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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

International Security Affairs

September 27, 1961

Refer to: I-16697/61

MEMORANDUM TO PARTICIPANTS IN ISA CONFERENCE (29 September - 1 October)

Attached are several documents relating to the exercise which should be brought to the Conference:

1. "Instructions for Red and Blue Teams", distributed herewith as an operational description of the technique to be employed. (S)

2. "Time Schedule", subject to minor changes but distributed as a supplement to the instructions to help visualize the procedure. (S)

3. Three brief draft "Scenarios", illustrative of a possible starting point of the game. One of these, in greater detail than the drafts enclosed, will be chosen as the point of departure. (S)

4. Memorandum regarding security. (U)

5. Tentative list of participants. (U) (You will be notified later of the composition of the teams.)

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File Berlin Game

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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ISA CONFERENCE

Instructions for Red and Blue Teams

I. Basic Scheme

1. The point of departure is a "scenario," prepared in advance, which carries events from the present to a future date. It is intended to be plausible, but not necessarily more plausible than a dozen alternative scenarios might be. It is designed to provide a climactic starting point, presenting each side with a pressing need for decision. Three such scenarios in brief form will be available to the participants in advance; one of these will be chosen for the exercise and made available in greater detail at the start of the exercise.

2. Certain military assumptions regarding available forces and their status, will be provided to Red and to Blue. Each will be provided appropriate intelligence about the other's military situation. For the most part these will be reasonable estimates projected to the opening date, somewhat modified by events in the scenario, and simplified to facilitate the game.

3. The game proceeds in a sequence of policy-planning stages. Each team evaluates the situation, identifies the principal strategies available to it, and determines a course of action. The course of action must be responsive to the anticipated actions of the other team; that is, it should contain contingent moves as well as definite moves, and specifies the response to alternative foreseeable moves by the adversary. Both Red and Blue do this simultaneously, as of a given point in time. The first such point in time--for the first policy planning session--is the point at which the initial scenario leaves off. Approximately three hours are allowed for each such stage.

4. For this purpose the Blue Team represents (or plans on behalf of) the United States Government, the Red Team represents the government of the Soviet Union. The Blue team does not control or represent the NATO Alliance. The Red team "controls" satellite governments--and in particular the GDR--to the extent it can be presumed to in reality. The control team will determine the actual behavior of other countries or of dissident elements within, say, the GDR.

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5. The Control team receives the planning documents from the Red and Blue teams at the end of the first policy-planning session. (No "game time" transpires during the policy-planning session; the teams develop their strategies as of the specified moment in time.) Using the plans of both Red and Blue, Control projects the original scenario to a second point in time, at which the second planning stage takes place. To the extent that Red and Blue actions are contingent on each other, Control must determine what actions are implied in the two plans taken together. Control superimposes such events as are outside the control of Red and Blue--e.g., third-country behavior, accidents or acts of God, outcomes of chance events. The starting point for stage two is thus the original scenario carried forward on the basis of the Red and Blue plans and Control's manipulation of outside events.

6. "Scenario" material for the second policy-planning stage is thus provided by Control. It indicates to Red and Blue what their actions were and what the consequences have been. It provides to each side appropriate intelligence about the other's action and about events and third-country behavior.

7. The second planning stage proceeds then like the first, is followed by another projection of events by Control, and a third stage, and a fourth.

8. At the end of the fourth planning session both teams are given the full documentation of the other team--the other team's planning documents and the other team's intelligence as provided by Control along the way. Each team thus has retroactive access to the other's estimates, statements of intent, etc. A fifth session is then devoted to a projection by each team of likely outcomes. Red, Blue, and Control separately prepare their evaluations and projections with full access to all the documents, and these three projections are distributed to all participants.

9. A sixth and final session is a plenary discussion of the entire experience.

II. Detailed Structure of the Planning Cycles

10. A "Cycle" consists of a Red-Blue planning session and a projection session by Control. The policy-planning documents submitted by a team to Control, at the close of a policy-planning session, will be referred to as the team's "strategy." The materials provided to the teams at the outset of the policy-planning session will be referred to as Control's "projection."

11. Upon receipt of scenario materials from Control at the outset of a planning session, Red and Blue teams may direct written "Questions" to Control, to which they will receive written "Responses." The purpose of these queries is to clarify unintended ambiquity in the scenario material, to check with Control any questionable assumptions the team will make, or to elicit supplementary materials on matters that Control was insufficiently responsive or informative on. Ordinarily these queries should be received by Control within the first half hour of the planning session. The queries need not all be collected in a single document; queries should be sped to Control as they arise.

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12. For the first session it is expected that such queries may be extensive, and will relate to preparation or actions that the teams will wish to assume they had taken prior to the opening of the game. For that reason a special session on the scenario will be held by each team on Friday evening. Teams will receive the scenario at that time and will have a two-hour session to familiarize themselves with the context, to discuss general strategy, to prepare their estimates of the situation and of the alternatives and to address queries to Control. Control's response and supplementary scenario material will be available at the start of the session on Saturday morning.

13. It allowing Red and Blue to make certain prior assumptions Control will be permissive within two important limitations. First, such assumptions must be consistent with the scenario and not too dependent on hindsight. Second, additions to the scenario requested by Red or Blue that would entail a response or countermove by the other team will usually be disallowed to avoid "gaming" the scenario retroactively.

14. At the end of each strategy session Control may direct queries to Red and Blue. These will be to elicit fuller or clearer detail at those points in the plan that Control (with access to the other team's strategy) foresees as critical. Control queries will be in writing, should be delivered within the first half hour after the planning documents are in, and should be answered promptly by Red or Blue.

15. Control will have an observer sitting in the room with each team. The observer will keep Control posted on developing plans of the team, to expedite Control's own preparations. The observer will sit with control during the "projection" phase of the cycle to help inform Control of the team's intentions and understandings. The observer will particularly be alert to any mistaken assumptions or interpretations of the team that need to be ironed out or coordinated with Control. The observer will help Control in the interpretation of queries received from the team. The observer will not be used by the team as a direct line of communication with Control.

16. Ordinarily Red and Blue will not communicate orally with each other or with Control. An exception may occur in connection with military matters. Direct consultation between the military members of Red or Blue and Control's military advisers may be necessary to iron out essential assumptions as to what military actions are feasible, how long they might take, what signals they would provide to the opponent, etc.

17. Certain military details will be displayed on maps. The purpose is partly to facilitate the team's appreciation of military resources and events, partly to provide a visual check on the consistency of team and Control assumptions about military resources and events. Team plans will make reference to maps where appropriate, and Control's military advisers may consult with team military members to verify plans or to clarify projections with reference to the map displays.

18. The exact form in which Red and Blue submit their strategies (planning documents) is up to them. They should include:

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a. An estimate of the situation with a statement of general objectives and an estimate of the adversary's general objectives, and an estimate of the effect of its own strategic deterrent on the adversary and of the extent to which the adversary's strategic force is operating as a deterrent.

b. An outline of main alternatives with their likely consequences; and an outline of main alternatives available to the adversary.

c. Detailed statement of strategy chosen, giving:

1. definite moves decided on;

2. contingent moves and what they depend on;

3. estimated adversary moves and responses.

19. Direct communication between US and SU governments may be indicated in the form of messages (e.g., notes, broadcasts) that are to be passed verbatim to the other team for the next cycle. Actions taken secretly or conspicuously should be so described to facilitate Control's transmittal of appropriate intelligence to the other team for the next cycle.

20. The projection provided by Control for each cycle will necessarily be brief and selective. For this reason Control will need to be aware of the emphasis teams attach to different issues and activities--e.g., to intelligence of particular kinds, to alliance problems, world opinion, alert state and deployment of strategic forces, military tactics, etc. The observers will help Control to be responsive to the teams' interests; but teams should be as candid and informative as they can be on their main interests at each stage.

21. The strategies of each team are the responsibility of the team captain; he may use his team members as staff or line officers, as seems best. The internal organization--if any--of Red and Blue teams is up to the teams. It is not intended that team members "represent" agencies or cabinet posts or any such thing. Any division of labor is an internal team matter. The one organizational requirement indicated by experience with this type of game is that the Captain must exercise authority. The time schedule requires this. Efficiency in reaching decisions and getting them on paper is essential to the pace of the exercise.

22. The teams are to develop the best strategies they can that are consistent with American or Soviet objectives. The Red team, in particular, is not to imitate or predict Soviet behavior but to explore what the Soviets can do and elect the most effective strategies. (The Red team is not comprised of specialists on Soviet behavior.)

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23. The teams are not directed to confine their attention to Berlin, or to Germany, or to Europe. If events dictate, or if strategies are so chosen, strategic forces or events and interests outside the theater may become a dominant preoccupation. Control will use its unseen hand to keep actions from becoming too diffuse; but, in principle, Red and Blue are deciding national strategy in a crisis, not just local or regional strategy.

III. The Control Team's Responsibilities

24. The Control team has two somewhat competing responsibilities. One function is to channel the game in interesting directions, maintaining the tempo of the game, and choosing decisive points in time for the successive policy-planning stages. In doing this it utilizes the variables under its control--third countries, chance events, selective intelligence flows to the teams, etc. It thus plays a more active role than a "referee." Since time is short and only four policy-planning stages will fit, Control must actively force the pace of events.

25. At the same time, Control must not make major decisions for Red and Blue. It must, as far as possible, project the explicit and implicit strategies of the teams and not commit them to decisions inconsistent with their strategies. Control must also stay within bounds of plausibility in the events it controls. Thus it must "guide" events in a plausible way within the strategies developed by Red and Blue. How faithfully it can project Red and Blue decisions will of course depend on how well those teams have identified contingencies and specified their actions and responses.

26. Military actions will likely be involved and may become dominant. The object is not, however, to explore or test the tactical implications of military plans; this is not a "war game." Control's military evaluations must be plausible but beyond that will be a compromise with time and will be responsive to the need to guide the game. Military detail may at times be exceedingly significant for political decisions, but military detail for its own sake is not the object.

27. Control will "leak" intelligence to Red and Blue, both intelligence of its own invention about the variables under its control, and intelligence about actions determined by the teams. Where the detail provided in team plans is insufficient to determine what the other team should "observe," Control will be obligated to flesh out the details of an action--within the spirit of the team's strategy, as far as possible. Control may give conflicting intelligence to Red and Blue if circumstances warrant, still within bounds of plausibility.

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TENTATIVE TIME SCHEDULE

Friday

7:30 to 8:00 PM	Orientation, administrative arrangements, discussion of scenario.
8:00 to 10:00 PM	Teams hold preliminary meetings on scenario, prepare questions for control, prepares estimate of situation and and outline of main alternatives.
9:30 to 10:30 PM	Control, prepares, responses to questions.

Saturday

7:45 to 8:00 AM	Coffee and rolls in snack bar.
8:00 to 11:00 AM	Planning session, cycle I- prepare detailed strategies
11:00 to 11:30 AM	Observers brief control, strategies delivered to control.
11:30 to 12:00 AM	Teams respond to controls questions.
12:00 to 2:00 PM	Team lunch - lunch bar or Sarris' Resturant Control prepares projection of Cycle II.
2:00 to 5:00 PM	Planning session, cycle II
5:00 to 5:30 PM	Observers brief control, strategies delivered to control.
5:30 to 6:00 PM	Teams respond to controls questions.
6:00 to 8:00 PM	Dinner - Sarris' Resturant Control prepares projection for Cycle III
8:00 to 10:30 PM	Planning Session - Cycle III
10:30 to 11:00 PM	Control and Team captains confer on questions.
11:00 -	Control prepares projection for Cycle IV

Sunday

8:45 to 9:00 AM	Coffee and rolls in snack bar.
9:00 to 12:00	Planning session - Cycle IV
12:00 to 12:30 PM	Observers brief control. Strategies delivered to control.
12:30 to 1:00 PM	Teams respond to controls questions.
1:00 to 2:30 PM	Lunch - Teams and control - Resturant and snack bar.
2:30 to 4:00 PM	Full documentation provided to all participants

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Sunday (continued)

2:30 to 4:00 PM	Reading period, teams' preliminary discussion Control initiates preparation of its projection.
4:00 to 6:30 PM	Teams and control prepare final projections
6:30 to 7:30 PM	Supper - Snack bar
7:30 to 8:00 PM	Control prepares agenda for plenary session. Projections distributed, reading.
8:00 to 10:30 PM	Plenary session.

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ISA CONFERENCE

BRIEF SCENARIO #1

It is November 17, 1961, 8 P.M., Berlin time. These are pertinent events up to this point.

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Following the sealing off of East Berlin, resumption of nuclear tests and a short period of great tension, events in Berlin remained tense but indecisive throughout the late summer and early fall.

In the United States a military buildup progressed in line with the President's speech of July 25. West German troop strength continued to increase and the draft was increased to two years. The German elections decreased Adenauer's strength in the Bundestag; and made less secure his position, but there were no signs of major change in German foreign policy.

The much anticipated "Berlin negotiation" did not occur. The Soviets and the West retained their positions on a separate peace treaty, and the status of Berlin.

In early October it was announced that the peace treaty with the GDR would be signed before the end of the month. Khrushchev made clear that the status of West Berlin was still subject to negotiation, that citizens of that city would be safe unless western adventurism put them in jeopardy. He particularly warned against Western efforts to use its so-called "supply problem" in Berlin as an excuse for violating the integrity of GDR. There is no supply problem and there

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need be none, he said, so long as the Western powers do not make illegal use of their obsolete "occupation rights" to violate GDR sovereignty.

The ceremony took place on October 21st. Breaths were held; but nothing happened for a week. On Friday, October 27, the GDR announced that the Allied powers were abusing their access to Berlin: Citizens of GDR, guilty of crimes against the state, were being flown through GDR airspace. This must cease or the GDR would be obliged to exert its sovereign rights over aircraft passing through its airspace.

On October 31 East German authorities dramatically announced that they would permit no further armed penetration of their borders. The transport of military equipment might proceed; armed penetration would not be tolerated. Specifically this meant that armed, combat-ready equipment might not proceed across East German territory except in accordance with legitimate treaties.

On November 2 military vehicles en route to West Berlin were stopped at the border. GDR authorities conveyed that combat vehicles must be inspected to assure that such vehicles "transported" to Berlin were not combat ready and not on an "armed mission". Accusing the GDR of trumping of fake issues, the Allies refused to submit to such inspection. A substantial increase in military airlift took place.

On November 9 a commercial aircraft flying from Berlin, bound for West Germany, was forced to land at an East German airfield. The East German radio announced that a "smuggling operation" involving East German criminal escapees had been intercepted in East German

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airspace, and warned that unless the practice stopped commercial aircraft would be forced to submit to inspection, either in Berlin or at airfields in the GDR. The action was hotly denounced by the Western Allies.

As a result of the incident West Germany suspended interzonal trade. A high state of nervousness was reported among the East German populace. GDR police were subjected to increased security measures. The United States ordered U.S. citizens travelling in Iron Curtain countries to return home. Macmillan in Commons stressed that this was a time to remain calm; one false move could send the world over the brink of war. The NATO Council was in constant session with rumors leaking of a major split in the alliance over a hard or soft line.

On November 12 another commercial plane was buzzed en route from Berlin. It crashed, no survivors. The Western Allies initiated a fighter patrol of the air corridors, announcing that any interference with flights would be treated as a hostile attack. GDR announced it would initiate its own fighter air patrol. The situation -- they announced -- is fraught with the peril of war; the Allied fighter aircraft will not be tolerated longer than necessary for the Allied governments to retract their illegal action.

The French, British, and U.S. Governments, all represented in the escort operation, denounced the concept of GDR airspace in the Berlin air corridors, denounced the piracy of the GDR in molesting air traffic and causing an aircraft to crash, vowed to continue providing for the security of Eastern European refugees seeking freedom in the

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west, and stated that the air corridors would be patrolled as long as East German molestation made it necessary.

On November 17 an American military cargo aircraft crashed in the Berlin corridor. A French fighter aircraft failed to return to base, the pilot having announced by radio that he and a cargo aircraft had been buzzed by a GDR plane, that the cargo aircraft was in trouble, and that he was going in pursuit of the East German plane. Two hours later the world was startled at a USSR announcement that Allied plane straffed GDR airbase; this has all characteristics of "undeclared war" on an ally of the USSR; GDR has full military support of USSR in any action it deems necessary to its integrity and security.

At 4 P.M. local time East German Radio broadcast message from GDR to Allied Governments, along following lines:

> Henceforth -- starting midnight -- any combat aircraft will be summarily despatched upon entrance to GDR airspace. Transport aircraft will be permitted, but only subject to the following safeguard to assure against any breach of the frontier: transport aircraft wishing to use the air corridors to Berlin must be manifestly unarmed. Any transport aircraft wishing to cross the GDR frontier will submit to inspection by GDR diplomatic officials prior to take-off, or alternatively will submit to escort and will land at designated GDR airfields for examination prior to proceeding to or from Berlin. Similar inspection by GDR will apply to military transport on surface routes.

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At 7 P.M. Mayor Willy Brandt broadcast a vigorous statement that a reckoning had come; that GDR was testing Allied resolve; that the West, however weak it has been in the past, would not accede to the GDR threat -- to do so would be to surrender Berlin; that the Berliners should be confident in the face of this Soviet bluff and show by their actions the stuff the West is made of.

It is 8 P.M. Berlin time, November 17, 1961.

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ISA CONFERENCE

BRIEF SCENARIO #2

The date is February 1, 12 noon Berlin time, and the following has happened since September 15:

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In October 1961, December 31st was announced as firm date of a GDR peace treaty, unless prior agreement were reached with the West on an all-German peace treaty. Soviet pressure for an early Summit was stepped up. The Soviet Union consented to a Foreign Ministers' Conference; the conference broke up November 30th, after two weeks of acrimonious debate.

Khrushchev renewed his call for a 4-power Summit, hammering on December 31st as his deadline, but not revealing any fresh negotiating positions. On December 20th, the U.S. gained reluctant consent by Britain and France to rejecting Khrushchev's "absolutely final" summit date, December 26th.

Khrushchev's reaction was vehement in condemning the war-mongers. He disclosed that if the West had accepted his Summit call, he would have come with new disarmament proposals. As to Berlin, he was forced to pursue his long-announced policy, hoping that reason would prevail in the West. If not, force would be met with devastating force.

On New Year's Eve, the Peace Treaty was solemnly signed. While the Treaty was declared effective immediately, it provided for a month's transition period during which the USSR would exercise its functions on

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access to Berlin. Midnight, January 31st, GDR authorities would assume these functions fully, all Soviet personnel be withdrawn, and all Allied military rights in Berlin declared null and void, subject to renegotiation with GDR authorities.

Some U.S press comment interpreted this as a "backdown", confirming once more that Khrushchev's ultimata were not to be taken seriously. More cautious comments spoke of a short breathing spell.

EVENTS IN BERLIN AND GERMANY

The sealing-off of the sector border had not brought explosive developments. A few refugees continued to enter West Berlin daily.

Outward calm in Berlin was facilitated by firm measures by West Berlin authorities to prevent provocative demonstrations by West Berliners. West Berlin morale remained moderately high but economic indicators showed some soft spots. In early December, an unusual number of West Berliners departed for early Christmas vacations in West Germany.

Latent unrest in East Germany subsided, as a result of (1) inconspicuous repressive measures against active discontents, (2) a wait-and-see attitude encouraged by Western firmness, (3) an announcement that the USSR (enabled by its 1961 bumper crop) had extended massive credits to the GDR, and publicity on the imminent institution of NEP-type policies in the GDR, involving retreat from collectivization.

WEST GERMANY

Although the election resulted in a weakening of Adenauer's position there was no evidence of a major shift in German foreign policy.

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Interzonal trade had been stopped October 15th, but United States efforts to extend the embargo through NATO actions resulted only in inconclusive consultations which dragged on into January. The USSR and satellites promoted indecision by offering large-scale orders to Western European concerns.

UNITED KINGDOM

The government's strong efforts to persuade Washington of the need for negotiation and summitry were evidenced in the press and parliamentary debate. Other issues diverted British interest: The economic austerity program failed to stave off an imminent balance-of-payments crisis, while exacerbating Labor opinion, causing much public disgruntlement, and raising inhibitions against tampering with East-West trade. In January a new threat to Hong Kong (see below) provided further distractions, and gave rise to commentaries on Britain's "hopelessly overextended defense commitments."

FRANCE

On December 1st the government of Tunisia and the Algerian government in exile announced a pact to meet French military power by force and to divide the French-claimed spoils in the Sahara. The pact had strong and unexpected UAR backing, but there was no evidence of Sino-Soviet instigation or aid.

The agreement signalled the start of terrorist operations all over Algeria, countered by French military reinforcements and increasingly uncontrolled French civilian counter-terrorism. In mid-December Paris informed

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Washington that it would be unable to add to French NATO commitments. In mid-January, Paris secretly informed Washington that by February 15th it would have to start moving two NATO-committed divisions to Algeria.

MIDDLE EAST

Sudden indications of an UAR-Iraqi rapprochement in December were followed, early in January, by offers to Kuwait and Jordan to join a new Arab Union, with indications that the offer would be implemented by force if refused.

AFRICA

Portuguese claims to have subdued rebellion in Angola were refuted by violent outbreaks there and in Mozambique. All Portuguese military resources were committed to Africa by the end of 1961, and Afro-Asian anti-Portuguese sentiment rose to an explosive peak.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Increased U.S. support had led to limited successes against Viet Cong, and Pathet-Lao and Viet Minh forces in Laos. U.S.-supported guerrilla inroads into North Viet Nam, started in October, had also found indigenous support and, by mid-January, had established several promising bases for extending these operations. North Viet Nam counteraction (with moderate Soviet airborne logistic support, and definite signs of low-level Chinese participation) had been vigorous and tended to expand the scale of operations and of U.S. commitments in Indochina, without preventing the initial successes of U.S.-backed forces. These successes led to expressions

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of interest by Thailand, and even Burma, in active participation, given much-increased U.S. support. There were ominous indications of massive Chicom preparations for "volunteer" intervention.

CHINA

A mending of Sino-Soviet relations was unexpectedly heralded by Chou En-Lai's appearance in East Berlin, where he signed the Peace Treaty. A few days later, Moscow and Peking announced an impressive agreement on economic, technical and scientific cooperation, backed by Soviet cancellation of all Chinese debts, a large credit to finance industrial expansion, and large Soviet grain export commitments (out of the same bumper crop).

In mid-January, the Chicom press launched a campaign on the theme that the "Free City" solution for West Berlin provided the perfect precedent for solving the anomaly of Hong Kong. A confidential note proposing immediate negotiations to this end was handed to the British Charge d'Affaires in Peking on January 26. By January 31st, London had passed confidential word to Washington about receipt of the note. By that date, Washington had also received a report passed by hitherto reliable satellite channels that the secret Sino-Soviet talks held in December had also led to agreement for USSR to provide large-scale assistance to Chicom nuclear and missile program, and as an interim measure, to supply and deploy a nuclear MRBM capability in China under joint Sino-Soviet control.

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UNITED NATIONS

Mounting Afro-Asian agitation over events in Africa, the Middle East, and S.E. Asia led to a special session of the General Assembly which started January 24, its agenda replete with anti-colonialist, anti-militarist, anti-Western resolutions. The USSR and other Soviet Bloc Delegations were reticent, and let Afro-Asians do the talking.

The United States -- its diplomatic and policymaking resources taxed to saturation point -- did its best to antagonize neither its NATO allies, nor the Afro-Asians. January 30 when the Assembly adjourned for a two-day recess, detached observers felt that the United States had pleased neither, and antagonized both.

PLANS FOR BERLIN DEADLINE

Although distracted by the varied events in January, the United States tried to concert with NATO its contingency plans for Berlin. Major military plans remained unaltered, except for a decision to alert one STRAC division for deployment in Germany by February 28, and to activate two more National Guard divisions.

Over British reluctance, the U.S. secured acceptance of plan to test GDR early in the morning of February 1 by sending a small elite force of U.S. reinforcements, with associated equipment, to Berlin; 20 vehicles are involved. Orders are to submit to routine clearance by GDR but to return if presented with inspection or other demands, or physical obstacles, or threat of force, and not to fire unless fired upon. This force crosses the border at 8 a.m. local time; GDR authorities

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go through minimal routine clearance processes but advise officer in charge that he will be subject to further clearance procedures en route. At 9:30 a.m., about 15 miles east of Magdeburg, the convoy meets advance motorcycle elements of a GDR military convoy travelling west on both sections of the autobahn. Traffic ahead has been stopped to let the GDR convoy pass. The U.S. force is instructed to stop; personnel are instructed to remain in the vehicles. Steady radio communication having been maintained, events to this point are clearly known to the Allied commander at Helmstedt.

Events then become confused. U.S. troops dismount and apparently a GDR motorcycle hits an American soldier and smashes into a U.S. truck. In the confusion and noise shots are heard. The American troops take defensive positions on both sides of the autobahn. GDR armored vehicles occupy the autobahn, others slowly encircle the U.S. position. No fighting occurs. At 12 noon the Allied commander at Helmstedt is contacted by GDR authorities and requested to instruct the U.S. troops in East Germany to return to their vehicles and return to Helmstedt to avoid an aggravation of the "incident". GDR radio announces that a token force of American troops have taken defensive positions upon contact with a sizeable GDR military convoy; that it is not clear whether this is a contrived incident or an unfortunate consequence of American blundering; that GDR troops are in complete control of the situation; that the American troops have been asked to evacuate at once; and that Allied behavior has evidently made the existing situation untenable.

The time is 12 noon, Berlin time, February 1, 1962.

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ISA CONFERENCE

BRIEF SCENARIO #3

The time is 1:00 a.m., November 1, 1961. These are principal events leading up to this time:

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The sealing off of East Berlin in mid-August was followed by striking evidences of unrest and disaffection in East Germany. Large-scale arrests of alleged foreign agents, saboteurs, trouble-makers, and would-be escapees were reported throughout East Germany. Protests against food shortages were reported to be widespread and taken as an indication of general discontent. In many cities, East German police were conspicuously unenergetic in enforcing repressive measures against disorderly groups of protestors. Increasing numbers of police and military personnel defected into West Berlin and asked asylum. Substantial reshuffling of top GDR military personnel was reported. Simultaneous appearance of an "underground" news sheet in several East German cities indicated organized resistance; its news reports of arrests, acts of sabotage, food shortages, personnel changes, and other isolated events were quick and reliable, indicating a high degree of organization and good communication.

Charging that West Berlin was the center of such illegal activity, the GDR cut telephone communication with West Berlin on October 1,

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continued widening the "no man's land" between East and West Berlin by closing up buildings, and stopping entry from West Berlin into East Berlin of all except allied military personnel. October 20, apparently tipped off, GDR police doubled their security guards around the West Berlin perimeter and rolled up unprecedented numbers of armored vehicles. At dark, evidently by prearrangement, mobs formed in East Berlin at several points only a few hundred yards from West Berlin; a number of fires broke out in the vicinity, explosions were heard, and the mobs moved quickly toward the barricades separating East and West Berlin. At all points but one, barricades, tear gas, and water pressure were successfully used to stop and disperse the mobs; but at _____the crowd tangled with police at close quarters, searchlights were destroyed, and in the confusion several persons made it across the barricades. A GDR tank broke its way through the barricade in apparent pursuit but, having opened a swath, pulled off to one side; the crew escaped to West Berlin. Several score East Germans made it through the gap before GDR tanks moved in to close it. Most of the crowd escaped back into East Berlin in the confusion; several score were arrested.

October 21, another GDR tank on border duty crashed the barricade, and the crew defected. Ostensibly pursuing the tank and plugging the gap, several additional border guards defected. The night of October 21, Soviet armored vehicles replaced East Germans along the Berlin sector border. During the following week, GDR military units in the area west and south of Berlin were reported being separated from their armor and most vehicles; many units were moved eastward and replaced by Soviet troops.

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The night of October 27 riots broke out in a dozen East German cities. In several instances, GDR troops sent in to support the police defected, joined the uprising, took up defensive positions, and used local radio stations to call for general revolt. Before dawn, Soviet troops were in motion to isolate all GDR army units; by early morning, numbers of GDR troops throughout the country had joined the uprising. In most instances they retreated into the nearest city or town, joined or initiated rebellion, assumed defensive positions, and denounced the Soviet occupation, calling for Western help. Widespread sabotage of transport and communication links slowed the Soviet countermeasures; and on October 30, large numbers of GDR MIG 15's straffed USSR air-fields in East Germany and fled to the west, many of them crash landing in open fields across the western border.

On October 31 all was confusion. Most cities in East Germany, with the notable exception of East Berlin and Magdeburg, appeared either to be in rebel hands with GDR military units collaborating, or else to be without effective government. Soviet army units were moving slowly to cut off and surround a number of cities; Soviet troops appeared to be in command of all airfields, but extensive sabotage to aircraft and POL had occurred at most fields, some of it by defecting armed aircraft. In _____Soviet troops had begun a "Budapest-type" invasion of the city. The night of October 31, identical announcements were repeated over and over on most radio stations in rebel hands:

The USSR--the announcement reported--had reinstituted a crushing re-occupation of what was to have become the German Democrated Republic.

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It had reversed the movement toward GDR independence, reinstituted repressive measures, and attempted to disarm GDR military forces. Instead of a "peace treaty", military occupation of the worst sort had been resumed. Spontaneous revolt had become organized, but it had no more chance than Budapest to hold out against Soviet military might. The Soviets were already using fire, tanks, and aircraft to massacre the people of East Germany. Only help from the West, within hours, could prevent the bloody suppression of East German self-determination. The West, and especially Germans west of the iron curtain, could not this time shirk their civilized obligations to intervene and demand Soviet withdrawal. The alternative is disaster at Soviet hands.

At dawn, November 1, a rebellious GDR army force, approximately in regimental strength, evaded Soviet encirclement and reached the border southwest of Gera. There it overcame Soviet border guards, demolished barriers, and took up defensive position on the border itself. A patrol made contact with West German military units in the area and asked for support to keep the border open.

In East Berlin absolute round-the-clock curfew reigns.

It is 1 a.m., November 1, 1961.

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ISA CONFERENCE

SECURITY PROCEDURES

The following security procedures will apply during the conference:

Entrance to and exit from the building will be limited to the main door of the Military Assistance Institute (MAI).. Each participant will be issued an identification card which will be handed to the Security Guard on entering or leaving the building. The Guard will then ask the bearer's name, check the master roster, and return the card to the bearer.

The MAI is a TOP SECRET facility. Consequently, conference papers and maps may be left in place at the conclusion of each day's activities. A Security Guard will continuously patrol the conference area when the conference is not in session.

No classified material generated at the conference will be removed from the building. All conference material will be considered as "working papers" and will be destroyed at the conclusion of the conference. During the week of 9 - 13 October each participant will receive a complete set of all conference papers (Administrative, Red and Blue).

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ISA CONFERENCE

Tentative List of Participants

White House

MacGeorge Bundy *

Carl Kaysen

Robert Komer

Henry Kissinger

OSD

Harry Rowen

George Carroll

Lawrence McQuade

Colonel DeWitt Armstrong

Colonel Tobias Philbin

Alain Enthoven

CIA

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[redacted]

USIA

Alfred Boerner

State

Martin Hillenbrand

(& 2 others to be named)

Abram Chayes

Richard N. Gardner

Jeff Kitchen

Ray Garthoff

JCS

Colonel Lucius Clay

Colonel Kenneth Field

Colonel Ernest Hardin

RAND

Daniel Ellsberg

Malcomb Hoag

Alan Ferguson

Tom Schelling

Leon Goure

* Limited Participation

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