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SUPPLEMENT

POLITICAL EXERCISE II -

The US and the USSR in Iran

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
December 1960

L I M I T E D D I S T R I B U T I O N

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Phase I

US Team Moves

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3 PM, EDT
September 14, 1961

PRESIDENT TO U.S. AMBASSADOR, MOSCOW

You will convey immediately the following message from me to Premier Khrushchev.

1. The United States continues to place on the Treaty of Alliance with Iran of January 29, 1942, of which your government is a signatory, the same high importance it has always attached to that Treaty.

2. Any action which would threaten "the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence" of Iran could yield the gravest consequences.

3. As in the case of the crises in Greece, Berlin, and Korea,--among others--the United States shall fully honor its treaty obligations and its obligations under the United Nations Charter. In particular we shall now honor the Agreement of Cooperation of March 5, 1959, under which we are committed "to assist the Government of Iran in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development." This Agreement has now been invoked by the Government of Iran.

4. The military dispositions I have ordered today, and the military dispositions of others similarly allied to Iran, are to be understood as reflecting the seriousness with which we would regard any violation of the Iranian frontier, or any other frontier of a nation allied to us or a member of the United Nations. The avoidance of war between our two countries has depended since 1945 on the mutual respect of the frontiers which emerged from the agreements which were made during and immediately following the Second World War.

5. It is our hope and belief that the present difficulties in Iran may be settled as an internal matter, promptly, and by negotiation between the contending parties. We shall use our influence with the Government of Iran to that end. It is our hope that it will not be necessary to move U.S. combat forces into Iran.

6. I count on the exercise of maximum restraint by the Soviet government in the interests of the Iranian people and the cause of world peace.

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MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO AMBASSADOR TEHERAN:

Make following statement to Shah about U.S. policy in crisis, intended U.S. and other countries' actions, and requested Iranian actions in support of objectives:

1. U.S. prepared to support Shah massively in military efforts to suppress rebel units and reassert control of country, under conditions specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

a. U.S. will provide substantial military supplies delivered by air to Teheran and Dezful, send by surface transport to Iran and also airlift for internal movements of Iranian forces, but no combat troops at present.

b. Turkey, U.K., Pakistan taking actions specified in other messages.

c. Shah requested to assume offensive as rapidly as possible in Azerbarjan, taking advantage of present disorganization of rebels, undertaking even military actions which are risky in view strength of defected rebel units. Defer offensive in Mished to concentrate on Azerbarjan.

d. Shah requested to attempt to get defected units to return to his support and not resist loyal units, by specific promise to military of no sanctions and by general open attitude toward rebellion.

2. U.S. considers some of rebel grievances valid. U.S. support contingent on bringing middle class and other dissatisfied nationalist elements into government. Desirable political outcome of military suppression to be a government under the Shah committed more clearly to vigorous economic development, land reform, and clean government. Ambassador may argue for this position partly on ground that without it eventual survival of Shah is militarily and politically in doubt. Therefore, U.S. insists as condition for support Shah request immediate ceasefire and offer negotiation with rebels on this in paragraph 3, below.

3. a. U.S. promises after suppression to make substantial aid available to Plan Organization, and to revise military assistance to enhance its economic effects and image.

b. Shah requested to speak as nation's monarch to rebels, to invite discussions in Teheran immediately on ceasefire while loyal units resume control, to start talks also on political settlement

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of grievances, to promise no reprisals except on persons directly responsible for assassination attempt, to offer united national program of economic development and social progress.

c. Shah requested, as signs of good faith, to reappoint Ebtehaj as director of Plan Organization, to appoint _____ as chairman of new committee to report on land reforms, and to appoint _____ as chairman of new committee on government corruptions.

d. Shah offers representation in government to non-Communist rebel leaders.

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MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO PROFESSOR MAHMADI (DELIVERED BY CIA)

1. U.S. supports Shah in military efforts to suppress rebel units and reassert control of country, but is demanding an opening toward the rebels for ceasefire and political negotiations on their legitimate grievances, including participation of non-Communist rebel leaders' in new government, with the aim of a united national progfam of economic development, social progress, and progressive democratization.

a. Rebels urged to accept opening and rely on subsequence negotiations.

b. U.S. promises to support constructive negotiations and to use full influence to prevent reprisals against rebels.

c. Detailed proposals as in telegram to Teheran.

2. U.S. would consider Soviet action across boundary a basic overturn of present tacitly-accepted cold war frontiers, and would take, with its Allies, whatever action necessary to correct violation. Preliminary moves specified.

a. Rebels urged not to count on Soviet assistance. On basis of historical experience of postwar, Soviets have not overtly violated frontiers, have not supported satellites if defeated, have backed down before determined free world resistance.

b. Rebels urged that progress of country better assured by accepting Shah's program and future U.S. aid than by seeking assistance from Soviet Union (which is only interested in disturbances) and subjecting Iran to major military operations.

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PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 14, 1961

1. A grave situation threatening the peace and security of the United States compels me to call the Congress back into session on Monday, September 19, 5:00 p.m.

2. Rebellion has broken out in a country to which we have close ties and whose national independence and integrity we are pledged to support by our armed forces if necessary. The Shah of Iran has called upon us under our treaty of mutual assistance for aid.

3. The danger is particularly acute because Iran lies right on that line which for the past fifteen years has preserved peace in the world. Mutual respect for this line has saved the world from the unutterable disaster of nuclear war since 1945. The world has been able to contain the vastly different viewpoints of the free and Communist nations because each has been willing to respect a limit to the area in which it would use military force. The border between Iran and the Soviet Union is part of that line; and this fact is recognized by the Treaty of Alliance of January 1942, of which the Soviet Union is a signatory. Iran, by its own free choice is on the non-Communist side of that line, a fact symbolized by our Agreement of Cooperation of March, 1959 which we are committed to honor. That is why events in Northern Iran represent a danger of such proportions that I am calling the Congress back into session. I cannot today say precisely what I will ask the Congress to do; but the situation is so critical that I wish to be able to call on the Congress for action at any moment.

4. The entire American defense strategy has been based upon the general acceptance in practice of the line I have just discussed. Should the neighbors of Iran either by overt or covert action place in question that basis of American defense policy--should they openly or subtly intervene-- I would feel called upon to ask the Congress to vote an immediate and rather large increase in our defense appropriations in order to make it possible for us to cope with the new and increased dangers to our security.

5. But most important of all, I wish to have the Congress available to vote the necessary funds and authorizations for a program I am proposing for Iran and which I hope will provide the basis for a peaceful and mutually satisfactory settlement.

6. There are genuine problems and genuine grievances in Iran, the problem of land reform being an outstanding example. At the same time it must be unequivocally recognized that the Shah heads the legitimate government of the country, and only through peaceful and constitutional means can genuine progress be expected.

more

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7. I have proposed to the Shah of Iran that he invite Mahmadi to Teheran to discuss the formation of a government of national unity. The U.S. is prepared to back a program of reconstruction and development that the Iranian governemtn may propose.

end

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US 5A

SECRET

SECRETARY OF STATE TO BRITISH, 2:00 PM EDT, and FRENCH AMBASSADORS,
2:30 PM, EDT.

FULL INFORMATION OF STEPS INDICATED IN OTHER NOTES INCLUDING PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE DRAFT AND PROPOSED MILITARY MOVES.

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE AT UN TO SECRETARY GENERAL, 5:00 PM, EDT

Same message, add: INCLUDING GENERAL CHARACTER OF MILITARY MOVES.

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GAME CLASSIFIED US SB

SECRET

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSTION WITH TURKISH AMBASSADOR, 3:00 PM, EDT

Secretary to explain that the U.S. hopes the Iranian situation can be settled by negotiation and without outside intervention, but regards the outcome as of utmost importance. Demonstration of free world seriousness of intent with respect to violation Iranian frontier regarded as essential to persuade rebels to negotiate with Shah as well as to dissuade Soviet adventures. Suggest Turkey reinforce Iranian border. U.S. is ready to send troops in for major military action if needed. Hopes that Turkey will give all necessary cooperation to troop movements from the Mediterranean, will provide bases for planes, etc., and further hopes that Turkey will make clear its support from the beginning so as to avoid giving Soviets any opportunity to bring pressure to bear to keep Turkey out.

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US SC

SECRET

LEAK FROM STATE DEPARTMENT TO UAR AMBASSADOR, 3:00 PM, EDT

Explain that the U.S. hopes that Iranian situation can be settled by negotiation and a coalition government under Shah, with new middle class representation and increasingly constitutional procedures. But U.S. regards violation of Iranian frontier as major threat to peace and has so informed Moscow. The US will not now comply with Shah's request for troops and hopes not to have to send any. If however there is Soviet or other interventions, or if rebellion is stabilized, e.g., by aid of neighboring nations, U.S. will use its full military might in Iran on behalf of the government. Such a situation might compel troop movements and overflights across neighboring countries.

SECRETARY OF STATE CONVERSATION WITH UAR AMBASSADOR, 4:00 PM, EDT

Same as above through line 8 (the government)

Add information that some units of the 6th Fleet will be passing through the Canal in routine security measures. Prepared to discuss compensatory measures in response to this courtesy.

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US SD

SECRET

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR, 3:30 PM, EDT

Same as Turkish except substitute words "troop staging" for "troop movements from the Mediterranean."

IRAQ -- Same as Egypt

Leak 3:00 pm, EDT

Conversation 4:30 pm, EDT

SECRET

SECRETARY OF STATE TO INDIAN AMBASSADOR, 5:30 PM, EDT

FULL INFORMATION (EXCEPT MILITARY MOVES) ON STEPS INDICATED IN OTHER NOTES INCLUDING PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE DRAFT.

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These moves, which would be set in motion on Sept. 14, 1961, are divided into 3 parts:

I. Direct Aid to the Iranian Government

II. Deployment of US forces outside of Iran; Alerting and Mobilization Actions

III. Consultation with Allies and Requests Made of Them.

2

I. Direct Aid to the Iranian Government

The basic character of the US action in the form of direct aid is to provide certain types of support but not to move combat forces into Iran. The support would be as follows, to be released to the Iranians only on order:

Airlift -- 50 tactical support aircraft (1 week to complete deployment) for the movement of Iranian forces plus 50 helicopters.

Replacements and resupplying of equipment/-- communications equipment, transports, engineers, tanks (100) and ammunition (1 week to 1 month to complete deployment). to Iranian Army

Technical and maintenance specialists -- 2,000 specialists to be airlifted from the US. These specialists would augment the existing Military Advisory Group in place in Iran.

Logistic Support Units: 1 engineer battalion; 1 transport military motorized unit; 1 automotive maintenance battalion; 1 group composed of chemical, biological and nuclear personnel; 10 truck groups; total about 4,000 people. Personnel to be moved mostly by air from Germany and Italy and the equipment to be moved mostly by sea from Germany and Italy. The airlift would be handled by MATS and charter aircraft. The shipment from Leghorn through the Suez Canal to Iran takes about 17 days.

British direct contribution: 25 short-range aircraft for tactical airlifts plus technicians to operate ports, barges and British radar equipment.

II. Deployment of US Forces Outside of Iran; Alerting and Mobilization Actions.

The US army deploys 1 airborne battle group from Germany to Adana, Turkey; 1 ballistics missile unit from Germany to Adana. The leading

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SECRET - CONTROL TEAM ONLY

echelons of Composite Air Strike Force to Wheelus Libya; 1 CVA from the US to the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. The 6th Fleet deploys two LPD's (amphibious support ships) to the Persian Gulf area; 1 marine battalion with support aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf; 1 British support carrier with marine Commando unit to the Persian Gulf.

In the US Army SIAC (Strategic Army Corps) alerted in anticipation of deployment to Europe of groups to replace additional units that might be moved to the Middle East. One Marine division alerted. SAC aircraft on ground and air alert increased (number of B-52's on airborne alert increased from 20 to 40). All military transport units alert and being deployed. Commercial airlines' operators warned of possibility that they may be called on.

III. Consultation with Allies and Requests Made of Them

The United Kingdom -- Forces Available (Background Information)

The United Kingdom forces in that part of the world are based in Singapore, Mombasa (an Infantry Brigade), Kuwait, Bahrein and Aden (one Infantry Brigade distributed among the three bases), Cyprus and Malta (equipment stocks for an additional British group), plus two parachute groups in the United Kingdom with airlift. Additional supplies available in the Indian Ocean area for 30 days at combat rates. Naval forces in the Persian Gulf have a supply and logistic support character; two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean.

Actions Requested by the US:

British forces are alerted; shipping is spotted in anticipation of further need; 25 short-range transport aircraft sent to Iran plus technical personnel as noted above. Ground forces in Persian Gulf area increased by one Brigade group (3,000 men). Two aircraft carriers moved from Mediterranean to Persian Gulf plus air defense cruisers and destroyers.

Turkey - Pakistan

Turkey and Pakistan are each asked to designate a member of their military forces as liaison with I.C.S. Each country requested to strengthen

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their border garrisons along USSR and Iranian borders. Turkish fleet in the Sea of Mahmora is requested to be on alert to Soviet Union movements towards the Mediterranean. Request cooperation of the Turkish navy with the 6th Fleet. Request Turks to cooperate in providing facilities -- ports, roads, railroads between the Mediterranean and the Iranian border in order to assist the logistical support of Iranian forces.

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Phase I

Soviet Team Moves

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USSR - No. 1

Communication to the Secretary General of the UN, September 14, 1961.

The Soviet Government proposes immediate convocation of a meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in Iran. Repressive action taken by remnants of the government of the Shah and interventionist moves by the United States have created a situation likely to endanger international peace and security requiring corrective action by the United Nations. At the meeting of the Security Council the Soviet Delegation will propose an appropriate resolution.

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USSR - No. 2

Note presented to Foreign Minister of Turkey by Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, September 11, 1961.

The Soviet Government would view with grave concern any move by the Government of Turkey to intervene in the internal affairs of Iran. In particular, any movement of Turkish armed forces into Iran, any provision of weapons to Iran from Turkey, or any use of Turkish bases by imperialist powers intervening in Iran would lead to immediate and forceful action on the part of the Soviet Union in the interest of its own security. Responsibility for the consequences of its interventionist acts would rest wholly with the Turkish Government.

(A similar note has been delivered to the Government of Pakistan.)

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Moscow, TASS, Sept. 14. Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, this afternoon met representatives of the Soviet and foreign press in the Grent Hall of the Kremlin. In an opening statement, Comrade Khrushchev declared:

The entire peace-loving forces of the world are united in their determination to repel the imperialist intervention in the internal affairs of Iran. Led by the Americans, who are ever more shamelessly intervening in Iran and have long been supplying the reactionary regime with planes, troops, tanks and guns, determined to crush the patriotic revolt of the Iranian people against foreign colonialism, the imperialists are trying desperately but unsuccessfully to prevent the establishment of a free, neutral, sovereign and democratic Iran. The Shah, the main lackey of the US imperialists, will not long escape popular vengeance. The new Iranian national democratic revolutionary movement, led by Professor Mahmadi, is, however, ever more successfully repelling the American colonialist intervention, and the people of the Soviet Union join with all peace-loving and anti-colonial peoples, especially in Asia and Africa, in their active best wishes to the heriec Iranian people in their struggle for independence and freedom.

The Soviet Union, ever mindful of its dedication to peace and international understanding, to the peaceful settlement of all disputes, and to the national independence, internal sovereignty, and absolute non-intervention in the affairs of other nations and peoples, joins with its

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brothers of the camp of socialism and with all peace-loving nations in its demand that the imperialist intervention in Iran be immediately brought to a halt. The Soviet Ambassador to the UN has been instructed by the Soviet Government to demand an immediate emergency session of the Security Council with a view toward achieving this essential objective. It is fully confident that in the UN, now composed to such a great extent of the newly-liberated peoples of Asia and Africa, an overwhelming support will be forthcoming for this just demand.

As is well known, the Soviet Government, under the Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921, in fact enjoys the right to repel any foreign attempt to invade and subjugate Iran. However, we of the great Soviet state feel sure that our friends throughout the world realize that only as a last resort, and only after exhausting all other means to prevent the reconquest of Iran by the colonialists, would the Soviet Union feel compelled to take such action.

Constantly faithful to its permanent fidelity to the cause of peace, the USSR does not believe in the use of force to settle international disputes. It hopes and trusts that the UN will be able to repel this new colonialist threat to world peace. Nevertheless, it cannot, given its treaty obligations to Iran and its adherence to the world peace movement, indefinitely stand idle and see the best sons of Iran mown down by American rockets and napalm. As is well known, the Soviet government is immutably dedicated to the cause of non-interference in the affairs of other nations.

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The leaders of the new Iranian national democratic movement, or, for example, the leaders of Finland, are not Communists. But they are fighting hard and effectively for the national independence of their country and for the end of its colonial exploitation.

I have heard that the Shah, desperate lest he lose his power and wealth, has asked Turkey, Pakistan and the US for aid. I have no wish to employ threats, and you all know that the Soviet Union does not make idle threats, but I must tell you in all frankness that, just as the Soviet Union does not itself intervene in Iran, it cannot and will not stand idly by while other nations intervene on the side of the colonialists. The time is long past when the colonialists can disregard the might of the Soviet Union. Today our scientific, technological, and, yes, our military power, are the first in the world. We trust that the peace-loving peoples of the world will restrain those of their leaders who in this moment are tempted to challenge the peace-loving forces. Let them do so at their peril.

But the imperialists are not satisfied with intervening in Iran alone. Realizing how close they are to disaster throughout the whole Middle Eastern area, they are planning to use their current intervention in Iran as a cover for a mad attempt, foredoomed to failure, to restore their former colonial position of military, political and economic superiority throughout the Middle East. It is not an accident, comrades, that

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the Shah last year moved closer to Israel, that well-known instrument of the imperialist war-mongers. Nor is it an accident that the reactionary forces in Jordan, desperate to retain their threatened power and privileges, are conspiring to submit even further to the imperialists, and, like Israel, become a major base for imperialist military forces. But we are confident that the newly-liberated Arab nations of the Middle East, once they realize this threat, will unite and determinedly repel it.

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Tass - Press dispatches, September 14

Khorramshar (TASS), Sept. 14. The intervention of the American imperialists against the Iranian national democratic movement is constantly increasing. Today two ships docked here and unloaded arms, ammunition, and troops. In spite of the terrorism of the Shah's secret police against the civilian population, workers and peasants demonstrated against the imperialist intervention, and the ships could only be unloaded under armed guard.

Teheran (TASS), Sept. 14. American transport planes are landing constantly at the Teheran airport, unloading men and supplies to aid the Shah's colonialist forces. It is reported that these planes are flying from American bases in Germany, and making intermediate stops either in Israel or in Jordan.

Baku (TASS), Sept. 14. Enraged crowds of students, workers and peasants demonstrated today in front of the Iranian consulate, calling for rapid and effective aid to the Iranian fighters for freedom and national independence. They also demanded that the UN effectively halt the imperialist American aggression there.

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Cairo (TASS), Sept. 14. The Egyptian paper "Al Goumhouria" reports today from Amman that unmarked aircraft in large numbers are staging through Amman airport. It is assumed they are en route from Germany to Iran.

Baghdad (TASS), Sept 14. The newspaper Ittihad es Shahab today called for the Iranian people to support General Kassem in his efforts to bring to an end the American imperialist intervention in Iran and to assist the efforts of the Iranian people to throw out the imperialist colonialists and their lackey, the Shah

Peking (TASS), Sept. 14. The People's Daily today joined in the chorus of support throughout the whole socialist camp for the Iranian national democratic revolution. Declaring that the CCP, led by Chairman Mao, was in full agreement with the statements made in Moscow by Comrade Khrushchev, the paper concluded with the statement that the Chinese people demanded the immediate expulsion of the imperialist interventionists from Iran.

London (TASS), Sept. 14. The London Daily Worker reported today that, at a large rally at Trafalgar Square, the Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament Movement declared that Great Britain, now faced with the imminence of nuclear war, must decisively take the lead in unilateral nuclear disarmament.

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Moscow, TASS, Sept. 14. TASS is authorized to state, from high circles in the Soviet Ministry of Defense, that rumors of Soviet general mobilization are entirely without basis. The Red Army is always fully ready to repel any threats to the peace of the world.

Tblisi, TASS, Sept. 14. Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski, was today present at a meeting of the Society for the Promotion of Culture, at which a resolution was adopted of complete solidarity in the struggle for the freedom and independence of Iran.

Moscow, TASS, Sept. 14. The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of National Defense today announced the successful completion of the flight of a manned satellite into space. The flight proceeded without incident and according to plan and the pilot has safely returned.

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GAME CLASSIFIED

To be considered party of USSR-11, Aims and Strategy

GAME CLASSIFIED

USSR - No. 5

Relations with anti-Shah forces

Within framework of overall Soviet objective to see establishment of neutralist Iranian central government and total overthrow of the Shah, Soviet officials will intensify and extend contacts with anti-Shah forces throughout country. Depending on continued favorable military developments in the northwest (See Control-2-USSR only 3) we await, but do not initiate suggestions re military assistance. It is of utmost importance to obtain immediately fullest possible details on Mahmadi and military leaders (see military report).

In the current phase all-out support will be given in news and propaganda media to the true representatives of the Iranian people. Ambassador and Soviet officials in Teheran and territory still held by Shah's forces should not go beyond official governmental pronouncements, while making full sympathy Soviet objectives of pelples demands known. Until situation further clarified it is necessary to maintain full diplomatic staff in capital and other parts of country. In northwest areas contacts through party members with our friends should be fully exploited, but no attempts should yet be made to accelerate penetration of Mahmedi group. Population mobilization through party members and friends for support of limited demands should be assisted by funds channeled through party or friendly associations (Soviet-Iranian Friendship Society).

While the Soviet government is taking all steps necessary to prevent outside military intervention in Iran, in particular enlisting the support of the UAR and Iraq as well aspeace-loving governments throughout the world, an offer of Soviet mediation in contacting Nasser and Kassem should be carefully made. Travel facilities through Soviet territory should be granted to authorized representatives who will be cared for by officials of the Azerbaijan Ministry Foreign Affairs.

It is important to ascertain the views of the democratic leaders towards Israel in connection with any possible future negotiation with the Arab states. In case of indications of opposition towards Shah's de facto recognition of Israel, our contacts should stress significance in Arab world of strong statement re reversal of this policy.

Absolutely no repeat no mention of possibility of creation of separatist regime in northwest provinces ~~xx~~ should be made in present situation.

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USSR - No. 6

Reuters dispatch, September 14, 1961.

London (Reuters), Sept. 14. The illegal "Free Iran Radio," believed to originate in the Soviet Union, and monitored here today, called for the widest possible mobilization of all elements of the Iranian people in order to expel the imperialist interventionists and to bring freedom and national independence to the country. Declaring that now was no time for dogmatism and sectarianism, the broadcast concluded with the statement that all Iranian progressive forces should rally around the national independence movement.

12

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USSR-7

[redacted]

Military Activity (Overt)

1. Military movements of USSR Army Units and their attached aviation units are ordered in the Transcaucasian and Turkestan Military Districts.

2. Tactical aviation units are ordered into Leninikan.

3. A noticeable increase of radio communications begins on military frequencies.

4. An announcement is made of theassignment of Marshal K. Rokossowski as new commander of the Transcaucasian Military District and, simultaneously, reports are released of the visit to the area of Marshal V. Chuikov, CinC Ground Forces and General of the Army A. Serov.

5. An announced practice launching of three ICBMs is made from an area "visible" to western detectors. Target for these missiles is in Siberia.

6. USSR naval units in the Black Sea begin training maneuvers.

7. The Soviet Ambassadors and their military attaches in [redacted] Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan leave their respective stations for an announced two day conference in Moscow.

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USSR-8

Military Activity (Covert)

1. A small group of Soviet military officers, in mufti, are dispatched across the Iranian border to obtain further information on:

a. The size and composition of the rebel forces.

b. The area currently being held by the rebels.

c. The status and equipment of the defecting air units, if any.

d. The supply status of the rebel forces and an estimate of the length of time they could engage in combat without resupply. (It is assumed that the period is probably two weeks.)

2. These officers are further instructed to offer their services as military advisors to the rebels. They have been provided with communications equipment and areordered to report their findings as quickly aspossible.

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USSR - No. 9

Telegram from Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Soviet Embassy, Baghdad, Sept. 11, 1961.

Arrange meeting with Kassem soonest. Inform him Soviet government has reason to believe American and British have plans to use Iran situation as means of restoring imperialist domination of Middle East. Reliable reports indicate they expect to violate Iraqi territory, sending Turkish forces through Mosul area to invade Iran, and [illegible] are already violating Iraqi airspace. Wider imperialist plans include huge military buildup and establishment or expansion of bases in Cyprus, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf area, and also substantial military assistance to Israel as bastion of imperialist power and influence. Iraq and Arab world can count on Soviet support in efforts to resist such imperialist efforts to destroy independence of Iraq and other Arab people. Iraq can count on sympathetic Soviet attitude in its future relations with Iran, which should be on much better basis in future if popular forces win their courageous struggle against Shah's hated regime.

You should [illegible] assure Kassem Soviet Government has no repeat no intention using [illegible] Kurdish question to create difficulties for [illegible] Iraq.

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USSr - No. 10

Telegram from Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Soviet Embassy, Cairo, September 14, 1951.

Arrange meeting with Nasser soonest. Inform him Soviet Government has reason to believe Americans and British have plans to use Iran situation as means of restroing imperialist domination of Middle East. Plans include greatly strengthened military forces based in Cyprus, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Persian Gulf area, and also substantial military assistance to Israel as bastion of imperialist power and influence. UAR and Arab world can count on Soviet support in efforts to resist such imperialist efforts to destroy independence of Arab people. ~~X~~ States of Socialist camp and peoples of Middle Ea st have supreme common interest in standing together against imperialist intervention in Iran and elsewhere.

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USSR: Aims and Strategy

1. Our basic strategy and immediate objectives in the Iranian situation are predicated on the Marxist-Leninist appreciation of the recent events in Iran as still one more significant step in the national liberation struggle in the colonial and demi-colonial areas. We see the popular uprising in Iran as a key advance of the national bourgeois revolution, directed at the withdrawal of Iran from the alliance and subservience to the Western imperialists. In view of the current stage of historical evolution of Middle Eastern area in general, and the situation in Iran in particular, it would be premature to seek at this time to introduce a pelple's democratic government. Accordingly, our chief aim is the complete severance of Iranian alliance ties with the Western imperialist powers, ending of ~~a~~ foreign military and intelligence bases of all kinds, and the development of closer ties with all peace-loving countries in the area. This would further weaken the entire imperialist base and alliance structure in the Middle East and elsewhere, by removing a key link in CENTO and by the undoubted effect of this move on other peoples in the area.

2. It is, therefore, in consonance with the current relation of forces in the world arena to support at this stage a popular front neutral government for the whole of Iran. The present revolutionary group represents the nucleus of such a regime. While seeking by all means consonant with the continued support of the revolutionaries to build the influence of the Communists within the new revolutionary movement, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government do not consider the time ripe to support a seizure of power. We regard the establishment of a rival Iranian government in the northwestern area resulting in a rival claimant to Teheran (as in Korea and Vietnam), while not our objective, as a secondary position to which we could, if neccessary, withdraw. In such a case, a UN cease-fire order might be sought in order to form and consolidate a revolutionary government in the northwest.

3. It is expected that the United States will support the Shah's forces with military assistance if required. However, even prior to new direct military moves, the full character of U.S. intervention in Iranian internal affairs--including military interfence--must be resolutely unmasked and castigated. In order to inhibit future US, UK, Turkish and other military support to the Shah's forces, it should be made clear that the USSR cannot itself idly stand by in the face of additional foreign intervention seeking to suppress the will of the Iranian people. Warnings of the adverse consequence of further intervention will be given both publicly and privately to the Turkish, Pakistani, and British member of the CENTO alliance. At the same time, appropriate unofficial and indirect reassurances

more-more

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of the broad national patriotic neutralist-nationalist nature of the new revolutionary movement will be conveyed to dispel slanderous charges of exportation of communism by force.

4. Appropriate military alerts, troop movements, and other measures in the USSR will be taken in the first instance to intimidate military intervention to aid the Shah's forces, and also to prepare for the possible contingency of our assistance to the popular revolutionary forces.

5. In order to reduce the likelihood, forms and extent of imperialist intervention in Iran, appropriate measures will be taken to alert the UAR, Iraq and other countries to the relationship of Iran to the whole imperialist polistion and policy in the Middle East. Diversionary moves, say in Jordan, would serve this purpose, and would distract and divide the Western powers.

6. In the event of a successful imperialist effort to maintain a pro-Western regime in Teheran, efforts will be made to consolidate and to gain recognition of for the existence of a rival Iranian government in the north-west, serving the remainder of Iran from Turkey and giving a land tie from the USSR to Iraq. All efforts would be made to expose the fact that the pro-Western Iranian regime in the south was supported only by foreign bayonets, and in the interests of the imperialists. END

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USSR - 12

Game Classified

Instructions by the Foreign Department, Central Committee, CPSU, for transmission through appropriate channels, for action in Iran (outside nationalist-controlled territory):

1. Student groups in Teheran and other cities will demonstrate and agitate against imperialist exploitation of Iranian resources, imperialist aid to reactionary forces, rigged elections, use of Iranian territory for aggressive provocations against Iran's neighbors.

2. Labor elements will call for general strike against economic abuses and foreign exploitation, concentrating especially on ports, transport, communications, public utilities.

3. Activists will promote effective direct action for removal of reactionary political, military and police leaders.

4. Patriotic demonstrations will be staged in bazaars and other public places, thus paralyzing commercial life in 8 major cities.

5. Port facilities and vessels will be sabotaged in Kurramshahr, Abadan and Bandhar Shahpur, and key military installations, communications and transport facilities, power stations and transmission lines, and air fields will be put out of action.

6. Information will be disseminated throughout Iran, especially in military, political and intellectual circles, regarding: (a) plans of the Shah and his immediate advisors to flee the country, and (b) a secret agreement by the Shah to accord U. S. interests a dominant position in Iran's economic and military affairs in return for assistance in putting down the nationalist revolt.

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USSR - No. 13

Letter of Premier N. S. Khrushchev to the President of the United States, September 11, 1961.

Because of the serious danger to international peace resulting from recent events in Iran, I propose that the heads of government of the major powers concerned meet urgently to ward off aggressive moves, to prevent intervention which would aggravate the already dangerous situation and to seek a peaceful solution which would make certain that the Iranian people can determine their own future. I propose that the meeting be held within five days at Geneva, and that the participants be the heads of government of the USSR, USA, UK, India and of other states to be agreed upon.

(Similar letters were sent to theheads of government of the U.K., and India.)

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GAME CLASSIFIED

Soviet Note delivered to Foreign Ministers of all NATO members except U.S.A., Canada, German Federal Republic, and Turkey, September 14, 1961.

Soviet Government calls attention to extensive dangers to peace represented by civil strife in Iran. USSR intends to abide stoicly by principle of non-intervention but will insist that other governments do likewise. Attitudes and recent acts of U.S. in this connection are accordingly fraught with greatest dangers to peace. Cooperation of any European nation with aggressive American acts could have result only of exposing Europe itself to military operations. Soviet Government does not believe any hostilities in Iran involving outside powers could be limited and wishes to remind Western European nations that if aggressive moves did so spread hostilities, they would face the possibility of total destruction. Soviet Government welcomes cooperation of all nations in efforts to avoid this contingency by immediate action to curb any aggressive acts aimed at Iran.

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GAME CLASSIFIED USSR - 15

Letter from N. S. Khrushchev to Pandit Nehru, delivered by Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi, September 14, 1961

I view with greatest concern the obvious fact that recent developments in Iran contain real threats to the peace of the world. These threats can be eliminated, I believe, only if the peaceloving nations of the world take the necessary steps, in time, to guard against adventurist moves on the part of outside powers to seize some supposed military advantages through a policy of intervention. I can assure you that the Soviet Union, whose security is directly involved in developments so close to its own state frontiers, will strive with all its might for a peaceful solution, which it believes can be attained only if other powers maintain hands off. I sincerely hope that your government will join its efforts with those of other peaceloving states in favoring this view at the United Nations and at the conference of heads of government which I have proposed in my letter of today's date. END

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Phase I - II

Control Moves

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Control - 1

GAME CLASSIFIED

U. S. Only - 3

CIA Memo

Regular armed forces and gendarmerie in areas now under rebel control apparently have gone over to the rebel side. The size of the force which has fled North is unknown

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Control - 2

GAME CLASSIFIED

USSR only - 3

Intelligence memo

Regular armed forces and gendarmerie in areas now under rebel control apparently have gone over to the rebel side. The size of the force which has fled is unknown.

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Control - 5

From: Control

To: U. S. Team (Copies to USSR Team)

Re: USSR - 4.

Control does not necessarily accept as fact reports in subject message from areas outside Soviet China's administration.

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GAME CLASSIFI

GAME CLASSIFIED -- U.S. ONLY

CONTROL 6

FROM U.S. EMBASSY, TEHRAN, TO SECRETARY OF STATE

(Message reaches Secretary of State 8 A.M., EDT, September 15)

Saw Shah 3 a.m. at Palace. Present only foreign minister. I presented message of your telegram. His reaction appeared to be surprise and relief. He quickly reassured me his sympathy with our political aims and conditions. He pressed two questions. First, under what circumstances can he count on U.S. and other combat troops. Second, how soon can he expect us to act and when can he announce U.S. intentions to his army, or broadcast to people. While he clearly would like combat troop support, he seemed to consider our message more favorable than he had expected.

On first question re combat troops I said I had nothing beyond message delivered. On timing, I said we would immediately take essential preparatory moves and would initiate supply of equipment and personnel promised as soon as clear to U.S. Shah agreeable to our terms in detail.

Shah avoided discussion of details his cooperation. My belief Shah is desperate for our aid, will try to comply in good faith, probably feels himself strengthened vis-a-vis rightist groups by our conditions, but not repeat not confident he can succeed along lines paragraph 2 your telegram.

I consider it impossible to be confident Shah can bring about reconciliation with rebels and reorganized government. I consider it impossible for his regime to survive if we do not proceed immediately and vigorously as outlined your telegram. We may be faced with failure of Shah to meet conditions after we have intervened. We may find that our aid as limited your telegram not sufficient. I personally urge you take this gamble.

I resume negotiations in two hours with Shah on details of our demands, but consider it urgent to tell him we are proceeding on assumption he can meet our conditions.

more

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SECOND MESSAGE RECEIVED BY SECRETARY OF STATE FROM AMBASSADOR TEHRAN
(also 8 a.m.)

Spent one hour with Shah 9 a.m. Discussed each point your telegram. He preferred postpone discussion military objectives your paragraph 1 until U.S. and Iranian military advisors could be present. Your paragraph 2 he expressed agreement 2-a and 2-b, said wanted to consider further personalities in 2-c. He said many recent developments affect choices of Ebthay, _____ and _____, about which he would consult me in detail soonest. Paragraph 2-d said Communist connection various rebel leaders fluid and uncertain and could only assure me of fullest agreement in principle.

Considering pressures on Shah, his personal direction of affairs, and inability any subordinate to commit Shah on these points, I consider present stage of negotiations finished. In my judgment we must proceed or not on this basis.

END

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Control - 7

Secretary General of UN to all Security Council Members.

September 14 evening.

Request has been received from USSR for immediate convening of Security Council to consider situation in Iran. Request expression of views as to convenient time for meeting.

Control to US and USSR

September 15, p.m.

Security Council met briefly. Adjourned subject to call of President in view of fact several Foreign Ministers en route to General Assembly meeting by sea.

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Control 8
U.S. and Soviet

REUTERS, TEHERAN, SEPTEMBER 14, 1961

Rebel forces from Meshed attempting to establish communication through Mazanderan with rebel forces of Mahmudi in Azerbaijan clashed this morning at Babul. Results were indecisive but in subsequent rioting gendarmes and police are reported to have killed five local residents generating widespread rioting in the area. At the same time government and rebel troops clashed east of Resht in Gilan province. Fighting continues, but odds favor government troops.

REUTERS, TEHERAN, SEPTEMBER 16, 1961

Rebel reinforcements with increasing local support succeeded in taking Babul and proceeding along the coast road. Rebel forces in the east took and passed beyond Resht. Crowds in Resht milled around with shouts of "Down with the Shah."

REUTERS, TEHERAN, SEPTEMBER 16, 1961

Resistance to the rebel forces has collapsed in Gilan and Mazanderan. Top government officials have fled. Loyalist forces are in disorderly retreat and rebel forces are apparently in control thus establishing rebel control of the entire northern areas of Iran.

END

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Control to US and USSR London, September 15

Prime Minister Macmillan speaking at Cambridge said Iranian situation may offer opportunity for long-awaited summit meeting. UK in favor of exploring every avenue for avoiding conflict. London keeping closest touch with situation which it views with gravity. Will be faithful to its treaty commitments and recalls its historic concerns in Iranian area. Consulting with allies, Commonwealth members, Iranian government and USSR. END

Control to US and USSR London, September 15

The LONDON TIMES learns from Lloyds that vessels of NATO powers seeking southbound transit of Suez Canal are experiencing long delays at northern entrance in obtaining ca nal pilots, water and supplies. Intelligence at Port Said reports canal employees are discussing sympathy demonstration for Mahmadi movement in opposing colonialist treaties in Middle East. END

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Control to USSR

Baghdad, September 15, 1961 Leak to US

Baghdad government naturally deeply concerned with events in neighboring country. Is taking appropriate measures to safeguard borders and preserve order within Iraq; appreciates Soviet expression of views (USSR No. 9). No violations of Iraqi territory have occurred; national focus will take all necessary measures to preserve nation's integrity.

Control to USSR Leak to US

Cairo, September 15, 1961

President Nasser acclaimed uprising in ~~Baghdad~~ IRAN; hailed ~~use~~ RISE of nationalist forces. Said Moslems everywhere will welcome freeing brothers from feudal rule. Urges Mahmadi throw off shackles of Cento treaty and declare true neutrality of Iranian nation. Sees possibility of Arab nations and Iran walking hand in hand. Meeting of Arab League Council called September 16 to consider common action. UAR forces in Egypt and Syria being put on alert and strengthened on Syrian-Iraq border. Nasser says to Soviet Ambassador best hope for peace lies in all powers respecting integrity and independence of Iran. Security measures being stepped up along Suez Canal.

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Control - 11

Control to USSR Leak to US

Karachi, September 15, 1961

Pakistan taking measures to maintain integrity of its borders. Shares concern with all powers that situation in Iran not lead to international conflict. Reaffirms ties with Cento powers.

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Control - 12

New Delhi, September 15, 1961 (UPI)

Prime Minister Pandit Nehru today urged that the problems raised by the Iranian revolt be referred to the United Nations. He called upon the neutralist countries of the world to entreat both sides of the Iranian conflict to cooperate with the world body in seeking a peaceful solution.

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Control - 13

Ankara, September 15, 1961 (AP)

The Prime Minister of Turkey today called for immediate consultation among the Cento Pact members. Government officials were obviously upset by the eruption of instability on their eastern borders. Their sympathies clearly lay with the loyalist forces because of the threat of Russian domination over the rebel leaders. Editorials in the morning papers of Ankara and Istanbul contained discussions of possible military aid to the Shah. Troop movements towards the Iranian borders are known to be taking place. This may be just a precautionary move, however, to bolster police strength in the predominately Kurdish highlands where Iraqi, Turkish and Iranian borders meet.

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Control - 14

News Dispatch (AP), 15 September 1961

Advance elements of the 1st Airborne Battle Group of the US 24th Infantry Division landed in Adana, Turkey today.

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GAME CLASSIFIED

CORRECTION

Control - 15

GAME CLASSIFIED USSR Team Only

Soviet Intelligence Report, 15 September.

Information received from very reliable sources indicates that the 1st Battle Group of the US 24th Infantry Division is in the process of landing at Adana, Turkey. One ballistics missile unit being dispatched from Germany, destination uncertain. Unit could reinforce troops landing in Adana or land in Iran. One CVA sailed from Norfolk for European or Mid-Eastern waters. US SAC placed upon limited alert, airborne bomber force appears to have been doubled and other crews placed upon alert. Several additional evidences of alerting of other forces in US, including military transport units and at least one Marine division. Numerous reports from Germany of various specialized personnel being alerted emergency duty and amphibious support ships observed arriving Port Said.

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Control to US and USSR

1. The time at the commencement of Move Period 2 is close of business Friday, September 15, 1961.

2. Both teams may have the messages they are entitled to, legitimately or otherwise, which originated with the other side. They also have reactions from elsewhere.

3. Information on internal events in Iran does not necessarily coincide exactly with the 24-hour elapsed time period since Move Period 1 commenced.

4. Military experts on both sides estimate that in the absence of direct combat support, neither rebel nor loyalist forces would be able to undertake offensive action in less than 30 days. Such offensive action could be undertaken only if either force were supplied with continuous logistic support from outside Iran. This estimate was considered to be essentially independent of the strength of the units in the vicinity of Teheran that defected and joined the rebel force in the North, as long as organized resistance by the Shah's forces were possible.

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GAME CLASSIFIED Control 17

Control to US

FYI only. Supplementing Control 16, para. 4, military advisers estimate that with aid on scale contemplated in your US-6, and in the absence of significant Soviet aid to rebel forces, Shah's forces could eventually subdue rebels and reestablish order, assuming he can maintain political control in his own area. In absence of such aid, prospects are Shah could not do so. END.

GAME CLASSIFIED

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REUTERS, TABRIZ, SEPTEMBER 16, 1961

Ex-governor-general, Ali Dehestani, who was under house arrest was shot today when trying to escape. Several other former top provincial officials have been transferred from house arrest to the military prison. The search for others who are missing has been intensified.

REUTERS, BEHRAN, SEPTEMBER 15, 1961

Rioting mobs in Isfahan storm U.S. Consulate, killing Miss Cynthia Lewis, administrative assistant, and severely mauling Consul Richard Styles. The apparent cause of the rioting is laid to former labor agitators who had succeeded in eluding government vigilence and are said to be financed by Soviet agents. The anti-foreign sentiments attributed to Mahmudi and his collaborators have been stirring up emotions among the submerged urban groups in Isfahan against the U.S. as the principal supporter of "the dominant military clique." The military ultimately restored order when they brought out tanks but only after some casualties, considerable looting of shops.

END

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Control - 19

Reuters, Tabriz, September 17, 1961

On the rebel radio at Tabriz Mahmadi announced today the victory of rebel forces in Guilan and Mazanderan and clarified the immediate objectives of the revolutionary government. These included: the exclusion of military personnel from cabinet posts; the restoration to the Majlis of responsibility for government policies and administration; the restriction of the Shah to his constitutional role and the elimination of any interference in the government or in politics by members of the Court; a clean sweep of corrupt and reactionary officials, termination of foreign military aid, including advisory missions; withdrawal from the present alliance with "imperialistic Western Powers"; inauguration of vigorous efforts to restore friendly relations with the USSR; and the promise, when in power, to allow no group or individuals to stand in the way of rapid progress toward the goal of achieving a strong, independent and prosperous Iran.

Reuters, Tabriz, September 17.

It has been reported that the former Iranian Communist leader, Nasrollah Said who had fled to Moscow in 1954, is now in Tabriz with the rebel forces.

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Phase II

US Team Moves

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PRESS CONFERENCE

At his press conference this mornig the President made the following points.

1. He welcomed Premier Khrushchev's commitment to avoid Sovid intervention in Iran.

2. He shared the Soviet view that what Iran required was a united national government determined to carry forward the economic, social, and political modernization of the country. Developments over recent years have made him hopeful of the possibility, if unity can be attained and a civil or international war avoided on Iranian soil.

3. Under no circumstances would the United States withdraw from its bilateral treaty obligations under threat. In the present circumstances the United States would back the Iranian government with supplies. There appeared to be no requirement for U.S. combat force uless other powers intervened. The U.S. would reconsider its position if intervention occurred. Sovereign governments could make treaties and abrogate treaties. Right now the American treaty with Iran was in force.

4. Speaking with particular emphasis the President rejected the idea that the Iranian forces and American military aid to Iran constituted in any sense a threat to the Soviet Union. The Iranian order of battle consisted of twelve divisions--only 150,000 men. Iran commanded no significant naval* Soviet military strength. There were no (repeat) no American strategic air bases in Iran. If we were to accept the principle that weak nations bordering the Soviet bloc could not seek military assistance many nations would be endangered.

5. He underlined the crucial importance of respecting frontiers for the maintenance of world peace. If the Soviet Union should intervene the consequences would be incalculable: it would mean a direct hostile confrontation of Soviet and American military forces.

6. The United States was prepared to state and defend its position in a meeting of heads of governments, before the Security Council, or before the UN Assembly. But what was most required right now wasnot an international meeting on Iran, but a ceasefire and negotiation between the contending factions in Iran.

*or air strength. This was evidently a trivial force, in comparison with

END

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AP NEWS DISPATCH

After his Press Conference the President had lunch with Mr. Joseph Smith, an old friend from wartime days in the Navy. Mr. Smith told the press, when questioned, that the President had expressed himself strongly to the following effect. He had worked hard to become President. He intended to enjoy the job for seven more years. He judged that the Russians were testing his mettle. If they concluded they could use threat and blackmail to force him to abandon treaty obligations or if they felt he was not prepared to protect to the limit the free world's frontiers, he would not have a good night's sleep for the period of his incumbency. He had always believe a show-down would come early in his Administration; and so far as he was concerned, he was prepared to have it right now, whatever the consequences.

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GAME CLASSIFIED

US 9

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO AMBASSADOR TEHERAN

1. Make following statement to Shah about immediate actions (within six hours) requested of him as conditions for actual delivery of military (noncombat) assistance already under way:

a. Major speech to nation stating his political position as indicated in points 3b, 3d, and 2d of U.S. 2, i.e., emphasizing political negotiations in Teheran aimed at united national program of economic development and social progress, no reprisals against military and rebels other than those responsible for assassination attempt.

b. Appointment of Ebtehaj, X, and Y, as in point 3d of U.S. 2. Our information is that these three national figures are definitely reliable. Appointments should be announced in speech.

2. State to Shah that our military authorities believe that military operations by loyal units, with U.S. and allied logistical and technical (but noncombat) assistance as programmed, can assure favorable outcome for him provided (a) he makes clear his political commitment to progress and reform, and (b) Soviet Union does not intervene. We and our allies are attempting to handle (b), and (a) is his responsibility.

Shah may announce in same speech our substantial military logistic support and our agreement with his political aims as specified.

President adds this personal message to Shah: "My job is to deal with the Russians, your job is to deal with your rightists. We must both be tough."

END

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GAME CLASSIFIED

US 10

MESSAGE TO THE AMBASSADOR TEHERAN--MAJOR GEN. CHIEF MAAG

U.S. EYES ONLY

Desire you make Chief Maag Iran available to Shah as operational advisor and make it plain to Shah he is expected to use him. Rest of MSN for Maj. Gen. Chief Maag.

1. Certain special forces units being sent soonest for use in disaffected areas to assist Iranians. These will be under Colonel X.

2. Combat elements of Iranian Air Force should be prepared to support ground action against rebel forces. Air transport wing should be prepared to support ground operations and its strength must be carefully husbanded.

3. Following measures are suggested for implementation with all dispatch and in coordination with Turks as appropriate.

a. Using division at Kazvin move toward Mehabad-Rezaieh Kol to effect junction with Turks.

b. Division now at Zenjan should coordinate with above by attacking toward Tabriz.

c. Iranian air force. Interdict routes of support to rebels--air fiels, etc.

d. Iranian troops Kazvin block pass from Resht using demolitions as necessary and prepare to assist in recapturing Resht.

e. Iranian Division Shahrud move toward Gurgan. Objective Bandar-shah. These troops must also block toward Mashed and plans should be prepared for recapture of that place.

f. Teheran should prepare to recapture Kabul and Bandar-shah speedily, interdicting ports surpasses meanwhile.

g. Emphasize importance to you and all members your command of physical activity and presence with all levels of Iranian army. Be sure Iranians realize we are supporting them but convey thought that they must fight for their own country.

h. Brigade at Zahedan block to the north.

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FUTURE U.S. MILITARY MOVES

1. U.S. Task Force Commander ordered:

a. To have advance echelon of U.S. forces in Turkey prepare to move supplies and U.S. combat forces by rail, road, and air to Turkish-Iranian border.

b. To prepare operation plans with view of airlifting Iranian and/or U.S. forces to ports of Bandar Shah and Resht, and beaches at Babul. Also airfields at Tabriz and Resht.

c. To conduct intensive aerial reconnaissance over rebel held areas. In particular, to gather evidence of Soviet support to rebels, its character, and extent.

2. One U.S. aircraft carrier and several shiploads of equipment and supplies leave Singapore for the Persian Gulf.

3. Two British aircraft carriers and other U.S. and British naval vessels arrive (Sept. 15) at Port Said on way to Persian Gulf.

4. Replacement aircraft for Iranian and Turkish air forces shipped from New York on aircraft carrier.

GUIDANCE: IRANIAN TACTICAL PSYWAR OPERATIONS - REBEL OPTIONS

Theme: Resio Shah's speech this is a wholly unnecessary war. Shah prepared recognize legitimate rebel grievances. Let's not let foreigners put us at each other's throats. End hostilities. Let's get back to work together. No reprisals.

end

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GAME CLASSIFIED

US 11 e.

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO AMBASSADOR CAIRO

Make following statement to Nasser:

1. U.S. and allies receptive to progressive political developments within Iran as indicated in President's message of US 4, but firmly committed to preventing Soviet intervention and preserving independence of Iran to adopt its own foreign policy.

2. If Iranian crisis not settled by internal negotiation, war would very likely spread throughout Middle East, with grave danger to all countries including Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states.

3. U.S. and allies committed to logistic (noncombat) support of Iran's legitimate government as a framework for future political developments. To maximum extent possible supplies will be sent by air and by land via Turkey. But some shipments through Canal are programmed, and U.S. would view with utmost seriousness their interruption.

4. If peace preserved in Middle East, UAR can count on U.S. support for its internal development. Soviet assistance in past, on other hand, has included attempted subversion.

more

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US 11 b

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY STATE TO AMBASSADOR ISRAEL

Make following statement to Ben-Gurion:

1. Iranian crisis involves threat of war throughout Middle East. U.S. would recognize validity of overt Israeli military preparations, including full mobilization of reserves, to protect its independence and interests.

end

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GAME CLASSIFIED

US 12

GAME CLASSIFIED

CIA INTERMEDIARY CONVERSATION WITH MAHMADI

The U.S. recognizes the justice of many of the rebel grievances. We have been putting pressure on the Shah even before the revolution to take steps towards liberalization and democratization. Also U.S. has been giving aid to improve lot of the people.

We would support your position in negotiating with the Shah on a number of points:

1. Return to constitutional government.
2. The inclusion of members of your group in the government and especially yourself if you take the lead in bringing about a reconciliation.
3. Continuing support in the elimination of corruption and in the creation of a liberal democratic government.
4. Support in your ambition to create a strong independent prosperous Iran.

Furthermore, the United States will expect all of its efforts to assure for guarantees against reprisals and full rights of citizenship all rebels who join soon in reaching a peaceful solution with the government except those directly involved in assassination attempt.

We recognize the right of any future government of Iran to choose course for its security, and specifically to choose to accept or not accept foreign military aid. We should like to point out that American forces in Iran do not include SAC units or other strategic units that might be used in hostilities against the Soviet Union, except in case of Soviet attack in Iran. They are solely of a kind calculated to help in the defense of Iran. They are there at the request of the Iranian government and can be withdrawn at its request.

At the request of the Shah his troops are currently being re-equipped and supported by us in ways which would make victory by the government inevitable unless there were massive and direct Soviet intervention. If you make military defeat of your forces the only alternative we would regret it because it would mean weakening drastically the liberal forces in Iran.

more

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Soviet intervention unlikely for reasons stated in previous note. If it occurred consequences for the people of Iran would be disastrous. Under those circumstances U.S. committed to military action which at best would result in Korea-like conflict and at worst nuclear devastation. Soviet victory would leave you under conditions of your co-religionists across border with your religion wiped out.

In short the only way you can win is by negotiating with the Shah. If you do that, we can see no limit to the legitimate aspirations of yourself as an individual and your movement as a political force in the future government of Iran.

end

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GAME CLASSIFIED

US 13

GAME CLASSIFIED

CIA TO MAG ADVISORY WITH 11TH DIVISION

Explain American view as expressed in Presidential statements and statements to Mahmadi (restated here by reference.) to Commanding General

Should Mahmadi not respond favorably to Shah's generous initiative, due to Communist influence, importance rebel army leaders--presumably nationalists--would increase. Note anti-generals statement by Mahmadi (none to be in government).

Suggest that 10,000 shares of Aramco stock are available to be deposited in Switzerland in the name of anyone he chooses to name if he can bring his division over to the government.

end

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GAME CLASSIFIED

US 14

GAME CLASSIFIED

CIA TO KURDISH TURCO-AMERICAN OPERATIVE

Go see Chief Mullah of Kurdish tribes. Explain American view as expressed in Presidential statements and statements to Mahmadi (restated here by reference).

Furthermore, the U.S. views Kurdish desire for autonomy and greater representation in government with favor.

Should Mahmadi not respond favorably to Shah's generous initiative, this is opportunity for Kurds to take the lead in establishing regime that would make possible the achievement of their aspirations.

end

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CAME CLASSIFIED

US 15

CAME CLASSIFIED

U.S. AMBASSADOR IN NEW DELHI TO NEHRU

We welcome the leadership he has given to responsible world opinion by his statement supporting a peaceful solution to the Iranian situation. That too is the American objective, illustrated by our initiative in seeking negotiations between the two sides. Stress our conviction that stability in the world depends on continued acceptance of present boundaries by all nations and US is prepared to defend these at any cost.

Present American aid primarily material and advisory. American disposition in Iran for defense of Iran. Includes no forces which threaten Soviet Union. Reassure him that U.S. will not introduce combat forces or nuclear weapons unless Soviets intervene. In the absence of Soviet intervention we believe Iranian government forces can readily restore order. Future American military aid in Iran a matter for decision by Iranian government.

U.S. would respond favorably and with pleasure to any initiative Mr. Nehru wishes to make to bring about a discussion of the Iranian problem among the interested parties including the Soviet Union. As the President has said we will gladly discuss our position in the UN at the Summit, or anywhere. He may wish to consider urgently and additionally using his great influence to encourage acceptance of Shah's offer of negotiating between contending parties.

end

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CAME CLASSIFIED

US - 16

CAME CLASSIFIED

CONTINGENCIES

1. If Shah cannot dominate Rightists and negotiate in good faith we shall continue to block direct Soviet intervention but try to work out best new government with most nationalist elements in rebel coalition. We regard this as unlikely contingency given pressure we can bring to bear on Shah and his unpromising alternatives. If Shah can proceed as in our present strategy, we back him on indicated terms.

2. If we find out from Col X that rebels are in fact tightly controlled by Communists interested not in Iranian reform but in creating a Soviet-dominated government, with removal of US influence, we shall continue to support Shah's military operations, short of US combat support, along lines of military appreciation in Control 17, meanwhile working through Col X to break out of rebel coalition military, nationalist, and Kurdish elements.

3. If we find out from Col X that rebels are in fact interested in national economic development and political reforms, and that Communists are a minor element, we shall back him strongly in negotiations with Shah. We judge that if this is their complexion, the question of US military aid would be negotiable with a new coalition government, perhaps by a shift in emphasis from military to economic aid.

4. If the Soviets attempt to move significant military supplies to the rebels, we shall help the Iranians mount interdiction operations in the passes (on the Iranian side), and, if necessary, by the seizure and subsequent air supply of the Caspian ports. It is our military appreciation that the rebel forces are now excessively thin on the ground; they wholly lack air strength; and that these operations against specific points can be successfully conducted, if pursued with energy and planned with US support.

5. If the Soviets infiltrate "volunteers" in substantial numbers, we shall bring the matter promptly before the UN Security Council and back the Turks in moving across the Iranian frontier, in support of its CENTO ally, if the Security Council fails to stop the "volunteer" flow. The Pakistani would mobilize on the Afghan border, prepared

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to move if the Afghans move in support of the rebels. It is basic to our position that the rights on either side of the line are asymmetrical. We shall also, in this case, warn the Soviet Union solemnly that the danger of general war is approaching; at the emergency session of Congress ask for radically increased military expenditure to provide a full range of graduated force; increase the degree of SAC alert; put the National Guard on alert. The objective would be to communicate to the Russians our dead seriousness about resisting a violation of free world frontiers; our readiness to deal with the threat over a wide front, transcending Iran, short of invoking SAC; but also leaving it unclear to them as to whether we might not also go to the limit rather than surrender what we regard as the fundamental condition for stability in the Cold War.

6. It is our military evaluation that a likely flow of "volunteers" given the logistic position, could be handled by Turkish moves. The purpose of above is to bring Moscow up short before Red Army units formally cross frontier, which we judge only way of tipping balance in rebel favor, given our policy. If this happens, the fat is in the fire.

7. Our appreciation of a "realistic" Russian position in the context of the Iranian crisis is this:

a. They did not initiate the crisis with the intent to move Soviet forces into the Middle East. Their operation is one of exploitation to the maximum short of serious Russian military engagement.

b. They understood the asymmetry of the truce lines as well as we do, and have respected the principle from the Iranian crisis of 1945-46 down through Lebanon-Jordan in 1958 and beyond.

8. If the rules are changed--if the Russians decide the time is ripe to exploit the nuclear stalemate and US and Allied ground force and mobility weaknesses, the US has the alternatives of accepting what all would know was a major defeat, corrosive of our total position, or fighting a war at graduated levels, shifting the terrain from less favorable to more favorable ground. We would fight with some American troops in Iran; but widen the area of conflagration; e.g. perhaps in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, we would maintain diplomatic contact with the Russians via the UN. We have some more concrete notions about this widened --but still limited and graduated--war, but it would be inappropriate at this stage to go into detail.

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Phase II

Soviet Team Moves

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Military moves (covert)

1. In response to intelligence reports that the US/SAC Airborne forces have increased their activity, the SU ICBM forces are ordered into the highest degree of alert and the bomber aircraft of long-range air force make certain limited moves to dispersal airfields and a few are moved to staging bases in the Kola and Kamchatka peninsula areas.

2. One airborne regiment with its organic airlift is moved into airfields in Tbilisi. Three USSR divisions (one armored and two motorized rifle) are now poised in the southern Transcaucasian Military District.

3. Mobile anti-aircraft units and mobile radar equipment (suitable for control of defense fighter aircraft) are also poised in the same area.

4. Military equipment (rifles, light artillery, machine gun, ammunition, and logistical supplies) are now truck mounted in the area south of Baku, ready to move into the area held by the revolutionary forces if the decision is made to provide such support to these forces. END

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Moscow, Sept. 17 (TASS). Pravda this morning publishes an editorial signed "Observer" and entitled "Foil the Imperialist Intervention in Iran." The article declares that the arrival of U.S. troops in Turkey and the sighting of U.S. naval vessels off the Suez Canal have now revealed the extent of the U. S. imperialist objectives to restore Western colonialist rule over the Middle East and crush the national democratic revolution of the Iranian people. The Soviet peoples, Pravda states, view with grave concern this new threat to the peace of the world, and demand with one voice that the Soviet government do all in its power to prevent this imperialist intervention." As Comrade N.S. Khrushchev said today," the article continues, "the Soviet government, basing its policy firmly upon the Leninist doctrine of peaceful coexistence and the non-inevitability of imperialist war, and faithful to its adherence to the U. N. and to its treaty obligations, cannot stand idly by if U.S. military forces continue their preparations for full-scale intervention against the Iranian revolution and the countries of the Arab world."

The article continues by stressing the unanimous indignation of the Soviet toiling masses against the ridiculous pretext by which the U.N. Security Council was adjourned sine die, and their firm and principled demand that the Council be immediately recalled into session to prevent the U. S. military intervention. As Comrade Khrushchev also said in this connection, "The shameless and unilateral U. S. disregard of the U. N., the cynical saber-rattling by which it moves around airborne troops and naval vessels, only shows how, when their plans go awry, the imperialists reveal their true nature. The Soviet Government always bases its policy upon its obligations to the U. N. and the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and is always ready to support all peace-loving nations in their resistence to imperialist aggression. The artificial imperialist majority in the Security Council cannot be allowed to prevent the peace-loving masses of the world from stopping the intervention of the imperialists. For its part, the Soviet Union will stand firm against these foredoomed plans of the imperialists, and remain faithful to its treaty obligations." END

Moscow, Sept. 17 (UPI), by Henry Shapiro. TASS today issued a statement categorically denying the "imperialist fabrication" that the former Iranian Communist leader Nasrollah Said is now in Iran. (Ed. Note: This was reported today by Reuters from Tabriz). This reporter was today able to speak to Nasrollah Said in his apartment in Moscow, where the former Iranian Communist leader is recuperating from a long illness. Nasrollah Said told this reporter that, although his illness had prevented his being fully informed of developments in Iran, he fully sup orted the national democratic revolution there and hoped when his health permitted to take his proper place in the democratic political life of his homeland. END

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Summary of Presidium Discussion of the Situation (17 Sept.)

1. The US move to effect a rapprochement between the Shah and Mahmadi represents a significant recognition by the Western imperialist powers of the bankruptcy of their former policy of relying exclusively on right-wing lackeys. Evidently, the US has misunderstood our objectives, blinded by their own propaganda alleging an interest in forcing communist rule by military intervention. It is seeking to establish a national Iranian government which will only lean toward the West rather than being allied with it, apparently without recognizing that they cannot prevent a truly neutral Iran from emerging once the old regime is swept away.

2. The chief contingencies which may arise mxm seem to be three:

(A) The situation continues to develop with the revolutionary forces gaining and the Shah's authority disintegrating;

(B) The revolutionary forces losing momentum and the Iranians rally to the Shah; and

(C) US direct military intervention.

3. We believe that A is the most likely course of events. The US action to date makes their further direct military intervention less likely than we had initially assumed, though as the Shah's situation continues to deteriorate the chances of their intervention may increase. We shall not intervene militarily in order to advance the revolutionary control nor in order to increase our influence within the revolutionary government. We shall continue to isolate the Shah and the US and its allies.

4. The case B seems unlikely, but if the revolutionary forces seemed to be losing we would not intervene militarily to assist them, but we would seek a UN cease-fire to give the revolutionary forces time to consolidate.

5. In case of direct US military intervention, by land from Turkey, or by air or sea, we will immediately press vigorously for UN action to end the intervention. Only if this fails would we reconsider and possibly send Soviet military forces into northern Iran in order to maintain the revolutionary regime. They would seek, with Iranian revolutionary forces, to advance over the maximum areas n until contact with the US forces was reached and there to assume defensive positions. END

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USSR - 19

Note to Professor Mahmadi from Premier N. S. Khruschev

I wish on behalf of the Soviet people, shared I am sure by peaceloving people everywhere, to congratulate you and the Iranian people for your continuing successes in the struggle to secure the full independence of Iran. We wish to assure you of our full support for the efforts to establish the bases for full independence through [redacted] neutrality, and withdrawal from alliances with the imperialists, removal of foreign bases and military missions and other points in your program as announced on 17 September 1961. We shall do all we can to cooperate openly, provide such economic and technical assistance asyou may desire, and assist you on the basis of genuine equality and mutual non-interference in internal affairs. END

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USSR - 20

Letter from Soviet Permanent Representative to UN, V. A. Zorin, to President of Security Council, Sept. 16, 1961.

Soviet Government insists that Security Council meet at 5:00 p.m. today September 16 to consider under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, situation likely to threaten international peace and security as result of developments in Iran. In view of seriousness of the situation, majority of Security Council acted frivolously at meeting of September 15 in postponing discussion on matter on which action so clearly necessary in interest of international peace.

Draft resolution proposed by Soviet Delegation follows:

"The Security Council,

Mindful of its responsibilities for the preservation of international peace and security under the Charter;

Recognizing the right of the Iranian people to freedom and independence and to settle their own affairs without interference from outside Iran;

Taking account of the military support already provided by the United States and other members of the Western bloc to the former government of Iran, and of aggressive military moves now being taken by American forces in the general area of the Middle East with a view to intervention in Iran; urgently recommends

1. That all foreign military personnel, including advisers and technicians attached to Iranian military or paramilitary forces, be withdraw from Iran;

2. That no foreign military forces of any kind be introduced into Iran;

3. That all shipments of military equipment into Iran immediately cease;

4. That/the Security Council any violations of these recommendations, member states report to whereupon the Council will immediately meet to consider appropriate action."

END -END

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Political Strategy

Our general Soviet strategy is to mobilize world public opinion, particularly in Africa, Asia, Latin America and among the European allies of the U.S. (notably the U.K.) toward forcing the U.S. out of Iran and bringing about Iran's withdrawal from CENTO and the establishment there of a national democratic revolutionary government friendly to the USSR although not allied with it and without significant overt Communist participation in it. Our emphasis to all foreign countries, political and propagandistic, will be upon non-intervention and (indirectly) upon their fear of a general war, while stressing the corrupt, reactionary and non-representative nature of the Shah's regime.

Initially, ~~mx~~ our objective will be to obtain an U.N. resolution in such terms as (1) maximum: the substance of our draft resolution, or (2) minimum: the simple prohibition of introduction of foreign troops and supplies. The former seems initially unlikely, although we would fight hard for it; we would compromise gradually as to phraseology of the resolution. **Adoption of minimum** quite unlikely (indeed, it is difficult to see how the U.S. could vote against it); should it occur, ~~[illegible]~~ we would abstain, pointing out how the U.S. has thus documented its imperialist intentions to remain in its colonial position vis-a-vis Iran.

Anticipating that Security Council action would be both delayed and less favorable to us than General Assembly action, we would try to bring the latter into play as much as possible. Stress ~~mxkkx~~ would also be placed by us in our UN speeches upon the threat to the UAR and other Arab states by the presence of Western naval vessels off Port Said, upon the U.S.'s unsuccessful attempt to bribe Mahmadi into continuing the U.S. alliance, and upon our complete satisfaction with Mahmadi's actions and program.

We hope to be able to use the UN as a means of creating a political atmosphere in which the US will find it impossible to ~~mx~~ move militarily in Iran; and if they do so in fact, will give us maximum chance of acting through UN to compel their withdrawal. END

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Oral Communication by Soviet Ambassador in Cairo to President Nasser, September 16, 1961.

Further to statement of September 14 (USSR-No. 10), recent moves of imperialists in eastern Mediterranian and especially in vicinity of Suez Canal indicate cynical disregard of rights and interests of Arab nations. Attempt may be made to seize Suez Canal. USSR is confident UAR will take necessary moves to prevent use of canal by imperialists to further their intervention in Iran, and as in 1956 UAR can count on full support of Soviet Union to throw back any attack by aggressors on UAR's sovereignty and independence. Suggest also USSR and UAR cooperate in (1) bringing aggressive Amerikan actions before United Nations for condemnation, and (2) mobilization of Asian and African opinion against US through intensified ~~xxxxx~~ activity of Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council. END

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GAMES CLASSIFIED USSR -23

CONTROL ONLY

KGB Moscow to Teheran Eyes Only--Orinev Operational Immediate

1. As result recent events Shah has now becoms last effective rallying point of reactionary elements and last weapon of Western imperialists in Iran. In order clear way for final completion of democratic revolutionary process now under way he must now be removed from scene quietly and peacefully. Direct you undertake following action accomplish this purpose, designed persuade Shah cause is lost, imperialists are about to betray him, and his life in danger if he remains Iran:

(A) Allow Gen. Bakhtiar discover through penetration British Embassy, London Foreign Office dispatch relating substance of info acquired Washington by British Embassy Counsellor Hood to effect President has concluded Shah politically ineffective, emotionally unstable and therefore must be quietly replaced by "third force" capable effective internal reforms at home and resistance communist encroachment from abroad.

(B) Plant in Bazaar rumor circuit fragmentary reports of assassination plot against Shah and loyal advisors.

(C) Arrange for one of Shah's most trusted advisors (your selection) to receive evidence that several of his senior military and police officers are already in secret communication with Mahmadá.

2. FYI: We are arranging for Iranian Military Attache Ankara to obtain reliable evidence that American forces there will in no circumstances cross Iranian frontiers, and that American ambassador has sought assurances from Turkish government that Turkish armed forces will carefully refrain any border incidents or other action likely provoke hostilities in connection Iranian situation. END

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Phase II - III

Control Moves

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London, September 17 (Reuters)

British radio operators on the island of Bahrein today monitored radio broadcasts purporting to be the voice of Professor Mahmadi. He decried the "imperialistic interference" by the United States. The United States government, he said, had communicated with him and had announced support of the Shah, the "lacky of colonial militarists". Furthermore, the United States had called upon Mahmadi to betray the popular revolution by negotiating with the reactionary Shahist forces. The Professor said this was clear evidence of the degree to which the Shah's government was not a representative of the Iranian people but an agent of foreign interests. As for negotiation, the revolutionary government had already clearly stated its aims. If the Shah found the program of the revolutionary regime as outlined in the Professor's Sept. 17 message (Control 19) acceptable, and in particular would renounce all foreign assistance and intervention from whatever source, he need only give evidence of this by breaking his ties with the US, and then free negotiation between Iranians could proceed. The revolutionary government would never negotiate with a foreign pistol at its head.

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Control 25

CONTROL TO USSR

Control 24 to U.S. and USSR, to be considered response to your USSR-8.

end

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Control - 26

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Control to US

Intelligence sources report Soviet military personnel have entered rebel area in mufti. Not clear whether engaged in unilateral intelligence operations or collaborating with rebels, but appear to have at least acquiescence of local rebel forces.

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Control - 27

USSR Only

Cable

From: Soviet Agent Zsundoff

To: Moscow For Office

As a result of US approach to Mahmadi a number of the younger members in revolt led by Zarmegar and Nafici who known for their strong anti-US feelings have been pressing Mahmadi to develop closer contacts with USSR.

So far Mahmadi has resisted this pressure. At present he is still in complete control of revolution.

Brigadier General Fatimi, the leading military figure in the revolt, strongly urging Mahmadi to open negotiation with US.

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SUMMARY OF UN ACTION

New York, September 21

1. The Security Council met Sept. 17 on call of President, at the urgent request of the Soviet Delegate. Iran, which was invited to sit with the Council as a directly interested party, objected that the situation in Iran was a matter of domestic jurisdiction, and the Council failed to adopt the agenda item proposed by the Soviet Union (USSR 20). The Council adjourned after a 3-hour speech by the Soviet representative excoriating the United States for its imperialist intervention in the affairs of Iran, its attempt to suppress by foreign military means the true expression of the Iranian people against a "running dog" of the United States capitalists. The Soviet Union served notice that it would raise the matter in the General Assembly immediately upon its completion of its organizing yesterday, Sept. 20. (Ceylon, UAR and Ecuador voted with USSR to enroll Soviet item on agenda; UK, France, China, Colombia, Greece and Turkey opposed, US abstained.)

2. The 16th Regular Session of the UN General Assembly convened in New York on Sept. 20. Under Rule 15* of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure the Soviet Union requested that, as an "Additional item of an important and urgent character", the situation in Iran be placed on the agenda. While Brazil made its traditional opening speech in the General debate, the Soviet Union circulated its draft resolution (the same as contained in USSR-20 with substitution of words "General Assembly" for Security Council, and deletion of first preambular phrase).

Initial estimates by Secretariat staff members were that a majority of Members would favor inclusion, and two thirds would undoubtedly favor consideration before 7 days had elapsed. It was also considered likely

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*Rule 15. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a regular session or during a regular session, may be placed on the agenda, if the General Assembly so decides by a majority of the Members present and voting. No additional item may be considered until seven days have elapsed since it was placed on the agenda, unless the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting, decides otherwise, and until a committee has reported upon the question concerned.

MORE - MORE

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that a majority could be readily secured in committee, and 2/3 in plenary, for a resolution deeming the situation in Iran a potential threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, calling for all states to refrain from intervention and asking the SYG to offer his good offices and assistance. There were conflicting estimates among experts as to whether a 2/3 majority could or could not be secured for language explicitly embargoing external military support into Iran. The Soviet Union was not considered likely to secure 2/3 for their references to American military moves, but either an amended version of the Soviet draft resolution or a different resolution along similar lines would probably pass.

END

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Control - 31

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CONTROL TO USSR

Mahmedi made following earnest, high-level approach to Soviet government:

1. U.S. aid on massive scale being received by Shah's forces, arriving by airlift and--he understands--en route by sea. Already Shah has received fifty or one hundred tactical support aircraft and scores of helicopters, dozens of tanks, and thousands of so-called "noncombat" troops including an engineer battalion, various kinds of communications units with their equipment and transport; also large quantities of ammunition, spare parts, etc. No end in sight to American technical and logistic support.

2. Rebel forces cannot possibly mount any offensive against Shah's air superiority and airlift mobility. Further, rebel forces will be unable hold passes against a loyalist offensive if latter has complete air superiority and air transport capability.

3. Rebel forces will require material aid on large scale from Soviets, including equipment, ammunition, fuel. No combat trsops or technical personnel will be needed or requested. Rebels can do their own fighting if only American logistic support can be equalized for rebels. No repeat no Soviet military personnel in Iran is contemplated at any stage.

4. Absolutely essential to have tactical air support, including air transport. Rebel forces have some piston aircraft that can be extremely valuable in reconnaissance and in limited air-transport use. These are extremely vulnerable to air attack. Several aircraft lost on ground in last few days. No air defense currently possible.

5. In view of paragraph 4, Mahmedi urgently requests use of Soviet airfields for rebel aircraft. These will be operated by Iranian pilots. But they need the absolute sanctuary of Soviet airfields. They will engage in active military operations. Mahmedi will make clear by public speech that no repeat no non-Iranian pilots being used by rebel forces over Iranian territory. In view rapid build-up of Shah's air force, essential that rebel planes escape to Soviet airfields at once. Will be appreciated if Soviets will designate immediately (within 12 hours) airfields where Iranian rebel aircraft can land and be guaranteed freedom to depart at will on military operations. Technical discussions on methods of operation, etc. will be undertaken right away but rebel aircraft cannot wait.

more

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6. It is assumed that a rebel request for Soviet aid in form of aircraft fuel and ammunition, and navigational assistance, etc., will be forthcoming without question. It is further hoped that Soviet aircraft--suitebly marked to identify them as Iranian rebel air force--will be transferred to rebel forces and permitted to operate from Soviet bases unless maneuver outlinéd paragraph 7 succeeds.

7. Rebel forces intend to destroy Shah's airfields by paratroop and bombing attack before Shah is position to mount an offensive (within 30 days). Will wish Soviet facilities for further training of Iranian paratroops and launching of night paratroop attack from Soviet bases with Soviet aircraft piloted by Iranians.

8. Mahmedi urges on Soviets appreciation of following three points:

a. Without such assistance, Shah's forces will in all likelihood crush rebellion by virtue of air superiority and American logistic and technical support.

b. Rebel forces will under no circumstances accept Soviet troop assistance or any foreign military personnel assistance except in face of large-scale American or Cento troop intervention.

c. Airfield sanctuary described above absolutely essential immediately.

9. Mahmedi recognizes that Soviet government may feel use of Soviet territory for basing military operations is a step fraught with risk. Would point out that Shah's forces enjoy precisely that form of external help at present time. Believe Soviet and rebel position beyond reproach in view Shah's exploitation of sanctuary bases in Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and USA itself. Indeed the determination of rebel forces to decline any foreign military personnel assistance is demonstration to world that rebels are truly independent national force and that they are fighting against forces receiving illegitimate forms of assistance.

end

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Control-32

USSR ONLY

Soviet Embassy in Teheran to Moscow

The effort to ~~xxx~~ persuade the Shah that his cause lost not likely to succeed. Shah's morale buoyed by firm promise of American aid. The Shah is not moved by threats of assassination. He remains confident of American support and refuses to credit rumors casting doubt on this support. END

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GAMES CLASSIFIED Control 33

USSR ONLY

USSR Covert Military Mission, Mahmadi-to Moscow

Contact established with Mahmadi group. Forces well organized but spread over extremely large area and very short of supplies. Troops being subjected to sporadic air attack by Shah's forces. Estimate that should air activity continue, morale will deteriorate. Offer of assistance or advisors under consideration. Estimate that provision of small arms, ammunition, and general logistic support urgently required for offensive action; air support and supplies needed even for stable defense if loyalist air activity increases.

USSR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliable information that American forces are now landing in Iran, exact nature not determined but suggested scale appears massive. Equipment at Teheran airport consisting of tactical aircraft, tactical transport aircraft, heliocopters, small arms and ammunition definitely identified. Estimate that 500 troops, approximately 300 of which believed to be airforce technicians. Troop movements through canal increased. British elements observed, believed to be naval personnel. Movement of support troops from Germany by air observed. Current estimate of total to be moved: one engineer bn; one military transport bn; approximately 2000-5000 troops. Current movements suggest that Shah's forces will be able to reequip forces, consolidate position, greatly increase air attacks against rebel forces. END

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Control - 34

US Only

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US Consul to Sec'y State. Port Said, Sept. 21

Two amphibious support ships passed through canal southbound yesterday. Two British air craft carriers have been waiting 25 hours for passage. Mounting congestion of vessels off northern entrance. Prospect of additional delays increasing.

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Control 35

U.S. ONLY

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SECRETARY STATE, CAIRO, September 21

President Nasser expressed amazement at American imputation that passage of vessels through Suez Canal was being interfered with by Egypt. This is not true. Canal is open and operating to fullest capacity. Egypt is zealously observing all provisions of Treaty of Constantinople. Traffic has become exceedingly heavy of late. Every effort being made to expedite passage. Egypt regards massing of American naval power off Port Said as move threatening her independence and integrity. Egypt will repel with every effort in her command any attempt by American Navy to employ force against her. It almost sounds as if our conversations in Tel Aviv have been compromised. Understand President Nasser preparing to make public address tomorrow.

end

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Control - 36

GAMES CLASSIFIED

US only

Control to US

It is assumed for Move 3 that by the opening date, Sept. 21, your aid has been arriving by air, on schedule, for five days. Already aircraft, helicopters, even some tanks, ammunition, communication equipment, the engineer battalion, some motor transport units -- totalling some thousands of military personnel. This is reliably observed by Mahmadi's agents and is fairly well appreciated by the Russians. Meanwhile, the Shah's air forces have destroyed on the ground several of the air craft remaining to the rebels and appears determined to destroy every air craft as rapidly as it can find them, as a highest priority.

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Control - 37

Teheran, Sept. 17 (AP)

The first reaction to the Shah's speech of yesterday ended in violent disaster on the streets of Kazvin. A small band of Mahnadi's forces surrendered to gendarmeries in the small town outside Teheran. They were immediately taken to the courtyard of the local coffeehouse where a military court was suddenly convened. General Hussein Mazi arrived from Teheran to issue the verdict of guilty and sentence the band leader to death. Remaining rebel members were still in agony this morning from the bastinado, a foot-beating torture which the gendarmerie administered.

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Control - 38

USSR ONLY

Soviet Ambassador to Moscow, September 20

President Nasser deeply concerned massing American vessels off Port Said. Canal authorities doing best to handle increasingly heavy southbound traffic. Some delays are occurring. Egypt observing all requirements Treaty of Constantinople. If any move made by Americans to interfere with Canal or exert undue pressure upon authorities Nasser will announce this publicly, inform me and appeal to UN General Assembly.

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Control 39

U.S. ONLY

U.S. EMBASSY, TEHERAN TO DEPARTMENT

Large crowds mourners funerals riot victims during past week at various places including Isfahan, Yazd and Ahwaz kept orderly by strong police-military escort. Violent though veiled attacks on foreign intervention voiced by mullahs at these times clearly refer to U.S. military air to Shah. Crowds roared approval orators' references to foreign unbelievers and praise of Iranian martyrs.

Ebtehaj, X and Y, offered cabinet posts by Shah witholding acceptance until clearer whether national coalition government including Mahmadi will in fact be formed.

end

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GAME CLASSIFIED

Control 40

U.S. Only

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SECRETARY STATE. NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 21

Saw Nehru for two hours this morning. He is obviously perturbed over trend of events within and around Iran. He fears someone may make move from which it will be impossible to draw back short of overt intervention or general hostilities. Nehru would be prepared to mediate between conflicting parties in Iran to bring about ceasefire and reduction of world dangers on invitation of both repeat both Shah and Mahmedi.

end

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Control - 41

US ONLY

GAMES CLASSIFIED

Message received from CIA agent in Tabriz

Secured a one-half hour interview with Mahmadi tonight. He expressed grave doubts about the Shah's sincerity in wanting to negotiate. The Shah, Mahmadi believes, is being forced to negotiate by United States pressure. In addition, Mahmadi contends that the Shah cannot be removed from the domination of his aristocratic supporters, many of whom are related to the royal family, without a successful revolution. Mahmadi doubts if Shah's control is sufficient to insure effectiveness of any guarantees he might give relating to reprisal against rebels, and calls attention to outrages against captured rebels since Shah's speech. Apart from this personal belief, Mahmadi established five minimum conditions before he would negotiate:

1. The Shah must renounce all American military support of the Iranian government. If Iranian military situation continues to be grossly unbalanced by US military participation, rebels must seek material support from any available outside source.

2. The United States must cooperate by withholding any further logistical, advisory or technical support of the Shah's forces.

3. Mahmadi must have the position of Prime Minister in the new government in order to implement needed reforms.

4. Shah may retain--and Mahmadi will personally guarantee--Shah's appropriate constitutional prerogatives, and the royal family will undergo no personal danger.

5. Mahmadi will be only too eager to exclude all forms of Soviet influence if American influence eliminated as demanded.

end

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Control - 42

C O R R E C T I O N

Teheran News Dispatch (AP), 21 September 1961

Leading elements of the Iranian 2nd Armored Division entered Takistan, indicating movement towards Zenjan which is now held by elements of the 11th Infantry Division of the rebel forces. This movement may indicate intensive fighting in the area of Zenjan as the Shah's forces, re-equipped by American forces began to increase activity in the North. Sporadic air attacks occurred at Tabriz and other airfields in rebel held territory.

end

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Control ~ 43

Teheran, September 16 (UPI)

The Shah this morning announced far-reaching reforms in his government. Mr. Abol-Hasan Ebtehaj has been offered re-appointment as director of the Plan Organization. The ministries of Education and Labor were offered to persons known to be rebel supporters. Their reaction is still unknown.

The Shah promised that the new ambitious Third Plan which includes land reform and new measures of economic development would be given top priority. He indicated that extensive outside financial assistance would be available for this new program. To create the atmosphere he deemed necessary for reform, the Shah called upon all rebellious elements in Iran to lay down their arms and join in the national effort towards peaceful re-construction. Amnesty was promised for all acts legitimately associated with the rebellion.

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Control - 44

US ONLY

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CIA Tabriz to Sec'y State, September 21

Current appraisal complexion Mahmadi movement as follows:

1. Mahmadi himself genuine nationalist, realist with no strong ideological leanings.

2. A number of younger members in revolt led by Zapmegah and Nafici who known for strong anti-US feelings have been pressing Mahmadi to develop closer political contacts with USSR. So far Mahmadi has resisted this pressure.

3. Brigadier General Fatemi, the leading military figure in the revolt, originally strongly urged Mahmadi to negotiate with US.

4. Increasing sentiment among Mahmadi's military advisors for strong request to Soviet's for material and technical assistance, especially aircraft. Majority of military do not like dependence on Soviet but see no alternative in the light of growing US assistance to Shah.

5. Mahmadi believed genuinely opposed to foreign troop movements into Iran in support of rebels but might accept this as last resort if Shah received such assistance from abroad.

end

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Phase III

US Team Moves

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GAME CLASSIFIED

U.S. 18
Reference: Control 41

COLONEL X FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE PROFESSOR

You will point out the following:

~~1. General Mazi's head should reassure him about seriousness of Shah's commitment to amnesty.~~

2. As text of President's U.N. Assembly speech (attached) indicates, the United States will not alter its treaty commitments under threat or pressure.. The extent of military pressure from government is up to him: it will end with successful completion of negotiations. Underline dangers of delay. Mazi incident now contained; but continued hostilities will tend to compromise political negotiation and his personal status in future Iranian government.

2. As for turning to external support, this is evidently a matter of his choice. But point out cooly and professionally:

a. his forces now have only a few days supply if engaged on combat;

b. his forces now equipped wholly with U.S. arms; Soviet support would require replacement all major types of equipment;

c. Soviet aid on requisite scale difficult given limited supply lines we shall harass and would make total commitment to Soviet control;

d. such a move would, of course, definitely compromise his future role in Iranian politics.

3. As for substance of Iranian economic and constitutional reforms, the U.S. is strongly with him. Evidence appointments (control 43) made at U.S. insistence.

4. Mahmedi's role as prime minister evidently hinges on promptness and success of negotiation, likely to be made under surveillance of India and others with U.N. Assembly blessing.

5. As for future of American military and economic aid--or "influence"-- a matter for future government to decide. Reiterate limited defensive role of U.S. military aid. Emphasize our desire to see economic development accelerated. Underline that Iranian independence and ability to defend itself hinges on properly proportioned and mutually supporting military and economic programs.

end

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U.S. 19

SECRETARY STATE TO U.S. AMBASSADOR, CAIRO (Ref. Control 35)

Tell President Nasser that we had assumed Egypt would observe the Treaty of Constantinople. The U.S. is not threatening Egypt. Nor are we massing naval power off of Port Said. Most of the U.S. and U.K. vessels in transit or awaiting transit are not naval craft. Stress that we are determined to resist any Soviet intervention in Iran and that our present actions are directed towards this objective. Tell him also that there is no question of an Israeli offensive move in present context.

Ask him how his economic development plan is going.

end

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U.S. 20

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MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY STATE TO AMBASSADOR TEHERAN FOR SHAH

1. U.S. position at Assembly is to support placing Iranian crisis on agenda. President will appear personally to state and defend U.S. position, maintain integrity of regional pact, and welcome U.N. mediation between Shah and rebels. (See details in U.S. 22.)

2. We consider it urgent for Shah to express Iran's position in agreement with her allies, welcoming such U.N. action. We deplore earlier Iranian resistance to Security Council consideration of issue, and suggest Shah explain in terms of preference for action in veto-free Assembly.

3. Shah should be warned that any actions by him which appear to show intransigeance, either in dealing politically with rebels or in international negotiations in cooperation with his allies, may threaten the success of present policies for resolving the Iranian crisis.

4. U.S. intends to remain close to Shah and Mahmadi during negotiation, in context of likely U.N. Good Offices effort.

end

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CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFIED

US - 21

U.S. EYES ONLY

NEC U.S. AMBASSADOR TEHERAN

Please pass following to Maj. Gen. Chief Msag. Have noted press report of Iran Division move toward Zenjan. Request you report military situation through embassy and T F Commander Middle East daily. Would also like [redacted] from you appreciation of friendly and rebel supply situation. Suggest you take steps to destroy rebel supplies and resupply Shah's forces supplies according to need. Expect to hear you have started Kermanshah div on its way. Keep up the pressure.

Include in next report your version of Erwin incident. Be sure your people insist to Iranians policy of nonreprisal and suppression of other illegal acts is carried out.

Intelligence effort should be more productive.

end

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US - 22

GAME CLASSIFIED

September 21

US Ambassador to Shah; identical information to British, French, Canadians

1. US will not oppose General Assembly consideration of Iran situation. If as seems likely, majority favors this action, US will vote to place on agenda.

2. President of US will in that case address General Assembly.

3. He will argue that General Assembly cannot impair right of sovereign nation to receive aid for self-defense under a regional arrangement. Cf. articles 51 and 52.

4. The President asks both the Shah and Mahmadi to immediately repeat immediately request Nehru to use his good offices to initiate negotiations between the government of Iran and the rebels with a view to forming a national government as per terms of Shah's offer.

5. The US may at General Assembly propose that the Sec. General or Nehru be authorized to act along lines indicated in No. 4.

end

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GAME CLASSIFIED

US - 23

September 21

GAME CLASSIFIED

Sec'y of State to US Representative at UN

Points 1 - 5 same as in US 22

6. Work must begin now to rally every possible vote in support of positions in paragraphs 3 and 5. A 2/3 majority against us is inconceivable. We can count confidently on Belgium, France, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, UK, Australia, Canada, NZ, China, Israel, Pakistan, Phillipines, Thailand, Iran, Turkey, Liberia, and at least 11 Latin American votes with any effort at all. Besides, there are bound to be abstentions. However, our goal is to have at least a majority with us when the vote finally comes, and preferably 2/3.

Our strategy is 1) to keep discussions going as long as possible; 2) to involve Nehru in a constructive role so as to have India voting with us or at least not against us; 3) to win votes of all members of regional pacts who see consequences of adoption of any other position than our own.

end

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AP, September 28

US voted with majority to place Iranian item on agenda. American representative gave speech explaining that the treaty arrangements between Iran and the US were inviolable and protected under Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter; that American actions in assistance of the government of Iran were in support of the charter and the spirit thereof; that the Iranian situation did constitute a threat to peace because of the danger of intervention by outside powers against the authority of the government of Iran. The US therefore votes for the resolution.

US also expressed hope the General Assembly will take constructive steps to encourage reconciliation between Iranian factions. The US notes with pleasure the liberal gestures of conciliation taken by the Shah towards the rebels.

end

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AP --- October 5

Speech of President of the US at General Assembly

The President of the UN made a one and a half-hour speech at the General Assembly debate today. He outlined in detail the history of the UN Charter, its regional arrangements, the threats to peace which have arisen since the formation of the UN, especially those arising from Communist aggression and subversion and the measures taken by the UN in support of peace, and by US and Allies in support of principles of UN Charter.

The UN Charter gives to every sovereign nation, he said, the right of self-defense (Article 51). It further urges them in support of this right to form regional arrangements for self-help (Article 52). Under these provisions Iran joined the CENTO Pact of 1955 and signed the agreement of cooperation with the US on March 5, 1959. Any proposal that the General Assembly attempt to deny the right of a sovereign power to defend its frontiers from aggression and subversion in this way is obviously invalid under the Charter and a violation of the intention and spirit of it. The United States will honor its commitments to Iran at Iran's request and will honor thereby its commitments to the United Nations and its Charter.

The Iranian situation is indeed a threat to peace. It is appropriate that the General Assembly address itself to this threat and act in such a way that the freedom of sovereign nations and the inviolability of their frontiers not be jeopardized. It is to be hoped that the General Assembly will authorize the Sec'y General to use his good offices in accordance with the action taken by the Assembly, to secure negotiations in Iran, as proposed by the Shah, between the government and the rebels, with a view to the formation of a government of national unity which can restore peace to that country. The US stands ready, by itself or through the UN or both, to provide substantial assistance to a development program designed to put Iran on the road to democratic development, progress, and prosperity, as the government has shown it desires

end

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Phase III

Soviet Team Moves

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Khrushchev Press Conference, Sept. 21.

Moscow, Sept. 21 (TASS). This afternoon N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, met representatives of the Soviet and foreign press in the Great Hall of the Kremlin. N. S. Khrushchev made an opening statement as follows:

"The U. S. President, increasingly desperate in his attempts to prop up the tottering Shah, that notorious lackey of the American imperialists, has finally been no longer able to conceal the open intervention of the U.S. in the internal affairs of Iran, and thus, in spite of the efforts of the USSR and all the peace-loving forces of the world to prevent it, has turned the Iranian situation into an international crisis of the first magnitude. I say to you, with all the seriousness at my command, that the peace of the world hangs in the balance. Only the most rapid, resolute, principled and radical measures by the United Nations can prevent a catastrophe. This is the more difficult, but the more necessary, Comrades, because the United States has so flagrantly disregarded, flaunted, and ignored the authority, nay, even the existence of the United Nations. How long will the peace-loving nations allow this outrageous defiance of the United Nations, this flagrant violation of the principles of peaceful coexistence and non-interference to continue? As for us, the Soviet toiling masses expect and will get from the Soviet Government the fullest support of the United Nations. But, should, which we hope and expect will not occur, the machinations of the imperialists prevent the United Nations from preserving the independence and integrity of Iran, and bringing to a halt the U.S. intervention, and facing the withdrawal of American forces, the Soviet Union will know how to safeguard its interests and its obligations, and no power upon earth will be able to prevent us from doing so.

"I appeal to my friend Prime Minister Mr. MacMillan, I appeal to my friend General de Gaulle: Why are you so silent? I can well understand you feel unable to support this outrageous American intervention, in fact just as contrary to your interests as to ours. I can also understand your reluctance to condemn publicly your ally, although I can remember as well they did not hesitate to condemn you. But the very existence of your countries, and the survival of your people, is now at stake. I appeal to you to join me in bringing the rulers of America to their senses, so that the threat of the destruction of mankind will vanish.

"I have assured Prime Minister Nasser, whose country is clearly menaced by American naval movements, of our full support. The same, it goes without saying, is true for Iraq, and for all nations menaced by the mad running-amok of the American imperialists.

"The peaceloving and cultured Soviet people have been particularly enraged by the bestial executions and tortures, in Kazvin and throughout Iran, of the Shah's Gestapo-like police, and demand that immediate action be taken to prevent this Nazi-like action on their part.

"Finally, I have assured Professor Mahmadi of our full sympathy, appreciation and understanding for his heroic stand against theimperialist intervention, and have promised him that, should the United Nations (which I cannot believe) fail to halt the American intervention, theSoviet Union will be faithful to its interests and its obligations, and will not hesitate to do its part in the world-wide struggle for peace, independence, andprosperity."

MORE

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Khrushchev Press Conference (continued)

N. S. Khrushchev then answered questions from the press representatives present. In response to a question from the representative of Al Goumhouriya (Cairo), he declared that the American imperialists appeared not to be satisfied with their intervention in Iran, or even their menacing naval moves near Port Said, but were already preparing to establish extensive military bases in Israel and Jordan. He was confident, however, (he added), that the forces of the Arab League, aided by all countries of the camp of peace, would, through the instrumentalities of the UN, prevent this from occurring.

In response to a question from the representative of the New York Herald-Tribune, he denied that he considered that the American people were anti-Soviet or behind the moves of their government. On the contrary, he said, as far as he could see the American scene had hardly ever been more disunited. The extreme reactionaries were enraged by the American pressure on the Shah to accept Mahmadi in his government, theprogressive forces were appalled by the yawning nuclear maelstrom toward which theAmerican leading circles were careening, and all peace-loving Americans were having increasing doubts about the wisdom, and indeed the sanity, of their leaders.

In response to a question from the reporter of the New Statesman, N.S. Khrushchev declared he could not in honesty conceal from the British people that the danger of the American rocket bases on their soil to theirown peace and safety was now so great that he did not see how any British government interested in the very existence of the British Isles could any longer remain inactive in the face of this peril.

In response to a question from the representative of Ittihab es Shahab (Bagdad), N. S. Khrushchev ridiculed the Shah's announcement several days ago of a reform government and a n increased economic development program. These promises can be given no more credence than those of an amnesty, and the bloody tortures and massacres of Kazvin show how fraudulent that was. Such promises had not helped Farouk, or Nuri Said, or Batista, and would not help that American lackey the Shah.

In response to a question from the representative of El Diario (Quito, Equador), N. S. Khrushchev expressed the gratitude of all peace-loving Soviet citizens to the government of Ecuador for their vote in favor of the Soviet resolution in the U. N. Like the government of Finland, or the movement of Professor Mahmadi, the Soviet Government, he went on, is quite aware that the Government of Ecuador is not Communist andhas no intention of becoming so, anymore than the Soviet Government has any intention of bringing about the coming to power of Communism in Ecuador. All the more does it appreciate the courage of the government of Ecuador in standing up for the interests of peace against the Yankee warmongers.

The conference concluded with N. S. Khrushchev stating, in reply to an inquiry by the correspondent of Jen-Min Ji-Pao, of his full support of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence and the non-inevitability of imperialist war, principles which, he added, had so recently and in such a principled and correct fashion been exemplified in word and deed by the great leader of the Chinese people, Chairman Mao.

END

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Military Moves (covert)

1. In response to the request from Mahmadi (Control 31) to be allowed to use Soviet airfields for sanctuary for his remaining aircraft, the following is to be permitted:

A) The aircraft of the revolutionary forces will proceed at once to Tbilisi Airfield. All available revolutionary pilots should be in these aircraft so that they may be given a series of familiarization flights in USSR aircraft.

B) Suitable revolutionary military personnel willproceed quickly into the USSR to receive training on USSR anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank weapons, and other equipments.

2. The suggestion is made to Mahmadi that, until it is appropriate for Soviet equipments to be provided, his forces in the area of Takistan should withdraw slowly demolishing the bridges and blocking the roads wherever possible. END

MORE

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Alert Measures to be Detected by Western Intelligence

1. All military personnel on leave are recalled.

2. All long range air force units are "stood down."

3. All tactical aviation units and naval units are placed on maximum alert.

4. All submarines requiring resupply are ordered into port immediately. All submarines ready to go to sea are dispatched.

END-END

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Soviet Diplomatic Messages

On September 21 the Head of Soviet Delegation to General Assembly, A. A. Gromyko, has communicated with the President of the GA, the Chairman of the General Committee, the Secretary General, and heads of all delegations along the following lines:

1. Calls attention to failure of Security Council to take urgently needed action regarding situation in Iran likely to threaten peace and security, and to Soviet request of September 20 to have item included on GA agenda as "additional item of an important and urgent character";

2. Refers to massive U S intervention, including introduction of US troops into Iran, which has taken place in past few days, making immediate consideration of question by GA of crucial importance to peace of the world;

3. Urges immediate vote to place item at top of agenda, interrupting for this purpose usual series of formal opening speeches;

4. Proposes GA amend its rules of procedure to permit immediate consideration of Iran topic in plenary session. END

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NOTE FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO MAHMADI

1. We appreciate your concern over the new U.S. action in directly intervening in support of the Shah's forces, and are ready to grant all appropriate assistance. We have undertaken the necessary maneuver to prepare for massive supply of weapons, equipment, munitions, fuel and these are being held in readiness for transfer. All aircraft and air force personnel of the revolutionary forces will be welcomed in the USSR, and modern aircraft and munitions in any quantity will be available for familiarization training, so that they will soon be able to fly under the Iranian flag, if this becomes necessary.

2. We have information that the U.S. movement of military supplies is already overtaxing available supply lines and the rapid initial rate cannot be maintained. Also, we can assure you of information that probing moves by the Shah's military units do not represent any immediate intention nor reflect a current capability to mount serious offensive action. Accordingly, the immediate situation is not critical and the terroristic acts of the Shah's powers will doubtless antagonize more Iranian patriots than they intimidate.

3. It is our considered opinion that the best course of action at the present juncture is to move vigorously in the UN General Assembly for a resolution demanding that the U.S. cease its introduction of military forces and arms and withdraw those already in Iran. If this decision is not made by the UN, which must act within a few days, or is subsequently not carried out by the U.S., we shall be prepared (A) to explore the question of the recognition of your government at the proper time; (B) supply all necessary military equipment, weapons, and supplies, including as many MIG-17 and MIG -19 fighters with missile armament, IL-28 light bombers, and assault transports as are required and capable of being moved by Iranian-- and, if you wish, Azerbaizhan and other volunteers from the USSR--to fly initially from Iranian air bases and if necessary clandestinely from bases in the USSR; and (C) provide readily installable and transportable surface-to-air missiles for protection of airfields and other objectives in free Iran (for which you may now wish to send AAA officers to the USSR for training).

4. We concur in your judgment that it would be preferable to avoid introduction of Soviet combat units, but assure you that if this too proves necessary the Soviet people will not be found waiting in their resolve to aid the people of Iran to the utmost. The Iranian personnel--

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aviation, AA artillery, anti-tank and other--which we recommend you send will be fully at your service, but we trust you will concur that at the present juncture it would be inauspicious to take any action--no matter how much justified--which might blur the clear vision of the world that only the US is intervening; consequently we do not favor the use of USSR airfields for mounting air missions into Iran at this time.

5. We have found that there is widespread understanding and support in many countries for your position, and against the imperialist intervention, and we see hopeful prospects for favorable action in the UN. If, however, the imperialists succeed in nullifying the wishes of the peoples for all cessation of foreign intervention in Iranian internal affairs, we shall be ready to stand by you.

end

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USSR will move for earliest possible discussion and vote on its resolution (see Control 20, para 2) by General Assembly. We shall not insist that text remain inviolate. We would accept minor amendments to the wording of the "whereas" clauses. We would accept weakening or even omission of operative clause No. 1 (see USSR-20) if such change would increase voting support for resolutions. We will stick firmly on inclusion of clauses (2) and (3).

USSR reserves position on any counter-resolution proposed by US or one of its allies. END

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Press Dispatches, 21 Sept.

AFP - Moscow - 21 Sept. Reliable diplomatic sources reported today that a special meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Central Committee was convened at 4:00 p.m. ~~ix~~ yesterday and remained in continuous session until 3:15 a.m. today. These observers attached special significance to the fact that the meeting was apparently attended by several military leaders who are not Presidium members including Marshals Malinovsky, Grechko, Chuikov, Nedelin, Vershenin and Serov.

AP, Moscow, 21 Sept. Western tourists in the Soviet Union are being denied permission to travel in the Caucasus or any areas bordering on the Black Sea, the Caspian sea, or the southern areas of Central Asia. Intourist officials would not confirm that a formal travel ban had been decreed, but several tourists have, in the past 24 hours, been told that travel in these areas is presently "impossible" due to "lack of accommodations." [Western news dispatches from Moscow are encountering the most severe censorship since the Korean War--Editor]

NYHT, Washington, 21 Sept. By Marguerite Higgins. Despite the most severe Soviet press censorship since the death of Stalin, it can be reported that large-scale measures of military readiness are being vigorously carried out in widely separated strategic areas of the Soviet Union. It has also been learned that restrictions of unprecedented severity have been imposed on American military attaches in our Moscow Embassy, whose efforts to carry out their normal functions of travel and observation are being systematically frustrated by ingenious Soviet tactics of harassment and obstruction. END

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USSR - 32

Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Circular Telegram to all Ambassadors and Ministers accredited to states members of UN, except USA and Iran, September 21.

Transmit urgently to Head of Government following personal message from N. S. Khrushchev:

I must express my grave concern that American actions in Iran may bring on war of incalculable destruction. Best chance to avoid catastrophe lies in making all peoples' unanimous will for peace to be made effective through instrumentality of United Nations. I therefore request your full support for speediest possible resolution by GA to put stop to acts of US which are directed against Iranian people and against the peace. Should UN delay or fail to act, the USSR and other peaceloving states would have no alternative but to take necessary forceful actions to preserve their own security. USSR cannot allow aggression, especially in the areas of its own borders, to go unchecked.

END

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Phase III - IV

Control Moves

Political Crisis - The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Iran Supplement 1960 Dec.

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1. Time at beginning of Move Period 4 is 8 p.m. Washington time, October 20, 1961 (or 4 a.m., October 21, Teheran and Moscow time).

2. Confusion and interruption normal communications attending military build-up have resulted in collapse central government control over tribal areas of Qashqai, Bakhtiaris, and Lurs in Zagros. Railroad from Bandar Shapur to Teheran cut by dynamiting of bridge south of Khurammabad. Reports of increasing incidents of brawling between civilians and U.S. personnel on leave in Teheran and other cities and of petty thievery and assault. Senior Iranian officers increasingly resentful of assumption command functions by U.S. officers and reports of numerous instances of lack of understanding and cooperation between Iranian and U.S. personnel. Disaffection within Shah's top command over Shah's apparent complete subservience U.S. orders is breeding distrust between Shah and closest military associates. This, plus weakening of central government control throughout country have caused Shah take increasingly oppressive steps toward populace which make assumption liberal pose progressively more difficult for him.

3. Situation Report, October 21, 1961.

Following defeat of USSR resolution in UN to force immediate withdrawal of US forces from Iran, and in accord with prior commitments to Mahmadi, the Soviet Union intervened on behalf of the rebel forces to the following extent: initial supplies were provided by secret night movement by truck from Astara to Mianeh and Nikhiebevan to Tabriz; and by air drop to other units. Mahmadi forces were provided "technicians" and equipment to rebuild airfield at Tabriz, control air movement at Tebriz and Meshed and to train rebel forces in the use of Soviet equipment in spite of fairly strong objections by Mahmadi. About 50 rebel pilots were trained at USSR airfields in the USSR, augmented with volunteers, and rebel planes provided use of Soviet fields in Caucasus and South of Kara Kum; air mobile, air defense units were deployed at critical points in rebel held territory and though it was reported in USSR press that these were manned by rebel forces trained by the USSR, they were actually operated by Soviet "volunteers." Following these initial moves, USSR continued slow introduction of Soviet equipment into Mahmadi's forces, the movement of equipment occurring either at night or under protection of USSR air defense forces. Morale improved, the rebel movement gained popular support and the rebel force gained strength gradually.

Rebel air activity was severely constrained by the Soviet Union and no repeat no "volunteer" pilots were permitted to engage in the infrequent air attacks on Loyalist bases in the South, although Soviet inerceptors were active over all rebel held territory. Supplies from Astara through

MORE

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Resht were completely blocked through interdiction and loyalist control of the Kazvin Pass. Two rebel infantry divisions engaged elements of the 1st infantry division and 2nd armored division in vicinity of Zenjan, ~~leaving~~ heavy fighting now under way.

Rebel forces in Northeast greatly strengthened through tremendous logistical support from Ashkhabad and are now poised for attacks on Shahrud. This force opposed by the Loyalist 9th and 5th division both of which are at full strength. The Loyalist forces at Shahrud and Zenjan are now heavily dependent on the logistical complex at Teheran.

4. The General Assembly concluded its debate on the Iranian situation on October 1. After a series of complicated procedural maneuvers resulting from a flurry of last minute proposals and amendments the Assembly adopted an 8 Power resolution introduced by Japan, Sweden, Italy, Ecuador, Tunisia, Ghana, Thailand, and Austria.

Recalling the purposes of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and to bring about by peaceful means the adjustment of situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, the Resolution (1) expressed the concern of the General Assembly that the situation in Iran might lead to actions endangering the maintenance of international peace, (2) called upon all members to refrain from any actions that might aggravate the situation, (3) asked the Secretary General to undertake an immediate study of what additional ~~maneuvers~~ measures of economic and technical assistance the UN could extend without delay to the Government of Iran and to report to the Assembly thereon within ten days.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 61 to 23 with 14 abstentions. (The Voltaic Republic and Togoland were not present.)

By its action the Assembly turned down the Soviet request for a condemnation of American activity in Iran and a demand by implication for the withdrawal of all American personnel. Insufficient support was available for the American proposals for an acknowledgment of the rights of self-defense and affirmation of the propriety of actions taken under regional arrangements.

In the course of the debate the Indian delegation strongly opposed the American suggestion that a third power be invited by the Assembly to meddle in the internal affairs of Iran, and a large number of Asian and African delegates expressed open objection to reported American activities in Teheran.

END

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Control - 48

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TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM: AMEMBASSY, TEHERAN

NO: 1043

October 21, 1961

4:00 a.m.

NIACT

TOP SECRET

PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE EYES ONLY

Shah called me to Palace at 3 a.m. today in highly agitated state to say the following:

Entire situation has become steadily more critical. Shah's military advisors apparently represent increasingly doubtful factor. Several key officers have become restive in face massive US takeover Iranian strategic and tactical scene, Shah beginning seriously doubt their loyalty to him. In view SOV supplies and manpower flowing into North, considering continued deterioration civil authority Shah's areas, and given unreliability some crucial military elements particularly in Teheran garrison, Shah concludes his survival rests on all-out US intervention. He therefore urgently requests immediate REPEAT immediate dispatch one airborne division US ground forces with appropriate support, to establish security Teherar and engage rebels in north. If this not done Shah says he will have no alternative but to QUOTE abandon country to chaos and communism UNQUOTE.

AMB recommends favorable action without delay, particularly in light MAAG report sent you yesterday. We have already committed ourselves here massively, entire US position in Middle East, including our reputation for standing back of our commitments, at stake.

WAILES

end

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Control - 50

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Joint MAAG - Embassy Report to SecState and JCS.

October 20.

PERSONAL From MAAG Chief and Ambassador.

Our appraisal of military- political situation Iran as follows:

1. Improvement in combat-readiness Shah's forces, insofar as equipment, technical aid, and general logistic support are concerned, has proceeded very satisfactorily with steady inflow of US aid during past four weeks.

2. Mahmadi forces receiving sizeable aid in form of equipment, technicians, and general logistic support, but badly hampered by poor supply routes, interdiction by our aircraft, mismatching of Soviet supplies and parts with initial-issue American equipment, acute differences in operational practices between US-trained Iranian forces and their new Soviet advisors, and other difficulties.

3. Mahmadi ~~faces~~ forces clearly overcoming difficulties mentioned para 2, but for another month or so should be seriously inferior to Shah's forces. Shah's forces, insofar as equipment and supply concerned, should have been able to be ready by now to launch one offensive before winter snows set in.

4. Shah's forces not REPEAT not capable of doing so. In spite of US aid they are hampered by internal disagreement, by sabotage of vital rail lines to north, by popular rumors, demonstrations, and harassments that lead to continual disaffection of individuals. Further, we believe morale of army leadership at all levels seriously impaired by frustration at US "take-over", by temptation to escape with skins and abandon a losing fight, by disgust in some cases with Shah's efforts at conciliation with rebels and in other cases with Shah's lack of energy in reconciliation rebel troops. Must be kept in mind that rebel and loyal troops are essentially same in background, politics, outlook, etc., and are in many cases personal friends, presumably still in personal communication with each other.

MORE

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5. Therefore no REPEAT no ~~involvement~~ movement north in strength possible in near future.

6. Stalemate may last all winter, during which time military buildup in north will make offensive at any time by Shah's forces out of question. De facto partition of country likely to lead sooner or later to political collapse of Shah's area.

7. Situation especially aggravated by morale and military weakness of loyal troops in Teheran area. Evidence of poor morale and possible disaffection suggests most urgent need to add reliable and effective troops at once. If military or psychological collapse occurs among these troops, Teheran intself likely to become malstrom from which all who can will flee, leaving moral and political victory for Mahmadi that could never be reversed and would perhaps guarantee collapse of South.

8. This is critical moment, while Mahmadi forces still have not assimilated aid, and before winter comes, to strengthen Teheran and perhaps force rebels onto defensive, disorganizing their internal communications and forces them into less affective modes of supply from Russia. If Shah can assemble a full-strength division of complete reliability and move it to Teheran, there is good chance he can mount offensive soon or at least next spring. We doubt he has the troops. We anticipate a request for immediate US intervention with front-line combat troops.

9. If Soviets limit aid to logistic and technical aid and rebel use of Soviet bases, we believe US intervention at once with available US - British airborne troops and troops standing by aboard ships can turn tide, and further US, British, ~~But~~, Turkish or other troops arriving within ninety days can guarantee a successful spring offensive. If Soviets move in with troops, of course, all bets are off. Suggest Washington give careful consideration to military and political role of nuclear weapons for this eventuality if decision should be taken to send troops to front.

10. Anticipate Shah will make such request soonest unless he has already abandoned hope.

END

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USSR ONLY

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October 21. Mahmadi to USSR

Turning point at hand. Understand Shah urgently requesting US combat troops at once. Military activity around Teheran suggests airborne arrival US troops there imminent. Obvious that Shah's forces hoped to launch at least limited offensive by about now but hampered by sabotage, poor morale, bickering among generals, shifts in leadership. We believe if Americans stay out there is good chance we can cause panic in Teheran, collapse of Shah's forces in Teheran area through subversion, confusion, fear. This would leave us north of country to consolidate until spring thaw, with Shah suffering political decay in south.

This situation, so favorable to us, has made Shah desperate. If Americans enter in force we have little hope even with your generous logistic and technical help, to prevail. If Americans bolster Teheran, with airborne troops in division strength, spring offensive can finish us as organized military force upon arrival further troops from USA or Europe.

We do not know what size American force Shah requesting or what American response will be, but evidence is that airborne divisions Turkey and marines offshore may be in place in matter of days or at most week or two. Suggest you check own intelligence on activity US troops Turkey.

We need Soviet troops if the Americans come in. We recognize that Soviet troops will be under your command and that important strategic decisions must be shared with you.

We urge you consider possibility of forestalling American intervention by declaring determination to oppose them with overwhelming strength. We believe immediate military objective should be hold north including Teheran and let south crumble in our good time.

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Control - 52

U.S. ONLY

MAHMADI THROUGH CIA AGENT TO PRESIDENT OF USA

In hope of preserving independence for my country, and to impress upon you the gravity of the present moment, I am sending you verbatim my message to the USSR sent this morning. The message is self-explanatory.

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USSR ONLY

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USSR ONLY

October 21. To USSR from Soviet military intelligence in Iran.

URGENT

Pursuant to message you have by now received from Mahmadi today.

1. Mahmadi evidently still in close touch with American agents. Presumably trying to forestall American intervention with large scale combat-troop aid. Virtually certain he has informed them of his request to you to respond with combat troops if Americans enter.

2. Evident from all Mahmadi political and military decisions of past five weeks, and from his message to you today, that last thing he wants is Soviet troops if he can possibly prevail without them. Clearly he is fighting against many subordinates, including some of his generals, who badly want Soviet intervention for political or military reasons.

3. Our military appraisal is that, if Americans should enter, they would consider first priority to bolster defense of Teheran, probably using airborne troops Turkey and troops offshore. Further troop arrivals, required for any offensive, would take fifty to ninety days to get in place.

4. If Americans surround Teheran our own military position in north, if we entered in strength, would be weak unless we engaged them directly. If we did we could probably defeat them before reinforcements arrived from States. (Assuming conventional weapons.)

5. If we enter at once can undoubtedly be in virtual command of north, including Teheran, before Americans arrive, or at least confront them with certain disaster.

6. Thus, if we enter as contingently requested by Mahmadi, we gain great tactical advantage by entering before Americans move. We may also in that way, if it is deemed desirable, confront Americans with fait accompli in north. Americans might then occupy south, creating de facto military partition with no hope of dislodging us by offensive action, and with poor political prospects for anything but continued deterioration of loyalsit government beneath their feet.

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Control 55

CONTROL TO U.S. TEAM

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF CONTINGENCIES

In response to your question as to the probable success of a spring offensive by the Shah's forces and one U.S. airborne division, assuming that the Shah's forces are brought under effective control, that sabotage of supply lines can be substantially stopped, and that USSR continues to restrict rebel air activity (particularly to attacks by "volunteers" on loyalist air bases), it appears that if one division goes into Teheran area immediately the Shah will then have sufficient strength to hold Teheran till spring (assuming no sizeable intervention of Soviet troops). There is then a good chance of then mounting a successful spring offensive without additional American troops, but this is by no means certain. Much depends upon the success of USSR efforts to train rebels and strengthen their forces over the winter.

end

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Control - 56

US ONLY

GAME CLASSIFIED

CONTROL REPLY TO US TEAM

1. US Ambassador in Rawalpindi reports that Pakistan government suggest US not withdraw from Iran but would not favor large-scale introduction of US combat forces.

2. US Ambassador in Ankara reports that Turks would vigorously deplore US withdrawal from Iran. Turkey would support introduction of American combat troops and is prepared to move in its own troops if requested.

3. Upon learning of the Shah's importunate appeal to the US, the British Prime Minister telephoned the American President at once. The PM said the following:

> The Cabinet, still in session, agrees that 1.) every effort be made for an urgent private meeting between the American and Soviet heads of government or their deputies in order to avert the impending collision and reassure each other about the others intentions re/ general war; 2.) if retention of Iran in the non-communist world comes to depend on introduction of Western combat forces for purely defensive purposes on behalf of pro-Western Iranian government, HMG would support US in every way possible and wish to have Commonwealth forces associated with the operation. British Indian Ocean Fleet under steam and all available reserves in region on 12-hour alert basis.

end

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Control - 57

Control to US

In response to question:

Your military intelligence extimate that the effect of American intervention in division strength at or near the fighting front would (assuming no comparable Soviet troop interventinn) have a pronounced and favorable effect on troop morale and on the loyalty of the Shah's military leadership. At least for the time being, disaffection of entire units would be extremely unlikely, disaffection of individuals would greatly diminish. This would not by itself take care of sabotage, harrassment by the populace, etc.

END

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Should the Shah flee to Geneva, some defections of loyalist commanders and troops to Mahmadi would occur at once; but continuation of the civil war preventing assumption of control over whole country by Mahmadi would be likely for a few weeks. Long-term prospects are for collapse of loyalist army, and this might occur quite rapidly. Early negotiation possible between military on both sides, assuming Russian control over Mahmadi forces not established.

end

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Phase IV

US Team Moves

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U.S. 28

GAME CLASSIFIED

SECRETARY OF STATE TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR

The President is unwilling to move to a summit meeting now. Our postion in Iran has deteriorated so badly that he would either be put in the postion of blustering military threats undercutting any future possibilities of future negotiations with the Russians or he would be forced into a position of intolerable inferiority. We do, however, share the British desire for a last appeal to Soviet reasonableness and are therefore sending General Lucius Clay to Moscow as personal representative of the President. Summary of his instrucions are enclosed.

We are simultaneously preparing for troop movements into Iran outlined on military memorandum and hope we can count on British landing in the South from British Indian Ocean fleet.

end

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U.S. 29

GAMZ CLASSIFIED

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO ANKARA TO TURKISH GOVERNMENT

Inform of military plans and ask three divisions be prepared to move across Iranian frontier.

We must make clear from the beginning that troops will be withdrawn when situation is stabilized and that we have no aggressive intentions with regard to any Iranian territory.

end

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U.S. 30

GAME CLASSIFIED

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT

Appreciate concerns of Pakistani government and am sending Gen. Clay to Moscow to avoid if possible need to send Cento troops to aid of Iran. However, situation has so far deteriorated that positive response to Shah's request seems almost inescapable. Hope that in case of Turkish American, and British troop movements from South and West, Pakistani troops can be prepared to move in to reinforce loayl Iranian garrisons in East. At moment, however, we feel your Cento obligation fulfilled by pinning down Afghans to border strengthening.

end

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CLAY'S MISSION

The situation as we make our move in Iran is:

a. the Soviets and ourselves are in active mobilization for a mill nuclear and/or conventional war.

b. The British (and presumably what passed for "world opinion") insist on one more try between the U.S. and the USSR before a direct confrontation of U.S. and Soviet troops takes place.

Therefore, we propose that the President dispatch to Moscow as his personal representative General Lucius Clay. We select him because the Russians know these things about him: his connections and memories go back to World War II, he was personally tactful, conciliatory, even friendly with the Russians in Berlin (notably a friend of Sokolonsky's); he was also capable of being clean, tough, and taking his play.

Clay would explain these things;-

1. The Second World War ended in a particular arbitrary way, with certain truce lines.

2. These truce lines were altered by postwar events; e.g., in Yugoslavia, China. But the alterations have been the result of a failure of either side to be able to deal with a situation on its side of the line. We couldn't deal with China. They couldn't deal with Yugoslavia. It was not Soviet threats or weapons or forces that determined the outcome in China. It was not U.S. threats, weapons, or forces that determined the outcome in Yugoslavia. Where we had no line in Indo-China we created one in 1954.

3. The U.S. regards any violation of these lines based on Soviet threats, weapons, or forces, as a new postwar situation and a cause of widened hostilities. Whatever the UN formula may be we insist on the right-- within our military and political capabilities--to do on our side of the line what we regard as necessary. Our objectives in Iran differ from Soviet objectives in Hungary in 1956, but we insist on the same degree of freedom of action as the Russians insisted on at that time and place.

4. The situation and morale of the rebels depends on the assurance of Russian supplies. Without those supplies there would long since have been a negotiation and the creation of a national government. We shall shortly undertake direct operations in Northen Iran, under Cento, to block that flow. The scale and character of the forces will be sufficient to dominate the Northern area, but it will be evident that they are in no way designed to deal with Russian forces, should they cross

MORE

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the frontier. As you know, limited U.S. and Allied forces are already moving into the Teheran area.

5. The Soviet Union will understand the effects of this move on rebel and the Shah's morale. It will set the stage, along with other moves elsewhere in Iran, for the political negotiation we seek.

6. As we see it Moscow has two choices: first, it can, for the first time since the Second World War, send troops across the cold war frontiers. With respect to this alternative we would point out that we would regard this as a wholly new situation in which the United States, its allies, and all the UN strength we could muster would be mobilized to fight; and we would not fight in Iran alone.

In this connection we would point out that no new situation is created for the Soviet Union by the American presence in Iran. It is temporary; it is not of a kind or on a scale to threaten Russia; and we confront each other directly on other frontiers--e.g., Germany and Turkey. There is no necessary virtue in disengagement on fuzzy areas; no necessary danger in clearly defined frontiers. But we repeat the American presence in Iran is wholly to frame a political negotiation; and we shall, as a symbol of this interest, man the Iranian frontier partly with Iranians.

7. There is a second alternative: to join with us in ending the crisis by insisting jointly that Mahmadi and the Shah negotiate a settlement. There is, so far as we can perceive, no major Russian interest contrary to this move. The Iranian rebels are not Communists. They will push vigorously for reform; and a future Iranian government may wish more economic and less military aid; or no military aid. We view this possibility with equanimity. The independence of Iran will grow as its industrialization proceeds and the old landlords are moved out from their present status of disproportionate political influence. The defense of Iran remains based on the principle on which it is now based: U.S. and free world determination not to see the cold war frontiers violated. The U.S. will not depart from this principle unless it is defeated in a major war; for if we permit the violation of this principle we are convinced our national existence is at stake.

8. Therefore, we propose that the Soviet government accept our second alternative. If accepted, --and a satisfactory message which I am empowered to negotiate--dispatched to the President, (for simultaneous release, Moscow-Washington) there is still time to forestall the American movement in the North and for Moscow to prepare Mahmadi. But the Soviet choice must be prompt and without ambiguity.

9. The choice is, then, a widening of conflict whose end cannot be foreseen on the basis of what the U.S. regards as an intolerable violation

MORE

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of a basic principle of cold war stability; or a joint pacific action which might open the way to widening negotiations on outstanding issues between the Soviet Premier and the new American President.

end

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