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Vol.

pp.

POLEX DATA I

PRELIMINARY CRITIQUE SESSION

Sunday, November 25, 1962.

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POLITICAL EXERCISE

1962 NOV. 25

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PRELIMINARY

CRITIQUE

SESSION

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, Presiding

HAROLD R. AARON
DONALD L. M. BLACKMER
ROBERT BLUM
ROGER L. BULL
CHARLES T. CROSS
EDWARD CUSHEN
LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN
SIDNEY F. GIFFIN
MICHAEL J. L. GREENE
EVERETT E. HAGEN
RICHARD W. HATCH
LESTER G. HAWKINS
ELMORE JACKSON
ROBERT H. JOHNSON
DONALD KESSING
JAMES E. KING, Jr.
ERNEST W. LEFEVER
CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL
HANS J. MORGENTHAU
WESLEY POSVAR
LUCIAN W. PYE
HERBERT RITVO
BARTON WHALEY
MARVIN ZONIS

M.I.T. Endicott House
Dedham, Massachusetts
Sunday, November 25, 1962

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(11 a.m., Sunday, November 25, 1962.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The problem today is to try to pull together this lost week end somehow. Mainly, I think it is an opportunity for two things: analysis of what has happened, what it means; and secondly, it is certainly an opportunity to vent any pent-up frustrations, aggressions, or other emotions which are quite normal in these proceedings. I should say that it has always struck me as normal that team members come out of the exercise with feelings toward the Control group ranging from mild annoyance to outrage. It might just make you feel better to know that there is nothing pathological about feeling this way.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. That spoils it.

MR. PYE. God created.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is just a little mild psychotherapy before we begin. At the same time, Control certainly has problems of its own and tends to evaluate the performance of different parts of the world quite differently. Now, no one is keeping score. This is not a typical military war game where you have winners and losers. There is going to be no attempt to grade the teams, and I hope no one takes that seriously. We are computing conflicting strategies using this bizarre technique of gaming. I am going to save my own observation, critique, and so forth until the end,

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if at all, or at some other point.

I just want to say this: I found this game quite difficult, more difficult for everyone than straight two-team games, which is the typical Pentagon or even Endicott House type of game brink-of-war situation. I think this one was much more complex, multidimensional. In many ways it was more demanding on you. It called for far less simple reactions and intellectual processes than in this other kind.

I should say that I saw three errors of management which I would like to mention now so that we don't need to waste much time on them. One was a communication foul-up on the first day which you may not even have noticed. The second error was made by us when we called that meeting yesterday at the time we did. This is recognized by me; maybe not by others. Thirdly, I think I erred in not enforcing more rigidly this wall of separation between team move periods and Control move periods. It is extremely difficult to manage if that wall becomes loosened.

Later on in today's agenda which we are modifying slightly -- it is essentially as you saw it -- we will ask for your views on this technique of gaming. I thought we would save that until later.

Before you leave tonight, I have a very brief questionnaire here which will be of great value to us. If

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you would fill it out, say, within a week, while the tears are still hot, I would appreciate it.

MR. WHALEY. I might interject here to say that even if you don't do it for our sake, please bear in mind that there will be three other groups similar to your own which we will be inflicting this on in the future, and the answers to the questionnaires may enable us to make things easier for them.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is right. Now, for the moment, we thought that we would start with a reasonably-brief presentation by the chairman of the team supplemented, if necessary, by statements from other members, so that we can say, "Here is a picture of the problem and the world and the situation and his strategy as he saw it." We thought we would do this before lunch, starting with China which is the agent provocateur and instigator of the problem, and the USSR; and then after lunch we can do the same with the American team and the UN team, and then continue to move along, reversing the agenda slightly. I would rather not start this experiment under No. 4 until everyone has had at least 23 drinks. Until then, we will deal with what seems to me to be the most significant insights that we have received into policy and into strategy.

I think that we are most interested in hearing from the teams. They have been isolated upstairs. The information

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has been imperfect, which simulates reality, basically. Communications have not been as perfect for them as they have been for Control.

So the primary focus now is to hear from you, holding to some extent to this schedule and starting first with the China team for perhaps 20 minutes, with a chance for some questions. Then we will move on to the next team and so on until we complete each general presentation, each picture of the world as you saw it, before we close in on the details of the game as it moved along.

Bob?

MR. JOHNSON. I have not had much time to get organized here but let me just say in general how I plan to run through this. I would like to start off with a statement of our general concept of our strategy and approach to this problem and then deal with the problem of the ambiguity of the situation at two or three stages and then how this affected our own reaction to this and how we feel that it led to sort of a diverging of lines of action which were brought together only towards the end.

In general, and in accordance with what we consider to be Chinese views of a situation like this, our strategy was basically a quite cautious one. It was a strategy creation and exploitation of guerrilla conflict but at a

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level which sought to avoid justification for outside intervention; and if outside intervention occurred, to provide any basis for effective military action against such intervention. One point that is relevant to this -- and it didn't come out clearly in our papers -- in accordance with the Chinese view we believe that Burma had a fairly low priority target in Southeast Asia for the Chinese. It was for this reason that in our initial strategy we conceived of this primarily as a base for use elsewhere in the area, including against Burma, but also particularly against Thailand.

Now, approaching the problem with this point of view and with a somewhat admittedly ambiguous scenario, our initial size-up or estimate of the situation was still one of a relatively limited guerrilla-type operation. We think that if at this stage, that is, at the scenario stage, we had injected into the thinking of everybody including ourselves the things that were in subsequent Control Documents 4, 9, and 14, that we would have been faced by a different interpretation of the situation which would have called for a different type of response. But this was our interpretation based on our view of the world and our understanding of the initial scenario and how much flexibility it gave us.

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This problem was faced, as you probably realized, between Control and the Chinese team between our Moves 1 and 2, and we attempted to make an adjustment to it. On the one hand, the Control team induced us to come in further, and there was a rapid expansion in response to this kind of opportunity. But, again, we feel that Control, in its interpretation of what we were doing and what it was putting out to the other teams, was giving a rather more alarmist view of what the Chinese were up to than what we thought we were up to.

There were continuing reports in this period to the other teams that suggested that this conflict was escalating much more rapidly than we planned or than we felt we were actually engaged in. In Period 3 -- moving up to the UN action -- again, there were reports of larger forces than we had ourselves reported, we believe, in our statement of our moves. For example, Control No. 23 talks about larger forces than I believe we indicated we had in there.

Now, this situation, I believe, created some misconceptions on our part just as it did on the parts of the other teams because we had intended to operate with the view that it was a low-level military operation of the kind that we intended and of the kind that we forecast in our moves. We recognized the possibility of some kind of intervention

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at a fairly early stage. We thought that the evidence that was being presented was sufficiently contradictory that the first obvious move would have to be some kind of substantial, more substantial verification of the presence of Chinese units in the area. We thought, therefore, that we could get away with a UN ploy or ploy interval which would call for an inspection arrangement preferably not within the UN network. But then, at the time that the UN action came, there was the report from Narasimhan which again suggested that the operations were much larger than we had in fact planned and that we felt we were engaged in.

This apparently, then, produced a situation in the UN where, despite our efforts in collaboration with our Soviet colleagues that turned us in the direction of inspection which we did not fear because we thought since we had essentially guerrilla units in there that it would be easy to cover them, we tried for the inspection gambit but it failed. Again, I think it was because of the different interpretation of what the actual situation was. We were also surprised at this stage by the rapidity of the US military action. We had noted the rumors of US troop movements. We had noted the clear indication that they had moved troops into Thailand, but we considered this to be primarily a psychological maneuver, as I think we have

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reflected in our documents, rather than a serious military maneuver. Again, it related partly to your different estimate of what the situation was. It also related, I think, to our view as to the feasibility of moving troops rapidly from this area in Thailand into Burma. Then when it finally became clear that the US and others were acting on a very different estimate of the situation, we thought that since we were engaged still in this low-level military operation we could exploit this differential view of the situation because the US and UN reactions seemed to us quite disproportionate to our activity. So we continued this strategy and we again sought to get rapid international inspection on the assumption that if we could show that there weren't Chinese forces in there in significant degree, that the whole international basis for the UN action would rapidly erode and the US would be left there in a very untenable sort of a situation. The final moves in the game were designed to play out that effort, including efforts against the Burmese government designed to destroy any possible basis for different US-Burmese relationships in the military area. So in our view the basic problem here were these different estimates of the situation that were made both at the beginning and subsequently despite our effort, we felt, to clarify what it was that we were engaged in.

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Another difficulty from our point of view was the lack of communication with the Burmese government. We felt that the Burmese reaction in this situation was rather implausible. We had made offers of joint Burmese-Chinese inspection of the border area both directly and indirectly through the Swedish ambassador and had never received any kind of a response from the Burmese. Yet one would assume, I think, in the situation here that the Burmese would have made some kind of contact with the Chinese and that we might have received at least some kind of indication that they were moving as rapidly as they did toward collaboration with the imperialist US in bringing US and UN forces into Burma.

One other point that I think I might make inasmuch as it has been discussed in corridor conversations and otherwise is the Sino-Soviet relationship in all this. We were uncertain on our side that we were going to get Soviet support at the beginning.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. You were certain or uncertain?

MR. JOHNSON. We were "uncertain" as to whether we would. We thought it was quite possible that the Soviets would take advantage of this situation to take some actions that would be opposed to our interests in Laos or elsewhere. But we were encouraged by the initial Soviet reactions to bring them into our planning to the extent of making it

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clear to them that we had no extensive military ambitions at this stage and that our real ambitions were to build a guerrilla force in this autonomous region in the Kachin area.

Perhaps -- I can only speculate -- but perhaps because we were offered greater opportunity and did not seize it, the Soviets were reassured and found that some limited degree of co-operation with us was possible. We have some question about the Soviet interpretation in their last paper as to whether this forecasts continued collaboration between the Chinese and the Soviets. For one thing, there seems to be a view in the Soviet paper that fear of a US-Chinese confrontation which they correctly interpret as an element in our motives in being cautious here means that the Chinese will take a different attitude toward the possibility of a US-Soviet confrontation. We do not believe that this is in a more adventurous course on the part of the Soviet Union. We do not believe that this is true.

We believe that, as Chinese, we have always been concerned with the possibility of an escalation which involved a threat to Communist China itself. This was the danger which we saw at one point in this situation, and that caused us to draw back from a more ambitious military venture.

We also question in the final Soviet paper whether

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they could be quite as successful as they apparently hope to be in establishing a relationship with the Rangoon government in picking up the pieces. I think it is a very clever job, but our own view is that we are in a situation where we can apply all sorts of pressures on the Burmese government. There is quite a possibility that we can turn it in a Chinese direction.

This is the best I think I can do now in a rambling account. I think the best thing to do would be to ask questions of others to find out their comments or recommendations.

MR. GIFFIN. Do you have the time?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes. Your colleagues should supplement anything they want to.

MR. GIFFIN. It seems to me from the standpoint of reality -- if you can talk about reality in a game -- that the scenario left us in a situation in which only the Chinese team knew what the situation was in the Kachin area of Burma. Of course, Control, which is omniscient, also presumably knew. But Control omnisciently knew something different from what the Chinese omnisciently knew. It seems that here this might have been corrected, if the Chinese had a private and separate communication in terms of a different scenario which nobody else shared so that they

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knew what Control thought the situation was or had dictated to them by Control. Control Documents 4, 9, and 14, which further amplified and clarified the situation in a somewhat ambiguous way, should have been introduced into the scenario but perhaps unambiguously. Then we would all have started in the same situation.

Now, the point I would like to make is this: It is quite apparent that the intent here was to try to introduce a situation somewhat similar, I should say, to Korea. That was one possibility. From a military point of view, logistically speaking, this becomes very difficult in Burma for the US. In Korea, you will all remember that we had a very good base in Japan. It was quite close to Korea. The only similar base that I can think of -- and I tried to think about it last night -- that you might use in order to get into Burma -- or even the United Kingdom which I think is the best one, provided Nasser would let you go through the Suez Canal -- is Australia. There are no other bases.

MR. KESSING. Thailand.

MR. GIFFIN. No. Thailand isn't a base.

MR. BLUM. Singapore.

MR. GIFFIN. No, not Singapore. I am talking about a base of sea power, say, like the United Kingdom or Japan. We had this advantage in the Korean war. In order to support

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a major force in Burma -- even five or six divisions -- you would probably have to go through the Atlantic and Mediterranean, rather than through the cross-straits and up into Rangoon. It is just a very, very long distance. It would take twice as many ships as Korea.

So Burma is not a very good theater, I should think, for sizable conflict in which US forces could successfully operate except at very great cost against 250,000 Chinese which the Chinese could support in Burma. I think that they can support, we estimate, about 250,000 down there. Of course, this does invite escalation into the use of nuclear weapons.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Are you going to add anything to that?

MR. KESSING. I think I will pass.

MR. AARON. At this time could you give us some idea as to this scenario? In other words, your objective?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Control has asked one member of Control to be prepared to give a very brief picture of this situation as each country is presented, from Control's point of view. Sometime before lunch Everett is going to represent what the position of Burma was throughout this exercise. I don't envy him that task.

MR. PYE. I think we should start with Everett.

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After Everett speaks, then Jim can go ahead. Why don't we do that?

MR. JOHNSON. I would like to make one point. I have been reading my notes, very rought notes. There is one point about our final moves here, I think, that may need some explanation. We could, it seems to me, logically have stayed in the Kachin area to a greater extent than we had planned to inasmuch as I think there is a real question as to whether this kind of international force could deal effectively with the sort of forces that we had in the area.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is a crucial point.

MR. JOHNSON. There are two reasons why we couldn't take that ploy. One reason we couldn't take that was because we had no idea as to what kind of a UN force it was or where it was. So the cautious reaction was to withdraw. But the more important reason was that we thought that our major advantage in this situation was the international advantage that we had gotten out of what we considered to be the miscalculations of the situation and the fact that the US was in there fighting mosquitoes with missiles, as our Soviet colleague pointed out. In order to make that absolutely good, we had to minimize any risk of running into any Chinese units in the area. Pardon me. I thought that explanation would be a little plausible.

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MR. KESSING. Our intelligence was much worse than anybody else's. In a real situation, our intelligence would be much better than anybody else's.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. This might be a good moment for Everett to explain what the Burmese government's stand was here and why it was so difficult to get a straight answer from them.

MR. HAGEN. All right. I want to do only three or four minutes mainly about the Burmese situation as we visualized it early in the game. Let me say that we didn't have anyone in control of Burma. No one person was in control of Burma. I wasn't Burma throughout. Burma was the responsibility of the Control group and I think one difficulty resulted from that. You must first remember that the scenario provides that the government of Burma between November, '62, and November, '63, had split and was rather paralyzed and ineffective because of dissension within the military. Secondly, there always has been an autonomous tendency in the Shan State and the Kachin State, and the government of Burma was predisposed to be greatly concerned about any autonomous tendencies. Also, the government of Burma historically has had a fear of China, along with admiration for Communist China's defiance of the West. China is pretty big and close by, and Burma has some fear of it.

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Now, these things, combined with the knowledge of reports of Chinese infiltration or disturbances in Vietnam -- it's now North and Laos -- and the fact that there were Burmese troops there and that clashes were going on --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Chinese.

MR. HAGEN. I mean, "Chinese", of course. We assumed, Burma assumed, that the Chinese activity there was larger than the Chinese assumed it was. Maybe the Chinese had justification on paper for seeing the facts as they saw them, but let's skip that for the time being. Let me repeat the fact that we were disintegrating, the government was disintegrating, because of conflict within the military. So we were easily alarmed and called for help.

Now, as for the reason why Burma did not respond to China's two or three messages which said that they were, you know, fed up and that they would be glad to have negotiations, inspections, and so on, was because we, the Burmese government, was in confusion, disintegration. I think I might also say that in control we didn't give that enough attention because we were busy with a lot of things and no one person was responsible for Burma. So I think that this wasn't an entirely deliberate decision. We had a lot of things to do and the time was short because, in Control particularly, we never got the two hours shown on the schedule

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because of a lag in the secretarial work. That was easily remedied and we remedied it later, but let's not go into that now.

So Burma went to the US. The Burmese ambassador went to the US. We reflected this Burmese attitude and I think it was quite realistic. Burma wanted UN help. Burma wanted intervention. Burma was frightened or separate Burmese fragments of control were frightened. But we were afraid of a purely US force in there because we expected a hostile reaction by the Burmese population on account of the colonial heritage and all that sort of stuff. So we told the US and we told the UN that we didn't want a separate US force if we could help it and that we would prefer a mixed bag of whatever was to be sent to defend us to be under UN auspices. If it was not possible to get a UN Commonwealth action, then our last choice was the US alone. This was in the background of the Burmese attitude.

MR. PYE. I can add a footnote as to how Control did communicate to the Chinese. The rioting in Rangoon of anti-Chinese made it impossible for this flimsy government to even think of engaging in normal relationships. In short, when you have serious rioting, reports that the Chinese are attacking and so on, and the police were ineffective, well, at that point you cannot ask for reasonable negotiations.

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MR. KESSING. But there is a tendency at present and in recent history for Burma always to take a path of accommodation with China. Burma has been very soft and deferential and tries very hard to keep its relations with China good, and China has responded by not putting on guerrilla pressures or other military pressures despite hundreds of miles of frontier. I think that in any Burmese government this would continue to be a keynote of policy unless they felt that we could get in on the spot and stay there almost forever.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I must say that I think what you just said could have been said of India up to last year. I am not sure that it is an immutable principle myself.

MR. HAGEN. I notice that the scenario assumed, as we interpret it, that the principle you just stated was somewhat obsolete.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jim was going to footnote, from Control, the Chinese position as seen by Control. Others are welcome to add to his comments.

MR. KING. In my own thinking and I think the thinking of the other members of Control, the fact that one year prior to the date on which the game started we were in the midst of a Chinese invasion in India was a very critical fact. That part of the world was simply alert to any kind of

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Chinese action. The US, which is obviously on the brink of committing itself to India in some way at the moment, was alert and in a mood to overreact. I think it is clear that the US did overreact. But it was plausible that the US did overreact in terms of the setting which we assumed and which we think comes from history. I think it is fairly clear that Control made a couple of mistakes in dealing with the China team, but I don't think the general interpretation of the scenario of the situation that we had and of the way that we tried to structure it was reasonable or plausible in the least. The scenario, so-called, said that well-substantiated reports were circulating that Chinese Communist cadre were operating in the Kachin area. This was the basis from which everything started. It only takes one Chinese to make a Chinese army if you are looking for a Chinese army. This was our basic rationale. If a government were falling apart, if its agents in the field were thinking with panic, and they definitely identified one Chinese in the presence of rumors which said that Chinese armies were moving around the place, then this would be taken to indicate the presence of Chinese military forces.

Now, I think we did slip up a couple of times. One was we did not leak or otherwise provide the Chinese team with Control No. 5, the one that talked about the two

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Fulbright teachers. I think it would have been useful if the Chinese team had had some indication of the scope of the contradictory intelligence reports that were being fed to the US team and which Control was feeding itself. I think we also made a bad mistake on No. 14, too, which was simply the result of hasty drafting. That document gives the impression that we were actually reporting as a fact, rather than as a report or rumor, that a conflict was going on between Chinese and Burmese regular troops.

MR. KESSING. How about 23?

MR. KING. In the first place, the Kachin situation was very confused. In our rationale, the original Kachins in the scenario were one group of Kachins who were trying to assert themselves or at least express their disenchantment with the Burmese government. Then the Chinese introduced other Kachins, some of whom were generated outside of Burma and some of whom were generated inside of Burma. These Kachins had a slightly different orientation, but actually a much more effective orientation. We assume that the anti-Chinese Kachins, if there were any, took off and left the situation in the control of the Kachins who were under the control of the Chinese, and these were welcomed by the local people or at least accepted by the local people. In some cases, with enthusiasm; in most cases, with just

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acquiescence. Now, concerning -- what was the other one?

MR. KESSING. No. 23. You make mention in that document of vehicles, troops, regular army troops, and such where there were none present in our point of view.

MR. KING. No, we didn't.

MR. KESSING. You couldn't have gotten that information. Even if it were true, you couldn't have got it. Since we were in small bands, you certainly couldn't have got it.

MR. KING. Actually, I wrote this one myself and I can swear on a stack of bibles. Your statement said that you were introducing several hundred Chinese cadre leading small groups of organized Kachin guerrillas. Now, when guerrillas are not opposed, they are not guerrillas. I think everybody missed this point. We didn't miss it in Control. If there is no opposition to guerrillas, they can walk right down the paths, take over the villages, and everything. That is why we used the word, "irregulars". As long as there is no opposition, the place is occupied by sort of a partisan army. When the UN forces moved in there, if you had decided to fight, obviously you would have fought a guerrilla action. But if you take over an area with organized force, even though it is not very strong militarily and would have to take to the hills if it were opposed, then,

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in fact, you take over the area.

MR. KESSING. But one meaning of the word, "irregular", is that they operate in such a way that you can't see them.

MR. KING. Oh, no.

MR. PYE. I may be able to solve this problem. Maybe the Chinese team, as Sid mentioned, had a model of Korea as what they thought Control was thinking of. What we really had in mind was Laos as the model. As you will remember from the whole history of Laos wherein there was no opposition built up, this type of operation is really effective in certain areas. You very quickly begin to get an image of very strong forces which are relatively minor in operation. In short, I think the Chinese did not solve the problem of how to introduce guerrillas against no opposition and not make it appear to be a massive assault. I mean, zero against nothing is massive.

MR. GIFFIN. Not in my book.

MR. PYE. I mean, one against zero in my book is massive.

MR. KING. Let me tell you where this actually came from. This came in your cable, your message.

MR. KESSING. Yes.

MR. KING. Your first action message, No. 2, said, in part: "rapid 3-day introduction of additional Communist

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Kachins and Communist cadre into Burma to create a Burma-Kachin autonomous region." Now, the information we got from our intelligence simply exaggerated what you did. You introduced cadre who were not being opposed, who were not being effectively opposed, because the Burmese had run away. The report that CIA picked up was that these units were of greater strength than they actually were. We thought that that was a perfectly plausible response for Washington to get from its agents in the field who obviously were not well situated to get information in that remote area.

MR. GIFFIN. I don't think we can quarrel with this. Obviously, there is a fog of war in here but it does result in fighting two different wars in pretty much the same place. We would have had more confusion if we had had two different wars in two different places.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Did you want to say something?

MR. HAGEN. No. China did not see Control 23 until this morning, is that right?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Apparently not. Is that so?

MR. KESSING. That is right. We had no inkling of it.

MR. KING. I just want to ask why it could not be considered appropriate that that should be so. In the fog of a war situation there will be differing intelligence

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estimates.

MR. MORGENTHAU. But still, there is a discrepancy between what Control says the Chinese are doing and what the Chinese think they are doing. I mean, this doesn't square and this is bound to lead to confusion when you have two different conceptions of reality, especially on the part of one group which is supposed to manipulate reality.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think Lucian can answer that. My impression was that Control knew very well what the Chinese were doing, but Control fed to others a somewhat distorted picture of what China was doing which reflected Control's opinion of what intelligence in those circumstances would feed back to them. Is that a fair statement?

MR. PYE. Yes. I think that one of the points that hasn't been brought up was that maybe this is an inherent limitation of the Chinese position, that is, that it was almost impossible for the Chinese, through other means and channels other than direct action, to clarify what they were doing and their intentions. They had no mechanisms outside. Now, possibly the Soviets, by trying to tone down things, seemed to be putting a cover over the whole operation so that the more the Chinese relied on the Russians to suggest that this was not serious, the more it made it appear to be serious. In a sense, what other devices did they have?

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It seemed to me that the Chinese -- and I think they were correct -- could not have used diplomacy in relation to other Afro-Asian countries like this to suggest the innocence of their position.

MR. JOHNSON. Probably because we were making the allegation that this was a wholly Burmese situation.

MR. GIFFIN. I am going to stop after this one comment. I do think that the factor that really operated to distort certain aspects of this game is what you might call the DAIS bias. In other words, if you had not been attempting to play out something in connection with this DAIS business, if this had been a real game that was allowed to go where the players wanted it to go, within the limits of reasonable control by Control and reasonable Acts of God, then it seems to me that the very first thing that would have happened is that the Chinese would have attempted to achieve some kind of an inspection deal. This is the very first thing you would have done because everybody wants to quiet these things down. The first thing people like to do is to inspect, negotiate, have an ICC. But nobody even answered our repeated inquiries on this because of the DAIS bias. This was not important for you or to you, see? That was the reason it was dropped.

MR. JOHNSON. What I have been saying all along is

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that there was a gap between the traditional Chinese policy as we brought it into the game and the needs of the game itself to create a situation where it would make sense to introduce international force, and there was a constant pulling and hauling here to bring it to that level.

MR. JACKSON. This first became evident to us when Control wrote Narasimhan's response. We had sent Narasimhan out but we had no control over what he said when he came back because that was written by Control. It did not correspond to our estimate of what he would have said under real circumstances.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. This is where nature, of course, imposes itself to constrain the game in a certain way. You may be right, Sid. This has been the most worrisome thing about the enterprise from my standpoint.

MR. PYE. I still --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let me finish, please.

MR. PYE. This may be true.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I don't think we constrained the UN and the US and the Soviet teams. We did try to constrain -- Control tried to constrain China a little bit, but I don't think you can say that the teams were not free to play out their own strategy.

MR. GIFFIN. We did continue with ours, regardless

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of everything else.

MR. PYE. To keep coming back to it, if you were concerned with looking at reality as it only touched upon the border area and you were not paying as strong attention to other areas, then I think it is because you didn't want anything to happen in Rangoon to provoke you. You seemed to pass over the rioting, the disintegration of the government, and the fact that there were really no foreign office to handle this thing. When the UN team came out, he finds the city in disarray, panic around, all kinds of rumors rife, nobody in control, no contact with border areas, no way to get up there, and so on.

MR. HAGEN. I don't think that is reflected in the written report.

MR. LEFEVER. On the DAIS bias, I think it should be understood by all of us on this week end that there would have been no game if there had not been a project called DAIS. The function of that project is to discuss the feasibility and desirability of an international force. Therefore, there was a conscious and sometimes unconscious bias to manipulate reality so that it was plausible for a force to be committed. The members of Control, to a lesser or greater degree among various members, were injecting their bias into this situation and they may have distorted

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and nudged reality a little bit so that we could get an international force committed. This is a legitimate concern and everyone had his eyes open to it.

MR. JOHNSON. We understood that. It is just a question of whether you can do this or whether you should have been at a higher level of escalation at the beginning of the game so that you would have avoided this problem of Chinese strategy that made it difficult to get up to the required point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. WHALEY. I have a question for Hans Morgenthau. Was one crucial source of unrealistic confusion in your mind the fact that Control failed to properly distinguish leaked intelligence reports and rumors from statements of fact?

MR. MORGENTHAU. Certainly correct.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's say this: Until the team is debriefed, is there anything more regarding the Chinese team? The more teams we bring out, the more depth we will get to the whole picture.

MR. BLUM. I want to comment on the Chinese position. I wonder if there isn't a contradiction in the Chinese statement as I understand it between their claim that in effect their intentions were really quite modest and that this thing was at a low level and, on the other hand, the

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impression I received that it was a very vigorous, very ambitious statement of Chinese intentions in their strategic plan and their contingency plan. I mean, one is faced here with something that isn't quite consistent.

MR. JOHNSON. I think this concerned me a little, too. It perhaps should have been made clearer, but what we were talking about here were long-range objectives. We tried in one or two statements of those objectives to indicate more specifically what our intermediate-range objectives were. Those ambitions were over, I think we indicated, a period of some years or something like that.

MR. BLUM. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Why don't we turn now to the Soviet team? Later on we will take up those questions which are crucial to the Soviet team and let them lay on the table their picture of the world and how they manipulated it.

Herb?

MR. RITVO. Despite the bursting of whatever temporary illusions I may have had concerning the lasting nature of Chinese good will, I think that we had to base our policy during this game on the fact that we had a rare situation in which the Chinese obviously found some use for our Soviet good offices. The basic problem which the Soviet team faced was not to determine US intentions but to attempt to

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establish what the Chinese were doing. I think in our contingency plan you will note that we even omitted what actually happened in the course of the game: the intervention -- unilaterally almost -- by the US, under the cover of the UN, before the Chinese had moved in any meaningful military way. There were other contingent plans which were intended to cover the other courses of action -- the minimal one, which the Chinese adopted and which in effect meant that the Soviets in this game had no real problem. The problem was to make the Chinese position credible, to assist the Chinese case in the UN, and to attempt to do for the Chinese that which they had obviously been unable to achieve through their contacts with the Burmese. We had the same difficulties in getting a response from the Burmese government, although I must admit that we didn't make any particular effort other than communicate with them once and then expect that they would at least reply or give us some kind of message.

I would accept, however, the explanation that the Burmese Government in a situation like that may not have had to think very much about the utility of the Soviet interpretation, and turn very quickly to US and UN action especially. But once the game took the direction of a minimal Chinese involvement, there were no immediate

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problems of Soviet policy as we saw it, and everything that happened peripherally could relatively and simply be covered by Soviet standards of procedure. The problem of Formosa concerning air action was answered, I think, in the way that everyone would have expected: by denunciation, warnings that this kind of action could lead to serious consequences of the type that the Soviets have made any number of times.

MR. BLACKMER. This was the only occasion when we resorted to any rocket rattling.

MR. HAGEN. Or rattle rocking.

MR. RITVO. I think that one need not develop this line at any length. We were quite surprised by the fact that the developments in the UN went at such a pace that steps were being taken hardly before we had become aware of the report of the factfinder and the decisions of the Security Council. In this sense, certainly, the Soviets would again be open to charges by the Chinese side that their diplomatic assistance in international organizations is probably useless. I assume that for this we have no answer, but it does not seem to me that the Soviets would have been quite as ineffective as we were in our performance before the UN.

With regard to the US, again, our view of the situation was such that there did not seem to be any

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possibility whatsoever of the military confrontation which would necessitate a decision for Soviet assistance. The Soviets need not have been particularly upset and in fact may have welcomed this kind of premature action by the US because then they would have the rare opportunity of being able to scream to high heaven for any kind of inspection which our Chinese colleagues were so graciously willing to accept.

MR. GIFFIN. In Burma?

MR. RITVO. In Burma, yes. I feel that the situation that the US-UN team would find itself in would be somewhat similar to the situation which US forces found themselves in in Lebanon in '58 where once they got there, their primary objective was to get out as quickly as possible and with the least amount of embarrassment. There were different elements, of course, at this time. China is somewhat different than Iraq. Certainly the most embarrassing position which a world power such as the US can find itself in is to be fighting what would be considered a phantom war. I think we perhaps made it a little easy for ourselves by restricting the Soviet view of the problem to the time period which the game involved. Certainly we may have been somewhat overly optomistic about the benefits that might accrue from this kind of operation for Sino-Soviet relations.

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But when our relations are as bad as they are, even the slightest indication which suggests that they will not continue to listen perhaps may be considered as positive.

Those are the only comments that I have. Perhaps Don (Blackmer) has some.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Don?

MR. BLACKMER. I was waiting to see if there were any questions on specific aspects of the case.

MR. HAGEN. I wonder why in your last document or, at any rate, last night's document, you seem to be so sensitive about whether China might be offended by moves you took in Burma. Was there some importance to this or was this rather casual?

MR. BLACKMER. The best way to answer that would be to say that there was a compromise resolution which resulted in a lengthy debate in the Presidium. There was a minority faction which was more concerned about the long-term aspirations in this area and which was urging a somewhat stronger policy, a policy which might have led in some ways to offending the Chinese. Our resolution was intended to straddle the fence in the sense that we were going to take some actions vis-a-vis Burma to strengthen the Soviet position and to severely limit the possibility for Chinese expansion in the area by making a stronger Burmese government.

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We hoped that we would be able to succeed in doing this without offending the Chinese for the reasons which Herb mentioned earlier. This seemed to us an excellent opportunity for making some real progress on Sino-Soviet relations which, after all, must remain for us a fundamental problem.

MR. RITVO. There was, I think, a basic agreement on our side as to the limited degree to which the Soviets could actively influence Chinese action in an area where there is no real need for Soviet military assistance. That is, the Chinese were completely capable of doing a great deal more, regardless of what the Soviets thought or whether or not they approved of it. Certainly the bitter lessons of Soviet policy of the last few years have been that not only the Chinese are capable of doing it, but also smaller bloc powers can do a great deal. Once an action like this begins, the Soviet choice between supporting and co-ordinating its objectives with the Chinese is resolved relatively easily, particularly if outside events go as well as they did in this case.

MR. BLUM. Did you at any time consider consulting with the Americans or communicating with the US government to influence their reactions to these events?

MR. GIFFIN. They did.

MR. RITVO. Briefly, there was some communication.

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MR. BLUM. One exchange of letters?

MR. RITVO. Yes. But I would also say that once the events began to move, the Soviets saw no real reason to view with alarm continued US embarrassment.

MR. BLUM. We had some discussion in the US team as to whether to consult with the Soviets more than we had done in preparing our position.

MR. RITVO. My own position was that the US did not have much of a case to discuss with the Soviet Union. One would have received merely assurances that everything is all right.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

MR. KESSING. I am curious about your estimate in one regard. The US deployment and support of UN forces in Burma represented a straining of US military and logistic capabilities in the Far Eastern area in particular and also represented the denuding of US forces elsewhere in the Far East in order to be able to inspect a few guerrillas up in Burma. We have viewed this, I think, as significantly weakening the US ability to counter lower-level threats elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia. Did this concern you in your estimate?

MR. RITVO. I think we noted that it was nothing that was discussed at any length, but I feel that the basics

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of your policy here was not to create other areas of incitement. We would have anticipated that as a result of Indian commitments in Burma, that the Chinese might have started something on the Sino-Indian border again. But it is still not clear to me whether we or you started things in North Vietnam or Laos.

MR. BLACKMER. I think a weakening of US forces in the area would be a significant advantage for the Chinese obviously, but is there any reason to suppose that the Russians would feel that they would profit from such a situation, essentially, in Burma?

MR. KESSING. I thought you might feel that way.

MR. BLACKMER. We did not look askance at the introduction of Western forces particularly in a fashion in which it was clear that they would have to get out fairly rapidly simply because this did limit the opportunity for Chinese expansion.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Wes Posvar will comment briefly from the celestial standpoint.

MR. POSVAR. From the standpoint of Control, I think that the important point is that the Soviets had a trivial role to play in this game and they played it that way very well. If they had chosen to compete with an equal volume of dispatches, I think it would have distorted the game very

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badly; but they did not do this. Their policies, I think it is useful to point out to their great credit, had some very orthodox revolutionary Marxist elements in it. They were on the one hand playing it cozy with the neutralists and putting a little pressure on Nehru, and they were also communicating with the US and trying to conciliate us at the same time. I think if there is one lack or one surprising element missing in their policy, it is the lack of anxiety about the possibility of general war or escalation, and perhaps this was tacit so far as their dispatches were concerned. But I also wonder whether there may not be a real kind of insulation against this kind of war on the part of the great powers at this time so far as Southeast Asia is concerned, so far as our having gotten away from it so far is concerned, without having atomic war. I think that there was one omission, so far as reality was concerned, which was not their fault. That omission was this: I think they would have taken much more effective steps to obstruct UN decision making at the time the Security Council and General Assembly were meeting. But the tempo of the game was such that this wasn't possible.

I think later on they did very well in their dispatches in bringing pressure to bear upon the weak neutrals identified as such by their UN action. In fact,

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I think it is rather interesting that their strategy in the latter part of the game or their tactics was coincidental with the desires of the Chinese Communists as to what their strategy should be before they even had communicated their request to the Soviets.

MR. KESSING. This is partly because we shared the same estimates of the situation.

MR. POSVAR. But I think from a policy standpoint that there may be a valid conclusion here. That is, that it does not take very much to drive the Soviet Union and the Chinese government back together. There are natural forces all propelled in their direction. Even without a great deal of communication and while they are doing this, they maintain the outward appearance of the alliance being intact. The Soviets and the Chinese were very judicious about this. But from their strategy, it was apparent that the Soviets were very suspicious, very hostile, toward the intentions of the Chinese Communists. Toward the end, they were, let's say, suspiciously sympathetic, but they were working together.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. May I ask you a question? Did you view the Burmese situation as being in the category of a war of national liberation rather than a limited war? In other words, what ideological position did you take toward

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it and was that influential in contenting you with the situation rather than worrying you?

MR. RITVO. We certainly did not discuss it in this sense. My own concept of this was that we -- and I think this emerges out of our contingency plans -- are not for Chinese victories in national wars of liberation. Certainly, as the game was set up for us, the Kachin autonomous movement was not directed at an immediate control over all of Burma. Therefore, it does not then become a war for national liberation, it seems to me, with respect to Burma. But we think that moves were made in this direction. To answer your question specifically: If eventual Chinese subjugation of Burma or Chinese liberation of Burma had been involved, I think our contingency plans indicated that the Soviets would have been faced with a completely different kind of a problem. The kind of position that we would have taken in that case would have been the position we took in the Indian case. Certainly that would be the first position that the Soviets would have taken. That is, had the game gone in the direction in which perhaps it was intended to go and had we been faced with a situation wherein the Chinese had marched straight down to Mandalay, halfway through Burma, with an ability to set up a partition of the country, the Soviet position would, I think, have been considerably different.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let me ask you one other question. What priority did you actually attach to moving closer to China as compared with the strategic geographical kind of priority that you have been speaking of? Where on your scale of priorities was the opportunity to do something in concert with China as compared with the problem of the possibility of escalation -- Chinese versus Soviet influence in Southeast Asia?

MR. RITVO. As a representative of the Soviet faction?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. RITVO. The co-operation with China, on our scale of priorities, would be very high.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Very high?

MR. RITVO. That is, I think that since the Soviet outlook is to co-operate with China whenever there is an opportunity to, that the Soviets would take advantage of it if it is a long-range development and one in which, as in the case of Burma, the Soviets would feel that they have some chance of setting up a national democratic Burmese government. Obviously, there was no consideration taken from the Soviet side as to using either of the Burmese communist parties. I have no way of knowing whether there is any possibility for the Soviets and the Chinese to compete for subsequent control within a broader national

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POLEX - DAIS I - PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION
1962 NOV. 25

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government there. But I do think that Burma would provide a case where the Soviets would realize that in the long run a strong China would be in a better position to exercise direct influence over Burma, but it would be a Soviet objective to keep Burma viable and from prematurely falling under Chinese influence.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Don?

MR. BLACKMER. I do want to comment on this. It seems to me that our priorities actually shifted as the game went along. In our first contingency plan we were most of all concerned about an aggressive Chinese policy, that is, too extensive an advance by the Chinese. It was only later on, I would say, when it became clear to us that the Chinese goals were extremely limited, that we were then willing to put this as our first priority. It seemed like a target of opportunity which we mildly hoped for at the beginning and which we became more confident of as the game went along.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bob?

MR. BLUM. No.

MR. BLACKMER. I have one more comment.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Sorry. Go ahead, Don.

MR. BLACKMER. My comment is with respect to Colonel Posvar's concern about our neglect of the possibility of

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escalation. We were concerned about this, but it seemed to us that this was a likely possibility only in the event of a direct confrontation between Chinese and Western -- presumably American -- troops. We reacted strongly, you remember, at the evidence of Chiang Kai-shek action in the one case. Secondly, in our contingency plan we were prepared to abandon our stand on China as soon as they moved downward, thus precipitating a major US intervention. We did not really consider that US intervention would occur without the Chinese march forward. Thirdly, when the UN did come in, we tried to indicate our seriousness in our message to the President of a situation in which a UN force would move north toward the border and thus risk a challenge with a Chinese force. In that case, again, I think our policy would have changed quite significantly.

MR. POSVAR. I am anxious to know one thing. Although I know it is impossible for you to identify yourself with the Russians, did you feel at all the threat that something might be left to chance -- irrationality on the part of the US or some precipitation which would result in involving the Soviet Union here? Was this a factor in your thinking?

MR. HAGEN. Not with the present administration.

MR. BLACKMER. Not in the context of the game.

MR. RITVO. No.

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MR. PYE. In Control we were struck with one part of the Soviet planning, and I wonder if there is anything more that should be said about it. This came out of Contingency Plan No. 5, I mean, your Document No. 5, which had a rather interesting curve here in terms of your attitude toward a UN or international force. In short, you are willing to take it at a low level. If the conflict is low, you are with it. When it escalates to a certain level, you oppose it. But if it gets up to a higher level, you would not veto it. In short, at this point you are willing to accept it again. Now, this is an interesting curve. Is this likely to appear in other kinds of relationships? It seems to me that this might be an interesting insight into Soviet position. At certain levels, yes; at certain levels, no.

MR. RITVO. You would have to think that it is variable, yes. In certain situations where the Chinese are favored from the military aspect, then the Soviet problem becomes even more difficult. The worse dilemma that the Soviets could face would be to be publicly against a speedy and decisive Chinese victory. Their ability to influence and to prevent that kind of victory is almost minimal in the case of a country like Burma. For that reason, we think the best we can say is that they would have to take the type of disapproval as they have done in the Indian case and

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sort of wish that the problem would go away quickly. Perhaps they would not have vetoed UN action in this case. Just abstain. Whether they would have come out as strongly on the Burmese side as they have come out on the Indian side, I question, because it seems to me that Burma is not as important to them as India is.

MR. BLACKMER. There was virtually no Burmese government at this point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I thought the veto was entirely plausible myself. I can't conceive of the Soviets abstaining in that particular vote.

MR. RITVO. In the case that we had, yes. But I meant in the case of a massive Chinese victory.

MR. PYE. When? At what level?

MR. GIFFIN. It's like the martini analogy. One is not enough, two is enough, three is not enough.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Very good. Do you want to respond to that?

MR. KESSING. I want to comment on something that was asked of the Soviet team, which was whether they were concerned about an irrational US response. In the case of the Chinese team, there was such a concern at the very end. We thought that after the US had gone chasing mosquitoes in

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Burma and found itself embarrassed and frustrated in this adventure, that it was unwise to stir too many pots in the rest of Asia and particularly in Southeast Asia at a low level. We felt that on the heels of such an unfortunate adventure, the US might be in an irrational mood and would strike out at China the next time possibly even with nuclear weapons in the event of a provocation that would not under other circumstances have evoked such a response.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Larry?

MR. JOHNSON. That is why we kept out of Laos.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. The Soviet delegation did not have the control document which was the CIA situation report?

MR. RITVO. No.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. I won't comment on how natural that may have been. But had the Soviet delegation had access to the same sorts of intelligence or been aware that the US was operating on the basis of such intelligence, I assume that this might have made a considerable difference. The Fulbright report was countered by the Roman Catholic one, or am I thinking --

MR. HAGEN. Later we gave a fairly hard CIA report.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Some of this did leak to the Soviet team.

MR. RITVO. We have received nothing in the course

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of the game which would have permitted us to have argued convincingly with the Chinese about what the situation was there. I don't know, but I suppose there might have been an element of doubt introduced by having had this document available. I am not certain that it was really effective in helping us consider what we were able to do.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Marvin?

MR. ZONIS. During the course of the game, was there any contemplated alteration of Soviet military posture? You received no information on it?

MR. RITVO. No.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jim?

MR. KING. I just want to comment as I did a moment ago. I think in this kind of game that the major failure perhaps in this structure -- and only because you did not have experience before with Control controlling more than two teams and also playing several teams itself, because we had several other parts of the world represented -- was lack of intelligence. There should have been a special group in Control whose business would have been to feed out intelligence.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I agree.

MR. KING. But intelligence is not fact, and the situation might not have been changed at all, except that

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it would have made it more interesting if there had been more intelligence. It would be completely unrealistic to give anybody something and say, "This is fact; this is what God says", because there just aren't any facts. Even with your own moves there are bound to be some uncertainties. When one team makes a move and moves a certain number of troops, as the China team did, up to a point, well, of course, they know exactly what it was. But somehow they might lose control of the situation. This is just ordinary experience. I don't think you could ever get everybody to agree on the same basis as far as the facts are concerned. It would be the most unrealistic thing you could do.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jackson?

MR. JACKSON. I am very surprised not to have been completely plastered by the Soviets either publicly or privately for having taken the initiative in the creation of a UN force of the nature agreed upon.

MR. BLACKMER. We meant to do that.

MR. JOHNSON. Regarding the Chinese view of the Secretary General during this crisis, I might say that we had a dim view of the UN before but it became even dimmer. It seemed to us that the US had put the Secretary General in an impossible situation. This was pointed out to us by our Soviet colleagues, and this, we thought, was a major

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point of weakness which could be pried at. But perhaps the Soviets decided that the Secretary General had sold out so completely, that he was beyond recall. I don't know.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Are there any other questions to the Soviet or Chinese teams?

MR. MORGENTHAU. I have a number of questions which I shall postpone until the US presentation.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think the US presentation is going to be crucial.

MR. MORGENTHAU. I am not unaware of the criticism which has been made and I am not indifferent to it. I will postpone my reaction to it.

MR. GIFFIN. This reminds me of a rocket in a countdown.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. We are on schedule. It has been suggested to me that it would be humane to break now for a leisurely lunch and for time to reflect.

(Recessed at 1 p.m. for luncheon.)

(Reconvened at 3 p.m. Mr. Hatch and Mr. Hagen were not in attendance.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Gentlemen, if I can suggest that we gird up our sagging loins for one more effort, why don't we go ahead with the US? We will cut it off at a reasonable point and go on to the UN. We will then try to discuss the

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strategic issues with some system. So, Hans, the floor is yours.

MR. MORGENTHAU. When we were informed of the Chinese activity in Northern Burma, whether of organized military or of surreptitious nature, we were also faced with the basic strategic objective of our policy in Asia, that is, containment of China within its present limits of influence and power. Obviously, there are two different ways in which you can enforce a policy of containment: either by responding to peripheral pressure with peripheral counterpressure, or by pitting the over-all power of one nation against the over-all power of the nation to be contained.

In the case of the Soviet Union, we have obviously followed the latter type of containment. For instance, we have said to the Soviet Union with regard to Berlin and with regard to Cuba, and with regard to the line of demarcation dividing Europe, in general: "If you take one step beyond thatline, you will not only be confronted with local resistance, but you will be at war with the US, pitting its total power against yours."

In regard to China, we have pursued the former course, that is, to resist local limited advanced by local limited countermeasures sufficient to contain those local advances. We did not see any reason at this point to change this local

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strategy in the case of Burma, even though we were aware of the pitfalls and of the possible unmanageability of this policy in the long run.

Everyone has criticized Control and I have, too, but I want at least to say a word of praise for this particular kind of dilemma which confronted us in raising the issue of Vietnam simultaneously, and of Thailand, simultaneously with the issue of Burma. As I say, it is possible, in my personal opinion, it is even likely, that later there will come -- rather than sooner -- a point where we will be faced with a much more serious choice than we are faced with now and that we can now manage. Local peripheral containment is primarily as a result of the temporary weakness of China. Therefore, we chose the established pattern of resistance to Chinese expansion. That is to say, to meet attempts at local expansion with counterpressure at this particular point.

How are we going to apply that counterpressure? Now, we were convinced that this counterpressure could be most reliable and most effectively employed by United States armed forces based upon a United States decision. However, we were also confronted with a tactical political problem. In fact, both from the Burmese point of view and also from the point of view of our allies and other nations, some cover for American initiative would be desirable. We were also

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aware of the desirability of covering up the very fact of military intervention under our auspices by some kind of disguise which we chose -- investigating teams, teams of observation, which, in view of the insecure situation in Northern Burma, needed massive military support. So our original proposal was to send teams of observation into Northern Burma, massively supported by military forces ostensibly for their protection but actually and primarily for the purpose of forming a military barrier to Chinese expansion.

In our view -- and it may have been a mistaken view -- this scheme became obsolete on the second day of the game when we received information both from CIA and from the Assistant Secretary General of the UN that a massive organized advance of Chinese troops had occurred into Burma. So we changed our tactics while retaining our fundamental strategy by urging the Burmese government to bring the case before the United Nations and also at the same time organizing an American force and adding to the forces of other nations which would be able to move into Northern Burma regardless of any action by the United Nations. In other words, if there had been no action by the United Nations, we would have moved anyhow under the guise of a commonwealth force.

We were here confronted with -- I should say we

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embarked upon a strategic move which remained unchanged under different conditions and we changed our tactics in reply to changing conditions. We got United Nations approval, and a United Nations force went into Burma, staying there until the first of February, 1964.

Now, it has been said that this action was a premature reaction or an overreaction. I find this argument entirely unconvincing, for we must here distinguish between reaction to a threat which has already materialized similar to that which occurred in Korea and reaction to a threat which is in the process of materializing and which can only be forestalled by quick and drastic action.

If two months ago, let me say, the United Nations armed force had gone into Northern India with the Chinese not reacting to it or reacting to it by retreat, you could have made the argument that the United Nations has overreacted or has reacted prematurely. But in a situation where the problem is not to meet an actual threat but to forestall one, that is, to prevent a threat from realization, either you act early and successfully or you react late and unsuccessfully. So to say that we have overreacted or reacted prematurely is perhaps sensible from the Russian or Chinese point of view, but it is groundless from an objective point of view. Furthermore, the action was completely successful, for without

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this action it is at least a very moot question as to whether the independence of Burma in whole or in part could have been maintained. As a consequence of the action, the independence of Burma has been maintained.

I would also say that the comparison with our intervention in Lebanon is quite unfounded, for the intervention in Lebanon was really pointless in that it had no clear objective. It was directed against nothing in particular. It was a kind of grandiose demonstration of American willingness to commit military forces for something or other. Whereas here you had a clear threat. You had a clear objective. You forestalled the materialization of the threat and you achieved your objective.

The phasing out of the United Nations from Burma in consequence of other developments is a perfectly reasonable and acceptable move in view of the success of the operation. I am quite unable to understand the allegation that the US is being embarrassed by this phasing out. There will always be somebody who will criticize the actions of a great power, especially when they are successful. I would be much more embarrassed if Burma had gone Communist than I am now when I have to give orders for the dismantlement of the military establishment in Burma after it has achieved its aims.

Now, the last phase of the game, the phasing out of

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the United Nations forces there, coincides with threats similar in nature to those which occurred in Burma, in both Thailand and Vietnam. Those threats, as I have indicated before, indeed raise the over-all issue of the feasibility of a local peripheral policy of containment. But in our opinion I think the issue can still be answered in the affirmative. It is not correct, as a matter of fact, that the commitment of a couple of thousand American troops in Burma has overstrained our military resources. As a matter of fact, it is simply not the case that by our commitment in Burma we have incapacitated ourselves to meet similar threats elsewhere, such as the ones in Thailand and Vietnam.

I would also say that there is much to be said about a virtually permanent limited mobile force sustained by the United States in South Asia to be employed in whatever local danger spot which might become acute in South or Southeast Asia.

So I must state -- we have discussed this this morning -- that I can find very little to criticize in retrospect in the series of actions we have taken, and I have noticed this morning with a degree of satisfaction the statement of both the Soviet and Chinese representatives that they were surprised at the swiftness of our action. I am delighted to hear that. We have made one obvious mistake

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which was simply a mistake under the pressure of time and the inattention following from it. We have taken it as a fact that a nuclear explosion occurred in China. If we had been a little more careful, we would probably have called upon the AEC to verify this rumor or this news item before the President would go to press conference and make a statement as though this item were a reflection of the fact. If we had put in a phrase to the effect that, "If this news item is correct, then certain facts followed", we would have saved ourselves this little mistake. This is all I want to say at the moment.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Hans, do any of your colleagues on the US team want to comment on what you have said?

MR. MORGENTHAU. If they want to, they are here.

MR. BLUM. I do not think that in the original discussions this morning or perhaps in Dr. Morgenthau's statement now sufficient attention has been paid to the disorganization of the Burmese government. We were faced not merely with reports of infiltration of Chinese troops, of Kachins supported by the Chinese, but with a very serious political situation in Rangoon which meant in our opinion that unless swift action was taken this government would collapse, that it was unable to deal with the situation, that the Shans, the Karens, and others would create trouble,

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and that the Chinese would inevitably move into this vacuum. To supplement what Dr. Morgenthau said toward the end of the game when the question arose of withdrawal from Burma, I would just remind you that we did not feel that the time had come to withdraw the entire United Nations presence, but, rather, to phase out the military or combat presence and to maintain the observer corps, so that we were not running away from this alleged or real criticism of UN and US presence there. Moreover, we were maintaining the troops that had gone to Thailand -- maintaining them, we hope, for the continued effect they would have on the situation in Burma and because there were these late reports on the worsening of the situation in both Thailand and Vietnam. So that this much larger American contingent that was in Thailand was being kept there at the time that the game ended.

I would say this, too: that I think one of the great difficulties that this whole exercise reveals, as Dr. Morgenthau said, is the problem of peripheral containment. As the game ends, one says to oneself: "Now, where do we have to do this next? Now, what is going to happen next? From where is the next initiative coming, the next infiltration, the next guerrilla activity? How often do we have to keep responding this way?"

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Les?

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MR. HAWKINS. I think I might mention that as far as I could see, there was only one time when we felt momentarily that we were in some kind of real trouble, and that was when we got the impression that it was the Brazilian resolution literally which was passed in the UN, which would have been very uncomfortable. If that had been the case, we would have consulted with the Secretary General and got a much better resolution.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Lucian?

MR. PYE. Were the Soviets aware, incidentally, of the difference in these resolutions?

MR. HAWKINS. We were quite surprised that the Soviets didn't attempt to press for the Brazilian resolution.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The question was whether you had analyzed the difference between those two resolutions.

MR. BLACKMER. No.

MR. KESSING. Nobody had any time for that on the Communist side. It was all done in our absence, essentially.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I have a message from the outside world: Washington 10 - New York 28 at the half. For those who do not know what I am referring to, there is not time to explain.

Larry?

MR. FINKELSTEIN. I agree with the general statements

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of my colleagues that perhaps with a little more help from Control, this exercise would have worked out very well. Confronted at the beginning with a collapsing Burman government, with a Red Chinese force, with a genuine concern for territorial integrity on the subcontinent, on the periphery of the continent, and with the Indian-Chinese experience in the background, the United States in our estimation was concerned with ways to demonstrate its commitment in ways which would support the morale of neighboring Southeast Asia countries and which would permit a period of stabilizing time buying in which a new Burmese government could be reconstituted with the ability to cope with its own domestic problems. It was interested in seeking ways to invoke the threat of superior US military capability -- hopefully without being called on to actually apply such superior ability -- while avoiding a lengthy ground force commitment to a continuing guerrilla battle. As it ended up, all of these objectives were achieved through the happy intervention of the UN force which, at the end of the exercise, remains there offering the basis for the reintroduction of further force if, due to the deterioration of the Burmese situation, that became necessary.

I think the game would have become different if the Burmese government and the Control government had been able

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to call for outside assistance earlier than it did, because in those circumstances it would have been relatively easy for a UN observation force of some character to be authorized in the UN organ. The evidence is that this would have caused little difficulty to other powers. Whatever the problems on the ground might have been, which were somewhat difficult to overcome, nevertheless you would have then had fairly early the introduction of a UN force of some kind and credible circumstances which would have confronted you with the real problems of operating such a force in the field. As it was, the fact that that did not occur meant that the situation deteriorated, according to the information available to the US, very rapidly and in a way which led to a rather further involvement of other forces that were involved and in a way which led to the rapid pace of events that led to a decision which did require some help from Control to get, namely, the one which the UN forces finally agreed on and which took place.

I just want to point out that the course of events might have gone differently if the Burmese call for help had been much different.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Chuck Cross wants to say a word on behalf of Control as to the way that Control viewed this. I would like to point out that nothing in the directive was

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given to the Control group. We did not call on them to make things easy for any team in formulating its strategy or its decisions. Quite the contrary. Maybe that was obvious.

Chuck?

MR. CROSS. I have little to add. I think that the game tested very well what we were trying to do. As far as we were concerned, we wanted to put on all the pressures we could possibly concoct to force a need for early US action in Burma or to force a need to provide some sort of fig leaf for this UN fig leaf or for this action. I think that the American team may have overestimated the pressures for early action and we may have piled some on that would not have existed. Also, their information would have been perhaps more accurate as to Chinese intentions and the extent of the Chinese involvement. We also tried -- and I do not think we did this successfully enough -- to build up a competing requirement for US military power, but I do not think we got enough into the game in that respect. I think that if that had been done, the American action to move rapidly into Burma might have been curtailed. It may even have had to face the fact that with things going on elsewhere and with what Americans had to prepare for elsewhere, that that would have made it difficult to put any really substantial force into Burma for logistic reasons, among others which have been

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pointed out by the Chinese side.

Another thing: We were trying to force the American group to come to better relations with the Burmese government. Nowhere throughout the game did any of the teams get to the Burmese and really get something from the Burmese in the way of actions that they wanted.

MR. BLUM. How could we when Control was playing Burma?

MR. CROSS. There were few moves towards Burma.

MR. MORGENTHAU. We made a number of moves pressing upon the Burmese government for certain action which we wanted it to take, offering and getting the permission to supply administrative and military assistance and so forth. When you have a government which is hardly more than a government in name, you can't get anything out of it because the government can't do anything for itself.

MR. CROSS. Well, the purpose here was to add to your difficulty.

MR. MORGENTHAU. Because you had to substitute for the Burmese government.

MR. CROSS. Yes, which leaves you in a difficult position. The last thing I want to say -- and I do not think anything could have been done about it -- is that I had hoped that we could have forced the American team to try to do some

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POLEX - DAIS I - PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION
1962 NOV. 25

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things to split a little bit more the Soviets and the Chinese; but I think that what has been discussed before, shows that there was very little opportunity in this particular situation to do such.

MR. MORGENTHAU. I would agree with that. You cannot do anything with the Chinese, to begin with. You cannot even talk to them. What arguments -- we raised this point in different phases of the game -- what arguments could you have made to the Soviet Union which would have made it attractive to them to split with the Chinese? The propaganda moves that we made and the sensational statements of the President were in good measure directed to the Soviet Union. The threat of escalation, for instance, the leaking of certain sensational news, how seriously we regarded this situation, the letters to Mr. Khrushchev and the other leaders, all this had the primary aim of impressing on the Soviet Union the seriousness of the situation and inducing it to separate itself from Communist China. But we had nothing to offer in a positive way to the Soviet Union.

MR. CROSS. As long as the Chinese followed the line they did, there was no chance to develop this any further.

MR. MARSHALL. I think it was important in this situation, the situation in Burma. It would be an act performed by ourselves and our friends rather than an act

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performed in conjunction with the Soviet Union, although there was superficially considered some coincidence of intention by ourselves and the Soviet Union. That is to say, we did not want the situation in Burma to be stabilized on the basis of US-Soviet collaboration. Sensing that although there might be some parallelism between Soviet intentions and our own, there would be a very great probability of misparallel in the immediate sequel. On this I think we proceeded quite prudently. I would add this observation: Starting out from there, we had the theoretical choice of not reacting at all. We also had then the theoretical possibility of raising the stakes to the ultimate, that is, bringing it fully to bear and going for escalation. Obviously, with respect to this, this was a factor which we had to bring to bear explicitly in terms of the Soviet Union. Then the third possibility was that of a local response.

Therefore, we had three general choices, theoretically. We could have used the SEATO framework. We could have made some sort of a scratch team, joining with the Philippines, that is, one of our SEATO allies, and combined with some Commonwealth forces. The third choice was the UN. We started out with the second and wound up with the third. But we did not at the same time really snub SEATO in this respect. SEATO was useful to our position. That is, our

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accesses to Thailand were very important, and also our channel of communication. I think there was one omission on your part -- that we should have registered our actions with the SEATO Secretariat as we went along.

MR. BLUM. Just to supplement that last --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go on.

MR. BLUM. When it was all over and we discussed the value of SEATO in this exercise, I think one can ask: What would have been different had there been no SEATO in existence? I think it would be hard to say.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. How would you answer that?

MR. BLUM. I would say that probably nothing would have been different.

MR. MARSHALL. Well, what about Thailand?

MR. MORGENTHAU. If you had a bilateral agreement with the Thais, then nothing else.

MR. PYE. I would like to put a question to the American team which, from Control's vantage point, was not at all clear to me. What kind of image were you trying to create with your policy and your use of force? Were you primarily concerned with bringing force into play so as to affect Chinese calculation in Peking? In short, was this a counterforce policy? To what extent did you want to do this unilaterally to get that effect? To what extent were you

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really concerned with trying to get a collective action, other countries in, and why more countries? Whose sensitivities were you worried about particularly, if you wanted more than yourself in this thing? Was it just the Burmese government and the problem of entry that was concerning you, or was it something larger? Was it world opinion? What was it? In short, it seems that you were working in terms of a very thin area between unilateral action and collective action, and it was not clear to me why you picked this particular level to play it in. There may be some reasons but I could not see what they were. I wondered if you maximized the virtues of these particular positions, which is one of almost acting unilaterally but also of being able to show the world that "They'll go along with us in whatever we do", and, therefore, this gives great strength to that position. Or was it that you were rushed, because of time, and that you felt this was a desperation move?

MR. MORGENTHAU. No, certainly not the latter. It was the former. You really answered it yourself. It was really an attempt, considering the climate of opinion, to make this move which we would have made unilaterally if we had been forced to, to appear as a collective move of all those nations which were threatened with Chinese imperialism.

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I should also say that the swiftness and demonstrative character of the action was addressed to not only the Chinese even though it was addressed to them in the first place, but was also addressed to the Soviet Union and to the rest of the world. In other words, we tried to use the Burmese conflict as a demonstration of our resolution to stop Chinese imperialism with all the means which are necessary to stop it.

MR. MARSHALL. In answer to the question as to what image we were trying to create, I would like to say that I do not think we spent a fraction of a second thinking about images.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Isn't that creating an image, Burt?

MR. HAWKINS. Yes. When we and IDA drew up the scenario for this, it did not exist. That is, what has happened between India and China. In other words, if what had happened between India and China had not happened recently, we would have been very dubious that India would be prepared to denounce China as an aggressor before the UN.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bob Johnson?

MR. FINKELSTEIN. On the resolution, I think it is correct that we were trying to project an awareness that the United States had superior military power. We were trying to create a sense of risk, that is, that if Chinese military force were employed in ways that we thought contrary to the

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US national interest, there was a real risk of a confrontation on a high level of strategic power. Beyond that, in dealing with the local situation, we wanted to have an international UN operation to hold the line, to stabilize it. In pointing toward that, we wished to heighten that sense of risk and therefore create an environment in which the composition of the force and the decision to use the force would most accommodate the US sense of how these should be accomplished.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bob, in taking the floor, I hope you will indicate whether the intended purpose of this set of moves conveyed itself to the Chinese team.

MR. JOHNSON. I am not altogether sure that they did.

MR. BLACKMER. Could I get a point of information before we go into this? I have been unclear throughout as to whether the President's decision to place troops in Burma was made before the first meeting of the UN Security Council.

MR. HAWKINS. Yes.

MR. BLUM. Oh, yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bob?

MR. JOHNSON. Up until we began to catch up to the West's interpretation of this, I think we were rather puzzled by it because we were perhaps too overinfluenced by our own interpretation of the situation. The question to which I

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would like to address myself primarily is this question of proportionality of the reaction of the US and the ways that we attempted to exploit this in our late news. I agree that from the US point of view it is an interpretation of evidence, again, from its concerns, a need to react in Southeast Asia, and that it was a proportionate reaction. But from the Chinese point of view, you see, it was a disproportionate reaction because of our understanding of what our involvement was. Now, the question that is relevant, however, as Professor Morgenthau has indicated, as to whether this was an exploitable situation with other countries, is the question of how proportionate it could be made to seem not only at the time the action was taken on the basis of the Narasimhan report which, I think, we would as Chinese have considered rather implausible. They could have made it very convincing. But in any event, our view would be that over the longer run it would be very, very difficult to have continued to make the case that the Chinese were ever there in significant numbers and that they were still there. Therefore, we could make a case that the US had miscalculated and then we could play on another element which seems to me one bad aspect of US policy: the suddenness of their news item with relation to the Burmese government. Now, it seems to me that when the Burmese government recovered from the trauma from

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which it had suffered, that it would have begun to be concerned that it had been pushed into something, lured into something, partly generated out of its own excessive fear, partly generated by pressure from the US. I think that these two elements could be brought into play against the US and UN position both in world opinion and Burmese opinion. This, I think, would be our view on this question of proportionality. I don't know how exploitable it would have been.

MR. AARON. I would like to ask Control one question. I think this discussion is bringing out a good picture here of image versus fact. How many troops did we employ in Burma?

MR. PYE. How many did the US employ?

MR. AARON. Yes.

MR. POSVAR. Not clear.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Deliberately unclear. This is an important point. It was unclear.

MR. AARON. It was unclear. Yet one gets the impression that we denuded our forces in the Pacific for this. We could have used two men and told you it was Joint Task 6. One also gets the image that a tremendous armada was sailing into Burma. When I sat down with Mike Greene to sort of work out the relationship with UN forces, US, Commonwealth, and so forth, all I had in mind in my own mind

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to employ in that area -- merely because it was a base station -- was a Marine regiment from Okinawa, an Air Force task force of 300 aircraft from Clark Field, and the logistical support and shipping carriers and so forth, with part of the Pacific fleet. Then we moved in the 25th Division which is about the first real notion you got of what we were employing. It was a big situation. This is what we discussed at the beginning. We were not going to get caught short if we had wanted to use force elsewhere in the Far East against China if it became necessary; and if it did escalate, we had to be prepared for the Soviet Union. In other words, these were the contingencies that we were playing with. So this is the impression I wanted to correct. Nobody here realized what we were really using.

MR. GIFFIN. The point I was going to make was that there was another aspect of disproportionality other than the one we were worried about, and that is that the US had to make some estimate of what we had in Burma. What we had is that there were (reading from document): crucial troop movements and forward movements -- very successful, very rapid advance -- of regular Chinese units in Northern Burma. The Chinese have the capability of putting quite a few troops in Burma -- not as many as Korea. It does not require as many divisions as Korea. But China has the capacity to

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introduce very rapidly into Burma at this point, assuming this is her intention, perhaps 200,000 troops. They could do this, certainly, faster than the US can respond with enough troops to stop it all the way to Rangoon without any real difficulty. I feel that what the US did was eminently successful in backing us down to what we were actually doing, which was a reasonably large guerrilla thing in North Burma, by a move that was disproportionate because of the threat we were offering. So we decided to soft-pedal for the time being and we were successful, but I think you were successful because you made a gross miscalculation of the situation. It seems to me that your gross miscalculation was equally a miscalculation if we had been moving in with forces that you would not have been able to handle. I think you had too much for us to handle on a guerrilla basis, but not nearly enough if we had been doing what you thought we were. What we were doing was the forerunner of what we could do, you see, on the basis of the way one interprets the intelligence, and I think that you would have been dead ducks along about 30 days later in Burma. Now, I do not mean by this that the US does not have other means of handling the situation. As I said before this morning, the US wanted bases in India to permit a build-up and to permit a re-entry into Burma and then a fight up the peninsula. But you could not succeed in that.

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Perhaps you could. I just wonder if you did make a calculation of what a hell of a thing you were getting into here if you really calculated that they were regular Chinese units, because regular Chinese units don't go backwards.

MR. AARON. Based on the facts we had, I think we made a good decision.

MR. GIFFIN. You had to figure out the maximum escalation to which you might go on this? You had to go through that?

MR. MORGENTHAU. That is right.

MR. MARSHALL. On the Chinese point of view on the consequences of our so-called overreaction in Burma, I would say this: That there is a lesson for the Burmese to derive out of this. How they apply it, I do not know; but let's hope they apply it well. Going back to something Veblen offered in 1917, he said that any nation which permits itself to get into a position of weakness between two great powers is a source of anxiety to both great powers and cannot maintain its independence. It is bound to be moved from one side to the other or perhaps both. Now, there is a position which holds that a nation coming into independence has got to maintain control of itself if it expects to maintain its entity, if it expects to maintain its juridic independence. I think that this is true in international affairs.

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In Nitze's term, the unpardonable sin is weakness. If that is a lesson that the Burmese can get out of this, so much the better; but I do not think that we can afford to conduct our policy on the basis of the sensibilities of a feeble polity.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Nehru is a repentant sinner, according to you.

MR. GREENE. I do not know whether we want to get into a discussion on this now, but --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. If it is on the UN side, could you hold it?

MR. GREENE. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Could you hold that for a while?

MR. GREENE. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Larry?

MR. FINKELSTEIN. I think it is possible in this situation, as in lots of others, for people to reach the same conclusion for separately varying reasons. In response to Sid Giffin's question, I would like to say that it was never my belief that the US either should or would attempt to counter a Chinese ground operation of large scale at the same level of force. It was my belief that we should be signalling to the Chinese that the kind of victories described was the kind the Chinese should not want to win.

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MR. BLUM. This follows rather closely on what Larry has just said. I find an ex post facto justification for the American reaction. I read (red) the Chinese strategic plan. There was also a contingency plan, the 60-day contingency plan, which, to me at least, meant that if the United States had not reacted and if this disintegration had continued, the Chinese would be in Rangoon or you would have in Rangoon a government completely under the domination of the Chinese. This was part of the Chinese objective to be achieved then; and if not then, then at a later time. But the American action stopped this.

MR. MORGENTHAU. I agree with you except there is another point, another question: If it be true that our action was too strong for what actually happened and not strong enough for what could have happened, what was the alternative? What should we have done, in other words?

MR. KESSING. I think, as Americans, that we would like to believe that we have learned some kind of a favorable lesson, but I am not sure that the lesson just isn't that Control can push the US Air Force onto anybody. The US team has been living, up to the point where the game breaks off, in a sort of a happy dream situation in which its every wish becomes reality -- it gets a pretext for going in, which isn't a dangerous pretext; gets the Burmese government to

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agree to it in a way that we have never done, on the verge of a US decision to intervene whether the Burmese or the UN like it or not; the Secretary General comes in their lap; international opinion comes into your lap; nobody even notices that this is an aggressive course; they get a happy reception in Burma although the Burmese government has sent them an estimate that they would be very unpopular there when they arrived; no problems in deploying a force of less than 10,000 men through a country of a quarter of a million square miles with 15 languages and lots of nationalities, most of whom are not used to outsiders; with very little internal communications in this country; they get all these problems solved in a few days and the Chinese don't know what their problems are and what the situation is; there is very little response to it. But even so, suppose you could get all the forces in here. Isn't a UN or a US force out on a limb? Does it then cut its throat? I mean, does it ruin American interests in the end to have our people all over some foreign country on no particular pretext? Does it help or does it hurt? The Chinese estimate on this situation which, given all the collateral developments in Burma, is not an over-all view of the result. In other words, the Chinese estimate is not an over-all view. There are other things: having the US go in there on very little pretext and making itself

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plentiful in this country for a while. After that, Burma would be more ripe to anti-American feeling than before. Is this right?

MR. MORGENTHAU. This is certainly not right. It is certainly not right. You see, I have no idea what the feelings of the Burmese government are, one way or the other. What they were six months ago may not be what they are going to be six months hence. I know only one thing: that my feelings would be terribly hurt if Burma would go Communist. I would rather take in my strike whatever unfathomable negative psychological reaction might occur in Burma, Ghana, Nigeria, Colombia, than to see Burma go Communist. The communization of Burma is a thing you can observe. It is a fact of life. The fleeting impressions and reactions of individuals are very difficult to ascertain, to begin with, and they are neither here nor there.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Burt?

MR. MARSHALL. I think what has been put forward so far here, the inherent difficulties and vicissitudes, no one thinks are rosy situations. I think that in any team test we are not overjoyed at their enormous success. I think we face a point where we have some very, very difficult decisions and some very close ones coming up, but what we are reassured by is that we still have some franchises in the

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decisions in that area from which we could very well have been foreclosed if we had not acted in this way.

MR. KING. I think the China team has worked itself into a thing on what the US knew about the situation. It really ought to be resolvable. In the first place, there was no indication anywhere of any hard assessment that indicated that Burma was being invaded by regular Chinese troops. Every indication they got was that there were irregulars or guerrilla-type troops with some Chinese cadre involved, and all the reports were speculative. The first hard report they got from their own security, I mean, their own intelligence, was the one that talks about 10,000 to 15,000 Chinese troops and so forth. This, plus the political situation, it seems to me, gave the United States every reason for assuming it was not going to be a 250,000-man invasion of Burma unless the Chinese got away with this first move. It was to stop this first move, we assumed in Control, that the US acted.

Now, as for the justification or lack of justification on the part of Control in putting a 15,000-man unit into Burma -- which was admittedly hypothetical -- what we had to go on was the statement from the Chinese team that there were 3,400 Chinese Kachins and about 1,500 Burmese Kachins with 140 Chinese cadre leaders and so forth. Then there was

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another paragraph which said that the Chinese possessed the capability of rapid introduction of 9,000 Kachins. A little later it says, "China will exploit this success by the rapid 3-day introduction of cadre into Burma." They did not tell us how many of the 9,000 they were going to put in, so we simply added a reasonable percentage to what they could have had in there. Then we doubled it to give a reasonable intelligence estimate and not a confused estimate.

MR. JOHNSON. Partly as a result of the discussion this morning, we feel that the US was justified, on the basis of its appreciation of the situation, to act. We agree that they had an adequate basis for acting, but I think the question is whether, in the longer run, the US can deploy a force to an area like this and ignore the feeling of the population which we think, in view of what little we know of the psychology of the Burmese phobia and fear of being controlled by others and so on, would lead to a reaction particularly in a situation where they had been pressured.

Now, the other part of the situation which I think is more important, perhaps, in some ways to the general problem which we are facing here is the question of what kind of evidence is required in order to get not only initially international support, but continuing international support for an operation against a situation of ambiguous aggression.

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We are basing this view on the past experience on this sort of thing which the US has had, which, I think, leads us to believe that this is a very, very difficult thing to do. You can get intelligence reports of one sort or another, rumors, all sorts of things. You can turn up one bit of evidence or another. But it is always possible to make the case that this is purely an indigenous operation. It is always possible to cast doubt on this kind of evidence. The kind of evidence that is likely to be left by a guerrilla force of this sort is going to pose real problems of continuing international support for this type of operation. Without this international support, then it seems to me that the attitude of the Burmese should be stirred up and that would be a big factor.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jackson?

MR. JACKSON. I think this discussion of the last few minutes has been quite one-sided with regard to the UN force. The sole purpose of the UN force was not just to force back the Chinese in Burma. It also had the purpose -- and this was a major one in the beginning -- of restoring a measure of peace and security within the area, the southern and central areas of Burma. In other words, a policing function. The force was designed both to carry out a policing function in Burma and to restore some measure of local and public

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order, as well as to have the potential to push the Chinese back if they were found. So that this was not just a question of the US or the UN vis-a-vis the Chinese.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. In about five minutes I think we probably should ask the UN team to give us their perception of the situation. There is just one question that I would like to put. Chuck, I was not sure whether you wanted to leave the impression that Control really manipulated the situation for the Americans so that Control caused the Americans to choose unilateral movements and then the UN umbrella. It was not my impression that Control had even anticipated that outcome. I was not sure that you wanted to leave that impression.

MR. CROSS. No. We wanted to put as many pressures on the US as possible.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. To make it as difficult as possible for them to make choices?

MR. CROSS. To prevent them from doing anything to buy time. They could take varying courses of action, but they did not have much time. The pressure was piling up. They had to move in one direction or another.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Right. Let me then ask the US team whether, in that crucial move of theirs where they laid out three alternatives and then opted for, first of all, quick

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unilateral action, they felt constrained by the problem we had given them; and if so, to what extent. Let me answer it partially by saying that since they opted for unilateral action, I think it is very doubtful that the game was so rigged that the only solution you got was a UN force. But what was your impression?

MR. MORGENTHAU. I think the impression of all of us was very clear. We felt that if we did not act with the utmost speed and determination, the Chinese would sweep down toward Rangoon and we would have a situation very similar to that which occurred in Korea. We certainly were clearly under the impact of an emergency which required immediate and drastic action. There is no doubt about that.

MR. KESSING. This assumption, by the way, was not justified. The Chinese timetable in Burma was really quite a long-run one and the Chinese had rejected the strategy of going in overtly with Chinese troops for various reasons. But in any case, the timing of the Chinese timetable for the take-over of Burma for at least the leftist movement of Burma was not appreciably slowed down necessarily by the US action and may have been speeded up because it really was a long-run timetable.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The other point I wanted to make has to do with two things which Don Kessing has said which

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I think we ought to flag or that I am flagging for my use. One is that it is not right for all of the teams to come out of this with a sense of euphoria and that there must be something wrong if everyone feels that they won. I think that is an interesting question, and I think it is an interesting question in nonzero subgains. It is also a real question in relative diplomacy.

The other point that you have made several times has to do with imperfect information, which is one of the most interesting things about the games to me and about real life. I wonder if it is clear in your mind or if it is clear to the American team that they misread Chinese intentions or that they misread a piece of paper which told them what Chinese intentions really were. Which was it?

MR. MORGENTHAU. I do not think we misread anything.

MR. AARON. You were looking at capabilities, which is ridiculous.

MR. MORGENTHAU. We looked at the information which Control gave us, we remembered the over-all trend of the Chinese foreign policy, and we arrived at those conclusions. You see, it is a very open question as to whether, if we had not reacted as we did, the Chinese would not actually have swooped down toward Rangoon or whether Burma would not at least have been partitioned, if not completely absorbed into

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the Communist orbit.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Cushen?

MR. RITVO. As far as the Soviet side is concerned, if we had looked at exactly the same information that the US team looked at, we should have come to roughly the same conclusions that we came to -- diametrically-opposite conclusions.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Explain that, Herb. The same conclusions as whom?

MR. RITVO. As the US team --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. RITVO. -- in their estimate of Chinese intentions.

MR. BLACKMER. We were given early the first Chinese estimate or one of the first ones.

MR. RITVO. We, of course, did not have all the information that the US team had.

MR. POSVAR. The Soviets never had the intelligence which the Chinese did.

MR. BLACKMER. We had Document 2, strategic plan, which had been given to the US.

MR. RITVO. We had no Chinese papers.

MR. GIFFEN. I think the US was justified in making the estimates they made.

MR. CUSHEN. I think Control was not trying to load

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the dice so that the US would take one action in preference to another. Nevertheless, going back over the history of the messages that were sent out and the messages that have been cited by various players as being reasons for why they did something, the messages that led to unilateral action all went to the US. The ones which stand out are the ones about the Korea report, the SEATO activity, the message to the Soviet Union from Burma saying, "Come in and help us", which was relayed to the US. So I can imagine how the US would put a unilateral action in preference over UN action. These were sent at the same time as the one about Narasimhan and the message about the encouragement of the UN.

MR. POSVAR. There is no answer to that. All the other players in the UN were ourselves anyhow. So I do not think that that is a crucial difference. I think it is only coincidental. I think that it is significant to point out here, though, that at one point along in here the Chinese estimate of their own capabilities -- not their intentions -- was that they could sweep through Burma in 30 to 60 days, regardless of any allied intervention on any feasible scale. Therefore, all the US did was misunderstand the Chinese intention. They read the Chinese capability very well.

MR. PYE. Very correctly.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Burt Marshall, and then I think we

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really ought to take time for our UN friends.

MR. MARSHALL. I think it is a very changeable thing. They were subject to contraction in their response to opportunity. I am not sure that the Chinese intentions were as fixed as they think they were. In retrospect, I can go to our own actions in Korea a decade or so ago and see how they varied with the apparent opportunity then opening up. But I think that rigid or anything approaching rigid and firm and conclusive assumptions on the basis of diminution of the intention of the other fellow can lead to great fallacies. I do not trust these Chinese as much as they trust themselves. I think that if they saw this opportunity wide open, they would just pull right in there.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's move, without leaving this subject in any way, to the fourth dimension of this box into which we have put ourselves: the UN view of the scene and also our particular concern for the kinds of things they felt capable of doing in the face of a very messy, sloppy, ambiguous, difficult, complex situation.

Elmore, why don't you and Mike give us your picture of the situation?

MR. JACKSON. Well, I will just comment very briefly on this. You may want to go on and pick up certain features of this that relate to what might have been the next step or

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the next UN step.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. After you are through, we are going to come back to look at some of the outcomes that might have come out of everything.

MR. JACKSON. All right. Well, first, I think our first attempt was to keep open all lines of communication in order to get an assessment of this situation. For this reason we called in the US, Soviet, and Chinese ambassadors and what we call the Burmese ambassador from Control. I think the essence of the Secretary General's position in a situation of this kind is open communications and good communications; and if at any point these either become closed or become poor, then whatever role he or the UN can play becomes very much muddied and cloudy. We played the discussions with the Chinese in a deliberately-ambiguous fashion, as I am sure Bob Johnson knew, as to the extent which "This is the Government of Sweden speaking", "This is the Secretary General". Then on the second day, he suggested that he really did not want to deal with the Secretary General, that he preferred to deal with the Government of Sweden. We took this as a signal that there was not any real fruitfulness in continued direct discussions.

From the beginning I think the big question for us here was whether this was going to lead to a UN factfinding

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observer negotiating role or whether it was going to lead to a UN-administered international force of some kind. Now, the first possibility, the factfinding observer negotiating role, could have been mounted even if the US had gone in unilaterally. The second possibility, however, would exclude a unilateral US move. We did discuss quite informally with the UN delegation a third possibility which was that the UN might put in a factfinding observer mission supplemented by their negotiating role, but at the same time mount an economic blockade, naval blockade, of China. The US ruled this out by saying that they felt they were not ready to go this far. In other words, we were thinking of a holding operation in Burma, a blockade, to see whether the Chinese could be negotiated back through power plays that were outside of Burma itself.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let me interrupt you to make sure we understand. You said before that you ruled out the possibility of your Alternative D, namely, a UN force if the US acted unilaterally. That is not what happened. Are you saying that the outcome differed from your original estimates in that way?

MR. JACKSON. The second alternative would have ruled out a UN-administered force and would have pushed us back to the first alternative.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. But it did not happen in the game, did it?

MR. JACKSON. We got a UN-administered force.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I thought you said that would have been ruled out by unilateral American intervention. I'm sorry.

MR. JACKSON. I said that a UN-administered force would have ruled out unilateral US action.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. But it did not.

MR. BLUM. The US really held its land.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. It turned out to be the sum of neither, as it were.

MR. JACKSON. I am talking about not what the US does before landing, but after landing.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All right.

MR. JACKSON. We did not feel that you could have a US unilateral landing in Burma plus a UN-administered force in Burma.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Are you saying that if the US had landed in strength, which it did not, then your whole strategy would have been changed?

MR. JACKSON. Indeed, this was our leverage with the US delegation. We told them that if they landed unilaterally in substantial force in Burma, that we would throw our full

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weight to a UN resolution asking our forces to withdraw from Burma, including the US.

MR. MORGENTHAU. I remember that very well.

MR. JACKSON. Linc, you have anticipated just a little bit of the secrets here.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MR. JACKSON. In the beginning we considered that there were these two alternatives: a UN factfinding force or a UN-administered force. I think the key to our line of action came with the Narasimhan report. I think we perhaps made a mistake here in not defining in writing the terms under which Narasimhan was being sent out. The Secretary General would not send Narasimhan out to bring back a report on military activity in the area. What we intended to send Narasimhan out to do was to consult in Rangoon and with the remnants of the Burmese government to determine the terms on which this question might come to the Security Council or the General Assembly. But when his report came to us in Control, it was primarily a report of the military situation. As you know, it said that the Chinese Communists are apparently attacking in great strength in Northern and Eastern Burma, although it is not certain how many actual Chinese regular troops they are employing. At any rate, they are meeting no resistance and as far as Mr. Narasimhan could

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observe, they would be able to advance at will to Central and Southern Burma. In other words, in view of what Lincoln said at the beginning of this exercise, that is, that Control represented nature, in other words, the actual situation on the ground, we interpreted Narasimhan's report, since it came to us from Control, as being the actual situation on the ground.

MR. MORGENTHAU. So did we, as interpreted by Narasimhan.

MR. JACKSON. We got this from Control.

MR. PYE. If he had gone to Rangoon, that is what he would have found.

MR. JACKSON. This moves between the game and the frame of the game.

MR. PYE. No.

MR. JACKSON. The frame of the game, as laid down to us, was that Control represented nature, the actual solid facts of the situation. So when we got this message, we interpreted this as being a Korea-type situation and not what we would have gotten had we talked to the Chinese.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think there is a basic difficulty here. If this is a fault of management, it should so be noted. Control can represent both reality and a distortion of reality. When Control gives intelligence to a given team,

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it can manipulate that intelligence in ways which it considers plausible. Therefore, Narasimhan's report to you, as I understand Control's move, was what Control in effect told Narasimhan he learned in Rangoon, whether it was true or false.

MR. HAWKINS. In that case, Control has to put an intelligence evaluation on that.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. No.

MR. POSVAR. The fallibility of the delegate is part of the real world.

MR. PYE. If you have a man go in and out for such a short visit as this, for such a short time, to go to a capital city, Rangoon, where you have had the sequence of things that did take place in Rangoon, then what could you really expect him to learn? You have to expect him to learn something along this line. He was not able to leave his countryside. He did not go upcountry. There was not much of a government to deal with. This is the kind of thing you would learn if you went to either Rangoon or Leopoldville.

MR. MORGENTHAU. He might have talked to a number of people who might have just come from the scene. Furthermore, he is a highly-intelligent and responsible public official. Therefore, if he gives such a report, we are certainly forced to assume that he has grounds for making it and that he is

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not just naively misled by uncontrolled rumors.

MR. PYE. Read your report. Read Control Document 21. I think it is rather important here. What he says is, "We do not know at all how many Chinese troops are there. What we do know is that there is no Burmese resistance to whatever there is." In short, there is zero on one side and we don't know about the other.

MR. JACKSON. The first line says, "They are attacking in great strength." That is not difficult to understand.

MR. PYE. Certainly not.

MR. MORGENTHAU. If you and I had been in Rangoon in this position, we would have said, "Rumors which I cannot confirm are that the Chinese are attacking in great strength."

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think the word, "apparently", is in there.

MR. CROSS. We chose that word.

MR. PYE. (Continuing) "-- although it is not certain how many Chinese regular troops are employed. At any rate, they are getting no resistance. As far as Mr. Narasimhan is concerned, they would be able to advance at will, the Chinese would be able to advance at will, into Central and Southern Burma." This is the same intelligence we took from the Chinese. This is their own estimate of their capability to advance. So we have had to communicate this thought to you.

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MR. KESSING. How can you "observe" from Rangoon? The word, "observe", means that he went and observed.

MR. PYE. It describes the Burmese as being very disorganized and in a panicky state.

MR. JACKSON. I think the question is not how we would play it again. I think what you are interested in is how we read (red) the situation as a result of getting this information.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Right.

MR. JACKSON. Now, we read this in two ways, three ways. First, we read what we had in terms of what we were told in the beginning. We were told that Control represented nature, so we interpreted that as fact. We did not realize that there was a situation which could be manipulated by Control or that information was being manipulated by Control. Secondly, we interpreted this, therefore, as a Korea-type situation. Thirdly, we did, however, feel that Mr. Narasimhan, despite his report having come from such good sources, was a little overexcited and we sent him off for ten days to rest and cool down a little. We were stuck with his report, though. Perhaps Hammarskjold had to cover for his assistants or for people whom he had sent on missions and who had made mistakes. So, similarly, we took this, then, as the basis on which from here on we had to operate. Then we went into

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discussions with the US to see what their intention was. When we found that they were committed to a US unilateral action supported by certain other countries, whether or not they got a resolution through the Security Council covering this or a resolution through the Assembly, we then made strong representations of the nature which I mentioned a little while ago. We did not believe -- we did not think, first, that a resolution would go through the Security Council endorsing this. Secondly, we did not think that the US could get two-thirds support in the General Assembly. This would therefore lead to a straight unilateral action supported by several other countries. We made strong representations to the United States saying we would throw our weight against this kind of action and that we would be in favor of a resolution which we thought would get a two-thirds vote in the Assembly calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces in Burma, including those that the US was sending in. We were extremely happy that the US at that point agreed to withhold the landing of the main forces, giving us time to form a UN force under a UN command.

However, in light of Mr. Narasimhan's report and in light of the action which we then had to take in getting a UN force organized, the advance unit of which was still larger than that which had been set in motion by the earlier

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action of the US, I think all of us felt that we were getting braced for some either formal or informal remarks from the Soviet Union with regard to the illegal action of the Secretary General. Indeed, I think this would undoubtedly have led to a Trygve Lie-type of situation in which sooner or later the Secretary General would have to say he is not sure that he could serve usefully for the UN. This would develop as a political development which was not within the compass of this exercise. I think the one point where we felt we were straining credulity a little bit in the UN exercise was when we got the approval of the Swedish government for a Swedish commander of the unit. However, nobody in the exercise representing Sweden objected to this, so we considered this as something of a triumph. We did not raise this question with the US because we had enough objection to a Swedish commander from the US, anyway.

MR. BLUM. We discussed this but we probably figured we could ease him out.

MR. HAWKINS. Isn't it true that you informally told us that if it came to very serious fighting, we could kick the Swede out and put MacArthur in?

MR. JACKSON. I did not say you could kick the Swede out. I said I thought the Swedish government would probably withdraw him.

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The only other thing I would like in general to emphasize is that in Colonel Greene's and my planning we thought of this as a policing operation, as well as an operation with potential push-back capabilities. In terms of the initial planning, I think we were focused on the policing side of this, believing that if the Chinese did not withdraw as the UN force advanced, that there might be a pause at the point of confrontation while additional pressure, power pressure resources, were mobilized, and that we would enter into a negotiating phase at that point. If that failed, then it would go into almost a straight Korea-type operation.

MR. GREENE. I would say that I think the nature of Mr. Narasimhan's report, as we got it, did have one very useful effect, as far as I was concerned, because I have been telling the Secretary General for years that I needed more officers on my staff and that we could not possibly handle this sort of thing. He was so taken aback that he finally concurred and we rushed around and got some more officers. On the basis of the Congo experience, we started thinking of people we might want to get involved and so we started urgently consulting. I think that the nature of the US action actually made it easier for the way the force finally came out. None of our three or four contingencies

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had US or UK forces on the ground. We had also thought of them as providing the necessary back-up: aircraft carriers, logistic support, and that sort of thing. But by virtue of the fact that they had Marines floating around handy, we got them in in a hurry and this changed the nature of the force insofar as participants were concerned.

Now, I would like to comment here on a point that General Giffin has made several times and this is about the problem, the massive problem, of rounding up all these people and the logistic support and the amount of time to get them there and so forth. Now, this bothers people in the US military a great deal, but it does not bother the UN at all. They do not think about this because they do not have anybody that is trained in this sort of thing. They did not think about all of this in going into the Congo. As a matter of fact, as far as I know, they are still not thinking about it. They do not worry about where the logistic base for the Congo is because they know they can ask the US to take care of this problem, and they have done this throughout the Congo operation. Now, even if I finally got all 15 of these officers in my staff, they would not any of them be British, US, Canadian -- well, you might have a Canadian captain or so -- but you are not going to have graduates of the war colleges in this staff. Therefore, they are not really

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concerned about these problems. All they know is that they need to round up some troops and get them there and they will ask the US or maybe the UK to get them there, and that settles the problem as far as they are concerned. If later on they find out that there really is a problem in keeping them supplied, they would ask the US to give them C130's to take care of this problem. I am oversimplifying it, really, but in a sense this is what they have done in the Congo. Every time they have a problem, really, of massive troop movement or logistics, it just suddenly appears, and the only way they can solve it is to have the US help them.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. You speak with great feeling, Mike, with good reason.

MR. GREENE. This particular type of problem points out that the basic weakness in this whole operation is that the UN does not have a military planning capability for this sort of thing. The US Joint Staff isn't worried about planning for the UN. Certainly Harlan Cleveland's office doesn't engage in military planning for the UN. Certainly Brigadier Rikhye isn't doing any planning. So I do not see that the UN is really looking ahead to this sort of thing or worrying about what they are going to do with these problems other than ask the US to help them.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mike, it has been done by IDA and

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MR. GREENE. With reference to the size of the US contingent, we foresaw a phase approach. Initially, I think, two Marine battalions; and then at about the time the problem ended, we asked them to provide ten more battalions, which actually would have been a division.

Now, it would appear to me that if you started going considerably beyond that in an actual large US build-up of divisions in this force, then I think it is unlikely that the US would participate without actually having the commander actually being the UN agent in the area.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Now, let's see. Bob?

MR. JOHNSON. I have a few comments on what has been said. One is on our relationship with the Swedish ambassador. Naturally, we kept this deliberately ambiguous on our side, but we hoped that the Secretary General would see through the dialectical situation and would continue the communications, because we did not want the UN in, nor did we want to recognize that the UN had a role to play. But, nevertheless, we were delighted to have this channel of communication as a means for getting in touch with others with whom we might have settled this. We concede that the US might have conceived of its role as mediatory rather than one of direct involvement. On the tactology at the time of the Security

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meeting, I think what Elmore said throws some light, a new light, on our understanding of that situation. As I think we saw it and as I think the Soviet team saw it from listening here, we thought that the Secretary General's position had been rather pre-empted by a unilateral US action, but we apparently misunderstood how far the US had gone. It was because of this fact, plus the fact that we viewed the Narasimhan report and similar things as being subject to attack because of a lack of back-up evidence and so on, that we assumed that the possibilities were actually more favorable to our position in the General Assembly. There was, of course, some evidence of this inasmuch as there were some abstentions. I think the reason why we really passed through that without stopping was because our contingency plan called for withdrawal after penetration by the UN forces. As I remember -- and you may have misunderstood the situation -- the report that we got back in the next phase was that there were UN forces throughout Burma. So we thought we had it at that stage and that there was no possibility of "Hold here" or some kind of muddy situation which we should negotiate or administrate.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Was that your understanding of it?

MR. JACKSON. At this point, I think we rushed through, for reasons of timing. Control really set the thing

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several months ahead.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Sixty days.

MR. JACKSON. We passed through this without stopping.

MR. KESSING. The interesting question here is just what the resources of a UN-sponsored force with US participation would be in the event that the Chinese in such an area as Burma were to activate a really full-scale guerrilla and insurgent operation where the size of forces --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. We are trying to find that out.

MR. KESSING. -- where the size of forces committed by the UN could not be very large. It doesn't take many guerrillas to tie up a small force.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. If the Chinese hadn't chickened out, we might have found out some answers to that question.

(General laughter.)

MR. JOHNSON. There is another reason why we had to chicken out. Because it was not, Lucian, was it, a true guerrilla situation, in that we had not really put our roots down in this area. We had local assets but we were depending still to some large extent on these people that we moved in.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Les, did you want to say something?

MR. HAWKINS. No.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Larry, and then Ernie Lefever will comment briefly on the UN action as seen by Control.

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MR. FINKELSTEIN. At various points it has been suggested that a US unilateral force and a UN action were properly regarded as alternatives. I do not think this was ever so in the US view of the question.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. This is a very interesting point.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. The United States was prepared to use unilateral force if necessary, but we were also prepared to have an effective UN operation which would fulfill the US needs. It pressed the unilateral case as far as it did in part because it recognized that there were considerable political obstacles to the creation of the UN force. By threatening an alternative which nobody would like, it hoped to make the possibility of a UN force look more attractive.

MR. JACKSON. We responded to your ambiguity more than we did to the Chinese ambiguity.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. Even at the point where the Secretary General said that if a US force landed he would be forced to take a position which we did not like, we were at this point prepared to accede because the resolution which the Secretary General assured us could be adopted was one which met our needs in creating the kind of UN force that we wanted to have, and that included the incorporation of US units. Therefore, the US flag could fly in Burma under UN auspices in the event that major military force should be

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necessary.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. May I ask the US team a question on that point? It is not clear to me whether your view that your unilateral action forced the UN to move in and help you was a deliberate strategy on your part or whether it was an afterthought or whether it was a kind of general rationalization of moving unilaterally? Could you answer that question?

MR. MORGENTHAU. I think we were resolved to move unilaterally under any condition but we hoped -- and I think I can only repeat what Larry has said -- we hoped and worked for a cover of some kind. We chose first the cover of a team of observation. When this fell through, we moved in favor of a United Nations force. The aggressive alternative never did come up in such simple terms because the situation did not lend itself to it, but there is no doubt in my mind that as a last resort we would have gone into Burma unilaterally.

MR. MARSHALL. We saw that we had to manifest our willingness to act unilaterally in order to increase the chance of peace.

MR. HAWKINS. It was a real threat to the peace by moving in ourselves.

MR. MORGENTHAU. And I want to pay tribute to the fine impartiality of the Secretary General.

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(General laughter.)

MR. BLACKMER. You can afford to.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bob?

MR. JACKSON. Do I hear the Soviet delegate?

MR. RITVO. I have the feeling that --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Herb?

MR. RITVO. -- that we are in the wrong game. Perhaps I wasn't in the game that you people are all talking about and perhaps this should be in the form of genuine Soviet self-criticism. Certainly we missed some incredible opportunities, as I am now listening to them. In the first place, we spent a great deal of time wondering about what kind of observers would be acceptable to our Chinese friends. We thought that under no circumstances could we in the early phase of the game accept a UN observer team. Now, it seems that everybody would have accepted a UN observer team.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. In Burma.

MR. RITVO. Yes. The US, the UN, and we, certainly. Then, much to our amazement, even our Chinese friends, while we were trying to come up with something like an international control commission. If we had any idea that there was this kind of consensus here, at least the Soviets would have made moves in that direction and made their indications known.

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The other point I want to make is that I am afraid there was total confusion on our part about the UN. When we came down and had this meeting, everything was passed. Pye's famous words, "You can't turn history back", simply sent us back up to the conference room with the UN practically excluded from our thoughts from then on. I am looking back here in our records and I must admit we did not send anything to the --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I don't see that, Herb. You vetoed the two resolutions in the Security Council.

MR. RITVO. But we did not have a chance to do a resolution of our own.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I see.

MR. RITVO. There is something here which talks about a resolution. It is a note to the Chinese in which the US is asking them for support in the UN of any plan for inspection of Burmese territory for the presence of foreign troops. Later we have something here which would have been very close to what the UN Secretary General was saying: Secretary General and Burmese to propose comprehensive inspection teams -- call for withdrawal of all military forces. That is very close to the threat that the UN Secretary General was making without our knowledge. So I suppose there should have been something in here indicating that despite

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our dissatisfaction with the UN, that we realize that it exists. I am wondering, as the game historian goes through this, whether one of the obvious gaps and deviations from reality or one of the most glaring ones will be the Soviet disregard of --

MR. BLACKMER. We had a private conversation with the Secretary General in which he was supposed to have made a memo.

MR. HAWKINS. But you did miss the boat on presenting your own resolution to the UN Security Council.

MR. KESSING. That was because of the way the game was.

MR. BLACKMER. That was because of circumstances.

MR. HAWKINS. Yes.

MR. JOHNSON. This is something that has been a mystery to me, because we had this discussion with the Soviets in between the Security Council meeting and the General Assembly meeting, and we agreed on the general lines of a Soviet resolution which might be submitted. Did that ever get --

MR. BLACKMER. There was no opportunity. Control took over at that point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. We probably should not have done it but I do not think it was crucial to this particular game.

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I am reassured to know that the Russians are not always completely efficient and that they are not ten feet tall after all. I think Bob and then Ernie ought to take the floor. By then I think the bar will be open and we will stand for five minutes and charge our glasses.

Bob?

MR. JOHNSON. Just for clarification, our intent was to get a Soviet resolution introduced in the General Assembly. We realized that we had been pre-empted in the Security Council, but that was figured by Control.

MR. HAWKINS. Do you have a paper which explains how this resolution did get through with a two-thirds vote?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I am the one who voted for 103 of the 110 countries so I will have to explain that to you.

Ernie, why don't you give Control's view of this UN scene?

MR. LEFEVER. I am going to say one thing first in my capacity as a person interested in the study with which this first exercise is supposed to have some relationship. We are working on two hypotheses on the way the UN behaved to the issue. One is that the alternative course of unilateral or multilateral or UN action is not exclusive although certain forms of unilateral action by the US would have excluded UN action but certain other forms would not, so they are not

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mutually exclusive and this has been borne out.

The second hypothesis we are working on in the study is that it is not plausible to send a UN force to deal with major war or to deal with the most suitable kind of indirect war. Therefore, if there were manipulations in Control, at least on my part I was trying to help develop the situation -- neither too big nor too small. Therefore, that was the bias of Control which expressed itself in a variety of ways.

The second thing I want to say is that I feel that the Secretary General was very responsive to a changing and ambiguous situation and was very resourceful. Although I am inclined to think that the Secretary General was strongly biased in the interests of the West and if I had been on the Soviet team I would have clobbered him during the process, as Elmore Jackson himself suggested, the degree of friendship with the West and closeness to the West and responsiveness to the West and the neutrals, as opposed to the responsiveness to the Soviet camp, would have spelled his doom, I would have thought.

The other thing I want to say is that it looked to me as if the Secretary General had a certain institutional bias which he probably should have in real life, but it was a little strong perhaps to conform with reality. He was not satisfied with the retroactive fig leaf as in Korea. He was

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not even satisfied with the symbolic umbrella. He wanted UN-administered forces and he wanted the US under these forces. I think the model was not Korea but the model in the Secretary General's mind really was the Congo. It seemed to some members of Control that the Secretary General exceeded his mandate. I heard one member say something about "empire building".

MR. PYE. The question was you took over Thailand.

MR. LEFEVER. We couldn't calm down the Secretary General in the game itself to confine his movements. Most of the time he continued to try to move during Control time. But we should pour water on such. The substantive thing is what Lucian just mentioned: the elaboration of a UN-Burma observation group to regional border watches.

MR. HAWKINS. What about this suggestion of the blockade of China by the Secretary General? Am I correct that you suggested a blockade of China to us?

MR. BLUM. That was even too strong for the Americans.

MR. LEFEVER. One final point: There was one weakness with respect to this which I believe resided in Control and was alluded to a number of times -- mainly, the political configuration in the world. How could we ever have gotten a two-thirds vote in the Assembly for a revised vote for coming to the aid of poor Burma? First of all, we still have the

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unfortunate memory of Congo and the ambiguity of Congo. Secondly, the clear colonial issue was not at stake as it was in the Congo. Thirdly, they voted against it. The vote was written in Control in order to save time. There were an unusually large number of abstentions. There must have been a very large number of abstentions. One could count on four hands the people who would have voted for this.

Another factor on the other side is that India has had its experience with Red China. India, therefore, would have a brotherly interest in this question. But what interest would the Latin American states have? Many of them would probably have abstained. I am wondering if we could have got a two-thirds vote.

MR. KESSING. Ernie, it was because of this consideration, I think, that neither the Soviet Union nor China could be critical of the Secretary General. For reasons which were apparent to none of us, he got an overwhelming mandate consensus for a very strong position. Under those circumstances, we could see why he was working so closely with the US. The vote was unrealistic. There aren't that many people who like to abstain.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I don't support what you just said at all. You can challenge the estimates that were made on this vote. Informally, the Secretary General has verified

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for Control the estimate of the parliamentary session in the UN at that time. My impression is that this was quite a plausible vote.

MR. PYE. You had the warning about the meeting in Accra taking place in which the 11 Afro-Asian nations came out solidly in favor of the UN operation.

MR. KESSING. We didn't have that.

MR. PYE. Yes, you did. Control Document No. 11.

MR. HAWKINS. Reverse the question to the plausibility of that position.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The what?

MR. PYE. Control 11.

MR. LEFEVER. I forgot. I wrote the Accra question myself.

MR. PYE. That went to you at the same time, including China.

MR. JACKSON. The Philippines, Nigeria, and Mexico. If you get that combination behind a General Assembly resolution, that in itself signifies that you have pretty general support for it.

MR. LEFEVER. The question is whether you would have got a two-thirds vote.

MR. HAWKINS. The Brazilian resolution perhaps didn't denounce China as an aggressor but it called for the withdrawal

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of all foreign troops and the maintenance of law and order. There was one which started off, in effect, by denouncing China as an aggressor.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Did they do that?

MR. HAWKINS. Yes.

MR. JACKSON. No.

MR. JOHNSON. The question is: Was there an opportunity for the presentation of a resolution that the Soviets were thinking about? If the General Assembly had been offered the option of choosing one or the other, would they have chosen this stronger resolution or would they have favored one of ours?

MR. JACKSON. Looking back at the UN side of the operation, I think it would have been very useful if we in Control had identified the key decision making aspect of the process. That is, if you are going to move in with a UN force, what are the three or four key decision points with regard to the composition of that force and the operation of that force in the field? Now, we didn't do this in advance. Therefore, we flowed through or Control flowed through several key decision points without an adequate input from the various teams to that. I think one was the General Assembly period. That was not handled as a decision-making point. The other one was the confrontation or the possible

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confrontation between UN forces in Burma and Chinese irregulars. We flowed right through this and got word that the Chinese were out and that the UN forces were at the border. So that part of our problem here relates to the fact that we moved too fast through at least two key decision points.

MR. PYE. In discussing later on the problems of Control, I will bring up that problem. There is a problem of either playing out the decision and then having someone tell you what the score is, or there is the problem of changing the tempo in the game and playing out things in the small. You have to decide one or the other.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Gentlemen, if we can find the bartender, I suggest that we take exactly five minutes.

(Five-minute recess.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. This is the homestretch. The agenda that I have prepared mutatis mutandis is still being followed but not exactly. We thought that we would now ask Control to wipe a little bit of the egg off its face and give us a word or two.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Control should have the floor. Lucian, give us the picture of how you saw the game. If any other members of Control want to join in or if anyone else wants to take part in the discussion, that is all right.

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Then we will move on to a couple of issues that I think we ought to clarify, and then we will discuss the question of the technique with which we have been experimenting here.

Lucian, the floor is yours.

MR. PYE. I must say that I looked forward a little bit to playing this position because people told me this was God's hand that I was playing. I suppose the main thing that hit me was a sobering and maybe a shocking discussion that God is not omnipotent and that the limitations of Control are more impressive than its capability. I found that we couldn't turn things and adjust things the way we might have liked to. I think that what I would like to do in these comments is just to try to do as much as we can in the same way that the problems of other countries have been stated. In short, I will give an overview of some of the problems. We could go into problems of organization and so on, but I don't think that it is appropriate here except that I just want to mention that Control was not a coherently-organized force. It didn't have a strategy, it didn't have a program objective, and so on. So I think all through the game there were different points of view within Control. There was no attempt to work this out except as the pressure of particular decisions forced it. Whatever I am saying reflects, I hope, the consensus or majority point of view,

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but probably doesn't reflect everybody's point of view on every point. I think that the main problem as we started off, at least we were concerned with really raising the question of the problem which was not unlike a combination of Laos-Congo type of situation emerging. In short, we were concerned with the question of whether or not a UN force could work in: (1) a situation against a very low level guerrilla situation directed from outside; and (2) when the government involved was ineffectual and breaking down into a state of anarchy. In other words, a combination of disintegration of the government with some degree of outside intervention, and then the various kinds of pressure that would appear in the countries. So in a sense we are really testing the proposition of the pressure of anarchy existing in this situation or vacuum.

What struck us very early in the situation as an odd paradox was the extent to which it seemed necessary to build fires under people to move in a vacuum. The odd thing, I suppose, too, that struck us in Control was the situation where with all the slogans, I might say, or the casual remarks about the strategy and positions and so on, it seems that the Communists were shying away from fishing in muddy waters at an incredible pace, backtracking. There was then very little there to oppose and it was up for grabs. Now,

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from Control's position, another striking thing was the extent to which the country teams seemed to go into isolation and live really in a shell of their own, and the extent to which they really seemed to be playing with themselves --

MR. GIFFIN. Perhaps they were.

MR. PYE. -- and not really against opponents. It was hard to get into a situation of opponents working in this setting. The concentration was within the set of strategies which they had designed and the achievement and realization of these strategies without too much regard for the range of outside forces. In this sense, it led to maybe an unrealistic situation. We tried to break out of as much as we could from Control, but I don't know if we succeeded. This was the tendency of the game: to get overfocused on the Burma situation. We tried to put in outside pressures; we tried to remind the world that the world is still round. Other things did happen. But nobody was really distracted by anything that could happen. Everyone was quite sharply focused on this. You could have an atomic bomb go off and it didn't shake up any particular players or teams as they all looked to the purported situation. It seems that Control couldn't compute this. This had other effects, too. Another striking aspect was that once everybody got focused on this, they really ended up disregarding world opinion. They

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realized other things were not important and that in this action situation only the achieving of their own objectives was what counted before all else. Of course, the self-confidence of the players, in terms of their own strategies, became increasingly stronger in the game. I think it is a striking thing that as the game moved along, everyone was convinced that they were on a firm track; and no matter how hard you gave other kinds of evidence to them, this did not shake them at all. They were remarkably tenacious on this. The Chinese could have their military attache get kicked out of Rangoon and they could have a hundred-odd Chinese killed by a rioting situation, but this did not really faze them because they had already adopted a low-posture position and they were going to stick to that low posture no matter what. There was a large firmness. The UN position was very firm very early and it was hard. It did not want to accept the change in the facts of life. It did not like the idea that maybe the plan that it was carrying out had been mousetrapped, that Americans had actually pre-empted something. This was very disturbing to the UN, and I think this was one of the things we were not able to compute.

Another range of problems that came up, from Control's point of view, was difficult. This was the handling of the problem of timing and the counterpressures that come

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with timing and the flow of events in making it realistic. I think Control was quite conscious -- and maybe this is because of the five moves -- of the need to move things along, and this was partly the point that Jackson was bringing up. We could not play out some things in the small. We just felt that there would not be enough time. If we had, then this game would not have gone on to a conclusion as to the crisis situation.

So there was this constant pressure. At the same time, we wanted to create conflicting pressures. Therefore, events were moved along at such a pace that one would have been left at the starting post if he had not gotten around to acting. On the other hand, certain kinds of action may require a certain amount of preliminary preparation. In particular, I think we were quite anxious to put this kind of problem in terms of the American team, forcing them into a situation in which they felt the need for quick and firm action. Yet there was difficulty in getting the fig leaf to make that action comfortable and in making it clear that the timing on these two things could be different. I do not know that we have got this over. We were maybe more aware of this than the team would be. But we did, I think, succeed very well in making it clear to all teams that the initial and easy solution of a factfinding group or some kind of investigation

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would not hold. Events would move too fast for all of you on this one. You know, the initial proposals that all teams seemed to be happy with could not hold because anarchy was going at too fast a pace for it to work.

MR. BLACKMER. Or maybe Control was going at too fast a pace?

MR. AARON. That is the same thing.

MR. PYE. No. The possibility was that if any one team stepped above that, then you had to have certain events that all the teams would be caught with, if one team wanted to move bigger than contemplated. Another thing that struck us during our operation was how to handle the UN team. In some senses, it became a national team, from Control's point of view, and was almost like another actor in the game; yet somehow it should have been different. I think this is one of the things that calls for rethinking. I think that maybe the UN should have been in Control or been an adjunct to Control or operating that closely, because it seemed to me that a lot of decisions that the UN Secretariat would have to make would call for quick reactions to the other countries. So I think the UN needed some kind of a closer relationship. In this sense, I think that we put the Secretariat in a slightly odd position, a position which was unnatural in this game. Increasingly the UN did become a national team in the

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end. He was an ally. At least, it began to play out a hand like this to the point where we felt it was empire building.

MR. JACKSON. Can we stop there for a minute?

MR. PYE. Yes.

MR. JACKSON. Are you assuming that the UN was not an entity in this operation?

MR. PYE. It was an entity.

MR. JACKSON. Then why should it not play out its hand like a national team?

MR. PYE. Because I think it would be a different order of entity; that is all. We had you in there almost as though you were China, the US, or the USSR. I think the Secretariat in some ways is much more sensitive to the attitudes of the whole range of countries that can only be reflected in Control. When you were that far removed from Control, you really were not reflecting maybe these attitudes or inhibitions.

MR. MARSHALL. If the attitude of Control is that the UN was empire building, then is it the desire of Control to consume the UN?

MR. PYE. We are omnipotent. You're omnivorous.

MR. MORGENTHAU. The role of the UN was the result of the absence of counteracting pressure on the part of the Soviet Union and China.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Could you repeat that, please?

MR. MORGENTHAU. I was saying that the function which the UN played was in good measure the result of the absence of countervailing pressures on the part of the Soviet Union and China.

MR. JACKSON. I think that is true. I think, too, that at several points there were different readings of the situation by the UN team and Control as to what the reaction of various countries should be, and yet we never sat down to talk this out.

MR. LEFEVER. May I support Lucian? If we are the actors in a nation state system, then the United Nations is a channel through which these actors sometimes act. Therefore, it is in a different order. It is a very important component but on a different order from a state team. How one is to handle this order is a very difficult question.

MR. MARSHALL. I would put it this way: that we live in a world of institutions and some of those institutions are nation states and one of those nation states is the UN. They may be different in some respects but they are still an institution.

MR. PYE. I do not want to cut it out, but somehow it had to be closer to Control in some way. For example, regarding what countries would support or would not support,

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we should have been going through this. We should have been discussing these matters with the Secretary General and he should have been cognizant of the attitudes of all. He should have been cognizant of how Control had decided that the various powers would view this situation, the powers not represented in the game.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jim?

MR. KING. Well, I am not sure that I understand what Lucian is proposing, but I think this is again primarily an information problem and the UN has different information requirements than the national team. You could not put the UN team completely in Control because it would be unrealistic for the UN to have all the information. It does require quicker information. It requires information between moves, if the moves are to be reasonable. Of course, that is what we did.

MR. JACKSON. At the very beginning we understood from Control that we were not to have any informal discussions with any of the state groups at all, except written through Control. Now, this got cleared up and we were released from this and then I think the thing began to work; but at the same time, this emphasized, I think, from that point on that there were some differing assessments on our part and Control's part as to what the situation was.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

MR. GREENE. I think they were a little surprised at the lack of reaction from especially the Soviet Union and China to what the UN was in fact doing, but I found out that really they did not know in a sense what we were doing. So if the UN went too far or got too involved, it was because it was going into something that there was no reaction against.

MR. JOHNSON. It was partly the compression of time during that Security Council-General Assembly situation.

MR. ZONIS. There is one thing that struck me. There was just the Secretary General and his military adviser. The tendency for this so-called DAIS bias to operate was more profound than it otherwise would have been, and the situation progressed that here's the UN: "What we need in this game is a UN military force. Let's go out and get one." Had the team been larger or --

MR. GREENE. That is what I was saying. Jackson and I already discussed this.

MR. JACKSON. I think perhaps it is not significant to the group as a whole as it was in our discussion with the US delegation as to why we moved toward a particular line of approach. We talked this out with them.

MR. PYE. This is not a criticism of how you played

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your hand at all that I brought up. My point was simply, it seemed to me, that you were creating information in terms of the attitudes of different countries and how they would respond to this situation, which, in one sense, belonged to us. On the other hand, maybe you had a right to do it. It created the question of manipulating reality. In one sense, that is more serious than a country team. A country team can do anything. Should the Secretary General be able to figure out how Malaya is going to act or Nigeria? Isn't it a Control problem for Control to figure out how Malaya is going to act? So there were some questions that needed close consultation.

Let me go on to a couple of other points, two more points. One is the terrible pitfall of having either a UN Security Council meeting or a General Assembly meeting in this kind of a game situation because you might begin to act out and have a mock session which would take up the whole time, take up the whole afternoon, very quickly. We got ourselves, I think, in a worse situation on this point when, although we did not want to have a quasi session, we ended up almost getting a mock-up session of the Security Council; and in one sense, the inputs were not quite adequate for the ultimate decision which came out of it, and I think there was some feeling about it that maybe we should have handled

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this not by having the group appear together in a room, but, rather, because we felt that communications facilitate speed, that it would have been faster for us to go around the track and check out with each of you as to how you would have stood on a different range of issues. I think maybe that is the only way you can handle a General Assembly meeting or Security Council meeting in this type of game.

MR. GIFFIN. Could I interpose a suggestion there?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

MR. GIFFIN. I have been through a game which did involve UN stuff. An error was made. There was no UN. The UN was simulated by Control, which is the way I think it should be done. I do not think there should be a separate UN. But the vote that was made in this one was simulated so completely, that they forgot to consult with the teams that they did have as to how they would have voted, you see. So toward the end of the game, Control was asked: "How did we vote on that resolution?"

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Not in this game.

MR. GIFFIN. What I would suggest is that you either have a UN team with 110 members and a staff or you have none at all. If you have none, then Control on any particular problem must consult the teams in the game as to their vote. Then you can simulate everybody that is there. But you

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cannot simulate the ones that are not there.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let me say a word there, Sid. We will talk a little bit later about the design of the game. The Secretary General has become an international institution all by himself in the world, and the 110 countries are the world and they provide the inputs for UN decisions. It may be that this was not crystal clear. It may also be that the UN Secretary General ought to be in a kind of limbo between being a team and being on Control. It is the first team, as far as I know, that the Secretary General and a military adviser have ever been made a playing team in this kind of exercise, and the reason was clearly that even if you had never come up with a UN force -- which you might not have -- there was no requirement on you to do this, except a moral one. The Secretary General was continually asked by Control to develop contingent plans, but I think that perhaps we ought to reserve for the moment further discussion of how to organize Control, which is a crucial methodological problem in these games, and move on to one or two final substantive points.

MR. PYE. On that --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Lucian, were you through?

MR. PYE. I have just one more point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

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MR. PYE. It came out very clear from Control's position the extent to which you do not really have a divided world in the sense of two-power bloc mirror images of each other. The US on the one hand and the Sino-Soviets on the other were not at all symmetrical in this whole game. It was amazing the degree to which the problems were quite different in dealing with them and thinking about them and in foreseeing their strategies and treating with them. I would say that there is very little symmetry in this thing, which would be quite different than most of our confrontage games. But in this game you had almost none of that. Along with this, of course, was the inability within the game to see Control constantly concerned with the tensions that might be between the Chinese and the Russians. Again, we could not see any way in which these things could be increased. We were overpowered by the ease with which the bloc came back together again in spite of a malicious God.

MR. BLACKMER. It seems to me that Control made what in retrospect appears to be a fairly serious error in this regard, namely, in supplying the Soviet team at the beginning, I think, of the second move with a document containing Chinese intentions which the Chinese had supplied Control.

MR. JOHNSON. This is our error.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Don (Blackmer) has the floor.

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MR. BLACKMER. The Chinese made the request that it be transmitted to the Russians. The critical point, it seems to me, within the structure of the game is that we received the document knowing that it was the document which the Chinese had submitted to Control. Therefore, we felt that it represented an accurate estimate of Chinese intentions.

MR. GIFFIN. There were some deletions.

MR. KESSING. Very crucial deletions.

MR. GIFFIN. That is part of your error. You're the only heel.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLACKMER. It was passed to us as the document which you had submitted to Control. Therefore, we believed that we did have a full representation of Chinese intentions.

MR. WHALEY. It was a disclosure of all material facts.

MR. PYE. We had a tender feeling for the girls who did all this typing over again.

MR. JACKSON. It seems that you were in the same position as Dot was and almost had the same difficulty in manipulating the characters.

MR. JOHNSON. We realize that this was not the realistic way to do this, but the problem was one of sheer time. Every one of these papers was drafted and typed. We

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would have had to go back and --

MR. PYE. Retype the whole thing.

MR. JOHNSON. -- and change them and so forth.

MR. PYE. Even then, the closer you got in line with the bloc and the bloc got reformed, even that did not create symmetry in the game. There was a lack of symmetry.

MR. POSVAR. Do you deplore the lack of symmetry?

MR. PYE. No. I am impressed by it.

MR. POSVAR. Oh.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. The more the cohesion in the bloc became apparent, the less we had to be concerned with it because then the more it escaped our ability to influence. At the beginning, we were marginally concerned with the extent to which we could precipitate a situation in which the Russians would feel that they might be confronted with very difficult decisions; but as this possibility disappeared, we could no longer be concerned with it because we had no influence.

MR. HAWKINS. United on a fairly massive aggression in Burma.

MR. KESSING. But they knew that they wouldn't, and the reason they knew that they wouldn't was from their actions. As early as the first period, we were able to take a very accurate fix of what their actions would be almost

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throughout. They were behaving so well in simulating the Soviet Union that we were able to estimate them without much trouble and therefore could make an estimate that we should ask for their support and give them our --

MR. FINKELSTEIN. The problem is the reverse. What difficulties would they have with you, from the US point of view?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Are there any further comments on the way Control played its hand? If any other members of Control want to speak or if any other --

MR. KESSING. I just want to comment on some of the first points you (Mr. Pye) were making about Control. We are familiar with people going through this game business before. The backing away and caution, particularly on the part of the Red teams, is related, of course, to the long-term strategy. Their caution is induced by a position. There is also a tendency in this situation for them to reassert themselves to the status quo, so that Control has to keep shoving people together. This is very consistent, I think, in games of this kind partly because there is a good deal of resilience and stability in the status quo that we are in. The continuity of team actions and their tendency to build up self-confidence as they go along, I think, has to be anticipated by the guys who make up the game in such a way

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that you have to present really tough decisions very early because otherwise you get people frozen on courses that are not going to meet. These things, you will find, will again recur in other games, I think. Similarly, with a focus on the range, or, rather, "region" -- with a focus on the region in question, together with the strategic facts of all other regions combined, I think you will get that.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I must comment on that. Having myself sat through quite a few crises on the American side of things, I do not think that it would have been an accurate replication of nature to be forced to make crucial decisions the moment the crisis starts. My own impression, based on experience, is that decisions begin to mount as the situation unfolds, and this is the great difficulty. I find it unrealistic to think of being forced to make clean-cut decisions of an ultimate nature at the beginning of any particular crisis, particularly this kind of crisis. I think you and I are in some disagreement on that.

MR. GIFFIN. I do not think you are. I am not going to talk much because I think you want to talk about methodology later.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. GIFFIN. There is not much difference between you.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. There may not be. If there is

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nothing else from Control itself or as to how Control made decisions in playing its hand, we will hear from Hans and then Jim. Then later we will turn to "outcomes".

MR. MORGENTHAU. I think one disappointment the US team experienced was the lack of a real antagonist.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Lack of what?

MR. MORGENTHAU. Lack of antagonist. We did not play against anybody in particular. We tried to manage an objective situation. The main problem we had was to come to terms with action which we wanted to take in our own interests and the cover which we tried to provide through the United Nations. It was not a real problem that we were facing. The Soviet Union and Communist China were really shadows hovering in the back and not really opposing us in an effective way.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Are you saying that this is a good thing or a bad thing or a neutral thing?

MR. MORGENTHAU. I do not know whether it is good or bad, but it is unrealistic in terms of the situation which the actors of American policy making face.

MR. PYE. As the Congo?

MR. HAWKINS. You are tilting at windmills time after time.

MR. PYE. Your opponent is a shadowy thing. It is a

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disintegrating situation.

MR. KESSING. But the value of a game, as opposed to any other form of analysis, lies in the interaction of two or more teams. If the interaction of two or more teams is not allowed to determine the course of the game, then you might as well play each time against a static scenario on different weeks in different parts of the country.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think that is a very crucial part about method which we ought to come to. Is this a suitable technique for a sort of gray-area situation where you do not really know who your enemy is -- it may be yourself -- and where it is not red versus blue, which are the typical war-game designations? I think we ought to come to that. It is a very central methodological problem. Should we talk, at least briefly, about how all this might have come out? What would Move 6 have been, in other words? Is it possible to extrapolate from where the game ended to get some notion of where American policy would have been carried by their particular set of branch points of decisions?

Secondly, how does your prediction of the outcome compare with the predictions you made at the beginning of the game from your own particular standpoint of how it was going to come out or what this kind of problem would result in?

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MR. HAWKINS. I think the Chinese should be the ones to answer that.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's ask them. What do you think would have happened next and how does that compare with your predictions at the beginning?

MR. JOHNSON. I think this goes to the root of many of the things that we talked about earlier, really, and there is some difference between the Chinese and American teams on this. Our view was that it was possible to erode the international support basis which we viewed as weak in the first place for the UN presence and then the US presence; and that, therefore, we could over a time recreate a very spongy situation in Burma that would not be unfavorable to us. As to how we compare this with our expectations at the beginning, I think our expectations at the beginning were that it would be very difficult to get international support for a UN force; but that if such support were obtained, that it would be in some considerable difficulty. Now, we, in a sense, caved in more perhaps than we predicted in our estimate because of this new situation. That is, we thought that there had been a different appraisal of the situation by the US. We retreated on the ground more than we estimated we would have done in the beginning because of the likelihood of detection. We did not want to take this risk because we had greater gain here, as I

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said, by eroding the US force and the UN force.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Do you estimate your long-term prospects as good?

MR. GIFFIN. The US action has definitely postponed what might otherwise have happened. To that extent, they were successful.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. But (you were) not deterred?

MR. GIFFIN. We are not sure that they headed it off, however.

MR. JOHNSON. And we are not sure whether, in the process, they risked some political losses internationally.

MR. PYE. What have you done, the Chinese team, to prevent UN-US forces from reconstituting the Burmese government? Now, they are in there building up the military, reorganizing it, arming it, creating civil authority, and so on and so forth. I don't see that there was any action on your side except the sort of hope that people won't get along well with each other. This may be a good hope to bet on. There was no covert action?

MR. KESSING. Yes, there was.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Herbert?

MR. RITVO. I do not know why that situation, as presented by the Chinese, should look any different to either the Soviets or the Chinese as Laos where the Americans had a

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rather prolonged period of time in which to give military aid to influence the government but which, because of inherently-unstable situations, can turn out to be not as pro-American as the US would have wished. It seems to me, under the conditions of the game, that the limited objectives of the Chinese which conformed to an awfully high degree to the Soviet expectation of the situation, resulted in again a kind of optimum for the Soviets when one saw the mousetrap, as I saw it, of the US rushing in. It seems to me that we at least were under the impression that there was more in American intervention than has come out here. Although I expressly admired Professor Morgenthau's presentation of the American case, I would not be as optimistic that the long-range results or even the results in the relatively prolonged short-range period would be as beneficial to the United States. I do not say that they did not make the best case and I cannot provide an answer for what alternatives the US has. Given this kind of situation, you simply cannot stand by, it seems to me. If you have to decide whether to go in alone or to try to get the UN to go in with you, you operate for one or the other.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Can we ask the US to comment?

MR. HAWKINS. I think we have set up a Burmese regime.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. How do the estimates of the outcome,

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long-term, middle-term, short-term, compare with the estimates of the outcome that it hopefully made at the beginning?

Hans?

MR. MORGENTHAU. Yes. I want to start my observations by discussing the last comment you made. You see, it is, of course, very simple. We all indulge in this pastime from time to time to point out the weaknesses of a certain policy. There is no policy which has not such weaknesses, but it is difficult to decide this question when you are confronted with a political decision also. What is the alternative? What do you put in its place if this is the wrong policy and, as you just indicated, in all probability there is nothing to put in its place? If you refuse to accept this policy, you simply have not got a policy at all.

Now, concerning our expectations, I think we had less optimistic expectations at the beginning concerning the Soviet-Chinese reaction or lack of it than actually occurred. In other words, in terms of the short-range objectives of our policy, to preserve the independence of Burma and contain China, I think we were eminently successful. Insofar as the middle- and long-range expectations are concerned, I must frankly say without apology that as far as I am concerned we paid very little attention to that.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. This is a very American policy.

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MR. MORGENTHAU. All right.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Very realistic.

MR. MORGENTHAU. I think it is very difficult. You cannot look at foreign policy in terms of a chess game where you plan five moves ahead. I think the most rational way to go about this is to make the next move -- it was in general anticipation of developments -- but then to wait for the move of the others before you make another move. It is quite possible that that situation in Burma is going to deteriorate drastically by virtue of our intervention. Still, I would not arrive at any different decision if I could retrace my steps in view of this anticipated deterioration.

MR. RITVO. All I can think of is that if it had been possible in the game for the Soviets to have had the UN accept a full inspection without the use of any kind of force and then the inspection team had come back and largely substantiated the Chinese claims that there were no appreciable Chinese forces, the game would have then gone back into the laps of Control.

MR. MORGENTHAU. Correct. But, you see, we eliminated this possibility because we did not believe that you could guarantee the safety of the team and also the effective discharge of its functions without massive military support. In this we might well have been mistaken, but we based our

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estimates on the information we had.

MR. RITVO. That information would have been changed.

MR. PYE. What would you have done if you had found out that there was anarchy? Don't forget that there was this disintegration a la Congo.

MR. MORGENTHAU. We took this into account by impressing upon the Burmese government the need for its requesting UN and US technical administrative aid. Even if we visualized complete anarchy, we would have been willing, under UN auspices, to run Burma as well as we could.

Now, as far as long-range prospects are concerned, I think we all -- perhaps in different degrees -- are aware of the limited usefulness of peripheral containment. I think I can speak for the team when I say that we anticipate perhaps in the distant future a situation where we will confront a strong China which we will still want to contain and where we will then have to make a decision as to whether we want to give up the policy of containment altogether or confront China not at the periphery of its empire but with the totality of our power pitted against the totality of Chinese power.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bob Blum?

MR. BLUM. Just to supplement what Hans Morgenthau has said, we did not, as he said, really discuss our anticipation of our middle-term or long-term results. I think

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we were conscious of a certain fatalism almost at work here, with the result that when it was all over we felt that we had gained our objectives but it was still possible for the Chinese to continue their guerrilla activity whether in Burma or in Thailand or in Laos or in Vietnam and that we might be confronted with the same type of a situation all over again. Although we felt that we had gained a position of influence with the Burmese government, we had also gained probably a weak and unreliable new client government in Asia with all that that entails: weakness, unreliability, and an indefinite type of commitment. So although we did not really discuss this in any detail, my feeling is that we were aware that we had not reached a satisfactory result in any long-term sense.

MR. POSVAR. I would like to address myself to this other question of expected outcomes, and I think it relates in a way. I do not think that it is surprising that we did not get any long-term realizations here because it, after all, was a short-term game; but I, for one, was completely surprised at the outcome of the game or, let's say, the "method" of the game. I kind of expected that it would be very easy for us to get into a Korea-type situation. In fact, that, if anything, there would be feverish activity to keep it from becoming too headlong in its catastrophic nature. But on the contrary, I think there is a peaceful bias in this whole

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situation. There is a tendency, because we are a committee, as we were discussing this afternoon, in Control itself to discourage any particular introduction of a random catastrophic event and to rule these out altogether in a period of, well, in this case, four months or two months. I suggest that this is unrealistic and, as I said before, I think there should be a man in charge of random catastrophes in this game.

MR. MORGENTHAU. I think your point is very well taken.

MR. HAWKINS. We went through Korea without a catastrophe.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. A random one.

MR. POSVAR. If you look at all the possible kinds of events that can occur, you will find a peaceful valley between the peaks of sharp catastrophe and unpredictable events because we are unwilling to take the random decisions necessary to precipitate action.

MR. HAWKINS. I think there should be random decisions. We sat there and each of us said to you, "We are going through the same old motions." In a sense, we were in a groove that was perfectly predictable from past US history.

MR. POSVAR. This started at the very beginning, and maybe this is a suggestion of a method which is related. That is, that the scenario itself was inherently stable. Granted, our mutual desires for peace on top of it. What is

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needed besides the scenario known to everyone are a few secret catalytic messages which put the heat on to do something right away.

MR. BLUM. You almost had a nuclear explosion by the Chinese. You almost had Chinese Nationalists invade the mainland.

MR. POSVAR. These were deliberate attempts on our part and every one of them fell flat.

MR. GIFFIN. Inherently incredible is the reason.

MR. MORGENTHAU. You're not serious?

MR. GIFFIN. Not serious and not credible. Burma is the only thing that is serious.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I have the floor is the matter of fact. My observation, Wes, of that problem went as follows: In a particular brink-of-war game where you are looking for the pressures on the US whether to escalate, not to escalate, use nuclears, not use nuclears, and so on, you throw in these random events to make decision-making as hard as possible. My impression in this game -- because, after all, the Control team was in charge of this -- was that there was a deliberate effort to filter out that kind of noise because it was not felt -- and this was a conscious decision -- that it would help particularly to advance this particular policy planning and research objective to have a Burman blockade

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or King Hussein assassinated. I cannot think of a single time when King Hussein was not killed. He has been killed at least 45 times. But there was no need for it in this game. That was my impression, Wes. Now, maybe that is a mistake, but I think this was deliberate in this game. Maybe it was wrong, but I think it was deliberate.

MR. POSVAR. I think in respect to the events themselves there is a bias in response to the safe alternative.

MR. HAWKINS. Just going through the motions.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's see. Elmore.

MR. JACKSON. Well, this kind of game, if you intend to operate it against the background of reality and not try to reschedule reality, has to be pointed toward certain new and inventive approaches to situations. In this particular case, it was focused on the creation of an international force.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. "Possible" force.

MR. JACKSON. So a good deal of the inventive approaches which came out needed to be related to that.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. JACKSON. It would be entirely possible to run a game of this kind in this same area but on the basis of a different stage in history and we would come on a week end

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of this kind and spend the first hour or two reading what the ground rules are with regard to this stage in history, and then you run the thing. I think it is possible to develop perhaps on this kind of basis a series of crisis situations, a series of confrontations, that are quite different from any that we have met in this game. But the thing that impressed me about this week end has been that most of the points on which we came out and most of the unresolved problems that are left correspond to most of the situations, similar situations, in which the UN has been involved. You do not in this kind of operation, even though it stretches out over three years under UN auspices, solve the long-range problems. All you do is you find that there is some restructuring of the problem or you find that you have put in some new machinery to deal with the problem or there have been a few changes in national attitudes. But you have still got the background right there.

MR. MORGENTHAU. I never saw the long-range problem at this particular stage. Only historians in retrospect realize that an accumulation of small solutions has solved the long-range problem.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bob?

MR. JOHNSON. I have a couple of points to make. It seems to me that why both we and the US team can be optimistic

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or happy about the outcome is because the US team was looking at it in terms of the short-run objective and we were looking at it in the beginning in long-run terms. Burma, I indicated in my initial presentation, was a relatively-low-priority target for the US and for the Chinese, which made it easier, even, to view it.

Another thing: On the Congo comparison which has been made several times because it relates to the later outcome, it seems to me that it is not altogether positive because the Congo was notable for its lack of prior institutional situation, I mean, their almost total lack of political and social institutions. Maybe it is because I do not know the Congo. I am assuming this.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think you are right.

MR. JOHNSON. This is the popular view. Whereas, it seems to me, in the Burmese case, there would be a lot of institutions which may have been temporarily damaged and submerged in this crisis atmosphere which will reassert themselves. They would have a resilience and they would impinge on the ability of a US team under UN auspices to give advice. Also, the existence of these institutions would provide the Chinese with certain levers in the situation to operate against the US, levers which the Soviets rather lacked in the Congo. They tried to do some of this, but these were

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individuals who did not represent anything. Burma was a situation that was rather different. It is a matter of degree.

MR. RITVO. There is a question of ambiguity when you operate on the border of China and Burma and when you operate with continents separating you.

MR. KESSING. I have a similar comment on the substance here. When you mention the possibility of real anarchy and trying to use the UN, as you did in the Congo, to move in and try to take over and settle the anarchy, and you think of the Katanga analogy, I think it is clear that if you played this out slowly the mountain and minority areas in Burma might very well be split off. They could declare their independence in the course of the dissolution of the Union of Burma and then there they would be, sitting with lifelines to China, whereas the Lamumba region did not have lifelines to the Soviets. In Burma they could then have asked for Chinese support and could have gotten Chinese military support in there -- support which the UN would not have wanted to go against in an offensive operation.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jim King?

MR. KING. I really want to ask a question. I will start by asking: "How could you be realistic other than going along with Don's position that there is a tendency for things to return to equilibrium?" Wes' observation that there was a

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peaceful bias and so forth seems to me the way the real world operates. You do not get a really globe-shaking crisis the way this crisis arose. We would have a world war. There are a few with which we have experience. They come at the end of a long series of little crises like this; and because the short-run decisions such as Hans was talking about turned out to be unhappy ones in one sense or another, the situation progressively got worse and the crisis became more and more unmanageable and so forth. It seems to me that if you are going to take the thing realistically one step at a time, that you are almost certainly going to come out with a conclusion, a temporary interim conclusion, in which all the participants think they have won. That is the only way you get a stable conclusion. That is the way you can say, "Stop here", even for a moment. That is inevitable. Otherwise, the crisis is not over. I think that the real problem that we all have to face and which I hope the game will make some contribution to -- and this has no reference to the DAIS bias -- is how you make the connection between this short-run or mid-range prudence that moved the US team and, I think, everybody else and the longer-range implications which are so much harder to see. Maybe the only way you can do it is by doing a series of games on the same problem or the same problem series or having different people play in it over a period of time or

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something of this kind.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Larry?

MR. FINKELSTEIN. Well, Jim's last remarks about a stable conclusion seemed from my perspective somewhat optimistic because I rather lean to the kind of argument that Don Kessing has introduced about the problems that lie ahead. But in assessing how the US came out in this, I am impressed by two facts: firstly, that a UN continuing presence has been introduced along the frontier; and secondly, that constructive assistance relations have been established between the US government and the Burmese government, neither of which had previously been possible.

Therefore, the crisis, I think, in terms of the US assessment of what it might have hoped to get out of it, has led to two real gains as against the alternative ways of playing out the course of developments based on the original Chinese purposes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Lucian?

MR. PYE. No.

MR. HAWKINS. What kind of a Burmese government do we have? What are we saddled with in Burma at this point? What kind of a government are we actually dealing with? Is it any better than the one we have in our pocket in South Vietnam? Part of the scenario was that the South Vietnamese

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situation was, if anything, worse than it is at the moment.

MR. LEFEVER. At least, it is our client state and not somebody else's.

MR. HAWKINS. That is true. But do you also agree that we are omnipotent and that we can control 20,000,000 people just by virtue of the fact that the government happens to be in our pocket?

MR. PYE. That is a very unrealistic dimension of the program that we are dealing with.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Order, order, let there be order. Lucian has the floor.

MR. PYE. The end result here should not be depressing, one way or the other. This is the fact of life. There are many countries, so-called countries, in the world which really do not have the internal dynamics and so forth. Burma ranks among these. The real question in this situation is clearly: Whose clients are they to be? That is all it is. And who has the advantage? I think the way you would naturally expect this to come out would be that it would turn out to be a client state for the West but with certain possibilities for the Communists. It might have been a very shocking thing if it came out the other way around.

MR. HAWKINS. We have to consider the actual operational effectiveness of whatever government we find in our pocket.

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The evidence from South Vietnam is not very encouraging.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mike Greene has the floor.

MR. GREENE. Going back to the point which Don was making about the UN organizing its so-called Congo-type force, I have serious doubts that you are ever going to have a Congo-type force again because so many of the nations you are dealing with participated in the Congo operation and they either have already withdrawn or are now trying to get out of it because they do not want it to go on for more than six months or a year. Having had that experience, I doubt that there are any of them which are going to volunteer forces to participate in this, even though we deliberately organized a force of this nature.

MR. PYE. Did you think Scandinavia was all right? Did you ever think of putting in a white force?

MR. GREENE. I never had to. It was still a Congo-type operation and we still were relying on the Nigerians and the Malayans.

MR. PYE. Malayans were out.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bob Blum?

MR. BLUM. I would like to go back to a point that Johnson made. He viewed, I think, properly the distinction between the short-range benefits gained by the US and the long-range results of the Chinese team. But it would seem to

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me that those long-range benefits were there before, and I am not sure that anything really has been gained. There is a result of Chinese Communist geographical position, policy, and all the rest of it. But if the game was played and yielded desirable results from the Chinese Communist point of view, then how could the US have played the game in a way that would have yielded undesirable results to the Chinese Communists?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is a good question.

MR. JOHNSON. There were some respects in which they could have played it in a way which would have made the situation less vulnerable to Chinese leverage. If, for example, there had been opportunity for new deliberation in the UN and if the US had not forced the UN into this action and produced a situation wherein support for this force was rather minimal in the General Assembly, it seems to me that this would have created a more favorable long-term situation if he could have gotten the force through the UN through a more gradual process on the basis of developing a case, a sound case, and so on.

MR. PYE. By precipitating the action, how many votes would be swing votes? If you go down a list of the countries and check off the countries, I do not think there are that many swing votes that make that much difference.

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MR. JOHNSON. Not only the votes but also the question of how they felt about the way the thing had been done.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I raise a question on the timing because if you evaporated physically while the UN was debating, then you could have pre-empted the whole operation. I do not quite follow your logic, Bob.

MR. MORGENTHAU. Let me suppose that we had followed that course of action. We would certainly have lost the long-range advantage of deterring both the Soviet Union and Communist China from engaging in local aggression because we demonstrated our determination to oppose local aggression even in a situation where it did not exist.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Lefever has the floor.

MR. LEFEVER. Regarding the point made about defense and deterrents, I think that in a nation like the US, for instance, there is a signal of what we might do in a vital situation. So I think Professor Morgenthau's point is well taken. The other point I wanted to make is this: You do not need to greatly improve your situation to justify an act. If you can prevent the situation from deteriorating seriously against you, that is full justification.

MR. JACKSON. Are you planning to talk about the future of UN field operations, or should you --

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Why don't we talk about that right now in the context of a couple of policy questions which might bring to a focus everything that has been said in terms of our sponsor? The first question is how in this messy, ambiguous sort of problem of possible paramilitary guerrilla-warfare, indirect aggression, subversion, dissident minorities on borders, the most ambiguous, difficult kind of low-level antagonistic situation that the US confronts, how in this kind of situation can an international force fight, if at all? So the first question I come out of this game with, Elmore, is: Is it relevant to that kind of problem or is it not relevant? Do you want to start at that point?

MR. JACKSON. Well, this goes back to something Colonel Greene said here earlier. In the international scene I am not sure whether there will be any more Congo-type operations. Indeed, I am not sure how long this kind of operation can continue in the Congo. One of the queries that we kept talking about as this exercise went along which, I think, is very real in regard to the future, was whether for this type of situation there may not be a possibility of moving toward somewhat smaller forces at a higher level of training. These smaller forces would be supported by more sophisticated communications equipment and sophisticated logistic equipment. This force is the type of thing that we

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were suggesting here for the Burma border watch and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, but adapted to the circumstance, the time, more personnel, enlisted personnel, or at least enlisted personnel, but with the frank recognition that these forces are going to continue to operate in various areas of the world in one form or another more or less on a permanent basis with, I guess, the fluctuating sense of need. In other words, I do not think that we need to project here future situations in which the ratio of enlisted personnel to officer personnel is as high as it is in the Congo. One reason we regret a little bit, I think, in this operation being forced by the United States to move so rapidly to a decision as to the structuring of a force that put as much weight on quantity as this did, was because we thought it might be possible to mount a quality operation that would be built or designed a little bit more along these lines. Now, whether these are realistic possibilities or not, I do not know. I think they do have the possibility of getting around some of the problems that have developed in the Congo where you had very sizable national units with really good officer personnel and maximum enlisted personnel who have real problems of adjustment to the environment.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Gentlemen, the clock keeps going. We are going to just keep talking until dinner is served. We

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are not going to cover our agenda, but this is the way we need to focus on just what is on your minds now. What about the utility of this technique for policy, for planning? In other words, what is your evaluation now about this kind of exercise? Let me tell you that we are going to give you when you leave a brief questionnaire which I suggest you do not make out for a couple of days, but please make it out within a week. It is of absolutely crucial importance, probably the most important document in the whole game, in the whole exercise.

We have mentioned the scenario; we have mentioned the Control group; we have mentioned team operation. We have not really faced up to the utility of simulation for this kind of borderline problem where you do not have a confrontation of two antagonistic wills where one hits the other and the other moves up to the next cycle and hits the first and you move to the next cycle and so on. This has been found to be of great value in policy planning, but what about our kind of problem? Is this technique useful for observing a situation where you do not have "A" versus "B" or Blue versus White, but the typical situation of bad information, no real enemy, ambiguous intentions, and unknown capabilities except within broad limits? How could we do it better? Should it have been done at all? Should it be done again? How should it be

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done again? We are asking you those same questions in the questionnaire, but I think it is particularly useful to get some reactions right now. The floor is open.

MR. POSVAR. Well, I have a bias which has been building up over several years from having worked with several games myself, games like this, and more rigid games which we use for teaching at the Air Force Academy. I am convinced of two things very tentatively. One is that they are extremely valuable for teaching. I think that on this level in particular they are incomparably useful for broadening the judgment and deepening the insight and making people aware of the unknowns and the hazards and so on of dealing with multifactor problems as an experience-producing exercise, or on the low level as a teaching or training exercise. But as a device for producing substantive recommendations about policy, I consider it to be highly experimental, in fact, dangerous, considering the general public impression of what this kind of thing can do and also the impression by important people as to what this thing can do. In other words, very positive on the experience side, but very tentative and cautious on the policy side.

MR. HAWKINS. That would apply to either type of game that Linc mentioned?

MR. POSVAR. Yes.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Burt?

MR. MARSHALL. I just raised my hand but since you called me I will say that --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I saw you waving your hand.

MR. MARSHALL. I will say that what the gentleman just said, that is, that playing Romeo could be an enriching experience, but it does not necessarily teach you how to be a lover.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is a very profound point.

MR. BLACKMER. That should be in the record.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Everything is in the record.

MR. POSVAR. That should be.

MR. WHALEY. I just checked and it is.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. What about the scenario with which the game started? There have been some comments about this. Should the game start with a very detailed picture of the situation? Should it present a structure of such magnitude that it is not necessary for the instigating team -- in this case, China -- to carry it any step further? Was the scenario inadequate? These are all faults of management, if there are any faults. I should say that I think the players were enormously skillful in this exercise and played with great professionalism in every one of the teams, and I am

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absolutely convinced of this.

MR. LEFEVER. First of all, as a deep consumer of this game, I think it was very valuable for those of us on the staff and those of us who are consultants on study tests to have gone through this experience. This does not mean that this has a 1 : 1 ratio with the policy recommendations we may make in the study, but it shows certain problems more clearly and will make us wiser as researchers in the study.

On the question of the scenario, when I first read it -- it was sent out about three weeks ago -- when I got my first copy, I wondered whether the scenario had developed far enough to avoid the problem which you posed several times, namely, to get the type of conflict which makes it plausible for international force to be involved. It seems to me that it might have been better if the scenario had gone just a bit further -- not in greater detail, but in basic substance and broad brushlines -- to indicate more clearly the nature of the challenge confronted by Burma and therefore by the United States so that less time would have been spent by Control in defining the character of the problem and more time would have been spent in playing out the realities, the variety of interests, and the interplay in the real world. My assumption in the beginning -- as I think yours was and almost everyone else's -- was that a UN force was not capable of dealing with

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a low-key, highly-ambiguous, indirect, paramilitary, insurgent-type action. Therefore, it has to be a bit higher and a little bit more visible for the UN to be effective.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Has anyone drawn the conclusion, by the way, on that count that the UN has a role as a fig leaf in this kind of situation only if the US commits forces? In other words, that the UN really has no role independently to deal with this type of problem? Is this the sort of thing one can learn at all from this game?

MR. RITVO. It certainly seems that way to me on the Soviet side, at least in my opinion. I made no distinction between the US and the UN.

MR. GIFFIN. You don't think it could be a Soviet fig leaf as time goes on?

MR. RITVO. No.

MR. HAWKINS. You have the colonial situation.

MR. GIFFIN. Even in a retroactive colonial situation.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. In the early stages, the US would have a tough time defeating a Soviet move to participate in a UN inspection team.

MR. BLUM. Aside from the strictly US or Soviet national interest as it is narrowly conceived, I think the UN type of force has an importance of its own because it can deal with situations more readily and sometimes more

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effectively, I think, than either the US or the Soviets.

MR. LEFEVER. Does that include insurgency situations?

MR. BLUM. No. Well, in the Burma case, it could include the general area of advice to the Burmese government.

MR. LEFEVER. UNMAG?

MR. BLUM. Yes, on the military side.

MR. KESSING. If we are going to return, as I presume we are, to the scenario question, I would like to say that one device that would be useful besides scaling up the extent of the Chinese involvement and making extremely specific the present deployment situation, would also be to furnish them as principal actors or aggressors with a set of alternative plans, suggested plans and objectives, and have them move with relation to the several plans, or give them a staff study, in effect, of the several courses of action open to them and you can design it in such a way that the several courses, each of them, might lead in the direction that you would want. I think that this is not a bad device. Of course, you would have to have somebody who really thought about the situation from the Chinese side do this, but I think it is not a bad device to leave some freedom and some unexpectedness in the game.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Control tried to.

MR. WHALEY. This would not be constraint but

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suggestions, in other words? You would be free to choose?

MR. KESSING. Yes. The participants could be given a staff study with all the possibilities. Stack them in such a way that you would invite action of the kind that might be useful for the game. Let me ask you this: Should China have been in the Control group in this game?

(General "No".)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jim?

MR. KING. I want to ask the USSR team two questions. The first question is: If the Chinese action had been more extreme, had been in the third rather than the first category, is it conceivable that the USSR would have voted for a UN operation? In other words, was it at all in the cards that we might have had a UN operation with both the US and the USSR supporting it?

The second question is: If the aggressor had not been China but had been the UAR, for example, is it conceivable in those circumstances that the Soviet Union might have gone along with the US in sponsoring or joining in a UN operation?

MR. RITVO. I think the second question is much easier to answer. I can conceive of a situation where the US and the USSR would combine in some kind of UN action. On the first question, I think I would have argued within our own group against USSR action, although I feel that we certainly would

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not have taken the position based on the Indian thing of expression of disapproval with manipulations and maneuvering in order to keep our commitment to an absolute minimum.

While I am talking, I think that I can add at this time that for me the game sort of resolved a question which has been troubling me and to which I had attempted to find an answer, and that is the condition under the present state of strained Sino-Soviet relations in which co-operation and collaboration is possible. While I have felt that there could be this kind of condition, I was not certain. It certainly made it easier, in reading today's newspapers, to find out that Kadar at the Hungarian Party Congress had approved of the Chinese peace proposals, the cease-fire proposals, negotiating proposals. This was an action which was absent at the Bulgarian Congress ten days ago. But one has to read that in connection with the condemnations of Chinese actions in support of Albania. Therefore, out of this game we get a possibility of Soviet support for Chinese action where the action remains restrained, and that is comparable to support for the cease-fire action, but their interparty dispute continues to be a sort of friction.

MR. BLACKMER. I would advise you that for the other conditions vis-a-vis China, I would assume that in that situation there would have been a Sino-Soviet break.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. What about the second question?

MR. BLACKMER. My answer to the second question is that there would have been Soviet support of the UN action.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. I would like to follow Blackmer's point for the reason that the alternative might be the kind of confrontage between Chinese and US power that ultimately would confront the Russians with the choice of supporting a Chinese ally or watching it be defeated.

MR. BLACKMER. That is one major reason. The other is that the alternative outcome could be Chinese domination of Burma. Neither seems to be satisfactory to the US.

MR. KESSING. But it would not involve the UN or a UN force. It would involve cutting off our water in the form of gasoline and other things that we needed for our adventures and, on the other hand, informing the US that you were not going to cover us if they counterattacked on the basis of aggression.

MR. BLACKMER. That is what I implied when I said it would have led to a break. You would have been deprived of all Soviet support up to that point.

MR. KESSING. There would have been formed support of not only UN action but joint US-Soviet action to curb China, wouldn't there? Because there was nothing that the UN could put into Burma that would curb China as opposed to Soviet-US

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pressures, armed or otherwise.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think that I better sum up the position as of the moment. Let me tell you that Item 4 on our agenda for this afternoon is obviously not being carried out as indicated. I think it would be psychologically harmful -- possibly even menacing, to me -- to have tried to focus you on a new problem at six o'clock this evening. At the same time, some of us, particularly our sponsors with whom we agree, think it would be very interesting to take this same problem, that is to say, in gross terms of a Chinese Communist penetration into Burma politically, ethnically, and strategically, and stare at it briefly under the conditions of changes in the strategic environment. That is to say, significantly-different strategic deployments, configurations, specifically at mid-point in Stage 2 of the plan for general and complete disarmament. I think it is perfectly clear that we are not about to discuss that here.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. Why don't you invite us back on some weekday in January?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. What I would like to do is to hand out to you right now a one-page summary of a situation and to ask those of you who are conscientious enough to do this, to do it sometime in the next week or so when you are doing the questionnaire. Look at the questions we raised in the

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questionnaire, think back to your basic decisions, consider what major differences, if any, there might have been in your strategies. I don't even suggest that you read this now. What major differences would there have been in the American response to China? What major difference would there have been in the Soviet position? What major difference would there have been in the role of an international military capability, even on paper, in the face of this kind of situation once you had signed a disarmament agreement under what I think are probably as realistic conditions as you can assume under a disarmament agreement?

Having said that, I will move on to the ultimate point in our agenda, which is a very brief statement by me, possibly taking one minute. Then we will hear a word or two from Ed Cushen, who has been doing a job for IDA here about which he will tell you very briefly. Finally, we will hear a word from Jim King on behalf of IDA. All I want to say is what I said a few minutes ago, that is, that I think the games were extremely skillful and that these positions were exposed with great professionalism. This is our only justification for taking the time and the energy of busy people like yourselves. It cannot be done with people with less knowledge and less background. I am convinced of this. I think that the defect in our operation this week end was the result of my own

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defective design plus the fact that we were interpreting with a new kind of approach here. So far as the Center's objectives are concerned, I am satisfied myself that we have achieved some of these objectives. I have learned a great deal more about the possibilities and limitations of this kind of technique. On the basis of previous experience, I think that within a fortnight I know I am going to sit down and write a piece of paper about some satisfactory implications of this game which may have absolutely nothing to do with Burma; but on the basis of past experience, such a piece of paper has some rather extraordinary interest for some extraordinary people, stemming strictly from this kind of experience.

I think that we, IDA and MIT, ought to say how extremely grateful we are to all of you for giving so generously of your time and energy to this venture in social-science fiction.

Ed, why don't you take a very few minutes to make your pitch? Then Jim King can say a few words, and then presumably we will have a gourmet dinner with some kind of vintage Burgundy -- I don't know the year -- and then Godspeed to everyone.

MR. CUSHEN. This would probably be a lot more attractive if I were a dancing girl.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes, it would, but that is all right.

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MR. FINKELSTEIN. It's not your fault.

MR. CUSHEN. The thing that I have been attempting to do here has been essentially to carry out a basic research project having to do with the techniques of gaming, and we might symbolize it like this (drawing on blackboard). We have been playing a game which we could represent as a path that we follow through some wilderness here. We come to the decision point and decide that we select this alternative rather than this one. We go to another decision point and decide that we select this rather than the other one and we keep on going. Sooner or later we ask the question: How do we generalize from the situation that we have gone through? We have played one game, namely, this one. Is it possible to say what would have happened if other things had gone along? In pursuit of this question, my exercise was to follow through each of the messages that came through the game and each of the decisions that I saw Control make, and attempt to estimate how seriously the game was deflected by one or more of these messages. Now, clearly, since I am not a political science or an international relations expert, I am willing to jump in where angels fear to tread. The crucial question, it seems to me, is whether or not a demonstration of this sort would suffice to carry some of the burden of presenting the picture to you. So along this line I decided

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that we would draw lines like this for a trivial question. The alternatives would be close together. When I ran the line in this direction, I said this was against a UN force. If it ran in this direction down this way, basically, it was in favor of a UN force. For each message and for each decision I then drew lines. A very important decision such as the amount of information that was known to the Soviets about the Chinese intentions would diverge quite drastically.

MR. KESSING. In which direction?

MR. CUSHEN. In both directions. One way would give you one thing, and one way would give you another. Clearly now, we have not two dimensions but three because: (1) we can have a UN force; (2) we can have no force at all; and (3) we can have a unilateral force. So I got into complications I didn't expect.

MR. KESSING. The solution to the problem then would depend on the length of the vectors, wouldn't it? Furthermore, it would be very difficult for anyone to say how long the length of the vectors should be. If this is true, then this method would be meaningless, wouldn't it?

MR. CUSHEN. Any method will be only as good as the information used in it. One would need experts to say how long the lines should be. For the purposes of this exercise, I arbitrarily decided how long the lines should be. This

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would be a "yes"; this would be a "no". You could even have a 3- or 4-choice affair. Is it a huge effort or a little effort? The answer could be somewhere in between. Now, we reconstructed the situation. On six pages here we have every message that went through. If you believe this kind of nonsense that I have done --

MR. RITVO. We are impressed.

MR. CUSHEN. If it is possible to delineate, if it is possible just to lay out all the combination of circumstances -- most of you, I am sure, will deny that this can be done -- but if it is possible to do this, then we come to the following conclusions: (1) Control introduced a bias in favor of a UN force, a small bias; and (2) by the third time period they were beginning to take control of the situation in such a way that they were giving a fairly large amount of flexibility to the players, that is, they could engage in unilateral action or they could go in favor of a UN force or they could go in favor of no force at all. They introduced a kind of a damping or kind of a positive feedback loop, however, in that to the UN players they fed more information encouraging unilateral action, and to the other players there was more information encouraging either no action or UN action. This, as I say, is just an experiment.

MR. PYE. Is this God's conscience at work?

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MR. CUSHEN. I don't know.

MR. HAWKINS. God didn't create the best of all possible worlds.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. Were you planning to work out this design from the conclusions backwards?

MR. CUSHEN. No. I was working it forward rather than the adjunct solution.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. There might be something to be said for that. Then you could set your vectors.

MR. CUSHEN. Yes. Well, as I say, this is a basic research experiment in the techniques of game analysis. Is it possible to run more than one game and draw answers from it? It is only as good as the numbers that go into it. Indeed, any attempt to make foreign policy scientific, I think, is doomed to some kind of inevitable failure, but we would like to try it.

I drew the following conclusions: (1) there are certain problems that appeared to deflect the answer from very good to very bad, and we did not really know how to handle these questions. It may, therefore, be a purpose of gaming or a benefit of gaming to find out what these areas are and give further research to those.

MR. BLUM. Good what and bad what?

MR. CUSHEN. There are two extremes of answers here

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just saying good and bad.

MR. HAWKINS. Utterly for or against a UN force?

MR. CUSHEN. Yes. How do you evaluate the effectiveness of unconventional forces of the sort that we had? That question led to the problem of the Chinese advance in Burma. No. 2 had to do with the amount of information that was available to the different teams. These two questions seemed to bear very heavily on which way the game went. So I therefore argue that these are some things that we learned just from one play of the game. I have a couple of handouts here which show what the analysis looks like.

MR. GIFFIN. Are these applicable to commodities?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Is that all you have?

MR. CUSHEN. Yes. I will give you a written report.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Jim King has a few words for the group, I understand. When he is through, I am going to hand out this questionnaire. If you don't pay attention to any other piece of paper which you have been given today, then please pay attention to this one because it is crucial.

Jim?

MR. KING. It seems to me that the only thing I am permitted to say at this late date is: "Thank you very much." I don't think we need to apologize for or explain again the function of the bias in the team. I think this game

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illustrated again what I understand has been the experience of previous games of this character. No matter how skillful you are in devising a scenario or how strong-minded your Control is, it still takes major effort. As our Chairman said, we may be omniscient, but we are certainly not omnipotent. We tried our worst or best to seduce, provoke, and otherwise entrap the Chinese into invading Burma and they frustrated us at every turn. They were bound and determined not to do it and stuck to their long-range plans, which was excellent tactics.

MR. MORGENTHAU. It also proves that you can't do business with the Chinese.

MR. KING. I might say, on the other hand, that the American team surprised us almost as much by trying to run away with the game.

MR. MORGENTHAU. You can't do business with us.

MR. KING. Some of this experience probably will bear on problems like this. It is not an academic question, you know. I hope you all will -- those who are interested -- pay some attention to the sheet that Linc passed out to you and that you will let us have any thoughts you might have as to how the situation would have been different if we were in this armed environment. I think the problem becomes much more difficult and much more hairy in that situation because

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we obviously do not have the Congo and we do not have Laos.

Other than that, on behalf of the Institute for Defense Analyses, let me thank all of you for your efforts in this game. I hope you enjoy the gourmet dinner.

MR. FINKELSTEIN. I don't think you should adjourn without giving us a chance to indicate our appreciation to the Endicott House, the people who made this available, the bartender, --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. And the Secretary and Roger Bull and all of the staff.

MR. POSVAR. IDA, Lincoln Bloomfield, MIT.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All right.

(Ended at 6:55 p.m., Sunday, November 25, 1962.)

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