The Politics of Gender Mainstreaming in Foreign Aid

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Appendix

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A1 A Note on the Donor-Reported GEPM Data

In this paper, we rely on data from the OECD DAC Policy Marker System—and specifically, its Gender Equality Policy Maker (GEPM). This tool asks DAC donors to assess each of their aid activities for whether the promotion of gender equality is either that project's "principal" or a "significant" goal. This process is referred to as "screening" for the GEPM: screened aid activities are reported with values of zero, one, or two for their "Gender" variable. We describe projects with a value of either one or two as "marked" for gender: i.e., these are cases where the donor reports to the organization whether a project targeted gender equality or not, and to what extent. Conversely, if a donor fails to screen a given project—if it fails to assess and report whether that project targeted gender equality or not—its respective "Gender" variable is left as missing data, and we describe the project as "not screened."

As this process suggests, all DAC data on gender targeting in its members' foreign aid are donor-reported. This is far from exceptional: all DAC foreign aid data is donor-reported—i.e., the data used in the vast majority of the scientific literature on foreign aid as well as by IOs and development practitioners. To understand the data-generating process and the trustworthiness of these figures, we researched organizational documents and gathered information from DAC staff responsible for collecting and managing the organization's data.

First, it's important to understand that the OECD DAC provides its member states with tools and guidelines to help facilitate their data collection. Donors submit project-level information about their aid-giving to the DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) using spreadsheets and coding procedures thoroughly outlined by the organization. New members get trained on these data collection protocols, and all DAC donors can get detailed feedback on this in the context of the organization's Statistical Peer Reviews.

Second, in the year-to-year reporting practice, donors are not left alone in the implementation of these guidelines. The DAC Network on Gender Equality (GenderNet) is the official working party where DAC donors develop policies and practices to promote the rights of women and girls through their aid giving. Within this group, DAC members share notes on their GEPM use and work to ensure a comparable standard—so as to ensure that all donors have a common understanding of what it means for a project to "principally" or "significantly" target this policy goal. GenderNet meeting agenda documents typically feature allotted time for a couple of donor countries: for example, in November 2017, representatives of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) presented on their experience applying the GEPM and then there was time allotted for "sharing experi-

ences and discussion amongst members on applying the marker and on the impacts of the new minimum standards on measuring aid to gender equality, and decision on priorities for analytical work on aid targeting gender equality in 2018" (GenderNet 2017).

Third, the DAC data team routinely performs qualitative checks on these data. For instance, if a project is marked as targeting gender equality through the GEPM but the rest of the available CRS project-level characteristics suggest differently, DAC staff is likely to follow up and ask that the donor double-check on that coding and provide additional information to justify it; similarly, if a donor reports a large proportion of its CRS project-level data without screening for the GEPM, they can expect DAC staff to follow up and check on that missingness as well.

In principle, it is nonetheless possible that some donors might engage in behavior akin to the so-called "pinkwashing"—i.e., donors might be a little more liberal in marking projects as "significantly" targeting gender equality as a way to virtue signal. Through our research, we have not uncovered evidence to this effect, and instead we note that donors with explicitly feminist foreign policies are likely actually integrating programming elements in support of gender equality across the majority of their aid activities.

Lastly, according to DAC staff responsible for handling these data, it is not reasonable to expect that projects targeting gender equality will always include explicit references to that effect in the project title and description as reported in the CRS. Rather, information about how a project targets gender equality is often only available in full project documentation, not summarized in CRS data. In other words, it would be misleading to infer instances of "pinkwashing" simply because no references to women or girls are found in projects' titles and brief descriptions in the CRS.

A2 Descriptive Statistics and Figures

Figure A1: Top and Bottom Recipients of Aid for Gender Equality, 2018–2022

Top and bottom 15 recipients of gender-equality aid (GEPM = 1 or 2) in our sample, considering the 2018–2022 average in aid commitments from all DAC member donors. The figure shows the percentage of the total aid commitments they receive marked as having gender equality as their primary goal (dark gray) or as gender mainstreaming (light gray); black dots indicate the percentage of aid commitments designated with gender-related purpose codes.



A3 Recipient Fixed Effects

Table A1: Replication of Table 1 with Recipient Fixed Effects

Linear regressions at the recipient-year level (Models A1–A4) and donor-recipient-year level (Models A5–A6). Data built by aggregating positive commitments from all Official Development Assistance activities from 31 donor members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, 1998–2022.

	% Mainstreamed Commitments					
	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)	(A6)
Democracy	0.239	0.045	1.577	9.598*	1.215+	8.358**
	(1.229)	(1.215)	(1.571)	(4.596)	(0.643)	(3.048)
Quota	2.474+		3.956*		0.454	
	(1.369)		(1.615)		(0.991)	
WBL		−0.021		0.037		0.010
		(0.061)		(0.068)		(0.041)
Democracy × Quota			−3.943+		−2.006+	
			(2.005)		(1.015)	
Democracy × WBL				−0.144*		−0.118**
				(0.067)		(0.044)
GDP per capita (log)	−0.710	−1.535	−0.447	−1.349	−1.784	−1.774
	(2.542)	(2.525)	(2.561)	(2.528)	(1.678)	(1.668)
Aid Dependence	−0.359***	−0.375***	−0.363***	−0.381***	−0.069	−0.079
	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.052)
Importance to Donor					0.356**	0.366**
					(0.112)	(0.114)
Women in Donor Legislature					0.620***	0.620***
					(0.043)	(0.043)
Donor FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Recipient FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,029	3,026	3,029	3,026	54,690	54,782
R^2	0.545	0.550	0.546	0.551	0.331	0.331
Adjusted R^2	0.520	0.525	0.521	0.527	0.329	0.329

$+ \ p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

A4 Alternative Measures of Regime Type

Table A2: Replication of Table 1 with Regimes of the World Ambiguous Coding

Linear regressions at the recipient-year level (Models A7–A10) and donor-recipient-year level (Models A11–A12). We re-code ambiguous cases of the Regimes of the World variable so as to count them as autocracies. This entails taking observations that the V-Dem variable "Regimes of the World: the RoW measure with categories for ambiguous cases" (`v2x_regime_amb`) codes as "electoral democracy lower bound" and considering them as autocracies in our binary coding, as a way to be conservative.

	% Mainstreamed Commitments					
	(A7)	(A8)	(A9)	(A10)	(A11)	(A12)
Democracy	1.686	1.622	3.403*	11.866*	2.925***	2.620
	(1.097)	(1.163)	(1.434)	(5.301)	(0.768)	(3.157)
Quota	−0.307		1.123		1.590+	
	(1.126)		(1.466)		(0.825)	
WBL		−0.013		0.011		−0.004
		(0.038)		(0.040)		(0.027)
Democracy × Quota			−4.090*		−1.379	
			(1.965)		(1.135)	
Democracy × WBL				−0.147*		−0.005
				(0.074)		(0.043)
GDP per capita (log)	−4.426***	−4.386***	−4.346***	−4.277***	−4.456***	−4.295***
	(0.655)	(0.632)	(0.654)	(0.639)	(0.408)	(0.429)
Aid Dependence	−0.174	−0.159	−0.180	−0.166	−0.197***	−0.162**
	(0.129)	(0.119)	(0.130)	(0.117)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Importance to Donor					0.407***	0.419***
					(0.121)	(0.124)
Women in Donor Legislature					0.620***	0.621***
					(0.043)	(0.043)
Donor FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,029	3,026	3,029	3,026	54,690	54,782
R^2	0.400	0.404	0.403	0.407	0.318	0.317
Adjusted R^2	0.394	0.398	0.397	0.401	0.317	0.316

$+ p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3: Replication of Table 1 with Regimes of the World Four-Level Coding

Linear regressions at the recipient-year level (Models A13–A16) and donor-recipient-year level (Models A17–A18). We use the original four-level classification from the V-Dem variable "Regimes of the World: the RoW measure" (`v2x_regime`), classifying country-year observations as a closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral democracy, or liberal democracy—as opposed to turning it into a binary indicator.

	% Mainstreamed Commitments					
	(A13)	(A14)	(A15)	(A16)	(A17)	(A18)
Electoral Autocracy	1.528	1.927	0.369	2.413	0.631	−2.195
	(1.140)	(1.246)	(1.288)	(3.936)	(0.863)	(2.711)
Electoral Democracy	3.994***	4.613***	5.003***	16.527**	3.014***	1.464
	(1.077)	(1.318)	(1.456)	(5.518)	(0.872)	(3.290)
Liberal Democracy	2.913	3.794	5.333*	16.660	5.252**	10.273+
	(2.299)	(2.472)	(2.577)	(12.628)	(1.655)	(5.874)
Quota	−0.407		−0.560		1.424	
	(1.139)		(1.784)		(1.501)	
WBL		−0.040		0.018		−0.047
		(0.039)		(0.055)		(0.031)
Electoral Autocracy × Quota			3.428		0.891	
			(2.299)		(1.791)	
Electoral Democracy × Quota			−2.111		−1.020	
			(2.267)		(1.758)	
Liberal Democracy × Quota			−9.413**		−4.643+	
			(2.929)		(2.398)	
Electoral Autocracy × WBL				−0.015		0.059
				(0.069)		(0.043)
Electoral Democracy × WBL				−0.184*		0.026
				(0.087)		(0.048)
Liberal Democracy × WBL				−0.198		−0.078
				(0.181)		(0.085)
GDP per capita (log)	−4.472***	−4.460***	−4.255***	−4.191***	−4.318***	−4.179***
	(0.635)	(0.604)	(0.644)	(0.638)	(0.406)	(0.427)
Aid Dependence	−0.189	−0.182	−0.201+	−0.183+	−0.191***	−0.159**
	(0.120)	(0.111)	(0.118)	(0.104)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Importance to Donor					0.402***	0.420***
					(0.121)	(0.125)
Women in Legislature					0.620***	0.620***
					(0.043)	(0.043)
Donor FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,029	3,026	3,029	3,026	54,690	54,782
R^2	0.405	0.410	0.413	0.414	0.318	0.317
Adjusted R^2	0.399	0.404	0.406	0.408	0.317	0.316

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4: Replication of Table 1 with Continuous Electoral Democracy Index

Linear regressions at the recipient-year level (Models A19–A22) and donor-recipient-year level (Models A23–A24). As a continuous measure of democracy, we use V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (`v2x_polyarchy`), which answers the question: "to what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?"

	% Mainstreamed Commitments					
	(A19)	(A20)	(A21)	(A22)	(A23)	(A24)
Democracy	6.309**	6.945**	10.522***	37.785***	7.396***	12.312*
	(2.124)	(2.406)	(2.324)	(9.846)	(1.550)	(5.950)
Quota	−0.482		4.613+		2.741+	
	(1.130)		(2.468)		(1.420)	
WBL		−0.036		0.138*		0.018
		(0.038)		(0.063)		(0.038)
Democracy × Quota			−11.033**		−3.705	
			(4.278)		(2.572)	
Democracy × WBL				−0.473**		−0.092
				(0.150)		(0.084)
GDP per capita (log)	−4.602***	−4.586***	−4.455***	−4.120***	−4.477***	−4.277***
	(0.622)	(0.601)	(0.627)	(0.652)	(0.396)	(0.422)
Aid Dependence	−0.193	−0.184	−0.204+	−0.185+	−0.204***	−0.170***
	(0.125)	(0.116)	(0.123)	(0.110)	(0.045)	(0.050)
Importance to Donor					0.401***	0.410***
					(0.120)	(0.124)
Women in Donor Legislature					0.620***	0.621***
					(0.043)	(0.043)
Donor FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,029	3,026	3,029	3,026	54,690	54,782
R^2	0.403	0.408	0.408	0.415	0.318	0.317
Adjusted R^2	0.398	0.402	0.402	0.409	0.317	0.316

Note: + $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5: Replication of Table 1 with Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous Coding

Linear regressions at the recipient-year level (Models A25–A26) and donor-recipient-year level (Models A29–A30). As an alternative binary indicator, we use the Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy (2022). In our data, 324 recipient-year observations differ in their dichotomous coding for regime type by this variable compared to the original Regimes of the World variable.

	% Mainstreamed Commitments					
	(A25)	(A26)	(A27)	(A28)	(A29)	(A30)
Democracy	2.392*	2.573*	3.881**	15.255**	2.130**	7.472**
	(1.118)	(1.274)	(1.328)	(4.814)	(0.779)	(2.606)
Quota	−0.516		1.696		1.963*	
	(1.089)		(1.492)		(0.933)	
WBL		−0.026		0.039		0.050+
		(0.039)		(0.042)		(0.027)
Democracy × Quota			−4.287*		−1.198	
			(2.000)		(1.248)	
Democracy × WBL				−0.196**		−0.091*
				(0.071)		(0.040)
GDP per capita (log)	−4.353***	−4.511***	−4.281***	−4.190***	−4.317***	−4.144***
	(0.561)	(0.572)	(0.563)	(0.596)	(0.354)	(0.385)
Aid Dependence	−0.180*	−0.242*	−0.196*	−0.265**	−0.240***	−0.220***
	(0.087)	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.033)	(0.041)
Importance to Donor					0.380**	0.400**
					(0.121)	(0.125)
Women in Donor Legislature					0.651***	0.657***
					(0.045)	(0.046)
Donor FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,023	2,990	3,023	2,990	51,088	50,555
R^2	0.353	0.359	0.356	0.365	0.335	0.337
Adjusted R^2	0.347	0.354	0.351	0.359	0.335	0.336

Note: + $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

A5 Additional Donor-Level Controls

Table A6: Replication of Models 5 and 6 with Additional Donor-Level Controls

Linear regressions at the donor-recipient-year level. "Women's INGOs" is the number of international NGOs concerned with women's rights with headquarters in the donor country; "Female Development Minister" captures whether the donor ministry in charge of development assistance is headed by a woman.

	% Mainstreamed Commitments					
	(A31)	(A32)	(A33)	(A34)	(A35)	(A36)
Democracy	2.894***	2.915***	2.893***	3.922	4.108	4.127
	(0.716)	(0.720)	(0.722)	(2.583)	(2.581)	(2.601)
Quota	2.109*	2.132*	2.117*			
	(0.888)	(0.891)	(0.892)			
WBL				0.002	0.003	0.003
				(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Democracy × Quota	−2.128+	−2.208+	−2.178+			
	(1.142)	(1.138)	(1.139)			
Democracy × WBL				−0.029	−0.033	−0.033
				(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
GDP per capita (log)	−4.354***	−4.380***	−4.363***	−4.172***	−4.188***	−4.169***
	(0.394)	(0.393)	(0.394)	(0.418)	(0.419)	(0.419)
Aid Dependence	−0.198***	−0.202***	−0.201***	−0.160**	−0.162**	−0.162**
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Importance to Donor	0.400***	0.410***	0.411***	0.410***	0.420***	0.421***
	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Women in Donor Legislature			0.564***			0.562***
			(0.043)			(0.043)
Women's INGOs	0.178***		0.129***	0.177***		0.129***
	(0.019)		(0.020)	(0.019)		(0.020)
Female Development Minister		0.865**	0.412		0.920**	0.469
		(0.290)	(0.292)		(0.287)	(0.288)
Donor FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	54,690	53,864	53,864	54,782	53,958	53,958
R^2	0.315	0.317	0.321	0.314	0.316	0.320
Adjusted R^2	0.314	0.316	0.320	0.313	0.315	0.319

Note: + $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

A6 Effects on Alternative Outcomes

Table A7: Replication of Table 1 with Outcome: Primary-Targeted Commitments

Linear regressions at the recipient-year level (Models A37–A40) and donor-recipient-year level (Models A41–A42). Data built by aggregating positive commitments from all Official Development Assistance activities from 31 donor members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, 1998–2022. Activities with the GEPM equal to two have gender equality as their primary objective.

	% Primary-Targeted Commitments (GEPM = 2)					
	(A37)	(A38)	(A39)	(A40)	(A41)	(A42)
Democracy	0.624^{*}	0.728^{*}	0.793^{*}	1.727	0.884^{**}	2.008^{+}
	(0.292)	(0.287)	(0.380)	(1.063)	(0.335)	(1.211)
Quota	0.547^{+}		0.740^{*}		0.969^{**}	
	(0.300)		(0.370)		(0.343)	
WBL		−0.008		−0.004		−0.013
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Democracy × Quota			−0.429		−0.576	
			(0.512)		(0.522)	
Democracy × WBL				−0.015		−0.017
				(0.016)		(0.018)
GDP per capita (log)	-1.038^{***}	-1.020^{***}	-1.027^{***}	-0.997^{***}	-1.200^{***}	-1.147^{***}
	(0.153)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.170)	(0.157)
Aid Dependence	-0.067^{**}	-0.066^{**}	-0.068^{**}	-0.066^{**}	-0.065^{*}	-0.068^{*}
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Importance to Donor					−0.013	−0.008
					(0.027)	(0.027)
Women in Donor Legislature					-0.082^{***}	-0.078^{***}
					(0.019)	(0.019)
Donor FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,029	3,026	3,029	3,026	54,690	54,782
R^2	0.127	0.124	0.127	0.124	0.077	0.077
Adjusted R^2	0.118	0.115	0.119	0.116	0.076	0.076

Note: $+\ p < 0.1$; $*\ p < 0.05$; $**\ p < 0.01$; $***\ p < 0.001$

Table A8: Replication of Table 1 with Outcome: Commitment to Gender-Related Sectors

Linear regressions at the recipient-year level (Models A43–A46) and donor-recipient-year level (Models A47–A48). Data built by aggregating positive commitments from all Official Development Assistance activities from 31 donor members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, 1998–2022. Activities to gender-related sectors are indicated with purpose codes 15170 ("women's rights organization and movements, and governments institutions") and 15180 ("ending violence against women and girls").

	% Commitments to Gender-Related Sectors					
	(A43)	(A44)	(A45)	(A46)	(A47)	(A48)
Democracy	0.187**	0.171*	0.177*	0.125	0.141	0.066
	(0.066)	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.292)	(0.124)	(0.390)
Quota	0.087		0.075		0.299*	
	(0.062)		(0.069)		(0.132)	
WBL		0.001		0.001		0.0004
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.004)
Democracy × Quota			0.025		−0.051	
			(0.115)		(0.197)	
Democracy × WBL				0.001		0.0004
				(0.005)		(0.006)
GDP per capita (log)	−0.085**	−0.081**	−0.086**	−0.082**	−0.124*	−0.104
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Aid Dependence	−0.006	−0.004	−0.006	−0.004	−0.012	−0.010
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Importance to Donor					−0.031***	−0.030**
					(0.009)	(0.009)
Women in Donor Legislature					−0.047***	−0.047***
					(0.010)	(0.010)
Donor FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,029	3,026	3,029	3,026	54,690	54,782
R^2	0.114	0.112	0.114	0.112	0.042	0.043
Adjusted R^2	0.105	0.104	0.105	0.104	0.041	0.042

Note: $+ \ p < 0.1$; $*$ $p < 0.05$; $**$ $p < 0.01$; $***$ $p < 0.001$