Appendix

Alternate Measures of Affinity

Using affinity scores based UN voting records (following Gartzke) is not the only way to measure common interests between the permanent members of the Security Council and countries experiencing civil wars. To demonstrate the robustness of our findings, we also used joint membership in the WTO as well as the presence of a defense pact (using the ATOP data (Leeds, *et al* 2002)) as an indicator of affinity or common interest. For WTO membership, we included the percentage of the P5 countries that were WTO members in a given year as a rough approximation of the heterogeneity measure. Unfortunately, incorporating preference heterogeneity based on alliances is more difficult. These results are presented below.

Table 1: Long Time Extensions

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
WTO Membership	-0.910**	(0.221)
P5 WTO Membership	1.343	(2.977)
ln(UN Troops Deployed)	0.296*	(0.119)
Chapter VII	0.524	(0.457)
Repeat Mission	-0.149	(0.267)
ln(Battle Deaths)	-0.032	(0.024)
Contraband	-0.495†	(0.274)
Strength of Govt Army	-0.067	(0.075)
Victory	0.940*	(0.438)
Total Resolutions	-0.284**	(0.086)
Year	-0.025	(0.041)
Intercept	-2.590	(1.862)
N	261	
Log-likelihood	-84.997	
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	299.341	

Significance levels : $\dagger : 10\%$ $* : 5\%$ $** : 1\%$

Table 2: Short Time Extensions

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
WTO	0.483†	(0.293)
WTOperc	-4.197†	(2.536)
ln(UN Troops Deployed)	-0.227*	(0.098)
Chapter VII	-0.115	(0.531)
Repeat Mission	0.355	(0.338)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.019	(0.020)
Contraband	0.842*	(0.363)
Strength of Govt Army	0.084	(0.212)
Victory	0.856	(0.612)
Total Resolutions	0.304**	(0.054)
Year	-0.009	(0.039)
Intercept	2.149	(2.060)
N	261	
Log-likelihood	-126.892	
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	142.711	

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Table 3: Mandate Specificity

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
WTO	0.149	(0.113)
WTOperc	1.446	(1.331)
ln(UN Troops Deployed)	-0.036	(0.065)
Chapter VII	0.111	(0.229)
Repeat Mission	-0.300*	(0.141)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.045**	(0.013)
Contraband	0.148	(0.131)
Strength of Govt Army	0.083	(0.064)
Victory	0.184	(0.357)
Total	-0.070*	(0.035)
Year	0.010	(0.032)
N	287	
Log-likelihood	-363.921	
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	109.744	

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Table 4: Long Extensions, Defense Pacts

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Defense Pacts	-0.676**	(0.247)
ln(UN Troops Deployed)	0.173†	(0.101)
Chapter VII	0.901*	(0.428)
Repeat Mission	0.018	(0.285)
Contraband	-0.597	(0.444)
ln(Battle Deaths)	-0.026	(0.019)
Strength of Govt Army	0.005	(0.072)
Victory	0.636	(0.450)
Total Resolutions	-0.257**	(0.087)
Year	-0.031	(0.048)
Intercept	-1.510	(0.970)
N	261	
Log-likelihood	-87.423	
$\chi^2_{(10)}$	165.811	

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Table 5: Short Extensions, Defense Pact

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Defense Pact	0.025	(0.188)
ln(UN Troops Deployed)	0.116	(0.073)
Chapter VII	-0.080	(0.333)
Repeat Mission	-0.118	(0.251)
Contraband	0.098	(0.163)
ln(Battle Deaths)	-0.031†	(0.017)
Strength of Govt Army	-0.024	(0.139)
Victory	0.588	(0.470)
Total Resolutions	0.108†	(0.063)
Year	-0.014	(0.038)
Intercept	-2.113**	(0.715)
N	316	
Log-likelihood	-138.7	
$\chi^2_{(10)}$	340.95	

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Table 6: Mandate Specificity, Defense Pacts

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Defense Pact	-0.302†	(0.172)
ln(UN Troops Deployed)	-0.020	(0.058)
Chapter VII	0.095	(0.230)
Repeat Mission	-0.358*	(0.153)
Contraband	0.119	(0.162)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.041**	(0.013)
Strength of Govt Army	0.065	(0.064)
Victory	0.162	(0.368)
Total Resolutions	-0.088*	(0.035)
Year	0.034†	(0.019)
N	287	
Log-likelihood	-363.718	
$\chi^2_{(10)}$	97.888	

Significance levels : $\dagger : 10\%$ $* : 5\%$ $** : 1\%$

Selection

Recognizing the potential for selection effects, we performed several auxiliary regressions in order to deal with the problem. For each dependent variable, we re-ran the model two ways. First, following Gilligan and Sergenti (2008), we employed their matching model and techniques, dropping all unsupported cases. Secondly, we estimated the model following Copelovitch (2010) including the propensity scores generate by the matching procedure, recognizing the critiques of Ho *et al* (2007) for this technique. None of these corrections are ideal dealing with TCSC data, but we wanted to make an effort to address these issues. We did not find significant evidence that these corrections altered the results presented in the paper.

Short Time Limits

Table 7: Short Extensions with Matched Data

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Affinity	2.036	(1.300)
Heterogeneity	5.756**	(2.049)
ln(UN Fatalities)	-0.079**	(0.030)
Chapter VII	-0.574	(0.367)
Repeat Mission	0.018	(0.402)
Contraband	0.650	(0.421)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.010	(0.020)
Strength of Govt Army	-0.337	(0.237)
Victory	-1.413	(0.991)
Total Resolutions	0.293**	(0.047)
Year	-0.045*	(0.020)
Intercept	-4.231†	(2.169)

N	243
Log-likelihood	-117.573
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	70.735

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Table 8: Short Mandate Extensions with Propensity Scores

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Affinity	1.868	(1.495)
Heterogeneity	5.579*	(2.175)
ln(UN Fatalities)	-0.081**	(0.030)
Chapter VII	-0.563	(0.362)
Repeat Mission	0.039	(0.419)
Contraband	0.634	(0.428)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.011	(0.020)
Strength of Govt Army	-0.335	(0.235)
Victory	-1.415	(0.983)
Total Resolutions	0.291**	(0.049)
Year	-0.042†	(0.022)
Propensity Score	0.000**	(0.000)
Intercept	-3.971	(2.446)
N	243	
Log-likelihood	-117.441	
$\chi^2_{(12)}$	5881.925	

Significance levels : $\dagger : 10\%$ $* : 5\%$ $** : 1\%$

Long Time Limits

Table 9: Long Mandate Extensions with Matched Data

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Affinity	-4.319*	(2.064)
Heterogeneity	-5.318*	(2.589)
ln(UN Fatalities)	0.094**	(0.031)
Chapter VII	0.887†	(0.499)
Repeat Mission	0.556	(0.339)
Contraband	-0.747†	(0.443)
ln(Battle Deaths)	-0.026	(0.028)
Strength of Govt Army	0.151	(0.149)
Victory	2.515**	(0.858)
Total Resolutions	-0.273**	(0.088)
Year	-0.038	(0.074)
Intercept	6.306†	(3.361)
N	243	
Log-likelihood	-72.717	
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	174.647	

Significance levels :   † : 10%   ∗ : 5%   ∗∗ : 1%

Table 10: Long Mandate Extensions with Propensity Scores

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Affinity	-7.244**	(1.968)
Heterogeneity	-8.160**	(2.965)
ln(UN Fatalities)	0.089*	(0.035)
Chapter VII	0.892†	(0.506)
Repeat Mission	0.766*	(0.308)
Contraband	-0.997*	(0.472)
ln(Battle Deaths)	-0.017	(0.022)
Strength of Govt Army	0.167	(0.160)
Victory	2.426**	(0.871)
Total Resolutions	-0.333**	(0.090)
Year	0.025	(0.062)
Propensity Score	-0.582	(1.150)
Intercept	11.141**	(3.327)
N	243	
Log-likelihood	-68.803	
$\chi^2_{(12)}$	125.492	

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Mandate Specificity

Table 11: Mandate Specificity for Matched Data

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Order	0.012	(0.024)
Year	0.090†	(0.052)
Affinity	-2.242**	(0.816)
Heterogeneity	-0.157	(1.295)
Chapter VII	-0.015	(0.176)
Repeat Mission	-0.173	(0.106)
ln(UN Fatalities)	-0.022	(0.025)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.061*	(0.030)
Contraband	0.024	(0.262)
Strength of Govt Army	0.009	(0.147)
Victory	0.539	(0.970)
N	173	
Log-likelihood	-207.835	
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	44.209	

Significance levels : $\quad \dagger : 10\% \quad * : 5\% \quad ** : 1\%$

Table 12: Mandate Specificity with Propensity Scores

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Order	0.017	(0.024)
Year	0.120*	(0.049)
Affinity	-2.652**	(0.948)
Heterogeneity	-0.613	(1.269)
Chapter VII	-0.084	(0.188)
Repeat Mission	-0.193†	(0.112)
ln(UN Fatalities)	-0.039	(0.030)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.080**	(0.028)
Contraband	0.078	(0.285)
Strength of Govt Army	0.130	(0.187)
Victory	0.552	(0.914)
Propensity Score	-1.191†	(0.666)
N	173	
Log-likelihood	-206.539	
$\chi^2_{(12)}$	63.222	

Significance levels : †: 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%