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Vol.

pp.

PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION

For

POLEX-DAIS IV

Saturday, March 23, 1963.

IRENE MANOOGIAN
11 PEMBERTON SQUARE
BOSTON 8, MASSACHUSETTS
Telephone Richmond 2-4676

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PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION

for

POLEX-DAIS IV

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, Presiding

RICHARD E. BARRINGER
THOMAS CARROLL
C. R. CLARK, Jr.
GEORGE M. CUNHA
ROBERT H. DIX
WILSON DIZARD
RICHARD W. HATCH
LESTER G. HAWKINS
JAMES E. KING
FRANK KNAPP
ERNEST W. LEFEVER
THOMAS LOUGH
THOMAS W. MILBURN
JOHN MONTIAS
MELVIN J. NIELSEN
DENIS P. O'CONNOR
WILLIAM A. PLATTE
ITHIEL de SOLA POOL
FRED W. PUMP
LESLIE ROOS
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
ROY STAFFORD
PETER S. THACHER
JOHN L. TOPPING
BARTON WHALEY

Endicott House
23 March 1963

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(10 a.m., Saturday, March 23, 1963.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Each chairman will have an opportunity to give us an overview as to how he thinks things happened and came out and so on. I think we all know what happened. We all know more or less how it came out. Some of us resent it and object to it. I would like to see the main part of our discussion focused on increased knowledge which is in your minds this morning. It may not be there tomorrow if you are as busy as I think you are, or on Monday, as to some of the policy issues in which we are all interested in here.

Before I ask each chairman to speak, I think that in all fairness we ought to take a few minutes for any irrepressible complaints or questions about this game. That is to say, the strategic outcomes. I have already heard one or two. In other words, we want to know of any burning questions addressed to others in this exercise as to what they did which is not clear or as to why they did what they did, or questions addressed to Control. I repeat: any burning questions which ought to be ventilated before we become too abstract from the game. Perhaps we could take a few minutes now just to open the floor to completely-free discussion of that kind of priority question about the game. If you want to ask the US team why it adopted a certain

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strategy or why the Russians did what they did or why Control did not take a certain factor into account, you now may. Let's just open the floor and get that out of the way. The floor is now open.

Peter?

MR. THACHER. I have a question for the chairman of the Soviet team. What was the chief factor which led you to issue the Khrushchev statement at the end?

MR. NIELSEN. I would say that the chief factor was our feeling that the treaty on general and complete disarmament had been violated by the US side. Therefore, we had to take official and public note of this even though we at the time did not take specific steps to violate the treaty further ourselves. Is this responsive to your question?

MR. THACHER. What did you feel concerning the objectivity or impartiality of the UN role in the Caribbean? What was your view of the UN's impartiality in that area?

MR. NIELSEN. From the information that we were receiving, I believe that we tended to feel that the UN was acting more in the US interests than as an impartial body, though some of the documents which we have been reading this morning lead us to believe that that was not as much true as we thought at the time. I do not know if my team members would support me in that statement.

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MR. HAWKINS. There were documents relative to the UN that I feel we should have received but that we did not receive.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. What kinds of issues were involved?

MR. HAWKINS. For example, we did not receive the statement to the effect that they were in Venezuela to, in effect, defend or deter the US movement in Venezuela. We did not receive the statement to the effect that they had called upon the US-OAS forces in Colombia to come under UN control or leave the country. Now, without those two facts at our disposal, it was impossible not to conclude that the UN was strictly in the pocket of the US team.

MR. THACHER. Can I ask one follow-up question?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Sure.

MR. THACHER. Did the American team believe that they could prevent the UN from taking exclusive control of the capital in Bogota at approximately the same time that the government returned to its seat in that city?

MR. POOL. I think that we had a very different picture of the situation than you had and perhaps than Control had. As we understood it, we had landed at the Bogota airfield and were advancing towards Bogota. We did not consider that we had a very difficult problem. We thought we would be there in perhaps 24 hours.

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MR. THACHER. With how many men?

MR. POOL. I do not remember.

MR. O'CONNOR. The 82nd Airborne Paratroopers, a regiment of US airborne infantry, and a marine landing force coming over the shore.

MR. THACHER. We figured at this stage of the game that the UN forces -- through the courtesy of a very fast lift which had been given to us in the scenario -- were numerically superior to the US force of approximately 5,000 in Bogota. We had Brazilian air cover coming in to strengthen our bid and we were confident that the US would agree to give the UN exclusive control of the capital city rather than face an outbreak of shooting between US and international forces.

MR. POOL. It was our policy to turn over control to the UN just as soon as the UN had de facto ability to maintain control. There was no difference, really, between the UN and the Soviet and the US points of view on this issue at all.

MR. THACHER. You had issued extraordinary instructions to your troop commander in Colombia. You said that under no circumstances was he to turn over control.

MR. POOL. We considered that you had only a trivial number of people there at the moment and we figured that it

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would be a week or ten days before you would have any significant force in there, if you were to arrive.

MR. DIZARD. We were not going to do any turning over until that legitimate government got back into the middle of Bogota.

MR. POOL. We were convinced that we would be there in the next 24 or 48 hours and that UN forces in any significant number would be there only in a week or ten days. The issue was one of fact. The problem just did not arise.

MR. CLARK. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Did you start to say something?

MR. CLARK. I was agreeing with him. We did not think that they (the UN) would come that soon with that much. We wanted to have the legitimate government back in power so that when the UN forces arrived, they would be forced to support that government rather than something else. You see, we were worried about what side they would take.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Tom, do you want to comment on this question from Control's point of view as to how you saw it?

MR. SCHELLING. "This question" being the --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The one, really, that Peter raised as to the UN's understanding of the Soviet -- I think it was the other way around. Was the Soviet understanding of the

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UN's intentions and bias based on preconceptions or was it based on any real facts that you had in the game? Did the facts support the preconceptions? Maybe you could say something about how Control saw it.

MR. SCHELLING. From my reading of the documents, I thought that it would be unclear to anybody -- even those on the Control team -- precisely what the relations would be between the US and UN forces. My impression was that the US was hoping that you would be delayed, thereby giving them a free hand as long as possible. How great the temptation would be to continue hot pursuit to the border, I do not know. My question now is --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Pardon me. It is hard for the stenotypist to get it if there are two conversations going.

MR. SCHELLING. If the UN flew in as fast as you hoped to, inasmuch as you were expecting to land troops in large numbers by "S" plus 10 or 11 -- and I guess you could do it with or without Brazilian air cover, which, I think, was not necessary -- I should think that before they got terribly close to Venezuela you would be there. Maybe you would not outnumber them, but you would be in a position to request that they submit to UN authority. This would come, I think, in a very few days, and I have no good idea as to how you would work it out between yourselves.

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MR. POOL. That was the most pessimistic of our assumptions: that, under those assumptions, we just would not have gotten into Venezuela.

MR. SCHELLING. Let me ask a question here on which I was confused. Did the US team believe that failure to accomplish what you wanted in Venezuela meant, in effect, that you had lost the game or that you had failed to make a great net gain? That is, in your view, was the status quo a Communist Venezuela or was it just a Communist Cuba?

MR. POOL. The status quo would be a Communist Venezuela. I think your question was whether that is acceptable.

MR. SCHELLING. Yes.

MR. POOL. I think the US team was probably divided on this point. Speaking for myself at the moment -- the others can express themselves later -- I would say that we were not ready to take blatant unilateral invasion action to topple the Venezuelan government. If everything occurred in such a manner that it remained in power through the crisis, we would then just keep pressing at it afterwards in whatever ways were available; but in the short run, at least, we would have to accept it. There may be some disagreement by the others to this opinion.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Do you have a question?

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MR. THACHER. Who played the OAS-US team? Control?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes, Control.

Tom, before we get away from this, I wonder if you would comment, from Control's point of view, on the question Peter raised as to the impression that the Soviets got of the UN's intentions in Colombia and Venezuela. Was there any reason why the Soviets should have misinterpreted the impartiality of the UN action, if it was impartial, or the partiality of it, if it was not? How did you see that?

MR. SCHELLING. I would have thought that the Soviet team would have been very suspicious of what was going on between the UN and the US. I assume that they would question whether the UN had dragged its feet for a few days so that the Americans could get there first. I am not confident that that was so. I would think that they would be genuinely suspicious of what was going on 7,000 or 8,000 miles away.

With reference to the resolving of the question about which we spoke a moment ago, I would like to ask this: Was the UN force willing to demand compliance of an American force that earlier in the game had outnumbered it?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Did you want to say something, Peter?

MR. THACHER. I would like to point out that it was

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factually inaccurate for the Soviet delegation -- I do not know whether they are aware of this or not -- to base any action on its stated belief that the revolutionary regime in Colombia had been recognized by any state in the OAS other than Venezuela. Are you aware of that?

MR. NIELSEN. We were aware of that. We were referring to Venezuela. This may be an inaccuracy in a document. We were quite aware that the revolutionary government in Colombia had not been recognized by any nations other than Venezuela, and we really did not anticipate that it would be.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jim King?

MR. KING. With reference to a question which was asked a moment ago, I, at least as a member of the US team, was unaware of the fact -- if it was a fact -- that the UN was going to have superior forces in Bogota within a day or two, but I do not think that this really would have mattered. Our immediate objective was to consolidate the position of the legitimate Colombian government in the capital city, and I do not think that it made a bit of difference to us whether this was done by the US or by the UN. Our real objective, our major objective, was to establish a position on the Venezuelan border which the OAS forces would dominate and which we could use as a means of

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putting pressure on the Venezuelan government.

Even though you might have had a superior number of forces in Bogota, I think that the military factors were such that because of our superiority in land movement and short jumps by helicopter, and that sort of thing, that we would have got to Bogota first. I do not think that you could possibly have won the race to Bogota, you see, which was our real objective in this case. Once Bogota was taken care of, then the Colombian problem was solved as far as we were concerned. We gave no thought to the possibility that you might insist on a referendum or anything to upset the apple cart in Colombia.

Let me make one more point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

MR. KING. I think we did lose the game if the status quo ante was maintained in Venezuela.

MR. KNAPP. In regard to the question as to whether or not we won the game, I felt that we lost if we did not recover Venezuela because of its strategic, economic, and psychological importance to us at this stage. This was my personal feeling. I had a general impression that the other members of the US team felt the same way. Now, as far as our tactics for going about this, that is something else.

With relation to the other question about the US

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forces in Colombia, I think that we are making a great mistake in calling this a US force. This was an OAS force. You recall that when in 1955 you had a similar case in Costa Rica which involved a Nicaraguan invasion, that the UN took no action. It let this regional organization handle a regional problem -- which it was set up to do -- with military force.

So even though, technically, you might speak of this as a US force inasmuch as most of it was made up of US troops, this actually was an OAS force.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Shades of Korea.

Ernie Lefever.

MR. LEFEVER. I would like to ask the Secretary General whether he regarded this US-OAS force as a rival in prestige to the UN force or as an ally for which he was grateful until he could come in and do its job. I think this is all-important, especially in terms of the project for which this game is being played. Did the Secretary General really consider this a legitimate regional expression which is inherent in the UN charter or a somewhat bastard action which quickly had to be covered over with the UN fig leaf?

MR. THACHER. Well, there are two parts to my answer. Insofar as the OAS generated for itself authority to protect the legitimate government of Colombia pending

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the arrival of a UN commander with forces to relieve them of that responsibility, I felt that the OAS was, as you describe it, taking a step which, as Secretary General, I could support.

There were, however, a number of indications that the US intended to use, if it could -- and I was rather skeptical that it could succeed in this, given the Brazilian position -- the OAS outside of Colombia and direct it against the legitimate government of Venezuela. It was with this in mind and because I felt that this was something that the OAS would itself not ratify, that is to say, any action against Venezuela territorially, that I moved my forces remaining in Jamaica to Venezuela so that they could deter the US if the US sought to move unilaterally.

Now, I also felt that the Soviets missed that early in the game by encouraging, in effect, the Americans to bottle the whole operation up in OAS, and I felt that it would be in the Soviet interest to force it straight into the Security Council where at least they could play an active part in shaping any of the decisions.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mel, do you want to respond to that, and then Captain Clark.

MR. NIELSEN. We did try to encourage the UN to move into Colombia. I think that the fact that it did go through

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the OAS was partly due to the move time, in other words, the fact that there were discrete (separate) periods and periods during which you do not have communication. But certainly throughout the time when the issue was in doubt in Colombia we were willing and anxious to see the UN go into Colombia but we regarded the US-OAS move as something that was very likely to go from Colombia to Venezuela and, therefore, we did not like this. We were afraid of it.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Captain Clark?

MR. CLARK. Going back to this question of the status quo and who won, we felt that the status quo was Venezuela under Communist domination, but we also felt that if we could not roll that back -- would we have lost? -- that you had not really consolidated this thing. We felt that if the Soviet government in Venezuela survived this crisis that effectively, that Russia had underwritten their forces in Venezuela. Therefore, you had one certain objective: --

MR. NIELSEN. This was our view of it.

MR. CLARK. -- To further legitimatize the Venezuelan government that you had there if you could manage to survive the crisis.

MR. NIELSEN. This was our objective, yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. John?

MR. TOPPING. Addressing myself to the business of

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the Russians attempting to force this whole crisis directly into the UN rather than permitting the OAS to take action, if we can extend existing reality, 1963, to the game, then that is perfectly valid. The entire OAS structure has an undercurrent of serious concern. That is exactly what will happen in any upcoming crisis, and that is one of the reasons why the Venezuelan team kept urging action in the UN. We knew that we could not get any action in the OAS favorable to the Secretary General's position, but we hoped that we could leap over the OAS and get UN action inasmuch as our chances in the UN would be much more favorable.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Frank?

MR. KNAPP. If this case were taken to the UN, we were hoping that the UN would take the view that this was a regional problem for a regional organization.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Hawkins?

MR. HAWKINS. Did the US proceed with an appreciation of the political situation in Colombia which made it confident that there could be a withdrawal from Colombia and no imminent return to the revolutionary regime once the military forces were withdrawn?

MR. POOL. Yes. We asked Control for intelligence about the situation in Colombia. We were told that the bulk of the army was loyal to the regime, but there were a few

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officers, older officers, who were conservative and who did not want to see an election held, and there were a few younger officers who were inclined to the left; but the bulk of the army was loyal. We were told a number of things of this sort on the basis of which we concluded that the predominant opinion in Colombia, with adequate external support, either UN or US, would maintain the regime.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Fred Pump?

MR. PUMP. My question is addressed to the US team. At such time that the UN force was in Colombia in enough force to try to take over law and order, would the US have sanctioned either US forces and/or OAS forces to come under the command of the UN in Colombia if requested?

MR. POOL. We did not discuss this question in a direct fashion, but we did discuss a number of points relating to that question. I would say implicitly yes, but our instructions to our commanders in the field were not to accept this sort of relationship for the present, but with the full expectation that this would be done at such point that the regime were stabilized and that the UN were there in adequate numbers.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead, Leslie.

MR. ROOS. Document 129 that we got from Control said: "The Colombian revolutionary government has occupied

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Bogota and now controls the bulk of the country. Loyal Colombian government still controls Southwestern Colombia and other isolated pockets, making its capital Cali." That does not seem to me to jibe too much with the information that the bulk of the army was loyal to the regime.

MR. POOL. You see, this was after we acted. We felt that Control did indeed change the world somewhat unpredictably from the point of view of the earlier information we had been given.

MR. ROOS. This was "S" plus 6. But you had acted?

MR. POOL. Yes.

MR. ROOS. In other words, we had two different pictures.

MR. POOL. Quite, quite.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I am still bothered by Peter Thacher's point because it possibly raises a larger question regarding some of the tactical problems of what happened in Venezuela and Colombia. Perhaps the Soviet team can help us on this. It is worth taking a few minutes to discuss. This shades into our next point, anyway. I am still unclear as to whether one single message or statement by the Secretary General would have profoundly altered the Soviet Union's perception of what the UN was, how it was likely to perform, or what its relationships were with the US. I

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do not think that your question has been completely answered, or, at least, the questions that your question raises, Peter, have not been answered to my satisfaction. I would be amazed if one message would have changed the Soviet Union's perception of the UN in the world. Is this true? Maybe the Soviet team ought to tell us how they viewed that.

MR. NIELSEN. Well, perhaps we appeared to be changing more than we felt we were. In our internal discussions our plans and objectives were fairly, we thought, consistent from beginning to end. We were willing to see things pacified in Colombia by the UN. We were willing to call off the adventure on our own borders and to accept some sort of UN inspection there. We were trying to communicate that we were willing to accept the status quo ante, provided this did not force us out of Venezuela.

From that point on, we were trying to threaten to make the picture look as black as possible so that the thing we wanted would look white. This is basically all that we were trying to do. In our final moves we really did not do anything. We took a posture that threatened to do a great deal; yet, we felt that we were leaving open, in appealing to Kennedy in the last move, the opportunity for the US and the UN to come to our point of view and accept the status quo ante.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let me push you a little further, Mel. Assume you had seen a message containing a private estimate from Sobelyev (phonetic) or whoever was sitting on the 38th floor for you fellows, and that the message said, "The Secretary General generally is impartial on this. He is not a tool of the US except for his own subconscious biases which, historically, he cannot help, and so on. The UN's present plan is to be impartial in Venezuela, keep the Americans out, and preserve the revolution." I do not know if there was any message which did say that, but if there had been, would your whole picture of where the UN fitted -- that is, Soviet foreign policy and American foreign policy -- have changed? I think that was the implication in Peter's question.

MR. NIELSEN. I think perhaps it would have.

MR. HAWKINS. We not only did not get that information but we got these three nuclear weapons that he was looking for in London. There was a lack of information on the one point, that is, what they were doing in Latin America, plus the actual information that they were looking for nuclear weapons in London.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Peter, and then John Montias.

MR. THACHER. On the question of the information to the Soviet team, first of all, I started the game very

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fearful that domestic pressures within the US would compel the administration to take forceful action against Venezuela, and I was surprised that this never materialized. Having that fear in mind, I felt restrained from making any public statement which would make clear that the UN viewed its role as protecting the legitimate governments of Venezuela and Colombia --

MR. NIELSEN. Yes.

MR. THACHER. -- from any overt threat of aggression. Now, I did feel -- and I could list the documents that were circulated to Control in the early moves of the game -- that I had telegraphed my intention of using half of the force in Colombia but retaining the other half for Venezuela. By the nature of my instructions to the troop commander, I did feel that in that way I had given Control enough information for them to keep the Soviets from fearing the worst because of the absence of any public statement reassuring my impartiality. I felt that that would be taken care of by Soviet nationals, you see, who keep their government well informed. These nationals are located throughout the country and, above all, on the military staff at the UN.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

MR. THACHER. I would like to make one point about

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the nuclear-weapon question. This was a more apparent threat than a real threat. I did not expect to get the weapons from the British. What I did expect to get from the British was their willingness -- connivance, if you will -- to allow me to play, in effect, a bluff hand which was designed purely to deter Soviet military on-the-ground aggression against Iran. I was hoping that that would work and that the bluff would not be called.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. John Montias?

MR. MONTIAS. In looking back at the situation, it seems to me that our reputation turned a good deal on the disarmament of the UN (sic) forces by Venezuelan (sic) military in Colombia. If this action had been accompanied by some sort of statement that the UN would do the same to anyone else coming into the area, we perhaps might not have --

MR. THACHER. It would not. It would not have sought to disarm troops in Colombia sanctioned by OAS. It would have sought either to take them under its command or to see, as soon as we could build up the force to do it, that they evacuated Colombia.

MR. MONTIAS. A statement of that kind would have helped the situation. On one hand, there was the attempted purchase of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom. On the

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other, if you arrived in Colombia and disarmed revolutionary forces there, it would have looked as if you were acting in cahoots with the US.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. My question is this: Was there any message that you could have read in the face of all of this which would have really convinced you that the Secretary General was impartial? Did you not consider that the OAS action basically was a fig leaf for the US?

MR. NIELSEN. Yes. We could not quite visualize a disarmament treaty -- even though this was not made specific -- which would permit the US through the OAS to operate without UN agreement. We simply considered this, in effect if not in fact, a violation of the treaty. I think early in the game we felt that we understood the UN quite well. In retrospect, I still think that we did. But at a later point, it appeared that the US was riding over the UN roughshod in Colombia. The bluff on the nuclear weapons just simply in our minds put the US on the UN side. We recognized it as a bluff and we thought that the only thing to do about it was to call it in strong language.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Pool?

MR. POOL. I merely want to go back to an earlier point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is all right.

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MR. POOL. I do not think that the US was riding roughshod over the UN. That is, there was this difference in the perception of what the facts were regarding the UN forces there. But the US policy was indeed like everybody else's: To get UN forces into Venezuela.

MR. SCHELLING. To ride smoothshod.

MR. POOL. But earlier, you see, a great deal of their discussion seems to have turned upon communication failures. Now, of course, there are communication failures in the field; therefore, this is all very realistic. But one of the things that struck me about the game is that the game, as it is set up now, discourages and penalizes negotiatory action. It penalizes communications because of the periodicity.

For example, we received a couple of notes -- one from the Secretary General, one from Khrushchev -- saying, "You have not answered my letter." Well, we had. The letter was written in Period I; we received it in Period II; we wrote a reply and it was received by them in Period III. But in Period II we have not answered your letter. Now, because of the fact that it is two periods out of the five between an action and the possibility of getting any feedback by a negotiatory process, it just means that negotiation is silly. You do not get into it. It is not

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going to work. Therefore, you are driven to actions, military or other postural actions. The game seems to be a little loaded in this way. If you want a game to include negotiatory procedures, you have to set it up differently.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is a telling point. The footnote to it is that the game designers may well have not wanted the situation resolved by negotiation early in the game, but, rather, to force, however artificially, the situation to certain ultimate points so that those could be examined. I am sure that you are aware of that.

MR. POOL. Sure.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's see. Frank Knapp.

MR. KNAPP. About this business of UN impartiality, I would like to point out that I think that the UN team could have far better shown its impartiality by expressing its appreciation to the OAS for supporting UN objectives in Colombia against a proven aggressor. They should have made this clear. They should not have taken the stand that the OAS forces were acting illegally. Now, the Soviet team recognized that this was a legal move on the part of OAS forces. That is part of the treaty. They did not recommend in their final paper that the OAS be removed. We were in a strong position there. If anyone, the UN, I think, failed to express an appreciation to the OAS for its

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willingness to help and co-operate in this case.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Ernie Lefever?

MR. LEFEVER. If I may get back to the methodological point raised previously, as I mentioned to you and Tom last night, I believe that a case might be made, in order to deal with this problem of negotiating lag, that we should not have let the teams read the papers of the other teams but that we should actually have asked Control to summarize reality after one move period and then have the teams respond to that new summary of reality in the next move period. Then we could again have Control summarize reality in terms of the total input, and then the teams could respond to that reality. This might be a technique which we can try sometime.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I hope that you will put that in the questionnaire, Ernie. It is a good point.

MR. LEFEVER. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Tom?

MR. LOUGH. My criticism is that intelligence did not work as well as it should have, I think, throughout the game. I think that the intelligence systems that we have today -- much less than 1972 -- are much better than you had them behave. This failure of knowing especially where sizable, battle-ready military units are, I think,

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is not realistic.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Which, specifically, Tom, so we will know?

MR. LOUGH. The UN forces.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The failure of knowing where they were?

MR. LOUGH. Yes, where they were and when.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I thought we supplied that in the scenario.

MR. LOUGH. In the --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. In the scenario.

MR. O'CONNOR. We only did not know where they were in Venezuela.

MR. NIELSEN. This is simply the lag.

MR. LOUGH. That should have been known immediately.

MR. NIELSEN. We should have known when they were en route. But this is due to the lag. You do not know that they are on the way until they have arrived.

MR. LOUGH. I should think that your intelligence should be better than that.

MR. NIELSEN. I agree with you.

MR. LOUGH. Yes. That bears on what Ernie was saying. He wants reality brought up to date. One way of

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achieving reality is to improve the assumptions about unilateral intelligence systems.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I hope that all of these points about technique will be put in the questionnaire. We really cannot cope with them too long here.

Captain Clark?

MR. CLARK. Two people have given me a prelude here. One was on this intelligence system; the other was on this bluff. One of the things that worried me was the tendency of people to compress time schedules when that was in their favor. They would like to drum up a revolution and have it start the next morning. This takes a little more time than that. The two squadrons of planes from Brazil, well, I guess that they were going to take off and carry their own airfield, support, gasoline, and everything else with them. By having three nuclear weapons in the UN forces, without delivery systems or anything else, just by possessing three weapons, all of a sudden you can bluff Russia? This kind of amazed me. If you had three weapons, you were going to mine a road with them? There was a little bit of irreality there.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. You are commenting on the strategy of the UN team.

MR. CLARK. No. I am commenting on the tendency

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to forget certain factors. Regarding those fighter planes, for example, you were forgetting the whole divisional supplies and all the backup that you must have with something like that. As far as the three nuclear weapons were concerned, I do not know if you are going to send them over in a suitcase. It was just a little bit unreal as to how some of these things happened. We had a problem ourselves. We wanted to get the revolution started.

MR. POOL. Venezuela.

MR. CLARK. It was not even on the same order of magnitude as far as the time scale was concerned. We wanted this revolution to start tomorrow morning. There were quite a few things like that. Of course, there was the fast airlift, too. In other words, I think that we tended to give these international forces a lot more capability than they could possess in real life.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. This is why we invite so many competent military officers here -- to restrain us in our unrealistic political desires.

Wilson?

MR. DIZARD. That was my point.

MR. MONTIAS. I am not so much worried about the effectiveness of the bluff or as to whether it was in character as I am about whether one can project that by 1972

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the Secretary General will use tactics of that sort. So far as I know, this is rather novel.

MR. THACHER. I will try to answer that as briefly as I can. I do not think for a minute that the Secretary General would allow himself to be put in the position where he has to make a decision to use any weapon of mass destruction. Under the circumstances, however, in which a major nuclear power appeared possibly to be in the process of invading a neighboring state and, in the process, creating tensions in the area, I felt that the Secretary General might get away with a gambit which would give him a bluff deterrent capability against the Russians. I did not feel that the Secretary General at any point had sufficient force to prevent any major power from just tearing hell out of the whole fabric of the game. I did feel that in this way if he could claim to have not small but large-yield weapons with a determination to get two-thirds majority in the General Assembly to support this deployment and, if necessary, the detonation of those weapons, that he then had a sufficient variety of means of delivery at his disposal so that he could effectively use this as a deterrent policy to make the Soviets at least reconsider.

MR. MONTIAS. You realize, of course, that the

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next thing would be that once the bluff had been called, the effectiveness of the Secretary General for the future would have been impaired.

MR. THACHER. There was a document that was never circulated and that I turned in just at the last move. In this document I laid out the script for a world-wide address by the Secretary General via telephone communications satellite in which he tries to overcome this very point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Tom?

MR. SCHELLING. I think we underrated how powerful this was. One of the most potent things about this was a leak relative to negotiation for nuclear weapons numbering three. He did not even have to get them to Iran. In other words, it was powerful. This prompted the Russians to declare that it considered GCD null and void, to prohibit non-Soviet citizens from travel in the USSR, to restrict all diplomatic missions to their quarters in the city, to order their IDO out in 48 hours, and to state that the world was on the brink of war. If you can do this with three nuclear weapons which you do not even have yet, then you have got something.

I think that the US document, if I correctly recall what I was reading, sort of implies that perhaps the most important, the most potent, threat that the

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Secretary General can make is to do something about the status of nuclear weapons. In that sense, if the Secretary General is about to do something, even if it is tactically foolish, it is going to cause some stirring around for nuclear weapons or selling them to the Secretary General or saying, "He has them. Why don't we have them, too?" This is a psychological political act which is not lacking in potency. I would say that it is so potent that it was a mistake for him to do it because I think it led to a much greater reaction than he anticipated.

MR. THACHER. It is an exercise in brinksmanship.

MR. O'CONNOR. I think that that is wrong. We were not reacting to the nuclear-weapon threat, which we considered ridiculous. That merely confirmed the fact that the UN was working for the United States.

MR. HAWKINS. There were two messages.

MR. O'CONNOR. We then had to maintain our own national security. We had to withdraw from the UN and protect ourselves.

MR. SCHELLING. From what did you have to protect yourselves?

MR. O'CONNOR. We felt that the UN peace force was in control, but three nuclear weapons and a 15,000-man army were not going to bother us.

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MR. SCHELLING. If you were as contemptuous of the three nuclear weapons as you say you were -- and I do not blame you -- then why did you issue certain orders?

MR. O'CONNOR. We were going to make a completely different change in policy because we thought that Venezuela was going to fall. So we decided to make trouble in a neighboring country -- Iran, Berlin, the Dardanelles -- and beat somebody. It was to be a completely different change in policy because of the loss in Venezuela.

MR. POOL. I would like to say that Tom (Schelling) is absolutely right about the US. This was, to us, the most important event and we projected our view onto the Soviet Union just as I think you are now doing. That is, we assumed that this was the reason why the Soviet Union canceled GCD. But in talking to Mr. Khrushchev since, I gained the impression that this was not actually the trigger that led you to cancel GCD.

MR. NIELSEN. That was not?

MR. POOL. The three nuclear weapons.

MR. NIELSEN. No. We sincerely believed that the US was the first to violate the treaty, that is, we tried to place ourselves in their position. We felt that we simply could not accept unilateral US military moves as consistent with the treaty. We felt that if we did swallow

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this, it would be a great psychological defeat and a show of weakness, one which we could not tolerate.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

MR. POOL. Did you make that decision before the news about the three nuclear weapons?

MR. NIELSEN. Which decision?

MR. POOL. The decision to cancel GCD.

MR. NIELSEN. We were ready to announce that we considered it null and void because of US action, but we hoped to go back and preserve GCD, and we still were at the end of the game. We were trying to talk as tough as we could, but we wanted to postpone any action that would foreclose going back to the status quo.

MR. CLARK. With reference to the nuclear-weapon bit again, I feel as you do on it. They had no power in them at all. As you say, that was utterly ridiculous. But all of a sudden, you see, events occurred in such a manner that some of us could have said, "That guy down there in the UN who has been against us must have stepped out for lunch, because things have really swung our way."

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think I really ought to keep elevating our dialogue a bit as we go along. Did it occur to anyone or was it implicit in what you were saying, Mel, that the fundamental outlook of the Soviet Union towards

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any peacekeeping machinery that accompanies a disarming process or arms control and so on was going to be conditioned on previous prejudices reinforced, new decisions made, and so on, the first time that the peacekeeping machinery was used? Was it not used as I, for one, assume it always would be used: to abort what might seem to the Russians a war of national liberation, but which to someone else is an active indirect aggression requiring peacekeeping operations?

Just for the moment getting away from which message was seen by whom, this seems to me fundamental to our whole enterprise here. How about that? Was that a trigger anywhere in the world which everyone else thought was peacekeeping, but which you interpreted as clearing your pitch in an area of new opportunity and, therefore, illegal, and that, therefore, the US was conspiring with the UN and all the rest of it? How about that?

MR. NIELSEN. Well, in our efforts to project ourselves into the Soviet mentality, I think we reasoned somewhat as follows: It was not the peacekeeping machinery which was getting in our way. It was the US in overriding or anticipating, if you prefer, the peacekeeping machinery. We would have welcomed quicker action by the UN and by the peacekeeping forces. So I did not feel that we were

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reacting to the existence of these forces and their frustration of our desires, but, rather, to the indication that we could not use the forces in an equitable way. The reason we could not was because the US was going to act unilaterally to prevent their being used in an acceptable way to us.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think that the Control group recognized a very significant threshold. One was this nuclear threat. Another one in the game, as I recall it, was when the Venezuelan troops crossed the border into Colombia. It was at that point that all the shenanigans that can go on inside national territories that are not covered by such international laws as exist, suddenly become the subject of international law. You can invoke your peacekeeping machinery. It was at that point, as I remember it, that something changed in this particular exercise. The peacekeeping machinery could then be aimed with the OAS fig leaf and with the US, an enthusiastic vanguard, driving the Venezuelans back out of Colombia and doing whatever else they said they were doing. That was a clear violation of the law. That was something that was unacceptable to the Communists because it meant killing off a revolutionary situation.

Did you see it in that way?

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MR. NIELSEN. No, I did not.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Why?

MR. NIELSEN. We were attempting to get the Venezuelans out of Colombia, as you recall.

MR. HAWKINS. From the very beginning, that was one of the first things that we did.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. But the effect of your satellite or your putative satellite doing this meant that UN machinery was going to be used, was going to come in, and was going to reinforce, probably, the counterrevolutionary movement in Colombia. Wasn't that inevitable?

MR. THACHER. From the US point of view, yes.

MR. HAWKINS. It probably would have overthrown the regime. If we had known that the UN was taking measures to prevent that -- we did not really know that -- we would have regarded this, especially in the Western Hemisphere, as clearly within the US military sphere of influence to be able to inject the UN to protect a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere. This would have been regarded by us as a considerable victory.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. If you were writing a planning paper on an international force for Paul Nitze or Walt Rostow or someone else, which a lot of people are doing, would you conclude from all of this that, whatever happens, if there

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is peacekeeping machinery, that the Soviet Union is going to want to use it to establish and consolidate revolutions or wars of national liberation in Latin America and that the US is going to want to use it to see that this does not happen? Is this the real story of the uses of a UN force in that region?

MR. HAWKINS. And the reverse in another region.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. And the reverse in another region? Peter, please.

MR. THACHER. I think that we have skirted around this point, but perhaps we should come to the question of what the relationship was at scenario time between a regional defense organization and the UN -- in this instance, the OAS and the UN. It seemed to me that although I did not expect the OAS, at American instigation, to succeed in doing anything which would be illegal -- that is to say, I did not expect the US to succeed in getting the OAS to legalize an armed attack against Venezuela -- nonetheless, I did see a very real clash coming up between OAS mandate and Security Council mandate.

Now, the OAS appeared to be about to place OAS forces on the Colombian-Venezuelan border. That was all right from my point of view, as long as they were under my control. But if they were not under my control, I had to get them out

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of the country inasmuch as I could not prevent the US from using those forces on the border for incursions into Venezuela. I foresaw a real clash between the so-called supreme international Security Council mandate and a regional one.

Similarly, if a similar organization existed in the Warsaw Pact and if there were an uprising in Poland with threats of outside interference and provocation and if that organization sent troops to defend Poland against presumed attack, I do not see thatthe Security Council could have in any way tried to contravene that move.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. John Topping?

MR. TOPPING. From the point of view of the Venezuelan revolutionary government to all this, it was our conviction -- which, we thought, the result of the game fully validated -- that both the US and the USSR would attempt to use UN security forces as pawns in furtherance of their continuing national objectives. As the game progressed, we were satisfied that this attempt by the US was not going to be successful in the case, certainly, of Venezuela and possibly of Colombia. We felt that the US action under the rather thin disguise of the OAS was an attempt to achieve national objectives by direct means -- in effect, by unilateral means.

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We were, as Venezuelan revolutionaries, overjoyed to see the UN in colombia. We were not aware of the presence and size of the UN in Venezuela, but we had no objection to it. We were already welcoming it as it came along.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. On that count, were there any surprises in terms of the way that this three-way relationship developed or this four-way relationship?

The relationship between the revolution and counterrevolution is one factor.

The US and the OAS is another factor.

The Soviet Union's sighting of an opportunity which it would be unforgivable to neglect is a third factor.

The UN's rather frantic and at times quixotic attempts to be neutral, to be impartial, to satisfy everybody, and to do its job is a fourth factor. Those were really the four things that were in motion in the area. Were there any surprises for anyone in terms of preconceptions about what was going to happen next in Latin America or the way things might come out?

Tom (Schelling), I think you had your hand up.

MR. SCHELLING. One thing here struck me as an interesting ploy, and that was that the way to get the UN force to assist you is to be an aggressor so that they have an excuse to stop you.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Fascinating.

MR. SCHELLING. It seems to me that if the Russians had had more confidence in the speed of Peter's airlift, that they need not have touched the Iranian borders, which set this off. They should have supported the Venezuelans and gotten enough men sighted there so that Peter Thacher would have the clear duty to go in and protect Colombia. They should have assisted in making sure that Peter Thacher got there quick enough to stop the Americans.

Right at the beginning, they were wholly content if they could consolidate Venezuela. They were going to keep the Venezuelans out of Colombia, they were going to keep the Chinese away, and they were content to lose the revolution in Colombia as long as they could consolidate Venezuela. If Peter Thacher, with an excuse to go in, could have assured the Soviets that, "I will be there at least as fast as the Americans. You do not care whether the Americans and the OAS come in to put down the revolution as long as I am there to guarantee the Venezuelan border. I will not let the Americans blockade Venezuela."

MR. THACHER. I might not have been able to prevent a blockade.

MR. SCHELLING. You could have tried. You could have indicated that you would try. You also could have said

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that the only ones that the Venezuelans needed to be protected from were the Chinese and the Americans, and that you would have gotten the Chinese to stay away and that you would have forced the Americans to keep out of it.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. You could not have the three nuclear weapons for that.

MR. KING. The same principle would indicate that if the Venezuelans had not been so stupid as to cross the Colombian border, the Communist bloc would have won Colombia or might very well have won Colombia, too, because when the UN force arrived in Colombia it would have no basis on which to make an arbitrary decision between the two elements that were then claiming control over the country.

MR. THACHER. I had an OAS mandate.

MR. KING. To do what?

MR. THACHER. The OAS had a legal right by its own decision to have forces in Colombia pending the arrival of sufficient UN forces.

MR. KING. I am saying that if you were able to get there first, the aggressor would have an advantage inasmuch as this new situation would be an open situation in which you would have to have some kind of settlement, a settlement which might come out in his favor. You could have had a plebiscite or a continued guerrilla operation.

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There was no guarantee that the legitimate government of Colombia was going to come out on top. The only way that we could be sure that the old government of Colombia would win out was by having OAS support in there to help it.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Venezuela wishes to exercise its right to reply.

MR. TOPPING. When the game started, the Venezuelan revolutionary government was confronted with a direct and imminent threat, which was aggression organized by the US. Our fundamental objective was to preserve ourselves.

MR. POOL. Why did you think so?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Betancourt.

MR. TOPPING. We had been in power for a year and we were revolutionaries. We knew where Betancourt was. We did not have to have it spelled out. We had been listening to the US go at us for a year. We also had obviously infiltrated the exile movements outside the country. Well, how could we protect ourselves? By the way, another national Venezuelan objective, of course, is to expand the sphere of similar governments in Latin America. The obvious way to do that is to shift the direction of the attack which is coming at us. We thought that we were just as successful as all get out and that the key to it was to get Venezuelan troops into Colombia and then get them out -- enough, at

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least, so that we could scream our innocence. It seemed to work.

MR. MONTIAS. You asked for certain surprises in this connection. I was astonished at the way that attitudes and aims developed in Venezuela. Venezuela was, in a sense, a very troublesome ally to have around. We were very unhappy when Venezuela did not pull back its forces from Colombia. This could have proved extremely embarrassing. Further, the fact that Venezuela reacted more to our public statements, Mr. Khrushchev's statement, whatever his public statement might have been, than to our private conciliatory statements, was astonishing.

MR. ROOS. This was because there was a communications breakdown.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Wilson?

MR. DIZARD. It struck me that there was a blank in the second half of the game, and that was the reaction of the Chinese Communists. I am not thinking in terms of the two freighters with troops on them or the alleged Venezuelan bomb that they were working up with the Venezuelans. I am thinking of their present ideological conflict with the Russians which, presumably, will extend down through 1972. They must have been putting terrific pressure on the Russians to keep at this war-of-national-liberation theme

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in Latin America -- not only in Venezuela, but in Colombia.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I remember that there was a very nasty message from the Chinese to the Russians in which the Chinese told them to stiffen their spines and stop being so chicken. You probably saw that. No, you did not see it.

MR. DIZARD. We did not see it but we should have heard, by radio or AP, some Peiping reaction. It would have been an important factor.

MR. POOL. One thing that puzzles me is the general assumption that UN presence in Venezuela would be favorable from the Soviet-Venezuela side. I guess one of the differences is that we started with the military assessment that US forces as they existed in 1972 were not adequate for an all-out invasion of Venezuela. The Venezuelan fear that we were about to invade just did not match our assessment as to what we would be getting into. Venezuela is tricky, difficult country. We had no desire to be bogged down in a big military operation there. We were not at all sure how easily we could carry it out.

Therefore, we were looking forward to anything which would disturb the control of the existing Venezuelan regime and check their ability to communize the country and, best of all, that would create internal splits that would provide or create a coup or a base for Betancourt or that

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sort of thing. The ideal thing would have been to go on the border of Colombia to get Betancourt established in part of the country, or something of that sort. But short of the ideal, from our point of view, a UN presence in substantial numbers, getting in the way of the full control of a Communist regime in the country, seemed to us to be an asset rather than a liability.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Could we talk for a second, since the clock is really moving fast, about the same problem but with another dimension added? That is to say, this rather bizarre arrangement that we gave you in mid-Stage III of a disarming world. What, if anything, has been learned from this? I know that some of the things which I have learned shake me. What, generally, have we learned from this about GCD, about the disarming process, about Stage III, about the relationship between that and the kind of ideological, social, revolutionary, great-power conflictual situation and the role of an international peacekeeping agency that we have just been discussing?

Jim?

MR. KING. I have a little speech on that. I will try to make it brief, though. It seems to me that we probably have made a mistake. I do not know whether it is a repairable mistake or not. We talk about conditions

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after disarmament and that we should concentrate on conditions after disarmament. I think the really critical issue is the condition of disarmament. Sitting before a disarmament conference, I think that the US could have foreseen a lot of this. They could have foreseen that the US would consistently lose or would have a high probability of losing what we would regard as wars of liberation unless there were a regional authority which was basically representing our interests, an authority which could get in before a UN force could get in to hold elections or to make objective decisions. One cannot win in a situation where an objective decision is made.

I think, similarly, that the Soviet Union would feel that its purposes were going to be frustrated if the UN performed the function of being a US global deterrent to limit the Soviet Union's possibility of exerting pressure against a country like Iran and so forth.

What I suggest is that before you would actually sign a disarmament agreement, there would have to be some kind of understanding as to what the world is going to look like afterwards. I think that probably the minimum requirement would be a sort of a general recognition of the status quo as far as any major conflicts are concerned, and a general understanding about spheres of influence and

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probably a realization of the world.

For instance, the Middle East -- which the Soviet Union feels is its doorstep -- could be developed on the model of the OAS so that there would be a regional authority in that area to solve intraregional problems. I just do not think that either one of the great powers is going to permit the UN -- whether it is the Secretary General or the General Assembly with the votes being dominated by the votes of independent powers -- to make the kinds of decisions that will arise in cases of serious conflict on their doorsteps. I think that this is going to have to be worked out in some regional fashion. Otherwise, I do not think that they will sign the treaties.

I could go into a lot more detail on this, but this is the real problem: What kind of expectations would justify the great powers in signing an agreement to reduce arms? You see, as you go down the arms scale, a lot of things change besides the level of armaments. We have at the present time a balance of imbalances. There is a balance of opposing forces at one level. If you go down this thing, you cannot have the same balance of imbalances and you cannot say that you have it simply by signing a piece of paper, if the US did not literally have the capacity of having a modified defense against Soviet invasion

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in Iran which it has now. That is why we talked about re-establishing NATO. The scenario said, "We have not given up our basic friendship and loyalty to our allies." But this becomes rather unrealistic. I think that some other arrangement will have to be dreamed up which will provide for that. I do not see that we can conceivably sign a general and complete disarmament agreement and go to mid-Phase III unless we recognize that the Soviet Union is going to be in a dominant position in the Middle East, that Communist China is going to be in a dominant position in Southeast Asia, and so forth. I think that this would be mitigated by probable preference on all sides for nonaligned governments, as opposed to flagrant shifts in the local balances.

I think we would prefer, for example, a popular-front government in Venezuela, rather than a blatantly pro-Communist government. Now, the Russians might not be able to control the Venezuelans, you know. The Venezuelans might get out of hand. In that case, I think that the Russians would say, "Please, boys, keep some democrats on your government because we do not want this thing to blow up."

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Ernie Lefever?

MR. LEFEVER. I would like to just indicate some

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of the more obvious reasons which lead to Jim King's conclusion about the inadequacies of this type of world from our point of view.

Point 1: The lower level of arms, of course, does not end conflict. Conflict is inherent in politics. In fact, it may make low-level conflicts more frequent than now inasmuch as the fear of escalation would not be present. Also, you can get away with it more, you see, for the obvious reason that large countries cannot extend protection to small countries at great distances.

The second point is that the nuclear-weapon problem is still very much with us even when we get down to 85 per cent lower than we are now in arms. The threat to use it is still present. There is a need for a UN force to gain a nuclear capability or some other form of deterrent capability. I think that the need for at least tightening up and thinking through what the nuclear picture would be at that stage became very clear in this game.

The third point, a point to which I alluded before but which has many implications about regionalization and spheres of influence which Jim mentioned, is this lack of capacity to protect at great distances. This presents an asymmetry, I believe, as far as the US is concerned, because these distant states will be more vulnerable then than now

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to outside intervention which is restricted to tactics not outlawed by a disarmament treaty. Some countries are better at using those tactics which are not banned by the treaty than we are, perhaps, and these countries, Communist countries, would have an advantage in these areas.

The fourth point is that it seems to me that the game showed that the threat to end the disarming process is not a compelling and credible threat. Obviously, the threat is a factious threat inasmuch as these factors are determined politically. If a country goes to the point of violation, he is really saying that the threat is not important. Otherwise, he would not have violated it in the first place.

The final point, Point 5, is that there are two types of limits on the UN force. One is the limit of size and capacity which we saw very strongly in this game. This standing force of 15,000 men could not take care of two simultaneous very modest crises. Nor could it take care of one crisis involving directly a major power. Furthermore, this limitation would not be greatly changed by the earmarked forces on your Table A, which had a theoretical force of 199,000 men, because these men, pledged in advance to some future contingency of unknown size and unknown political complexion, are not really available

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any more than they are in today's world. There are problems of distance, readiness, capability of these earmarked forces, and, most important of all, political acceptability to a political mission.

The UN forces also were hampered by a lack of capability or control or arrangement regarding nuclear weapons. When the Secretary General got in on the act in this awkward fashion, you saw what happened. It seems to me that even if we solved the nuclear problems, as far as the UN forces are concerned, and if you improved and strengthened the UN forces but they were still weaker than the two or three great powers, that it would still be an instrument of the great powers. It would be an instrument of the great powers until it became greater than the great powers. It would be an instrument, by definition, until it had a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jim King asked for 15 seconds, and then Nielsen.

MR. KING. More rebuttal. Ernie put some words in my mouth. I am not saying or asking that disarmament be contrary to the interests of the US. If the Soviet Union could persuade the nonaligned powers within its spheres of influence that they would be patterned on the model of Finland, this might be a very good deal for us, if, at the

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same time, it greatly diminished the risk of thermonuclear war.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Ernie?

MR. LEFEVER. I concur.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Nielsen, and then Tom Schelling.

MR. NIELSEN. I just want to say that our discussions and our perception of the situation support very much the point made by the two previous speakers -- that of a new sphere of influence or new spheres of influence. This is implicit in the scenario which you gave us, but not yet recognized. The feeling that we had was that in this crisis or in any other crisis there would be a tendency for this implicit sphere of influence to become actual. We were, in fact, trying to signal this as a danger during part of our moves.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Tom Schelling?

MR. SCHELLING. There was an earlier remark to the effect that the Chinese presence was not felt enough in the game. I feel that the non-Western Hemisphere countries were just not as visual as they should have been. My feeling is that -- and I mention this because maybe it is the fault of Control -- both sides took Latin America much too seriously. I think that by "S" plus 10 the Americans had a European crisis so great that the OAS thing may have

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faded into the background. Western Europe was sitting over there in this particular stage of disarmament with hardly any nuclear weapons and not much by way of delivery vehicles since they were frozen in 1963. You have got your first evidence in nine years, apparently, of how fragile the whole arrangement was, plus a demonstration that, from the UN point of view, the old NATO sphere does not exist.

Maybe the Europeans would interpret that the Russians were quite ready to renegotiate a line of demarcation with the Americans and say, "You can have Cuba and the whole kit and caboodle, but that means that we get Iran, Turkey, and so forth." This would mean the re-emergence of geography as an important limiting factor in this kind of world.

There was an enormous isolation which, I think, showed up on the American side here and which the Russians were pretty well ready to reciprocate. It seems to me that at that time the British, the French, and the Germans and most of the world that we take seriously -- including West Berlin which, I guess, is still there -- were left in an acute position with enormous decisions to make.

If you recall the SYG trouble in regard to why the Russians did what they did, the Russians discovered an illicit Chinese nuclear program. I feel that the successor of General de Gaulle must be at least wondering

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what is going on in the Soviet Union and what is going on between the Russians and the Americans. "What do the Turks know that we do not? Where are we if GCD does break down?"

Given this peculiar fact that Americans and Russians probably have a momentary physical lead in strategic weapons of a quite obsolete sort, technology and economics in Western Europe now put them in a position where from the word, "go", they could probably have damn good strategic systems in a few years.

The next question is: Can the Russians let them? Can the Russians afford to see a desperately-rearming, rich, technologically-advanced nuclear Western Europe? Can the Americans even let the Russians get that alarmed about a rearming German-French-British alignment here? Can it be that because Control did not keep the British knocking at your door or the Germans or the French, that we live in a world in which somehow Antarctica and Western Europe were minor uninvolved areas? Are the Americans making a deal? Are the Russians thinking that they should rearm?

I should think that the Europeans are back in 1949, but, economically, a lot more potent. This could have been dominant by well before "S" plus 30, and I should think that that might have been a main consideration for the US and the Soviet Union's willingness to let GCD go

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and also a main consideration in terms of the decisions that would have to be made. Were they getting ready for a new diplomacy and a new military build-up in this 1972 world without or possibly without GCD?

MR. POOL. Well, I think that those are very important points. From watching the game, three conclusions struck me --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Excuse me. I think I obliterated your remarks.

MR. POOL. There were earlier remarks that people cannot see our getting into this type of world because of the disadvantages. Well, there are offsetting advantages. I did not have the feeling, as was suggested in Control's last statement, that the world had deteriorated. It seems to me --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. This was a question.

MR. POOL. Yes. It is about as unpleasant a world as it is today, but one of the respects in which it did deteriorate was this resurgence of isolation about which Tom was talking. We looked at Iran; we looked at Europe; we looked at these parts of the world and said, "Well, there is really nothing that we can do unless we turn to nuclear weapons."

I guess this never got into a document, but we

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talked about hoping that maybe the Europeans -- the British, the French, and the Germans -- would do something about this Middle East situation because they were in a better position to do so. It was not that Venezuela was just so much more important in a global view than Iran that we could do something here and really could not do anything in the other situation. Therefore, geography made a great deal more difference.

Now, I have put in a qualification: "unless we turn to nuclear weapons." One of the things which has puzzled me in talking to our friendly enemies since the game is that they never took our nuclear threats seriously. We took the question seriously and we sent a memo to Khrushchev in which we said, "Invasion of Iran would force us to an extreme decision." We thought this was perfectly clear, that is, that it meant that it would force us to perhaps launch a nuclear attack. When, in our own team, would we really do it? Some of the responses were, "Well, if we say we will and they go ahead (into Iran), then I guess we would." Now, I am not sure whether we really would have. But we, at least, were very seriously considering this as the only alternative. In other words, it puts a tremendous burden on the nuclear-weapon question. The Russians apparently just did not think that we would

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conceivably do it.

The third point that I wanted to make was that, to me, one of the great surprises was that there was very little pressure to rearm. I thought in advance of the game that there would be problems and that the natural response would be to be armed, and, particularly for the US, the best industrial plant, the greatest facility, to rearm quickly. But this seems to me to illustrate a general principle that Tom was getting at just before, and that is the unpleasantness of the unknown. That is, one somehow copes with the problems that he faces that exist at the moment, but one is very reluctant to open up a Pandora's box. Given this disarmed world, the rearmed world is in large part an unknown. It was a basic American policy to continue GCD and to preserve it. As far as the Russian policy was concerned, we interpreted their cancellation of the treaty as being just a temporary move and that they would be ready to renegotiate and re-establish it. We assumed that that was the case and we were anxious to do so.

There were plenty of problems in the world, but it was not obvious how rearming would solve those problems. It would just open up a new battery of new problems. It was undesirable and unpredictable. It is like people's reaction

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to the problems of satellite weapons up there. It is just too difficult to figure out what it might mean. It might be good; it might not. Why get into it?

I think this is in large part a strength of GCD. It was not that we had any ideological determination to protect GCD because this was the best hope of mankind. Maybe some of us had this feeling in the back of our minds. I do not know. But it was basically that we did not see what any positive outcome would be in getting away from it.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I gathered before that you (Mr. Lough) said, in effect, that because of your shortened strategic reach and your highly-diminished forces, that the road from limited disarmed forces to nuclear weapons becomes quite short, and, in a sense, that is what the UN said, too, in its sudden jump to nukes as the only alternative. This is sort of underscored in the whole dialogue.

MR. LOUGH. It seemed to me that the lack of pressure to rearm and the lack of attention paid to Europe was probably as much due to the set which many of us had as a result of playing the game according to the rules as it was to any predisposition that we carried in with us before we started to play the game. We were paying attention to South America.

MR. POOL. Oh, that, yes.

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MR. LOUGH. And there was not any particular thing that arose. As in a real-life situation, the European desk goes on and the telegrams are coming in from there. Again, the pressure to rearm was not given in the original scenario. We kind of were given the ground rules to begin with.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. What's that?

MR. LOUGH. I have one more point just to add, and that is the feeling that the UN peace force was more a moral thing than a military thing. This is kind of a psychological feeling. I felt more that we were sending out our women and children, more or less -- I was on the UN team -- than we were sending out soldiers. It is more symbolic. We were sending people out there to be shot.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes, like martyrs.

MR. CLARK. How do you get around the idea of sending out UN troops? We have not really faced this yet, but the UN troops were essentially mercenaries. You can call them anything, but you are hiring people to go out there and they are from various countries. Well, as long as you do not run into any opposition, everyone likes to be a soldier. But when people start getting shot, it gets to be a little difficult and you can no longer raise to a sufficient level the pay of a man who is going to be shot. It has to be for patriotism or esprit de corps or something

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like those motives. How do you achieve this in a UN force?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I will give you a short answer. MIT is putting out a book this month on that subject which includes a chapter by a very good psychiatrist who answers those questions.

Peter Thacher?

Does that answer your question?

(Mr. Clark nodded.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Good piece.

MR. CLARK. He would say that there is no price.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. He addresses himself to that question.

MR. THACHER. In the summation which the UN team turned in at the end of the game, it is apparent that we were puzzled about the motivation behind Soviet action which closed the game fairly confident that things were going to smooth out. Now, we thought -- and I believe, generally, that we were accurate in this -- that their reaction was triggered by Soviet underevaluation of our ability to protect Venezuela. If that were not the answer, we postulated a couple of other ideas in the Soviet mind that might explain their action. One of these ideas was that the Soviets had reason to fear that the US was mounting or preparing for a strategic exchange with the Soviet Union.

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Now, coming to this point of geography in this scenario world, we accepted at about the middle of the game that the UN enjoyed unquestionable strategic advantage, if it came to actual exchange, over the Soviet Union. But it was immediately apparent -- maybe we were incorrect -- to the UN team that Western Europe was absolutely just nothing in the face of the Soviet MRBM capability.

It was this concept that led me to think that if the Soviets did fear a US attack, I probably would not be able to disprove it because my IDO teams would still be prevented from inspecting certain zones in the US. In my inability to convince the Soviet Union that the US was not mounting an attack, I figured that my first move was to start with Western Europe and to get them worried about it, in the confidence that Western Europe would immediately start putting pressure on the Americans: "For Pete's sake, don't do anything foolish." Therefore, I figured that I had an ally in Western Europe because of the vulnerability of Western Europe to the Soviet MRBM.

MR. HAWKINS. We gave some thought as to how the Soviet team should approach Western Europe on this whole thing, but we did not have the time or manpower to write the necessary messages.

MR. THACHER. I have one more comment.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Sure.

MR. THACHER. Certainly from the UN point of view, there were some other factors. There did seem to be a failure of adequate communications coming in. I would suggest that by 1972 there would be a new dimension which the scenario left out. In general terms, that dimension is outer space. I have in mind specifically the enormous beef-up of telecommunications facilities which will exist by 1972, plus certain obvious military applications of outer space which will in no way be a violation of the treaty by 1972. Therefore, I do believe that there would be a very real increase in the ability of nations to be relatively confident of their evaluation and understanding of what other nations are doing, and I think that this does support the thesis, in effect, that as you reach disarmament, if you are going to go all the way, that the world has to open up. It has to be opened up. You cannot get to the conclusion of GCD if there remains anything that truly resembles a closed society.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Peter, I would like to raise a question as to your confidence of a great increase in communications. Does this increase one's ability to estimate capability? I assume that it does. But would this really increase one's ability to estimate intentions any more than

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other quantum jumps in communications, in traffic, in transportation, over the last 2,000 years have done?

MR. THACHER. It may not increase your capability to estimate intentions, but I think it does increase your ability to eliminate speculative intentions that one might credit to another.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Isn't it reciprocal? Doesn't it increase one's capability to spoof your system or flunk your system?

MR. THACHER. Yes. If openness does not come, then that stops the disarmament process.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Knapp.

MR. KNAPP. I cannot see a game of this type -- either on disarmament or power politics or different military levels, nuclear or below -- being played any differently. The same suspicions and the same trusts will abide. All of the powers use the conventional ways. They rely on their own resources according to the way they would play the game in real life. The Soviets will have considerable advantages -- I think we all know about that -- until the rules are changed. We all interpret the rules on disarmament and agree to abide by them. I feel that the international organization, inasmuch as it would have to operate under the same pressures in its ability to act,

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will be vitiated in the same way.

I was particularly concerned in this game in this sense: The Soviet Union clearly violated the disarmament agreement in Iran. I think that that is an accepted fact. We have another clear violation of a Soviet puppet regime in Venezuela. It violated the disarmament agreement by direct military aggression in Colombia. The position of the UN is not to condemn and renounce and take punitive action against it, but, rather, how to reassure the Soviet Union that it is going to act impartially so that the present Venezuelan regime is going to remain in power. I think that this is a kind of funny attitude to take under these circumstances.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jim King?

MR. KING. Oh, I just wanted to remark, in connection with Mr. Thacher's comment on the European situation, that if we had been driven to strategic employment of nuclear weapons, that, in the extreme, I think there would have been no launching. I think it also would not have meant a mass attack on the Soviet Union. It would not have made sense. It probably would be limited reprisal. Maybe hitting Odessa. I think the most effective Soviet response would be against Western Europe. That is what I meant by this balance of imbalances. I simply cannot see the US signing

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an agreement or the Western Europeans permitting us to sign an agreement until something had been done which would prevent that kind of thing from happening. Otherwise, the Western Europeans are, obviously, the most obvious hostages to our good behavior.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Tom?

MR. SCHELLING. I have two points to discuss. One of the reasons why it becomes more difficult to operate at a distance here -- I guess the main reason -- is the withdrawal from overseas bases, rather than the level of armaments. This is why it is so difficult to make your strategic-decision threat so plausible. You do not have what Tom Lough was referring to as the martyrs in Iran, who, when they are killed, will make it more plausible that your reaction will be nuclear rather than to look the other way because it is Iran. It is one of the time-honored functions in America. This UN presence in Iran is all out of proportion to its numerical force. You just cannot get there in time. There is this inability to plant the flag and to be ready to bleed and die for the sake of reaction back home. This, I think, is what mainly was denied us by the reduction in the nonstrategic forces.

One of the reasons why the Americans want to rearm is because it is one of the few nations in the world who

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does not have to rush much. Everyone reads the figures to see that Western Europe looks like hell, but the US looks good. I would think that the urge to rearm in the European countries at this point would be awfully great and that they would be looking at everything ranging from civil defense -- which might make an enormous difference in the next year or two to a country like Britain -- to aircraft.

The British and French have nuclear weapons but they have no delivery capability. They sure have been thinking about it for the last nine years, wondering about this day. So the urge to rearm might have been more visible in some of those other countries.

Let me just raise a question here. I find it a little implausible in the world about which we are now talking that the Russians would have been all that interested in their foothold on Latin American countries. They are not positions of strength. They are rather weak outposts. The US can knock over Cuba any day it wants to in this 1972 time period with no real retaliation that I can see, and I am not sure but what Cuba has become a hostage in the hands of America, rather than an outpost of Communism in this hemisphere.

I would have guessed at this point that whatever Latin America is worth to America and the Soviet Union, it

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Just does not compare with Western Europe, particularly in this kind of disarmed world where the poor, unarmed nations are going to stay poor and unarmed except for very minor forays against each other. I am wondering why Latin America has not fallen back in the US value system to about where it was in 1948. Western Europe, being the really important part of the world and the so-called competition for the underdeveloped countries, has ceased to be anything like a motivation for a cold war.

MR. HAWKINS. That is a good question. We assumed that the ideological conflict, regardless of the military spheres of incluence, was an ideological twist here.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. After Captain Clark, I would like to rephrase the question before us.

MR. CLARK. I think we -- somebody mentioned it before -- were all sort of tempered by the circumstances here. We were invited to a Latin American game and most of us had experience in that game, and people said, "Why don't you pay attention to the Middle East?" That game was back at Christmastime.

Another thing: We were not attempting to rearm because rearming is a process that is on the time scale of five or so years and we had a problem when we are talking about hours and days down there, and we were not considering

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rearming because the problem had no bearing on rearming. We felt a need for rearming over-all and we would have considered it for a later thing because of our inability to protect the friendly countries. But we were not attempting to push the button and go ahead with rearming. We did feel curtailed in our ability to protect our friends from an aggressive world.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let me see if I can phrase what seems to me, I think, an extremely crucial issue on which perhaps the whole business turns and which has come out in two different ways. In one way it has come out that you should tailor the disarmament agreement in such a way so as to alter the political configuration of international life. Jim King's suggestion is that you have simply got to minimize your relationships in certain areas, certain spheres of influence. This means, for the Russians, obviously, putting an end to their top priority on wars of national liberation wherever they may occur.

Then Frank Knapp's point that whatever happens in life, the basic characteristics of political relationships and the role of power and prestige and everything that I inferred from what he said, would continue. The implication of this is that you would have to tailor your military perimeters in accordance with the realities.

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To reduce this to its simplest form -- which may not be the right thing to do but it seems to me that that is so -- perhaps we can best get at this by asking this: What in your view would have really happened or might have happened in this particular crisis, as well as in the world crisis which we have deliberately permitted in certain ways to happen, if there had been no disarmament agreement and if this crisis had developed as I for one would predict that it probably will sometime in the present strategic environment? What would have been different in the basic outcomes? I do not mean whether the UN's message actually got to the Soviets or not. In terms of the basic strategic outlooks, capabilities, intentions, ideologies, and probable policies, would it have been very different? What do you think?

John?

MR. TOPPING. Let me talk for a little while from the point of view of the small nations in the world. I have been trying to think like one for several days past. In looking back on the assumptions that we almost unconsciously made in our team, it seemed to me that we viewed GCD as simply lessening the capability of the great powers to have at each other's throats and to throw into turmoil our whole world as we, the smaller nations, knew it. It did not at all, we felt, lessen the capability of the individual small

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nation to pursue, under GCD or without it, its own immediate, quite selfish objectives. We assumed that the political or ideological struggle would be continuing. We also assumed that the USSR was very far from being the master of a monolithic structure. We were not particularly concerned at all over bowing courteously and doing what the Russians told us.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think that all of these things were said in the scenario, too, yes. It was given to you.

MR. TOPPING. We felt that we could act with relative impunity and that under GCD we would have no more dangers of achieving our own small objectives than we would under the 1963 situation.

There was one thing here about which we were concerned: the sudden East-West confrontation caused by the Khrushchev blast. We felt that what we kept calling the Afro-Asian bloc, the majority of the members of the UN, the small nations, would, in effect, become enthusiastic supporters of our immediate small objectives, which were to retain ourselves in power and leave the situation in Colombia where it could be captured. I think that you will find, in general, the small nations behaving that way regarding nationalism, and that this will cause a great deal of difficulty in the spheres-of-influence approach about which

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Jim has spoken. Nationalism, I think, stands a good chance of becoming in, say, arbitrarily, ten years anti-Communistic nationalism.

MR. POOL. It is very hard to figure out what would have been done. Of course, we can rule out certain things. Two things come to mind immediately and I will mention both of them. One is that we would not have ruled out direct action on Venezuela. What conclusions we would have come to, I do not know, but it would have been very feasible.

The second thing is that we would have made military moves presumably with our NATO allies in Europe and the Middle East around the Middle East situation.

These are the two things that I can think of that we withdrew from simply on the grounds of capability.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. How do you balance that against the constraints which would have operated against you? What kind of trade-off would there have been if you had been in the present strategic world? Would you have been inhibited about Venezuela in the way that the US is inhibited about Cuba today?

MR. POOL. We did not discuss this because it was ruled out. My immediate reaction is: no, that the Cuban experience has probably made us more aggressive.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's see. Frank Knapp, and then

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Nielsen.

MR. KNAPP. This will be very brief. One comment is about what Professor Schelling said: that there are only a few areas in the world which have great strategic importance. For example, Japan. I think that we have to realize what Venezuela is today and what its importance is -- not just as a nation that falls to the Communist bloc, let's say, after Cuba. It is a nation with almost 40 per cent US direct private investment in the area. One might also mention the oil and the iron ore. The psychological impact of the loss of Venezuela to the Communist bloc would probably mean the eventual loss of all of the area, and I think that that makes it a very high priority in our scheme of things, strategically, in the present world. I think that this can be argued out ad infinitum and that different things can be pointed out, but I think that it is hard to deny this.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Nielsen?

MR. NIELSEN. I want to respond to your question concerning differences in disarmament. We specifically took note of the fact, in making our Iranian adventure, that the US really could not do anything about it and, therefore, we did not regard it as especially dangerous in the local sense. We were not concerned with what could happen. We felt that we could control it. In a way, this adventure to us was

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symbolic: we were trying to indicate that the US could not have a free hand and do what it wanted to in the present crisis without expecting trouble to arise elsewhere and in an area where we were strong. I think that if there had been strong US forces nearby, that we would have thought a long time before we did that. There would have been a difference there.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Topping, and then Wilson.

MR. TOPPING. Referring to two earlier comments, it was the assumption of our team that the US had every capability in the world to clobber Venezuela any time it wanted to. That was beyond question. We thought that GCD had not really affected that balance of power -- the US versus, well, in this case, some Caribbean countries. We also assumed -- I think this is correct; the team can correct me if I am wrong -- that the chances of world conflict were known. Certainly during the first three move periods we did not think that anything that the US did in the Western Hemisphere was going to lead to an exchange of nuclear weapons between East and West. We also assumed -- this was commented upon earlier -- that as far as our own personal fortunes in Venezuela were concerned, that what we could stir up in Western Europe was minimal and that the reaction of Western Europe would not be taken into account in this particular

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confrontation between Venezuela and the US.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mainly because of the lowered strategic reach of the US?

MR. TOPPING. Yes.

MR. DIZARD. Assuming a specific agreement with the USSR on the question of zones of influence in a GCD world and assuming that we both agree that an OAS or UN peace force will be permitted to move into each zone to break up little wars, I think that the problem becomes a question of what are little wars, what are little situations, what are little disputes, and what are disputes that affect our vital interests. I think that we certainly concluded early in the game that Venezuela was too important for us to permit to leave to the UN. In effect, that we had to move in.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. May I just ask you a question? You did conclude that, and the Soviet team concluded simultaneously that Venezuela was at the top of its priority but for a different reason, which relates to Jim's point regarding spheres of influence. The Soviet Union recognized this as an ideological factor which opened up a new geopolitical opportunity, as I interpreted it. You recognized it in the terms that Frank Knapp mentioned before of economic, hemispheric --

MR. DIZARD. Domestic.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. -- domestic, political interests.

MR. MONTIAS. I have a comment on another factor that we perhaps have glossed over so far, and that is the economic consequences of disarmament, namely, the tremendous dollar flow which might occur to the underdeveloped countries if we were released from the armament build-up. You refer in your scenario to disruption and dislocation in the US economy. There would certainly be a great tendency for much more capital to flow to the underdeveloped countries than perhaps has flowed so far. We ought to relate this to the "per thousand". You made reference in the scenario to the fact that the other countries -- for instance, Brazil and so on -- would be allowed 3.5 arms.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Per thousand.

MR. MONTIAS. Per thousand. This was important in our thinking. We kept on referring to the fact that Brazil might have something like 300,000 soldiers. Brazilian military strength and economic capability would greatly enhance their strength and importance. In this case, I would agree with Professor Schelling. I think that their (the Brazilian) relative position and importance is greatly enhanced as a result of all this.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Why don't we take Tom (Schelling) first and then Tom Lough.

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MR. SCHELLING. I have a question. One thing that we did not get to test was the relative seriousness of the different kind of violations. The conspicuous violations of the treaty here were of a qualitative diplomatic sort: Venezuelans crossing the border; Americans moving in without appropriate authority. The Americans thought that they did not have the military strength to conduct a mopping-up operation in Colombia and Venezuela, or Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba, simultaneously, or, given what John Topping hoped to do when he got to Peru, Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela.

If you had gotten to the point of being engaged in a war in Northern Latin America where you were strained for resources to terminate it successfully but where you also felt that you could not get out, you might then have had to consider violating some of the quantitative limits on manpower by calling up reserves and so forth. I think that it would have been interesting, if we could have done it, to see what this would have looked like to the Secretary General, to the Russians, to Control, and to everybody.

I do not think that we got any good notion out of the game yet -- because it did not happen, except for Turkey, which nobody took seriously -- as to what happens when somebody in a nondiplomatic, international-border kind of way simply violates the quantitative limits. I cannot guess how

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it would have looked to me or how it would have looked to the rest of us if the British had called up reserves or if you had, anticipating this problem, tried to raise your armed forces by a few hundred thousand extra men.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Tom Lough?

MR. TOPPING. Well, let me --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. It is a question of personal privilege.

MR. TOPPING. I thought nobody was going to notice it. We had a wonderful time, remember? The Venezuelans mobilized the people's militia. We were way beyond our ceilings and we knew it. At one time we thought that the UN was really going to swing on us for this.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Footnote: The US had a wonderful time, too, because they put a fig leaf labeled, "Police", over a fairly substantial overage of military strength moving south.

Tom Lough has the floor.

MR. TOPPING. This is something that the US might attempt.

MR. LOUGH. We were led to believe in the scenario that this was kind of fuzzy, too.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That what was?

MR. LOUGH. The levels of paramilitary forces -- no --

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what did you call it?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Internal security forces.

MR. LOUGH. Internal security. I remember the phrase. In no case was it supposed to be double.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. This is something that is being studied right now. Let me just make two footnotes. One: The internal security forces -- we have not really talked about them except just now -- the US reached for that almost at once, and the Venezuelans reached for that almost at once. Then nuclear weapons is one of the few open doors under present disarmament planning. It is there. You are allowed internal security forces. If you have 2,000,000 Texas Rangers or an NKVD regiment, that poses a negotiable problem.

There is another question which we really have not talked about but which came up before in this dialogue over here and I would like to have it in the record so that we can study it later. That question has to do with the relationship of the US to client countries in different parts of the world. Someone said, "Well, you would not really pay too much attention to Iran or the Soviet Union would not pay too much attention to Venezuela because they lacked the military capability." In fact, the client country, if I may use that expression, becomes a liability, someone said, rather than an asset because it no longer has a big army like the

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South Koreans or the Thais or the Turks or even the Israelis, which are four examples, by way of countries, which are going to suffer bitterly in any quantitative cutdown vis-a-vis their needs. That is why you (the small countries) cannot get a disarmament agreement even though the big powers get one. But it is still a political question. Despite the fact that Turkey becomes a liability for the US, militarily, and Venezuela becomes a liability for the Russians, militarily, it is still a political world. I agree with Knapp. It is not a military world exclusively.

Therefore, there remains the question of what US relationships are going to be with other societies around the world and whether you can really simply write them off because they are a military problem. I think this is a crucial, vital, philosophical question about disarmament that has never been examined carefully.

MR. LOUGH. I was going to say that I had two questions for Control. One of them was just that one. Actually, it was for Tom Schelling.

I do not quite see the relationship between what Jim King has said about the spheres of influence. I picture, you know, geographical spheres of influence and the kind of thing that you were saying and that Tom Schelling said earlier. Maybe it is because I am just not thinking too clearly.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Have another drink, Tom.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Gentlemen, I am going to have to exercise the dictatorial rights of the Chairman. We have got just a couple of minutes left. I think that I will call first on Tom (Schelling), who has been my colleague and collaborator in a whole series of games for three years now, to see if there is anything that he wants to say.

Tom, you have a special position about this whole enterprise. Is there anything that you would like to throw in before we break up?

MR. SCHELLING. I probably gave enough of my own opinions, but I would like to say that this is one of the few games of this style in which Control did not have to distort itself or --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. SCHELLING. -- use dynamite to keep the action going. In many games of this type the action peters out because the teams temporize and use too much caution. They think that they are being bold, but they are really being awfully cautious to the other side. Therefore, the action runs down, and then Control has to detonate an accidental nuclear weapon or has to get an East German revolt going or has to have the Chinese invade the Russians in Siberia or

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something to keep, I guess, the action going.

This is the one case in which or one of the very few cases in which it looked as though the thing would go by itself. Whether this was because the scenario starting point was just too good to be true, I am not sure.

Another thing that is regularly noticed, not invariably but very frequently noticed, is a certain sense of euphoria that things are not going badly for you. Sometimes it looks to an observer that because another criteria for judgment shifts along with your fortunes, sometimes it looks as though you are judging the outcome in terms of the impression which you have made on the other inhabitants of the world. Assuming that your efforts to impress people have been successful, you take credit for a great show of strength for this reason. Of course, this can be corrected by having access to the other side's documents. Frequently each team feels that it has taken a tactical loss but has made a strategic gain and, under the circumstances, has shown the other side how to behave. Consequently, there has been quite a shock upon revelation of each other's documents to each other. I do not think that that occurred --

MR. POOL. Oh, yes.

MR. SCHELLING. -- so much in this case. As Albert Wohlstetter once said, "War is a non-zero-sum game of men

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making a situation in which everybody can lose." The truth is that this game has proven that war is a situation in which everyone can win, at least by his own thinking, and --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is a Rand type of game.

MR. SCHELLING. -- that has been demonstrated by these games. If you circulate a questionnaire in which there is the question, "Who do you think won?", you will get several answers: "We did."

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Now, a word from our sponsor.

Jim, do you have anything that you would like to say before we wrap it up?

MR. KING. I will forbear the temptation to make further comments on the game, but I will say that this is the last of the POLEX-DAIS series of four games. This one stands out in my mind because a concerted, determined, stubborn effort was made to force people's thinking into the disarmed world. That, I must say, is difficult. It is difficult to get the gears in the right slots; it is difficult to rev the motor and to get the scenario and everything written so that you would be forced to think this way. I, at least, have been extremely gratified by the effort which everybody has made to try to think this thing through. I think that until we begin to think in these terms and until we begin to face

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seriously the problem of what the world will look like once you have a disarmament agreement, that we really are not in very good shape to assess the pros and cons of any disarmament agreement that is thrown at us. It is a very hard thing to do. I think that you all deserve credit and you certainly have my gratitude and, through me, the gratitude of the Defense Department for your contribution to this effort. It has been an extremely necessary thing to do; it has been a worthwhile thing to do; and I think that, by and large, it has been extremely well done.

I would like to express my appreciation, as a representative of IDA, to our Director for his sterling efforts in the other three games and in this game. I think that the MIT performance on this series has been magnificent, as I have said in writing and will say again, and this time I will send you a copy.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes, please do that, Jim, in triplicate.

(General laughter.)

MR. KING. In order to save you the expense of a telephone call asking me to do so.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. "Local papers please copy."

I might as well say that this is the moment of truth. We resisted a little bit putting on a game in a disarmed world

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because I was somewhat embarrassed to turn to some of my former colleagues in the Government, in academic life, and all the realists with whom I deal from the Rand Corporation and Harvard and everywhere else, and say, "Pretend that the world has been disarmed", because the tendency was to say, "I do not accept your premise; therefore, all the details of the problem are irrelevant." And we said, "Just put yourself in the frame of mind that if you can believe that, you can believe anything." So they then believe that the world was disarmed and then they believe our scenario. We gamed that all out mentally when Jim and Ernie Lefever urged us to go all the way in this game or almost all the way. And I would publicly confess now that I am very glad they did. All of my own research objectives have been overfulfilled. I thought it was a fascinating game myself. I think that it was an utterly fascinating exercise, and it will be more fascinating in about ten days when one gets away from whether So-and-so's cable should have been passed to someone else, sits back and then sits down and says, "What did I really learn from this about UN foreign policy?" I will bet that if you try it, that you will be pleasantly surprised.

On behalf of MIT and the Center for International Studies, we are deeply grateful to all of you for this sacrifice of your time and energy -- and, in one case, health --

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in the national interest, and I want to thank you all. I hope that we have advanced knowledge by some amount. I hope that you have had a good time. And -- who knows? -- we may even have some influence on American foreign policy. One never knows.

Thank you very much.

(Ended at 12:32 p.m., Saturday, March 23, 1963.)

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