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pp.

PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION

for

DETEX II

Endicott House
8 February 1964

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POLITICAL EXERCISE
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for

DETEX II

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BARTON WHALEY, Deputy Game Director

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8 February 1964

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(4 p.m., Saturday, February 8, 1964.)

CHAIRMAN BLOOMFIELD. I have asked the staff to join us and listen in to the extent they want to.

I would just like to say, first of all, in case no one else says it, that I think we may have stumbled on a way towards a Central European settlement here, but apparently you have to start by launching a Polaris at Polunochnoe. The thing is: if it does not work out well in the end, we can always have another game.

(General laughter.)

CHAIRMAN BLOOMFIELD. So this, I think, will be our first recommendation.

The second thing I would like to say is that all of us who have run these games know how exhausting it can be, what an emotional drain, as well as an intellectual experience and drain; and we particularly appreciate how frustrating the game format is for people. Things just do not go the way one hopes they will. One's strategy tends to get loused up by either the other side or by Control. In a sense, it is easier to blame Control because you are used to fighting the other side. But you come out of it, I think, with the feeling that you have been fighting against two

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MC.2 Z4

opponents, which is a very difficult form of bargaining.

The third thing I would like to say before calling on the team chairmen is that I found this game very revealing in a number of ways. For one thing, this is the sixth exercise which I have had the pleasure of running for the Defense Department, for one part or another of the Defense Department, in the last two years; and it is the only one of the six that has come close to the brink. It is very difficult to get to the brink. It is also, I think, the only game where the Soviets have had some real troubles and where the Americans have not gotten it in the eye. This is interesting; we will have to find out why.

The last thing I want to say is that I think the teams performed -- and this applies to Control, too -- with an extraordinarily-high professionalism, which is obvious and to be expected, and performed with a great sense of responsibility, which is to be hoped for.

I apologize for the questionnaires just because it is an added burden that has been put on you. We like to think that at least some of them will

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advance the state of knowledge.

A final questionnaire which will give you a chance particularly to advise us on the method of gaming and other things that you may remember after you leave here will be handed out as you leave, and we implore you to return it to us as soon as possible.

I should have mentioned, parenthetically, something about Ambassador Yost, of the US mission to the UN. He was on our original list, but he is not here. Charlie Yost called me two nights ago to point out what everyone should have realized -- that they were having a spot of bother at the UN with Cyprus, Panama, nine or ten other things; and he said that it was the greatest accumulation of individual crises that they have had there, just in terms of workload, outside of a General Assembly period. He was very apologetic about his not being able to be here.

The agenda for the remaining hour and a half of this session or, if we want to go longer, until the bar opens, and then subsequently, is this: First of all, I have asked the two team chairmen and the Control Chairman to take about 15 minutes, with the help of their colleagues as necessary.

For the sake of efficiency in this maneuver

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here, I have asked the team chairmen, first of all, to report on the final move period about which no one really knows. This is where we get the report on what happened in Move Period E. But I have asked them to do this in a difficult way. That is to say, in the broader context of the game as a whole, with some references back to their initial strategies and their overview of the whole game and how it went.

Control, Ithiel Pool, will, at the end of a half an hour, say a little bit -- possibly defensively, but I hope not necessarily -- about how Control played its hands, which was a complex and interesting exercise itself.

I hope that in doing this for the next 45 minutes, you will focus retrospectively on how you arrived at these points in the last move on at least some of the crucial turning points and how your values and objectives of your team may have shifted during this unfolding of events.

If you remember to say how you think you came out vis-a-vis the other team, fine. If not, we will ask you how well you think you communicated your strategy and how well you think others understood you.

We will then proceed to a general, open, free-

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MC 2 Z4

for-all cross-examination on the basis of what has been put before us, with some specific questions -- mainly about implications of this game for policy.

We have some specific problems to raise, so why don't we start with the Soviet team, Marshall Shulman. If any of his colleagues want to reinforce or contradict Professor Shulman's views -- which seems to be plausible, as far as I have heard -- or liquidate or anything else they want to do to Marshall at this point, they may. We are all out of roles and we are all colleagues again in a search for effective American policies and strategies.

Marshall, why don't you take 15 minutes and tell us what happened in the last move period in this larger setting?

MR. SHULMAN. As this period opened, we were confronted with five major sets of problems that needed attention.

The first and most urgent from our point of view was the developing military situation around Berlin and Eastern Germany. The period opened with the report of US support to West Germany and its military intervention in East Germany and in Berlin.

The second problem or group of problems that

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we had was the continued deterioration of our control position in Eastern Europe.

The third one were our direct communications with the United States, mostly hot-line communications about the possible Vienna meeting and the note that had entered into those in which the United States was trying to bring pressure on us to withdraw from our military pacification in Eastern Europe.

The fourth was the upcoming General Assembly meeting scheduled for this evening in which we formulated our position.

And the fifth was some uncertainty about what the Chinese were up to -- the reports developing the Chinese gathering of forces on the mainland opposite Taiwan and our uncertainty as to what this portended.

Our response to these were based upon a determination that the maintenance of our position in Eastern Europe, in East Germany and Poland, was absolutely paramount; that we had to take whatever methods were required in order to maintain Soviet control in an area that we continued to regard as an area of vital primary interest to us.

As a consequence, we followed two lines of policy in regard to Eastern Europe. One was to

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construct our forces to use whatever measures were required to put down the disorders; and the other was a political pacification to seek for political elements that we could work with in these areas and install alternative governments.

Finally, toward the end of this period, in view of the communications between Gomulka and the West or the possible implication of Gomulka's being tempted by the obvious US play made for him, we resorted to assassination and his replacement by other forces which we hypothecated or built up around fear of German militarism and revanchist threat to Polish integrity.

In the meantime, in meeting the broad situation in connection with the general heightening of tension, we continued to make efforts to encourage particularly the British prime minister to take initiatives, in calling for peace conferences, and we engaged in other symbolic actions of this kind, indicating our peaceful intent and trying to evoke a response from the peaceloving forces within the Western world -- the Poles, the British, and other peaceful elements around the world.

In our communications with the United States we at first continued to emphasize our readiness for some

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MC.3 Z4

kind of high-level meeting; but towards the end of the period, we chose to communicate to the United States our very strong view that US intervention in Western Europe or US provocation of the West Germans to intervene in East Germany would be regarded by us very seriously and that we would respond with force. We wanted to make it as clear to them as we could that our response would be radical, if necessary.

In regard to the General Assembly, we sent instructions to our representative to work with the basic resolution that had been proposed, to accept those parts that we could, and to try for some essentially-procedural modifications in the others. That is to say, we accepted that part of the resolution that provided for further pressure for general and complete disarmament at the General Assembly.

We tried to deflect the call for a European action into some sort of an All-European conference for a neutral and independent Europe. We rejected, but by substitution, the proposal for any UN presence in Eastern Europe. We would have declined, in practice, to accept the definition of this as being a "disputed territory", and we would not have accepted any UN intervention.

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MC.2 Z4

In the meantime, we continued to stimulate as much as we could demonstrations and disturbances in other parts of the world, partly as a means of increasing pressure and distraction on the United States. We sought also to consolidate our position with our Cuban and Chinese friends -- who were pressing us for more militant action -- by raising the possibility of additional economic assistance and by trying to assure them that their point of view was being fully represented in what we were doing.

Now, the estimate of the United States that we had in this period was that if they behaved in a pattern which was consistent with their previous behavior, they would not intervene in Eastern Europe if they became convinced that it entailed the risk of general war; and we acted on that assumption throughout.

Now, this course of action, however, particularly in the latter phase of the game, began to produce strong divisions of opinion within the Soviet team. In the first part of the game, the first phase of the game, which involved the exploitation of the situation from the explosion at Polunochnoe, we felt that we had clearly successfully exploited that to weaken the US position and to bring out fissures

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MC 3 Z6

in NATO.

But as the second phase of the game unfolded, which brought troubles for us in Eastern Europe, and when we were in a somewhat defensive position, this produced these major divisions.

Now, the positions were grouped, really, under three headings.

One group began to urge, and urged increasingly as the game went on, for a disarming strike by our IRBM's against Western Europe on the grounds that our previous policy was becoming demonstrably bankrupt and that this would effectively establish our control or, if not establish our control of Western Europe, at least eliminate a US military power in Western Europe.

Those who argued for this point of view took two possible consequences into account. One, that the United States would not effectively respond to this; and the other is that they might respond with Minuteman. Those who advocated this position felt that they could handle the second contingency. They felt that in an exchange in which we would direct our strikes against US command centers and some major cities, that the net outcome would be relatively to our advantage. That was Position A.

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MC 2 Z6

Position B also argued that our previous policy had been shown to be bankrupt. It, however, started from the assumption that it was not only hopeless for us to try to restore control in Eastern Europe, but it was not even desirable for us to do so, and that the best thing for us to do at this point was to cut loose from our entanglement in Eastern Europe and, rather, build with China a consolidated base for later more effective advances, particularly in the underdeveloped countries. In other words, this group tended to accept these strategic outlooks that the Chinese have been arguing about as to where the future gains would be had.

The third position was essentially a projection of what we understand the Khrushchev outlook to be, and that sought to use a mixture of pressure and conciliation over a long-term political gain, but essentially avoiding a general war, and to try to exploit the situation against the United States as much as possible in all political ways -- to sound bellicose in the protection of our position in Eastern Europe. There was no doubt, in this position, that it would fight, if necessary, over the Western intervention in Eastern Europe; but it would at the

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MC.2 Z4

same time maintain as much as possible a general public attitude of being conciliatory and being peaceful and indicating an area of possible collaborative action with the United States in conciliation, provided vital Soviet interests were not impaired. That position remained dominant, but it was weakening internally and there was some doubt as to how much longer it would have been able to hold the dominant position in Soviet policy determination.

Now, particularly the last information we got just after we had broken up and after time had been declared, we received the last hot-line communication from the United States indicating that the United States was advancing down the Autobahn with force. I am not sure what the consequences of that news would have been if it had come during gametime for us. It might have affected the leadership situation if the game had continued beyond that point.

In working this out all together, one problem for us was that we were missing some critical political inputs that might have affected our strategy somewhat. For example, in the early phases of the game, we had relied fairly heavily on trying to evoke responsiveness from the British, the French, and others

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MC.2 Z4

to take the initiative in action that would have been essentially divisive from the NATO point of view; but we had no response coming back about this. It would have affected our game somewhat if we had known whether these efforts were successful and it also would have strengthened the hand of the group within the Presidium that was advocating this line of action.

Also, with relation to the disruptive actions that we sought to encourage in other parts of the world, we had no information back on how successful they were. That also would have affected our policy thinking. And then in a way, the unfolding of the situation in Eastern Europe would have depended somewhat on what else we had to work with in Eastern Europe, what other political forces there were there, whether they had moderate leadership or some alternatives -- Ulbricht, for instance, in East Germany to work with.

The handling of those situations would have depended on whether we were, in fact, faced with stark alternatives between complete disruption of our political position and having to regard only political preservation or whether there was anything more that could have been done in political action in those areas.

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I think at this point that it might be useful to encourage comment from other members of the team.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Do any other members of the Soviet team want to add to or detract from anything Marshall has said?

Colonel Posvar, Wes?

MR. POSVAR. Just as a footnote to this extreme militant position, I would like to say that I think that to an extent initially this was forced or induced because we recognized in the team that there was an inherent stability in a game situation, a conservatism in a committee situation, a lack of real emotions and fears and so on.

So we positived this extreme position first hypothetically but rather quickly. The events vindicated our position. I think that if we had had Move 6, why, the balloon would have gone up, so to speak.

But I do think that the critical question here is: Did escalation take place spontaneously in this game? I would have to doubt this a little bit. I think that maybe the trigger was forced.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Professor Kintner, Bill?

MR. KINTNER. I would just like to point out

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that in our view of the game, I believe the shift from what we considered to be an advantageous situation where we believed we had pinned upon the United States responsibility for the explosion and deterioration of the US position with our allies was somewhat changed artificially by Control because the developments in Eastern Germany did not seem, in the way it was presented to us, to arise naturally from the way the other situation was handled.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Alex Korol?

MR. KOROL. I would like to add a footnote: Position C was really accepted by the Presidium; but at the same time, we did not fail to mobilize all the necessary resources, and the troops were ready to move into Germany and Poland. That is quite aside from local forces. Therefore, Position C was accepted, but there was a provision for a change of situation.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Wes?

MR. POSVAR. I think an important question which we did not look into fully enough was the matter of risk calculus in the two contingencies that Marshall mentioned about possible US reaction, that is, whether or not they would or would not attack us on the basis of positive action against Western Europe. I think

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that the dominant element here was faith. I think that there was a large tendency to hope that the United States would not react or a tendency to believe that the United States would not react.

I do not think that we looked into the question of the expected value, let's say, of their reacting. When we said that there would be a relative advantage even if they did attack first, this was largely Marxist wishful thinking, and I suggest that this is the way it would really be.

I just cannot imagine people undergoing a risk-calculus or expected-value kind of decision in this type of situation.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's say that some of us found that particular message a very striking and revealing message.

I wonder if we should discipline ourselves to the point of getting the American position on the table now before we go any further. We can come back to all of these once they are out.

Max, would you give us the American position?

MR. MILLIKAN. I will be exceedingly brief. My colleagues may expand later if they want to.

First, as to the general strategic policies with

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which we concerned ourselves through the course of the game, at the beginning we put a very high priority after this accident on trying to keep the situation in bounds and trying to prevent the situation from escalating. We did this partly because we had genuine uncertainties as to what the sources of this explosion had been and partly because we thought there might be quick and emotional reactions that ought to be cooled off.

So our early moves were designed -- our withdrawal of forces back to the United States and so on, initially alerted -- were designed to keep the thing quiet.

As a second objective, we attempted to use this event to force an extension of inspection in a wide variety of directions.

Finally, of course, after Control threw in the events in Eastern Europe -- which were a surprise to us, as well as to the Russians -- this we regarded as a lollipop which we really had not deserved, --

(General laughter.)

MR. MILLIKAN. -- but one which we were very grateful for. And, of course, as we looked at the situation, as reported by Control, in the whole of

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the Eastern European situation, it seemed that there was a golden opportunity here to do something that we had never had any chance to do before: to put real heat on for the unification of Germany. We felt that this was an opportunity, you see, in the event -- as we rather expected would be the case -- that the Soviets did not buy this. Of course, we were not sure how they appraised the situation.

It was very interesting to learn from Marshall that there was at least one contingent that thought maybe the situation was bad enough so that they had to do something in the way of modifying their approaches to Eastern Europe.

This was what our tactic was based on: to attempt to get Germany unified.

We tried in a variety of ways to provide some reassurance to the Soviet Union that we were not using this situation to exploit to the maximum everything that was going on. We tried to confine our proposals to Western Europe and to indicate that there would be no crossing of the Oder-Neisse line either by the Federal Republic, FRG troops, or by our own.

Let me come back to what we did in the last period. These were the three big things that we were

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worrying about.

There was a minor theme which we worried about throughout, but it was really a fairly-minor one on the part of the United States. It appeared to be a major concern of the Soviet team. And that minor theme was the propaganda image that was being created by the Soviet activities around the world.

I think that it is safe to say that whereas we felt that this was, in the short term, disturbing and unfortunate, we felt that it was not a profoundly-important problem for the United States to concentrate its attention on reversing this propaganda image.

It is interesting that the Soviet team's expectations from Control and ours were exactly opposite. We thought Control was being quite unrealistically vigorous in producing widespread acceptance of the Soviet claims around the world. We did not think that our allies would, in fact, have believed that we had done this -- at least, without a little more evidence.

In the fact of all the evidence we supplied them about the nature of the control system and so on, we thought that Control was pushing this a little far in this direction from the standpoint of realism. This

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may have contributed a bit to our being relatively relaxed about this range of issues. We were relying on the inspection procedures and the proposed UN arrangements as ultimately producing a corrective to the Soviet propaganda campaign.

Therefore, our impulse throughout was not to worry too much, to have the President make a dignified statement as to the reasons why we were not convinced that we would do this, but to rely primarily on developing investigation to produce whatever evidence it might, which was the best way. There were a couple of problems here but I will not go into them now.

Control was obviously interested in raising problems in our communications with our submarines, and we had to deal with these problems. We did not feel that they were terribly serious, as posed by Control.

There was no point, I think it is fair to say, -- my colleagues may deny this -- but I think that there was no point at which we felt that our strategy was really seriously endangered by difficulties of Control with the fleet.

We felt throughout, of course, that part of our policy was to maintain a strategic posture which would

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permit deterrents, second-strike deterrents. And particularly after the German events, we felt that it was exceedingly important, and we sent out messages in the last period to our naval commander to maintain second-strike deployment and to hold the Polaris fleet on station.

We were a little concerned that the pressures for the kind of inspection that the Soviets were demanding, namely, simultaneous surfacing and returning to base of all our subs, might be difficult to resist, but we were fairly confident that in a reasonable discussion in the UN we could persuade the allies and the neutrals that an inspection device could be worked out which would be as effective, that is, the sequential rotation of subs. For the purposes that we were interested in, we felt that this would be as effective as simultaneous surfacing and returning to base. We felt that we could do this and that we could have an inspection system that would maintain our defensive posture.

Now, the big problem related to Eastern Germany and what to do about that. In the last move period we did a number of things about this. At the end of the preceding move period we had sent a message to Erhard

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MC.3 Z6

indicating that we would maintain the inviolability of the FRG and would provide logistic support if the West German army wished to move to the help of their East German brethren, but that we would not participate.

We got a communication from Erhard which said that he wanted US forces to lead a spearhead in the direction of -- where was it?

MR. BRENNAN. Leipzig.

MR. MILLIKAN. -- Leipzig with US air-ground forces involved. There was some difference of opinion in the US team as to how to react to this. We, too, had a militant group.

(General laughter.)

MR. MILLIKAN. Our Pentagon group, which normally is not, in fact, militant, in this case was.

(General laughter.)

MR. MILLIKAN. They wanted to pull out all the stops; whereas the State Department felt that this was really quite risky and that we should not do it.

Again, we were troubled with lack of information of a variety of kinds. We really did not feel that we sufficiently knew the military situation in which the Soviets found themselves. The argument for an aggressive posture was that the Soviets really were in

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deep trouble, as suggested by the evidences of defections from the Soviet forces; by the fact that they had uprisings all over Eastern Europe, especially Poland, that they were going to have to hold down; and that the 20 divisions that they had in East Germany might by now be dispersed and be grossly weakened.

Therefore, the militant group felt that it would not be an impossible task to take on in the absence of the intervention of nuclears -- and I will come to that in a minute. If it was a ground conflict, it was felt that it would not be impossible for us to try several different things at once.

These several different things were: the maintenance of access to Berlin by breaking the blockade of the Autobahn; the maintenance of the frontiers of the Federal Republic (of Germany) in the event of any incursion from Soviet troops in East Germany; and the launching of this spearhead.

The nonmilitant group won out in the end. They suggested that at least in this move period we should confine ourselves to things that were clearly and establishedly within our treaty report or within our rights under treaty obligations and to things that we had committed ourselves to doing over and over again;

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MC 3 Z4

and the maintenance of access to Berlin was one of these.

We all agreed that in view of the disorganization of Soviet forces, that we had no alternative but to push forward vigorously to break through on the Autobahn, and we sent our military commanders instructions to that effect.

We told Erhard that we would neither provide air support nor American ground troops for the spearhead, pointing out that a concentration on reinforcing Berlin at this time seemed to us to be the proper thing for us to do.

We sent a message, a hot-line message, to the Soviets, saying that we were proceeding down the Autobahn and repeating urgently the request that we had made that Soviet forces should be returned to their barracks in East Germany, stating that if this were to occur, that FRG troops would not attack -- we had cleared this with Erhard -- and that we would co-operate to protect Soviet troops in East Germany; but that if there was a massive Soviet attempt to put down this rebellion by forceful means, then we would have no alternative but to back the FRG.

I think that these are the main things that we

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actually did in this period.

I think it is useful to mention our contemplation of the problem of nuclear response. We took the view that we did not wish to initiate nuclear action, either tactical or strategic; and we felt that the military situation in Germany was such that in all probability -- and the Soviet position sufficiently weak -- that with reinforcements from the West, which we did initiate, in particular, and with the troops present there, that we could probably put on a fairly good showing in a conventional exchange in East Germany.

As the game closed, we were at the point of sending a precautionary message to the Soviet Union indicating that we would not initiate nuclear strikes, but that any nuclear strikes initiated by the Soviet Union would be replied to by strikes in kind and in similar quantity and force.

I think that that is essentially enough.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Do any other members of the US team want to add to what Max has said, or does anyone want to challenge what he has said?

MR. BRENNAN. That was largely to do with the last move period?

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. At the moment, yes, although general US strategy is also on the table. Do you want to comment on it, Don?

MR. BRENNAN. Well, --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Or add to it?

MR. BRENNAN. I had some remarks about some of the trends in the game as a whole but not specifically towards the last move period.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Why don't you go ahead, Don, because we are going to move on to the Control team and then to some specific policy issues rather than the game itself; so why don't we do this: Say what you want to about the strategy of the team.

MR. BRENNAN. Well, the thing that struck me most was the change in our outlook as the game progressed. I think that this was occasioned by two things. First, initially we were very defensive. At the time of the explosion at the opening of the game we were being just very defensive and very cautious and not looking for any sweeping objectives. We had hopes of achieving some increase in Soviet openness through further inspection methods, as Max indicated, but that was not really a strong hope and we were certainly not in any aggressive mood.

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As the game progressed and we became increasingly confident that it had not been a US weapon that was detonated at the Soviet test site, we became more confident of our own moral position, I suppose, and we became increasingly encouraged by the obvious degradation in the Soviet position in Eastern and Central Europe. So that between these two factors we became, well, you might almost say, pushy---

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. A good word.

MR. BRENNAN. -- toward the end of the game and were looking toward major objectives, such as: reunification of Germany and loosening the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe. There was quite a dramatic change in our objectives and outlooks and attitudes throughout the course of the game.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Are there any other comments directly bearing on the US team and the way it played its hand?

(No response.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. If not, just to complete the picture, we will give the Chairman of Control his day in court. He may need the help of some of his colleagues on Control; but having sat in with him

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MC.2 Z4

quite a lot, I take my hat off to him just as I do to the other chairmen. It was a trying and difficult task.

Ithiel, why don't you take a little less (time) because we do not need you to describe the last move, but, rather, an overview of the world as Control saw it and manipulated it.

MR. POOL. All right. I think that I ought to say first a little more than has been said up to now about the main functions of the game as it was planned and not fully revealed to the players.

The objective was to explore the problem of communication with the Polaris deterrent system. You were quite right in suspecting that Control was actively interested in this problem more so than would normally be the case. Therefore, the game had to be set up in such a way as to create problems that might lead the American Government to wish to communicate short of the circumstance of all-out war.

Obviously, the main communication problems with the Polaris system are its second-strike problems. Once there has been a first strike, then the Polaris becomes the main residual force, and that is when the real communications problems arise; but that is not what we were exploring here.

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What we were exploring here was: Are there any circumstances under which communications with Polaris in a situation short of war would be really significant? All right. So we pressed the scenario in those directions.

Our first effort was to creat a situation in which the American Government might want to confirm what the subs have been doing, confirm -- as you did want -- whether one had shot. That was the first communication situation.

Then it moved on to a situation where there was the problem of first withdrawing and then putting them back on station -- a series of contradictory orders. We did not know whether you would surface them or not, but we created a situation where that at least might be under consideration, where withdrawal might be under consideration. As soon as you would start withdrawing them, we wanted to change the orders around and get them back out again.

The third set of communication circumstances that we pressed had to do with the question of whether the system was functioning, and so we created somewhat artificially a situation where some had been sunk and rumors and evidences were going around that a lot more

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might be currently being sunk, so that there might be some question as to whether the system was functioning. All right.

That was the main framework of the scenario. In order to make it work, we had to maintain a situation of high crisis. It did not matter so much from the point of view of the Polaris problem what the crisis was, but it needed to be in a Soviet-American confrontation since the Polaris is, of course, a deterrent system rather than a limited-war system. The East European situation produced a Soviet-American confrontation of fairly-massive proportions, as it was intended to do.

I concede that the turn of events in Eastern Europe were somewhat artificial.

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. When we decided to have a confrontation arising from Eastern Europe, we decided that a second objective might be interesting. In a number of games that I have seen, there has been a tendency to replay Hungary and Poland. We know how those events came out.

It occurred to us that it might be interesting to ask: What would the Soviet team do if things

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really went badly for them?

Instead of letting the thing end up the way Hungary and Poland ended up, -- there is always a tendency to repeat history -- we just thought that we would throw it all against the Soviet team and see how they would behave under those circumstances. So the Soviet team has a gripe.

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. Now, so much for the scenario, the way the game was set up.

Let me react to a few of the comments that were made just now and to the way in which the very interesting play of the two teams looked to us at Control where we saw both simultaneously.

I am intrigued to hear about the things on which you expected communications from us and did not get them, and there are a number of them. Apparently, the Soviet team felt that in creating a situation with three factions, that they were giving Control an opportunity to choose which faction was going to be on top and thus to direct the game. That never occurred to us.

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. We did not get that communication from you. We thought that you were the Soviet team,

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and we were very reluctant to take any move that would pre-empt your right to decide what was happening in the Soviet Union, just as we felt the same way about the American team. We felt that the only things we really wanted to manipulate were the rest of the world, and then let you react.

Conversely, you felt that we were not giving you information on a number of things -- on the British and French responses. We did not realize that we were not giving you this information.

The British and French -- as Max noted in his comment, but we felt that the American team did not fully note -- were basically convinced that it was probably a Polaris strike and were very alienated, needless to say, from the American position at that point; but as we thought we were communicating, they came back into camp to a very considerable extent, to the degree that the Eastern European situation developed. In other words, we had to go siding very strongly with the Americans, or at least we thought we did.

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. And the British, wishy-washy. But, in short, we did not realize that we were not

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communicating on it. The same is true on the disruptive actions elsewhere which we permitted to take place but did not feel would get anywhere seriously and we did not let it. We did not produce anything very seriously.

Thirdly, you felt you needed more information on the alternatives in Eastern Europe -- where were the groups on which you could count. We thought that we had communicated that there were not any, and that you were faced with the stark alternatives of defeat or Soviet action. That is the way we intended it to be played. Perhaps we did not make that clear enough.

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. We shot, we killed Sheisskopf, but that apparently was not enough.

MR. BRENNAN. What I want to know is: Who invented Sheisskopf?

MR. POOL. The American team also felt that it did not have all the information that it needed, and I think in this case completely justifiably. Perhaps if we had planned the game more in detail in advance, we would have come in with better hardware calculations. We just did not have them; that is quite true.

(Mr. Millikan nodded.)

MR. POOL. The other thing that always happens

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MC 2 [illegible]

in games and, I suspect, in real life is euphoria on the part of each team which thinks it is winning, and this was very conspicuous here.

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. The American team started out with the assumption that the whole Soviet position on the Polunochnoe explosion was really propaganda, and that they were really faced only with a propaganda problem. We intended to play it that really most people in the world took it for granted that this was a Polaris attack and that you really had the problem of a complete disintegration of NATO under this situation.

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. That changed slowly in the course of the game, but the American team did not seem to want to accept this.

(General laughter.)

MR. SHULMAN. That is possible.

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. And the notion that when things blew up in Eastern Europe this was considered a lollipop, well, it was a lollipop in a way but it was a lollipop which got us closer to nuclear war than any previous game has.

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On the Soviet --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. We have closed the lollipop gap.

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. Yes. On the Soviet side, likewise. Although we did really throw things against you, we had the impression that there was this rather strong euphoria at the beginning that things were going the Soviet way. Later on when they were not, as Linc said, we found striking the conclusion on the Soviet part that despite the enormous nuclear disadvantage which we assumed existed and which the Soviet team assumed existed, the imbalance between the two sides -- given that you are able to evacuate the cities and taking into consideration the possibility of strike and so on, the situation such as you could really calculate on -- that you would come out of this with a moderate advantage and that your losses in a nuclear strike would not be decisive. We found that conclusion striking.

MR. SHULMAN. That was not an all-team feeling.

MR. POOL. Yes.

MR. POSVAR. And the basic assumption was that the US would not respond.

MR. POOL. To a nuclear strike.

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MR. KINTNER. A localized strike against Western Europe.

MR. POSVAR. A sanitized, localized nuclear attack.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Do other members of Control want to add to that before we throw the floor open?

(No response.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I will add just one thing as someone who watched Control during much of the game: the question that may be crucial to the whole game before we come to what may have been learned that is relevant to certain policy problems, but as far as the game is concerned, the question that might well be crucial, I suppose, is: How plausible is it that a chain reaction would develop -- in this case, in Eastern Europe; possibly somewhere else -- from an unauthorized or unexpected or sudden nuclear explosion that was ambiguous? What would be the effect of an ambiguous nuclear explosion?

This is something that arms controllers have speculated on for several years. Is it plausible that it would loosen up things sufficiently here and there, worry people, seem to open up opportunities to people, so that what Control postulated in Eastern Europe was

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a reasonable chain-reaction development?

In this connection, the hot line, which did not exist in any previous games that we have put on because it is very new, I think it would be very interesting to know more about what the influence of direct ready communication between the two sides was in the interplay, either escalating or de-escalating, of a crisis like this.

In defense of Control, I think they faithfully followed to some extent, anyway, --

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. -- my own injunction that they be quite permissive. In fact, out of this, I got the nickname: The Permissive Line.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. But that is neither here nor there.

The floor is open for a little while, gentlemen, now that we have these three sets of perceptions and strategies, before I have to blow the whistle and turn to some precise policy implications. Everyone should feel that he has a chance to attack or counterattack or question --

Walt Clemens?

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MR. CLEMENS. I would like to comment on something that you just brought up. I would like to ask the reaction of the rest of the group. Sitting with Control, my impression was that the hot line was used pretty much like any other means of diplomatic communication. In fact, both sides seemed to indulge in just as much nasty name-calling, just as much threats, just as much stratagems designed in some cases even to mislead, as they would with any other means of communication.

There was none of the sort of sincere heart-to-heart talk that one might have hoped for between the heads of the two governments. I think that it would be very interesting to find out whether this is the way that the hot line will, in fact, be used in the future.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Before I call on those who put their hands up, it looks as though Max wants to respond to that.

MR. MILLIKAN. I just want to say that our image of what we were doing is very different from yours, Walter.

(General laughter.)

MR. MILLIKAN. We felt that the Soviets were using language that was typical propaganda language;

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but we thought that we were being quite stripped of that, for the most part, and that we were making propositions that we meant them to listen to. We felt that we were not making a big propaganda pitch.

MR. GUETZKOW. In that type of case, the Soviets would not have the "face" problem.

MR. MILLIKAN. It is true that we used this just as another means of communication in several of the cases. The early hot-line communications, indeed, were identical with things which we subsequently broadcast because we did not see that there was anything in that particular communication -- which is really what we wanted to say -- that needed to be private. But we did subsequently make private proposals.

MR. CLEMENS. I agree that the US use of it was much more restrained, but then US communications are generally much more restrained and much less propagandistic than Soviet communications.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Commander Wertheim?

MR. WERTHEIM. I would like to make the comment that I do not think you should draw too many sweeping conclusions as to the way it was used in this game because in real life the hot line has a tremendous advantage over any other means of communication as far

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as speed of delivery is concerned, whereas in this game I did not see any difference. We did not get communications from the other side generally until the next move period, anyway, whether it was hot-line or not, with one or two rare exceptions.

MR. MILLIKAN. Yes, I think that it is worth adding here that part of the problem was that the difference between hot-line and other communications was not well simulated in the game procedure.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is important.

MR. WERTHEIM. You might have seen a difference if there had been a direct connection between our two gamerooms so that when you sent a hot-line message, it arrived promptly.

MR. KOROL. Or a teletype.

MR. HENZE. Or a pair of teletype machines.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I made a request for that in our new building but got turned down.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Just for my own information, didn't the hot-line messages arrive during the same move period, whereas other messages did not arrive during the same move periods?

MR. WERTHEIM. No.

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MR. HENZE. No.

MR. KOROL. No.

MR. BRENNAN. No.

MR. MILLIKAN. There were a few that did.

MR. BRENNAN. There were not many hot-line messages that did.

MR. WHALEY. Some hot-line messages in this game were issued right at the end of the move period, and the Chairman of Control deliberately sat on them because although he could have forwarded them, you were already ready to come down for your final debriefing.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think that this is worth pinning down because -- in no defensive spirit at all -- I personally chased some of these hot-line messages, particularly the first few, and I would be willing to put a little bit of money down that the ones that came in during the move period when the other team could respond were delivered by hand at once.

Right!

I think at least a quarter of them, if not a third, came in within two or three minutes before the end of the move period, and we had to be absolutely rigid about that; so they were delivered at the beginning of the next move period. But a pair of teletype machines would be a little bit better.

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Alex Korol?

MR. KOROL. What I have to say is not apropos of that question. I have a minor technical question relative to the initial response to the message that we received at the beginning of the game. In a way, it was a crucial one.

In the Soviet team the question of the origin of the explosion soon became secondary. Immediately the opportunity was grasped to reduce the international position of the United States. Nevertheless, the Soviets investigated it and it was our team that privately informed the Presidium that it was an accident.

Now, in the original interpretation, first we debated. You know, we listed the probabilities as to what could have happened. One of our signals was that B-52's were dispatched. Why were they sent? In response to what signal? That was not clear in the specifications of the scenario.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I will answer that, and I said something about it at the beginning of the game. We wrote into the scenario, rightly or wrongly but on some pretty good advice, that certain precautionary alerts had been executed during the night by the National

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Military Command Center by watch officers and up the line on hot phones with the US nets on receipt of hard intelligence about a fairly-massive nuclear explosion.

MR. KOROL. Oh.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All that this took the form of were preliminary alerts. We may have gone too far in launching some B-52's toward the line of positive control or toward the bomb line with orders to turn around when they reached that point, although this is not an uncommon, unknown procedure.

You may have had the impression that all available planes were launched, which was not the intention. The intention was to indicate that the airborne already was significantly increased and that certain B-52 squadrons were launched simply to the bomb line. This can be challenged.

As far as the other question is concerned, of what the explosion really was, --

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. -- this is really fascinating because that was the first question that Control asked the management when the game started: "Who did this?" We told them that we had not decided yet because we

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wanted that choice to be available as an option to Control in optimizing the value of the game.

I think, though, that it was Control that sent you a message about ground zero. The CEP was zero. This, I think, came from Control.

MR. HENZE. Yes.

MR. KOROL. Control sent an inspection team to the Presidium, and then the Chairman asked Control to tell us what the inspection team found.

MR. KINTNER. I would like to ask Ithiel a question. I gather that what you tried to do towards the end was get us into a bind where we would essentially have to abandon our position in Eastern Europe or take drastic action. Yet your inference was that it would be unwise for us to take drastic action because you question the type of possibilities that we had in launching a strike against Western Europe without hitting the United States, placing the United States in a great dilemma as to whether it is going to really face the implication of general nuclear war.

We thought from an over-all point of view that that may have been the most interesting question. Yet you somehow imply that we did not really have a

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realistic option, that we essentially had to abandon our dream of 45 years of expansion at that moment.

MR. POOL. No, --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Ithiel, do you want to comment?

MR. POOL. No, I did not mean to say that you did not have a realistic option. What I was saying was that both sides seemed to take a very optimistic view of what they could accomplish by their various alternative strategies. It seems to me that the fact of overwhelming predominance of US nuclear forces, at least the major faction in the Soviet team saw this as a realistic option that would be to their advantage, and they adopted this tendency to look to the rosy side.

MR. KINTNER. We were not rosy at all. You placed us in a very disadvantageous position.

MR. POSVAR. The essential difference here was that you had lowered the value of peace among our alternatives so drastically, at least for this minority group, that we felt that we were obliged to take this course of action.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Cathy?

MISS McARDLE. Can I just ask a question to get your point of view?

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What was going to be the character of the attack against Western Europe? You said that it was going to be a sanitized nuclear attack. Would it have been an interdiction attack or would it have been a countervalue attack or counterforce attack?

MR. KINTNER. It would have been a discriminating attack against the command posts, nuclear stockpile, some of the soft airfields, and perhaps the missile bases, about 90 targets altogether, with discriminating warheads and relatively-small collateral value. Numerous studies were worked out on this.

MR. HENZE. In line with what Bill (Kintner) just said, I think Control could have forced the Soviet team to come to a conclusion much faster if Control had to some extent chosen between factions. We just -- as the American team -- could not quite believe that NATO was falling apart; we could not believe that Eastern Europe was falling apart.

We kept arguing about whether we had enough information to indicate that Poland was really lost, that Czechoslovakia was really in an uproar. If Control had given us information that indicated that our situation in Europe was essentially hopeless, then

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we would have made a decision as to whether or not we should engage in nuclear action or a full withdrawal.

MR. POOL. No conventional action?

MR. HENZE. Well, I suppose that that would have been a third alternative. I think that we felt -- I am not sure if we were clear on this -- I think we were arguing on this near the end. We felt that we probably would have been faced with a situation wherein it would be very difficult to move large bodies of conventional forces into Eastern Europe, but I am not sure. We had to fly them into Berlin because we decided that we could not move them through Poland.

MR. KINTNER. You were having our men desert all over the place, too.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. One problem --

MR. POOL. I wish it were that easy.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. One problem of this is that Control plays God, but we have never had a Marxist God in Control. We will try that next time, Bill (Kintner), and it might be that their prevision of history might well shape the way they play their hand.

Don Brennan?

MR. BRENNAN. With relation to the Soviet position that they could conceivably have found a

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disarming strike against Western Europe useful, I would like to say that a strike to me is one of the most surprising things that can occur. Certainly as of 1963-1964, any such strategic attack, even confined to so-called sanitary targets in Europe, would be an unqualified disaster for the Soviet Union, and I should be surprised that it would be much different in 1967 either in a real situation or in a game situation. Certainly speaking as a very pushy Secretary of Defense, --

(General laughter.)

MR. BRENNAN. -- I can assure my Soviet friends and colleagues that you would have, so far as it would have been up to me to determine the American response, you would have found it very disadvantageous.

MR. KINTNER. It would be very disastrous if you had come back immediately. But if you had debated the situation perhaps long enough for us to launch an attack against your command centers in the United States, with our cities evacuated, with your soft aircraft knocked out, we might have had a chance. That is all that we were saying. We had less chance to lose everything that we had fought for.

MR. BRENNAN. You might be interested to know

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MC 3 20

that we came very close to adopting a fail-dangerous firing doctrine for the submarines, in view of the difficulty that we were having communicating with them.

MR. POOL. Is that in a written record?

MR. WYLE. No.

MR. POOL. It would be helpful to have a note on that.

MR. BRENNA. It is here (pointing to shorthand notes of stenotype reporter).

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I will give you the floor, Dave, and then we will narrow this down further. Dave Schwartz?

MR. SCHWARTZ. I just wanted to note that a very interesting mesh of attitudes lay back of this tripartite split on what to do here. I wondered if the members of the Soviet team would like to comment on that. I thought that the crucial factor was not so much the differential perception of threat. I think at this point that there was a widespread expression. Everybody felt threatened. One expression was futility. Those who wanted to adopt certain policies felt that it was quite futile to attempt any pacification of Eastern Europe.

The other thing which was not mentioned in standard literature on a simulation was action

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orientation. The notion that we have got to do something: "The team has got to do something, damn it, so we will pre-empt or we will do this", as opposed to a couple of other members of the team who, I think, were less action-orientated and did not feel that they had to bite the bullet at this time. They wanted to sit back and watch the march. "World history is on our side, anyway."

So I think that this might be a subject for future research. I would like to have any teammates comment.

MR. KOROL. That was the Leninist position.

MR. HENZE. We argued which was the true Leninist position.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Now, gentlemen, the clock is moving. Don Brennan has led us right into the area that I would like to see us spend time on, which is the notion of surprises, new insights, if any, that were developed, that are relevant and useful to American policy planners and policymakers and students of foreign policy.

I do not say, "new knowledge", because I do not think that any of us believes -- I think I am quoting you, Ithiel -- that the game generates new knowledge,

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but it certainly can generate some new ways of viewing one's knowledge.

Don mentioned his surprise. I think half a dozen categories would be interesting to address ourselves to. Others may have other notions.

One category is our primary research interest as to what we may have learned about the Presidential relationship with the Polaris system. That is, what must he get from that system under the circumstances we postulated, if anything?

In the Sino-Soviet alliance I find some interesting things emerging. Also interesting are alliance relationships in general under conditions of acute strain and pressure.

Another category is the possible behavior of both sides in a crunch, including this almost irresistible pressure for entente as you go along.

Finally, a category that I mentioned before was the catalytic effect politically of an ambiguous or frightening or sudden nuclear explosion in this kind of atmosphere.

Let us now address ourselves to the surprises or new knowledge or new insights that may have emerged here.

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Don?

MR. BRENNAN. I would just like to clarify briefly the surprise that I just spoke of. That was a surprise of this session and not a surprise of the game. Speaking for myself, I scarcely give the possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack a second thought.

We discussed once or twice the question of whether or not we wished to say something to the Soviets about the possibility of a nuclear attack, and dismissed it as not being a likely, immediate problem. I thought that a later Soviet communication about Soviet IRBM's was just talk.

MR. HENZE. Addressing myself to the catalytic effect of this, in a sense I found the outcome of the game extremely encouraging from an American policy viewpoint because it would appear to indicate that if we (the US) want to be pushy, we can gain a lot; but at the same time, it seems to me that the game, as a test of what might happen if you have an odd development such as an unclear nuclear explosion, was not really a very effective test of this problem because, really, it took Control to throw in the rather far-reaching exploitation of this development.

The American team was disinclined to use it to

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press for very much. It was only when trouble in Eastern Europe generated spontaneously or as a result of Control, --

(General laughter.)

MR. POOL. Same thing.

MR. HENZE. -- that both sides then began to face this issue, and that the political problems of the game, so to speak, escalated. In terms of our own East European policy at that time and in looking back over the past ten years, the lesson for the United States would appear to be, "If there is going to be any trouble in Eastern Europe, let's have it in several places at the same time because under those circumstances maybe we can get the Soviets sufficiently tied up so that they cannot deal with them; but if they only have Poland or Hungary to consider, the chances are that they can deal with it, and we will be sufficiently cautious meanwhile that they can get away with it."

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill Kintner?

MR. KINTNER. I thought that the US position that its case was unassailable after it found from the debris of the atmosphere that it was definitely a local experiment or a local accident was something that we take too much for granted because, of course, the one

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reason we sank the submarines was to destroy part of their case.

After we conducted our own investigation, orders were given to go in and clear out the evidence, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Eisenhower and his team were to come over there. I think that no matter what would have happened, the waters of public world opinion would have been pretty well muddied and the US case of unimpeachable control of its forces would have been slightly tarnished. I do not think that the US team accepted that point of view.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Fred Wyle?

MR. WYLE. I do not think that it was so much that we did not accept that there would be a lot of muddying on the waters. It was that we had big fish to fry and we were affecting the margin that we could affect because we just assumed that those people who were amenable to rational persuasion by objective evidence would be persuaded when we could make our case. Many of the others would react on grounds that we could not too much affect by propaganda or exposure; and while that was a good thing to do when we delegated our information people to spread it around, we felt that we should not take the time of the top leadership to

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MC 3 26

discuss this at great length and worry about how we would maximize essentially our publicity on the issue.

But we did not expect that everybody would then accept it. We thought that some proportion never is going to believe it, anyway, or worry about it.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Don?

MR. MILLIKAN. That is right.

MR. BRENNAN. If I understood you correctly, you were saying that if the environment were real, it would have been different. I would like to add that if the environment were real, it would be different in a different way.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Max, did you start to comment on that?

MR. MILLIKAN. No.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Walt Clemens?

MR. CLEMENS. I would like to go back to something that Mr. Henze said. I think you rightfully pointed out that if there were trouble in a number of satellites at the same time, that it would tie the Russians up much more seriously than if there were trouble in only one or two satellites. This, of course, creates lots of opportunities for the United States.

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By the same token, I think that it creates significant dangers, as we have seen today. It creates a situation in which the Russians are liable to become much more desperate. It might give the upper hand to the Russians, who are particularly desperate.

This brings me to a major impression about the whole game today, and that is that the Kremlin and Washington were both obviously very concerned about keeping this thing from escalating very far. Yet they were also rather convinced that their opposite numbers wanted to prevent escalation. Assuming that their opposite numbers would not deal in steps that would contribute to escalation, they were both rather willing to do big things in Eastern Europe. The United States was willing to march down the Autobahn, assuming that that the Russians would not fight a major war just because of East Germany. The Soviets assumed that the United States would not fight a major war over Eastern Europe. I think that this is a rather dangerous situation.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. It is too bad that we did not have Move Periods VI, VII, and VIII.

Cathy McArdle?

MISS McARDLE. I wanted to go back to a previous

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topic just to restate something that Dr. Millikan and also Dr. Brennan said, and this had to do with the desire of the US President to communicate through Polaris. As Dr. Millikan pointed out* in his remarks, I think that the thing which struck me about the behavior of the US team was that at no point did we feel that the need to communicate was not greater than the need to protect the strategic capability. In other words, we were willing, in almost any situation that Control could throw at us, to communicate, given our other structure, that is, that the possibilities of detection -- while considered -- were not of such significance that they outweighed the need to communicate.

*On p. 21 above.

MR. WERTHEIM. By "communicating", do you mean: submarine to the US and back, or one way?

MISS McARDLE. Both ways.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Fred Wyle?

MR. WYLE. This is to underline what was said.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

MR. WYLE. In line with what Cathy said, there seemed to be an assumption by Control which kept cropping up that we were very much more concerned with preserving the invulnerability of the Polaris submarine than we, in

Wow! ✓

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fact, were concerned.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think they felt that you should be.

(General laughter.)

MR. WYLE. The reason we were not very concerned in every situation that they tried to raise this question was because we did have the Minuteman. We felt fairly confident that no large proportion of those would have been knocked out. We did have aircraft alerts and so on.

We did not think it too credible that, given those forces, the Soviets would regard the loss of the two Polaris submarines as substantially impairing our second-strike capability.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Ithiel?

MR. POOL. What I was going to say is not on the floor.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Wes?

MR. POSVAR. This is not relevant to anything in particular, but I would like to make my annual skeptical statement about making judgments about policy in general based on the game. I think that the game is very wonderful and useful, but I think that we must limit our deductions from the game to the scope,

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MC.2 Z4

perhaps, of raising new questions, identifying issues for study, and so on.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. POSVAR. And certainly not to generalize into a real crisis situation.

MR. GUETZKOW. I was intrigued that we did not go into longer-range policy development as this crisis was going on. We worried about the scenario's comments with respect to the new technologies that were about to break through in terms of antisubmarine warfare and so forth. We worried about trying to get inspection. We got it, that is, they allowed Eisenhower to go, but we did not exploit that. We could not see how to exploit that in terms of future possibilities for inspection.

At every corner we seemed to be always shoved into the short-range kind of things rather than the long-range kind of things.

MR. WYLE. That is very realistic.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. One thing that struck some of us was the realism of games in general, and perhaps in this game more than others, in the way in which the Soviet team or the Soviet people, who put themselves in the frame of mind of Marxist-Leninist, structured

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their future and their strategy. However badly things were going, they always had a new structure for you that fit within Marxism-Leninism, while the American inclination was not to be confined to some fixed vision of where they were going but to take it step by step. This seemed very striking and very reminiscent, I must say.

Alex Korol?

MR. KOROL. This is somewhat apropos of that: Am I correct that from the very outset the first concern of the American team was to find out the truth?

MR. POOL. Yes.

MR. KOROL. Whereas I think there was not even one dissenting voice. They surely were interested. But the point was: What to make of it? How best to utilize it?

(General laughter.)

MR. HENZE. I think it was half an hour or three-quarters of an hour, as I recall, in the first meeting of the Soviet team before we even mentioned China, and then it suddenly struck us that we really ought to think about China and perhaps take it into account.

I think China was a problem for us throughout

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MC 2 Z6

the whole game; and toward the end, I think we felt that perhaps it would have been even handy to have a Chinese team down the hall because we never quite fit that into our scheme of thinking and planning.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. This raises a question of gamesmanship that was raised before. There are three ways in which you can hear from an authentic German voice in this kind of problem to find out if there is going to be a chain reaction in Eastern Europe.

One is in the real world if the Germans do something.

Another is in a game. We might have had a West German team, an East German team, with factions -- a Polish team, a Polish hard-line and soft-line group, and so on -- and had precisely the same problem. In fact, I am tempted to see if we cannot take the same problem and run it but with more playing teams.

The third way is simply to have Control play with modified resources, that is, the same inputs that those teams might otherwise have. I do not think that it has been proven that a playing team would have done something differently or similarly or what would happen in real life.

MR. HENZE. Could I ask whether the American

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team felt any gap of this sort with respect to any of their allies?

MR. MILLIKAN. We basically never felt those pressures. Every time we cross-questioned our allies, we got reasonably-reassuring responses.

(General laughter.)

MR.MILLIKAN. Not on their attitude toward the explosion. We did not do anything about that. But whenever we wanted to do anything in Germany, De Gaulle would say, "Dandy", and the British would say, "Fine, go ahead." We never felt under any restraint.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Marshall?

MR. SHULMAN. One place where this possibly becomes relevant is in the conflict of different points of view in the Soviet leadership. You see, one wing which happened to be the dominant one here is following a policy which relies rather heavily on political interreactions. The fact that we did not put much into those weakened their position, as it might not have done in a game situation where there was more input, more responsiveness to the day-to-day efforts of the British and so on.

Now, that possibly affects your consideration on another game situation in which you have a richer

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input of that kind. You see, that would affect, I think, Soviet leadership.

MR. WYLE. Also, on the American side, some of the euphoria might have been dampened down if we had British and French inputs. That would have made us more cautionary.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Right.

One other area which no one has mentioned but which has special interest for me or partial interest for me is the emergence of the United Nations as a possible way out for both parties here. I thought that it was particularly interesting because the relevance of the United Nations to this sort of direct confrontation of the Soviets and Americans in Germany particularly is a role for which the United Nations is usually completely discounted.

Wes, this has happened in several games now with people who went into the game with no thought that the United Nations would become in any way relevant to the American role in Germany and an explosion there. I am a little moved by some conclusions that are beginning to form in my mind on this. In fact, I won some money from Bob Amory on this point.

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MR. POSVAR. In connection with this point on the number of players, I would like to compare this with the games last year when we had four (players), I think, on each occasion. Admittedly there is a little degradation of realism in a situation like this, but not nearly as much as we would have expected. I think almost as much pressure and confusion was existent for each team in this situation as there would have been if there had been three or four more players.

I suggest that it is always possible to elaborate Control even more in this respect, and I do think that this kind of a game today is more efficient for getting the job done in two days, let's say, than the game was last year for getting an equivalent job done in three.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Marshall, go ahead.

MR. SHULMAN. I have been brooding about the interplay of different points of view in the Soviet delegation. Obviously, it was a crucial point for us in considering whether an increase of tensions of this kind or the difficulties that the Soviets ran into in Eastern Europe would, in fact, produce this kind of result in the Soviet leadership.

Now, I wish it had been possible in managing

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the game time to allow a bit more of reflective action in examining those three possible courses of action. We could not in any case have predicted a specific outcome. For example, we would have had to hypothecate what the relative factional strength of the groups were, and this would be arbitrary.

But what would have been possible would have been to have examined the considerations that bore just on the merits, apart from the adequacy of the situation on these courses of action. For example, the question that has been raised about the assumptions of which Course A was based, the attack on Western Europe, really needed to get further examined in the light of what the forces were, what the possible consequences would have been, and so on.

Of course, time was such that it just was not possible to do it. There was a point in which it was necessary to cut off debate and make a decision, without those alternatives really being examined carefully.

One of the most illuminating things that the game could do would be to perceive just how far you could plump that decision with all the resources we had available to us in the room.

Therefore, possibly under ideal circumstances,

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MC.3

if one could stop the clock in terms of game time and really get a reflective examination of each of those courses, it might be illuminating.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is a very valuable suggestion.

Fred?

MR. WYLE. I have learned from this game that if we had in the Government rapporteurs and staff of the quality that you have here, we would do very much better.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Alex?

MR. KOROL. May I say -- perhaps wholly inappropriate in the context of the over-all exercise -- that a game confined only to the Presidium of the Soviet Union, confronted with a set of situations involving purely internal decisions, would be very interesting. I would suggest that as a theme for a possible gaming exercise.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Is there anyone else from whom we have not heard who would like to chime in?

(No response.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The clock has caught up with us. I just want to give you warning that it has, so you can get ready so that no women and children will

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get crushed in the rush.

Don?

MR. BRENNAN. I was just going to say: Are we through with the formal discussion?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think we must be, yes. We can continue it informally around the bar.

MR. BRENNAN. I was just going to say that I have been personally involved with quite a few games -- some with more detail, some with less detail -- but certainly in terms of personal stimulation and high personal interest, I have not been in anything that I found as interesting as this one.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Well, the management is deeply moved and touched by what you say.

I would like to thank the staff particularly before anyone leaves the room because I thought it was a very impressive performance myself and I think they deserve recognition. The message center: Bob Coward and Heddy and Les Roos and Matt, who must have lost at least ten pounds -- maybe they made it up in the dining room; I don't know; it's hard not to.

And our girls who doubled as typists and bridge partners, Lisa and Judy and Kitty and Gaby and Charlotte -- Ken, Jim Dorsey, who did all the

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MC.2 Z6

housekeeping problems; and Bart, who had a great deal to do with putting the game together.

Just a final cautionary note: This game was technically unclassified, but we have so far been very lucky in that our injunction that the proceedings remain private and that the participation of individuals remain private has been maintained. While we reserve the right to describe the general operation for the scholarly fraternity and others, we do keep this private. It is not technically confidential, but it is an otherwise confidential exercise.

The books of moves must be turned in, but anyone with a need to take them or need to have them should check with our security officer, who turns out to be Jim Dorsey, along with everything else that he does. Jim will either log you out if for Government agency reasons you wish to take a set back with you -- and I know two people who feel they should. Anyone who wishes it sent should check with Jim. But otherwise the books should be left here.

The seafood bar for which Endicott House is justly famous is, I hope, open. The Bartender is standing at the ready.

I want to thank all of you who have come from

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Washington and elsewhere for giving of yourselves so generously and for what I hope was a mutually-interesting experiment.

These proceedings are closed.

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