.4 and 2C.5). The models are ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered by country. In these models, all contextual variables are centered. In Table 2C.5, the interaction is with low income preferences – the segment of the polity whose influence on subsequent policy change can most be expected to be moderated by the political-institutional conditions measured, here. I get similar findings if I interact the contextual variable with high

income preferences. Again, other measurements of the various income positions produce the same results. The overall picture is quite clear: I do not find any moderating effects of contextual variables and preferences on the dependent variable. This is likely to reflect the limited number of observations and limited coverage in some other respects. The sole exception to this pattern is found in model 1 of Table 2C.5, but this is only barely significant at $\alpha = 0.10$, with a small effect size that is in the opposite direction of what I expected.

Table 2C.4: Ordinary least squares models of changes in welfare state generosity with interactions between median preferences and contextual variables

| | Model 1 (Age of dem.) | Model 2 (Eff. parties) | Model 3 (Gall. index) | Model 4 (Cab. comp.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Median preferences | 0.059** | 0.045* | 0.044* | 0.044* |
| | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Contextual variable | -0.000 | 0.300 | -0.285 | -0.112 |
| | (0.007) | (0.438) | (0.368) | (0.305) |
| Interaction | -0.000 | 0.002 | -0.002 | 0.006 |
| | (0.000) | (0.012) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 11.107 | 16.662 | 9.211 | 7.752 |
| | (17.683) | (20.422) | (18.740) | (17.525) |
| $R^2$ | 0.143 | 0.098 | 0.097 | 0.096 |
| Observations | 130 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

| | Model 5 (% Right part.) | Model 6 (% Left part.) | Model 7 (Federalism) | Model 8 (Union dens.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Median preferences | 0.051** | 0.045* | 0.041** | 0.063** |
| | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.020) | (0.029) |
| Contextual variable | -0.001 | -0.004 | 0.053 | -0.063 |
| | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.311) | (0.068) |
| Interaction | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.005 | 0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.008) | (0.001) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 6.800 | 8.951 | 7.977 | -5.213 |
| | (17.088) | (18.286) | (18.680) | (19.856) |
| $R^2$ | 0.109 | 0.092 | 0.093 | 0.138 |
| Observations | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2C.5: Ordinary least squares models of changes in welfare state generosity with interactions between low-income preferences and contextual variables

| | Model 1 (Age of dem.) | Model 2 (Eff. parties) | Model 3 (Gall. index) | Model 4 (Cab. comp.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | -0.041 | -0.067 | -0.069 | -0.067 |
| | (0.049) | (0.044) | (0.042) | (0.044) |
| High income preferences | 0.101** | 0.106*** | 0.107*** | 0.102** |
| | (0.045) | (0.040) | (0.038) | (0.040) |
| Contextual variable | 0.013 | 0.049 | -0.105 | -0.262 |
| | (0.012) | (0.555) | (0.472) | (0.439) |
| Interaction (P10 * context. variable) | -0.000* | 0.008 | -0.008 | 0.008 |
| | (0.000) | (0.013) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 12.712 | 18.819 | 12.873 | 11.246 |
| | (17.695) | (20.244) | (18.557) | (17.235) |
| $R^2$ | 0.184 | 0.133 | 0.136 | 0.130 |
| Observations | 130 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

| | Model 5 (% Right part.) | Model 6 (% Left part.) | Model 7 (Federalism) | Model 8 (Union dens.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | -0.055 | -0.071 | -0.078* | -0.056 |
| | (0.043) | (0.044) | (0.043) | (0.047) |
| High income preferences | 0.100** | 0.106** | 0.106*** | 0.104*** |
| | (0.039) | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.039) |
| Contextual variable | 0.005 | -0.008 | 0.092 | -0.055 |
| | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.432) | (0.083) |
| Interaction (P10 * context. variable) | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.005 | 0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.009) | (0.002) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 9.953 | 12.481 | 11.884 | 1.144 |
| | (17.042) | (18.002) | (18.308) | (19.924) |
| $R^2$ | 0.139 | 0.127 | 0.128 | 0.157 |
| Observations | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Beyond the institutional variables, I estimated models using a different specification of GDP, economic growth and unemployment as control variables. In the baseline models, these are all measured at t. In Table 2C.6 below, they are measured as the average between t+1 and t+4.

Table 2C.6: Controlling for average GDP, economic growth and unemployment between t+1 and t+4

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.057*** (0.021) | 0.056*** (0.019) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.032 (0.041) | -0.037 (0.044) | -0.006 (0.030) | -0.052 (0.044) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.079*** (0.030) | 0.085** (0.034) | 0.058*** (0.021) | 0.099*** (0.038) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 29.571* (16.893) | 30.502* (16.913) | 26.257* (15.720) | 26.426* (15.764) | 27.555* (16.456) | 27.966* (16.835) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 105.35 | 103.17 | 84.31 | 83.41 | 93.07 | 93.08 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Alternatively, we can measure the average *change* in GDP, growth and unemployment between t+1 and t+4. The results of these models are provided in Table 2C.7.

Table 2C.7: Controlling for average change in GDP, economic growth and unemployment between t+1 and t+4

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.059*** (0.022) | 0.057*** (0.020) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.040 (0.038) | -0.046 (0.041) | -0.018 (0.029) | -0.061 (0.042) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.087*** (0.033) | 0.094** (0.037) | 0.069*** (0.025) | 0.107*** (0.040) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -1.086 (1.630) | -1.062 (1.642) | 0.268 (1.345) | 0.178 (1.362) | -0.121 (1.301) | 0.365 (1.353) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 43.62 | 39.19 | 35.09 | 35.01 | 37.57 | 33.94 |
| Observations | 127 | 127 | 127 | 127 | 127 | 127 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

In short, the main results do not change much across many specifications with respect to contextual controls. Also, most of the controls have no significant effect on the dependent variable, except for the average (logged) GDP and the change in growth, which are marginally significant at $\alpha = 0.10$.

Online appendix 2D: Alternative embedding and jackknife analysis

Finally, the robustness and sensitivity tests focus on a range of alternative estimators. The estimators on which I focus below include alternative multi-level models in terms of embedding and random intercept and random slope models, as well as various kinds of jackknife analyses.

*Alternative embedding in multi-level models*

Tables 2D.1–2D.5 present a number of alternative estimators. These include the baseline multi-level model and embedding, but with random coefficients for the attitudinal variables (in addition to the random intercepts). They also include alternative embedding (in two-level and three-level models), that are otherwise the same as the baseline models with respect to controls. In all cases, the results do not change appreciably relative to the baseline models.

Table 2D.1: Two-level random intercept, random slope models of change in welfare state generosity with country as clusters (preference variables as random coefficients)

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.052*** (0.018) | 0.051*** (0.017) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.036 (0.041) | -0.041 (0.043) | -0.013 (0.030) | -0.057 (0.043) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.078*** (0.029) | 0.084*** (0.032) | 0.059*** (0.020) | 0.099*** (0.036) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 21.949 (18.168) | 22.570 (18.322) | 19.775 (16.411) | 19.729 (16.531) | 20.376 (17.323) | 21.144 (17.331) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 57.16 | 46.63 | 51.09 | 49.12 | 71.92 | 55.44 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2D.2: Two-level random intercept models of change in welfare state generosity with country-Year as Clusters

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.053*** (0.016) | 0.050*** (0.015) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.058* (0.035) | -0.067* (0.038) | -0.038 (0.030) | -0.086* (0.044) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.097*** (0.032) | 0.107*** (0.036) | 0.080*** (0.028) | 0.125*** (0.043) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 15.486 (15.732) | 16.242 (15.708) | 16.311 (14.111) | 16.392 (14.104) | 16.349 (14.871) | 17.973 (14.598) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 18.57 | 20.31 | 24.87 | 25.44 | 19.59 | 23.36 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2D.3: Two-level random intercept models of change in welfare state generosity with country-topic as clusters

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.056** (0.024) | 0.053** (0.022) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.063 (0.040) | -0.071 (0.043) | -0.040 (0.038) | -0.088* (0.048) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.100*** (0.033) | 0.109*** (0.037) | 0.082*** (0.029) | 0.126*** (0.041) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 17.025 (18.345) | 17.698 (18.486) | 16.636 (17.382) | 16.571 (17.467) | 15.900 (17.518) | 17.951 (17.782) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 26.53 | 26.64 | 26.47 | 26.69 | 25.36 | 26.60 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2D.4: Three-level random intercept models of change in welfare state generosity with country and wave as clusters

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.053*** (0.018) | 0.051*** (0.016) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.040 (0.045) | -0.035 (0.041) | -0.013 (0.033) | -0.058 (0.047) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.084** (0.035) | 0.078** (0.031) | 0.060** (0.024) | 0.100** (0.039) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 22.640 (18.204) | 23.585 (18.201) | 20.387 (16.920) | 20.234 (16.810) | 21.668 (17.680) | 22.194 (17.337) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 13.36 | 14.49 | 28.80 | 28.03 | 29.09 | 25.34 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 2D.5: Three-level random intercept models of change in welfare state generosity with country-year as third level

| | Model 1 (All) | Model 2 (P50) | Model 3 (P5 / P95) | Model 4 (P10 / P90) | Model 5 (Quint. 1 / 5) | Model 6 (Terc. 1 / 3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall / median preferences | 0.053*** (0.018) | 0.051*** (0.016) | - | - | - | - |
| Low income preferences | - | - | -0.040 (0.045) | -0.035 (0.041) | -0.013 (0.033) | -0.058 (0.047) |
| High income preferences | - | - | 0.084** (0.035) | 0.078** (0.031) | 0.060** (0.024) | 0.100** (0.039) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 22.640 (18.204) | 23.585 (18.201) | 20.387 (16.920) | 20.234 (16.810) | 21.668 (17.680) | 22.194 (17.337) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 13.36 | 14.49 | 28.80 | 28.03 | 29.09 | 25.34 |
| Observations | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 130 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

*Outliers, influential cases and jackknife analysis*

To further investigate the sensitivity of the results to the baseline specification, I performed a range of jackknife analyses, including step-wise removal of country-waves or country-topics, but also full country levels. In addition, I consider jackknifing of standard errors based on

such clustering. In outlier analysis of the country-topic-year data distribution, and as already discussed above, I find a major outlier – Swedish unemployment assistance in 2006. But this is not an influential outlier, as captured in the leverage-versus-residual-squared plot below (based on the tenth and ninetieth percentile baseline model).




Figure 2D.1: Leverage-versus-residual-squared plot

In any event, I focus below on what I consider the most aggressive jackknife analysis, where all the observations for each country were removed from the sample "one by one" and the model was estimated using the remaining countries. This results in twenty models, the key results of which are presented in Table 2D.6. The Table shows the coefficients and standard errors of low- and high-income preferences when leaving out the country in the first column. Note that the Table contains results of two sets of models, one with the tenth and ninetieth percentiles and another with the lowest and highest quintiles, so there are forty models in total. Despite some variation between countries, the significant effect of high-income preferences – and the non-effect of low-income preferences – is quite stable.

Table 2D.6: Results of jackknife analysis by country

| Excluded | P10 | P90 | Quintile 1 | Quintile 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| None | -0.041 (0.043) | 0.084 (0.032)*** | -0.013 (0.030) | 0.059 (0.020)*** |
| Australia | -0.043 (0.044) | 0.097 (0.033)*** | -0.014 (0.030) | 0.071 (0.020)*** |
| Austria | -0.041 (0.043) | 0.083 (0.032)** | -0.015 (0.029) | 0.060 (0.019)*** |
| Canada | -0.044 (0.046) | 0.085 (0.033)** | -0.015 (0.032) | 0.059 (0.020)*** |
| Denmark | -0.041 (0.043) | 0.083 (0.032)** | -0.013 (0.030) | 0.058 (0.020)*** |
| Finland | -0.035 (0.044) | 0.079 (0.033)** | -0.007 (0.031) | 0.054 (0.021)*** |
| France | -0.053 (0.046) | 0.095 (0.033)*** | -0.020 (0.031) | 0.066 (0.020)*** |
| Germany | -0.024 (0.043) | 0.076 (0.033)** | -0.001 (0.028) | 0.056 (0.021)*** |
| Great Britain | -0.009 (0.038) | 0.068 (0.032)** | 0.001 (0.027) | 0.060 (0.023)** |
| Ireland | -0.070 (0.040) | 0.100 (0.031)*** | -0.036 (0.028) | 0.071 (0.019)*** |
| Italy | -0.046 (0.045) | 0.077 (0.032)** | -0.023 (0.031) | 0.057 (0.021)*** |
| Japan | -0.043 (0.046) | 0.088 (0.035)** | -0.009 (0.032) | 0.058 (0.022)** |
| Netherlands | -0.043 (0.044) | 0.088 (0.033)*** | -0.013 (0.031) | 0.061 (0.020)*** |
| New Zealand | -0.058 (0.040) | 0.104 (0.032)*** | -0.017 (0.029) | 0.066 (0.021)*** |
| Norway | -0.034 (0.046) | 0.077 (0.031)** | -0.010 (0.034) | 0.055 (0.019)*** |
| Portugal | -0.039 (0.042) | 0.075 (0.031)** | -0.014 (0.029) | 0.052 (0.019)*** |
| South Korea | -0.041 (0.043) | 0.081 (0.032)** | -0.013 (0.030) | 0.056 (0.020)*** |
| Spain | -0.008 (0.042) | 0.056 (0.031)* | 0.006 (0.030) | 0.042 (0.020)** |
| Sweden | -0.064 (0.047) | 0.095 (0.035)*** | -0.028 (0.032) | 0.063 (0.021)*** |
| Switzerland | -0.042 (0.048) | 0.091 (0.036)** | -0.008 (0.034) | 0.060 (0.022)*** |
| United States | -0.031 (0.049) | 0.075 (0.037)** | -0.003 (0.036) | 0.051 (0.026)** |

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

# Chapter 3

## Online appendix 3A: Survey sources

The data sources for the survey questions used in the paper are listed in Table 3A.1, reproduced from the printed appendix. Most of these sources were found by searching the website of the Dutch Data Archiving and Networked Services in early 2017, specifically everything in the category of social sciences.[1] Since the availability of suitable survey questions becomes very limited before 1979, this was chosen as the starting year.

One source requires further justification, namely the online panel of EenVandaag, a Dutch news program. As Table 3A.1 shows, this is the source of seventy-seven questions, or about a quarter of the total. The problem with this panel is that it is based on self-selection, raising doubts about the extent to which this sample is representative of the Dutch population. The reason this source was still included is that their surveys include questions about very specific policy issues that are salient and can clearly be linked to policy change. In that sense, their questions are better than those included in, for example, the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies, which has better sampling methods.

To limit any bias that the EenVandaag survey panel might introduce, post-stratification weights were applied before calculating the preferences, based on gender, age, education, income, province and party choice. Furthermore, the main analyses were repeated without questions from EenVandaag to make sure the results would stay the same (see online appendix 3E).

A list with full references to the surveys is provided in appendix 3E. The surveys of the EenVandaag Survey Panel and the Citizens' Outlooks Barometer are not included in this list, as they are not publicly available.

[1] The website can be found at https://easy.dans.knaw.nl (accessed March 18, 2019).

Table 3A.1: Data sources for the survey questions, sorted by frequency

| Survey | Year(s) | *N* |
|---|---|---|
| EenVandaag Survey Panel | 2006-2012 | 77 |
| Cultural Changes in the Netherlands | 1979-2012 | 61 |
| NIPO Weekly Surveys | 1982-1994 | 29 |
| Centerdata Telepanel | 1993-1999 | 25 |
| Public Opinion on Social Security and Labor in the Netherlands | 1995 | 21 |
| Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies | 1981-2012 | 19 |
| LISS Panel | 2008, 2010 | 16 |
| Citizens' Outlooks Barometer | 2008, 2012 | 11 |
| International Social Survey Programme | 2006 | 9 |
| Individual Freedom of Choice in the Field of Social Insurance | 2001 | 6 |
| Eurobarometer | 1984, 1991, 1993, 1996 | 5 |
| Justice Criteria and Income Inequality | 1987 | 4 |
| Family Survey Dutch Population | 2000, 2003 | 2 |
| Income Inequality, Income Politics and Redistribution Preferences | 1982 | 2 |
| Socioeconomic Developments in the Netherlands | 1998 | 2 |
| European Values Study | 2008 | 1 |
| Sociocultural Developments in the Netherlands | 1995 | 1 |

Online appendix 3B: Question list

Below is the complete list of survey questions used in the analysis, translated from Dutch and arranged by the survey organizations listed in Table 3A.1. Twenty-seven questions were asked more than once. For these, a number in parentheses at the end of the question indicates how often they were asked.

*EenVandaag Survey Panel*

- We should abolish the referendum in the Netherlands.
- It is a good idea to reduce the number of marriage migrants from 30,000 to 5,000 a year.
- People and organizations that help illegal migrants (like municipalities) should be criminally prosecuted.
- Children up to twelve years old who commit criminal offenses should be admitted to closed institutions for as long as necessary.
- There should be a ban on prayer calls with sound amplification from mosques.
- What should the Netherlands do in Uruzgan after 1 August 2008? (A) The Netherlands should withdraw; (B) The Netherlands should continue the current mission in the same way; (C) Stay, but with fewer troops and resources; (D) Stay, with more troops and resources.
- Should the Netherlands continue to pay for Geert Wilders' personal security in the future or not?
- Are you for or against the presence of Dutch troops in Afghanistan?
- Which statement about the sale of soft drugs by coffee shops do you support the most? (A) Coffee shops can stay open and sell soft drugs; (B) All coffee shops should be closed.
- Do you think the current investigation into the war in Iraq in sufficient, or do you think there should be a parliamentary inquiry?
- What do you think should happen to the pension age if you could choose between these two options? (A) It should remain sixty-five; (B) It should be increased to sixty-seven.
- Which of these measures do you find acceptable? Retirement benefits should be cut.
- Which of these measures do you find acceptable? Pension contributions should be raised.
- What do you think: should the Netherlands buy two Joint Strike Fighter jets or not?
- The Netherlands has led the NATO mission in Uruzgan since 1 August 2006. Are you for or against the presence of Dutch troops in Afghanistan?
- The Netherlands should completely withdraw from Uruzgan after 2010.

- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Voters should not only influence the composition of the Second Chamber of parliament but also the composition of the government coalition.
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? People who smoke should pay more in health insurance premiums. (2)
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? People who are overweight should pay more in health insurance premiums. (2)
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? People who are older than seventy-five should pay more in health insurance premiums. (2)
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? People who live healthy should pay less in health insurance premiums.
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? All Islamic schools in the Netherlands should be closed.
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Government employees should be allowed to wear a headscarf during work.
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? It should not be allowed to build new mosques in the Netherlands.
- Do you think the queen should play a role during the formation of a coalition or do you think the queen should not play a role during the formation?
- Should the Netherlands continue with the European currency, the euro, or should it not?
- Do you think it is a good idea to replace the current provinces with four large regions, or do you think it's not?
- A merger of the provinces of North Holland, South Holland, Utrecht and Flevoland is in my opinion: a good idea / a bad idea.
- A merger of the provinces of Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe is in my opinion: a good idea / a bad idea.
- A merger of the provinces of Overijssel and Gelderland is in my opinion: a good idea / a bad idea.
- A merger of the provinces of Limburg, North Brabant and Zeeland is in my opinion: a good idea / a bad idea.
- Do you think building a coal-fired power plant in the Eemshaven is a good idea or a bad idea?
- Merging Flevoland, North Holland and Utrecht into a large urban province [Randstadprovincie] is: a good idea / a bad idea.

- Do you think a second nuclear plant should be built in Zeeland?
- Do you think the introduction of the 'weed pass' is generally a good thing or a bad thing?
- The 'weed pass' should be introduced simultaneously throughout the Netherlands and not only in Limburg first.
- Do you support or oppose going forward with the current pension agreement?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to reduce unemployment benefits by five percent?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to no longer link benefits to wages?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to ask for a personal contribution of five euros per visit to a general practitioner?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to gradually decrease the deductible excess to 775 euros?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to reduce the budget for development aid to 0.6 percent of GDP?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to reduce the budget for development aid further than to 0.6 percent of GDP?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to replace the study grant with a loan system?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to increase the low VAT rate from six to eight percent?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to increase the high VAT rate from twenty to twenty-one percent?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to introduce a congestion charge in traffic?
- There should be a referendum on the question whether the Netherlands should give up the euro or not.
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to increase the low VAT rate from six to seven percent?
- Do you support or oppose freezing (almost) all wages in the Netherlands as much as possible?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to ask for a personal contribution of nine euros per drug prescription?
- Do you support or oppose abolishing the mortgage interest relief for people who want to take out a new redemption-free mortgage?

- The Netherlands should stick to the EU norm and make sure the budget deficit is not above three percent next year.
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to increase the pension age faster than was previously agreed upon?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to institute a zero line for government employees?
- Do you agree or disagree with the proposed investment in lowering the property transfer tax?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to ask for a personal contribution for every day spent in the hospital?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to remove the walker from the standard health care package?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut not to adjust the tax brackets to inflation?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to increase excise duties on cigarettes and tobacco?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to increase excise duties on alcohol?
- Do you support or oppose the proposed budget cut to address the compensation of travel expenses?
- Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea to introduce an electoral threshold in the Netherlands?
- Are you for or against reducing the duration of unemployment benefits?
- Do you think employers should pay for the first six months of unemployment benefits or not?
- Vocational studies with good job prospects should be made cheaper than other studies.
- Technical studies should become free because there is a shortage of technicians.
- Do you generally support or oppose budget cuts in the standard health care package [basispakket]?
- Are you for or against a system of health care-saving [zorgsparen] in the Netherlands?
- Do you support or oppose the increase in the deductible excess from 220 euros to 350 euros in 2013?
- Do you think the deductible excess should be equally high for everyone, or do you think it should become dependent on one's income?

- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? People who have an unhealthy lifestyle should pay more in health insurance premiums than people with healthy lifestyles.
- Do you think people should be allowed to take out a mortgage that is higher than the value of their house?
- If you could choose, would you prefer the queen to play an important role during the formation of a coalition or would you prefer parliament to arrange the formation without the queen?

*Cultural Changes in the Netherlands*

- Can you indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following measures? The government should increase art subsidies. (6)
- Can you indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following measures? The government should extend compulsory education to the age of 18. (6)
- Which of the following measures do you think the government should take to reduce energy consumption? Institute a car-free day. (2)
- Which of the following measures do you think the government should take to reduce energy consumption? Provide higher subsidies on home insulation.
- Which of the following measures do you think the government should take to reduce energy consumption? Higher taxes for cars with high fuel consumption.
- Can you indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following measures? The government should increase the minimum wage by more than other wages. (4)
- Can you indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following measures? The government should increase taxes on higher incomes.
- Can you indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following measures? The government should increase the inheritance tax. (3)
- Can you indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following measures? The government should increase the amount of money that is spent on development aid. (4)
- Can you indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following measures? The government should increase defense spending. (2)

- Can you indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following measures? The government should increase indirect taxes on beverages and tobacco.
- Can you indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following measures? The government should increase indirect taxes on daily necessities of life. (3)
- What do you prefer: to build more nuclear plants in the Netherlands, only maintain the existing nuclear plants, or shut down the existing nuclear plants? (3)
- There should be shorter school holidays and fewer days off for school children, so that more time can be spent on education.
- Please indicate for each statement to what extent you agree or disagree with it. The government should provide everyone with a minimum income.
- Please indicate for each statement to what extent you agree or disagree with it. The government should spend less on social security benefits.
- In a number of countries, including the Netherlands, organ transplantation is only possible with explicit permission: this is the permission system. In several other countries, organs are always allowed to be transplanted, unless the deceased has objected to this beforehand: this is the no-objection system. Which of these two systems do you prefer?
- Do you think the minimum wage for adults should be increased, decreased or kept the same? Or should the minimum wage be abolished altogether? (2)
- Do you think the minimum youth wage should be increased, decreased or kept the same? Or should the minimum youth wage be abolished altogether? (2)
- Do you think the average age for early retirement should be increased, decreased or kept the same?
- According to some people, the government should only provide a kind of social assistance to unemployed and disabled people in the future. People who want additional benefits must take out supplementary insurance and pay a premium for it themselves. Are you in favor of or against such a 'mini-system' in social security? (2)
- Another possibility that is sometimes discussed in newspapers and television is the introduction of a basic income. Are you for or against the introduction of such a basic income? (2)
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If both parents work, they should receive financial compensation to pay for childcare. (2)

- During in vitro fertilization, ova and sperm cells are brought together outside of the woman's body, so that embryos can develop. Some of these embryos are inserted into the womb of the woman in order to develop further there. If the treatment is successful, some embryos are left over. Would you consider it justified if these embryos were to be used for scientific research?
- Do you think that, apart from consultation with parents and family members, the attending physicians have to take that responsibility [for euthanasia] alone because they are experts and know the case? Or do you think there should be separate advisory bodies to which doctors present such a case so that they can share responsibility?
- Are you for or against a system of 'mandatory work for everyone who is able to'? (People who are unemployed or disabled and can't find work on their own get a job from the government, where they do work that is useful for society. In exchange, they receive the minimum wage. People who refuse this job get no money from the government.)
- To what extent do you agree with the following statements? On some of the important decisions in our country, voters should be able to vote by means of a so-called referendum. (3)
- Gay couples can now marry each other. Do you think this is a good thing, a bad thing, or do you not care? (2)
- To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Gay marriage should be made illegal.

*NIPO Weekly Surveys*

- In the past, there was compulsory voting. People had to go to the polling station, even though they could decide to not vote or vote blank when they arrived there. Do you think compulsory voting for elections should be reinstituted?
- Are you in favor of abolishing the minimum youth wage?
- Are you in favor of abolishing the minimum wage in general?
- Are you for or against reducing unemployment benefits from eighty percent of the previous wage to seventy percent?
- In built-up areas, the maximum speed for vehicles is currently fifty kilometers per hour. Do you think this is too fast, too slow or acceptable?
- What is your view on the speed limit on highways? Should this remain a hundred kilometers per hour or change to something else?

- What do you think, should the Dutch nuclear power plants be closed down or stay in operation?
- Stores are currently allowed to be open until six o'clock at night. There are plants to extend this to seven o'clock at night. Are you in favor or opposed to this?
- There are plans to construct a pipeline in the Waddenzee, which would transport oil and gas from the North Sea to the province of Groningen. Do you think the government should approve this or not?
- What do you think, should our country remain a member of NATO or not? (3)
- Minister Brinkman wants to institute fines for television stations if they show or mention brands, manufacturers etc. because this would constitute advertising. Do you think this is a good or a bad measure?
- Have you heard or read about proposals to replace various social services with a free basic income of 450 guilders a month for Dutch citizens from the age of eighteen? Do you think it is a good or a bad idea to provide everyone with such a free minimum income?
- There are people who want to ban the Center Party and the Center Democrats. Would you be in favor of such a proposal, so they can no longer participate in elections?
- Every company has to pay forty cents in corporate tax for every guilder they make in profit. Do you think this is a reasonable percentage, too high or too low?
- To put pressure on the South African government, several countries have put sanctions in place and started boycotts. Should our country join such measures?
- What should the maximum speed be on divided highways?
- In most countries outside of the Netherlands, one is obliged to always carry a passport or other form of identification. Would you be in favor of introducing this in our country as well, so the obligation to always carry identification?
- Do you think the Netherlands should resume development aid to Suriname?
- There are suggestions to institute a real commercial television station. So one where all the programs are paid for through commercials. Are you for or against such a station?
- There have been proposals to treat severe traffic violations as crimes from now on, which would mean penalties could be much harsher and a prison sentence is even possible. Do you support or oppose this proposal?
- Do you think the Netherlands should join a boycott of oil from Iraq and Kuwait?
- Would you consider it a good idea or a bad idea to make all legal Dutch citizens carry personal identification?

- The Simons plan is a system of obligatory health insurance for everyone. What is your opinion of this Simons plan?
- Are you for or against replacing the guilder with a European currency?
- The government currently sets a minimum wage and a minimum youth wage. There are proposals to abolish this legal minimum wage. Wages would then be decided by deliberation between employer and employee and between unions and employer organizations. Are you in favor or opposed to abolishing the legal minimum wage?
- All political parties have been talking about the level of social security benefits and the minimum wage lately. Do you think the minimum wage should be lowered?
- All political parties have been talking about the level of social security benefits and the minimum wage lately. Do you think unemployment benefits under the unemployment law [WW] should be lowered?

*Centerdata Telepanel*

- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? The Netherlands should stop giving development aid to countries that refuse to take back their own citizens.
- Are you for or against a Benefit Entitlement (Residence Status) Act that makes it so that immigrants are checked even more strictly than they currently are when it comes to their right to use government services?
- What do you think should happen to the number of public television stations? (A) The situation should stay as it is; (B) The number of public Dutch stations should be reduced from three to two; (C) There should be one public station; (D) The three public stations should all disappear.
- Do you think it's justified that you have to pay a local fee on top of your license fee in the future to pay for local public radio?
- Do you think it is a good or a bad idea to set a maximum on the price of the basic health insurance [basispakket]?
- How long do you think a lifelong prison sentence should last?
- Now we want to ask you a few questions about the shop closing law. Are you for or against extending the opening hours of food shops?
- Abortion clinics currently receive government subsidies, provided they meet the legal requirements with regard to abortion. Do you think the government should subsidize abortion clinics?

- The opening of the Gender Preselection Clinic in Utrecht, which claims to be able to determine the sex of embryos with great accuracy, caused a lot of commotion a few months ago. Do you think the government should take measures with regards to such a clinic?
- Using tests, some hereditary diseases can be detected at the start of the pregnancy in the unborn child. Are you in favor of such tests?
- What do you think: should the cloning of humans be made illegal in all circumstances?
- Some people think the Reformed Political Party [SGP] should be banned as long as they do not allow women to become members. Other people think such a ban would go too far. To what extent do you agree with the statement that the Reformed Political Party should be banned as long as they do not allow women?
- It is currently the case that immigrants who have legally been in the Netherlands for five years can only vote in local elections. Which of the above options fits closest with your opinion? Multiple answers are possible. Immigrants should not have the right to vote at all.
- It is currently the case that immigrants who have legally been in the Netherlands for five years can only vote in local elections. Which of the above options fits closest with your opinion? Multiple answers are possible. Immigrants should be allowed to vote for the States-Provincial.
- It is currently the case that immigrants who have legally been in the Netherlands for five years can only vote in local elections. Which of the above options fits closest with your opinion? Multiple answers are possible. Immigrants should be allowed to vote for the national parliament.
- The government will probably decide to institute a binding referendum. A binding referendum means that the Dutch people are asked to express their judgment about a decision of the Dutch government through a referendum. When a majority of Dutch people rejects the decision, and turnout is high enough, the decision can be blocked. In general, what is your opinion of the idea of a binding referendum?
- Minister Netelenbos thinks she should get a chance to show that road pricing reduces traffic jams. What do you think? (A) Minister Netelenbos should get this chance; (B) Minister Netelenbos should not get this chance.
- You currently have to pay 3.51 guilders in excise duties on a pack of twenty-five cigarettes that costs 6.15 guilders. Do you think this is too much or too little?
- Would you consider it fair if smokers had to pay higher health premiums due to a higher risk of lung and heart diseases?

- One of the measures announced in the government memo “Gezond en Wel” is the restriction of the sale of cigarettes and cigars to tobacco stores. What is your opinion of this measure?
- The recent government memo also talks about a restriction or ban on advertisements of tobacco products. Which of the views on the screen best reflects your opinion? (A) Advertising for tobacco advertising should be liberalized, so also allowed on radio and TV again; (B) Regulation of tobacco advertising should stay the way it currently is: not on radio/TV and with an explicit warning; (C) Tobacco advertising should only be allowed in tobacco stores; (D) Tobacco advertising should be banned altogether.
- Another option considered in the memo “Gezond en Wel” by the ministry of health is an increase in excise duties on tobacco. What do you think should happen to the excise duties on tobacco?
- Finally we would like to know how you feel about a general ban on smoking.
- To what extent do you agree with the following statement? The financial distinction between paid and volunteer work should disappear by instituting a basic income for everyone.
- Should there be a central hotline for violence on the street (or in nightlife venues)?

*Public Opinion on Social Security and Labor in the Netherlands*

- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Shortening the work week for everyone with a full-time job.
- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Give bonuses to companies if they hire long-term unemployed or disabled people.
- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Make it mandatory for companies to hire long-term unemployed people or partially disabled people.
- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Make it mandatory for companies to implement positive discrimination for ethnic minorities.
- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Make it mandatory for companies to implement positive discrimination towards women.
- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Give bonuses to companies if they hire ethnic minorities.

- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Increase pension premiums for higher incomes.
- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Increase the pension age (for instance from sixty-five to sixty-seven years).
- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Make pensioners with higher incomes pay state pension premiums, instead of nothing, which is currently the case.
- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Increase the current pension contributions.
- Can you indicate how strongly you are in favor or opposed to the following measures? Lower state pensions.
- Do you think pensioners with a high income should receive the same state pension as others, a lower state pension or none at all?
- If someone turns sixty-five and retires, how high do you think the state pension should be compared to their previous income?
- If it were up to you, would you lower the various social security arrangements, leave them as they are, or increase them? Unemployment benefits.
- If it were up to you, would you lower the various social security arrangements, leave them as they are, or increase them? Social assistance.
- If it were up to you, would you lower the various social security arrangements, leave them as they are, or increase them? Widow and orphan's pension.
- If it were up to you, would you lower the various social security arrangements, leave them as they are, or increase them? Sickness benefits.
- If it were up to you, would you lower the various social security arrangements, leave them as they are, or increase them? Child benefits.
- If it were up to you, would you lower the various social security arrangements, leave them as they are, or increase them? Minimum social security benefits.
- Do you think single people without a partner or children should pay premiums for the general widow and orphan law [AWW]?
- Do you think people with a high income should receive the same child benefits as others, less child benefits or none at all?

*Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies*

- At this moment two nuclear power plants operate in the Netherlands, in Dodewaard and in Borssele. Do you think these plants should be kept operating or do you think that they should be closed down? (2)
- Please indicate for each statement whether you agree completely, agree, don't agree and don't disagree, disagree, or disagree completely. The Netherlands should, if necessary independently from the rest of NATO, set a good example and ban all nuclear weapons from its territory.
- Would you indicate with the help of this showcard to what degree you are in agreement with each of the statements? The Netherlands should, if necessary independently of the other NATO countries, give a good example and reduce the number of nuclear weapons on its territory.
- At the beginning of this line are people and parties who think that additional nuclear plants should be built in the Netherlands (at number one); at the end of this line are people and parties who think that no nuclear plants should be built at all (at number seven). Where would you place yourself on this line? (2)
- Would you indicate with the help of this showcard to what degree you are in agreement with each of the statements? On some of the important decisions in our country, voters should be able to vote by means of a so-called referendum. (2)
- Could you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement? Stores should always be closed on Sundays.
- Could you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement? The tax advantage for people with a mortgage, the mortgage interest relief, should be abolished.
- Could you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement? Gay marriage should be made illegal.
- Would you indicate with the help of this showcard to what degree you are in agreement with each of the statements? Adoption by gay couples should be possible.
- Could you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement? The Netherlands should spend more money on development aid.
- Could you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement? The immigration of Muslims into the Netherland should be halted completely.
- What do you think: should the Netherlands have nuclear weapons or not?

- To what extent do you agree with the following statements about double passports? Ministers should not be allowed to have double nationalities.
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? The Netherlands should lend money to European countries with financial problems, like Greece, Portugal and Ireland.
- Could you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement? The Netherlands should spend less money on development aid.
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Within a few years, the retirement age should be increased to sixty-seven years.

*LISS Panel*

- The minimum age at which someone can buy alcohol should be: lower / higher.
- The minimum age at which someone can buy cannabis in a coffee shop should be: lower / higher.
- Below is a list of measures that the government can take to prevent youngsters from starting to use alcohol and drugs. To what extent do you support these measures? The price of alcohol should be raised.
- Below is a list of measures that the government can take to prevent youngsters from starting to use alcohol and drugs. To what extent do you support these measures? Alcohol advertisements should be banned.
- Below is a list of measures that the government can take to prevent youngsters from starting to use alcohol and drugs. To what extent do you support these measures? Happy hours in bars and discos should be banned.
- Below is a list of measures that the government can take to prevent youngsters from starting to use alcohol and drugs. To what extent do you support these measures? Supermarkets should not sell alcopop such as breezers.
- Below is a list of measures that the government can take to prevent youngsters from starting to use alcohol and drugs. To what extent do you support these measures? Supermarkets should not sell any alcohol at all.
- Below is a list of measures that the government can take to prevent youngsters from starting to use alcohol and drugs. To what extent do you support these measures? People below the age of sixteen who drink alcohol should be punished for it.
- And to what extent do you support the following measures? It should be permitted to sell cannabis in coffee shops.

- And to what extent do you support the following measures? Coffee shops should not be located in the vicinity of secondary schools.
- And to what extent do you support the following measures? People below the age of eighteen who use cannabis should be punished for it.
- To what extent do you support the following measures? Alcohol use should be prohibited.
- To what extent do you support the following measures? Cannabis use should be prohibited.
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? The law should continue to distinguish between soft drugs and hard drugs.
- Do you, on the whole, take a positive or negative view on the introduction of this measure in the Netherlands? Extending powers of police officers to stop and search citizens without specifically suspecting them of having committed a punishable offense.
- Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements. The state should no longer give students a study grant, but only a study loan under favorable conditions.

*Citizens' Outlooks Barometer*

- Do you think the national government should spend more or less money on the following goal? Improving mobility (public transport and roads). (2)
- Do you think the national government should spend more or less money on the following goal? Contributing to the development of poor countries.
- Do you think the national government should spend more or less money on the following goal? Stimulating culture and the arts. (2)
- Do you think the national government should spend more or less money on the following goal? Improving education. (2)
- Do you think the national government should spend more or less money on the following goal? Improving (health) care.
- Do you think the national government should spend more or less money on the following goal? Stimulating research and technology. (2)
- When it comes to the planning of the Netherlands and the living environment, which direction do you think we should go in? (A) Reduce maximum speeds on roads to reduce noise and air pollution; (B) Increase maximum speeds as much as possible.

*International Social Survey Programme*

- Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are against. Reducing the working week to create more jobs.
- Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. The environment.
- Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. The military and defense.
- Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. The police and law enforcement.
- Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. Culture and the arts.
- Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. Education.
- Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. Unemployment benefits.
- Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. Health.
- Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. Old age pensions.

*Individual Freedom of Choice in the Field of Social Insurance*

- Can you indicate whether the following welfare measures are currently too generous, acceptable, or not generous enough? The unemployment law [WW].
- Can you indicate whether the following welfare measures are currently too generous, acceptable, or not generous enough? The pension law [AOW].

- Can you indicate whether the following welfare measures are currently too generous, acceptable, or not generous enough? The survivor's pension law [ANW].
- Can you indicate whether the following welfare measures are currently too generous, acceptable, or not generous enough? The disability laws [WAO, WAZ, Wajong].
- Can you indicate whether the following welfare measures are currently too generous, acceptable, or not generous enough? The sickness benefits law [Ziektewet].
- Can you indicate whether the following welfare measures are currently too generous, acceptable, or not generous enough? The social assistance law [ABW].

*Eurobarometer*

- I will now ask your opinion on a number of items. Will you please, for each item, select on this list the answer which best describes your own opinion? Military expenditures should be reduced.
- Several countries have adopted or are about to adopt a law which bans all forms of direct or indirect advertising of tobacco products. Are you, personally, for or against such a ban?
- Do you think that homosexual couples should, or should not, have the right to marry each other?
- Do you think that the Dutch government should spend more, the same amount as today or less on health care?
- Do you think the (development) aid provided by the Dutch government should increase a lot, increase a little, decrease a little or decrease a lot?

*Justice Criteria and Income Inequality*

- Do you think the current minimum wage should remain as it is, or do you think it should change? The minimum wage is currently 1500 guilders a month for people who are twenty-three or older with a non-working partner.
- Do you think there should be a maximum income?
- Do you think the current net minimum benefits should stay as they are or change? Minimum benefits are currently 1500 guilders a month for a household of two adults, the same as the minimum wage.
- Minimum social security benefits are currently the same for families with children and families without children. It is sometimes said that people with children should get more benefits than people without children. Do you agree with this?

*Family Survey Dutch Population*

- Can you indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements? Unemployment benefits are currently too high in the Netherlands
- For the following statements, can you indicate whether you agree or disagree? Gay marriage should be made illegal.

*Income Inequality, Income Politics and Redistribution Preferences*

- Please indicate whether you support or oppose the following measures? Increasing the minimum wage.
- Please indicate whether you support or oppose the following measures? Introducing a maximum wage.

*Socioeconomic Developments in the Netherlands*

- Should the government maintain a minimum wage - the lowest wage for which employers can hire someone?
- If so, how high should that minimum wage be?

*European Values Study*

- How would you feel about the following statements? Do you agree or disagree with them? Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children.

*Sociocultural Developments in the Netherlands*

- Do you think that we should pay much more or much less attention in the Netherlands to increasing defense spending?

Online appendix 3C: Preference gaps

Table 3C.1 presents models where differences in preferences between two groups are incorporated as interaction effects. To give an example of how this can be interpreted, model 1 shows that the preferences of the low incomes (the tenth percentile) have a significant, positive effect on policy change when the differences in preferences with the high incomes is zero and the interaction term is zero as well. The bigger the absolute difference in preferences is, however, the smaller the effect of low incomes preferences becomes, as indicated by the interaction term that is significantly lower than one. When the difference is twenty percentage points, the effect is no longer significantly distinguishable from zero (at $\alpha = 0.05$). The point estimate of the effect becomes zero when the difference is twenty-five percentage points.

This is in contrast to model 2 in Table 3C.1, which shows the effect of preferences of the ninetieth income percentile, interacted with the preference gap with the tenth income percentile. This time, the interaction term is negligible, indicating that the ninetieth percentile has a strong effect on policy change, regardless of how much preferences diverge from the tenth percentile. Looking at the other models, we can see that the same conclusion applies when comparing the fiftieth and ninetieth income percentiles.

Table 3C.1: Logistic regression models of income groups when preferences diverge

| | $10^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P50) | Model 4 (P90) |
| Preferences | 1.030*** | 1.023** | 1.033*** | 1.022** |
| | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.011) |
| Difference in pref. | 1.049 | 0.929 | 1.094 | 0.896 |
| | (0.037) | (0.052) | (0.062) | (0.067) |
| Interaction | 0.999** | 1.001 | 0.998* | 1.002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | 0.103*** | 0.144*** | 0.073*** | 0.141*** |
| | (0.056) | (0.090) | (0.041) | (0.085) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.038 | 0.079 | 0.041 | 0.079 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

Online appendix 3D: Additional robustness checks

For each of the robustness checks, two types of models will be presented: separate, bivariate models for each income and education percentile and models with interaction terms between preferences and preference gaps, like those found in Online appendix 3C.

*Macro-level control variables*

Table 3D.1 presents models that are analogous to the bivariate models found in Table 3.1 of the main text, the difference being that they include control variables for the level of unemployment, economic growth, the size of government debt and the average left-right position of the government at the time of the survey. Unemployment figures were collected from Statistics Netherlands (2018a). Economic growth and government debt were taken from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2018c, 2018a).[2] The left-right position of the government was obtained using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (and the earlier Ray-Marks-Steenbergen Survey), with the score being the weighted average of the coalition parties. Since there is no information on the left-right positions of parties before 1984 and between 2003 and 2006, I copied the positions from the nearest period for those years. For election years, I took the average of the old and new governments.

Table 3D.2 contains models with the interaction of preferences and preference gaps. The most noteworthy result here is that the interaction term is no longer significantly negative in the models where the tenth and fiftieth income percentiles are compared to the ninetieth income percentile. However, I attach no great importance to this, for several reasons. Firstly, the p-values are still quite close to statistical significance ($p$ = 0.123 and $p$ = 0.118, respectively), and the number of observations is relatively limited. Secondly, the effects are not substantively different than they are without control variables (see Table 3C.1). Thirdly, the effects *are* significant when controlling for unemployment, economic growth, government debt and the left-right position of government as the average over the first four years following the survey. It seems to me that this specification is not necessarily better or worse than the one presented here.

[2] The OECD figures on government debt are not available after 2010. For the years after that, I used data from Statistics Netherlands (2018b), which are themselves not available before 1995.

Table 3D.1: Logistic regression models of income groups (with controls)

| | Model 5 (P10) | Model 6 (P50) | Model 7 (P90) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preferences | 1.017*** | 1.020*** | 1.033*** |
| | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.008) |
| Unemploy-ment | 0.897 | 0.909 | 0.921 |
| | (0.078) | (0.080) | (0.083) |
| GDP growth | 0.888 | 0.882 | 0.887 |
| | (0.073) | (0.072) | (0.073) |
| Debt | 1.015 | 1.013 | 0.998 |
| | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Left-right position | 1.196 | 1.133 | 1.072 |
| | (0.230) | (0.217) | (0.211) |
| Constant | 0.061 | 0.076 | 0.103 |
| | (0.104) | (0.129) | (0.176) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.048 | 0.055 | 0.092 |
| *N* | 285 | 285 | 285 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

Table 3D.2: Logistic regression models of income groups when preferences diverge (with controls)

| | 10th vs. 90th percentiles | | 50th vs. 90th percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 8 (P10) | Model 9 (P90) | Model 10 (P50) | Model 11 (P90) |
| Preferences | 1.029*** | 1.026** | 1.032*** | 1.023** |
| | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.011) |
| Difference in pref. | 1.028 | 0.935 | 1.081 | 0.903 |
| | (0.039) | (0.055) | (0.063) | (0.070) |
| Interaction | 0.999 | 1.001 | 0.998 | 1.002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Unemploy-ment | 0.936 | 0.942 | 0.928 | 0.923 |
| | (0.082) | (0.086) | (0.084) | (0.084) |
| GDP growth | 0.864* | 0.880 | 0.876 | 0.893 |
| | (0.072) | (0.074) | (0.072) | (0.074) |
| Debt | 1.007 | 0.996 | 1.005 | 0.995 |
| | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Left-right position | 1.171 | 1.111 | 1.113 | 1.079 |
| | (0.233) | (0.222) | (0.217) | (0.213) |
| Constant | 0.064 | 0.162 | 0.061 | 0.214 |
| | (0.111) | (0.294) | (0.105) | (0.384) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.064 | 0.100 | 0.063 | 0.097 |
| *N* | 285 | 285 | 285 | 285 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

In Tables 3D.3 and 3D.4, the same models are presented but this time with dummies for each year. This is perhaps the most conservative way to exclude any spurious effects of macro-level processes. The number of observations is slightly lower here because some years have no variation on the dependent variable. Since the dummies take up a lot of space and they are not substantively interesting for my purposes, they are not included in the Table.

The same finding emerges here as in the previous models: the interaction term is no longer significantly negative in the models where the tenth and fiftieth income percentiles are compared to the ninetieth income percentile. However, the same reasons apply for attaching no great practical significance to this, since the effects are again on the edge of statistical significance, the number of observations is limited and the effect sizes have not changed much. Furthermore, the year dummies remove a sizable part of the variance from the data.

Table 3D.3: Logistic regression models of income groups (with year dummies)

| | Model 12 (P10) | Model 13 (P50) | Model 14 (P90) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preferences | 1.019*** | 1.022*** | 1.036*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.213* | 0.179* | 0.108** |
| | (0.199) | (0.168) | (0.103) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.128 | 0.136 | 0.168 |
| *N* | 271 | 271 | 271 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

Table 3D.4: Logistic regression models of income groups when preferences diverge (with year dummies)

| | $10^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 15 (P10) | Model 16 (P90) | Model 17 (P50) | Model 18 (P90) |
| Preferences | 1.032*** | 1.028** | 1.032*** | 1.021* |
| | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Difference in pref. | 1.037 | 0.941 | 1.059 | 0.869* |
| | (0.041) | (0.057) | (0.067) | (0.073) |
| Interaction | 0.999 | 1.001 | 0.999 | 1.002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.175* | 0.223 | 0.128** | 0.279 |
| | (0.182) | (0.252) | (0.134) | (0.306) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.141 | 0.173 | 0.140 | 0.177 |
| *N* | 271 | 271 | 271 | 271 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

*Survey organizations*

Tables 3D.5 and 3D.6 show the same models as before, but this time including dummies for each survey organization (listed in Table 3A.1). Surveys with only one or two questions are grouped together here. Again, the dummies themselves are not presented to conserve space.

I also removed the survey organizations one by one and repeated the models, but since this would take up even more space, full results of this are not shown. Most important is what happens when questions from EenVandaag are left out, for the reason mentioned above, and this does not change the effects. The only difference is that the interaction term in the model comparing the fiftieth and ninetieth income percentiles falls just below statistical significance ($p = 0.102$), but the coefficient is exactly the same (0.9982 vs. 0.9982) and it makes sense that this effect is estimated less precisely when a quarter of the observations are removed.

Table 3D.5: Logistic regression models of income groups (with survey dummies)

| | Model 19 (P10) | Model 20 (P50) | Model 21 (P90) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preferences | 1.015** | 1.018*** | 1.033*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.008) |
| Survey dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.190*** | 0.153*** | 0.064*** |
| | (0.079) | (0.068) | (0.033) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.083 | 0.089 | 0.127 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

Table 3D.6: Logistic regression models of income groups when preferences diverge (with survey dummies)

| | $10^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 22 (P10) | Model 23 (P90) | Model 24 (P50) | Model 25 (P90) |
| Preferences | 1.030*** | 1.022* | 1.032*** | 1.020* |
| | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Difference in pref. | 1.051 | 0.926 | 1.086 | 0.884 |
| | (0.040) | (0.053) | (0.066) | (0.071) |
| Interaction | 0.999* | 1.001 | 0.998 | 1.002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Survey dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.109*** | 0.132*** | 0.082*** | 0.141*** |
| | (0.071) | (0.093) | (0.054) | (0.098) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.097 | 0.133 | 0.098 | 0.134 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

*Excluding spending questions*

Table 3D.7: Logistic regression models of income groups (excluding spending questions)

| | Model 26 (P10) | Model 27 (P50) | Model 28 (P90) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preferences | 1.016** | 1.023*** | 1.041*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
| Constant | 0.132*** | 0.091*** | 0.036*** |
| | (0.052) | (0.038) | (0.018) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.019 | 0.038 | 0.098 |
| *N* | 249 | 249 | 249 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

Table 3D.8: Logistic regression models of income groups when preferences diverge (excluding spending questions)

| | $10^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 29 (P10) | Model 30 (P90) | Model 31 (P50) | Model 32 (P90) |
| Preferences | 1.039*** | 1.030* | 1.045*** | 1.030** |
| | (0.010) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.013) |
| Difference in pref. | 1.086** | 0.925 | 1.142* | 0.883 |
| | (0.042) | (0.064) | (0.079) | (0.085) |
| Interaction | 0.998*** | 1.001 | 0.997** | 1.002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Constant | 0.056*** | 0.081*** | 0.038** | 0.083*** |
| | (0.035) | (0.063) | (0.026) | (0.062) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.061 | 0.106 | 0.070 | 0.108 |
| *N* | 249 | 249 | 249 | 249 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

*Excluding outliers*

Table 3D.9: Logistic regression models of income groups when preferences diverge (by more than ten and less than twenty-five percentage points)

| | $10^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 33 (P10) | Model 34 (P90) | Model 35 (P50) | Model 36 (P90) |
| Preferences | 1.018 | 1.059*** | 1.000 | 1.033* |
| | (0.012) | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.017) |
| Constant | 0.154*** | 0.020*** | 0.433 | 0.082*** |
| | (0.099) | (0.017) | (0.306) | (0.074) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.019 | 0.140 | 0.000 | 0.038 |
| *N* | 112 | 112 | 86 | 86 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

*Other measurements of low and high income*

To conserve some space, I will only present the models that take preference gaps into account here. The bivariate models show that the effects increase with income, that is, the eightieth percentiles produce somewhat weaker effects than the ninetieth percentiles, while the ninety-fifth percentiles leads to bigger effects. In Table 3D.10, the twentieth and eightieth percentiles are used instead of the tenth and ninetieth percentiles. Table 3D.11 below shows the same models using the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles.

Table 3D.10: Logistic regression models of income groups when preferences diverge

| | $20^{th}$ vs. $80^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $80^{h}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 37 (P20) | Model 38 (P80) | Model 39 (P50) | Model 40 (P80) |
| Preferences | 1.028*** | 1.021** | 1.033*** | 1.023** |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.013) |
| Difference in pref. | 1.060 | 0.916 | 1.131 | 0.894 |
| | (0.051) | (0.069) | (0.098) | (0.104) |
| Interaction | 0.998* | 1.001 | 0.997* | 1.002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Constant | 0.111*** | 0.155*** | 0.079*** | 0.135*** |
| | (0.059) | (0.094) | (0.045) | (0.082) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.035 | 0.065 | 0.040 | 0.062 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

Table 3D.11: Logistic regression models of income groups when preferences diverge

| | $5^{th}$ vs. $95^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $95^{th}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 41 (P5) | Model 42 (P95) | Model 43 (P50) | Model 44 (P95) |
| Preferences | 1.031*** | 1.026** | 1.034*** | 1.024** |
| | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Difference in pref. | 1.045 | 0.942 | 1.082* | 0.922 |
| | (0.033) | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.055) |
| Interaction | 0.999** | 1.001 | 0.998* | 1.001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | 0.098*** | 0.132*** | 0.070*** | 0.126*** |
| | (0.059) | (0.083) | (0.040) | (0.076) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.040 | 0.084 | 0.041 | 0.084 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

*Other estimators*

Tables 3D.12 and 3D.13 present the same models as before, but now using ordinary least squares regression and robust standard errors. Tables 3D.14 and 3D.15 show probit regressions.

Table 3D.12: Linear regression models of income groups (with robust standard errors)

| | Model 45 (P10) | Model 46 (P50) | Model 47 (P90) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preferences | 0.0031*** | 0.0038*** | 0.0061*** |
| | (0.0011) | (0.0012) | (0.001) |
| Constant | 0.124** | 0.089 | -0.020 |
| | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| $R^2$ | 0.023 | 0.035 | 0.082 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Table 3D.13: Linear regression models of income groups when preferences diverge (with robust standard errors)

| | $10^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 48 (P10) | Model 49 (P90) | Model 50 (P50) | Model 51 (P90) |
| Preferences | 0.0058*** | 0.0050*** | 0.0062*** | 0.0042** |
| | (0.0016) | (0.0019) | (0.0018) | (0.0019) |
| Difference in pref. | 0.0085 | -0.0097 | 0.0154 | -0.0185 |
| | (0.0057) | (0.0078) | (0.0107) | (0.0117) |
| Interaction | -0.0002** | 0.0001 | -0.0003* | 0.0003 |
| | (0.0001) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Constant | 0.031 | 0.078 | -0.016 | 0.096 |
| | (0.084) | (0.091) | (0.094) | (0.092) |
| $R^2$ | 0.045 | 0.089 | 0.047 | 0.090 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Table 3D.14: Probit models of income groups

| | Model 52 (P10) | Model 53 (P50) | Model 54 (P90) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preferences | 0.009** | 0.012*** | 0.019*** |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Constant | -1.076*** | -1.190*** | -1.568*** |
| | (0.199) | (0.203) | (0.221) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.020 | 0.030 | 0.071 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Table 3D.15: Probit models of income groups when preferences diverge

| | $10^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 55 (P10) | Model 56 (P90) | Model 57 (P50) | Model 58 (P90) |
| Preferences | 0.018*** | 0.014** | 0.019*** | 0.013** |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Difference in pref. | 0.029 | -0.038 | 0.050 | -0.061 |
| | (0.021) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.041) |
| Interaction | -0.001** | 0.001 | -0.001* | 0.001 |
| | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | -1.382 | -1.189 | -1.536*** | -1.182 |
| | (0.315) | (0.348) | (0.313) | (0.333) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.038 | 0.078 | 0.040 | 0.078 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Finally, Tables 3D.16 and 3D.17 repeat the baseline models with standard errors clustered by the year of the survey.

Table 3D.16: Logistic regression models of income groups (with clustered standard errors)

| | Model 59 (P10) | Model 60 (P50) | Model 61 (P90) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preferences | 1.016** | 1.020*** | 1.034*** |
| | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.008) |
| Constant | 0.170*** | 0.139*** | 0.070*** |
| | (0.056) | (0.046) | (0.025) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.020 | 0.030 | 0.072 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

Table 3D.17: Logistic regression models of income groups when preferences diverge (with clustered standard errors)

| | $10^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | | $50^{th}$ vs. $90^{th}$ percentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 62 (P10) | Model 63 (P90) | Model 64 (P50) | Model 65 (P90) |
| Preferences | 1.030*** | 1.023** | 1.033*** | 1.022** |
| | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.010) |
| Difference in pref. | 1.049* | 0.929 | 1.094 | 0.896 |
| | (0.026) | (0.056) | (0.063) | (0.070) |
| Interaction | 0.999*** | 1.001 | 0.998** | 1.002 |
| | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Constant | 0.103*** | 0.144 | 0.073*** | 0.141*** |
| | (0.049) | (0.089) | (0.047) | (0.089) |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.038 | 0.079 | 0.041 | 0.079 |
| *N* | 291 | 291 | 291 | 291 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Effects are displayed as odds ratios.

Online appendix 3E: List of survey sources


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# Chapter 4

Online appendix 4A: Robustness checks

As a robustness check, model 2 in Table 4A.1 contains the overall mean preferences for each country-year-issue as the main independent variable. This produces nearly the same effect as model 1 with median preferences.

Table 4A.1: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (general responsiveness)

| | Model 1 (P50) | Model 2 (All) |
|---|---|---|
| Median/overall preferences | 0.010*** | 0.011*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.052 | 0.063 |
| | (0.071) | (0.071) |
| Growth (t) | -0.002 | -0.001 |
| | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.007 | -0.007 |
| | (0.354) | (0.008) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.354 | 0.224 |
| | (0.744) | (0.739) |
| *N* | 493 | 493 |
| Countries | 38 | 38 |
| AIC | 912.35 | 908.11 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.2: Random intercept models of logged attention by *right-wing parties* to *right-wing voters*, t+1

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences (left) | 0.008** | - | -0.003 | 0.009*** | - | 0.000 |
| | (0.003) | | (0.005) | (0.003) | | (0.004) |
| High income preferences (left) | - | 0.011*** | 0.014*** | - | 0.011*** | 0.011** |
| | | (0.004) | (0.005) | | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| Logged GDP (t) | -0.050 | 0.004 | 0.001 | -0.044 | 0.007 | 0.007 |
| | (0.082) | (0.085) | (0.086) | (0.081) | (0.085) | (0.085) |
| Growth (t) | -0.005 | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.007 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 1.280 | 0.747 | 0.763 | 1.236 | 0.700 | 0.700 |
| | (0.862) | (0.888) | (0.897) | (0.856) | (0.887) | (0.887) |
| *N* | 423 | 423 | 423 | 423 | 423 | 423 |
| Countries | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 |
| AIC | 1028.18 | 1017.52 | 1018.95 | 1025.70 | 1017.03 | 1019.03 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.3: Random intercept models of logged attention by *left-wing parties* to *left-wing voters*, t+1

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences (right) | 0.009*** | - | 0.003 | 0.009*** | - | 0.003 |
| | (0.003) | | (0.005) | (0.003) | | (0.004) |
| High income preferences (right) | - | 0.011*** | 0.009** | - | 0.010*** | 0.008** |
| | | (0.003) | (0.004) | | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.204** | 0.242*** | 0.244*** | 0.202** | 0.230** | 0.235*** |
| | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.091) | (0.090) |
| Growth (t) | -0.020 | -0.009 | -0.011 | -0.022 | -0.011 | -0.014 |
| | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Unemployment (t) | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -1.321*** | -1.278*** | -1.282*** | -1.340*** | -1.260*** | -1.274*** |
| | (0.275) | (0.281) | (0.276) | (0.279) | (0.281) | (0.279) |
| *N* | 423 | 423 | 423 | 423 | 423 | 423 |
| Countries | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 |
| AIC | 998.09 | 992.17 | 993.53 | 999.85 | 994.60 | 995.79 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

To clarify, model 1 in Table 4A.4 regresses attention by left-wing parties on the rich-minus-poor variable *calculated among left-wing voters*, while controlling for the preferences of left-wing voters with median incomes. Model 2 does the same for right-wing parties, so it regresses attention by right-wing parties on the rich-minus-poor variable calculated among right-wing voters, while controlling for the preferences of right-wing voters with median incomes.

Table 4A.4: Random intercept models of logged attention by *left-wing* and *right-wing parties* to their own voters, t+1, with preference gaps

| | Model 1 (Left) | Model 2 (Right) |
|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-poor (own voters) | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| Median income preferences (own voters) | 0.009*** | 0.010*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.227** | -0.022 |
| | (0.090) | (0.085) |
| Growth (t) | -0.022 | -0.004 |
| | (0.018) | (0.019) |
| Unemployment (t) | 0.004 | 0.001 |
| | (0.014) | (0.011) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -1.524 | 1.029 |
| | (0.973) | (0.906) |
| *N* | 423 | 423 |
| Countries | 36 | 36 |
| AIC | 998.53 | 1022.15 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.5: Random intercept models of logged party attention with preference gaps (rich-minus-middle)

| | Model 1 (All parties) | Model 2 (Left) | Model 3 (Right) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rich-minus-middle preferences | 0.013** | 0.007 | 0.022*** |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.008) |
| Logged GDP (t) | -0.060 | 0.100 | -0.173* |
| | (0.065) | (0.085) | (0.091) |
| Growth (t) | 0.004 | -0.028 | 0.002 |
| | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.006 | 0.006 | -0.001 |
| | (0.008) | (0.013) | (0.012) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 1.291* | -0.333 | 2.207** |
| | (0.701) | (0.919) | (0.958) |
| *N* | 493 | 473 | 473 |
| Countries | 38 | 37 | 37 |
| AIC | 936.53 | 1160.83 | 1162.43 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.6: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (with lagged dependent variable, t-2)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.001 | - | -0.004 | 0.001 | - | -0.003 |
| | (0.001) | | (0.002) | (0.001) | | (0.002) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.003** | 0.006*** | - | 0.002** | 0.005** |
| | | (0.001) | (0.002) | | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t-2) | 0.703*** | 0.691*** | 0.689*** | 0.702*** | 0.692*** | 0.691*** |
| | (0.037) | (0.036) | (0.034) | (0.037) | (0.035) | (0.034) |
| Logged GDP (t) | -0.033 | -0.013 | -0.011 | -0.032 | -0.015 | -0.013 |
| | (0.046) | (0.048) | (0.047) | (0.047) | (0.048) | (0.047) |
| Growth (t) | -0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.004 | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.004 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.774 | 0.585 | 0.537 | 0.770 | 0.598 | 0.562 |
| | (0.492) | (0.511) | (0.503) | (0.496) | (0.508) | (0.502) |
| *N* | 487 | 487 | 487 | 487 | 487 | 487 |
| Countries | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 |
| AIC | 532.49 | 529.32 | 528.95 | 532.35 | 529.58 | 530.11 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.7 contains controls for government spending as a percentage of GDP in each policy area. Spending figures were taken from the World Bank (2018a, 2018b), the OECD (2018d, 2018b) and Eurostat (2018). For culture and law and order, we used category 0802 (cultural services) and category 03 (public order and safety) of the COFOG classification, respectively. For environmental spending, we divided the total spending in 2010 US dollars by GDP in 2010 US dollars (both purchasing power parity).

Table 4A.7: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (controlling for government spending)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.009*** | - | -0.001 | 0.009*** | - | 0.001 |
| | (0.003) | | (0.005) | (0.002) | | (0.004) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.010*** | 0.011** | - | 0.010*** | 0.009** |
| | | (0.003) | (0.005) | | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| Gov. spending (percent GDP, t) | -0.026 | -0.026 | -0.026 | -0.026 | -0.026 | -0.026 |
| | (0.022) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.022) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Logged GDP (t) | -0.018 | 0.019 | 0.018 | -0.016 | 0.013 | 0.012 |
| | (0.060) | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.060) | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| Growth (t) | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.009 |
| | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.019** | -0.015** | -0.015* | -0.019** | -0.015** | -0.015* |
| | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 1.451** | 0.977 | 0.976 | 1.435** | 1.045* | 1.048* |
| | (0.644) | (0.613) | (0.613) | (0.643) | (0.618) | (0.617) |
| *N* | 304 | 304 | 304 | 304 | 304 | 304 |
| Countries | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 |
| AIC | 532.51 | 525.72 | 527.63 | 532.07 | 525.67 | 527.65 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.8: Random intercept models of logged *coalition* party attention, t+1

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.007*** | - | -0.008* | 0.007*** | - | -0.006 |
| | (0.002) | | (0.004) | (0.002) | | (0.004) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.010*** | 0.017*** | - | 0.010*** | 0.016*** |
| | | (0.003) | (0.004) | | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.045 | 0.099 | 0.100 | 0.044 | 0.096 | 0.096 |
| | (0.095) | (0.098) | (0.097) | (0.095) | (0.098) | (0.097) |
| Growth (t) | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.006 |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.017) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.020** | -0.017* | -0.015* | -0.020** | -0.017* | -0.016* |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -1.830*** | -1.783*** | -1.784*** | -1.833*** | -1.783*** | -1.775*** |
| | (0.338) | (0.327) | (0.341) | (0.337) | (0.333) | (0.344) |
| *N* | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 |
| Countries | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 |
| AIC | 1108.16 | 1095.78 | 1094.58 | 1108.07 | 1096.45 | 1096.21 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.9: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (limited to country-years with an election in t+1)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.006** | - | -0.020*** | 0.006** | - | -0.016** |
| | (0.003) | | (0.006) | (0.003) | | (0.006) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.014*** | 0.032*** | - | 0.015*** | 0.029*** |
| | | (0.004) | (0.007) | | (0.004) | (0.008) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.010 | 0.103 | -0.105 | -0.007 | 0.100 | -0.080 |
| | (0.266) | (0.253) | (0.182) | (0.268) | (0.256) | (0.202) |
| Growth (t) | 0.042 | 0.015 | 0.009 | 0.043 | 0.010 | 0.003 |
| | (0.041) | (0.040) | (0.030) | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.031) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.040 | -0.029 | -0.047* | -0.042 | -0.029 | -0.044 |
| | (0.038) | (0.037) | (0.026) | (0.038) | (0.037) | (0.029) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.496 | -0.438 | 1.830 | 0.678 | -0.402 | 1.544 |
| | (3.055) | (2.894) | (2.133) | (3.068) | (2.915) | (2.351) |
| *N* | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 |
| Countries | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| AIC | 197.40 | 187.09 | 180.70 | 197.77 | 186.26 | 181.20 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Note: GDP, economic growth and unemployment are not included as control variables in Table 4A.10 because doing so would produce extreme multicollinearity, without affecting the main coefficients.

Table 4A.10: Random intercept models of logged party attention, next election (no interpolation)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.002 | - | -0.004* | 0.002 | - | -0.004 |
| | (0.002) | | (0.003) | (0.002) | | (0.003) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.003* | 0.007*** | - | 0.003* | 0.007*** |
| | | (0.002) | (0.003) | | (0.002) | (0.003) |
| Lagged dependent variable (t) | 0.459*** | 0.445*** | 0.444*** | 0.460*** | 0.446*** | 0.446*** |
| | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.060) | (0.063) | (0.062) | (0.061) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.460*** | 0.447*** | 0.446*** | 0.460*** | 0.447*** | 0.448*** |
| | (0.061) | (0.060) | (0.058) | (0.061) | (0.060) | (0.059) |
| *N* | 499 | 499 | 499 | 499 | 499 | 499 |
| Countries | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 |
| AIC | 916.62 | 913.72 | 914.08 | 916.70 | 913.65 | 914.03 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.11: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (non-weighted dependent variable)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.011*** | - | -0.002 | 0.011*** | - | -0.001 |
| | (0.003) | | (0.006) | (0.003) | | (0.005) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.013*** | 0.015*** | - | 0.013*** | 0.014*** |
| | | (0.003) | (0.004) | | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.080 | 0.127** | 0.127** | 0.078 | 0.123** | 0.123** |
| | (0.061) | (0.060) | (0.061) | (0.061) | (0.060) | (0.060) |
| Growth (t) | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Unemployment (t) | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -0.042 | -0.566 | -0.573 | -0.025 | -0.521 | -0.522 |
| | (0.599) | (0.614) | (0.613) | (0.603) | (0.610) | (0.610) |
| *N* | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 |
| Countries | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 |
| AIC | 888.07 | 870.38 | 872.15 | 887.75 | 871.58 | 873.55 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.12: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (controlling for education)

| | Model 1 (Income P10, educ. P50) | Model 2 (Income P90, educ. P50) | Model 3 (Combined) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Income P10, educ. P50 pref. | 0.008*** | - | -0.004 |
| | (0.002) | | (0.003) |
| Income P90, educ. P50 pref. | - | 0.010*** | 0.013*** |
| | | (0.002) | (0.005) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.022 | 0.058 | 0.051 |
| | (0.068) | (0.070) | (0.069) |
| Growth (t) | -0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.008 | -0.006 | -0.005 |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -1.999*** | -1.977*** | -1.995*** |
| | (0.229) | (0.204) | (0.211) |
| *N* | 493 | 493 | 493 |
| Countries | 38 | 38 | 38 |
| AIC | 922.82 | 904.11 | 904.44 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.13: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (with country-topics as clusters)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.009*** | - | -0.004 | 0.009*** | - | -0.002 |
| | (0.002) | | (0.004) | (0.002) | | (0.004) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.011*** | 0.015*** | - | 0.011*** | 0.013*** |
| | | (0.002) | (0.004) | | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.021 | 0.070 | 0.065 | 0.023 | 0.065 | 0.063 |
| | (0.065) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.065) | (0.064) | (0.064) |
| Growth (t) | -0.009 | -0.007 | -0.007 | -0.009 | -0.007 | -0.007 |
| | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.009 | -0.006 | -0.005 | -0.009 | -0.006 | -0.006 |
| | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.700 | 0.164 | 0.189 | 0.683 | 0.219 | 0.234 |
| | (0.696) | (0.692) | (0.688) | (0.694) | (0.693) | (0.692) |
| *N* | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 |
| Country-topics | 214 | 214 | 214 | 214 | 214 | 214 |
| AIC | 858.67 | 840.47 | 840.80 | 857.09 | 841.89 | 843.44 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.14: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (with country-years as clusters)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.008*** | - | -0.006 | 0.009*** | - | -0.004 |
| | (0.002) | | (0.004) | (0.002) | | (0.004) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.011*** | 0.017*** | - | 0.011*** | 0.015*** |
| | | (0.002) | (0.004) | | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.042 | 0.096 | 0.098 | 0.042 | 0.092 | 0.093 |
| | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.063) | (0.062) |
| Growth (t) | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.007 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.007 |
| | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.005 | -0.002 | -0.001 | -0.005 | -0.002 | -0.001 |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.322 | -0.249 | -0.289 | 0.325 | -0.203 | -0.226 |
| | (0.683) | (0.691) | (0.689) | (0.680) | (0.693) | (0.693) |
| *N* | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 |
| Country-years | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 |
| AIC | 923.61 | 904.05 | 903.00 | 922.78 | 905.37 | 905.91 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.15: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (with countries and years as clusters)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.010*** | - | -0.007 | 0.010*** | - | -0.005 |
| | (0.002) | | (0.006) | (0.002) | | (0.005) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.013*** | 0.018*** | - | 0.012*** | 0.016*** |
| | | (0.002) | (0.005) | | (0.002) | (0.005) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.084 | 0.143** | 0.143** | 0.085 | 0.139** | 0.138** |
| | (0.056) | (0.059) | (0.060) | (0.056) | (0.059) | (0.059) |
| Growth (t) | 0.015* | 0.014* | 0.015* | 0.015* | 0.014* | 0.014* |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.014* | -0.009 | -0.008 | -0.014* | -0.009 | -0.009 |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.089 | -0.595 | -0.628 | 0.081 | -0.550 | -0.567 |
| | (0.577) | (0.629) | (0.645) | (0.579) | (0.628) | (0.638) |
| *N* | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 |
| Countries | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 |
| Country-years | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 |
| AIC | 915.06 | 891.52 | 890.02 | 914.01 | 892.90 | 893.14 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.16: Linear regression models of logged party attention, t+1 (with country fixed effects)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.010*** | - | -0.006 | 0.010*** | - | -0.004 |
| | (0.002) | | (0.004) | (0.002) | | (0.004) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.013*** | 0.018*** | - | 0.013*** | 0.017*** |
| | | (0.002) | (0.004) | | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Logged GDP (t) | -0.115 | -0.089 | -0.133 | -0.087 | -0.115 | -0.165 |
| | (0.460) | (0.447) | (0.449) | (0.462) | (0.447) | (0.450) |
| Growth (t) | -0.007 | -0.004 | -0.002 | -0.008 | -0.003 | -0.002 |
| | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.003 | -0.004 | -0.006 | -0.002 | -0.003 | -0.005 |
| | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 2.421 | 1.781 | 1.993 | 1.975 | 1.956 | 2.286 |
| | (4.914) | (4.785) | (4.784) | (4.939) | (4.767) | (4.772) |
| *N* | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.56 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.17: Linear regression models of logged party attention, t+1 (with jackknifed standard errors by country)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.008*** | - | -0.006 | 0.008*** | - | -0.004 |
| | (0.003) | | (0.005) | (0.003) | | (0.004) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.011*** | 0.016*** | - | 0.011*** | 0.014*** |
| | | (0.002) | (0.004) | | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.041 | 0.094 | 0.095 | 0.041 | 0.090 | 0.090 |
| | (0.089) | (0.089) | (0.088) | (0.090) | (0.089) | (0.088) |
| Growth (t) | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.008 | 0.007 |
| | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.005 | -0.002 | -0.001 | -0.005 | -0.002 | -0.001 |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.440 | -0.128 | -0.156 | 0.447 | -0.155 | -0.167 |
| | (0.988) | (0.985) | (0.962) | (0.990) | (0.975) | (0.962) |
| *N* | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 | 493 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.53 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table 4A.18: Random intercept models of logged party attention, t+1 (only established democracies)

| | Model 1 (P10) | Model 2 (P90) | Model 3 (P10/P90) | Model 4 (Q1) | Model 5 (Q5) | Model 6 (Q1/Q5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low income preferences | 0.010** | - | -0.005 | 0.010*** | - | -0.004 |
| | (0.003) | | (0.006) | (0.003) | | (0.006) |
| High income preferences | - | 0.013*** | 0.017*** | - | 0.013*** | 0.016** |
| | | (0.003) | (0.006) | | (0.003) | (0.006) |
| Logged GDP (t) | 0.149 | 0.190 | 0.170 | 0.155 | 0.183 | 0.166 |
| | (0.124) | (0.121) | (0.106) | (0.125) | (0.119) | (0.106) |
| Growth (t) | -0.027 | -0.034 | -0.036* | -0.027 | -0.034 | -0.035 |
| | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.022) |
| Unemployment (t) | -0.008 | -0.005 | -0.004 | -0.008 | -0.005 | -0.005 |
| | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.007) |
| Issue dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -0.585 | -0.996 | -0.810 | -0.642 | -0.915 | -0.752 |
| | (1.278) | (1.255) | (1.111) | (1.288) | (1.242) | (1.101) |
| *N* | 363 | 363 | 363 | 363 | 363 | 363 |
| Countries | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 |
| AIC | 692.48 | 675.67 | 674.22 | 691.41 | 675.93 | 675.10 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Online appendix 4B: Effects of party programs on policy

To validate the party programs as coded in the Manifesto Project Database as meaningful in the subsequent policy process, I test whether party positions predict policy outcomes. This analysis is limited to the welfare state, first and foremost because this is the policy area with the most detailed coding of policy across time and space, in the form of the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED) (Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto, 2017). The CWED combines several aspects of social policy – most notably replacement rates, benefit duration and waiting times – in the fields of unemployment, sickness and pensions into an overall index of welfare generosity. For most of the other policy areas, policy outcomes are only recorded as government spending in that particular area. Although spending is a meaningful and important metric, its validity as a measurement of policy is problematic (see chapter 2 of the dissertation). Furthermore, even though the welfare state is only one of the six issue areas in our main analysis, it is the most encompassing in terms of attention devoted to it in manifestos and in terms of budget size. It is also important with regard to unequal representation as the area with the largest preference gaps between rich and poor.

In line with the notion that party manifestos are largely prospective, I estimate the effect of party positions towards welfare on *changes* in welfare generosity, while controlling for the level of generosity at the time of the election. In this analysis, observations are elections, which are nested within countries. 168 elections in twenty-one countries can be linked to the CWED, which took place between 1972 and 2008. These twenty-one countries make up about seventy percent of the observations in our main analysis. I do not use elections that took place less than three years before the next election, simply because there was very little time to implement party platforms in those cases.

The independent variable is again constructed by subtracting the logged negative mentions regarding welfare from the logged positive mentions regarding welfare, adding 0.5 to both. This time, however, I do not take the weighted average of all parties in the legislature but the weighted average of coalition parties only, because the latter can be expected to decide on policy changes. The dependent variable is the percentage change in overall welfare generosity in the first two years following the election. To account for between-country and over-time clustering of the data, I include country dummies and control for the year of the election in an ordinary least squares model with robust standard errors.

Table 4B.1 shows the results of this model. The main coefficient, the welfare position of coalition parties, has a significant positive effect on the two-year change in welfare

generosity. In other words, the more coalition parties talk about expanding the welfare state in their programs, the more generosity increases following the election. A one standard deviation increase in the independent variable leads to an increase of around a quarter of a standard deviation in the dependent variable.

Table 4B.1: Effect of party positions on two-year changes in welfare generosity

| | Model 1 |
|---|---|
| Welfare position | 0.975*** |
| | (0.293) |
| Generosity (t) | -0.509*** |
| | (0.176) |
| Year (t) | -0.069*** |
| | (0.025) |
| Country dummies | Yes |
| Constant | 146.059*** |
| | (49.646) |
| *N* | 168 |
| Countries | 21 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.25 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

This effect is robust to various other specifications, including using a multilevel model with a random intercept for countries, removing an outlier with a large increase in generosity, changing the lag between the independent and dependent variables to one or three years, using year dummies instead of a linear term, using the non-logged version of the independent variable, not weighing the coalition parties by their seat share and also using elections that took place one or two years before the next election (Table 4B.2). It should be noted that the effect size decreases slightly in all these alternative specifications except in the first two, but this is to be expected. It is also encouraging that the effect decreases, and in some cases becomes insignificant, if the independent variable is calculated for all parties in a given country-election instead of only coalition parties.

Table 4B.2: Effects of party positions on changes in welfare generosity

| | Model 1 (Random interc.) | Model 2 (Without outlier) | Model 3 (One-year lag) | Model 4 (Three-year lag) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welfare position | 0.914*** | 0.744*** | 0.446** | 0.889*** |
| | (0.227) | (0.192) | (0.211) | (0.265) |
| Generosity (t) | -0.079** | -0.407*** | -0.142 | -0.855 |
| | (0.040) | (0.149) | (0.126) | (0.182) |
| Year (t) | -0.089** | -0.055** | -0.066*** | -0.099*** |
| | (0.036) | (0.023) | (0.021) | (0.035) |
| Year dummies | No | No | No | No |
| Country dummies | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 178.889** | 115.790** | 133.532*** | 212.426*** |
| | (72.008) | (44.119) | (42.085) | (67.498) |
| *N* | 168 | 167 | 194 | 161 |
| Countries | 21 | 21 | 21 | 20 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | - | 0.22 | 0.09 | 0.35 |

| | Model 5 (Year dummies) | Model 6 (Non-logged IV) | Model 7 (Unweighted IV) | Model 8 (All elections) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welfare position | 0.794*** | 0.146** | 0.932*** | 0.854*** |
| | (0.273) | (0.056) | (0.283) | (0.224) |
| Generosity (t) | -0.414*** | -0.536*** | -0.502*** | -0.548*** |
| | (0.151) | (0.180) | (0.176) | (0.188) |
| Year (t) | - | -0.076*** | -0.067** | -0.090*** |
| | | (0.029) | (0.027) | (0.025) |
| Year dummies | Yes | No | No | No |
| Country dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 7.816** | 162.301*** | 142.315*** | 189.211*** |
| | (3.019) | (56.737) | (52.597) | (48.918) |
| *N* | 168 | 168 | 168 | 199 |
| Countries | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.33 | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.25 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

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