Appendix to "Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint," *International Security*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Fall 2018).

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Online Appendix

To test theories of nuclear nonuse, I gathered records of elite American political-military wargames. This appendix describes these data, the selection criteria, discusses the qualitative coding methodology, and considers sample bias.

Wargame Records

The elite sample contains a total of 26 wargames held from 1958 to 1972 (see chart below). 13 of these wargames include only nuclear-armed teams, wherein deterrence logic should be strongest. The other 13 include non-nuclear-armed teams, wherein at least one team has an unmatched nuclear advantage over an opponent. In eight the subset with non-nuclear-armed teams, deterrence logic may still operate as extended nuclear deterrence provided by a third party. In the other five, extended deterrence is absent. Nuclear weapons were used in only two of the games.

Outcomes of Wargames with Strategic Elite Players

Nuclear-Armed Adversaries		Nonnuclear-Armed Adversaries	
Wargame	Nuclear Use	Wargame	Nuclear Use
POLEX I	no	SIGMA I-62	no
POLEX II	no	POLEX-DAIS I*	no
Berlin crisis game I	no	POLEX-DAIS II*	no
Berlin crisis game II	no	POLEX-DAIS III*	no
EPSILON I-62	no	POLEX-DAIS IV*	no
DETEX II	no	DETEX I*	no
EPSILON I-64	no	SIGMA I-64	no
DETEX III	no	SIGMA II-64	no
NU I	no	SIGMA II-65*	no
NU II	no	SIGMA I-66*	no
BETA I	yes	SIGMA I-67	no
BETA II	yes	SIGMA II-67	no
EPSILON 72	no	MU I-68*	no
* Deterrence logic may still operate via nuclear-armed third-party extended deterrence.			



The U.S. government documents come from the JFK and LBJ presidential libraries, the CIA's CREST archive, and the Gale database of U.S. Declassified Documents Online. The MIT records come from the MIT Institute Archives and Special Collections.

The U.S. government records mostly consist of four kinds of documents: Final Reports, Fact Books, Initial Scenarios, and move records (see sample images below). Final Reports are the most useful for this research, as they summarize the design of the game and the moves made by each team. They also typically include anonymized transcripts of post-game "Player Critique" discussion sessions. Players are rarely identified by name, only by which team they played for. Any players that I have identified as having been in the room during a game are mostly triangulated from other sources (archival copies of invitations to participate, post-game memos, or secondary sources). Fact Books and Initial Scenario documents describe the setup of a wargame, the simulated crisis at hand, and what military capabilities have been granted to each team. These would have been distributed to players ahead of the wargame. Finally, I have some documents of actual moves made by each team, including decisions made and sent to Control or messages sent from one team to another during game play.

MIT records are slightly more haphazard, but no less fulsome. The files of Professor Lincoln Bloomfield and the Center for International Studies contain summaries of wargames held at MIT's Endicott House in Dedham, MA. Professor Bloomfield wrote summaries of most of these games and kept transcripts of many post-game "Player Critique" discussions. In these records players are identified by name. These games records also contain move documents, detailing the decisions made by each team and communications sent between teams.

In some cases, I have found no official records for a game but have come across player summaries. These summaries are typically memos written by players for their home agencies or reflection memos sent by players back to the game organizers. If these summaries contain details about the play and outcome of a game, I include them in the sample. Memos confirming the existence of a game, but without details, are excluded from the sample pending more data.

Examples of U.S. Government Wargame Records









Scoping and Selection Criteria

The "political-military wargames" in this sample are just one type of a much larger set of simulations or exercises that can be called "wargames." These political-military games are, however, the most useful for testing political science theories of nuclear-nonuse. They are quasi-experiments for elite participants as subjects. For reasons discussed in the article, they are sufficiently externally valid. They give players a forum to debate the use of nuclear weapons.

I omit operational wargames from the sample, as they do not typically grant players discretion over whether or when to start a war; rather, they are already in one and are tasked with winning it. Military exercises are also not a part of this study, as they are conducted to test or rehearse operational plans, rather than give players discretion over operations or nuclear use.[1] I also omit scripted wargames conducted for educational or training purposes.[2] All of the wargames in the sample were conducted after the invention of thermonuclear weapons, granted players discretion over the use of nuclear weapons, and were conducted in the United States with American participants.[3]

[1] American military exercises did cross the nuclear threshold during the Cold War. Simulating nuclear weapons use in an exercise carried the added signaling benefits of communicating to the Soviet Union and reassuring allies that the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons in war. If kept private, wargaming settings did not carry such signaling dynamics.

[2] Wargames are occasionally scripted to cross the nuclear threshold for education or training purposes. No such wargames are included in this sample. Scripted games are usually simulations with lower-level participants.

[3] There is some uncertainty about when a nuclear taboo or tradition of nonuse began. Tannenwald argues for the beginnings of a taboo as early as 1945 (although she acknowledges it grew stronger over time). Others, like Gaddis, emphasize the importance of the thermonuclear revolution and the development of ballistic missile delivery systems. See Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb," p. 6; and Gaddis, "Conclusion," in Gaddis, Gordon, May, and Rosenberg (eds.), *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb*, p. 264.

I have applied no other selection criteria to the wargames in my sample, save for trying to collect records for as many wargames as possible with strategic elite players. Future scholarship should add observations to this sample as they become available.[4]

What Counts as an Observation?

As I am mostly concerned with individual beliefs about the use of nuclear weapons, I would ideally use the individual wargame player as the unit of analysis. However, this is not possible given that most wargame documents anonymized player remarks (MIT reports use player names, but Pentagon reports do not).

The next best unit of analysis to use is the wargame itself. Every wargame has four basic elements: (1) the scenario—the scene-setting political and/or military context presented to participants; (2) the rules of play—the structure of turn-taking and allowable moves; (3) the adjudication model used by Control—e.g. qualitative expert judgment versus quantitative computer modelling; and (4) the players themselves.[5] If any one of these four elements is altered, it is considered a different wargame. Thus, while many games were conducted in series, if enough variables change between each running of the game, they can be considered separate observations.

[4] More wargame records will become available in the future. Additional high-level wargames have been conducted. Other scholars have written secondary or anecdotal accounts of wargames that have yet to be declassified. Such secondary reporting provides guidance for declassification requests, some of which I have already submitted.
[5] Elizabeth Bartels, "Methods of Social Inquiry for Game Design," presentation at the Military Operations Research Society, Arlington, Virginia, February 13, 2015. The author also discussed wargaming methodology with Elizabeth Bartels.

Qualitative Coding

As I read through wargame records, I kept notes about which logics of nonuse players invoked during discussion of the use of nuclear weapons. I include in this appendix an Excel files that draws out sentences or paragraphs from wargame records and codes them according to the logic invoked (see the hypothesis section of the article for coding criteria). Some sentences are ambiguous and are noted as such (e.g. a statement such as, "we should not use nuclear weapons" is descriptively noteworthy but absent other information cannot be coded as invoking any particular logic). This is effectively manual text analysis and is a useful exercise.[6] However, coding sentences or paragraphs is difficult, if not impossible, outside of the full context of the game and discussion. Conducting a quantitative comparison of the number of times each logic is invoked would unduly ignore the context of player deliberations. I prefer the qualitative "processes tracing" I have performed in the article's empirical sections. The quantitative comparisons I make are to note the number of games in the sample that went nuclear (two games) and to note when a logic is rarely invoked (e.g. my findings on precedent and strict ethical logics).

I am grateful to Scott Sagan, Margaret Williams, and Chelsea Green at Stanford University for research assistance in adding additional pairs of eyes on the wargame records. They performed independent reviews of every "player critique" in my sample of wargame records. Their diligent efforts recovered some sentences that I had not and changed some interpretations of sentences that we had both recovered but coded differently. Consider these

[6] Text analysis might yield other interesting findings from these records (and other wargame records as they become available). Merely counting the frequency of invoked logics, however, is likely to be biased in favor of deterrence, since it is the most verbalized and debated logic, whether or not it operated to restrain nuclear use. Statements evaluated in context reveal more nuance.

examples. A reviewer questioned whether this sentence was an invocation of reputation logic: "[Players] felt their pride, their self-esteem, and sometimes even their local reputations were very much wrapped up in whether or not they brought off … this crisis satisfactorily."[7] The RAs agreed with my interpretation, so the sentence remains coded as a logic of reputation. On other occasions, RAs disagreed, and I amended my interpretations accordingly. For example, in an earlier draft I had coded this sentence—"the discussion demonstrated some grave uncertainty about the willingness of political leadership to use nuclear weapons even in a larger military engagement, giving question, first, about escalation and, secondly, about the ultimate utility"[8]—as an invocation of an ambiguous but non-deterrent logic. The RAs disagreed and so it is now interpreted as indistinguishable from deterrence. Overall, the RAs improved the standard of evidence used in this article.

Wargame reports also include several threats to use nuclear weapons. For this reason, I emphasize in the article that the low rate of nuclear use in wargames was not for lack of serious consideration. When an argument was made to use nuclear weapons, I discuss it in the article text in the context of the game deliberations. Nonetheless, the Excel file only categorizes "nonuse" arguments. I did not have ample space in the article to discuss some nuance in deliberations on the utility of nuclear demonstration strikes (i.e. whether detonating a nuclear weapon without a tactical effect on the battlefield would signal resolve or the opposite) or reputational logics that incentivize use (i.e. we should use a nuclear weapon because we threatened to and if we do not our reputations will suffer). I save these details for a different project.

[7] Thomas Schelling and Alan Ferguson, remarks at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, p. 3.
[8] "Politico-Military Simulation Epsilon 72: Simulation Documentation," p. L4.

Sample Bias Considerations

Does the filter of declassification bias this wargames data? I do not believe that declassification bias affects wargame records more heavily than comparable qualitative data sources—classified meeting minutes, policy reviews, intelligence assessments, etc. Indeed, much of the most important evidence available to scholars of international relations passes through a filter of declassification. Nonetheless, we can apply a few checks of the declassification filter to assess the representativeness of this sample. First, and most simply, wargame records are able to be declassified. It is the data used in wargame scenarios, as opposed to the deliberations in the game, that determine classification levels. Indeed, one sign of this is that I have accessed more "final reports" on the outcomes of the wargames (and crucially, records of the moves and post-game reflections) than I have "fact books," which were distributed beforehand and described the military capabilities granted to each team. The latter contain more classified information. Such details are, however, not necessary for this study.

Second, available declassified wargame records are not usually heavily redacted. Redactions typically black out names of individual participants or descriptions of the capabilities of certain weapons systems. In these cases, it is usually easy to read around the redactions and still comprehend the political impact of the move that occurred in the wargame. Additionally, participants' reflections shed light on games with scattered records.

Third, it would be a concern for this study if the use (or nonuse) or nuclear weapons in a wargame affected the likelihood of its records being declassified. Importantly, the sample contains two wargames that crossed the nuclear threshold, at least indicating that nuclear use in a wargame does not always prevent the declassification of its records. However, one cannot know

what additional evidence exists behind the filter of declassification, thus this study should be updated as more records become available.

A fourth, related concern is that declassification of wargame records may be used as a deterrent signaling mechanism, whereby American wargames that did cross the nuclear threshold are more likely to be declassified, because they would send a message to the Soviet Union that the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons. This again appears less of a concern for my sample, which contains wargame records declassified both before and after the end of Cold War. And, crucially, the elite wargames in the sample that saw a use of nuclear weapons were declassified after the end of the Cold War, not before, as a theory of signaling would suggest.[9]

Fifth, neither does it appear to be the case that the success of the Blue (American) team in a wargame is correlated with its declassification. My sample contains both wargames in which Blue figuratively "won" and "lost," although, as in real life, the outcomes are not usually so binary.

Sixth, alliance relations do not appear to be a concern in the declassification of wargame records. The sample contains wargames in which nuclear weapons are used on or close to allied territory, wargames in which the capability or reliability of allied governments are openly questioned, and wargames in which American players debated whether to come to the aid of allies.[10] If alliance relations were a concern for declassification, these records would likely not be available.

[9] These games were Beta I and Beta II (records declassified in 2004). One non-elite wargame that included the use of nuclear weapons, Olympiad I-62, was declassified in 1988.

[10] The EPSILON 72 wargame, for example, included debate among American players about how much to aid Norway after a Soviet invasion. See "Politico-Military Simulation Epsilon 72: Simulation Documentation." Players in NU I also debated whether to commit to the defense of India. "Final report of NU I and II-66," p. E13.

Seventh, the seniority of the participants does not appear to be an impediment to declassification. I know of no "higher-level" or more "serious" wargames held contemporaneously anywhere in the U.S. government that are hidden by classification.

Finally, beyond declassification bias, a threat to inference stem from the quality of the original wargame records themselves. Scholars should not assume that wargames are always well-documented. Indeed, the sample in this study likely skews in the direction of better-recorded wargames. Earlier games seem to have kept better records. Recent efforts within the Department of Defense to digitize and create a central depository of wargame records are perhaps a sign of how lax the standards of wargame recording have been.[11] Informal interviews by the author with practitioners suggest that transcripts of discussion, for example, are rarely kept in contemporary wargames. However, there is little reason to believe that the quality of a wargame's records is correlated with its outcome.

Is a sample of 26 elite political-military wargames a reasonable size for inference? The size of the total universe is difficult to measure, but the number is lower than one would think. Wargames, of any kind, are costly in terms of dollars and, especially for participating elites, time. Paul Borel, an elite participant in the SIGMA II-65 wargame, wrote that he devoted about 1.5 days of total time to the game, lamenting that it was "an extreme demand" on the time of participants.[12] One wargame from 1965 boasts of being "extremely economical of the time of participants" yet reported an "average of under nine hours per player" spent on the game.[13]

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[11] Robert Work, "Wargaming and Innovation," memorandum, February 9, 2015, *PAXsims*, https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2015/04/02/wargaming-and-innovation/.
[12] Paul A. Borel, "Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence," n.d., CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP68R00530A000200110007-7.pdf.
[13] This calculation likely includes the time devoted by all game participants, both action teams and senior teams. However, additional scheduling information included in the same report suggests that no players, senior or junior,

Another game from 1964 claimed a total of "900 man-hours of discussions among participants."[14] These are significant time commitments. Carrying out a high-level wargame within the U.S. government is, in fact, a feat of interagency cooperation.

While I have no definitive list of wargames conducted with strategic elite participants, we can estimate the total indirectly. Based on the preamble to a 1966 JWGA wargame report, we know that the JWGA hosted 24 political-military wargames between its founding in 1961 and 1966.[15] Of these 24, only 15 were interagency games with elite participants.[16] Generously assuming the same rate (~3 per year) over time, the total number of political-military wargames held before the end of the Cold War was somewhere on the order of ~100.[17] There are many reasons to believe, however, that the true total is lower. As gaming methods and computer-aided adjudication advanced, the U.S. government seems to have put more emphasis on operational games. Senior policymakers also had less time to give to simulations. Informal interviews conducted by the author suggest that high-level political-military games, like the ones considered in this article, are rarely conducted today. These factors give me confidence that my sample is reasonably representative for qualitative inference. Of course, more data would be better. The results of this paper should be updated as more wargame records become available.

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spent less than six total hours in team deliberations. This was not atypical. "Final report of politico-military game SIGMA II-65."

[14] "Final report on JCS politico-military game SIGMA I-64."

[15] See the forward to "Final report of NU I and II-66," p. ii.

[16] The others were either "experimental" runs of wargames or wargames played with non-elite participants, such as "summer interns" or "civilians from labor, industry, creative arts." "Final report of NU I and II-66," pp. iv-vii.

[17] This initial rate of ~3 elite wargames per year is corroborated by a 1965 wargame report stating that interagency exercises were "usually conducted three or four times each year." Nevertheless, the 1960s was a time of great innovation in the political-military wargaming method. It would not at all be surprising if the rate of game play fell off in subsequent decades. There are many other references in wargame records to how much effort went into planning each iteration of a game. "Final report of politico-military game SIGMA II-65," p. iv.

Gender is also worth considering in the sample. Interdisciplinary scholarship has isolated a psychological bias in wargames along gender lines. In a pioneering study of participants in an experimental wargame, Dominic Johnson, et al. found that men were more likely than women to be overconfident and aggress as a result.[18] As virtually all of the participants in this sample of wargames are men,[19] gender imbalance could tilt wargame outcomes in favor of aggressiveness, possibly including nuclear weapons use. This would tilt wargames against finding nuclear nonuse.

Finally, it is possible that the historical context of wargames may affect their outcomes. Games played in the 1970s, for example, presented players with more tactical nuclear capabilities than prior simulations, given American innovation of flexible response options. Additional smaller-yield nuclear weapons may make it more tempting to cross the nuclear threshold. If this introduces any bias, however, it is toward to the use of nuclear weapons in later wargames and not in favor of nonuse. It is notable that aversion to the use of nuclear weapons remained fairly consistent across the games in this sample (1958-1972).

Summary Charts

The charts below summarize basic data about each wargame in the elite sample, as well as several wargames I came across but excluded from the sample for the various reasons I describe.

[18] Dominic D.P. Johnson et al., "Overconfidence in Wargames: Experimental Evidence on Expectations, Aggression, Gender, and Testosterone," *Proc. R. Soc. B* October 7, 2006, pp. 2513–2520, doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.3606.
[19] Pronoun usage makes this obvious despite anonymized reporting in wargame records.

I have uploaded as many wargame records as possible to the dataverse website. Some records have been withheld due to permissions from archives. It is my hope that all manner of social scientists will find access to these documents useful. I am happy to discuss individual wargames with interested scholars and experts. I can be reached by email at rpauly@mit.edu.

Wargames with Strategic Elite Players (n=26)								
Wargame	**Host**	**Date**	**Teams**	**Adversary Nuclear Status (NWS /NNWS)**	**Scenario**	**Nuclear Weapons Use**	**Explanation (Logics Invoked)**	**Data Source**
POLEX I	MIT	September 1958	USA USSR Western Europe Poland Yugoslavia Near & Middle East Asia & Africa Latin America Scandinavia UN	NWS	Poland crisis	No	Deterrence	Game records
POLEX II	MIT	September 1960	USA USSR	NWS	Middle East crisis, Iranian regime collapse	No	Deterrence Practicality	Game records
Berlin crisis game I (Code-name: NATO Planning Conference)	JWGCG	September 1961	Blue (USA) Red (USSR)	NWS	Berlin crisis	No	Deterrence Practicality Reputation Ethics	Participant summary
Berlin crisis game II (Code-name: International Security Affairs Conference)	JWGCG	September-October 1961	Blue (USA) Red (USSR)	NWS	Berlin crisis	No	Deterrence Reputation Ethics	Participant summary
SIGMA I-62	JWGCG	February 1962	Blue (USA, allies) Red (China, allies)	NNWS	Southeast Asia crisis	No	Ambiguous	Game records
EPSILON I-62	JWGCG	September 1962	Blue (USA) Red (USSR)	NWS	Berlin crisis	No	Practicality Precedent Reputation	Game records
POLEX-DAIS I	MIT	November 1962	USA USSR UN China	Both (extended deterrence)	Southeast Asia crisis, Chinese intervention into Burma	No	Ambiguous	Game records

POLEX-DAIS II	MIT	January 1963	USA USSR UN	Both (extended deterrence)	Crisis over "colonial-racial" conflict in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, context of ongoing implementation of a disarmament agreement	No	Deterrence	Game records
POLEX-DAIS III	MIT	February 1963	USA USSR UN UAR Israel	Both (extended deterrence)	Near East regional war, context of ongoing implementation of a disarmament agreement	No	Deterrence	Game records
POLEX-DAIS IV	MIT	March 1963	USA USSR UN Venezuela	Both (extended deterrence possible)	Communist revolution in Venezuela, context of ongoing implementation of a disarmament agreement	No	Ambiguous	Game records
DETEX I	MIT	November 1963	USA USSR China	Both (extended deterrence possible)	N. Vietnam invasion of S. Vietnam, Chinese intervention	No	Deterrence Practicality Reputation	Game records
DETEX II	MIT	February 1964	USA USSR	NWS	East-West crisis begun by ambiguous nuclear detonation in the USSR	No	Deterrence Practicality	Game records
EPSILON I-64	JWGA	April 1964	Blue (USA) Red (USSR) Possibly others	NWS	Revolt in East Germany	No	No discussion	Participant summary
SIGMA I-64	JWGA	April 1964	Blue (USA, allies) Red (N. Viet, allies) Yellow (China)	NNWS	Southeast Asia crisis	No	Practicality	Game records
SIGMA II-64	JWGA	September 1964	Blue (USA, S. Viet) Red (China, N. Viet, allies)	NNWS	Southeast Asia crisis	No	Reputation Ethics	Game records

DETEX III	MIT	November 1964	USA West Germany Britain USSR	NWS	East-West naval conflict in Bay of Biscay, including MLF mixed-manned crews with nuclear weapons	No	Ambiguous	Game records
SIGMA II-65	JWGA	July-August 1965	USA, S. Viet USSR China N. Viet Viet Cong	Both (extended deterrence possible)	Southeast Asia crisis	No	Practicality Reputation	Game records
NU I	JWGA	January-February 1966	Blue (USA) Yellow (China) Unknown (India)	NWS (nascent)	Sino-Indian conflict, Pakistan involvement	No	Deterrence Practicality Reputation	Game records
NU II	JWGA	January-February 1966	Blue (USA) Yellow (China) Unknown (India)	NWS	Sino-Indian conflict, Soviet involvement	No	Deterrence Practicality Reputation	Game records
SIGMA I-66	JWGA	September 1966	Blue (USA) Green (S. Viet) Black (Viet Cong) Brown (N. Viet) Yellow (China) Red (USSR)	Both (extended deterrence possible)	Southeast Asia crisis	No	No discussion	Game records
BETA I	JWGA	April-May 1967	Blue (USA) Red (USSR)	NWS	East Germany crisis	Yes	-	Game records
BETA II	JWGA	April-May 1967	Blue (USA) Red (USSR)	NWS	East Germany crisis	Yes	-	Game records
SIGMA I-67	JWGA	November-December 1967	Blue (US/GVN) Red (NVN/NLF)	NNWS	Southeast Asia crisis	No	No discussion	Game records
SIGMA II-67	JWGA	November-December 1967	Blue (US/GVN) Red (NVN/NLF)	NNWS	Southeast Asia crisis	No	No discussion	Game records

MU I-68	JWGA	April-May 1968	USA USSR Israel UAR?	Both (extended deterrence)	Israeli retaliation for Arab-supported terrorism; superpowers encourage de-escalation	No	Deterrence	Participant summary
EPSILON 72	SAGA	October 1972	Blue (US NCA 1) Green (US NCA 2)	NWS	Polish and East German insurrections, Soviet invasion of Finland and Norway, NATO intervention in East Germany	No	Deterrence	Game records

NOTES

NWS (nuclear weapons states) = wargame includes only nuclear-armed adversaries and is thus not a good test of non-deterrence logics
NNWS (non-nuclear weapons states) = wargame includes only non-nuclear-armed adversaries and is thus a good test of non-deterrence logics
Both (extended deterrence) = wargame includes non-nuclear armed adversaries, but another nuclear-armed adversary provides extended deterrence
Both (extended deterrence possible) = wargame includes non-nuclear armed adversaries, other nuclear-armed adversaries exist but do not explicitly extend deterrence

JWGCG = Joint War Games Control Group
JWGA = Joint War Games Agency
MIT = Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NPS = Naval Postgraduate School
NWC = Naval War College
RAND = RAND Corporation
SAGA = Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency
Stanford = Stanford University

Wargames not included in the elite sample, but referred to in the text:			
Wargame	**Host**	**Date**	**Reasons Excluded**
Harold Guetzkow student games	Stanford	1960	Non-elite participants (undergraduate students)
EPSILON III (part of Olympiad I-62)	JWGCG	December 1962	Non-elite participants (business, labor, entertainment industry)
MU III (part of Olympiad I-62)	JWGCG	December 1962	Non-elite participants (business, labor, entertainment industry)
ZIP IV (part of Olympiad I-62)	JWGCG	December 1962	Non-elite participants (business, labor, entertainment industry)
DAFT (part of Olympiad I-62)	JWGCG	December 1962	Non-elite participants (business, labor, entertainment industry); scenario assumed nuclear war and simulated recovery
EXDET I	MIT	November 1963	Non-elite participants (undergraduate students)
EXDET II	MIT	April 1964	Non-elite participants (undergraduate students)
EXDET III	MIT	May 1964	Non-elite participants (undergraduate students)
EPSILON I-65	JWGA	October 1965	Alliance coordination game (no adversary teams), so no deliberation over whether to use nuclear weapons
Scylla III-73	SAGA	Nov-Dec 1973	Designed to study effect of tactical nuclear use, so no deliberation over whether to use nuclear weapons
Olympiad I-79	SAGA	July 1979	Insufficient records on behavior in the game
DELTA-84-M	SAGA	January 1984	Designed to study effect of tactical nuclear use, so no deliberation over whether to use nuclear weapons
Global War Games I	NWC	1979-1983	Insufficient records of deliberations; mostly operational games in which players were not tasked with sufficient strategic responsibility
Global War Games II	NWC	1984-1988	Insufficient records of deliberations; mostly operational games in which players were not tasked with sufficient strategic responsibility
The Day After series	RAND	1993	Scenario assumed the use of nuclear weapons and simulated responses
South Asian Stability Workshop	NPS/NWC	March 2013	International players
Managing Strategic Crises in South Asia	NPS/NWC	January 2014	International players
South Asian Stability Workshop 2.0	NPS/NWC	February 2015	International players

Archival Documents List
(Updated November 17, 2019)

Wargames (26 total)	**Host**	**Documents (page estimate)**
POLEX I	MIT	Scenario documents (43 pages)* Various team reflections Post-mortem (67 pages)
POLEX II	MIT	Final Report (109 pages)* Supplement to Final Report (145 pages)* Scenario documents (53 pages) Moves documents (176 pages) Post Exercise Evaluation (87 pages)*
Berlin crisis game I (Code-name: NATO Planning Conference)	JWGCG	Summary ()* Ferguson Summary (21 pages)* Ferguson Lessons (12 pages)*
Berlin crisis game II (Code-name: International Security Affairs Conference)	JWGCG	Player Summary (7 pages)* Scenario (27 pages)* Game Records (31 pages)* Schelling and Ferguson HKS Remarks (13 pages)*
SIGMA I-62	JWGCG	Final Report (65 pages) Fact Book (150 pages) Manual (15 pages) 4 Cycles (300 pages)
EPSILON I-62	JWGCG	Final Report (97 pages)
POLEX-DAIS I	MIT	Scenario and Moves (197 pages) Critique (177 pages)*
POLEX-DAIS II	MIT	Scenario and Moves (287 pages) Critique (135 pages)*
POLEX-DAIS III	MIT	Scenario (67 pages) Moves (230 pages) [No Critique in Archives]
POLEX-DAIS IV	MIT	Scenario (109 pages) Moves (264 pages) Critique (87 pages)* Final Report for IDA (248 pages)
DETEX I	MIT	Scenario and Moves (190 pages) Summary (58 pages) Critique (74 pages)*
DETEX II	MIT	Scenario and Moves (311 pages) Critique (73 pages)*
DETEX III	MIT	Scenario and Moves (262 pages) Bloomfield Observations (5 pages)* Final Report (38 pages)* [No Critique in Archives]

EPSILON I-64	JWGA	Participant summary (3 pages)*
SIGMA I-64	JWGA	Final Report (200 pages) Initial Scenario (80 pages)
SIGMA II-64	JWGA	Final Report (190 pages)
SIGMA II-65	JWGA	Final Report (250 pages)
NU I	JWGA	Final Report (73 pages)
NU II	JWGA	
SIGMA I-66	JWGA	Final Report (90 pages)
SIGMA I-67	JWGA	Final Report (135 pages)
SIGMA II-67	JWGA	
BETA I	JWGA	Game Requirements (6 pages) Fact Book (65 pages) Final Report (45 pages)
BETA II	JWGA	
MU I-68	JWGA	Participant summary (2 pages)*
EPSILON 72	SAGA	Final Report (148 pages)*
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