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SUMMARY HISTORY OF NATO PLANNING EXERCISE

9-12 SEPTEMBER 1961

D R A F T

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~~History~~ Summary History of the Berlin ~~Wargaming~~ Political War Game

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The game was played at Camp David, 8 to 11 Sept, 1961.

I. THE NATURE OF THE GAME

The ~~Hungarian~~ teams are shown in annex A ~~of this history~~. ~~[illegible]~~ this summer

A ~~Two~~ substantially similar version~~s~~ of the game ~~have been~~ was played ~~to date~~, ~~one~~ at RAND in Santa Monica ~~and one at Camp David~~. The game ~~It~~ is played by a Blue Team, a Red Team and a Control Team. ~~Starting from a scenario which is provided to them and which presents "future history," each team makes plans and taken actions designed to achieve its objectives in the game environment. Over a series of planning cycles, each reacts to the visible actions of its opponent and to actions taken by control. After the actual play, further future developments are projected and the teams' play is evaluated.~~

The point of departure is a scenario, prepared in advance, which presents ~~one~~ a set of hypothetical events extending from the present to a future date. The scenario is designed to provide a climactic starting point, presenting each side with a pressing need for decision. ~~Military environment is specified in the form of realistic but simplified assumptions as to forces on both sides, their alert states and potentials.~~

The Blue team represents ~~not the NATO powers but~~ the government of the United States; the Red team ~~represents~~ Russia, but it is considered to have control over the governments of the Satellites. Control determines the behavior of the Allies, of neutrals and of any dissidents in the Bloc, domestic and world opinion, accidents, acts of God, in short, everything outside the direct control of the U.S. and S.U. governments.

No ¶ It is the responsibility of each team to carry out what it considers to be the best strategy for the government it portrays rather than to ~~do~~ ~~not what the team members consider to be the most likely strategy.~~ ~~It~~ Each team is free to take military, diplomatic act in the way it considers most likely.

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and propaganda
~~or other~~ action ~~not only in or~~ either directly associated with Berlin, ~~but~~ or anywhere in the world. ~~Any internal organization of the team, other than the designation of its captain, is up to the team. The captain is specified in advance.~~

[No 9] No ~~oral~~ direct communication between teams is permitted; verbatim written communication through Control is possible. Each team gets only "intelligence" on the moves of the other, not complete or completely reliable information.

The game is made up of a series of planning cycles. Each ~~of which~~ consists of ~~preparing Red and Blue~~ preparation of strategies by Red and Blue, and a new projection of the scenario by Control. The first cycle begins where the scenario ends; subsequent cycles begin where the new projection of the scenario ends. In each cycle ~~the~~ each team submits to Control planning documents indicating:

a. An estimate of the situation with a statement of its general objectives and an estimate of the adversary's general objectives.

b. An outline of main alternatives with their likely consequences; and an outline of main alternatives available to the adversary.

c. Detailed statement of strategy chosen, giving:

1. definite moves decided on;
2. contingent moves and what they depend on;
3. estimated adversary moves and responses.

~~No time passes during the team planning session, and~~ Both teams plan as of the same moment in time, ~~However~~ and, each team must project its strategies into the future as far as it feels it can make contingency plans.

~~After receiving the~~ On the basis of teams' planning documents ~~from the teams~~, Control makes the projections from which ~~begin~~ the next cycle begins. Control has two somewhat competing

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responsibilities: it ~~should~~ must channel the game into interesting avenues, and maintain~~ing~~ its ~~the~~ tempo, ~~of the game, and choosing decisive points in time for subsequent planning dates (the planning cycles have no predetermined duration and typically differ in number of game hours or days determined by Control to have passed between decision dates)~~. At the same time, Control ~~should not~~ must make only such decisions ~~for the teams which~~ as are ~~not~~ explicit or implicit in their ~~the~~ teams' strategies, and introduce such chance or extraneous events as are "realistic" in some sense. ~~Control, then, examines the strategies submitted by the teams,~~ determines where plans meet and lead to action, or fail to collide leaving inaction, disallows actions considered implausible or unduly diversionary, introduces actions and reactions by other countries, chance etc. and selects a game date for the next planning cycle. It provides both teams with intelligence on what has happened. The new planning cycle begins.

II. THE SCENARIO USED

The scenario carried events from 8 September to 8:00 p.m. 17 November 1961.

The German elections resulted in no major changes. The NATO powers continued at a moderate rate their build-up of conventional forces in Europe, and the alert state of SAC was raised, ~~as the weeks passed, command exercises and conferences on civil defense were held.~~ The British government was represented as going along rather reluctantly with the preparations, while the Adenaur regime pressed for more vigorous measures, but urged both East and West Germans to remain calm.

On 21 October Khrushchev signed a peace treaty with the GDR. ~~was signed~~. Khrushchev send ~~made clear~~ that the status of Berlin was subject to negotiation, but he made threats regarding the

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"abuse" of the access routes, ~~as a challenge to the sovereignty of the GDR.~~ ~~Following threats on 27 October, the GDR~~ On the 31st of October, the GRD announced that no military vehicles could cross GDR territory in an *armed state, and On 2 November ~~GDR authorities~~ demanded to inspect a western convoy en route to Berlin. The Allies refused, discontinued use of the Autobahn for military traffic and increased air traffic instead.

Over the next ten days, a west-bound commercial airliner was forced to land in East Germany, seven refugees were taken off and arrested. West Germany suspended interzonal trade. There was unrest in East Germany. There were rumors of a major split among the Allies.

On 12 November a commercial airliner crashed after being buzzed by a GDR fighter. The Allies introduced ~~tri-partite~~ fighter patrols in the corridor, and demanded that the Soviet Union prevent further air piracy by the GDR. The SAC alert was further raised.

On the 17th an American military cargo plane was forced into a crash ~~crashed~~, and ~~after radioing that it was pursuing the GDR fighter that had buzzed the transport~~ a French fighter escort failed to return to base. Within two hours the USSR announced that a GDR airfield had been strafed by an Allied plane, ~~Deaths and damage had been inflicted before the fighter was destroyed~~. The USSR promised full support for any military actions by the GDR.

~~Late on~~ The same ~~afternoon~~ day the GDR announced that after midnight any armed western aircraft in the corridors would be attacked. Transport aircraft

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would be permitted to use the corridor only if they were inspected before departure or at GDR fields en route. ~~Similar inspection would be demanded of surface military vehicles.~~

At 7:00 Brandt told a mass rally in West Berlin that the time of reckoning had come, that the GDR was testing Allied resolve, that for the West to accede to the GDR's demands would be to surrender Berlin.

Cycle I began at 8:00 p.m. November 17, 1961.

III. TEAM OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA, GAME RESULTS

A. Objectives

At the beginning of the game the Blue team stated that its objectives were:

1. To maintain Berlin as a viable city, maintaining freedom of access;
2. To avoid ~~any~~ U.S. responsibility for a "solution" contrary to West German aspirations (e.g., recognition of the division of Germany);
3. To avoid adding to the "Laos" and "Cuba" image of lack of resolution.

Red's initial objectives were:

1. To remove the difficulties caused by West Berlin;
2. To preserve the division of Germany and move toward a neutralization of West Germany;
3. Force the West to retreat and to be conscious of having done so;
4. Weaken NATO and further the process of United States retreat in Europe.

Both teams took as an overriding constraint, the avoidance of high risk of general nuclear war.

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Both teams estimated the other's objectives fairly accurately. ~~For the most part each understood the other well. Significant in many respects is the following statement from Red. "We emphasize that Blue demands (regarding a Berlin settlement) some formal and public commitment ... and will not be content with an ill-defined situation continuing at a high level of tension." Similarly, "We (Red) estimate that the Blue government is much more anxious about individual moves which might seem to threaten general war than we are."~~

B. Criteria

After the last planning session each team was asked a number of questions, including their list of major criteria which they considered had influenced them and their opponents in making decisions during the game.

Blue stated its ranking (decreasing importance) of criteria as follows:

1. Avoiding the risk of general war;
2. Maintaining the status of West Berlin;
3. Desire to produce in Red a belief that Blue was prepared to go to general war;
4. The state of NATO;
5. "We feared the risk of European war throughout, but... were willing to run risks of European war because we did not believe, as much as the Soviets probably do, that a European war will escalate into general war."

Red ranked its criteria as follows:

1. General war;
2. Blue general war alert status;
3. Status of East Germany (risk of revolt);

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4. Status of NATO;

5. Assessment of own inherent advantages;

6. Risk of European war.

Both sides agreed that the following were unimportant to either:

1. World opinion;

2. Cohesion of the Soviet Bloc;

3. Southeast Asia (and other areas);

4. Domestic morale.

C. Game Results

In response to the final questionnaire each team presented some aspects of its own evaluation of the game results. There was not always unanimity within each team.

1. Red felt that the over-all risk of general war was not much (predictably) changed. Blue felt that it had been reduced by the experience of surviving the crisis.

2. Blue felt that NATO was stronger. Red believed it weaker.

3. Blue believed that East Germany was weaker; Red felt it was at least as strong as at the beginning of play.

4. Red thought that at the end of the play Blue's willingness to go to general war (compare Blue's third criterion) was lessened. Blue thought that Red's was.

5. Blue thought that both the rate of the arms race and the chances of substantial arms control had increased. No Red reply.

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6. Blue felt that Red's most successful tactic was keeping the access in doubt. It most feared an invasion of West Germany, Red most feared Blue's moves threatening general war.

a. "Had we (Red) received a personal message from Macmillan (especially in circumstances which involved his departure from London and his appearance in a non-NATO location) to the effect that he . . . had lost any influence on the situation and that the U.S. appeared to him prepared to initiate a strategic strike unless considerable decrease in tension was achieved, we would have been quite alarmed. However, this would have worked only once."

b. "Blue underestimated our concern with general war." Blue made the same miscalculation in the previous run of the exercise at RAND.

D. Who Won?

Red statement: "Red won straight down the line. Blue's defeat in the Belin situation was so sizable as to swamp any (other) effects...Red made a great gain in Berlin at no immediate cost."

Blue statement: "Note that we got all our objectives. ...it is a victory for us."

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IV. DETAILS OF THE GAME HISTORY

The game proceeded to the conflicting conclusions just mentioned through four strategy planning cycles (of about 3-1/2 hours each) and a fifth cycle used for evaluation, ~~in response to the questionnaire already alluded to.~~ ~~The fifth~~ cycle was followed by informal plenary discussions over cocktails extending into the small hours and by a more ~~formal~~ after-breakfast session. Many of the conclusions of these discussions are being distributed to the participants ~~in the form of Notes by T. C. Schelling.~~

The problem for Red and Blue, at the beginning of the first cycle (8:00 p.m. 17 November 1961), was to react to the situation presented at the end of the initial scenario (see above, p - ?) ~~namely, a GDR ultimatum effective at midnight to destroy any~~ military aircraft in the corridor and to insist ~~on~~ inspection of all ground and air supply vehicles en route to or from West Berlin. (Civil traffic remained unmolested.) Willie Brandt had just made a speech that the time for reckoning had come and that acquiesence by the West was tantamount to surrender ~~of Berlin.~~

A. Cycle I:

1. Blue

Blue ~~immediately~~ sent a note to the Soviet Union demanding that ~~it force the~~ GDR to withdraw its threat. To allow time for the S.U. to act, Blue suspended all flights in the corridor for 48 hours, after which they ~~were~~ to be resumed, with force if necessary. Blue proposed to negotiate the dispute. Similar notes were sent to the Satellites; ~~but~~ these ~~notes also~~ added a guarantee of their borders unless there ~~should be~~ was war. Additional verbal moves consisted of calling a meeting of the NATO Council and a report to the U.N. Security Council.

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~~The only direct and immediate physical move was the suspension of airlift.~~ Preparatory moves ~~consisted of~~ were ordering 75 fighter-bombers from the ~~United States~~ to Europe, and a request to the NATO Council to put NATO forces on a general alert.

Blue's contingency plans ~~included an ambivalent decision with regard to the re-initiation of flights:~~ ~~if~~ re- initiated, they were to consist of an average ~~the~~ provided that 6 flights were of three transport flights per day, with escort, flying irregularly; ~~but~~ At the same time, Norstad was given secret orders not to ~~institute~~ re-initiate them ~~unless~~ until he received a specific go-ahead ~~orders~~ from Washington. Other moves which might be taken on the basis of some unspecified contingency: ASW attacks, attacks on one or two GDR airfields, develop assets for exploiting unrest in the Satellites but not exploit them, not precipitate revolt. If an extended air battle should develop a ground probe would be considered. ~~(Note, Blue subsequently pursued all these plans.)~~

Although Blue was anxious to achieve support from the Allies for its moves and plans, they were willing to take some unilateral measures.

2. Red

Red's policy was to let the situation remain as it was. They believed that occasional interruption of access would have detrimental effects on the morale and economy of West Berlin, but feared that a more war-like response might solidify the West. Red believed that a Blue offer to negotiate at this point ~~(neither team knew what the other was doing or planning)~~ would be a sign

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of weakness. They expressed concern about general war but thought it unlikely; what concerned them more was possible incitement of revolt in East Germany. Red was persuaded that they could control the level of violence because they expected that Blue would only match -- not over-respond to -- Red moves.

Red increased its air defense alert, ~~and moved 3 Soviet and 1 Polish divisions into East Germany~~ (~~"...counting on Polish dislike of Germans..."~~) and took ~~other~~ measures to control possible revolt in E. Germany.

Verbal moves consisted of a threatening talk by Khrushchev, who announced the perfection of a 100 MT bomb and automatic response to any Western initiation of nuclear war. Red proposed a conference on the basis of guaranteed access under "adequate safeguards."

The Red contingency plan for action in the air corridor was to attack about 20% of the transports, randomly selected. They planned to meet and force back (not destroy) any ground advance. If the West proposed negotiations they would accept.

Thus the first cycle ended in suspenseful inaction.

B. Cycle II:

Control projected the two strategies forcing (~~by letting the secret order to Norstad leak~~) Blue to initiate three transport flights on 19 November. Over the next several days 3 or 4 transports were shot down, as were a few fighters on both sides.

Control resorted to invention. Western political reaction to the delay and the limited airlift was largely one of disappointment at the "weakness"

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of the gesture, ~~but the U.K. expressed reservations as to continuing air action along the corridor. No U.N. action.~~

West Berlin was somewhat demoralized by the delay and the smallness of the airlift. There developed a mild exodus, unemployment and morale ~~had increased.~~ On the night of the 22nd a rally developed into a march of silence to Brandenburg Tor, and in turn into a mob. There were shots at the Sector border and the mob burst across. Some VOPO's joined the rebels. By 6:00 a.m. Berlin was in full revolt. Freedom fighters controlled major portions of East Berlin. Brandt broadcast pleas to the world to prevent another Budapest.

The new planning cycle began at 6:00 a.m. 23 November.

1. Blue:

The President ~~immediately~~ made a direct call to Adenauer, urging that he persuade Germans to be calm. Blue secured the sector border against communist intrusion and helped East Berliners to escape. Blue cancelled corridor flights on the 23rd with orders to resume them the next day, declared a general naval blockade and moved 75 more fighter-bombers to Europe.

Preparatory measures included increasing the number of SAC aircraft on airborne alert to 100 B-52's ~~(that is a capacity sufficient to carry the equivalent of one ton of TNT per capita for the entire Russian population).~~ ~~A~~ and declaration of a national emergency, ~~was declared~~. Five wings of B-47's were alerted for movement to Europe and equipped for delivery of iron bombs.

The United States promptly proposed a Security Council resolution to send observers to East Berlin and asked NATO to agree to a battalion-sized probe

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along the Autobahn. A note was sent to the S.U., saying the riots were the consequences of interference with access, showing that both have an interest in free access. The note also called upon the S.U., again, to guarantee access, and it threatened to attack the "sources" of interference with ~~the~~ air ~~corridor~~ access.

Plans were made for ~~instituting~~ six transport flights per day beginning the next day. A demonstration attack against one GDR airfield was planned if air attacks were made. A one-battalion probe would be coordinated with the attack on the airfield. If interference in the air corridor continued, three GDR installations, SAM sites, airfields or radar sites, would be attacked. Notes were sent to Satellites warning them that there would be attacks on "sources."

2. Red:

Red moved ~~quickly and ruthlessly~~ to suppress the revolt. It surrounded Berlin with Soviet troops. Reinforced its air and ground units in East Germany. Interposed S.U. divisions between GDR units and the western frontier. But Red explicitly avoided any threatening SUSAC moves.

Red planned to meet any ground action in kind and was confident of its ability to repulse it. Red would not raise or extend ground violence.

By several means Red tried to influence opinion particularly in NATO countries saying: The communists were restoring peace after West German aggression, which demonstrates that revanchist character of the regime. They asked U.S., French and British help in restoring order in Berlin, and they explicitly threatened Adenauer. They appealed to the Security Council to

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restore the status as it existed prior to the riots, and used the bloodshed as evidence that the Berlin situation had to be re-evaluated in toto.

C. Cycle III:

1. Control

~~In carrying forward the strategies of the last~~ Control developed considerable action prior to the third planning session. The U.S. Navy was reported to have seized about a score of Soviet ships and escorted them to neutral ports. Airlift was reumed with one transport attacked and destroyed. A GDR field was attacked and the battalion probe broke through the barrier east of Helmsted. By nightfall it had been stopped and then surrounded by East German forces which greatly outnumbered it.

In Berlin the revolt was brutally suppressed and the Western garrison took steps to restore order in West Berlin.

The two notes crossed~~, but were~~ delivered, ~~and there was no significant action in the U.N.~~

2. Blue

Blue sent a new note to the S.U. proposing that all military actions be stopped, that access be restored as it existed prior to the peace treaty. Supply flights were suspended for forty eight hours to permit the S.U. to consider the note. Blue threatened to call off the cease-fire and the suspension if the battalion were attacked.

Blue's direct actions were to move 30 agents into the S.U. and the Satellites to report on Red force movements, to increase the number of ferret flights, to tighten the blockade and to suspend airlift flights. Blue also

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declared a general mobilization in the United States and initiated short lead-time civil defense measures. The Air Force began to airlift 3 STRAC divisions to Europe. By this time France was approaching M-Day force levels. Further steps were taken to develop assets in East Germany for possible future uprising.

Blue planned to support the battalion with air power if it were attacked. If its note were rejected it would resume U-2 flights and would begin hunter-killer operations. They sought NATO concurrence on a corps-strength probe.

3. Red

Red was now worried over the very high level of SAC alert, ~~(although there was some dissention in the team)~~. ~~They worried~~ both because it constituted a great threat and because it made invulnerable to a Russian first strike so large an American force that the costs to Red of pre-emption would be exceedingly high. They still doubted that Blue would attack Russia directly, but decided to "utilize the American offer of negotiation in order to lower the tension ~~in order to~~ and ...achieve our objectives...in the negotiations and in the period of disillusionment in the West which will follow..." [NOTE the difference between the Red words transmitted in this cycle and the Red purpose as expressed above that accounted for the great difference between the teams in the interpretation of the game results.]

Red agreed to negotiate at Vienna and to make "suitable arrangements" for access. Simultaneously the 100 MT threat was renewed.

The battalion was not attacked and the way was opened for it to withdraw. No response was made to the blockade.

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D. Cycle IV:

1. Control

Control carried forward the strategies of the teams by establishing a meeting in Vienna for the 27th of November, permitting the airlift to be reinitiated that day and permitting the battalion to be withdrawn. Also, in view of the fact that the level of air alert was considered too great to be maintained indefinitely, Control reduced it to ~~fifty~~ 50 aircraft.

Control ~~forced events by the following:~~ also provided that: The Soviet Foreign Minister proposed a five power (including the GDR, excluding the FRG) guarantee of Allied rights under essentially the conditions demanded by the GDR with its ultimatum on the evening of 17 November. Lifting of the naval blockade was demanded as evidence of good faith. Free access by air and ground were promised during the negotiations.

During four days of negotiation the blockade and the western military build-up continued, with the SAC air-borne alert raised gradually to 72 B-52's. It was rumored that the British were disturbed by the risk of American unilateral action and might reconsider the B-47 and Thor bases. In West Berlin unemployment had risen to about 30% of the labor force, many West Berliners were escaping down the Autobahn, there were massive bank withdrawals. Early on the fourth day, 30 November, the Vienna conference recessed.

The final planning session was dated 4:00 p.m., 30 November.

2. Blue

Civil and military needs in Berlin were supplied by ground and air, accepting perfunctory GDR approval. Although air defense forces in Western Europe

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were increased and further resistance assets were developed in Eastern Europe, most Blue moves in the fourth cycle reduced pressures. SAC and NATO alerts were modestly reduced. The blockade was suspended and ferret flights decreased.

Blue proposed a technical commission to work out means of guaranteeing access, with free access during negotiations. For West Berlin a ten-year plan to develop the city was announced.

As for contingencies, Blue planned to refuse to comply with any demands to change ground access procedures. If air interception should be resumed Blue planned to attack all twenty large airfields in East Germany (with HE), to increase SAC alerts again and to wage a massive leaflet campaign in the Satellites, stressing American friendship, asserting that the FRG accepts the Order-Neisse line and urging non-ccoperation. After the 20-airfield attack Blue might propose as a means of stabilizing the situation a 200-mile demilitarized zone, through Germany, with special arrangements for Berlin.

3. Red

Red was pleased that the earlier high level of SAC air alert could not be maintained but was again concerned that it had built up again in Cycle III. Otherwise Red considered the situation favorable, particularly in view of its ability to cut off access at will.

Red undertook to attack ferret aircraft far off-shore with a new long-range interceptor to reduce Blue's confidence in the ability of its bombers to penetrate, and secretly to sink with submarines two neutral vessels in the hope of raising resentment against the blockade. Assassinations in North Africa, designed to look like NFL acts, were ordered, and rumors were spread to try to tie French forces down in North Africa.

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~~Red's contingency plans now became a matter of meeting what Blue might do.~~

On the diplomatic front Red ~~made specific proposals~~ proposed, that an official commission be established to discuss relations between the two Germanies, specifically travel between them and travel between the sectors in Berlin; offered to exchange guarantees of the territorial integrity of the two Germanies provided they drop out of NATO and the Warsaw Pact group; ~~they~~ invited Western observers to the next GDR elections in exchange for allowing Warsaw Pact observers at the next one in the FRD. To embarrass Adenauer, secret suggestions were made to him and to some of his opposition that in the negotiations the S.U. would support ~~very~~ extensive inter-zonal travel.

E. Aftermath

At this point the formal play of the game terminated and the teams were asked to evaluate their and their opponents' play. ~~In Section III above and in Schelling's Notes~~ there are comments on that evaluation.

end

The crisis had come to a head at the time of the riots in East Berlin, then had hung suspended for several days and went into negotiations in early December without markedly more chance of stabilising the situation than had existed at the beginning of play.

A superficial review of game events suggests that with regard to both general war and large scale war in Europe the world may be a more stable place than some think. Looking somewhat beneath the surface one finds that even in this game that conclusion may not be warranted.

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There were opportunities for accidents and misinterpretation throughout the game. The Red team did not let the very high level of SAC alert trigger it into pre-emption, in fact that alert dampened whatever thoughts Red gave to pre-emption. How the real Red team thinks is less clear. Further, at the end of the game Blue had contingency plans which would have dramatically expanded the violence -- attacking 20 airfields and initiating hunter-killer operations. So far as the game is concerned the fact that the appropriate contingency did not arise is partly a matter of accident.

Nevertheless, the fact that both teams took as an overriding constraint the avoidance of central war was largely responsible for the stability displayed.

Although the West had received a great defeat in letting the Berlin riots be suppressed and had gained no improvement in the situation immediately relating to access -- it had some purposely deceptive verbiage -- Blue had moved to a higher level of military power in Europe. It was thus beginning to bring into play its latent military superiority.

V. OBITER DICTA

Blue: "At times we took steps without the concurrence of Allies in order to save the alliance." This contrasted with the observation that some members of the Blue team acted as if they tacitly assumed that consultation with Allies was an end in itself.

Alexander George observed: Blue, perhaps like real-life Blue, has a tactical rather than a strategic frame of reference. Blue was preoccupied with improving its immediate situation at the expense of their basis objectives.

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Red: "Leaving any sector (in the face of a ground probe) to as many as two GDR divisions presents an unacceptable risk of defection and/or revolt..."

Red: "Exercising SAC and the like frightens the Allies of the U.S. and does not frighten us."

Red: "In general, if the West is just responsive..we take this as indication that they are very uneasy ...and are willing to let us control the level of force. If the West over-responds we may wish immediately to reduce the level of tension."

Blue, in specifying main alternatives at the beginning: "Of course the West could acquiesce to the Eastern demands. The consequence: Obviously the loss of Berlin, likely destruction of NATO; serious demonstration of weakness. Acquiescence after taking a beating in a fairly large but obviously limited war may have other consequences."

Blue made no plan for long-continued period of tension below the crisis level. Nor did it plan what it would try to accomplish if it achieved an advantage nor how it would try to strengthen the alliance if it were roundly defeated, politically or militarily.

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