NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

CENIS POLEX II

Evaluation Session

Endicott House
Dedham, Massachusetts
Saturday, September 17, 1960
9:30 a.m.

Center for International Studies

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

I N D E X

	Page
Mr. Millikan	3
Discussion of team strategy	
Mr. Schelling	10
Mr. Rostow	16
Mr. Maury	26
Mr. Garthoff	31
Discussion of game techniques	61

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

MR. MILLIKAN. Gentlemen, I've been badgered into sitting as Chairman of this session, which I do reluctantly, mainly because there are some substantive things I'd like to say from time to time and questions I'd like to put, and I'll reserve the right to do this, even though I'm Chairman, but I'll try to control myself.

There are essentially, as I see it, three sets of purposes for this post-mortem session. The first is therapeutic, in a sense, to attempt to let some of you let off accumulated steam, which has undoubtedly been building up during the course of the thing.

The second is just the exploring of what, in fact, went on as compared to what you thought went on and why "X" was so absolutely crazy, whether it be the enemy team or the umpires, in the way they behaved at particular points in the game.

Actually, from the standpoint of what we know from the game, it is very much my hope that a lot of you are filled with either resentment or feeling that the other fellow is just clean off his nut, because this is the main advantage of this kind of a game, that this kind of a game can have over a simple seminar discussion of this kind of a state of affairs.

In a seminar discussion, you are constantly exploring in detail the logic of all of the positions involved, and everybody is carrying along that logic with them more or less

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

consistently, so that a lot of things that might very well happen in the real world will be ruled out as irrational, because in the back of everybody's mind in the seminar, or if it's a single individual who's writing a paper, in the back of his mind he's got a framework in which he puts all this, which forces him to accept or disregard things that in the real world might very well occur.

So that to some extent the function that a game can perform from the standpoint of illuminating the participants on possible alternatives is precisely that there are in this case three frameworks, because there were three teams, two completely isolated, except for written messages, and one somewhat isolated, because the umpires did have observers and were able to get a better picture probably of what the other two teams were really thinking than was the case with either of the other teams, but you've got until the end of the game, and this is almost a way of defining the game, you've got two sets of intellectual preconceptions in terms of which the moves are being made, and if those turn out to be identical, then the game is no better than any other way of doing this. There's not much point in going all through all this, except it's rather fun.

Therefore, it is evidences that these basic pre-conceptions were different that reveal how well the game worked and approach an element of reality it is difficulty to get at in any other way, because it is difficult, as I say, to sit

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

around a table and think of contingencies or introduce possibilities that are just automatically ruled out by the particular intellectual framework you are using, but it may be quite different from that of other frameworks.

So that, in addition to its therapeutic value, the second purpose of this post-mortem is to try to explore what substantively in terms of the particular issue and crisis in question, what were the differences in the basic preconceptions as to what the alternatives were at various points, as to what the choice points of the game were, as to what the controlling factors affecting those choices were on both sides, what were the differences among all three groups and how far were these differences realized during the course of the game and how far were they not realized until everybody had access to everybody else's classified documents and maybe how far are they still not realized until we begin to talk about it. So that's the second sort of purpose.

And a third purpose, it seems to me, is the much more mundane--not mundane, but the technical interest that the Center has in learning more about the gaming technique. "Are exercises of this kind useful?" is the first broad question, and if the answer to that question is "Yes, but . .", as it would be in most cases, then we want to know the "buts", how should it be done differently? A whole range of questions there.

Now, my suggestion as to how we should proceed this

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

morning in the light of this background view of mine is what we want to get out of this. We should proceed to divide the morning into two sections, and I'm not going to arbitrarily try to keep them completely separate--obviously these overlap--but I would like to start with substance primarily, not focus your attention for the first hour and a half or so on game technique, but focus our attention on what presumably is in the tops of all of your minds, which is the strategy of the teams and how they differed, what was puzzling to some of you about the strategies of others of you, etc., a sort of recapitulation of how the game actually went and an exposition and illumination through interchange of what the strategies were.

Then for the second portion, I'll try to direct your attention at the more mechanical questions of game technique and how it was run and how it might be improved for future gaming purposes.

Now, if that is agreeable, let me just take two more minutes to suggest the kinds of questions to stimulate you to a response on the game strategies that it seems to me would be illuminating to talk about, if we are to make the discussion of substance useful as a reflection of the game technique.

First, it seems to me we ought to start with just what were the three strategies, and I'm proposing that the two

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

team chairmen of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and my colleague, Tom Schelling, should lay out the strategies.

I'm proposing that Tom start, because whereas everybody has had some access to information in writing as to what the strategies and alternatives preceived by the Russian team and the American team are, there have been no opportunities for those two teams to know from anything that is put forward so far what the strategy and the purposes of the umpires and the alternatives as preceived by them were, and I'm going to ask Tom to start a little discussion of this.

Then I'd like, if they are willing, Walt for the U.S. and Jack for the U.S.S.R., simply very briefly, without defending them, but for purposes of summary, to state quickly what they preceive to be the key elements in their strategies, and then with that background throw it open for discussion, first based on attempting to understand these strategies. That is, I'd like you to start with questions where you just don't understand why the hell they did this or that and what the elements of this strategy here are, leading from that on into, or perhaps simultaneously--I don't want to separate this--into your expressions of view on the part of all of you as to whether these strategies were realistic, does this make sense. What seems to you queer about this strategy, once you think you have understood it?

Now, I would like you also to keep in mind, however,

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box 5 Folder

Political Exercise (US-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

or suggest that you keep in mind several other questions in the course of the discussion.

One question on which I would very much appreciate any comments you can throw in in the course of the discussion of strategies is the question of the extent to which your image of the enemy strategy shifted through time, either through the course of game play itself, the extent to which you found when a game was all over and you had access to the classified documents and to the explanations of the enemy team members, the extent to which you found you felt you really had understood their strategy all along, the extent to which there was a surprise here and to which you really understood it and the thing just hadn't gotten through, because one of the things I'm very interested in appraising is how many different conceptions of the different strategies involved there were, because this is one of the things that make the game interesting as against, as I said, a seminar or an essay thing where you are almost under constant pressure to reduce the number of alternative interpretations to a minimum.

Then another thing I think would be very useful for you to be thinking about and commenting on--what seems to you to be, once the strategies had been argued back and forth, we can look at the progress of the game, and to what seems to each of you to be the critical moves or turning points of the game, and

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

if we get a number of expressions of opinion on this we will again get some sense of how much congruity there is and how much difference in your various appraisals of what was happening, because if different people see quite different things in a crucial issue or crucial turning point, then I would take this to be again an advantage of the game technique approaching what I would describe as reality.

On the other hand, if everybody saw the essential critical moves or turning points in approximately the same light, then there was much less point in going through all this.

I think another question, which perhaps is another way of saying or posing one or two that I have already posed, is: Suppose that the game were to be played all over again tomorrow and that you knew that the other team was going to pursue the same course they pursued this time, would you play it any differently the second time around?

Another question--these are all just to stir you up a little bit and suggest kinds of things to which you can direct your attention. Another question is any reflections on the moods of the teams with respect to optimism and pessimism during the play.

I thought I noticed, and the umpires discussed this at several stages, that for the first two or three days, really until the last move, everybody thought things were going their

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

way on all teams all around the lot. Now, this particularly interested me, because this was precisely what happened in our last time around in exactly a wholly different state of affairs, and whether there is anything fundamental in this or whether this was just accidental in the two cases, I don't know, but I think the question can be posed another way by saying: As the game opened, when the initial problem was stated, did you perceive this situation as one primarily of threat and danger to the position of your side or as one primarily offering some brand new opportunities for some quite interesting advantages you could gain, and did your impression as between these two moods change and shift during the course of the game significantly?

Then if we have some time, I'd like to get--but I'd like to put this off until a little bit later, if we can--I'd like to get into the last move period and where it led, who won, and what's likely to happen next kind of set of questions, but I think we might wait for that a bit.

Well, then, when we turn to technique, I'll outline very quickly some of the problems I'd like to have you talk about in there, but let's get started on the strategies.

Tom, why don't you lead off?

MR. SCHELLING. I think the first thing to say is that we didn't begin with any detailed strategy of any sort. We were playing by ear, like the rest of you, and while we were

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

determined to create a crisis, we had predilection for a military crisis. We especially wanted a crisis that involved some real misapprehension on each side of what the other team was aiming at, and we had no advance idea in detail of what the game was going to lead to.

We also--I think this is important in judging the way we behaved--or at least I had a poor idea of what the tempo of activity would be, what would get accomplished per move, how fast time would elapse and how much control we would have over the course of the game.

I think between intervals, the first interval between 1 and 2 and the last interval between 3 and 4, there was a substantial change in the control we exercised.

At the end of Move 1, essentially we just built forward, let things go as they seemed to be going. We had a crisis brewing; it seemed as though it was going to develop under its own steam. We just tried to create a plausible next step and were substantially limited by the fact that your own strategies didn't go far enough ahead in the identification of contingencies, so we couldn't push as far before we sort of ran out of material from you, and for that reason we only went 36 hours ahead.

Between Moves 3 and 4, it must have been evident to you that we very carefully constructed the situation, using all the prerogatives of what Link called "social science fiction"

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

to set the thing up, and a lot of this was due to the fact that we had seen that it was terribly hard for us to get you in a position you couldn't wiggle out of.

A main feature of our strategy was to keep the person and the political complex of Mahmadi, variously pronounced "Mo-moo-di" and "Ma-may-di", etc., the Professor, ambiguous. I think we succeeded in this, and I think it was evident we were trying to do this all along the way.

There were a couple of observations we made as we went along that affected the way we made our moves.

One was this euphoria that Max mentioned. Both sides were continuously reported to be right on top of the world, and we were sort of wondering how far that can carry them into a trap and how well can we disappoint them on the final move, if possible.

Two more important things: One was, I thought, a remarkable ability of both teams to evade issues that we both thought we had rather tightly set up for them, Otto's escape into _____, when he thought we confronted them with actions rather than words. As a result, I felt that we had less control than I had anticipated over the choices you'd be forced to make at each stage.

The second objection, and this, I think, is a matter of game mechanics, rather than strategy and real history, although it is hard to generalize that from a sample of four

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (U.S. - Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

moves, but it looks as though it took us about two moves to set up a situation in which both of you were responding to an ingredient we had put in. It seemed as though, when we wanted to create a misunderstanding, we had to work through one of you with response and move later on the part of the other.

This led us to believe that at the end of Move 3 it was going to be awfully hard to find a climax for you by Move 4 or even in two if we went on to Move 5. So we really then from Move 4 decided we wanted to construct as carefully as we could a military crisis for both of you.

We debated a while whether we would set up a situation that was terribly messy for both of you but with a possible happy outcome if only you had the skill to find it or one that was terribly messy for both of you but with a possible disaster if only you had not the skill to avoid it.

We toyed around with the notion of setting up a situation in which you could still negotiate yourselves into a potentially happy outcome with Mahmadi and finally decided "No", and finally decided "Let's face them with war" and that's what we did, and we tried very hard to set it up so that you both faced it, and we tried very hard to make the military decisions so urgent that there just wouldn't be time for diplomacy on any appreciable scale.

Now, I think what we did between 3 and 4, while it may have looked like a somewhat arbitrary creation of a crisis,

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box 5 Folder

I would say that we weren't essentially responsible for the military crisis. What we did was to accelerate to Move 4 when it might have occurred about Move 12. I think this is what we could patiently have eased you both into, if the game had gone on indefinitely, but it looked as though the tempo with which you could get yourself into this situation was something terribly hard for us to accelerate, unless we just sat down and, in effect, wrote a scenario that got you to the very final stage.

I think it's fair to say that generally our strategy was not to let the situation be too much dominated by external events or Suez Canals, things of that sort. They were thrown in for noise, confusion, diversion, etc., but our feeling was that those things did not and we weren't going to let them dominate.

The only real question was whether this could become essentially a game of diplomacy and propaganda, probably centered on the U.N., or a military move game centered in Iran, and I think here there was a real choice, and it took not only the conscious decision on our part but some skill to force it into the military move direction, rather than the sort of U.N. diplomacy and propaganda direction.

On the plausibility of what we did, I have already said I think essentially at this creative stage, Move 4, we accelerated rather than invented a situation. I checked with

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box 5 Folder 1
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

Max, and we both agreed that probably as umpires we had been no meaner than Nature herself and a good deal more consistent.

Finally, a couple of comments about the way the game went. In the end, I felt we had more control over the game than I had anticipated, and I think the reason for this is that while we wanted and expected and asked over and over for what we called a contingency plan or strategy that outlined alternatives and what you would do in them, essentially we didn't get them until the very last move, where I think we got them in beautiful shape from both sides.

I'm not convinced myself that it was possible to have done that at every move of the game and whether it would have been wise, but I think essentially because you did not identify many contingencies or if you did you only told us what you planned to do in the contingency you focused on, for that reason when Move 3 was over you hadn't determined the course of events enough to keep us from being able to push it as we pleased. I think if you had identified more contingencies and what you would do in each contingency, we wouldn't have had the freedom we had between Move 3 and Move 4 to create the situation we did.

Just a final point. I had been terribly worried that we would get bogged down in technical matters that we are either unequipped to settle or that would take too much time and trouble to settle, particularly military issues. I was impressed

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

and my personal judgment was we did splendidly, and I think part of the reason is that with the prerogative of umpires we didn't give you facts from which you interpreted conclusions; we gave you conclusions and let you assume that the facts were such. That is to say, we tried to tell you what the balance of military forces was and what the outcomes would be of particular kinds of engagements at different times. We used military advice to make these plausible, but, in effect, we tried to tell you the payoffs of different conclusions, rather than the details from which those would be constructed.

I think that's it.

MR. MILLIKAN. Rather than have cross-questioning at this stage, I'd prefer to move on. What Tom has said will filter through all the rest of our discussion.

I suggest we focus on the two team strategies and come back to the umpire strategy at a later stage, and I suggest Walter summarize the American strategy.

MR. ROSTOW. Our strategy was based on this appreciation of the initial situation, and for good or ill, it's continuous from the first message to Moscow to Clay that runs through our papers.

We felt we had three problems. One is to maintain the postwar common law that Russian troops not cross the frontiers of the cold war. To this end, we felt it was essential to establish in the beginning with the Russians direct communications,

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S. Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

which we did in our first moves, through the first message to Moscow, through the press conference and the luncheon leak, and this we regarded as a contingency that we would not have to face on the most probable definition of a realistic Russian strategy, Khrushchev type.

On the other hand, we realized that "realistic" could be defined in a quite different way than "continuous with the past", namely a test of American will in the gap period or something of that kind, so I would say that with this possibility before us we were never in any sense euphoric. From the beginning, we thought this might lead to what we would regard as a major war.

The second job we felt we had was to maintain our right to respond to request from a power under whom we were under pact obligation. This was compounded because your bilateral arrangements with Iran went _____, and we felt strengthened in the common law of this and the fact that we responded to the Lebanon-Jordan crisis by moving troops even outside of a direct pact, but in any case we felt that the good word of American military arrangements around the world were at stake here in not only the Cento area, but the Seato area, where the kind of problem we were faced with might arise, where we thought similar kinds of moves might come up, and we thought we had to make a demonstration if we were to hold this together on a world basis.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

Third, we were very much aware of what your fundamental limitation would be in this operation, which was to have a viable political base from which to operate.

Our view was, and this was the reason for our questions at the beginning of the fourth period, our view was that there were moments when, if the base was really impossible, the United States really has to take its licking, that the United States cannot get itself into a position where it's operating even with military success but it's operating against a predominantly hostile population, that we are not symmetrical with the Russians, we don't have the capability domestically in our society or techniques to run a Hungary.

Therefore, we were very much confined to a short-run military base for our undertakings, and the possible thing that vaguely cheered us was the possibility that if we worked our way through this we could use the crisis to do something we have been wanting to do and which the Shah may have been wanting to do, which is to surround himself in a sort of a constellation in which the middle class was more important than the land owners. That was the only opportunity we saw if there was trouble, as it unfolded.

We moved to communicate with the Kremlin our high seriousness. We moved to aid the Shah under two conditions initially, one a contingent basis, meaning serious political opening to the Professor. We went to the Professor and tried

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

to move him this way, and we made our whole strategy, which was focusing, trying to focus on the internal negotiation, available to the world for the press conference.

In the second move, we did very much more of the same. We welcomed parts of Khrushchev's statement, trying to bring him towards the outcome which we wanted, which was support for these negotiations.

We reserved the right to use American troops, but we were given some encouragement in the hope we might get by if the political situation worked out tolerably through Control 16, which said that if we could hold the line politically and militarily and keep the Russians out of it, things would be handled domestically.

When we gave an ultimatum to the Shah, time ultimatum to make the appointment to move, we met the Professor on all points, except the question of the immediate withdrawal of American military aid. Our view--we want to separate very sharply the question of America meeting it's obligations to a responsible government in a short run and this other separate question as to whether a responsible government had a right to abrogate a pact.

Our appreciation was that, assuming that it was done in proper order and sequence, that the United States really had relatively trivial interests in whether military aid was or was not agreed upon by an Iranian government in the long run.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box Folder

However, in the short run, we took the issue very seriously, both in the face of Russian threats, U.N. pressure, and Mahmadi pressure. We would not be in the position of abrogating a military pact in the middle of a crisis.

When we came to state our contingencies, we laid out various contingencies here in U.S. 16, in which the first was if we really couldn't get the Shah to move, we would have to get him out on our own initiative by blocking the Russians by the bringing to Mahmadi of some sort of coalition.

We then discussed what we would do if he turned out to be a Communist or even turned out to be interested in the form.

Then at the end of Period 3, we were cheerful to this extent, that we had the Shah under pressure, that we had the United Nations negotiation in which we had some promise, even in a sense from Control, Control 40, that Nehru would in the United Nations contact from there his ways not on the issue of getting immediately withdrawal of American troops in Iran but on internal negotiation, and we thought if it went that way, this additional pressure on Mahmadi might get him to negotiate, and that if we had a reserve militarily, an appreciation that we could block the Russians from crossing frontiers, we could bring effective military pressure on him if the Shah's military position held up.

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-South) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

In short, it looked as though we might, if the U.N. thing went right and if the Russians were prepared to settle for a political negotiation, which we gave Mahmadi all domestic powers and even the right to, if he wanted to, get rid of the pact--we were in tolerable shape.

Then Control gave us the following conditions: There is increase in Soviet aid; there is internal deterioration; and there was a reversal in Nehru's interest in playing the part in the internal negotiation, and we asked two questions.

As we say in our final paper, we said that we considered the possibility that now the political situation might be so bad that we just had to accept an alternative we had in mind all along, namely that the only thing to do was to get out as gracefully as possible. We asked them, "Would the presence of United States troops be a constructive or a negative force in domestic morale?" and we were told that the answer was positive, and we asked whether the Center would stay with us if we moved troops in or whether it would not, and the roof caved in on the contingency, that we were told the Russians and also the Turks were unequivocal and pacts were equivocal but not militarily important.

I might say here that we have been aware all through this exercise that the political base in a country of this kind consists of a highly material small group at the top,

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

very much, that the way political, when you talk about the political moods of a country you're talking very often maybe about the urban crowd, but in Iran they can shift, where you're really talking about a very small group of human beings and there's a very small element of _____ in the future here as Control limited Lebanon morale, partly based on whether or not Russian supplies would come in and encourage them.

We learned later the entourage was split and very much under the influence of how the thing looked to be coming out. However, on the basis of Control guidance that we could get a possible guidance of our short run military, if the Russians were out, we went forward, and we decided not to go forward by scrabbling in the south but to go to the heart of the real political position to the Soviet supplies in the north.

We had originally envisioned doing this with the Turks, but we then thought that it would be better if we led the way, rather than the Turks, to Moscow. First we did, however, immediately put in a small contingency around Teheran for the question of security purposes.

MR. MILLIKAN. The Control group is very interested in the precise timing of your sending of the military. We weren't clear as to whether your sending of the Marine division, which was in the list of military things that were on 24-hour

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

notice, would have occurred before Clay's answer.

MR. ROSTOW. That's right. It would have.

MR. MILLIKAN. That wasn't at all clear from your document. We concluded the opposite. We concluded it was not.

MR. ROSTOW. The Marines would go in immediately. The move in the north would be held in reserve until something came out, because we were told that the security position was weak in Teheran, and we wanted the Marines there quick.

On the other hand, we felt that the cutting of the Russian supply line and the facing up, which we faced from the beginning, the possibility this would lead to a big war.

MR. POOL. The advance units would be in first.

MR. GARTHOFF. What time was this?

[Confusion]

MR. MILLIKAN. The umpires would have to rule on this.

[Confusion]

MR. ROSTOW. Then we sent Clay, and that was our last move. However, from the time it was stated in U.S. 16 that from the time that Russian volunteers crossed, we would have raised the thing in U.N.? and gone into partial mobilization on the basis of even volunteers, if the Russians crossed the frontier. This was our basic position.

Let me first state what I think are the issues, not of game theory but of substance, posed here, and I'll tell

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

you, the only thing about the Russian strategy and the Russian papers that at all did not conform to our image, which is a very simple thing--I think the issues that are raised that are really worth a lot more thought by the American government and people interested would be how much of a political base can the United States operate in a turbulent situation of this kind, given the, really, the nature of politics and the weight they swing and various elements, including external elements, etc.

Secondly, can or cannot the United States accept as legitimate something other than a _____ war, the technique which the Russian team proposed here, which is that you take legitimate dis_____ and put it in a position where it can get logistic and military support. You then invoke Russian military strength to create a crisis which scares the world about nuclear war, and you then take this to the U.N., and the combination of this thing forces the United States to abandon a military pact commitment.

This is an interesting technique that could be applied to the whole Seato area, applied to Burma, could be applied to provinces in India. In a sense, it might even be applied--you don't need a border to do it--but a version of this might even still--

MR. MILLIKAN. In the Congo.

MR. ROSTOW. In the Congo, etc., but this is the

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

technique that was proposed, and the nature of the American position in the face of it is worth quite a lot of thought.

Third, what is the Soviet view about using their own troops to cross frontiers, in fact, the cold war frontiers?

Fourth, what is the actual--I'm not talking about the margin of position of the United States vs. the Russians in total strength--but what is the actual appreciation of the present state of forces of the two sides? I do not wish to sound like Mr. Nixon, but I think there may be some confusion here in the minds between directions of individual and actual forces. I went back and read the military appreciation which preceded this exercise, and it left things pretty much--let's have a bit more air lift, etc.

Now, there was nothing about the Russian position that surprised us, not even the final decision to move troops, but what did surprise us was the failure to respond to solemn, direct American warning that this was an issue of war and peace, because in the papers there was very little discussion of the general strategic situation as the thing moves forward. The total issue of war and peace, which we posed at the beginning, the thinness with which this issue was treated in the face of the initial solemn moves and subsequent moves surprised us a little, but that's the only move that I can think of that was made that didn't seem to us very much part of the nature of the

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box Folder

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

team we were playing against.

My only final comment is that no one should be permitted to read a report of this kind casually, that anybody who gets this should be under--that a quick reading to find out how it came out or what happened without really going through it could make a war game report a very dangerous document.

MR. MILLIKAN. Thanks, Walt.

Before we discuss the American position, I'd like to have Jack just outline the Soviet position for a contrast. That may save us a little time, and then I propose that after he does this we discuss the American position and others than the team chairman make the responses as to what the American was.

MR. MAURY. I'll be brief and really deal with just one major and, I think, overriding factor here, which I believe was running constantly through our thinking, affecting our tactics, as well as our strategy and also, I think, important because it would seem to me to be applicable in real life in a number of situations, in other words, a factor which is not necessarily the product of any arbitrary or artificial local assumption regarding the particular time or place but which I think might be expected, if valid, to be applicable to reaction to similar situation, in situations in other areas.

It concerns mainly what Walt speaks of as the "common law", the solid line. We, as Russians, repudiate any

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

notion that there is anything sacred about agreements or commitments which represent, in our view, an attempt by the United States to freeze the normal forces of history and are in many cases, particularly here, a reflection of an American effort to draw upon dusty pieces of paper that may have constituted a recognition of real political forces when they were first drafted or commitments when they were first made but which have been overtaken by the advance of events of three kinds basically: first, a basic change in the power relationship, the power equation between the United States and the U.S.S.R; second, basic changes in the alignment of other nations, not only the neutrals but even some of America's staunchest allies, like the British.

One of the things we feel rather strongly is that the American team seems to have not been as inhibited as we would have expected it to be by world opinion and by the support of friends and allies, to say nothing of local conditions in the Middle East, as we would have thought the American team would have had to be sensitive to in some of these decisions and activities.

Mr. Khrushchev would have probably told Lucius Clay that we Soviets haven't threatened anybody. We do have missiles, but we have not used our missiles to threaten people any more than you have used S.A.C. to threaten people. What you claim is a Soviet threat of arms is really nothing more

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

than the inevitable projection of impressions of Soviet power around the Eurasian periphery and elsewhere which, of course, affect local conditions in Iran and affect public opinion throughout the world. We don't have to threaten.

MR. MILLIKAN. May I just break in to ask you one thing: Was the absence of any Soviet missile threat of the kind that was made at the Lebanon time explicit and decided on your part, or was this--

MR. MAURY. Yes. We considered threats, and we found them tempting, but somehow--I don't know exactly what the consensus was, but we decided we could achieve our purposes without them, and we felt they might be counterproductive. That was my feeling.

The way we saw the situation from the Soviet standpoint was that what was happening was, first of all, the product of the changing realities of power relationships between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.; second, an inevitable impact that these developments were having in world opinion and the alignments and allegiances of other powers throughout the world; and, third, the inevitable impact in the local political situation in Iran of these basic forces.

We felt that the political upheavals in Iran were perfectly normal and natural. We thought that they vindicated our basic interpretation of colonialism, and we thought it would be intolerable for the United States to attempt to freeze this

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box 5 Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

process, not only because of our vital interest in what goes on in Iran, but we felt under other pressures of various kinds.

Not only would effective United States action here have its ramifications in other areas, but we felt under internal pressure. After all, we have won some hard-earned blue chips in our efforts in the postwar period. We have our Chinese friends to consider. We have friends abroad that are carefully watching the moves and countermoves in world power relationships. This was a challenge to our prestige that we thought, if not met, would have far-reaching ramifications.

We considered perhaps our closest call in terms of the outcome here, or maybe a watershed, was whether the United States would eventually settle its differences with the Professor and build on a base a shade wider than the base they were willing to build on.

We were rather surprised, as I said before, at what seemed to be the lack of United States concern for what we thought the alignments in the U.N. might have been in this case, to say nothing of the United States indifference to the sensibilities of some of its allies or to some neutrals that would be in a position to be heard from in one way or another in the U.N. or elsewhere.

Also, we failed to recognize--I think it may have been our fault, it may have been the umpires' fault, or it may have been Walt's fault--but I don't think we ever got the real

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

impression of a very solemn warning that Walt speaks of. I'd have to look at the papers again to see whether we could see such a warning if we went back to take another look.

I won't try to go into the move-by-move strategy here. I would prefer to spread the work a little on that between two or three of ours and let two or three or your people participate, but it was this basic attitude that I think dominated our thinking throughout here, that we simple cannot tolerate a freezing of the status quo in the name of postwar alliances made or commitments by the United States made under conditions that we think have been overtaken by history.

MR. MILLIKAN. Good! Now, I want to separate sharply the discussion of Soviet strategy from that of United States strategy, because they obviously interact and intermingle, so the floor is open for anything.

MR. ROSTOW. May I ask a straight, factual question? Did the seriousness of our intent and anxiety, actually, to get a reformed government come through to you?

MR. MAURY. I think yes. I think we felt you were doing this in some measure of desperation.

MR. ROSTOW. It was the one hopeful thing.

MR. MAURY. Yes, we felt you couldn't squeeze much more mileage out of the Shah, no matter how much you and Alton Jones might have wanted to.

MR. MILLIKAN. There are several people I know have

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

specific questions of strategy or have challenges to the United States strategy. Let's plunge in.

MR. GARTHOFF. I don't want to ask any questions. I want to deliver a very short speech.

Well, Maury, just to mention what would strike me on the basis of this game as four pretty basic reasons that I would want to dissent from the basic United States strategy as presented in this game--first, because it seems to me, and this seemed to be reflected in the game, although perhaps not as sharply as I thought--it seemed to me to misconceive the Soviet strategy and, therefore, to oppose it less effectively and, therefore, to lead to unnecessary risk and, in fact, the likelihood of mutual destruction.

As an example of specific misconstruction, we weren't at any time thinking in terms of exploiting the missile gap. We were not thinking at any time--and this was not something that you apparently had in mind--but we were not thinking at any time of forcing satellitization of Iran.

We were thinking primarily in political terms, political and propaganda forms of struggle in this, and, as Control has stated, they intentionally pushed things in terms of a military solution, but just comparing the U.S. and Soviet approaches, it seems to me that the American was more inclined to assume or to expect or to allow at any rate a military situation to develop than was the Soviet one.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

Second, it seems to me that it fails to represent the real world, because I don't think that, although we can draw a line around the Soviet block, this line does not leave a monolithic free world on the one side and monolithic Soviet on the other, and again this, as Jack has mentioned, was perhaps the most striking thing. We on the Soviet side did not at any time even think in terms of your thinking of such a sharp line, and this was the greatest lack of meeting of minds in the thing as a whole, and that led each of us to make various moves that we would not have made if we had realized this lack of a common basis, lack of a common law position, and it seems to us that as a result of this the United States strategy relied too much on unilateral action and ignored too much world opinion and the way U.S. judgments, e.g., would have likely reacted to our continued insistence and readiness to have mutual withdrawal of all foreigners from Iran, etc.

Third, just speaking now as the general question of the line, not in the game itself, it seems to me to yield to the Soviets complete freedom within the bloc. If we are going to insist that there's a sharp line that we have the right to do anything on our side, then this concedes to them the right to do anything on the other side, which in the long run we may not find to our advantage, and, finally, it seems to me to concede to some extent their view of history under the forces in history, which I don't believe.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

I think they are too optimistic, because of their theological preconceptions, too optimistic in thinking that there's an inevitable trend in a certain direction of the weakening of what they see as the reserves of imperialism and in former colonial areas and the shift of these countries gradually from colonial and semi-colonial to neutral state, later to neutralism and pro-Soviet, and eventually, probably not for some time, to Socialist and Communist status.

Maybe that's enough.

MR. MILLIKAN. Now somebody--either umpire or American.

MR. POOL. I'd like to say I agree with him in part, but mostly I disagree.

The statement that the United States team misconceived the Soviet purposes--I'm not sure that I would accept this. We did not assume that your initial purpose would be to move in and create a satellite. This we regarded as a surprise when it happened, that is, your moving in we regarded as a pure surprise, although we had always had this in mind as a contingency, and our general image was if this happened this was an arena in which we couldn't possibly win militarily, and you are quite right when you say that the United States was more militarily oriented in this situation than was the Soviet.

We were quite ready to let this situation expand into other theatres of military action. We were, after all,

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (US-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

playing not a realistic American game but an optimal American game.

MR. MAURY. That's debatable.

MR. MILLIKAN. You don't debate that it wasn't realistic?

MR. POOL. When we made this very strong pitch for the recognition of the line between the two worlds, this was not predicated on the assumption that the Soviets would automatically accept this as a legitimate argument in this case, although I'm not sure I fully represent Walt's view on this point, but it was predicated on the assumption that this was a point that was terribly important for us to make that you could not simply disregard, that you would recognize the importance of it and the significance of what we were saying in this line, and what was a surprise to us was that our adopting this essentially new American position did not come through and was never answered and was never taken into account.

We would have been content to have accepted some of the outcomes that you had in mind and that you were seeking. For example, if our two sets of troops had been in there, and the U.N.--you said you would have been for U.N. intervention to pull them out and that we were disregarding the support that this would get around the world. We weren't disregarding this at all. On the contrary, this would have been our own salvation in this situation.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Past

MR. MAURY. It might have even come in Move 5 or 6.

MR. POOL. This would have been not optimal for us but would have been satisfactory, as compared to other outcomes as if Soviet troops were in there, because from the beginning we regarded a neutralist Iran of the sort that you were seeking not as an unmitigated catastrophe--it certainly wasn't what we were after, but it was something we were ready to accept as something we might have to accept.

MR. GRIFFITH. I don't think we ever understood that.

MR. MILLIKAN. It is probably partly the umpires' fault.

MR. POOL. Our general view was that the world as a whole, the U.N. would be much more receptive to this argument that we were presenting about the right of a nation to invite military aid and the non-symmetry of the situation than we expected you to be. We certainly expected this to carry in the U.N., because it would be very difficult for most nations to face a precedent that would preclude them in the future from having the right to make an alliance to invite military cooperation with another nation, as a sovereign nation.

To deny the right to two sovereign nations to agree to military cooperation in self defense would have been what would have been implied in the U.N. as accepting the Soviet position, the bilateral on the two sides of the position.

MR. MAURY. Doesn't that depend on the individual

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

circumstances? That would have been the matter of the whole thing starting by some Azerbaijani volunteers crossing the border.

MR. GARTHOFF. It would have been looked at this way by most people in the world, but the most of the countries in the world, even early in this game, consider that the Shah represented the Iranian situation, and did they consider this was a sort of situation which they would expect an alliance to be designed for? You see, some shaky rulers would look at it precisely in this way, but I would doubt that most would, and it really seems to me that the United States was more concerned with holding up these rights than it was with defining its interests in this situation.

MR. POOL. Control gave us the picture that we found quite unrealistic, that the Shah on the one hand seemed in a fairly stable situation in control of most of the country up to Move 4, as we were told several times that with a certain amount of aid he would certainly be able to hold on until spring and that at least half of the armed forces were still with him, and a number of indications that this clearly would continue to be viewed as the government of Iran and that there was a basis for moving forward, and, on the other hand, Control seemed to deny any degree of instability in the rebel coalition, which, of course, our primary strategy was predicated on the assumption that in a situation of this sort the rebel coalition would indeed represent a variety of points of view and that there would

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S. South) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

be a good deal of anti-Russian feeling or fear of Russia in such a coalition in Iran, that there would be a great deal of possibility for political movement with regard to the coalition. Control, for one reason or another, didn't want to play this game.

MR. GARTHOFF. This was not entirely Control, because we avoided very scrupulously any effort to put pressure on or build up the pro-Soviet groups within us. We put not one five-tenths of the pressure on him that you put on the Shah and did not try to subvert him within his own camp but let him very much call the tune on it.

MR. POOL. But our basic strategy was that a reasonable approach to the rebels would certainly win a good deal of support from among them, if not from Mahmadi.

MR. MILLIKAN. Does anybody on Control want to respond to this?

Let me just say a word, if nobody else wants to do this. The one place where I think our appraisal differed a little as to what was realistic from the American appraisal was the extent to which the thing that cemented the rebels was a resentment of foreign interference. We felt that this was perhaps the key to Mahmadi's holding this coalition together. The thing that primarily cemented them was not that Mahmadi stood for economic development or even that he stood for political reform, although certainly his opposition to corruption was a

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-South) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

major thing, but the image we tried to create, and that was why Mahmadi couldn't accept the American proposition, the image we tried to create was that that xenophobic element was an exceedingly important one in cementing the Mahmadi coalition and that, therefore, the very strong and vigorous and pronounced American military support of the Shah, all of which went from the very beginning to reinforce the image that the Shah was a foreign puppet, was the one thing which was critical to holding the rebels together.

MR. CLARK. That's a real point. On the analysis of the political base in countries with which we have pacts, actually there aren't so many of them that are in a comparable situation. You wouldn't probably _____ in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Thailand.

It isn't a terribly important issue, because it was certainly my view quite strongly, and I think it's a general tenor tenure of the feeling in the blue team that in this kind of tenor? situation the existing governments, even with their flaws, do represent in the present political constellation the best chance of evolution of governments in a progressive, economic and political direction and that failure of these governments to be able to show to the population that we have strong support from abroad in these objectives would be the most disasterous thing for our long-run interests here, and so our picture of our policy in the early stages was, I would interpret it as much

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

open to a neutral settlement in Iran than its political development than I interpreted our actual United States position to be in this case, but we retain as an important strand in our thinking the importance of clear support by the United States for this legitimate government and the residual progressive elements in it.

MR. MILLIKAN. One more word about this, that it was my feeling--I don't know how far others in Control shared this--I think Jerry and one or two others did--that whereas the appeal, the attempt to put the United States behind reform, anti-corruption, economic development would be a very effective slow-acting device over a long period of time, that to try to plunge this immediately as the key theme in a crisis situation where the rebels were primarily initially concerned with their military situation and were being shot at by American guns, etc., that in that kind of a situation the appeal of an American demonstration of support for these goals which was associated with a perfectly clear American statement that we were going to see the rebellion fail, that they were going to support the Shah militarily, that in the crisis situation this wouldn't be very effective. Am I correct?

MR. CLARK. Carrying this exchange one step further, could you clarify then what you would envision would have been the nature of a preferred initial response in the early move now, Move 1 and 2 response here? It seems to me one possibility

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

in this case would have been to accept immediately abdication or to get abdication of the Shah, you know, really to eliminate our support to the Shah immediately. Would this have been the preferred United States strategy?

MR. FRIED. You were caught— taught on one hand, you had our central commitment and the effect of this on opinion? _____ all over the world. You were trying to preserve that position. At the same time, you were trying to identify yourselves with a popular movement which you thought would be viable there, and I'm not so sure this can resolve, at least the way it was developed there.

To illustrate this, your first move, your first message to Mahmadi, as I remember it, was to the effect that--by God, you're a good guy, and we like some things you're doing, but we're going to beat the hell out of you if you don't come across--that the Shah has to be the chap on top here and we're all for him.

If you approached Mahmadi in a more equivocal way, you might have been able to-- I don't know exactly how you could have played it.

MR. POOL. We didn't know anything about Mahmadi, but we certainly felt that the rebels would not be a well-organized, unified, single view group at this stage. The failure of any of the generals to respond to bribery or political appeals, the failure of any groups within the rebels was indeed a surprise.

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

MR. ROSTOW. It was Control 44 that I didn't get until the very end, the major military feeling in Mahmadi's camp was pro-American.

May I make one observation? If that was your view, which is not wholly consistent with the build-up of this rebellion, if that was your view, I think it was wrong then to tell us at the end that the presence of American troops would strongly strengthen the moral position. If that was Control's line, it should have ended with a--

MR. MILLIKAN. There's a sharp distinction between morale on the two sides, and our answer at the later stages to you was that on balance, the presence of American troops would strengthen the Shah's position, which had deteriorated.

We weren't trying to be consistent through the thirty days. The reason we picked thirty days was precisely because they wanted to allow enough time for the internal situation to have shifted, because we think this is the way Nature works, and you were fairly well hooked on one position, and we then wanted to fix the internal situation in such a way to see what you would do when the initial situation had obviously changed somewhat in response to forces not under our control.

In the first place--let me answer your first part. The revolution would have been motivated in its early stages primarily by domestic consideration and not by zenophobia, but once the thing is full-blown and American support is then fully

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

behind the other side of the revolution, then this zenophobic thing becomes the key thing as far as the morale on the revolutionary side is concerned.

The only question we were asked in Move 4 by you is, "What would be the morale on the Shah's side of the fence in the event of American intervention?" and we said, "On balance" although we tried to hedge this. We said, "On balance, The way of the future would be more important than the other considerations."

MR. FRIED. If you remember, the threat to the Shah's position, we tried to indicate, came from the military groups around him in the first instance. That's how we pointed it.

When we said that his position, if American troops came in, would be strengthened, what we had in mind--at least I think what we had in mind I think was this group, once they were faced with American power there directly, would chicken out, that they would no longer continue their invasion and that they, the military group, as far as the populace goes, in a situation as we conceived it, immediately they would not be controlling in any case, and this is what we had in mind.

MR. CAMPBELL. Just one point I thought might clarify this a little in regard to the original and later American solemn warnings, because this might be a critical point in the analysis of the game.

As we read these, they were phrased in the same

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1136

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

general terms and line as many have been made over the past years, both publicly and privately, that the United States will honor its commitments and will answer aggression even with armed American armed force.

We took this to mean an American warning against the Soviet jumping into the Iranian situation with Soviet armed force, in which case the American reply would be as expected, a military one, the introduction of American forces.

Taking account of that, we made particular efforts to keep this whole thing on the political level as long as we could. We felt we had a favorable political situation developing in Iran with the forces of the people and the future on our side, and we felt that in world opinion we would have a favorable position as long as we did not make the first military move.

On the other hand, we did not regard Iran as a place where the Americans could move in forces and move them around more or less without regard to any possible action on our part.

We felt we were faced here not with just a situation where you would get an aggression and a reply, but a civil war in which there would be considerable world pressure to keep great powers out, and that if the United States were the first great power to introduce its own forces in, then any Soviet counter move would not be regarded by the world as an aggression, that it would have been the Americans who committed the aggression,

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

and particularly a Soviet reply in that case would be justified because the American intervention would be in a particularly sensitive area, very close, practically on the frontiers of the Soviet Union, so that in that sense we did not feel any great importance in an American warning, because we had no intention of making a military move unless there was some kind of a move by the American military first into Iran.

Meanwhile, we could play as far as we could the political line of keeping everybody out.

MR. GRIFFITH. It would seem to me that once the Americans engaged in negotiations with them and were willing to take them into the government, that this would largely have destroyed the Shah's position and could have insured later that Iran would have become neutral. Therefore, the essential Soviet objective was probably going to be achieved, even if the Americans did get Mahmadi into the coalition with the Shah, and so from that point of view our position was relatively easy.

The reason the Americans did not get it, they were unwilling to accept his position of withdrawal, which played into the hands of zenophobia. With respect to the strategy of extending the war, this would have been almost a guarantee a large majority of the U.N. and perhaps even some of the American allies, the British, for example, in respect to involvement in eastern Europe--this would have brought intensive pressure on the United States to accept Soviet demands that Americans be gotten

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

out, so from the Soviet point of view you might say that American moves toward extending the war would have been actually to the Soviet interest in the point of view of general strategy.

MR. POOL. It seems you are saying that the Iranian situation was loaded. I think the indication from the way you said it is that our two strategies were wrong. I would disagree. I think we were sound. That is, that the move towards Mahmadi, you say, would inevitably have resulted in a neuralist government. I would not think this would be likely. I think it would have been a possibility.

It would inevitably have resulted in a government that would be more acceptable to you than the present one but also a government more acceptable to us, and whether it would end up being neutralist, this was really a minor consideration to us, so long as it was not Soviet-dominated.

A second point--the extension of the military situation, you say, would build up pressure to remove Soviet and American troops. Well, again, if it had reached a situation where Soviet and American troops were in there, which we were trying to avoid, we would have been delighted with that, too, so this wasn't necessarily bad from our point of view.

MR. ROSTOW. The Soviet team takes it for granted that neutrality somehow is an automatic stage on the road to increasing Sovietization or communization in some way.

FROM THE FLOOR. No.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (US-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

MR. ROSTOW. Well, the way you stated the thing originally, it ends up with some form of socialism, as I took my notes. That's the way the Soviets would look at this.

Our view would be that this desire for neutrality and zenophobia is a very normal stage in the process of modernization of a society or achieving of its end, and the historical sequence as indicated by Nehru, to a certain extent by Kassim, to a certain extent even Nasser, by no means leads you down the road to serfdom, so there's a difference in historical judgment as to the significance of whether they get military aid or not, which I just point out as a factual matter. That's all. I wouldn't debate it. Just a factual difference.

MR. SCHELLING. I think we set up a situation in which it is very possible to describe an outcome that would have delighted both teams and that from that sense it is not a purely competitive game.

It's interesting that the two teams never did and I suppose never considered getting together. Maybe we didn't make it clear enough that this was a possible interest to both. Maybe this is the kind of outcome that can delight them only if they don't have to acknowledge common delight and work toward it.

It seems to me that it's a nice feature of this situation that both the Soviet and the American governments can easily identify an outcome involving radical reform, including

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

strong neutralism of a revised Iranian government complex, and would have left the Americans very relieved that they had come out of a crisis much better than they went into it and the Russians feeling they had a nice windfall to the south. Yet, they couldn't cooperate toward it.

MR. MILLIKAN. It might have happened in Move 5.

MR. SCHELLING. Clay's mission sounds to me like a highly competitive mission, not one which suggests, "We can both come out of this better than we started on August 28th."

FROM THE FLOOR. We took this as sort of an ultimatum.

MR. SCHELLING. My second observation is that this is sort of the same thing as between the Americans and Mahmadi. We clearly kept Mahmadi in a position right up to the last minute where he and the Americans could both have been delighted with an easily describable outcome, if only they could reach it, and I think there's a real question whether that kind of outcome can be reached in real life.

Lock two people in mortal combat, pistols pointing at each other, each taking the position, "You lay down your gun, and I promise to be reasonable."

I think the Americans did not pursue a very radical strategy. They were neither very accommodating to Mahmadi nor very tough, and it might be that one could explore at the two extremes ways of getting this Mahmadi agreement, but I think to

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (US-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

some extent the Americans and Mahmadi can be said both to have recognized that they were in one of those peculiar dilemmas, that clearly there was an outcome both would like but "you can't get there from here."

MR. MILLIKAN. I'd like to pose a question essentially left with us by Ben Schwartz, who couldn't be here today, a question which has a branch for the American side and a branch for the Russian side.

The whole initial strong American commitment to the Shah seems to have been based on the notion that any failure to support the Shah would be a clear abdication of the Cento obligations.

Now, question #1 to the Americans: Did it ever occur to them and did they consider the possibility in the very first move of emphasizing that this was for the moment an internal affair, that there was no evidence of external agression, which the umpires tried to fix it so that there would be no evidence, indeed, so it would be as clear as possible that the Mahmadi movement was not fomented from outside nor supported from outside, and the Russians cooperated with us beautifully in that, in trying to do everything they could to underline this point.

Is the United States under any obligation to come to the assistance of a member of one of its bilateral pacts who said, "I have a revolution. You've got to send me troops, some troops and equipment to help put it down."?

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

That's a question to the Americans.

The question to the Russians: Why did they at no stage underline this point much more heavily to the Cento allies and to the British and French, say "Look, this isn't a Cento pact matter. We know you have this obligation, but you have no obligation to provide troops to help one of your allies to suppress a rebellion. That isn't part of the deal in one of these pacts. It's only to suppress external aggression, and we give you absolute assurance that we have no intention of making such aggression"?

MR. CLARK. On this point, I would say this represented what I suppose is a realistic situation, if a crisis like this occurred tomorrow morning in a country like Iran. That's why we just didn't know the character of this rebellion. The amount of information in the game we had was a previous cocktail party conversation, and under terms of the game this could be a ruse as easily as it could be an accurate picture, but I think also in terms of the real world we might very likely be faced with the situation where we just wouldn't know.

MR. MILLIKAN. This was our view, because we had more immediate requests for more intelligence about this. Our own view was that in the real world you wouldn't know.

MR. CLARK. This is the two-pronged part of our [illegible] strategy which is a basic element in the difficulty of a situation like Iran. We wanted to take those actions which would

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box Folder

enable us to get an accommodation with this group, if they proved in fact to be reformed Nationalists, not Soviet agents, and at the same time we wanted to take those actions which, if they were of the other character, which would not leave us in a position of handing them the country without doing everything we could to prevent this.

MR. MILLIKAN. But there was no evidence in any of the early messages that you sent that the American team--certainly no evidence in the message you sent to Mahmadi that, for instance, if you could get perfectly clear indications that your Cento pact obligations weren't really called into play here, then you wouldn't behave this way. You made no intermediate move. The situation wasn't militarily exceedingly critical at the very beginning for the Shah. He appeared to be in a fairly good position.

Couldn't you have delayed your support in response to his requests under the treaty until you had explored this a little bit further and thus not made quite such a threatening move toward Mahmadi?

MR. ROWAN. There were technical restraints here. Isn't this right? The military actions were essentially put into motion, but because of the technical factors here, they couldn't actually arrive in Iran before we would hope to have this thing-- We talked a little at the beginning about these moves being preliminary in character, and there were inevitable

Political Exercise (U.S. Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

time lags. In fact, we made some note of the time, 17 days, in order to get shipments from Europe through the Canal and a week for some other things, and a lot of these things we decided we'd better get moving, but we weren't by any means convinced that we'd carry them through.

MR. MILLIKAN. The first sentence in your message:

[Mr. Millikan reads from message. Confusion.]

MR. MILLIKAN. --military efforts to suppress rebel-run units and revert control of the country. That was the thing which seemed to be absolutely black and white to poor, wretched Mahmadi in his tent.

MR. ROWAN. In terms of the objective United States military moves, which is what I was addressing my remarks to, apart from the message, in many respects these weren't so exceptional, certainly at the outset.

MR. MILLIKAN. That's right.

MR. ROWAN. They are very much in the order, say, of the Lebanon kind of thing.

MR. MILLIKAN. Why didn't the rest of you play this?

MR. MAURY. I think we did. On September 14th, we sent a rather stern warning, #2. Then in #14, we sent notes to all the NATO foreign ministers, calling attention to the dangers inherent in outside intervention.

MR. MILLIKAN. But you never emphasized that this was an internal matter and, therefore, they were under no obligations

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

under their--

MR. MAURY. In our #20, which we delivered to the Security Council, we recognized the right of--urged recognition of the right of the Iranian people to freedom and independence and to settle their own affairs without interference.

MR. ROSTOW. The American movements were not only designed to go in, you know, to fill the pipelines, because the Shah had lost a lot of logistical stuff, but they were put under the control of MAAG only to be released only if the Shah honored his contingent commitment to us to be completely forthcoming in his negotiations with Mahmadi.

MR. MILLIKAN. I'm clear about all of this, but what I'm not clear about is why nobody made more of the distinction between an internal rebellion with respect to Cento obligations. That's the point.

MR. MAURY. Our pact calls for the preservation--it's in a way like a Seato thing. It's got domestic integrity, if you look at our pact with them, and these fellows backed up against the northern border, which has in the history of American-Iranian and world-Iranian relations very particular significance, and also this is placed against the background of drumfire, of the Russians attacking the Shah. He was under both domestic and external pressure for a long time in the build-up and still was, and he was under what the late Secretary of State would have called "indirect aggression", and the

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S. Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

question of whether we used--what these pacts are meant to do with respect to this kind of indirect aggression is a real one.

Our notes were designed to make it contingent on the Shah to start negotiations, and our military moves were designed not for military purposes but to frame a political negotiation.

I'll certainly concede that we should have referred to Cento, particularly in some of these communications.

MR. MILLIKAN. It seems to be automatically assumed by everybody, by both sides that this particular kind of thing would require the Cento pact obligations to be fulfilled and that this would be a disaster towards American prestige if they didn't do it, and I just wondered whether that is really as clear as all that, whether somebody couldn't have made something out of it.

MR. FRIED. The only thing in the 8th U.S.SR move, they are already sending a small group of Soviet military officers in mufti across the border, not only doing it for intelligence purposes but are there to offer their services as military advisors to the rebels. This, it would seem to me, then, puts them in a position of--

MR. MILLIKAN. As God sees it, yes, but as the thing was emerging in the public print, there was still ploy here.

MR. CLARK. The first point was that the objectives of the Soviet team as played in this game were really quite li

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

limited. They were perfectly willing to accept a neutralist regime.

The question is this: Suppose this sort of crisis occurred actually, and we were concerned with designing U.S. policy for it, what would be the probabilities that the team would lay, given this information here, that this is the Soviet, the Soviet objective is limited in this degree and the probability that it probably is much more ambitious? What is the relative weight of these?

Obviously, you judge the limited objective as the most probable, but what is its probability as compared to the probability of having much more ambitious objectives in this area of the sort that the Soviet military might be urging upon the political leaders and saying, "Look, we have it made, boys. We can do anything you tell us."

MR. GARTHOFF. I would say there would be a high probability that this would be a Soviet strategy in this situation.

MR. GRIFFITH. Plus the fact that if the Soviet leadership started urging that sort of thing on the Soviet military, they wouldn't be political leaders very long.

MR. CLARK. Could you apply any indication of the probability of the more objective Soviet? Is it one in one hundred, one in ten?

MR. RITVO. The situation that was given to us was

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

a very favorable action on the part of the rebels, and certainly as the situation progressed more in a military sense, as the rebels perhaps expanded their hold on the terrain, they moved down into Teheran, then the question would arise as to how much Soviet influence would be exercised on Mahmadi when the time would come for recognition of the government, when the time would come to pull out communist followers and to put them into certain positions, and I admit the Control gave us an optimal situation from the Soviet side. Mahmadi posed no problems for us, and he was an unbreakable nut for the United States side.

MR. MILLIKAN. One alternative that occurred to me--we didn't discuss this in the control ~~game~~ team, but acquired it at the stage when it looked as though agreement was possible towards the end of Period 2 or Period 3.

FROM THE FLOOR. Period 3.

MR. MILLIKAN. If the game had quite a lot longer to run, one alternative course that would have been interesting to play would have been to load the dice very heavily in favor of a U.S. withdrawal of Shah's support, in other words, if we had given the opposite answer to Walt's question, so the U.S. would have been forced to withdraw, to have Mahmadi increasingly anti-Russian in the face of this thing, not neutralist still, but to have him apparently in a position to solidify the country around him in a way which would offer few levers for the Russians.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

This would have been an interesting thing to pose for Russian policy, because my guess would have been at that stage their attention would then be devoted towards indirect ways of creating chaos generally, of weakening the clear dominance and control of the Mahmadi forces. They couldn't have done this by military intervention but could have tried to stir up Tudeh and all other sorts of things.

FROM THE FLOOR. That's what the Soviets tried to do with Kassim.

FROM THE FLOOR. That's what happened in Iran.

MR. GARTHOFF. Putting it in the terms of the American strategy, it is not our general line, not our strategy to try and puncture or push back the line, insofar as there is a line. It is to us adventuristic to try, even with our missile nuclear power, to try to cash in in a direct way and have direct confrontation with U.S. and allied power.

But our prospective on history, the way we think it's going--

MR. MILLIKAN. Are you speaking as a Russian?

MR. GARTHOFF. Yes, yes. --is such that we think that there will be this kind of inevitable--there will be this kind of collapse in the capitalist world, and what we see as the great advantage of this nuclear missile power is not to cash in on a gap or not to use it for direct pressure, but to inhibit the U.S. from using its military power to stop this kind of

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

essentially political movement of forces in the world, and this is why we couldn't compromise too far, although our policy was what you might call a moderate or modest one in Iran in the game, but we couldn't for this reason agree to the line. We couldn't agree to it if General Clay had put it this way, because it would be conceding too much from our Soviet point of view to say that indefinitely we allow everything beyond this to be yours, and, well, that's it.

MR. ROSTOW. I think your position in terms of postwar Soviet history is a radical position. It may be one that will come, but all the way through the sensitivity of the Russians about moving troops across their borders is great. I'm sure that their consciousness of the line is greater, actually, than Washington's.

MR. GARTHOFF. This is not an invasion across the line.

MR. ROSTOW. Just as an historical fact, about moving Russian troops across borders, I think all the way through the Lebanon-Jordan crisis. Then it comes down to whether Iran is more sensitive, and so this is just a matter of judgment about their sensitivity on this issue.

MR. SCHELLING. You made the issue much bigger than Iran. You didn't go and say, "Let's _____ Iran." You said, "Let's nail down a law we have been trying to establish since the end of World War II. Here's an instance."

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

MR. ROSTOW. We tried to avoid getting American troops in.

MR. SCHELLING. It's forcing them to accept not only the Iranian solution but a principle that applies all over the world, and in that sense you were demanding more than an Iranian solution.

MR. GARTHOFF. You were demanding the right, e.g., to knock off the Indian revolution when one occurs in India, because the U.S. was not bound to do something in Iran here. This was an internal Iranian affair. The U.S. is not a member of Cento, the bilateral in March 1959, in case of aggression. You can define this as aggression, but you also have an advantage in not defining as aggression.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. It hands eastern Europe over to them for the first time since 1952.

MR. POOL. We're not asking the Russians to accept this. We didn't ask them, expect them to sign a treaty. We were just making it perfectly clear what the consequences would be if you didn't take full account of our feelings about the line, which feelings we expected you to have some understanding for.

FROM THE FLOOR. We didn't believe this would be a consequence.

MR. GARTHOFF. I don't think the Soviets have this understanding of the American position, and I don't think your

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

moves here would have been enough to give them that understanding.

MR. ROSTOW. Including the radical rise in military budgets the first time volunteers go up.

MR. RITVO. I think we did take some cognizance of that, but the Soviet estimate was not that the war in Iran or contact between Soviet and United States troops in Iran would lead to a general conflagration, by throwing in only after the United States intervened militarily--by throwing in this possible favorable position for Soviet intervention, massed Soviet troops, the position for the U.S. and for the U.N., the position in which the U.S. would find itself militarily, a position in which you saw no possibility of U.S. victory, that then hostilities would cease.

The Soviet intervention militarily was simply to exercise its weight to stop the war.

MR. MAURY. We were very careful to try to move our troops in such a way that they would be adopting a peaceful posture when you arrived and you would have to fire the first shot.

RITVO. This couldn't be done in many cases.

MR. MAURY. We were trying to get there first and confront you a fait accompli.

GENERAL HILL. So you started out by trying to capture a stronghold in the one place which was bound to be

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S. Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

most vigorously defended by the very best people available.

MR. GARTHOFF. We waited a month before we put anything at all. We only put it in when our Intelligence tells us you're about to land there. For tactical reasons, we land there covertly, although Control didn't take the opportunity to decide just who got to the airfield first.

MR. MAURY. We thought we were filling a vaccuum before you did.

MR. GRIFFITH. The great difference of estimate here is that the Soviet estimate was constantly that once the Americans intervened and then the Soviets intervened, the pressure of world public opinion of the Americans and allies would stop the war, and that for that reason it could not _____.

The American idea was apparently different.

MR. ROSTOW. This is why we had this luncheon leak from the new American President. This was a very serious communication from our point of view.

MR. RITVO. It should also be pointed out that in our discussions the question of raising the Berlin issue at this time was voted down and unanimously.

MR. ROSTOW. I'm sure that is a Russian thing. That doesn't impose a strategy on us, however.

MR. MAURY. We were worried about this brash young American President. You see, we recognized the luncheon leak as serious, too, but we also took it as a very direct challenge

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

to our own freedom of action over the next administration, and we had to set the pattern straight ourselves for this very reason.

MR. ROSTOW. And you set it with a Soviet move across frontiers which I envisioned as impossible.

MR. MILLIKAN. I hate to intervene and turn this discussion in other directions, but obviously we can go on with this strategic discussion all day, most pleasantly, and I would like to exercise my prerogative as Chairman to turn your attention to somewhat more practical matters of game techniques at this point.

You are perfectly welcome, indeed urged, if you like to continue to bring up substantive questions, but with particular reference to what they illustrate or demonstrate as to the value or lack of value of this kind of technique and how it can be made more or less effective.

Let me just mention two or three of the kinds of things that I'd like some reactions to from you, if you are willing.

First, on the selection of kinds of problems in which this technique is likely to be useful, did any of you have the feeling that this was an important problem to be tackled with this kind of technique?

At our last game, which was an uprising in Poland, where the line that has been described, the truce line was very

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder

effective. A number of us felt that this was bad, after it was all over, that you couldn't learn much from the technique as applied to that kind of a crisis, but my own reaction was that this one was much better from that point of view, but I would be interested in any comments you have on whether the problem could have been designed in such a way as to make this technique more useful or whether this was by and large a good design for this sort of thing.

Point #2: One of the things that worried us very much from the beginning has been mentioned by Tom, and I'd like to get any reactions any of you have to this one.

We were worried at the beginning that even three military advisors, all of whom were selected precisely because they had quite a lot of background familiarity with the Iranian terrain and the military problem there, that even this would not be enough, that the teams would feel as they were making their moves that the lack of a fine structure of military background really prevented them from playing the game effectively, and I'd be interested in knowing whether any of you had that feeling or whether by and large you felt that the military or any other kind of technical information was inadequate. Did we know too little? Did you feel that your knowledge of Iranian internal politics might realistically have been expected to be a good deal more full bodied than the information and intelligence you were given during the course of the game or not?

Political Exercise (US-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box 5 Folder

Then finally we come to the whole set of questions that have to do with the particular structure of this game, the principle of the alternation of move periods with umpire periods. Was this a good principle?

The last game we played, we played continuously with the umpires reacting and moves being interchanged as they were played. In this game, we decided to try this business of separating them with some slight modification of this at the end, but actually almost none.

Would you have any judgments about this? Do you have any judgments about the length and frequency of move periods? Were they long enough to get your moves formulated as you wanted to get them? Were they longer than necessary?

It obviously would have been highly desirable to--the reason I mention these two things in the same breath is that obviously any game is more interesting the larger number of move periods you can have, because then you can have--because then there are a number of chances where it would have been fascinating to carry this forward, but increasing the number would have involved reducing the period.

Do you have any reactions as to whether the terms were as to the size and composition of the terms, were they too big? Were they too small? Could this have been improved to any extent?

There's another range of questions that has to do

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

with the degree of realism introduced into the play. In the last game, we had a great deal, a much larger degree of realism in that we permitted, e.g., direct negotiation between individuals, face-to-face negotiations between the individuals concerned.

We cut that out this time, partly for historical reasons, partly because it was exceedingly difficult to keep track of what in fact was going on under those circumstances, but also partly because we had the feeling that the attention of the participants was distracted to an unnecessary degree in that first game by too much of the trimmings and trappings of the thing.

There was some suggestion, going to the other end of the spectrum, that maybe the degree of realism was too great in this game, that there is too much time spent on composition of actual TASS task editorials and actual messages back and forth whereas a much briefer indication of content would have done.

The case against that is that if you deprive the game too completely of realism, the involvement of the participants is reduced to the point where you may lose a major part of the thing.

Then finally there is a point Tom mentioned already. Is there any way, in view of the limited number of periods that is physically possible, each one of which to be satisfactory here,

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

is there any way in which you can get more forward projection in one period of what might happen under the number of different contingency alternatives, so that you can skip forward several moves without feeling--so the umpires can skip forward farther in time without depriving, without giving the teams the feeling that they have really been deprived of control because they hadn't been permitted to implement this policy?

Perhaps I might ask a direct question of both teams on this one. Did you feel that the final move where we jumped thirty days was in a sense unfair? Did either of you feel that this was unfair because the situation which we then adumbrated at the end of the thirty days was one you felt you could have prevented from occurring if you had been able to exercise influence through the period?

Well, these are some of the questions. I'm not going to put these systematically, because what I really would like each of you to do or any of you to do is to comment on whichever of these things seems to you to be most fitting.

MR. SCHELLING. I'd like to add one question. Did you feel that the papers that you gave us in the last move, that format, would have been a satisfactory format for all the moves?

MR. CLARK. A comment about the structure of teams, team moves, umpire moves, etc. I think it relates to this question of how--what happens during the moves. It seems to me that this was not--I wasn't in the early one, but it seems to me

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

basically this was a constructive direction to revise the game structure, and it seems to me it ought to go further in this direction even in this game, since the experience was pretty clearly that in the first three moves the teams didn't get very far because Control was essentially accepting our projection of events and we didn't project them very far.

I suggest you can modify the team behavior somewhat in the way of getting us to go further ahead by changing the format of what you asked us to do, but it seems to me for research purposes it might be worth while to accept a little more uneasiness of the teams that they have been put into situations that they would have prevented, are unfair, if Control would sort of consciously between moves make the clock move a lot and get to a crisis situation.

This relates a little bit to some other experience I have had in gaming, which is exactly the same way, that it is terribly hard to get the teams to confront each other on the key issues unless you get them right up to the brink and in a crisis in which we have to do something.

Everybody likes to figure out a way to prevent the problem from being as critical as it might become in the real world.

MR. POOL. It seems to me everything depends on your purpose. The way we played it last time, in which there was a lot more emphasis on what you call the trimmings, seems

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

clearly superior for purposes of training of relatively--well, people with relatively little experience. That is, the involvement in the last game was even more intense than this one, and it's been intense enough right here.

The kind of direction that you were suggesting seems to me very desirable for the purposes you indicated. On the other hand, we would have lost one thing which was very valuable in this game. That was a good deal of the misunderstanding that came through, that only could come about if you gave the teams the opportunity to try to make the moves that they think they are making.

I sense here one danger in the whole gaming process that I wasn't aware of before, and that is I have a feeling that those of us who played have become rather rigid. I sense that the Soviet team still thinks that they played this thing right.

MR. MILLIKAN. There's no possible question about you? [Laughter]

MR. POOL. That's right. I think we made three basic decisions: the decision to seek a coalition government and so to accept neutrality if it came; the decision to emphasize the frontier danger and even to be willing to expand the war; and the decision to cross the frontier finally in the north and not in the south, and I would maintain these are obviously inspired decisions. [Laughter]

MR. ROSTOW. I have only one suggestion. I have

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box
Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

never done a game before, and from my point of view and from those I have talked with on the blue team, I think we have all enjoyed it very much and regard it as satisfactory.

I guess there are two suggestions. One of them, I think you should ask at the beginning for a strategic appreciation. I think that you ought to have in your hand an explicit statement as the first act before they plunge into moves, what they regard as the problem, the alternatives, their choices, their contingencies. I think this would be good.

I think secondly--

MR. MILLIKAN. This would be the first period, in other words, would be a period to formulate strategy rather than a period to make moves?

MR. ROSTOW. Yes, and it would be a prolonged one in which you might formulate the strategic plan and then implement it.

MR. PADELFORD. This I think was done in one of the student sessions and was a very valuable thing.

MR. SCHELLING. This is exactly what I thought I asked for orally before the game began, in writing between Move 1 and Move 2, and what Max asked for in writing in Move 4 and we finally got in Move 4.

MR. POOL. You didn't give us time but gave us a real situation which was much more pressing and this memorandum which we knew you had asked for but couldn't be bothered with.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

MR. SCHELLING. I think the critical issue is how do you force it onto people who are under the temptation to get onto moves, and maybe the answer is you have got to separate the two procedures.

MR. GARTHOFF. Doesn't #11 fulfill this purpose? This was our first paper. It took longer to type. That's why it got #11.

MR. ROSTOW. For the least frustration in this period--it may or may not be important--I think you should provide for more time at the end for a return to an isolation of what the underlying issues of substance are that control the positions and this relevance for the people to think about.

It may be that the discussion we have had is sufficient for the staff to do this, but behind our position and I'm sure behind the Red team's position are a lot of things that ought to be set down fairly fully.

MR. MILLIKAN. One way of doing it mechanically would be to have an additional period in which each team would compose a piece of paper, which was in effect what you fellows have been saying this morning.

MR. MAURY. Would you wish to include in this an Intelligence appreciation of the other side's capability and intention?

MR. MILLIKAN. I think that would be very good.

MR. ROSTOW. One thing obviously crucial here is a

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

total military appreciation and because, if as in many crises each side has to face up to the possibility of a general war--I mean, brinkmanship is a real thing, whatever we think of the phrase--and a widened war, I think a much more general military appreciation perhaps should be given by Control, which I'd be perfectly willing to live with, because my judgment was that we were extraordinarily well served by our military advisors in all this. They took us through the terrain and logistics of that particular situation, but obviously the plays here involved, if you are going to involve yourself in brinkmanship problems, crossing frontiers and the like, involve the laying down of the law by Control, I think, rather than having extensive argument about what the world appreciation is, but this we felt is--we were thrown back on our own judgment here and our own judgment as to what the United States would do in a critical moment.

MR. HALPERIN. I was very impressed with the format of the final Russian move, in which they finally got to a very clear contingency paper. I wonder whether it might not be worth trying a game in which we limited the teams to just this sort of paper at each stage, a paper which allows them to make moves, which says, "If this happens, I'll send a telegram", eliminating completely the motion of actually drafting speeches, actually drafting telegrams, just limit it to this kind of contingency paper which allows the referees to jump as far ahead as they want without violating what the teams--

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet)

MR. GRIFFITH. The final Russian paper was not only sort of a general thing, but it had a lot of very specific moves in it. It was cast, however, in the form of an over-all decision of the regime.

MR. MILLIKAN. It did have the advantage. The other way of getting the same result, which is much more cumbersome mechanically, would be to have your specific moves accompanied by a paragraph where their strategic import was not crystal clear, saying we are doing this for the following reasons.

My only feeling is that Mort's suggestion is a mechanically more feasible one from this point of view, but it does mean losing something. There are times when the phraseology of the message is quite important to getting the full flavor of the move.

MR. CAMPBELL. I have one suggestion from the point of view of the role of Control.

It seemed to me that our team--I don't know whether it was true of the others also--was operating with a lack of information compared to what the situation would be in actuality, that in keeping all the things classified, game classified, so that we saw none of--we saw about three American documents up until the end--I think we had very much less idea of what was going on both on the American side and in the rest of the world than we would have had under the ordinary circumstances from Soviet diplomatic reports, intelligence, and all the rest of

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

it.

In that sense, we were working perhaps under a certain handicap in not having as much information as we really need, would have ordinarily to make the decisions that we had to make.

It seemed to me that this can be corrected simply by a greater flow of information from Control and by not keeping so close a hand on the other side's stuff, keeping it from us.

MR. MILLIKAN. I think there are two different issues here, if I can respond to this from Control. My colleagues can chip in.

I plead "Guilty" to half of this and not on the other half. I plead "Guilty" with respect to one point which somebody raised--I think it was Ray--about a feature of Soviet strategy and a lack in American strategy for which I think the umpires were responsible, and that was the reactions of third powers.

We were quite explicitly ourselves trying to concentrate our attention to the Iranian scene, and we perhaps underestimated the importance of the Soviet strategy to mobilize external influence on this thing, and so we didn't respond enough to this and didn't give you enough information. You would have had enormous amounts of information certainly on what was going on in world capitals, etc.

We did consider this, and the one thing, we considered this quite carefully, and I think Norman and Link would defend the final position we took, what would have actually happened in the

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

U.N., and there we spent quite a lot of time talking about the reactions of the rest of the world to the Soviet proposal and came to the general conclusion that the U.S. could scare enough of the members of the U.N., more than a third of the members of the U.N., with the implications of having bilateral pacts stuck on the horns of the U.N. resolution, so that we decided that, whereas you might conceivably get a majority, you wouldn't get the two-thirds you would need to get a resolution.

Therefore, I think we'd defend that position as being realistic. Nevertheless, I agree we didn't give enough information on what was happening around the world.

As far as information about what the other team was doing, my own feeling would be that this was fairly realistic. I may be wrong about this.

MR. GRIFFITH. An American team and a Soviet team--in real life, we would know much more about what they were doing than they would know about what we were doing, because they would get the New York Times and we wouldn't.

MR. PADELFORD. My feeling to Control in reprospect in the game, it would be very desirable in another game to have perhaps a somewhat larger control unit, some of which would be devoting time consistently to thinking of the reaction of foreign countries in the immediate neighborhood.

We on Control got it toward the end of the game, sort of a reaction to the American posture and activities in the

Political Exercise (US-South) Post Exercise Analysis

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder

Iranian scene. We tried to view it from the point of view of India and the Arab countries and the surrounding area, and that's why we reserved Nehru's stand on the mediation business and why we turned you down on the proposal of the right of self-defense being in a resolution of the General Assembly. We felt your behavior in Iran would have become so well known to the Asian powers that you would have found it very difficult.

It seems to me what would have been desirable would be either to have a third team, which in this case might have been an Asian team, since this was set in an Asian setting, that would be continually thinking about--now, what's going to be the reaction of the Asian powers and what should the Asian powers be feeding into the situation?

Also I think we on Control should have done considerably more than we did in bringing a British element into play in the situation, that the British would have been much more active in real life than they were here.

GENERAL HILL. Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry to break in. I have to leave in just a few minutes.

I counsel against formalizing your game too much and surrounding it with rules and that sort of thing.

Possibly the suggestion that was made over here as to a format for the responses of the player teams has merit and would help us, but don't stiffen the thing up too much with that sort of thing, because this brings in too many constraints on

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

free play, and this is a wonderful thing about this simulation that you have just completed.

As far as this critique is concerned, I believe where your time is limited, so that you know in all probability ahead of time that those who talk first are going to be almost the only speakers, it would be well to have the teams or the various groups meet beforehand, so that the leader of the group would have the consensus of all of these things, and I think you get a lot more out of the critique if you do something like that. Otherwise, you would have to devote a lot more time, much more time than I think you can afford, to let everybody talk.

MR. CLARK. One other comment: It seems to me there is a real relationship between Walt's point about the need of additional evaluation and Ithiel's point about the polarization of the sides, because this does happen in a game, you know. We get to thinking, to fit--to have an accommodative relationship here. It may be intensive here, because it happens that the Soviet team are Sovietologists who know more about the Soviet than our team, so we may not have a proper impression of the sensible interpretations of the Soviet policy, so maybe in the evaluation you may be able to design a situation in which, if Control would specify a list of key substantive issues, it might be able to break up into subcommittees, explicitly joint between the two teams, to prepare a discussion from the standpoint of view of _____ policy, of pros and cons of the treatment of a

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

particular issue, like how you treat the Shah or how the Soviets would react to the question of the line.

MR. MILLIKAN. I'm very puzzled. I think this question of how you make the final session most useful is a very important one.

I have a dilemma here. In one sense, the polarization which occurs during the game is one of its most valuable fruits, and this time around my concern was to bring out the polarization as much as possible, and, therefore, we explicitly did not provide a lot of opportunity for a lot of talk back and forth and a lot of consultation across teams before the evaluation session, because we didn't want to wash out the polarization.

I was a little afraid that if everybody got all their questions answered and got all their frictions out of their systems before this session, we wouldn't really ever find out what they were in any systematic way.

MR. CLARK. I didn't mean during the game.

MR. MILLIKAN. So there are two different ways of doing this. One is to simply follow what I took to be General Hill's suggestion, to have a polarization a little less individual and to have the teams get together and decide what they wanted to polarize around before the evaluation session, but they would still be separate as teams under those circumstances.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

The other is your suggestion, which goes in the other direction of trying to bust this up, and we'll have to give some thought to each of those.

GENERAL HILL. I'd like to express my great appreciation at being invited to participate in this function. I have been delighted all the way through, without admitting any euphoria.

MR. MILLIKAN. I'd like to say before you go, General Hill, and this applies to all three of the military advisors, from my standpoint, surveying the scene as a whole, your participation was really the most critical element in making this thing the success that we have had. It was the thing I was most worried about at the beginning, how we could get a game up to the brink of war without having ourselves too distracted by the military detail that we couldn't do anything else, and I think the performance of you three gentlemen was just magnificent in this thing, and I want to thank you very much for coming.

GENERAL HILL. My approach to this thing all the way through was that the winner or the successful contestant in the strategic area would be the one who was able to apply his force without becoming violent about it.

FROM THE FLOOR. A "general" observation.

MR. ROWAN. Reviewing the variety of games that have been played during the last several years, my impression is that

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (US-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

this did succeed. I have a fairly general acquaintance with the results of many of these games, and my impression is that this game did really succeed in turning up terribly important questions. Many of these, I know for a fact, just haven't been adequately recognized, and to be able to do this in three days with such remarkable efficiency is, well, quite an achievement.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let me ask a question: Three days with a half a day for critique. Would this group as a whole, if we can get a consensus, have been willing to come and go through this exercise if it had been, let's say, five days? I know for a fact there are some here who have told me in advance they wouldn't, and I ask the question because we are still impaled on the horns of a dilemma about getting people together and preparing a careful strategic estimate before the moves begin and then moving, leaving enough time for the move, and then having plenty of time for the critique.

Could we get some expressions on length?

MR. POOL. Not only do I think I would not have been willing; I think the game would have broken up somewhere along the middle just by reaching a point where people wouldn't have been properly involved, properly motivated any more.

MR. MILLIKAN. Would anybody question that it's more important to have a continuous group participating consistently from beginning to end than it would be to have more time with people dropping out or dribbling in?

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

MR. ROSTOW. One thing I just thought of, Max. The involvement of the key points is sufficient that you really could have a night session. You didn't work us as hard as we probably would have been willing to work, if it was just three days.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Is that a unanimous feeling, by the way?

FROM THE FLOOR. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Could the move periods have been shorter?

MR. MILLIKAN. One of the reasons I think you could have night sessions--I think with the kind of game we had before of continuous action, this wouldn't have been possible--one of the things I liked about this game was that the alternation was psychologically very valuable, that during your move periods you had to concentrate on what you were doing now and you couldn't really sit back and think, "Now, what about our longer term strategy and what about these contingencies?" This way you get your mind refreshed every two or three hours by a shift of pace, and I think with that shift of pace you can afford to carry it on longer. I think you could go through dinner and into the evening perfectly effectively without fatigue.

MR. ROSTOW. Probably not for three nights; maybe only for two nights, or something like that, but I couldn't give five days, and I expect a lot of people couldn't, but I think you

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

could pack more in.

MR. SCHELLING. Formalizing the game along the line Mort suggested, it seems to me it is possible to compress the whole game product down into position papers that outline alternative A, B1, B2.

One thing it's terribly important not to lose--Walt referred to the solemn declaration of the President, and they said they didn't hear that solemnity come through. I think this is a terribly important misunderstanding to make room for in a game of this sort, and you can't have the Americans say a President makes a persuasive President because-- [Laughter]

And it isn't enough to say the President takes a hard line on this or that. I think there has to be some amount of effort at direct communication just to see to what extent people like Rostow and Maury can read each other's writing and perceive what one side thought was so obvious it needn't be labored further.

MR. HALPERIN. I go along with that, but what you could cut out is communications to other people. There's no point in making long speeches to the Professor when he didn't exist, spending hours drafting telegrams and communications. It seems to me the things that are worth drafting are the things that would have been basic to the other team.

MR. MILLIKAN. The Control group was acting as a team in a sense. We were trying to be Mahmadi and see how we

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

would react to the American letter, and I think again there were some misunderstandings here that would have been missed if you hadn't had this wedge.

MR. CAMPBELL. There are certain periods, some times of considerable length, where the control group is bogged down in paper and we are waiting for them to produce the next lot of stuff. I think that these are the periods in which the individual teams should be making their strategy periods, and in the move periods they can go ahead and make their moves, so instead of saying, "What do we do now?" and just sit around drinking until they come to the beginning of the next period, this can enable you to do more in this three days probably than we did here.

MR. MILLIKAN. The Control team did a good deal of this. We used the move periods for speculation on what we would probably be confronted with the next time around.

We had this device, which we found exceedingly useful from the Control's point of view, of having observers skipping in and out. The umpires wouldn't have been able to proceed otherwise, until-- The only case where we didn't have our strategy mapped out before we got any of your papers was between 2, 3 and 4 moves. There we did have to give a lot of serious thought to what we were going to do next, but the other days, because we had these observers, we had a pretty good picture of what was going on.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

MR. SEWELL. I was going to say that having some tone content in these communications was important, and you brought out the Mahmadi case where, if we didn't have the tone of that note which was in it, which would have been lost if it had been abbreviated, we would not have been able to bring out an imagined reaction of Mahmadi, because it was the tone of it that the resistance was going to be crushed by the Americans.

MR. CLARK. In this particular--I don't know, there may be others, but this was an illustration of a thing in the tone that you got was not the tone that we intended.

MR. MILLIKAN. But that happens. That's part of one of the things you bring out in a game.

MR. CLARK. But the tone is influenced by the nature of the game itself. You're dashing out something in a very short time, not focusing on the tone, but focusing on the position paper. That's a pretty good idea.

MR. HALPERIN. I just had a small suggestion about techniques, which I'd like to bring out.

It's clear from the evaluation that one of the central features in the game was a misunderstanding, particularly on the American side, of what the Soviets were likely to do in a situation, and that also one of the failings from--I admit this is a biased point of view--that one of the failings of the technique was a lack of sufficient recognition of various contingencies on both sides.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (US-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

I wonder whether or not it might help if there were a man placed on each team whose explicit purpose was to think for the other side; that is, on the Soviet team there might be an American expert reporting to the presidium, whose job it would be to think through all the possible contingent American lines of action, and a similar man on the other side.

It seems to me this would be useful, because when the team gets wrapped up in its own problems, even though it's generally aware of what the other side is thinking about, it really becomes extraordinarily difficult to think the thing through in detail how the other team is going to act, because you get too involved in your own capabilities and your own interests in a situation.

MR. MAURY. Many things we sort of divided up. Did you have a Chris Herter? Did you have a C. D. Jackson and ~~Peale~~ people like that, to make a breakdown?

MR. ROSTOW. I suppose we operated more like the theory of N.S.C., the theory, let's say, of Truman, Marshall, ~~Leverett~~ Lovett, Harriman. Everyone worked on the total strategy. Then we passed out specialist jobs, but we didn't have one man speak for State, one for Defense. It was a general discussion and agreement on strategy.

MR. MILLIKAN. There's a difference in the structure of the teams, depending on whether you're playing what Link has called a realistic strategy or an optimal strategy.

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

If you're playing a realistic strategy, it's very important that you have appropriately represented the forces that could be impinging on strategy formation, but if you are playing an optimal strategy, you can play it different.

MR. McRAE. I think it's very important, something that Mr. Rostow mentioned, putting the question of how much information you can provide the two teams both from the daily press and from Intelligence sources, and to handle this problem I think it might be a good idea to have one person assigned to the Control team who really serves as an intelligence operator, and he scans all information coming through the both sides and prepares press releases and intelligence releases and in general controls the information flow between the two teams.

This might serve a very useful purpose in preparing the general background in what's happening throughout the world.

MR. MILLIKAN. In Control, what we actually did was usually the last thing somebody would say, "Well, shouldn't we say this?" "Can't we see whether any of these should be leaked?" Somebody would flip through. Somebody would say, "Maybe we ought to have a news release."

MR. HALPERIN. I think the way to make Control more efficient is to take seriously the difference between umpire and consultant, which wasn't done at all. The Control group operated as a unit.

It seems to me that if you keep the umpires separate

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box Folder

to make the decisions and actually use the consultants--and it may be somewhat frustrating to the consultants but more satisfactory to the game--as people to draft people for the umpires to consult with, the umpires might decide among themselves what they want to do about the Iranians and then go to the Iranian experts and say, "Here's what we want to do. Fix it up so it makes some sense and accomplishes the point."

When you try to make all these decisions in a group of nine or ten people, it will inevitably take a lot longer and you only get to the most obvious things.

MR. MILLIKAN. I'm of two minds about this, because there's so much interaction here. We toyed with this before we started in a control group and decided with a group that size we probably can manage the other way. If you make it a little bigger and particularly if you have more specialists, maybe you could follow your suggestion.

MR. UPTON. I thought it worked pretty well as it was in the control group. I thought the performance of the team was brilliant.

MR. MILLIKAN. Are there any last thoughts that anyone wants to pose? We're getting along towards lunch time.

If not, Link, do you have something to add?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes, just a word. Thank you very much, Max.

Incidently, a light lunch, I believe, is to be served.

Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326 Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

I have personally found, I and I'm sure others who have been playing with this gaming technique have found these criticisms and suggestions enormously valuable. It is a distillation that you couldn't get from reading endless documents and reports about other people's experiments. This has been extraordinarily useful from our standpoint.

I feel very much confirmed in my own conviction, which has been growing, that gaming can be invaluable in looking at just this kind of problem, the kind of problem that can be rigorously examined only perhaps by this technique, the kind of increasingly painful situation that the United States confronts where ambiguity, rather than clarity, characterizes the situation and where you have elements of popular revolution, xenophobia, treaty alliances, diplomacy, military strategy, indirect subversion and aggression all mixed together.

This is not a problem for specialists, it seems to me, unless they be somehow focused together, and I have become quite enthusiastic in this experience.

I don't know if any of you have any idea what was going on down in the engine room, down in the ~~valves~~ bowels of the ship, but I cannot let the group break up without saying a word about the staff and their heroic labors.

Roger Bull has done what I consider a superb job; Grant Sewell and Mort Halperin helping us on the control side; and certainly our three indefatigable girls, and I want to

NOTICE: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code).
THIS COPY IS FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP, OR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
No part may be sold, loaned, copied, or published without the express permission of the MIT Institute Archives.

MC 326
Box Folder
Political Exercise (U.S.-Soviet) Post Exercise Analysis 1958

thank all of you for being so very generous with your time and with really your energy perhaps even more than your time, which is what we drained you of, in a cause which at least is promising.

Now, in the immortal words of that great role player of our day, these proceedings are closed.

- - - - -