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THE U. S. AND THE U. S. S. R. IN IRAN

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POLITICAL EXERCISE II -

The US and the USSR in Iran

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
December 1960

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

I Foreword

On September 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1960 the Center for International Studies conducted its second Political Exercise, once again at Endicott House in Dedham, Mass. In general terms, the purpose was to carry a step further our continuing experimentation in the simulation of a crisis-type political situation in an exercise characterized by brevity, economy, and high professional quality of the participants.*

The Center's previous political exercise in 1958 was undertaken for the light it might throw on the potentialities and limitations of the gaming technique. Our interest was in the potential uses of gaming both as an educational tool, and as a device for testing hypotheses developed in the course of more traditional studies about international relations and in conventional policy planning. In POLEX II -- the 1960 game -- we wished to go a step further and see if we could learn more about the value of the game technique as a source of insights into possible alternatives, both political and military.

*For details on previous experiments at M.I.T. see Bloomfield, Lincoln P., Report and Analysis of Political Exercise, September 1958, (C/58-21 Revised, ditto) Center for International Studies; Bloomfield, Lincoln P. and Padelford, Norman J., "Three Experiments in Political Gaming", American Political Science Review, December, 1959; and Bloomfield, Lincoln P., "Political Gaming", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1960.

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which might be available to American foreign policy in the event of a serious diplomatic crisis involving American-Soviet relations. We particularly wished to learn more about the gaming of a simulated crisis with the Soviet team playing a "realistic" strategy but with the US side playing a "deviant" or "optimal" strategy; also to learn more about gaming with a minimum number of teams and somewhat formalized rules for moves, while still attempting to simulate real-life pressures on real-life governments.

Substantively, our purpose was to expose the alternatives open to the United States and the extent to which various factors might be determinative in a Soviet-American confrontation arising out of a new Middle East crisis along a sensitive Soviet frontier. We were interested in the interaction of diplomatic and military alternatives at critical choice points, and their effects on possible outcomes. Such alternatives would include both diplomatic and military moves, with a particular view to considering, among other things, at what points and in what degree the military moves would either increase or prejudice the chances of a peaceful settlement. The problem we chose centered on a hypothetical civil-war situation in Iran, with the United States supporting the Shah and his forces and with the Soviet Union becoming increasingly associated with the rebel group.

This report deals exclusively with the substance of the problem as we gamed it out. Our findings and conclusions from the standpoint of technique and method will be contained in a separate report. This

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report has been prepared for those, chiefly within the US Government, whose primary concern is not so much with the methodology of political gaming as with the issues of diplomatic, military, and economic foreign policy raised in the exercise. The second section of this first Part describes the setting in which the problem was gamed, with only enough description of the techniques employed to orient the reader who may be unfamiliar with this device.

Part Two is a summary of the strategies and moves made by the two teams, representing the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as moves made by the Control Team which consisted of the two umpires and their expert advisers. Mr. Richard W. Hatch, who served as game historian, prepared Part Two of this report. He has summarized the main events of the game, the principal alternatives considered by the two teams, the basic strategies decided upon by them, and the tactical moves designed to carry out their strategy. A few of the teams' written moves are reproduced verbatim in order to expose in needful detail such contingency planning as was done. However, readers with a special interest in the fine detail of the exercise might wish to consult the full record of written moves. For their convenience we have prepared a small number of supplements to this report, containing all relevant written moves.

In Part Three I have ventured some observations about lessons learned from the game in the realm of foreign policy or in terms of further researchable areas of inquiry. In offering these observations

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I have drawn freely on the comments of other participants without making individual attributions.

The political sensitivity of this material will be apparent to the reader, and it is requested that it be treated with appropriate caution. In general we have considered the exercise to be an integral part of our scholarly endeavors--which indeed characterized the spirit in which the participants took part, including participants from government. But at the same time we have taken a number of steps to minimize the possibility of embarrassment to our government which might ensue if the material was misused or placed in unfriendly hands. The first step was to protect the privacy of the participants, some of whom were senior government officials. None of them is identified in any report on the exercise, nor will they be. In addition, no publicity was given to the exercise at the time it took place. Finally, the dissemination of this is on a "need-to-know" basis. While it is not labeled with a government security classification, it is being handled in a highly confidential fashion and its distribution restricted accordingly.

The reader is cautioned against seeking for simple wins and losses, and against setting too high a value on the predictive powers of the gaming technique. All one can safely assert is that what happened in this game represented the unfolding of one reasonable strategic possibility out of many. Its value lies more in awareness of the alternative possibilities, and the choice points at which one or another alternative was possible, than in the fine-grain detail of this particular set of outcomes.

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II The Setting

The particular situation we sought to simulate centered around a revolt in Iran with the proclaimed objectives of ending the corruption, inefficiency, and foreign influence associated with the assumed present regime. The revolt apparently had some popular support, considerable military support, but no visible internal Communist support. After the first 48 hours of fighting it appeared that the rebels were concentrating in the northern provinces, with the Shah's forces holding Teheran and the South. Prior to the overt stage of the revolt, the putative rebel leader had approached the American ambassador in Teheran in an attempt to secure United States support, but such support was not forthcoming at that stage. (This particular exchange was not made known to the Soviet team until after the game.) When the revolt actually broke out, Pravda supported the rebels and denounced the Shah. The Shah declared the revolution to be a Soviet conspiracy and called publicly for assistance from his CENTO allies and the United States.*

The time period during which these hypothetical events began to unfold was the late summer of 1961. The precise time at which the Soviet and American teams were confronted with the problem and charged to act upon it was September 14, 1961--exactly one year later

---

*The full text of the problem as presented to the two teams is contained in Appendix 1.

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than the real time at which the game commenced. The participants had been furnished with a scenario which briefly described the state of the world as of game time. In brief, the relevant features of that scenario were that world political relations remained fundamentally unchanged between September 1960 and September 1961; and that military technology in the same period, while undergoing change, did not significantly alter the relative position of the two powers.

The instructions to the two teams made it clear that while the Soviet strategy was expected to be "realistic", that is, as representative as possible of the probable reactions of present Soviet leadership to a given set of events, the American team's strategy was to be "optimal". The US team, that is, was not to be constrained or inhibited by predictable reactions on the part of the Administration in office in the United States on September 1960; but neither was it to attempt to predict the strategy that would be followed by either presidential candidate if he were elected.

The two teams were further instructed to preface their moves by the preparation of a strategic plan. This plan would include a statement of their basic goals, the contingencies which they foresaw, and the major strategies with which they would meet those contingencies. (Subsequently, during move period #3 the Umpires asked the teams to prepare a new estimate of their strategic situation; for this, see Appendix 2.) The teams were asked not to attempt to simulate in detail every economic, propaganda, and military move which the United

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States or the Soviet Union might be expected to generate, but to emphasize fundamental choices and policy decisions based on those choices. All moves were to be prepared in writing by the teams during the course of the four separate move periods, and turned over to the Umpires at the end of each period. There was to be no direct contact between the two teams.

Chairmen were designated for both teams, but no other internal organization was prescribed. Each of the three groups had a military adviser attached to it, whose function was to advise on primarily military questions. These two, plus the military consultant on the control team, would in the event of game hostilities be expected to make a rough joint estimate of the military position produced by a given level and type of military action.

The Control group, consisting of two umpires and their special consultants, had the basic function of reviewing the teams' moves for plausibility, assessing their strategies, and redefining for the teams the new situation at the beginning of each phase of the exercise. In the course of this process the Control Group also supplied the moves, both initiatory and reactive, which would plausibly come from other parts of the world, as well as intelligence reports which should be available to the two playing teams. The Umpires, along with their consultants, could be consulted informally by the teams at any time. The Umpires designated members of the Control Group to be present unobtrusively in the two team headquarters at least

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part of the time. Their function was to get a picture of the situation which they reported periodically to the umpires, so that the latter were supplied with periodic information and could plan accordingly.

At the conclusion of the game a brief questionnaire was presented to all participants, while the tears were hot, so to speak, asking questions about the individual players' impressions of the objectives and intentions of both teams, the relative dangers of war, etc. The morning of the fourth day was devoted to a post-mortem critique session. A few days later a further questionnaire was sent to all participants asking for detailed comments. Both the critique and the questionnaires have been drawn upon in the ensuing report.

There follows in Part Two the Summary Report of the substantive events, prepared by Mr. Richard W. Hatch, Editor in Chief at the Center for International Studies and game historian at POLEX II. He was assisted in this endeavor by Messrs. D. L. M. Blackmer and A. L. Singer, who served as rapporteurs of the Soviet and American teams, respectively.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield

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PART TWO

SUMMARY OF STRATEGIES AND MOVES

I. Phase One

1. The United States

2. The Soviet Union

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1. The United States

(For detailed moves see US-1 through US-6 in Supplement)

The United States, surveying the available intelligence on the Iranian crisis, at once raised the question of the military strength and political complexion of the rebel movement. Information was received that the military in northern Iran had apparently gone over to the rebels, assuring for the time being their control of the region. No further information was forthcoming on the political support of the rebel leader--"Professor Mahmoud Mahmadi," so it was taken as fact that the rebels were neither Communists nor Soviet controlled but, on the contrary, represented a range of political views, including some anti-Soviet.

The United States immediately made two strategic assumptions which governed US decisions throughout the Iranian incident.

The first was that it was exceedingly unlikely that the Soviet Union would move its armed forces across existing cold-war truce lines. This assumption involved first of all the nature of such lines. As stated by the US:

1. The Second World War ended in a particular arbitrary way, with certain truce lines.

2. These truce lines were altered by postwar events, e.g., in Yugoslavia, China. But the alterations have been the result of a failure of either side to be able to deal with a situation on its side of the line. We couldn't deal with China. The Soviet couldn't deal with Yugoslavia. It was not Soviet threats or weapons or forces that determined the outcome in China. It was not US threats, weapons, or forces that determined the outcome in Yugoslavia. Where we had no line in Indo-China we created one in 1954.

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3. The US regards any violation of these lines based on Soviet threats, weapons, or forces as a new postwar situation and a cause of widened hostilities. Whatever the UN formula may be, we insist on the right--within our military and political capabilities--to do on our side of the line what we regard as necessary. Our objectives in Iran differ from Soviet objectives in Hungary in 1956, but we insist on the same degree of freedom of action as the Russians insisted on at that time and place.

It also involved Soviet acceptance of such lines. The US position was that the Soviet leadership "understood the asymmetry of the truce lines as well as we do, and have respected the principle from the Iranian crisis of 1945-46 down through Lebanon-Jordan in 1958 and beyond," and so would not move armed forces across the Soviet-Iran border--one of those lines--except with the intention of completely revising the terms of the existing East-West truce. Thirdly, the initial assumption posed basic critical alternatives: "if the rules are changed--if the Russians decide the time is ripe to exploit the nuclear stalemate and US and Allied ground force and mobility weaknesses, the United States has the alternatives of accepting what all would know was a major defeat, corrosive of our total position, or fighting a war at graduated levels, shifting the terrain from less favorable to more favorable ground."

The Soviet advantage in geography and manpower was not overlooked, but this first fundamental assumption was not seriously questioned; and, as events made it increasingly crucial, US reliance on its validity became increasingly firm.

The second fundamental assumption, also unquestioned, was that US treaty obligations embraced the present situation in Iran.

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It followed that the governing US strategic decision was to support the Shah. However, this did not mean that the only outcome acceptable to the United States was the maintenance of the status quo. American strategy granted from the start that a neutralist Iranian government not linked to Moscow and committed to the economic and political development of Iran would be an acceptable resolution of the crisis.

Support of Mahmadi and the rebel forces being out of the question in view of treaty obligations, there appeared to be three possible courses of US action:

1. Direct secret representation to the Soviet Union that the United States regarded the Soviet-Iran border as a sacrosanct truce line.

2. Support for the Shah in one or more of the following ways:

   a. Existing pipeline of aid
   b. Increased military aid
   c. Pakistani and Turkish combat troops
   d. US combat troops

3. An attempt to secure negotiation for acoalition government in Iran and the end of civil war.

There emerged a broad two-part general strategy. First--and this was stressed as of major importance--the United States would with the utmost firmness discourage Soviet intervention. Second, it would bring pressure on both the rebels and the Shah to negotiate, the objective being a coalition government under the Shah, a government with representation of non-Communist liberal elements and committed to progressive policies.

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In sum, at the first stage of the Iranian revolt the United States had no sense of being caught on the horns of a dilemma or in the backwash of a misconceived policy in Iran. On the contrary, the issue seemed clear-cut--a matter of honoring bilateral commitments correctly made and at the same time moving to encourage the further progressive development of Iran wholly in the spirit of the US policy with respect to all underdeveloped countries. Neither the justification for US action nor the acquiescence of its allies was in question. Equally clear was the US stake--its integrity in the eyes of the rest of the world. The US actions were made in full confidence of success and without hesitation. And, from the very start, the US mood implied a determination never to yield, whatever the extremity, in the face of Soviet threats or action.

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2. The Soviet Union

(For detailed moves see USSR-1 through USSR-15 in Supplement)

In the eyes of the Soviet planners no high Soviet stake was involved in the Iranian revolt. There was so little Communist Party strength in Iran as a whole and so small a Communist element in the "Mahmadi" movement that it would be sheer adventurism to seek to establish a satellite Communist regime in Iran at this time. The Soviet Union therefore faced no immediate clean-cut crucial alternatives.

Rather, it was agreed that here was an opportunity to seek the limited objective of a neutralist popular-front government in Iran, the single essential condition from the point of view of Soviet acceptability being the renunciation of ties to the United States and the Cento powers. A possible alternative and lesser objective, considered but shelved for the time being, was a partition of Iran with the Soviet Union supporting a nationalist or Communist government in the region controlled by the revolutionary movement. In any case, the situation most favorable to Soviet purposes was one in which the revolutionary movement gathered strength and the Shah's government deteriorated.

It was decided, therefore, that the main lines of present Soviet strategy would be to make preparatory clandestine military preparations and covertly to incite mob action and other civil disruption in the area controlled by the Shah while taking in the eyes of the

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world, and especially in the United Nations, a position of strong insistence on non-interference in Iranian affairs by any outside power.

The subject of Western intervention was a paramount consideration. There was some feeling expressed at this stage that the Soviet position was strong enough so that intervention by the West might not be altogether unwelcome. A Western military intervention which collapsed after the fashion of the 1956 Suez disaster, presumably through UN intervention, would put the West in the worst possible position. Military intervention by the United States was regarded as politically advantageous also in the sense that it would give the Soviet Union a freer hand, enabling Soviet troops to enter in support of the rebels if this seemed necessary. But such speculations gave way to the judgment that Soviet interests would be best served by making every effort to deter Western action to assist the present Iranian regime.

Various tactical moves were discussed. As to Iran itself, it was agreed that it would be premature to recognize the Mahmadi group as the legitimate government of the country. Looking beyond Iran to the Middle East as a whole, both the incitement of a diversionary Arab-Israeli conflict and the possibility of creating a Middle East crisis by the assassination of the King of Jordan were discussed and rejected, at least for the present, as too risky because they might either create a situation beyond control or provoke major intervention by the West. In the context of Western alliances it was agreed that

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it was important to suggest the thought of general war to Britain in order to frighten off British support of any US military move to assist the Shah; a move in Berlin to that end was also discussed but rejected as possibly having the very opposite of the desired effect. Thought was given to making an effort to lead Turkey and Pakistan to default on their pact commitments so that any US military move would have to be made without their support. For instance, Mahmadi might assure Turkey of his friendship and that he was not under Soviet control. During all this discussion it was not overlooked that Peking might urge upon the Soviet Union an aggressive course of action to establish a Communist regime in Iran and thus reduce Western influence in the Middle East.

But despite all these far-ranging considerations there was in the end only one central issue--the possible course of US action. The pervasive awareness underlying all of the initial Soviet discussion and decisions was that, although they involved carefully calculated moves and serious Soviet purposes, the crucial decision lay ahead--the choice of military alternatives which would be posed if the United States intervened with combat troops.

As of the moment, a considerable show of strength and determination to act militarily was required if intervention by the West was to be deterred. Threatening gestures, troop movements, I.C.B.M. firings, and the like were all seen as necessary moves to inhibit the United States and its allies. On the other hand, a policy of threat and missile rattling was recognized to be inappropriate for

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the Middle Eastern countries themselves, including Iran. The objective here was to present the Soviet Union as a peace-loving state intending only to protect the integrity of its Middle Eastern neighbors and to assist them in resisting Western agression. Too tough a military line and too obvious a degree of support for the rebel group in Iran might make the achievement of a neutral nationalist coalition government in Iran difficult to achieve. It was agreed that one immediate Soviet action should be to create the impression that Western military agression was in fact already occurring. If it did not actually take place, the Soviet Union could take credit for having scared it off; if it did take place, world public opinion would already have been mobilized in opposition to such a move and subsequent UN action could easily be promoted.

As the first phase of the Iranian crisis ended, the Soviet planners had made two major assumptions: first, that the United States would not be likely to accept voluntarily a neutralist government as a satisfactory solution in Iran; and, second, that there was therefore a great likelihood that the United States would intervene in one fashion or another.

But Soviet planners were not in full accord as to how the Soviet Union should respond to a US intervention if it took the form of combat troops. A minority held the view that the Soviet Union should probably not under any circumstances allow a direct confrontation between Soviet and American troops in Iran; the objective at

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stake (a neutral non-Communist Iranian government outside CENTO) was not significant enough to risk a large-scale conflict which might grow into world war. The majority felt it would be a mistake to rule out the possibility of sending troops into Iran, but agreed that an overt intervention should occur (1) only in response to a prior US troop intervention, and (2) only in the full expectation of withdrawing, along with the US, in accordance with a UN resolution.

Since there seemed no immediate likelihood of US troop movement into Iran, this difference of opinion was not brought to a head. The situation at this point permitted unanimous agreement on the decision not to move Soviet troops or substantial supplies into Iran at least until after the United States had taken such actions. The Soviet Union would use every legitimate means to prevent assistance to the government of Iran and would ostensibly maintain a hands-off position; but it would operate covertly to enhance the chances of rebel success, the Soviet objective being an Iranian government with no ties to the West.

It should be stressed that at no time in their deliberations did the Soviet planners even implicitly accept the idea, later revealed to have been central in the thinking of the American team, that a crossing of the Soviet-Iranian frontier would constitute a violation of a tacitly-accepted "cold-war" truce line between the United States and the Soviet Union. The differences among the

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Soviet team members were entirely on grounds of expediency rather than of "principle"; that is, the decision whether or not to intervene militarily was considered solely in terms of the estimated efficiency of such a move in achieving the limited Soviet objectives.

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II. Phase Two

1. The Setting
2. The United States
3. The Soviet Union

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Phase Two

1. The Setting

(For details of Control's moves during Phase I and Phase II see Control-1 through Control 19 in Supplement)

The Time

The action period for the United States and the Soviet Union begins at close of business September 15.

Outside Iran

The immediate Near East reaction to the Iranian crisis has been twofold--to take steps to protect national borders and to call for Cento Pact and Arab League consultations. Nasser has acclaimed the rebel movement, and the Turks have made no effort to conceal their sympathy for the Shah's forces.

The British, while mindful of treaty obligations, have set in motion consultations with allies, Commonwealth members, the Iranian government, and the Soviet Union, their proclaimed objective being to avoid international conflict. Nehru has called for submission of the Iranian problem to the United Nations and for the neutralist countries to cooperate with the United Nations in seeking a peaceful solution. The UN Security Council has met in response to the Soviet call but adjourned without action because several foreign ministers are still en route to the regular 1961 General Assembly meeting, due to convene on September 21.

An AP dispatch reports that advance elements of the 1st Airborne Battle Group, US 24th Infantry Division, landed September 15 in Adana,

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Turkey. The London Times reports southbound vessels of NATO powers experiencing long delays at northern entrance of the Suez Canal.

In Iran

Rebel victories in military skirmishes and the flight south by loyal forces appear to confirm rebel control of the northern areas of Iran. Neither rebel nor loyalist forces are in a position to take offensive action in less than 30 days, and neither will be able to do so then without continuous external logistic support.

Late News

Four Reuters dispatches from the rebel area report the execution and arrest of government officials in Tabriz; the mobbing of the US Consulate in Isfahan, resulting in assault on the US Consul and the killing of one Consulate employee; the presence with the rebel forces of a former Iranian Communist leader; and rebel victory in Guilan and Mazanderan.

The last dispatch also reported the rebel leader, Mahmadi, as listing some of the immediate objectives of the revolutionary movement as follows: the exclusion of military personnel from cabinet posts; the restoration to the Majlis of responsibility for government policies and administration; the restriction of the Shah to his constitutional role and the elimination of any interference in the government or in politics by members of the Court; a clean sweep of corrupt and reactionary officials and termination of foreign military aid, including advisory missions; withdrawal from the present alliance

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with "imperialistic Western Powers"; inauguration of vigorous efforts to restore friendly relations with the Soviet Union; and the promise, when in power, to allow no group or individuals to stand in the way of rapid progress toward the goal of achieving a strong, independent, and prosperous Iran.

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2. The United States

(For detailed moves see US-7 through US-16 in Supplement)

With the latest news reports in hand, and information received covering Soviet overt actions to date, the US planners turned their attention to two pieces of intelligence.

The US Ambassador in Iran reported the Shah's instant agreement in principle to the US message of support accompanied by recommendations for reform, amnesty, etc., but his inability or unwillingness to agree specifically to all of its political conditions. The Ambassador doubted both the Shah's ability to effect reconciliation with the rebels and the ability of his regime to survive without immediate assistance as outlined in the US message. Neither the Shah's ultimate agreement to political conditions nor victory for the Shah was certain even if the US aid proposed were forthcoming; but the Ambassador urged the gamble of furnishing such aid immediately.

Secondly, military estimates (from Control) were that if the Soviet Union did not give significant aid to the rebel forces and the Shah could maintain political control in his own area, US aid on the scale contemplated would enable the Shah in time to subdue the rebels and reestablish order.

Without debate or dissent, US planners agreed that, since the Iranian revolt was wholly indigenous in origin and strength, the Soviet objective in Iran was simply to make the most of an unexpected opportunity. At the minimum the result might be a government in

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Iran not closely tied to the West; at the maximum, if the rebels could be subverted, a government controlled by Moscow.

This view of the Soviet objective, plus the military estimate that US aid would enable the Shah to reestablish his government's control in Iran, implied complete success for the US strategy. In a confident and optimistic mood, the US planners set out to reaffirm that strategy in a new series of consistent tactical moves suggested by the temporary stalemate in Iran.

These moves, all made promptly, and agreed upon without debate by the US planners, included a firm Presidential statement of US intentions, strong pressure on the Shah to agree publicly to US political conditions as a prerequisite to aid already under way, and a warning to Mahmadi that only disaster for him could result from his failure to negotiate with the Shah. Meanwhile, in diplomatic messages, Nasser was warned not to interfere with Suez Canal passage, Israel was encouraged to mobilize its military, and Nehru was both assured of US peaceful aims and invited to initiate moves toward negotiation between the Iranian opponents. Covert moves were made to assure the Kurdish tribes of US sympathy and to undermine the rebel strength by securing by bribery the defection of a turncoat Iranian general and his division. The Chief of the American Military Assistance Group in Iran was given detailed instructions for immediate Iranian operations.

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The world was told that the United States, emphasizing the sanctity of frontiers and of treaty obligations, would give non-combat military assistance to Iran with the sole objective of a cease-fire followed by negotiated settlement; and that any Soviet intervention would have incalculable consequences. The Shah and Mahmadi were told to negotiate. As in the first phase, the US planners moved with a sense of the complete rightness and logic of their assumptions and strategy; and they moved with confidence and unanimity.

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3. The Soviet Union

(For detailed moves see USSR-16 through USSR-23 in Supplement)

Immediately upon reviewing US overt actions generated in Move Period 1 and the over-all situation the Soviet planners received the following intelligence report:

> Information received from very reliable sources indicates that the 1st Battle Group of the US 24th Infantry Division is in the process of landing at Adana, Turkey. One ballistics missile unit being dispatched from Germany, destination uncertain. Unit could reinforce troops landing in Adana or land in Iran. One CVA sailed from Norfolk for European or Mid-Eastern waters. US SAC placed upon limited alert; airborne bomber force appears to have been doubled and other crews placed upon alert. Several additional evidences of alerting of other forces in US, including military transport units and at least one Marine division. Numerous reports from Germany of various specialized personnel being alerted emergency duty and amphibious support ships observed arriving Port Said.

Soviet deliberations at this stage centered primarily on the military situation, which was seen as requiring decisions in the context of two kinds of contingencies, one involving local elements only, the other involving action by the United States.

There being immediate agreement that it would be a major error for the Soviet Union to send troops into Iran before US armed forces entered the country, it was decided that whatever happened as a result of the clash of local forces, including possible intervention by the Turks, the Soviet Union would not give troop support to the rebels. In the event that defeat of the revolutionary movement by the Shah's forces was threatened, the Soviet Union would seek a

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UN cease-fire to give the revolutionary forces time to consolidate their strength. The most likely development appeared to be progressive deterioration of the Shah's authority while the revolutionary movement gathered strength, particularly since it now seemed that the United States wished to avoid direct military intervention.

The more serious contingencies hung upon US actions. It was possible that American assistance not involving troop support would enable the Shah to get the upper hand. This would pose a most difficult decision, but one, it was quickly agreed, which need not be made now. The possibility that the United States might airlift troops over the rebel territory was also discussed and dismissed as not requiring immediate decision. The paramount consideration, which could not be dismissed or postponed despite its present apparent likelihood, was the contingency of direct US armed intervention.

As indicated previously there were arguments both for and against Soviet armed intervention if US combat forces entered Iran. The proponents of intervention felt that its purpose should be only to enable the rebels to advance until met by Iranian and US troops and then hold a defensive line, it being recognized that such action would raise the possibility of partition of Iran. It was generally agreed that the United States would be forced by UN pressure to withdraw from Iran and thus suffer a major political defeat, and that, although Soviet strategy required preparations for the contingency

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of US armed intervention, direct confrontation of Soviet and American troops should be avoided if possible.

There were, therefore, to be four continuing lines of Soviet action: efforts to secure world and UN support to prevent foreign military assistance to or intervention in Iran; Soviet military moves to prepare for the possibility of US intervention, some of which would be intended to impress and deter the United States and its allies; covert efforts to weaken the Shah's position; declarations to the revolutionary leadership limited to moral support and willingness to consider requests for military and economic assistance.

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III. Phase Three

1. The Setting
2. The United States
3. The Soviet Union

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Phase Three

1. The Setting

(For details of Control's moves during Phase II and between Phase II and Phase III see Control 23 through Control 44 in Supplement.)

Time

Action for the United States and the Soviet Union starts at the opening of business September 21.

In Iran

The Shah (September 16) addressed his people with a fervent appeal for loyalty; promising sweeping reforms and priority emphasis on economic development, offering two cabinet positions in a new government to prominent rebel supporters, and promising amnesty to rebels. The next day, however, a group of rebels who surrendered were cruelly beaten by the military and their leader summarily executed.

Mahmadi, replying the next day to the Shah's speech, excoriated the United States for its interference and declared that the rebels would never negotiate with the Shah until he severed his ties to the United States.

Now, four days later, the rebels have effective control of five northern provinces, all of the military north of the rebel line having joined them; but most of air force has remained loyal and joined the Shah's forces, leaving the rebels no jets, a few other planes and some crews, but with no supplies or equipment and no

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organized air force units. Movements of the Shah's forces, now reinforced by the arrival of American non-combat aid, indicate the beginning of a loyalist offensive.

In the United Nations

The Soviet Union (September 17) presented to the Security Council its resolution calling for withdrawal from and subsequent denial to Iran of foreign military personnel and assistance of any kind (USSR-20). Upon objection from Iran that the revolt was a domestic matter, the Council failed to adopt. The Soviet Union has now moved for inclusion of the Iranian situation on the agenda of the regular General Assembly session due to start in a few days, circulating essentially the same draft resolution as that proposed in the Security Council.

Initial estimates indicate inclusion on the agenda and early consideration, with ready passage of a resolution deeming the Iranian situation a threat to international peace and security and calling for non-intervention; but it is improbable that a 2/3 majority could be found to explicitly embargo external military support for Iran. (Note: At this point a special requirement was imposed on the teams to supply a new strategic plan to the Umpires, indicating alternatives, contingency plans, etc. Because of their significance these are attached hereto as Appendix 2.)

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2. The United States

(For detailed moves see US-18 through US-25 in Supplement)

Diplomatic messages report that Nehru would be prepared to mediate in Iran if invited by both the Shah and Mahmadi, and that Nasser, while disclaiming any hindrance to Suez Canal traffic, has assumed a position generally hostile to the United States. But although there is every evidence of mounting congestion at the northern entrance of the Suez Canal, American aid by air has steadily arrived in Iran for the past five days. Its arrival, and the fact that it includes both substantial equipment and some thousands of military personnel, have been impossible to conceal from the rebels and the Soviets. The Shah has immediately capitalized on it, his forces destroying much of the meager rebel air strength and taking vigorous initiative to destroy it all.

The political situation in the Shah's area is not so favorable. There is much popular approval of the mullahs' implicit attacks on foreign intervention which clearly refer to the United States. The Shah's offer of cabinet posts to the opposition has elicited no acceptances.

There is a new CIA appraisal of the complexion of the rebel movement stressing three facts. Both strong favorable and equally strong unfavorable attitudes toward the United States are held among the rebels. The majority of the military supporting Mahmadi see Soviet material and technical assistance essential although they do

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not like dependence on the Soviet Union. Mahmadi, a genuine nationalist without strong ideological leanings, would accept foreign troop support only as a last resort if the Shah received such assistance. CIA also reports that there are Soviet military personnel in mufti in the rebel area with the acquiescence of local rebel forces, for what purpose it is not yet clear.

Most important in this connection, there is a reply from Mahmadi, relayed by CIA, in which the rebel leader, professing strong skepticism as to both the Shah's sincerity and his effectiveness, sets the following five conditions as minimum prerequisites to negotiation:

1. The Shah must renounce all American military support of the Iranian government. If the Iranian military situation continues to be grossly unbalances by US military participation, the rebels must seek matorial support from any available outside source.

2. The United States must cooperate by withholding any further logistical, advisory, or technical support of the Shah's forces.

3. Mahmadi must have the position of Prime Minister in the new government in order to implement needed reforms.

4. The Shah may retain -- and Mahmadi will personally guarantee -- his appropriate constitutional prerogatives, and the royal family will undergo no personal danger.

5. Mahmadi will be only too eager to exclude all forms of Soviet influence if American influence is eliminated as demanded.

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The net result of these latest developments was a conviction on the part of the United States that it was following a policy not only correct but also meeting with general approval in world opinion. The fact the Nehru, without expressing any opposition to current US actions, called for negotiation was taken as indicative of a widely favorable view of the US position. The US planners were sure that the Soviet resolution would fail in the General Assembly since it would "impair rights of a sovereign nation to receive aid for self-defense under a regional arrangement". On balance, developments in Iran, despite Mahmadi's intransigent position, did not appear to make necessary any change in basic US strategy. The suggestion that Mahmadi be invited to the United Nations was made but rejected on the ground that he would inevitably denounce the Shah and thus hinder any possible progress toward a coalition government in Iran.

Thus general confidence still prevailed, and US moves at this time were in line with previous tactics.

Embassy Cairo was instructed to reassure Nasser that he had no cause for alarm, US actions being taken solely in the context of possible Soviet intervention in Iran, which the United States was determined to resist. Chief, MAAG in Iran was instructed through the embassy to insist on Iranian compliance with policy of non-reprisal, to coordinate and maintain pressure on rebels, to report daily on military situation, and to increase intelligence flow.

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While awaiting further clarification of the situation in Iran, the United States directed its tactics predominantly toward action in the United Nations. After instructing the embassy in Teheran to urge the Shah to take a position in the United Nations in agreement with that of his allies, and to warn him against obstructing political negotiations with either his allies or the rebels, the following was communicated to the Shah and to the British, French, and Canadians:

1. The United States will not oppose General Assembly consideration of the Iran situation. If, as seems likely, a majority favors such action, the United States will vote to place the item on the agenda.

2. The President of the United States will in that case address the General Assembly.

3. He will argue that the General Assembly cannot impair the right of a sovereign nation to receive aid for self-defense under a regional arrangement. Cf. articles 51 and 52.

4. The President asks both the Shah and Mahmadi to immediately request Nehru to use his good offices to initiate negotiations between the government of Iran and the rebels with a view to forming a national government as per terms of Shah's offer.

5. The United States may in the General Assembly propose that the Secretary General or Nehru be authorized to act along lines indicated in No. 4.

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The US delegation to the United Nations was instructed to secure every possible vote in support of the position stated in 3 and 5 above.

The United States voted with the majority to place the Iranian item on the agenda of the General Assembly, affirming the inviolability of the treaty between the United States and Iran. A week later the President of the United States addressed the General Assembly, in a vigorous one and one half hour speech, declaring that any proposal that the General Assembly attempt to deny the right of a sovereign power to defend its frontiers from aggression and subversion in this way is obviously invalid under the Charter and a violation of the intention and spirit of it. He stated that the United States will honor its commitments to Iran at Iran's request and will honor thereby its commitments to the United Nations and to its Charter.

Agreeing that the Iranian situation is a threat to peace, he hoped that the General Assembly would authorize the Secretary General to use his good offices in accordance with the action taken by the Assembly, to secure negotiations in Iran, as proposed by the Shah, between the government and the rebels, with a view to the formation of a government of national unity which can restore peace to that country. The United States stands ready, he concluded, by itself or through the United Nations or both, to provide substantial assistance to a development program designed to put Iran on the road to democratic

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development, progress and prosperity, as the government has shown it desires.

The text of the President's speech was forwarded for transmission to Mahmadi with warnings of the probably adverse military and political consequence for him of recourse to Soviet assistance and continued refusal to negotiate. At the same time the United States reassured Mahmadi of its strong support for Iranian economic and constitutional reforms and reiterated its position that future relationships with the United States would be a matter solely for Iranian decision.

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3. The Soviet Union

(For detailed moves see USSR-25 through USSR-32 in Supplement)

Soviet embassies in Cairo and Teheran reported respectively Nasser's deep concern at the massing of US vessels off Port Said, and the probable failure of any attempt to intimidate the Shah, whose morale was high because of his complete confidence of American support. Intelligence, reporting in detail on the arrival in Iran of what appeared to be massive US assistance, affirmed likelihood of Shah's being able to reequip his forces, consolidate his position, and greatly increase air offensive.

Intelligence from agents with the Iranian rebel forces set forth two principal facts. Although well organized, the rebels were spread thin and extremely short of supplies, being not only incapable of offensive action but also threatened with defeat if loyalist air attacks increase and they do not receive assistance. Secondly, with his leading military figure urging negotiation with the United States and many of his younger supporters urging him to develop closer relations with the Soviet Union, Mahmadi, retaining full control, resisted both pressures.

The most important communication reaching the Soviet planners came from Mahmadi himself, who said that, although he needed neither Soviet combat troops nor technical personnel, he must have Soviet material aid on a large scale to match US assistance to the Shah.

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He requested immediate use of Soviet airfields both as sanctuaries and as operating bases and hoped for transfer of Soviet aircraft to rebels for their operation. He would under no circumstances accept Soviet troop assistance or any foreign military personnel assistance unless he was confronted by large-scale US or CENTO troop intervention. Without the assistance he now requested, he faced defeat due to US aid to the Shah.

The compounding evidence of American determination to help the Shah and the accompanying successful airlift of large-scale assistance, when set against Mahmadi's estimate of the rebel position, clearly presented a situation not developing favorably from the Soviet point of view. But it was agreed that no change in basic policy was yet required. The priority concern was still Soviet efforts in the United Nations to achieve a cease-fire and withdrawal of US military assistance while strengthening Soviet military preparations in case Soviet intervention became necessary.

Nevertheless, it was also agreed that Mahmadi's request and indeed the whole subject of Soviet relations with the rebel movement now created and issue which must be dealt with promptly; and this issue was the focus of most of the discussion at this stage.

There was no difference of opinion as to the two guiding imperatives: on the one hand, to raise rebel morale by signifying Soviet willingness to give all possible assistance; and on the other, not in any way to commit the Soviet Union at this stage to military action

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in Mahmadi's behalf. Thus it was decided to make Soviet airfields available to the rebels for sanctuary and training but not as bases for any aggressive action.

There were major differences when it came to formal Soviet relations with the rebels, the issue being whether or not the Soviet Union should at this time recognize the rebel regime as the legal government of Iran. Support for such action as necessary to bolster rebel morale and to justify whatever moves the Soviet Union might make was met by two arguments: that from the standpoint of rebel morale it was not necessary, and that, of more importance, it would signal a far more serious commitment on the part of the Soviet Union than was wise at this stage. Such a commitment, it was argued, would indicate that the Soviet Union could not accept less than partition and thus make virtually impossible the attainment of the Soviet objective of a neutralist Iran.

Since fortunately Mahmadi had not requested formal recognition, it could be agreed (by a three to two decision in the Presidium) simply to let Mahmadi know that the Soviet Union would be willing to consider any request for recognition which he might make.

With this issue resolved, priority attention was given to a Krushchev propaganda speech and press conference and messages to United Nations delegates and the President of the General Assembly to attain the already established Soviet objective in the United Nations. A military alert was ordered and made obvious to Western

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intelligence and the international press. Mahmadi was assured of Soviet preparations to give him all possible assistance short of troop support or the use of Soviet airfields for offensive operations and of Soviet willingness to consider recognition and further military commitments if the United Nations failed to act favorably on the Soviet resolution.

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IV. Phase Four

1. The Setting
2. The United States
3. The Soviet Union

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Phase Four

1. The Setting

(For details of Control's moves during Phase III and between Phase III and Phase IV see Control-47 through Control-58 in Supplement)

Time

Control deemed that one month had elapsed. The beginning of action for United States and Soviet Union was therefore October 20 at 8 p.m. (4 a.m. October 21 Teheran and Moscow).

Over-all Situation

Debate in the United Nations General Assembly on the Iranian situation, which was concluded October 1, resulted in a resolution expressing concern at the potential threat to international peace aroused by developments in Iran but in effect ignoring the Soviet proposals.

In the face of defeat in the United Nations, the Soviet Union moved promptly to furnish supplies, equipment, use of airfields, "technicians," and "volunteers" to the Iranian rebel forces. Soviet planes have appeared over rebel-held territory, but no "volunteer" pilots have participated in the sporadic rebel air offensive. The rebel forces have been very substantially strengthened by the Soviet assistance thus far received.

Meanwhile conditions in the area held by the Shah have deteriorated over a 30-day period. Central government control in some of the tribal

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areas has collapsed; there has been sabotage; and there appears to be increasing resentment on the part of both civilians and military, including the Shah's top command, at the apparent subservience of the Shah to the United States. The result has been increasingly oppressive measures by the Shah which tend to offset any attempt on his part to assume a liberal pose.

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2. The United States

(For detailed moves see US-28 through US-31 in Supplement)

Intelligence reaching the United States at this point shattered confidence that US objectives could be attained without inviting the risk of international crisis which would accompany the movement of US combat troops into Iran. A detailed political-military situation report from MAAG, Iran, confirmed by the embassy in Teheran, was in effect a prediction of ultimate defeat for the Shah unless he received US combat-troop support; and the Shah himself in a dramatic midnight appeal to the American Ambassador stated that unless the United States despatched immediately one airborne division of US ground forces with appropriate support he would have no alternative but "to abandon the country to chaos and communism."

This information was followed immediately by a communication from Mahmadi repeating his latest message to the Soviet Union, affirming his confidence that the rebels would win in the end if the United States did not intervene with combat forces but stating unequivocably that if there was such intervention the rebels would need Soviet troops--under Soviet command and with the Soviet Union sharing strategic decisions. He urged Soviet declaration of intention to meet armed American intervention with overwhelming Soviet force.

Urgent requests for further intelligence received only conditional replies. If the Shah fled, his cause was lost. American intervention in division strength would very favorably affect the morale of troops

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and loyalty of military leaders under Shah--if there was no comparable Soviet intervention. One US airborne division might assure eventual success for the Shah, but that would depend on Soviet actions and on the effective control of both civilian and military elements in the Shah's area.

American inquiries through diplomatic channels found Pakistan favoring retention of present US personnel in Iran but opposing introduction of large-scale combat support and Turkey prepared both to support introduction of US combat troops and to send in Turkish troops if requested. Britain, urging a private US-Soviet summit meeting to avert a crisis, was however prepared to have Commonwealth forces associated with the United States in armed intervention for defensive purposes if necessary to prevent a communist Iran.

The unfavorable turn of events raised one sharply decisive political issue among the US planners. To the majority, the presumed favorable effect of US intervention on the Shah's political position encouraged introducing combat troops into Iran--not just one division but two--in response to the Shah's request. But it was argued in opposition that there was such fundamental weakness in the Shah's position that the United States should abandon the attempt to support the Shah and should try to create a new nationalist coalition without him. The minority was overruled on the ground that without the Shah there would be no basis for a political coalition since most of the loyalists would turn to Mahmadi, but it remained unconvinced and submitted a dissenting memorandum.

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On the basis of the majority political judgment, the United States made two principal moves. First, full preparations for armed intervention by US forces were made in the form of orders subject to execution on 24-hour notice. Second, the President decided to send General Lucius Clay to Moscow with a last-chance message to the Soviet government. Clay was to spell out the US position on the cold-war truce lines, reaffirm the US determination to move in terms of its treaty obligations, and urge joint US-Soviet insistence on a negotiated settlement in Iran. The conclusion of the Presidential message would be virtually an ultimatum: violation of the Iranian border truce-line by Soviet armed forces would mean war.

The British were informed of the US decisions, including rejection of a summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union, and were given a summary of General Clay's instructions. The Turks were informed of US military plans and requested to prepare three divisions for movement into Iran. Pakistan was informed that, while the United States was sending General Clay to Moscow to prevent the necessity, it appeared that the United States would have to make a positive response to the Shah's request for combat troops. It was hoped that Pakistan would cooperate in any joint American, Turkish, and British military action.

Thus the climax decision of the United States was for action which unconditionally confirmed both the original US position and the strategy originally derived from that position.

(See concluding section for final US strategy statements.)

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3. The Soviet Union

(For detailed moves see concluding section.)

A report from Soviet military intelligence in Iran confirmed Mahmadi's great reluctance to have recourse to Soviet troop support unless the US introduced troops. Nevertheless the report suggested that consideration be given to the advisability of having the Soviet military enter Iran before US troops arrived, in view of the military superiority such action would bring about. It was felt by a majority of three to two that the situation had now sufficiently altered so as to make immediate intervention the best course. The decisive considerations in the majority view were the urgent request for assistance from Mahmadi and the likelihood that without Soviet help he would be defeated by the Shah aided by American troops.

It was felt that a successful outcome could only now be achieved if Soviet military assistance were brought in on a substantial scale; moreover, the Soviet identification with the Mahmadi cause was by this time so substantial that a defeat of the rebellion would inevitably be a serious blow to the prestige of the Soviet Union itself. In short, the stakes involved in the conflict had suddenly been raised, in the majority Soviet view, by the anticipated American military intervention. The original limited Soviet objectives were no longer the decisive ones, for the conflict had now been transformed into a more serious and direct power struggle with the United States. Thus, the majority felt that temporary political losses which might be incurred

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by moving first into Iran with troops would be more than compensated for by the anticipated long-run gains in the world power struggle.

The minority argued that the USSR should not lose sight of its original limited objectives and should not allow the ante to be raised to the point of risking a direct military clash with the United States. They felt that the US could still be forced to withdraw by the United Nations or by Soviet threats, without achieving its objective of destroying Mahmadi; the bulk of world opinion would back the USSR in condemning American intervention in support of a tottering ruler threatened by a nationalist and non-Communist uprising.

A compromise agreement was reached which satisfied both sides. It was decided to undertake a limited military move--the capture of the Teheran airport by an airdrop of Iranian rebel forces augmented by Azerbaijani "volunteers" and strengthened by substantial concealed Soviet participation. Once the airport was captured, there would be renewed Soviet appeals for UN action and withdrawal of foreign troops as a prelude to negotiations--with the rebels of course in a greatly improved position.

This solution seemed to permit the USSR to have its cake and eat it too. The military advantages of intervention could be obtained without suffering corresponding political damage. It was argued that a massive Soviet encircling action to isolate the comparatively small initial US forces would actually end hostilities by facing the United States with the alternatives of (1) suffering certain military defeat

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in the local arena; (2) spreading the conflict into a general war; (3) accepting the offer of UN intervention and withdrawal of all Soviet and US forces. Since the latter contingency was deemed the most likely, the Soviet intervention, allegedly countering US aggression, could be expressed as purely defensive in character. The minority were led to agree that there could be a situation such as the present one when it was no longer possible to defend as an axiom the premise that the Soviet Union should, as in the past, refrain from the use of troops outside the Soviet bloc. (See concluding section for final Soviet strategy statements.)

cf Beta I

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V. Phase Four (concluded):

Final Strategy Statements

1. Directive (Control-49)
2. US Strategy (US-32 and US-33)
3. Soviet Strategy (USSR-33 with annexes)

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1. Directive

Control to both teams

Move Period #4, which now commences, will be the last formal period for team moves. It will run from now until 4:00 p.m. today.

Since there will not be opportunities for further interaction between teams, it is suggested that both teams concentrate their efforts during Move Period #4 on a single strategy paper which, in the course of making team moves, outlines the choice of alternatives at this stage, the contingencies the team foresees arising as a result of the other team's possible responses to its moves in this period, and how the team might meet these contingencies. The umpires are available to respond during this move period to requests for additional information which the teams might reasonably expect to have and which they regard as essential to the formulation of their strategies. END

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GAME CLASSIFIED

Military action in Iran in cognizance of October 20 situation and in consonance with US political actions. All moves subject execution orders on 24-hour notice.

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1. US division in Eastern Turkey crosses border headed for Teheran in two columns. North Column via Khoi Tabriz. South Column via Kezdupeh Mehabad.

2. Turkish forces protect MSR's as far as Maraud and Mehabad, until relieved by loyalist Iranian Forces. Iranian loyalist forces attack from east and south to assist the columns forward.

3. Supply of these forces will be from Turkey by both ground and air.

4. USAF will provide air cover for both columns.

5. US Marines will send one BLT air landed to Teheran without delay. This will be followed by remainder one Marine CT now in Mediterranean. These forces will secure Teheran and environs including air and land communiciations using assault helicopters to be provided by 6th Fleet and in conjunction with loyalist forces; they will seize Resht, then support loyalist forces in attack on Astara.

6. As soon as Tabriz Airport secured loyal Iranians will be air landed and proceed toward Julfa to clear communications to USSR border. As fast as Army or Marines are available they will be used to support loyalist troops in operation to clear territory of rebels east Teheran. No US troops will go north of Khoi - Tabriz - Gurgam Bodjurd.

7. British, with forces now in Persian Gulf--Indian Ocean area, will secure Persian Gulf ports and assist Iranians in clearing out rebel pockets in that area.

8. Following for radio release and leaflet drop six hours before entering Iran: To Professor Mahmadi and his followers. The US intends to interdict supply from the USSR by sending troops from Turkey into Iran. These troops will not molest your forces unless you oppose them. They are not being sent to fight USSR, but solely for the purpose stated above. Again urge you enter negotiations to establish independent national government in your country.

end

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GLOBAL U.S. DEFENSE ACTION

1. As stated in U.S. appraisal (U.S. 16) concerning possible Soviet reactions, (a) to infiltrate or (b) openly intervene, the U.S. has made preparations including long-lead time actions to radically increase the defense budget, to purchase a full range of graduated force, increase SAC alert, and mobilize the National Guard. It has also begun to deploy two divisions to Europe (one as a replacement for the division sent to the Middle East) and a marine division to the Middle East.

The President has already asked Congress for a $10 billion increase in the Defense Budget. This increase is to be spent to support operations in Iran to aid eight army divisions and to increase our tactical and strategic air force. NATO has been urgently requested to increase its forces. In particular to bring its forces up to SACEUR'S thirty division goal immediately. These actions would increase Western European defense budgets from $14 billion to $17 billion a year.

2. If Soviet forces openly intervene and clash with U.S. and allied forces, the U.S. would take the following actions:

a. defense budget increased to $85 billion a year;

b. army tripled in size to 50 divisions;

c. number of tactical aircraft in operational units tripled as soon as possible;

d. 15 aircraft carriers withdrawn from mothball fleet and others started in production;

e. B-52 force put on full scale air borne alert;

f. rate of production of Polaris submarines and missiles doubled and extra ICBM's procured;

g. civil defense which has been concentrating on R&D expanded: massive public education program, planning for evacuation, and use of existing shelters;

h. procurement of first-generation antiballistic missile defenses;

more - more

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i. Allies asked to increase forces to 1952 Lisbon goals (60 divisions in Western Europe), U.S. military support substantially increased.

3. If Soviet Union intervenes, U.S. objective is to attempt to shift principal military actions to more favorable theaters; especially to Eastern Europe. Action started now intended to shake confidence of Soviets in the strength of their military and political position in the satellites; the vunerability of their extended supply lines; the consequences of a large scale satellite uprising with U.S. support. There would not be an immediate large scale attack on the Russians. However, the Germans would be encouraged to make border incursions; attempt to get defection of East German units; special U.S. forces would covertly be dropped into the satellites. The broad military objective is to beat the Russians at the mobilization game.* The European objective would be preceded and accompanied by massive use of balloons, air dropped ~~leaflets~~ leaflets, and radio broadcasts directed at satellites and Russia to incite trouble in Eastern Europe. It is not the intention of the United States to use nuclear weapons if this can be avoided: (1) because it is our assessment that NATO can do well at the non-nuclear level especially in a situation in which we have advance notice and can take initiative in Europe; (2) because U.S. use of nuclear weapons might weaken the cohesion of the NATO alliance.

4. If Soviet Union uses nuclear weapons inIran we would call for UN war against the Soviet Union. As in (3) above, still try to exploit our non-nuclear advantage in Europe.

* We have indicated before this, our interest in this strategy in Europe, this game is not designed to investigate it. That should be the subject of another exercise.

END - END

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3. Soviet Strategy 57 2

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CONTROL ONLY

Summary of Decisions of Presidium Meeting, 21 October 1961.

1. The Presidium, having carefully considered the situation in Iran, has concluded that the following plans should be put into effect in the contingencies indicated.

2. Stage I. An immediate coordinated operation (Operation CAVIAR) will be undertaken by Revolutionary forces, including trained Soviet military volunteers, to seize the Teheran airfields (Operation STURGEON) and local covert forces will neutralize Radio Teheran and attempt a coup in the city. (Operation SAIMON). Revolutionary troops at Shahrud and Senjan will assume the offensive (Operation PIKE). The objectives are (a) to forestall American airlanding of combat forces at Teheran, and (b) to give impetus to revolutionary activity in Teheran. If the US succeeds in landing its forces first and securing the airfield, (Contingency A) we shall immediately introduce overtly several divisions of Soviet troops to move as rapidly as possible by land and air to isolate any US forces north of the 33rd parallel and assist the Revolutionary troops to destroy the Shah's force. If our side lands first and secures the airfield (Contingency B), we shall deny any US landing there and proceed with our plans. The US may then bring in combat troops elsewhere in Iran (B-1), or give up such plans (B-2).

3. In either contingency A or B-1, as soon as any US combat forces land in Iran the USSR Government will (a) announce its recognition of the Iranian National Democratic Revolutionary Provisional Government, (b) announce its accession to the request of the INDRPG to provide Soviet military support in the area north of the 33rd parallel, and (c) its renewed call on the UN to arrange the complete withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, including Soviet, from Iran and the introduction of UN personnel from appropriate neutral countries to assure this withdrawal.

4. If the Revolutionary forces are repelled in this landing attempt, the Teheran airfields will be subjected to heavy bombing of the runways to deny the U S the possibility of airlanding troop transports. If the airfields are secured, and the Revolutionary forces are placed under heavy attack by hostile Iranian troops they will attempt to defend the airfields and waiting reinforcements will be air dispatched. If nonetheless they are defeated, the move will be ended. The airfields and Iranian Royal forces will be heavily bombed. Soviet forces from the USSR will reach the area within four days.

more - more

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5. If no US troops are brought into Iran (B -2), there will be no introduction of Soviet forces into Iran (excepting of course those volunteer technicians and airborne forces already introduced under cover).

6. Soviet military forces will seek to minimize direct conflict with US troops. Wherever US troops are encountered, Soviet forces will immediately seek to isolate and surround such forces, take up defensive positions, and fire only in defense if the US troops advance on these positions. Similarly, all aircraft will use INDRPG markings, and will seek to avoid combat with US aircraft in areas beyond the INDRPG territory except in close support of Revolutionary and Soviet troops engaged with the Shah's forces.

7. Stage II. Efforts will be continued to get a UN decision calling on the US and USSR to withdraw all military personnel, with neutral countries to provide observers to insure this action. Short of such mutual withdrawal, Soviet military forces will secure all territory above the 33rd parallel, sealing off any US or other foreign troops above that line, and INDRPG forces (with all necessary non-combat support from the USSR) will continue to occupy all territory possible beyond that line until the Shah's forces are eliminated or a cease-fire is agreed.

8. The effective provision of Soviet military aid, the scrupulously correct behavior of Soviet personnel vis-a-vis Mahmadi and his associates, the subtle cultivation of those among the most well-disposed toward the USSR, the US support of the Shah, and the disintegration of all non-Revolutionary political forces in Iran are all expected to make the new government of Iran a neutral with friendly inclination to the USSR. A temporary neutral-nation UN custody of the country should not aversely affect these powerful tendencies in the formation of a final Iranian government, even one democratically elected.

9. In all contingencies, the military and political success of the Revolutionary forces seems assured. Even if US and other foreign forces occupy certain areas, the political isolation and disintegration of the Shah's government is almost certain. Even if a united government were formed with the Shah or his son as titular head of state--the maximum concession--a neutral Iran would emerge.

10. Thus, the general final outcome which we forsee is the following:

(a) The CENTO alliance dies.

(b) Iran becomes neutral, and the US is denied bases for intelligence and other activities.

more - more

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(c) The US will have been demonstrated impotent to save its ally, the Shah's regime.

(d) The USSR will have proven the devoted supporter of the UN.

(e) The USSR will appear reasonable and non-aggressive by withdrawing its troops and not creating a satellite.

(f) Neutralist sentiment in Turkey, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and elsewhere will be greatly stimulated by the points above noted.

(g) Soviet military power will be shown to have checkmated US nuclear power, and outshone other US military power. END

Special Annex (Special Security Handling)

1. The Presidium has decided that if the US uses tactical nuclear weapons in Iran, the USSR will initially not reply with use of such weapons but exert all efforts to occupy the country with conventional forces alone, meanwhile convoking an extraordinary meeting of the UN. Depending upon the political and military situation, the USSR may decide to use tactical nuclear weapons against US forces in Iran. The US use of nuclear weapons will be a major strategic gain for the USSR, and if this desperate measure is unsuccessful in preventing Revolutionary-Soviet successes, will be still greater a defeat for the imperialists. END

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Annex 1 to USSR - 33

MILITARY MOVES

UNDER ALL CONTINGENCIES

USSR night fighters and revolutionary day fighters, operating from Tabriz and other airstrips prepared during the past month, are ordered to immediately destroy any foreign aircraft penetrating the air space over revolutionary-held terrain from Turkey. Appropriate radar and communications equipment to control this operation, having been set up along the border well inside of revolutionary territory, will control these aircraft.

Contingency A (American combat forces arrive in Teheran before the Revolutionary Forces perform their airborne attack.)

Soviet land forces, with heavy tactical air support, are ordered to proceed as rapidly as possible from the Transcaucasian Military District and the Turkistan Military Districts toward Teheran. Standard precautionary formations will be used as there is a possibility that nuclear weapons may be employed by the US. Every effort is to be made to expedite this movement. The object is to break through the forces of the Shah and seal off the US military forces. Wherever possible, local pockets of Iranian resistance will be isolated by the revolutionary forces. Because it is likely that sporadic air conflict will occur, the covering aircraft will be marked so as to identify them as revolutionary forces. Every effort will be made to avoid direct conflict and exchange of fire with US combat forces. No advance past the 33rd parallel is permitted.

Contingency B1 (US combat forces arrive in southern Iran.)

USSR forces from the Transcaucasion and Turkistan Military Forces are to proceed at maximum speed toward Teheran. These troops will receive heavy tactical air cover by aircraft with revolutionary markings. Standard precautionary formations will be employed as there is a possibility that the US will employ nuclear weapons in an attempt to halt this operation. The object of this operation is to seize Teheran and all Iranian territory to the 33rd parallel before the US combat forces can move north. In the event contact is made with American Ground Combat forces north of the 33rd parallel, Soviet forces will attempt to avoid conflict by taking up defensive positions. If direct conflict occurs, it is highly desirable that the initial attack be made by US forces.

MORE

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Contingency B2 (If US does not come in at all):

At the same time as the meeting of Presidium, a mixed force of Iranian revolutionaries and Soviet "volunteers" comprising the equivalent of an Airborne Regiment are readied for an attack on Teheran air fields. The transport aircraft, located at Tabriz and Baku, will have appropriate markings to identify them as belonging to the Revolutionary Forces. They will be prepared to approach the Teheran airfields under heavy MIG-19 cover (with revolutionary force markings) at low altitude from the north taking advantage of the surprise which they can achieve by suddenly appearing over the mountain ranges and down to the airfield areas. The initial force will paratroop onto and near the main airfield to take over initial control of the airfield. They will be followed immediately by the transport aircraft landing as rapidly as possible. The object of this operation is to hold the airfield, preventing its occupancy by US combat forces. It is expected that this force will be able to hold the airfield area until the arrival of ground forces from the east. They will require maximum assistance from local subversive forces, considerable air support and air-delivered logistic support from the territory of the USSR.

At the same time a heavy commitment of tactical support aircraft, flown by "volunteers", will attack with bombs, air-to-ground rockets, and gun fire the Shah's forces facing the revolutionary ground forces around Zenjan, Takistan and Kazvin to the west of Teheran and near Shahmid to the east of Teheran. This is to permit these revolutionary forces to proceed toward Teheran (Operation Pike).

end of Annex 1

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Annex 2 to USSR - 33

INSTRUCTIONS TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Contingency A (If US troops intervene in Teheran or elsewhere):

1. Instruct Soviet delegate to UN to demand plenary session of General Assembly and make speech, repeating points made in statement of N. S. Khrushchev and asking that General Assembly (a) consider Iran question on emergency basis with view to arrangements which will reduce danger of war and make possible eventual withdrawal of all foreign troops; (b) invite representative of Iranian National Democratic Revolutionary Provisional Government to be present and be heard when General Assembly considers question; (c) instruct Secretary General to consult following states re possibility their contributing to UN force that may be needed in Iran: India, Indonesia, UAR, Morocco, Guinea.

2. Send urgent personal Khrushchev message to Macmillan pointing out firmness of Soviet intention to prevent US domination of Iran through invasion and conquest by military force. Use of American armed forces for aggression in defiance of UN Charter and in disregard of desire of all peoples for peaceful settlement has compelled USSR to take counteraction to protect Iranian independence and Soviet security. We will not hesitate to use all force necessary to thwart American designs. Persistance by Americans in this venture will inevitably bring world to edge of major war involving all of us. I hope you will make clear to them this situation. I am prepared to meet with you, the President and Nehru if such meeting would be useful, but cannot agree to attend as long as US military actions in Iran continue.

Contingency B (If Soviet "volunteer" coup carried out and no US intervention):

1. Transmit message to US Government to the effect USSR has evidence US preparing to intervene in Iran with its own armed forces, and stating categorically that such a move will be met at once by massive Soviet counteraction. Message would urge upon US Soviet desire for peaceful solution unless US makes it impossible.

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2. Transmit personal message Khrushchev to Macmillar pointing to evidence of imminent US military action in Iran that could bring world to disaster of nuclear war. USSR would have no choice but to move forces into Iran if US moved first. Indeed, threatening position of US may give us no alternative to taking military measures for our own protection. At this juncture crucial to maintenance of peace I urge you to exert your influence on side of restraining US aggression.

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Annex 3 to USSR - 33

DIRECT ACTION BY PATRIOTIC CIVILIAN ELEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The Foreign Department Central Committee, CPSU and the IX Chief Directorate of the KGB will coordinate in initiating actions set out below by Iranian patriots in Teheran area. Instructions for such action to be transmitted under maximum security, "Eyes Only" to bearers of Category A Party cards or equivalent KGB security clearance. In no circumstances will Soviet sponsorship of these actions be revealed to members of Iranian National Revolutionary Democratic Provisional Gov't. other than those in above categories. In all cases such action will appear local in origin and spontaneous as to timing. Actual timing and specific details will be transmitted over Project Caviar "Salmon" net.

SPECIAL ORDERS

Contingency A (Americans have seized Teheran airfield):

1. Team Herring will seize Teheran radio, broadcast that: (a) formation of Provisional Government imminent; (b) spectacular announcements by leaders of new government expected momentarily; (c) all Iranian patriots must rally under direction of local Nationalist leaders to seize key objectives in Teheran area, consolidate Nationalist control throughout country north of 33rd parallel, immobilize imperialist elements at Teheran airport until arrival of Soviet forces, which are already rapidly approaching in strength. (Team Herring will act as central control).

2. Team Trout will storm police headquarters, seize all police weapons, equipment and communications facilities in both headquarters and precinct stations.

3. Team Bluefish will occupy telephone and postal headquarters.

4. Team Pike will occupy power stations, prepare to turn off power in various sections of city on order from Team Herring.

5. Team Bass will sabotage all military objectives, supplies and equipment which remain in hands of forces loyal to Shah.

6. Team Tarpon will attempt sabotage all facilities Teheran airfield, paralyzing all operations if possible, otherwise cutting communications, destroying navigational facilities, etc.

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Contingency B (Nationalist forces have seized Teheran airfield).

1. Team Herring will seize Teheran Radio Station, broadcast that: (a) New Provisional Government established, effectively controls all Iran north of 33rd parall l; (b) Provisional Government has been recognized by Soviet Union, and massive Soviet military assistance is immediately forthcoming; (c) all patriots rally to, carry out orders of new regime; (d) Followers of Shah have 6 hours to report to Nationalist district chairmen and receive guarantees of amnesty--otherwise must expect peoples' wrath. (Team Herring will act as control team.)

2. Teams Trout, Bluefish, Pike and Bass -- same as Contingency A.

3. Team Tarpon -- subordinate to Teheran Airport commander for security and other assignments.

GENERAL ORDERS

All Nationalist patriots will agitate among the population the themes broadcast by Radio Free Iran, and in particular will disseminate information regarding disintegration of position of the American imperialists and their lackey, the Shah.

end of Annex 3

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Annex 4, p. 1

Directive, Presidium to Agitprop

1. Initial and throughout: maximum use of all available domestic and foreign media to present imminence, size, and unilateral nature of US imperialist intervention, disregarding UN, allies, Afro-Asian sentiment, worldwide perceloving opposition to it, and absolute Soviet determination to oppose it by all necessary means.

2. Implementation of military moves in Iran:

(a) Contingency B (if US does not first move combat troops into Teheran and/or rest of loyalist territory). Using Radio Tabriz and Radio Free Iran personnel in airlifted transmitter plus leaflet drops, implement the following line: a spontaneous revolt of the Teheran revolutionary underground, capturing city and airfield, has been joined rapidly by overwhelming revolutionary forces and defecting loyalist troops; collapse of the Shah's regime and revolutionary victory are imminent; previously-stated objectives remain in force (national, revolutionary, democratic, independent, neutral Iran, withdrawal all foreign personnel and influence), US intervention imminent.

(b) Contingency A (US occupies Teheran with combat troops first, or Red Army enters Iran only after US intervention has forestalled revolutionary rising in Teheran). Comrade Khrushchev will announce Soviet intervention, stressing that Soviet move: (1) Followed US intervention, which was contrary to UN resolution re non-aggravation of situation, (2) was in response to request from INDPRG, (3) will remain defensive in character and attempt to avoid combat with US forces, will go only to 33rd paralled, is in accordance with Soviet treaty and UN obligations and (most important) with primary intent to force joint Soviet/US withdrawal and UN-supervised formation of united Iran government with revolutionary and loyalist participation, (4) Soviets have no intention to begin conflict with US, demand UN (Afro-Asian) forces rapidly and progressively replace USSR/US forces.

3. Geographic implementation:

(a) To Western Europe, Asia, Africa: stress imminent danger of thermo-nuclear missile warfare, Soviet determination to avoid it, Soviet demand for rapid UN action to prevent US imperialist precipitation of it and to produce USSR/US withdrawal and united government.

(b) To Middle East: stress US violation of Iraqui air space, threat to UAR, use of Israeli/Jordan bases, renewed US-led imperialist colonial threat Arab independence.

more - more

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USSR-33
Annex 5, p. 1

Directive to USSR MISSION TO MAHADI

Review of Situation

Since the beginning of the revolution Soviet relations with Professor Mahmadi have been entirely satisfactory. In view of the favorable developments of the overall situation, politically and militarily, during the past 30 days, no issues involving a serious conflict of interests have arisen. Such differences as have appeared were readily resolved, i.e. training of pilots at USSR airfields (Control 47). In fact, really complete unanimity of views on strategy and tactics for the initial period has obtained, in particular on the key question of direct involvement of Soviet troops. This harmony has also been reflected in the coalition of forces supporting Mahmadi, who is now prepared to announce the formation of provisional government representing all elements--including a satisfactory representation for our pro-Soviet friends. In view of the immediate prospect of direct US intervention with combat troops, Mahmadi is now also ready to satisfy the demands of his generals who have--in our opinion and his--been prematurely demanding overt Soviet military intervention.

Present requests by Mahmadi

We are ready to comply immediately with Mahmadi's plea for the strongest possible statement regarding a firm Soviet ~~xxxx~~ commitment to act with overwhelming strength to counteract US military aggression in Iran. At this time, upon request ~~xx~~ from Mahmadi, we announce the recognition of the Iranian National Democratic Revolutionary Provision Government. (All countries of the socialist camp will also grant recognition and an all-out effort will be made to obtain recognition of Afro-Asian and other neutral countries.)

This statement will be a personal communication from Comrade Khrushchev to the US president tersely stating the decision in this matter and warning the US that they bear the entire responsibility for the consequences. The Mahmadi request on where this action is based will be enclosed. (For diplomatic action to supplement this move, see Annex 2).

Although we are not optimistic concerning the full success of this declaration and supporting diplomatic and propaganda activities, it will provide the appropriate culmination of our strategy to fix full responsibility for the military intervention on the US. Should this step, however, succeed in stopping direct US combat intervention (Contingency B-2) we continue present policy of full support without direct involvement of Soviet troops.

more - more

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In case of US intervention and seizure of Teheran airport (Contingency A), we will fulfill our military commitments as stated above (Annex-1) in response to the official request for assistance from the Iranian National Provisional Revolutionary Democratic Government. As requested by Mahmadi we maintain full command of our troops; we immediately inform Mahmadi and military of basic plans to be implemented under Contingency A, including all subversive and propaganda operations (See Annex 3).

Simultaneously with declaration we comply with Mahmadi's request (Control-51, last para) to seize Teheran through airborne action of selected Azerbaidzhani units wearing uniforms of revolutionary forces (Contingency B). Success of this operation, supported by commitment of necessary troops to extend territory held by revolutionary forces to 33rd parallel will create situation desired by Mahmadi gradually to extend control southward. END

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PART THREE

SOME POLICY OBSERVATIONS

This Part, while making no pretense to be exhaustive or even comprehensive, represents the Game Director's attempt to abstract from the exercise some issues which seem particularly relevant to real-life policy, and which might be of interest in terms of future research, planning, or even gaming. The reflections of other participants have been liberally drawn upon here.

In broad terms, the game might be summarized as having the following salient features:

1. Both sides believed strategies were available to them in which they could place considerable confidence. The Soviets saw the situation as a positive opportunity. To a lesser extent, so did the Americans. But both predicted favorable outcomes for themselves.

2. Both sides initially chose limited goals, and developed essentially cautious strategies. Risks were to be taken, but neither strategy could be described as reckless or even adventurous.

3. Each perceived the other's strategy imperfectly, and neither assumed that a common interest might exist between them other than avoiding general war. In retrospect such a common interest might well have been postulated.

4. Both intended to avoid direct intervention and face-to-face conflict, but ultimately this happened--although with some manipulation by "Nature."

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The primary cause of the ultimate military intervention lay in the fundamental instability of the internal situation and the lack of genuine communication between the great powers. In this situation, the initially cautious strategies on both sides were replaced by policies involving considerable risk.

Behind these general statements, however, lie some more precise issues, which may best be identified by reference to the two different levels on which the game functioned. The first level was the indigenous situation in Iran. Some of our findings apply to Iran, but may also extend to the larger pattern of relationships with transitional underdeveloped societies in general, of which Iran was an example. The other level was that of Soviet-American relations. Of particular interest were the kinds of estimates each side made about the situation it confronted and about the intentions of the other, as well as the processes of communication by which strategies were mutually comprehended--or misunderstood.

I Local Factors

1. The game dramatized sharply what is perhaps the deepest contemporary dilemma for American policy: what base of popular political support is available to the United States in situations of conflict between on the one hand pro-Western regimes which rest on traditional--(dynastic, aristocratic, or oligarchical)--rulership, and on the other hand populist forces exploiting political, economic, or social grievances? And what can be done to enlarge the base of those pro-Western regimes? US strategy in the game suggested some policy alternatives from which we have hitherto recoiled: reexamination of the possibility of support for popular

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domestic forces even at the cost of annoying friendly governments; and reexamination of our traditional non-intervention policies in order to work more vigorously toward reform of the established order. Systematic reexamination of the popular base in friendly or strategically vital countries where this brand of conflict potentially exists might suggest better ways of anticipating the processes of decay which so far have had an inevitable quality.

2. In its "optimal" strategy the United States did press the Shah for internal reforms, curbs on corruption, and a more vigorous development program. One criticism of the American team's policy, however, was that while those policies might constitute a very effective slow-acting device over a long period of time, other actions would be more crucial in a crisis situation where the rebel force is preoccupied with the tactical military situation. This also suggests the need for closer integration of military contingency planning with the kind of planning that concerns itself with political, economic, and social reform, a type of activity with which military planners are not normally associated.

3. There was considerable uncertainty on both sides whether such treaty commitments as CENTO can feasibly be invoked in internal civil war situations. The Soviet Union might well have emphasized to the other CENTO countries that no automatic commitment existed, thus increasing the chance that the United States would be isolated if it intervened.

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4. The rebel coalition was held together by a number of common causes, among which were the urges for more speedy economic development and for significant political reforms. But in the large, what held the group together was xenophobia. This posed an exquisite dilemma for the United States. The more vigorously the US supported the Shah, the more believable his public image as a foreign puppet and the stronger the cement binding the otherwise loose rebel coalition.

5. The two sides in the game rather sharply illustrated conflicting current views about the place of political neutralism in the process of modernization. The Soviets assumed that political neutralization is a step on the road to socialization; the Americans assured themselves that neutralization is a normal and essentially healthy step on the path to modernization and, ex hypothesi, to genuine independence. The crucial practical significance of this theoretical cleavage was the Soviet Union did not at all understand that the United States could learn to live with a neutral Iran, and continued to proceed on the assumption that the United States must regard such a contingency as an unmitigated catastrophe.

II United States Policy Factors

1. Perhaps the most interesting single quality of the game lay in the failures on both sides to understand adequately the true intentions of one another. This was particularly true where an innovative policy clashed with a stereotyped image held by one side or the other.

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In this sense both sides continued to be captives of their own pre-conceptions based on previous--but not necessarily current--historical evidence. In a related sense, both sides resisted accepting "understandings" which one or the other assumed must necessarily be held symmetrically.

a. The centerpiece of American strategy was an explicit willingness to face down the Soviets, on the belief that a determination to go all the way would more effectively deter Soviet adventurism than hitherto routine or ambiguous warnings. But this new intention failed to communicate itself. The Soviet side failed to respond with appropriate seriousness to the American warning that this was an issue of war or peace. At the same time, to the extent that the Russians did take it seriously they saw it as a potential threat to their freedom of action under a new American administration and felt it essential to set the latter straight. The seriousness of this Soviet intention was in turn not fully appreciated. Even after the game, in response to a questionnaire, the large majority of Americans said that at the game's most dangerous stage they felt that Soviet-American troop engagements on an important scale were unlikely.

b. The Soviet Union took the solemn American warning to mean the same thing as all similar past warnings which implied that the United States would counter actual overt commitment

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of Soviet military forces. The USSR had no initial intention of committing such forces and thus felt secure in its belief that the American warning did not cover the preferred tactics of infiltration, political warfare, etc. Moreover, they later indicated that the Americans had not seemed to grasp the Soviet strategy of "a sauter pour mieux reculer", a strategy of initial advance and subsequent withdrawal to which the United States did not react in anticipated ways.

c. The very bedrock assumption of the American team was that the truce lines created by post-war arrangements throughout the world constituted a common law which, though implicit and occasionally violated, was fundamentally respected by both sides. The Soviet team was never really aware of this assumption. In retrospect it is clear that even if they had been they would have rejected it on the ground that some truce lines are obliterated by history (Berlin?), and the inhibitions they connote subject to changes in power relationships, new alignments, etc.

2. Given the spiraling nature of the two powers' commitments in Iran and the ultimate military involvement of both, it would seem in retrospect that vigorous UN intervention by a strong UN majority--with American support--to pull both sides back and indeed out of Iran, might have been a more favorable outcome for the United States as well as the Soviets.

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III Soviet Policy Factors

1. The most provocative result of the game under this heading was that some members of the Soviet team were not as unequivocally sure after the game as they were before it that, in a comparable situation, the Soviet Union would not ultimately intervene with its own forces.

2. In the game, the Soviet team was clear that it would not tolerate a freezing of the status quo in the name of peace or of alliances or agreements made under conditions which history had overtaken. Out of its reasoning a profound political danger for the United States emerges. It is that in an increasing number of comparable situations the United States may be outmaneuvered by the Soviets if we rather than they can be shown to threaten overt military action. As the power required to defend its existing positions, the United States may appear to world opinion to be treatening the use of force while so long as the Russians do not have to make the first military move, Soviet support for indigenous popular forces will attract favor. The Soviet team in the game considered that if the United States resorted to force a military response would be justified in the eyes of the same audience, particularly in a sensitive region bordering on the Soviet Union. (Flowing from this, the greatest political risk from the Soviet standpoint lay in the possibility that the United States would eventually solve its difficulties with the rebel leader and begin to develop a broad popular base for a friendly regime.)

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3. The Soviet strategy underscored the orchestrated technique available to the Soviets in this kind of situation: working with a legitimate dissident group, increasingly maneuvering the latter into a position to take Soviet logistical and military support, then invoking Russian military strength and deliberately creating a crisis designed to frighten the world with the prospect of nuclear war, and finally taking the matter to the United Nations with a complaint about the threatening nature of American counter-measures. In this sense the advantage to the Soviets of their missile power is not necessarily to cash in on the gap or even to use strategic weapons for direct pressure, but to inhibit the United States from using its military power to stop the movement of political forces in directions which the communists consider desirable and inevitable.

4. Elements of this Soviet strategy have of course appeared in a variety of places in the real world. What the game achieved was to provide a model of the whole in strikingly sharp terms. To devise effective counters, US research and planning might well take as a whole--even if all parts of it are not yet revealed--the potential Soviet strategy of fostering revolutionary movements, flooding them with aid, scaring the world with the threat of war if the 'imperialists' intervene, and finally going to the United Nations to inhibit Western counter measures by the force of public opinion, eventually squeezing us out of the area in question.

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5. An intriguing suggestion was made that both the Russians and Americans were seen in retrospect to have shared a common interest in internal reform and international neutralization. To the Russians a move toward neutrality obviously represented a welcome windfall along a sensitive border. To the Americans, again in retrospect, such a development would have left them better off than the final military involvement, particularly given their own theory of modernization and development. Needless to say, the two sides could not or would not cooperate toward achieving their common interest. More than that, neither side even identified such a common interest at any stage of the game. Instead, it was assumed that a conflict situation existed, and both sides behaved accordingly. One can speculate about the degree of rationality required to identify such common interests in advance and actively to seek to negotiate them.

6. Some of the difficulty in communication referred to at several places above might well have been intrinsic to the game. But some was doubtless representative of real life communications barriers. Further thought needs to be given to two related questions: how can we make persuasive to the Russians a message signaling a change in American policy which does not conform to doctrinal prejudices? And how can we ensure sufficient realism in American interpretation of Soviet purposes in the face of such semantic obstacles as ideological dogmatism, Aesopian language, and typically obscure communist bargaining strategies?

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IV Miscellaneous

1. Our military advisors not unexpectedly felt that the game underscored the need for greater appreciation of the role of military forces both in resolving political problems and in planning a strategy which profits from the existence of military power while not contemplating its application.

2. The Umpires played their role quite permissively. There was, however, one turning point late in the game which the Umpires deliberately devised in order that the game remain focused on its primary methodological objectives. At the opening of the final move period the Umpires supplied the US team with an intelligence estimate to the effect that the presence of American ground forces in Iran would enhance the eroding morale of the Shah's troops. At the same time the rebel forces were made to step up their pressure to gain Soviet support. Both Umpire moves were part of a strategy designed to force the parties into an ever-closer confrontation rather than allowing them to evade the hard choices the game management wished to study. Their natural desire was of course to dodge such a confrontation. The Umpires decided that to hold their feet up to the fire was consistent with the primary purpose of the game, which required that both teams seriously consider alternative courses of action which might involve them in significant military action. The American team later expressed some dissatisfaction with the way the Umpires at that stage had interpreted the internal situation in

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Iran, for up to that point, the Americans (like the Russians) were euphoric in their confidence in a favorable outcome if they continued to pursue their initial strategy. Management deliberately destroyed this comfortable feeling on both sides. As it turned out, the results may have justified this possibly artificial interference with the course of events as the teams saw it.

(It would have been equally interesting to have played it the other way, i.e., with Control telling the Americans at the same crucial moment that the presence of American forces would have a demoralizing effect. The United States might then have presumably withdrawn its support from the Shah and still have kept the rebels anti-Russian while giving them the opportunity to organize the country with few levers for the Soviets to manipulate.)

3. In considering the variable factors whose manipulation by the Umpires influenced the course of events, one crucial element was the rebel leader. His personal character and political complexion were deliberately kept ambiguous. In this way the pressures on the parties could be adjusted by the Umpires as desired, simply by defining more precisely the internal factors in the rebel movement. Within this general policy, however, the Iranian experts on the Control Team sought to keep the rebel movement historically plausible in every possible way.

4. Some additional results of the post-game questionnaire referred to above:

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a. The United States was split as to whether it came close to achieving its maximum objective, but the Soviet team was unanimous in believing that it achieved its maximum.

b. The United States was split as to who came out better, all things considered, but the Soviets unanimously chose themselves. (The Control group predominantly also chose the Soviets.)

c. Both teams thought their objectives realistic and their moves plausible. But while the Americans, with some qualifications, thought that the Soviet strategy was plausible, almost half the Soviet team did not think that American policy was plausible. A majority of Americans were not entirely happy with the Control team's action and reactions, while the majority of the Russians were.

d. The US team was divided as to whether it had adequately foreseen the contingencies which actually developed. The Soviet team was almost unanimous in believing it had.

e. The Americans rated as unlikely and the Russians as likely the probability of Soviet-American troop engagement at the game's most dangerous stage. The Control group was divided on this question.

f. The US team rated as unlikely or even completely negative its willingness to undertake nuclear war at any time. The Soviet team was also unanimously in the negative. But both were somewhat split as to whether the other team was prepared at any stage to

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initiate nuclear war. The US team was split as to whether at its most dangerous stage the game was likely to lead to nuclear war, while the Soviets were quite assured that it was not. (A majority of the control group, however, foresaw the likelihood of limited nuclear war.)

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Appendix 1. - The Problem

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Problem Basic - 1

POLEX II

THE PROBLEM

London Economist - June 5, 1961

From our Special Correspondent in Teheran

It is a little less than a year since the last elections were held in Iran. These were so blatantly rigged that even in this less than free city they caused a public outcry sufficient to move the Shah to rescind the election results and authorize the calling of new elections. The latter are to be held during this month--June 1961--throughout the country. How the new elections will be conducted may well prove a key to whether Iran in the immediate future is in for a period of political turmoil or relative calm.

In a number of circles inside and outside the government and among the intelligentsia generally a good deal of skepticism is being expressed as to whether the new elections will prove any more bona fide than the previous ones. (For a country in which the military and the security police play such an ubiquitous role, the outspokenness of individuals--at least in private groups--comes always as something of a surprise to the foreign observer.) At best it is expected that a few "independents" may be permitted to be elected to the Majlis from Teheran.

The prevalent political mood here in Teheran and--if one can judge from reports received--in other of the major cities in Iran varies from cynicism to despair to deepening resentment depending upon the day and the group one happens to be with.

More and more of this resentment is being focussed on the person of the Shah. At this point only he can initiate the basic political and social changes which are needed at the present, and the hope that he will be able to do this is rapidly vanishing.

The more generous of his critics acknowledge his good intentions. They believe that the Shah is dedicated to the modernization of Iran and the improvement of the general lot of his people at the maximum pace possible. They believe that he is committed to these

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goals not only as a moral imperative but also because he recognizes that progress toward their achievement is essential to the security of his regime.

Others though are pessimistic about the Shah's prospects of bringing out the needed reforms and uniting the nation behind him. Their pessimism can be ascribed to two basic but related factors: One is that, though the Shah is commander-in-chief of the army, he is in a significant sense its captive; and secondly, he lacks faith in his own people. This lack of faith and trust, it may be noted, is part of a general malaise that characterizes Iranian society generally and is not peculiar to the Shah himself.

Howbeit, a pervasive sense of frustration is evident. How intense this is cannot be easily determined in view of the fact that public discussion either in Parliament or the press is highly restricted.

One possible gauge of this may be the rising crescendo of public comment on the corruption theme. Recently several contracts for large government industrial installations were concluded; not many hours afterward the bazaar buzzed with the rather impressive amounts that reputedly changed hands in the process, the receiving hands being identified as fairly close to the Shah. While "corruption" is almost endemic to the society here, that the "court" (even though not the person of the Shah) is identified with it gives rise to much cynical comment. More important, it makes it difficult for the Shah to become the rallying point for reform and progress.

One other possible index to the heightening tension is the clamor over the cost of living. This again is not a novel theme but the complaints have seemed to be taking a more strident note these last six months as the rise in prices accelerated. Meat, fresh fruit and vegetable and dwellings have been the items in the cost of living that have made the greatest jumps--and these fall largely on the growing urban middle class. That a less-than-prudent financial policy pursued by the government has been a factor in this is being given a good deal of attention in the local press.

In all these political crosscurrents and uncertainties it is a curious fact that the economic boom continues unabated. The Government's Seven Year Development Program, now in its sixth year, is being carried out without any serious hitches, and private investment is surprisingly buoyant. Oil production and oil income, though no

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longer increasing at the substantial rate of the past years due to the weakening of the world oil market, still earned for the Iranian government almost 300 million dollars last year.

There are a number of spotty parts in the economic picture. There have been some recent bank failures and several more threatening, reflecting the rapid mushrooming of new under-capitalized and ill-managed banks, in the recent period. This had some unfavorable repercussions in the bazaar. Iran's foreign exchange reserves are virtually depleted. And while government revenues have been rising substantially, government expenditures continue to rise at an even faster rate.

Last week the government released for public discussion a proposed Five Year Plan to begin in 1962 at the completion of the present Seven Year Development Program. The targets appear rather ambitious and for their fulfillment would impose requirements both on the Iranian people and their leadership that seem hardly likely under the present circumstances to be forthcoming. The Shah has indicated that the Plan's targets are a minimum in terms of the nation's needs and future.

One further observation on political currents should be noted. While the issue is not discussed in the press or in Parliament, there is undoubtedly a growing feeling against the unqualified commitment to the West as expressed in Iran's present membership in the Cento alliance. Part of this is a spill-over of feeling against the dominant military group and its policy of self-aggrandizement; part of it reflects the feeling of those who hold that the Shah, in leading the country away from Iran's traditional diplomatic stance of playing one power against the other, i.e. Iran's own variety of neutralism--has made a grave mistake; part from leftist elements who feel that the Cento alliance areas in the U.S.-Iran Military Agreements must be abrogated as a prelude to a more friendly relationship with the U.S.S.R.; and finally, there are those who believe that Iran's present commitment leaves little room for bargaining and this is indeed a most un-Persian position into which to be forced!.

From all accounts the Army-upon which the Shah's power so largely rests-gives every indication of continuing loyalty to the regime. Rumors persist nevertheless of disaffected groups within its leadership--particularly among the lower echelons of the officers.

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Problem Basic - 2

TEHERAN - July 1, 1961 - (AP)

During the past two weeks national elections have been taking place in Iran. With the exception of the city of Teheran, the voting appears to be almost completed. Tabulation should take some time however and results will only become known in approximately a week.

The voting seems to be proceeding without any marked disturbances. However, it has been reported that in the northern provinces and in Isphahan sporadic rioting did take place but was quickly quelled by the police.

In addition, several knifings took place in Tabriz, resulting in one fatality. It is not clear, however, whether these were directly related to the elections or not.

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Problem Basic - 3

TEHERAN - July 5, 1961 (Special to The New York Times)

The citizens of Tehran completed their voting today and so ended the national elections ordered by the Shah in place of those held last September.

About 100,000 of Teheran's citizens voted, representing a substantial portion of the electorate. The voting seems to have taken place without many incidents.

Besides a number of candidates from the two official parties there have been three independent candidates not representing either of these parties who have run for office. There is a strong probability that votes will not be tampered with this time and that these candidates will win.

In general, throughout the country there has been considerable apathy regarding the elections. Aside from the several independent candidates, all the others in both parties, the National Party and the People's Party, have again been thoroughly screened for acceptability by both the Court and the Military.

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Problem Basic 4

NEWS SUMMARY (excerpted from
REUTERS Middle East wireless file)

TEHERAN. September 11 - 9 AM local time FLASH
A Revolutionary Force has taken over the Teheran radio, some key policy installations and is attacking the palace of the Shah.

It is reported that a bomb has exploded within the palace killing a number of people including the Shah himself.

Mobs are fighting in Teheran streets concentrated around Sepah Square and the main thoroughfares.

Some of the mobs are shouting "Long live the Shah" and others "Death to the Shah."

Trucks of soldiers are driving through the streets also shouting "Long live the Shah." Others are crying the refrain "Death to the Shah."

Steel shutters are down on all the shops. The Bazaar is closed completely. Exchanges of gunfire can be heard all over Teheran. MORE

TEHERAN. September 11 - 10 AM
A message was beamed this morning from Radio Teheran by Professor Mahmoud Mahmadi who is evidently the leader of the Revolutionary Force.

He has announced that military garrisons in Tabriz and Meshed and Sanandaj areas have revolted and that provinces of Khorrasan, Azerbaijan and Kurdistan are in the hands of the Revolutionary Forces.

He pleaded for the support of his countrymen in driving out the corrupt clique who, allied with "foreign elements", have been running the country.

He promised that the Revolutionary Government will "give Iran back to the Iranian people." MORE

TEHERAN. September 11 - 12 Noon FLASH
It is reported that the Shah has survived the assassination attempt with only minor wounds and has escaped to the Iranian Officers' Military Club. He has there assumed direction of that part of the Teheran garrison troops which have remained loyal.

Heavy fighting is going on about the Teheran radio broadcasting installation.

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Problem Basic

Street mobs have increased and there appear to be hundreds of casualties.

Tanks have appeared on the streets but it is not clear to which side they belong. They appear to be shooting indiscriminately into the mobs and at each other.

TEHERAN. September 12 - 9 AM

Troops loyal to the Shah have regained most of the strategic places in the city including the Radio Broadcasting Stations.

Sporadic shooting is still heard in the all but deserted streets.

The uprisings in Isphahan, Shiraz and Ahwaz are reported to have been completely suppressed. The southern provinces and the oilfields are reportedly under the control of government forces.

TEHERAN. September 12 - 3 PM

The Shah's voice was heard this afternoon over Radio Teheran calling upon his country to remain loyal and denouncing the rebels as traitors to their country. (Ed. note: Radio Moscow reports that rebel forces are gaining ascendancy in Iran's northern provinces)

TEHERAN. September 12 - 5 PM

Fighting is still going on in the northern provinces but it now appears that these have fallen to the rebel forces.

The leaders of the revolt in Teheran along with many of the defecting troops have fled north to join their compatriots.

An ominous quiet hovers over the city of Teheran. The hospitals are filled with the wounded and dying.

Martial law has been declared with curfew at 5 PM.

TABRIZ. September 13 - 9 AM

The voice of the Rebel Forces was heard announcing that the battle has but begun and calling upon the people to rally to their cause.

The rebel leader Professor Mahmoud Mahmadi was heard once again denouncing the elections as fraudulent and announcing that until new and honest elections are held the rebel force represents the will of the people.

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Problem Basic

He again repeated theme that Iran must be freed "of foreign influences and the corrupt Iranian clique that has served these interests."

MOSCOW. September 13.

Moscow came out today in support of the Iranian rebel forces. A lead editorial in PRAVDA denounced the Shah as a "traitor to his people" and a "lackey" of the US and UK.

September 13. 5 PM Local Time (Tehran Radio) (Monitored in Cyprus)

The Shah this evening denounced the revolution as a "Soviet conspiracy" and called publicly upon his Cento Allies and the US for immediate assistance.

PARIS. September 13. 3 PM Local Time (Reuters)

London and Washington are understood to be in urgent consultation on the Iranian crisis. Our Middle East correspondents report that both the US and UK are being pressed for advice from the Turks and Pakistanis. Our Baghdad correspondent has cabled through censorship that Iraq has closed borders on Iran and is strengthening its troop forces in Shattel-arab area. There are unconfirmed reports of US and British naval units steaming toward the Persian Gulf, as well as of Russian troop movements toward the southern Soviet borders.

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Probelm Basic - 5

MATTER OF FACT

by
Joseph Alsop

BEIRUT, Sept. 14, 1961. In the past four days I have witnessed the outburst of Civil War in Iran. When I left earlier today Government troops and tanks were patrolling the streets of Teheran. The schools, the University, the Mehrabad Airport in Teheran and most of the shops were closed down and a curfew was in effect that forced all citizens off the streets except those with official passes. I flew out by courtesy of an American military plane that was enroute to Rome with a stopover in Beirut. It is from that once crisis-torn capital that I survey the ominous clouds rapidly gathering in the Middle East.

Though the Shah's forces are in control of most of the Country, his hold appears extremely shaky. Two major northern provinces bordering the Soviet Union -- Azerbaijan and Khorrasan-- appear to be completely in the hands of the rebel forces, as is the northwestern province of Kurdistan. As I left, the two sides appear to be reforming their forces for the next phase in what may well be a long-drawn-out struggle.

How strongly the revolt is based on popular support is not clear, but it is probably considerable. Many of the nationalistic followers of former Prime Minister Mossadegh are certainly supporting it. A number of the western-educated younger men with the leader of the revolt, Professor Mahmoud Mahmadi, have recently returned to Iran and have become impatient with the pace of social reform and persistence of the traditional ineptness of the government processes. Furthermore, the rebel group almost certainly includes some sympathizers with the outlawed Tudeh party; but these are not dominant.

Professor Mahmadi comes from a prominent Iranian family as do Colonel Asbaghai and Brigadier General Fatemi, the military leaders of the revolt. If the recent elections had actually been free there is a good chance that Professor Mahmadi would have been the next Prime Minister. He would have made a strong Prime Minister and he and his colleagues would notably have used their position to remove Iran from the CENTO Alliance. Should the rebel cause prevail, the chances are that Iran will join the growing group of "neutralist" nations in this part of the world.

A number of younger military officers are among the leaders in the revolt. Their social origin appears mainly to be from the middle class. Their political coloration is at this point an unknown factor.

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As the world now knows, the Soviet Union has--not unexpectedly--come out in support of the revolt. It can in the immediate future be expected to intensify its support. How far it will go in this direction, cannot at the moment be determined, but the situation has all the makings of a first class international crisis, with all its ominous overtones.

The Western Alliance is once again in a difficult position for which American leadership must bear much of the blame. Commitments to the regime in Iran are considerable. Present Western defense strategy in the Middle East appears to be at stake. Yet should the West unreservedly back what may in the end prove to be the losing side, Iran may permanently be lost to the West--an incalculable disaster. On the other hand, if the West does allow the Shah to go down the drain, the West may be irrevocably excluded from this strategically vital region.

At present, the situation both internally and externally is a fluid one, with Western policy having to be determined primarily by the United States.

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GAME CLASSIFIED

Problem - U.S. Only - 1

TO: Secretary of State

FROM: AMEMBASSY, TEHERAN

NO: 890

August 31, 1961

PRIORITY

SECRET

RE: EMBTELS 520 OCT. 1960, 575 DEC. 1960, 35 FEB. 1961. Last night at Pakistan EMB cocktail party I was casually approached by Professor Mahmoud Mahmadi who has held prominent positions in the Iranian government but has not been a part of the government in recent years and is now teaching at the University of Teheran. He has been known to be friendly to US. He asked for a few words in private with me and we retired to a secluded corner of room.

He opened conversation by asking me to forgive him for coming immediately to point but it would be too conspicuous if we talked too long together here. He said that despite outward appearances the political situation in Iran is deteriorating rapidly. He said that he had given up hope of the Shah permitting constitutional government to be established, that Shah feared a strong Prime Min in office, that corruption was assuming proportions enormous even by Iranian standards, that the rising cost of living due to financial irresponsibility of govt, i.e., the Shah, was causing hardship and popular unrest, and that therefore QUOTE radical change UNQUOTE must soon take place.

He went on to inquire what the attitude of the US GOV would be should such an attempt at fundamental change take place. He stressed that he was not asking for direct US intervention or support in such a situation but only that the US not be unfavorably disposed to the attempt.

I inquired as to the groups that would seek to carry out such a QUOTE change UNQUOTE.

He said he was not at liberty to tell me but that he could assure me that no REPEAT no Tudeh elements or sympathizers were represented. He went on to say that no commitments either implicit

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or explicit have up to now been made by group to Soviets.

I then said that as matter of principle US government does not intervene in the internal affairs of another country. I went on to remind him that it was not too long ago that Iran went through a period of political turmoil in which the country was almost lost to the Communists, and that the Shah appeared to be the best hope to maintain the stability that Iran so desperately needs at this time. I concluded by saying I would report this conversation to my government, and on this note we returned to the party.

In our dispatches and telegrams of the past year EMB Teheran has dealt extensively with the difficult situation here. We are not able yet to assess the strength, composition and seriousness of Professor Mahmadi's group. I do believe however, that they are not to be taken lightly. Members of EMB staff have received such overtures during the past year which have been reported to Dept. in REFTELS. This has been the first time however it has been put on such an explicit basis by a prominent personage, and that the approach has been made directly to AMB.

My own view is that we should not, repeat not, encourage this group in any way, manner or form. The present regime despite all its weaknesses still remains the best hope the country has for stability, progress and the continuation of a pro-Western government that in particular will remain faithful to its CENTO commitments.

I have consulted with my British colleague and have been informed that he has been approached almost simultaneously and in the same vein. He has advised his Government along lines similar to those taken here.

Please cable instructions soonest.

WAILES

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Problem - U.S. only - 2

GAME CLASSIFIED

TO: EMBASSY TEHERAN

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE

September 5, 1961

REF: EMBTEL 890

NO: 434

SECRET

Concur completely with Embassy recommendation in REFTEL. If approached again advise that U. S. GOV does not intervene in internal affairs of friendly country and cannot therefore give assurances requested.

UK FONOFF has cabled similar instructions to EMB Tehran.

Please keep DEPT. advised on current developments particularly with respect to possible overtures of group to SOV EMB.

MERCHANT, ACTING

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Problem - U.S.S.R. only - 1

GAME CLASSIFIED

TO: MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MOSCOW

FROM: AMBASSADOR OF USSR, TEHERAN

DATE: SEPTEMBER 8, 1961

SECRET

In recent despatch of August 2, 1961, our analysis of situation here was that time ripe for coup in Iran but did not believe our party members here or their friends were in position to carry it out.

Today have been approached by representative of group that appears prepared to take action. Our best intelligence indicates that this is not just more quote cocktail party revolution unquote.

While group appears dominated by landlord-capitalist-military clique believe their action could serve our interests here if managed properly. At the least we could expect Iran to leave Cento and US-Iran military association.

I have been asked by group representative whether, if such an attempt at a coup took place they could expect USSR to look favorably upon such an action. There has been no, repeat no, specific requests for arms or other type of logistic support and I gather none at least is expected at this point.

I have advised representative that I would consult my government and have encouraged him in believing response would be favourable.

He is to contact me in three days. Cable instructions soonest.

Подцероб

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Problem - U.S.S.R. only - 2

GAME CLASSIFIED

TO: AMBASSADOR OF USSR, TEHERAN

FROM: MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MOSCOW

DATE: SEPTEMBER 10, 1961

SECRET

With reference to your telegram of September 8 advise contact that if their venture gives evidence of possible success Soviet Union would give fullest support possible to Iranian people's demands for democracy and independence which they would then represent.

Громыко

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Appendix 2. - Revised Contingency Plans

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Control - 21

From Control to US and USSR Teams

During Move Period 2 it is especially important that you provide us with a position paper, or strategic plan, that explicitly identifies the main alternative contingencies you foresee and that indicates your program for each of those main contingencies. If your actions are dependent on events in Iran or outside Iran, and especially if dependent on decisions to be taken by the other team, indicate what you propose to do if things go as you hope or expect and what you propose to do if the course of events departs in major ways from your hopes or expectations.

For the Umpires' practical purpose, this is to permit our meshing of US and USSR plans, and autonomous events, over a period of time that may extend beyond the first point at which your planning assumptions may be invalidated. In terms of the Game's purpose, this is to force you to plan beyond your immediate unconditional moves and to anticipate different situations, particularly to anticipate alternative strategies that the other team may follow.

For this purpose it is suggested that you provide us with a paper indicating which of your proposed moves are immediate or unconditional, and which depend on the responses and decisions of other parties and on the course of events, and what form your moves will take in those different contingencies.

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GAME CLASSIFIED

MOVE PERIOD 4 - STRATEGY PAPER

1. We considered two eventualities: one that the internal political situation had so far deteriorated against us and the Shah that the introduction of an American division as requested by the Shah would not save him and would in fact accelerate defections to the rebels; the other that American forces would still serve to strengthen morale. If the first situation had been the case we would have seen no alternative but to cut our losses, pull out of Iran and try to get some kind of neutralist non-Communist government by political means. However, control solved this problem for us by providing an assessment that the internal situation could still be bolstered.

2. We also considered two eventualities regarding Cento attitudes: one that their morale and willingness to keep up the fight had collapsed, the other that they would go with us on sending troops in. Again control's estimate in particular of the Turkish and British attitudes justified continuing a military effort. Partly to satisfy the British demand for a diplomatic approach to the Russians, we decided to send General Clay to Moscow.

3. It was our assessment that a literal adherence to the Shah's request would only drag out a painful and deteriorating situation. While we could stabilize his control of Teheran the rebels in their area would be continuously strengthened by Soviet support and increasingly brought under Soviet control.

We therefore decided that a direct attack upon the rebel concentrations of strength by our already prepared forces on the Turkish side of the Turkish-Iranian frontier would be far more profitable. It would above all cut off the rebels from Soviet assistance. It would bolster the morale of the loyalist forces at least as well as having a lot of idle American troops sitting around the capital making it look as though the Shah was simply the captive of a foreign force. It might bring an immediate collapse of rebel forces before any chance for reaction or reconsolidation. At worst it would identify Soviet intervention as a clear cut violation of frontiers by Red Army forces, resulting in the decimation of an American division, but with the expectable response in both the UN and the United States Congress of a willingness to face up to the need for very drastic action in the light of the Soviet abandonment of the postwar rule of the game that troops are not sent across the cold war line.

MORE

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4. An alternative we faced was whether to send in minimal troops to minimize provocation, keeping reserves in the background or to make a perhaps superfluous effort in the hope of perhaps decisively changing the situation within a week. The latter strategy was chosen.

5. Finally the decision had to be made whether to send in the American troops with or without tactical nuclear weapons. (A related decision had to be made whether to blow up the passes from Russia with nuclear explosions.) The use of nucs might have made the Soviets more hesitant about intervening out of fear of triggering off total war. The idea was that they might even relish the idea of chopping up an American division. However, the decision was against the use or even introduction into the theatre of nuclear weapons because of (a) the impossibility of getting British and perhaps other allied agreement, (b) the consequences for local morale, (c) the consequences in the UN, (d) the consequences to us of Soviet retaliation with nuclear weapons, e.g., on Adana or Turkish rail line, and (e) the dangers of escalation.

6. In short, the basic strategic decision was to send a force of American and Turkish troops across the neck of Iran, as described above and in our military document: to airlift loyal Iranian troops to the North of our troops so that Iranians would hold the Soviet frontier; to put in a small number of marines in Teheran to support the Shah; to have some British forces come in from theSouth while loyal Iranian troops proceded Northward to attack the rebels; to send General Cly to Moscow to make our position clear and, if possible to get Soviet agreement to a political settlement in Iran along the lines of our initial proposals to the Shah and Mahmadi; and to prepare in case of Soviet military intervention in Iran for a widening of the theatre of conflict to Eastern Europe.

end

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DISCUSSION OF A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY IN U.S. POSITION PAPER

1. Given:

a. Deteriorating political position of Shah making it even more difficult for him to serve as national leader for liberal reform.

b. Judgment that appearance U.S. combat forces would solidify loyal Iranian military but not cure popular disaffection

c. Stated willingness of Mahmadi to seek Soviet combat forces, and hence risk of Soviet action

2. Further U.S. intervention could take, among others, two forms differing in degree:

a. Attack from Turkey and with Turkish participation designed to block Soviet-Iranian border (preferred by U.S. team).

b. Demonstration landing in Teheran by U.S. combat forces without military contact with rebels but releasing Iranian forces for front.

3. Latter might have certain advantages within Iran.

a. It might permit formation of new political basis for Iranian government, probably with withdrawal of Shah and assumption of control by military leaders.

b. It would avoid policial repercussions of U.S. attack resulting in Iranian (rebel) casualties.

c. It would leave open the possibility of a Mahmadi-loyalist military ceasefire for formation of nationalist government without Soviet participation.

4. Latter might also have certain advantages in dealing with Russians.

a. It might reduce likelihood of Soviet Union accepting Mahmadi's invitation (if continued), since U.S. forces arrived by invitation without Iranian casualties, and hence Russian action would be more radical violation of tacit cold war boundaries.

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b. If Russians didn't come in, improved political situation within Iran would still leave possibility of favorable resoltuion of crisis in future. However, it should be recognized that this is less desirable than outcome of stronger policy 2a if Russians don't come in.

c. If Russians do come in, this would permit an even more frightening U.S. response, including probably use of a few tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet troops, at less cost to the U.S. in terms of U.S. casualties and in terms of world indecision as to who attacked first. This would probably be more desirable than outcome of stronger policy 2a if Russians do come in. Note premise here is that if Russians come in they are bound to win in Iran, and U.S. longer run world interest is to make Russians feel close escape from general war.

5. Latter also has certain relative disadvantages, notably less decision and slower military influence on Iranian crisis if Russians can still be prevented from coming in, explaining team preference for stronger policy 2a.

end

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GAMES CLASSIFIED USSR -24

USSR Strategy - Alternative

Internal Developments.

1. Mahmadi remains in full control with no fundamental changes in program as proclaimed (Control-19) and interpreted (Control 23)

   a) Full Soviet support, including recognition at appropriate moment.

   b) Warnings to restrain younger elements from pushing pro-Soviet prematurely.

   c) Assurances of economic aid.

2. Mahmadi moves towards a more compromising position on less important internal issues including relation with Shah but renunciation of present military assistance remains in program.

   a) Requires no revision of basic Soviet line.

3. Mahmadi yields to U.S. pressure (diplomatic or military)

   a) If this provokes split among Mahmadi followers, Soviet support to opponents conditional until strength can be determined.

END-END

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

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