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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

22 August 1961

International Security Affairs
I-16,034/61

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE LIST OF PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS

SUBJECT: Proposed Game on the Berlin Situation

1. ISA is sponsoring a game-type analysis of the Berlin situation to be prepared by the RAND Corporation under its ISA contract, and to be conducted with the participation of high level officials from the White House, State, Defense and CIA.

2. Attached hereto is a brief description of the purpose and nature of this exercise. Knowledge of this activity must be closely held. Misinterpretations (within the Government as well as in the public domain) could obviously be very damaging at this time. Consequently, [redacted] Since intensive work over a considerable number of hours is necessary to accomplish the purposes of this exercise, it is planned to hold it outside of (but as convenient as possible to) Washington and over a weekend. The present plan is to utilize the period from Friday evening, September 8th, through Monday afternoon, September 11th. My office is currently discussing with the White House the possibility of utilizing Camp David for this exercise.

3. The game will involve a red and a blue team of 4 members each, drawn from the White House, State and Defense, with a control team drawn from the foregoing agencies, CIA and the RAND Corporation. The total number of principals involved will be approximately 12 with an additional 6 professional people and 12 to 15 administrative-clerical-support personnel.

4. I believe that the values of this game will be such in relation to the Berlin situation that participants will find the time spent well worth while.

Paul H. Nitze

Paul H. Nitze

Inclosures - 2

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.6
NLK-00-4A
By MJP NARA Date 3/08

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BERLIN DECISION EXERCISE

Game-like exercises emphasize uncertainty--the "fog of war". They emphasize the bargaining relation between adversaries--the need to communicate intent by actions and to design actions accordingly, and to interpret the other side's intent. They particularly emphasize the interaction between adversaries' decisions--the need to anticipate countermeasures and counter-countermeasures and to identify what the adversary thinks he is countering. Decision-games also stress the speed of events--the need to prepare responses in advance for contingencies in which there will not be time for centralized review of the situation. And they stress speed of decision--the need to eschew information and analysis that cannot be brought to bear in time.

Decision games are time-consuming; and, since the main benefit is to the participants, they cannot usefully be farmed out. They work best for issues that have come into sharp focus and for situations in which the speed of events would force concentration on a reduced set of options.

In the Berlin crisis, a decision game is more suitable to military moves than to pure diplomacy. The game proposed will therefore assume a point in time at which some military step is imminent or under way. (A "scenario" will set up that point in time.) This is not to prejudice the question of whether "negotiation" or "action" will decide the outcome on Berlin; negotiation itself depends on an exploration of what happens if negotiation fails. (Negotiation, by actions as well as words, continues anyway.)

Design of the Exercise

The scheme of the game is like that worked out by Bloomfield, Millikan and Schelling at MIT/Harvard last year and applied to a hypothetical middle-eastern crisis. It has been modified and tried at RAND on the Berlin issue.

It consists of a series of policy-planning sessions, the first taking off from a prepared scenario. At each session the Red and Blue teams evaluate their objectives and choices and each other's probable actions and draw up their "strategies". A strategy is a statement not just of immediate moves and definite future moves, but of anticipated adversary moves and adversary responses and the contingent steps the team will take according to what the adversary does. These strategies are drawn up by Red and Blue simultaneously, as of a given moment in time.

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Because the strategies are drawn to cover the main foreseeable contingencies, they can (taken together) be projected to a future point in time by the Control Team, which adds to the projection events outside the control of Red and Blue. Since Red and Blue act just for the Soviet and U.S. Governments, the Control Team can affect the pace of the game through the decisions and events it imputes to third countries and acts of God.

The projection of Red and Blue strategies sets up the point of departure for the next strategy session. (The projection is, in effect, the original scenario carried forward on the basis of the teams' decisions.) Red and Blue receive separate projections since the intelligence to the two teams differs.

Four such sessions will exhaust two days. At the end of the fourth session, the full documentation of each team's strategies and the intelligence provided at each stage by Control is made available to the other team. In the fifth session all three teams, Red, Blue and Control, separately evaluate the likely outcome on the basis of the full documentation. The sixth session is a plenary discussion of the entire experience.

The teams would not try to predict or to imitate actual Soviet or American behavior, but to develop the best strategies they can that are consistent with each side's objectives. (The game explores what each side could do, not what they would do.) The Control Team must impute plausible actions to other countries but is not limited to "best" predictions and will, in particular, use its control over these events to keep things moving. (To compress the exercise into a three-day weekend, the pace has to be forced by the Control Team.)

The teams are not, it should be stressed, to confine their attention to Berlin, or to Germany, or to Europe. If events dictate, strategic forces may become a dominant preoccupation, or actions quite outside the theater. Control will have to use its unseen hand to keep action from becoming too diffuse; but, in principle, the Red and Blue teams are deciding national conduct and strategy in a crisis, not just the local or regional part of that strategy and conduct.

Red and Blue teams should be no larger than four persons each. Control should be two or three with several consultants.

Military actions and events will likely be involved and may become dominant. The purpose is not, however, to explore the tactical implications of military plans; this is not a "war game". Control's military evaluations must be plausible but beyond that will be a compromise with time and will be responsive to the need to guide the game. Military detail may at times be exceedingly significant for political decisions, but military detail for its own sake is not the object.

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Results of the Exercise

It is not expected that a game of this sort can predict outcomes or test policies. There are too many arbitrary elements; and, in any case, a single "experience" could not prove much. Freedom to experiment will require that it be agreed not to take too seriously the actual course of events generated by the game.

The value lies rather in the insight and experience the exercise provides into the character of the planning and decision problem, the interaction of political and military considerations, and the problems of evaluating enemy intent from observed enemy behavior, conveying intent through actions, and gauging enemy interpretation of our own intent. It is an exercise in the process of bargaining by military action as well as by words.

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LIST OF PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

International Security Affairs

September 6, 1961

Refer to: I-16,299/61

MEMORANDUM TO PARTICIPANTS IN NATO PLANNING CONFERENCE

REFERENCE: ASD(ISA) Memorandum, 22 August 1961 - I-16,034/61

Attached are several documents relating to the exercise which should be brought to the Conference:

1. "Instructions for Red and Blue Teams", distributed herewith as an operational description of the technique to be employed. (S)

2. "Time Schedule", subject to minor changes but distributed as a supplement to the instructions to help visualize the procedure. (S)

3. Three brief draft "Scenarios", illustrative of a possible starting point of the game. One of these, in greater detail than the drafts enclosed, will be chosen as the point of departure. (S)

4. Memorandum regarding travel and accommodations. (U)

5. List of participants. (U) (You will be notified later of the composition of the teams.)

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Berlin Decision Exercise

Instructions for Red and Blue Teams

I. Basic Scheme

1. The point of departure is a "scenario," prepared in advance, which carries events from the present to a future point in time. It is intended to be plausible, but not necessarily more plausible than a dozen alternative scenarios might be. It is designed to provide a climactic starting point. Actually, three such scenarios in brief form will be available to the participants in advance; one of these will be chosen for the exercise and made available in greater detail at the start of the exercise.

2. Certain military assumptions regarding available forces and their status, will be provided to Red and to Blue. Each will be provided appropriate intelligence about the other's military situation. For the most part these will be reasonable estimates projected to the opening date, somewhat modified by events in the scenario, and simplified to facilitate the game.

3. The game proceeds in a sequence of policy-planning stages. Each team evaluates the situation, identifies the principal strategies available to it, and determines a course of action. The course of action must be responsive to the acticipated actions of the other team; that is, it should contain contingent moves as well as definite moves, and specifies the response to alternative forseeable moves by the adversary. Both Red and Blue do this simultaneously, as of a given point in time. The first such point in time -- for the first policy planning session -- is the point at which the initial scenario leaves off. Approximately three hours are allowed for one such stage.

4. For this purpose the Blue Team represents (or plans on behalf of) the United States Government, the Red Team represents the government of the Soviet Union. The Blue team does not control or represent the NATO Alliance. The Red team "controls" satellite governments -- and in particular the GDR -- to the extent it can be presumed to in reality. The control team will determine the actual behavior of other countries or of dissident elements within, say, the GDR.

5. The Control team receives the planning documents from the Red and Blue teams at the end of the first policy-planning session. (No "game time" transpires during the policy-planning session; the teams develop their strategies as of the specified moment in time.) Using the plans of both Red and Blue, Control projects the original scenario to a second point in time, at which the second planning stage takes place. To the extent that Red and Blue actions are contingent on each other,

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Control must determine what actions are implied in the two plans taken together. Control superimposes such events as are outside the control of Red and Blue -- e.g., third-country behavior, accidents or acts of God, outcomes of chance events. The starting point for stage two is thus the original scenario carried forward on the basis of the Red and Blue plans and Control's manipulation of outside events.

6. "Scenario" material for the second policy-planning stage is thus provided by Control. It indicates to Red and Blue what their actions were and what the consequences have been. It provides to each side appropriate intelligence about the other's action and about events and third-country behavior.

7. The second planning stage proceeds then like the first, is followed by another projection of events by Control, and a third stage, and a fourth. These four policy-planning stages, together with Control's projections of events, take two days.

8. At the end of the fourth planning session both teams are given the full documentation of the other team -- the other team's planning documents and the other team's intelligence as provided by Control along the way. Each team thus has retroactive access to the other's estimates, statements of intent, etc. A fifth session is then devoted to a projection by each team of likely outcomes. Red, Blue, and Control separately prepare their evaluations and projections with full access to all the documents, and these three projections are distributed to all participants.

9. A sixth and final session is a plenary discussion of the entire experience.

II. Detailed Structure of the Planning Cycles

10. A "Cycle" consists of a Red-Blue planning session and a projection session by Control. The policy-planning documents submitted by a team to Control, at the close of a policy-planning session, will be referred to as the team's "strategy." The materials provided to the teams at the outset of the policy-planning session will be referred to as Control's "projection."

11. Upon receipt of scenario materials from Control at the outset of a planning session, Red and Blue teams may direct written "Queries" to Control, to which they will receive written "Answers." The purpose of these queries is to clarify unintended ambiguity in the scenario material, to check with Control any questionable assumptions the team will make, or to elicit supplementary materials on matters that Control was insufficiently responsive or informative on. Ordinarily these queries should be received by Control within the first half hour of the planning session. The queries need not all be collected in a single document; queries should be sped to Control as they arise.

12. For the first session it is expected that such queries may be extensive, and will relate to preparation or actions that the teams will wish to assume they had taken prior to the opening of the game. For that reason a special session on the scenario will be held by each team on the

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evening before the first policy-planning session. Teams will receive the scenario at 8:30 Friday evening and have a two-hour session to familiarize themselves with the context, to discuss general strategy, and to prepare in detail the queries they wish to address to Control. Control's response and supplementary scenario material will be available at the start of the first planning session Saturday morning.

13. In allowing Red and Blue to make certain prior assumptions Control will be permissive within two important limitations. First, such assumptions must be consistent with the scenario and not too dependent on hindsight. Second, additions to the scenario requested by Red or Blue that would entail a response or countermove by the other team will usually be disallowed to avoid "gaming" the scenario retroactively.

14. At the end of each strategy session Control may direct queries to Red and Blue. These will be to elicit fuller or clearer detail at those points in the plan that Control (with access to the other team's strategy) foresees as critical. Control queries will be in writing, should be delivered within the first half hour after the planning documents are in, and should be answered promptly by Red or Blue.

15. Control will have an observer sitting in the room with each team. The observer will keep Control posted on developing plans of the team, to expedite Control's own preparations. The observer will sit with Control during the "projection" phase of the cycle to help inform Control of the team's intentions and understandings. The observer will particularly be alert to any mistaken assumptions or interpretations of the team that need to be ironed out or coordinated with Control. The observer will help Control in the interpretation of queries received from the team. The observer will not be used by the team as a direct line of communication with Control.

16. Ordinarily Red and Blue will not communicate orally with each other or with Control. An exception may occur in connection with military details. Direct consultation between the military members of Red or Blue and Control's military advisers may be necessary to iron out essential assumptions on military detail.

17. Certain military details will be displayed on maps. The purpose is partly to facilitate the team's appreciation of military resources and events, partly to provide a visual check on the consistency of team and Control assumptions about military resources and events. Team plans will make reference to maps where appropriate, and Control's military advisers may consult with team military members to verify plans or to clarify projections with reference to the map displays.

18. The exact form in which Red and Blue submit their strategies (planning documents) is up to them. The contents should include:

a - An estimate of the situation with statement of general objectives and estimate of adversary's general objectives.

b - An outline of main alternatives with their likely consequences; and an outline of main alternatives available to the adversary.

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c - Detailed statement of strategy chosen, giving:
1- definite moves decided on;
2- contingent moves and what they depend on;
3- estimated adversary moves and responses.

19. Direct communication between US and SU governments may be indicated in the form of messages (e.g., notes, broadcasts) that are to be passed verbatim to the other team for the next cycle. Actions taken secretly or conspicuously should be so described to facilitate Control's transmittal of appropriate intelligence to the other team for the next cycle.

20. The projection provided by Control for each cycle will necessarily be brief and selective. For this reason Control will need to be aware of the emphasis teams attach to different issues and activities -- e.g., to intelligence of particular kinds, to alliance problems, world opinion, state of strategic forces, military tactics, etc. The observers will help Control to be responsive to the teams' interests; but teams should be as candid and informative as they can be on their main interests at each stage.

21. The internal organization -- if any -- of Red and Blue teams is up to the teams. It is not intended that team members "represent" agencies or cabinet posts or any such thing. Any division of labor is an internal team matter. The one organizational requirement indicated by experience with this type of game is that the Captain must exercise authority. t The time schedule requires this. Efficiency in reaching decisions and getting them on paper is essential to the pace of the exercise.

22. The teams are to develop the best strategies they can that are consistent with American or Soviet objectives. The Red team, in particular, is not to imitate or predict Soviet behavior but to explore what the Soviets can do and elect the most effective strategies. (The Red team is not comprised of specialists on Soviet behavior.)

23. The teams are not directed to confine their attention to Berlin, or to Germany, or to Europe. If events dictate, or if strategies are so chosen, strategic forces or events and interests outside the theater may become a dominant preoccupation. Control will use its unseen hand to keep actions from becoming too diffuse; but, in principle, Red and Blue are deciding national strategy in a crisis, not just local or regional strategy.

III. The Control Team's Responsibilities

24. The Control team has two somewhat competing responsibilities. One function is to channel the game in interesting directions, maintaining the tempo of the game, and choosing decisive points in time for the successive policy-planning stages. In doing this it utilizes the variables under its control -- third countries, chance events, selective intelligence

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flows to the teams, etc. It thus plays a more active role than a "referee." Since time is short and only four policy-planning stages will fit, Control must actively force the pace of events.

25. At the same time, Control must not make decisions for Red and Blue. It must, as far as possible, project the explicit and implicit strategies of the teams and not commit them to decisions inconsistent with their strategies. Control must also stay within bounds of plausibility in the events it controls. Thus it must "guide" events in a plausible way within the strategies developed by Red and Blue. How faithfully it can project Red and Blue decisions will of course depend on how well those teams have identified contingencies and specified their actions and responses.

26. Military actions will likely be involved and may become dominant. The object is not, however, to explore or test the tactical implications of military plans; this is not a "war game." Control's military evaluations must be plausible but beyond that will be a compromise with time and will be responsive to the need to guide the game. Military detail may at times be exceedingly significant for political decisions, but military detail for its own sake is not the object.

27. Control will "leak" intelligence to Red and Blue, both intelligence of its own invention about the variables under its control, and intelligence about actions determined by the teams. Where the detail provided in team plans is insufficient to determine what the other team should "observe," Control will be obliged to flesh out the details of an action -- within the spirit of the teams strategy, as far as possible. Control may give conflicting intelligence to Red and Blue if circumstances warrant, still within bounds of plausibility.

IV. Rapporteurs

28. Rapporteurs will be assigned to Red and Blue teams. They will keep notes of the discussion -- of points that arise, ideas raised and discarded, reasoning of the team, etc. They should write up their notes immediately after each strategy session. (Teams may use the rapporteurs as recorders of ideas they want in the record but that do not show up in their strategies; but they need not make use of the rapporteurs.) Rapporteurs' notes should be available to team members prior to the next session.

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TIME SCHEDULE

Friday

8-8:30 p.m.	Orientation, administrative arrangements, distribution of scenario.
8:30-10:30	Teams hold preliminary meetings on scenario, prepare queries for Control.
10:30-12:00	Control prepares responses to queries.

Saturday

8:30-12:00	Planning session, Cycle I.
12:00-12:30	Observers brief Control, strategies delivered to Control.
12:30-1:00	Teams respond to Control's queries.
1:00-3:00	Teams lunch. Control prepares projection for Cycle II.
3:00-6:30	Planning session, Cycle II. Control develops questionnaire.
6:30-7:00	Observers brief Control, strategies delivered to Control.
7:00-7:30	Teams respond to Control's queries.
8:00-9:30	Dinner
9:30-12:00	Control prepares projection for Cycle III.
9:30-10:30	Team session on questionnaire.

Sunday

8:30-12:00	Planning session, Cycle III.
12:00-12:30	Observers brief Control, strategies delivered to Control.
12:30-1:00	Teams respond to Control's queries.
1:00-3:00	Teams lunch. Control prepares projection for Cycle IV.
3:00-6:30	Planning session, Cycle IV.
6:30-7:00	Observers brief Control, strategies delivered to Control.
7:00-7:30	Teams respond to Control's queries.
8:00-9:30	Dinner
9:30-11:00	Full documentation provided to all participants. Reading period, teams' preliminary discussion. Control initiates preparation of its final projection.

Monday

8:30-10:00	Control finishes projection.
8:30-12:00	Teams prepare projections.
10:00-12:00	Control prepares agenda for plenary.
12:00-1:00	Lunch
1:00-2:00	Final projection of Blue, Red, and Control distributed, one hour for reading.
2:00-5:00	Plenary session.

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DRAFT SCENARIO

The date is February 1, 12 noon Berlin time, and the following has happened since August 15:

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In September 1961, December 31st was announced as firm date of a GDR peace treaty, unless prior agreement reached with the West on an all-German peace treaty. Soviet pressure for an early Summit was stepped up. The Soviet Union consented to a Foreign Ministers' Conference; the conference broke up November 30th, after two weeks of acrimonious debate.

Khrushchev renewed his call for a 4-power Summit, hammering on December 31st as his deadline, but not revealing any fresh negotiating positions. The U.S. gained reluctant consent by Britain and France to rejecting Khrushchev's "absolutely final" summit date, December 26th, on December 20th.

Khrushchev's reaction was vehement in condemning the war-mongers. He disclosed that if the West had accepted his Summit call, he would have come with new disarmament proposals. As to Berlin, he was forced to pursue his long-announced policy, hoping that reason would prevail in the West. If not, force would be met with devastating force.

On New Year's Eve, the Peace Treaty was solemnly signed. While the Treaty was declared effective immediately, it provided for a month's transition period during which the USSR would exercise its functions on

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access to Berlin. Midnight, January 31st, GDR authorities would assume these functions fully, all Soviet personnel be withdrawn, and all Allied military rights in Berlin declared null and void, subject to renegotiation with GDR authorities.

Some U.S. press comment interpreted this as a "backdown," confirming once more that Khrushchev's ultimata were not to be taken seriously. More cautious comments spoke of a short breathing spell.

EVENTS IN BERLIN AND GERMANY

The sealing-off of the sector border had not brought explosive developments. Inter-sector commuter traffic resumed almost its previous scale under a permit system. A few hundred refugees continued to enter West Berlin daily, with GDR exit permits. They were mostly elderly and other persons dispensable to the GDR economy.

Outward calm in Berlin was facilitated by firm measures by West Berlin authorities to prevent provocative demonstrations by West Berliners. West Berlin morale remained generally high but economic indicators showed some soft spots. In early December, an unusual number of West Berliners departed for early Christmas vacations in West Germany.

Latent unrest in East Germany subsided, as a result of (1) inconspicuous repressive measures against active discontents, (2) a wait-and-see attitude encouraged by Western firmness, (3) an announcement that the USSR (enabled by its 1961 bumper crop) had extended massive credits to the GDR, and publicity on the imminent institution of NEP-type policies in the GDR, involving retreat from collectivization.

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WEST GERMANY

When early September public opinion polls disclosed an unexpectedly strong SPD position, CDU politicians increasingly appealed to nationalist and irridentist sentiments. Their speeches were picked up by Soviet propaganda as evidence of revanchism, and also by the press in Britain and France. The SPD, during the election campaign, was rent by a public split between a pro-Brandt majority and factions left of him, and suffered heavy defeat.

Interzonal trade had been stopped October 1st, but United States efforts to extend the embargo through NATO actions resulted only in inconclusive consultations which dragged on into January. The USSR and satellites promoted indecision by offering large-scale orders to Western European concerns.

UNITED KINGDOM

The government's strong efforts to persuade Washington of the need for negotiation and summitry were evidenced in the press and parliamentary debate. Other issues diverted British interest: The economic austerity program failed to stave off an imminent balance-of-payments crisis, while exacerbating Labor opinion, causing much public disgruntlement, and raising inhibitions against tampering with East-West trade. The Kuwait crisis, and (in January) the new threat to Hong Kong (see below) provided further distractions, and gave rise to commentaries of Britain's "hopelessly overextended defense commitments."

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military power by force and to divide the French-claimed spoils in the Sahara. The pact had strong and unexpected UAR backing, but there was no evidence of Sino-Soviet instigation or aid.

The agreement signalled the start of terrorist operations all over Algeria, countered by French military reinforcements and increasingly uncontrolled French civilian counter-terrorism. In mid-December Paris informed Washington that it would be unable to add to French NATO commitments. In mid-January, Paris secretly informed Washington that by February 15th it would have to start moving two NATO-committed divisions to Algeria.

MIDDLE EAST

Sudden indications of an UAR-Iraqi rapprochement in December were followed, early in January, by offers to Kuwait and Jordan to join a new Arab Union, with indications that the offer would be implemented by force if refused.

AFRICA

Portugese claims to have subdued rebellion in Angola were refuted by violent outbreaks there and in Mozambique. All Portugese military resources were committed to Africa by the end of 1961, and Afro-Asian anti-Portugese sentiment rose to an explosive peak.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Increased U. S. support had led to limited successes against Viet Cong, and Pathet-Lao and Viet Minh forces in Laos. U. S.-supported guerrilla inroads into North Viet Nam, started in September, had also found indigenous support and, by mid-January, had established several

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promising bases for extending these operations. North Viet Nam counteraction (with moderate Soviet airborne logistic support, and definite signs of low-level Chinese participation) had been vigorous and tended to expand the scale of operations and of U.S. commitments in Indochina, without preventing the initial successes of U.S.-backed forces. These successes gave expressions of interest by Thailand, and even Burma, in active participation, given much-increased U.S. support. There were ominous indications of massive Chicom preparations for "volunteer" intervention.

CHINA

A mending of Sino-Soviet relations was unexpectedly heralded by Chou En-Lai's appearance in East Berlin, where he signed the Peace Treaty. A few days later, Moscow and Peking announced an impressive agreement on economic, technical and scientific cooperation, backed by Soviet cancellation of all Chinese debts, a large credit to finance industrial expansion, and large Soviet grain export commitments (out of the same bumper crop).

In mid-January, the Chicom press launched a campaign on the theme that the "Free City" solution for West Berlin provided the perfect precedent for solving the anomaly of Hong Kong. A confidential note proposing immediate negotiations to this end was handed to the British Charge d'Affaires in Peking on January 26. By January 31st, London had passed confidential word to Washington about receipt of the note. By that date, Washington had also received a report passed by hitherto reliable satellite channels that the secret Sino-Soviet talks held in December had also led to agreement for USSR to provide large-scale

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assistance to Chicom nuclear and missile program and, as an interim measure, to supply and deploy a nuclear MRBM capability in China under joint Sino-Soviet control.

UNITED NATIONS

Mounting Afro-Asian agitation over events in Africa, the Middle East, and S.E. Asia led to a special session of the General Assembly which started January 24, its agenda replete with anti-colonialist, anti-militarist, anti-Western resolutions. The USSR and other Soviet Bloc delegations were reticent, and let Afro-Asians do the talking.

The United States--its diplomatic and policymaking resources taxed to saturation point--did its best to antagonize neither its NATO allies, nor the Afro-Asians. January 30 when the Assembly adjourned for a two-day recess, detached observers felt that the United States had pleased neither, and antagonized both.

PLANS FOR BERLIN DEADLINE

Although distracted by the varied events in January, the United States tried to concert with NATO its contingency plans for Berlin. Major military plans remained unaltered, except for a decision to alert one STRAC division for deployment in Germany by February 28, and to activate two more National Guard divisions.

Over British reluctance, the U.S. secured acceptance of plan to test GDR early in the morning of February 1 by sending a small elite force of U.S. reinforcements, with associated equipment, to Berlin; 20 vehicles are involved. Orders are to submit to routine clearance by GDR but to return if presented with inspection or other demands, or

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physical obstacles, or threat of force, and not to fire unless fired upon. This force crosses the border at 8 a.m. local time; GDR authorities go through minimal routine clearance processes but advise officer in charge that he will be subject to further clearance procedures en route. At 9:30 a.m., about 15 miles east of Magdeburg, the convoy meets advance motorcycle elements of a GDR military convoy travelling west on both sections of the autobahn. Traffic ahead has been stopped to let the GDR convoy pass. The U.S. force is instructed to stop; personnel are instructed to remain in the vehicles. Steady radio communication having been maintained, events to this point are clearly known to the Allied commander at Helmstedt.

Events then become confused. U.S. troops dismount and apparently a GDR motorcycle hits an American soldier and smashes into a U.S. truck. In the confusion and noise shots are heard. The American troops take definsive positions on both sides of the autobahn. GDR armored vehicles occupy the autobahn, others slowly encircle the U.S. position. No fighting occurs. At 12 noon the Allied commander at Helmstedt is contacted by GDR authorities and requested to instruct the U.S. troops in East Germany to return to their vehicles and return to Helmstedt to avoid an aggravation of the "incident." GDR radio announces that a token force of American troops have taken defensive positions upon contact with a sizeable GDR military convoy; that it is not clear whether this is a contrived incident or an unfortunate consequence of American blundering; that GDR troops are in complete control of the situation; that the American troops have been asked to evacuate at once; and that Allied behavior has evidently made the existing situation untenable.

The time is 12 noon, Berlin time, February 1, 1962.

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BRIEF SCENARIO

It is February 11, 1962, 8 P.M., Berlin time. These are pertinent events up to this point.

X X X X X

Following the sealing off of East Berlin and a short period of great tension, events in Berlin remained calm if tense throughout the late summer and early fall. The refugee flow inched up and by the end of the year had stabilized at 150 per day coming in through a well-organized underground railroad.

In the United States a moderate military buildup was in progress in line with the President's speech of mid-July. West German troop strength continued to increase and the draft was increased to two years. The German elections resulted in no major change in the composition of the Bundestag; Adenauer continued as Chancellor.

The much anticipated "Berlin negotiation" never occurred. The Soviet position continued to be that a separate peace treaty was inevitable by the end of the year if a new status for Berlin and the GDR could not be negotiated; the Allied position continued to be that such a peace treaty was a violation of the occupation agreement but that the only fighting issue was access to Berlin. Talk of a "Summit" conference continued but no basis for such a conference emerged from the various notes and conversations.

In early December it was announced that the peace treaty with the GDR would be signed at the end of the month and would go into effect on the first of January. Khrushchev made clear that the status of West

Berlin was still subject to negotiation, that citizens of that city would be safe unless Western adventurism put them in jeopardy. He particularly warned against Western efforts to use its so-called "supply problem" in Berlin as an excuse for violating the integrity of GDR. There is no supply problem and there need be none, he said, so long as the Western powers do not make illegal use of their obsolete "occupation rights" to violate GDR sovereignty.

The ceremony took place on New Years Day. Breaths were held; but nothing happened for nearly two weeks. On Friday, January 12, the GDR announced that the Allied powers were abusing their access to Berlin: Citizens of GDR, guilty of crimes against the state, were being flown through GDR airspace. This must cease or the GDR will be obliged to exert its sovereign rights over aircraft passing through its airspace.

On January 16 East German authroities dramatically announced that they would permit no further armed penetration of their national border. The transport of military equipment may proceed; armed penetration will not be tolerated. Specifically this means that armed, combat-ready equipment may not proceed across East German territory except in accordance with legitimate treaties.

On January 17 military vehicles en route to West Berlin were stopped at the border. GDR authorities conveyed that vehicles in an "armed" state would not penetrate the border. This will require inspection to assure that any armed vehicles "transported" to Berlin are not combat ready and not on an "armed mission." Accusing the GDR of trumping of fake issues, the Allies refused to submit to any such inspection. A substantial increase in military airlift took place.

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January 31 a commercial aircraft flying outbound from Berlin, bound for West Germany, was forced to land at an East German airfield. The East German radio announced that a "smuggling operation" involving East German criminal escapees had been intercepted in East German airspace, and warned that unless the practice stopped commercial aircraft would be forced to submit to inspection, either in Berlin or at airfields in the GDR. The action was hotly denounced by the Western Allies.

As a result of the incident West Germany suspended interzonal trade. A high state of nervousness was reported among the East German populace. GDR police were subjected to increased security measures. The United States ordered U.S. citizens travelling in Iron Curtain countries to return home. Macmillan in Commons stressed that this was a time to remain calm; one false move could send the world over the brink of war. The NATO Council was in constant session with rumors leaking of a major split in the alliance over a hard or soft line.

February 3 another commercial plane was buzzed en route from Berlin. It crashed, no survivors. The Western Allies initiated a fighter air patrol of the air corridors, announcing that any interference with flights would be treated as a hostile attack. GDR announced it would initiate its own fighter air patrol. The situation--they announced--is fraught with the peril of war; the Allied fighter aircraft will not be tolerated longer than necessary for the Allied governments to retract their illegal action.

The French, British, and U.S. Governments, all represented in the fighter escort operation, denounced the concept of GDR airspace in the Berlin air corridors, denounced the piracy of the GDR in molesting air traffic and causing one aircraft to crash, vowed to continue providing

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for the security of Eastern European refugees seeking freedom in the west, and stated that the air corridors would be patrolled as long as East German molestation made it necessary.

February 11, Sunday, an American military cargo aircraft crashed in the Berlin corridor. A French fighter aircraft failed to return to base, the pilot having announced by radio that he and a cargo aircraft had been buzzed by a GDR plane, that the cargo aircraft was in trouble, and that he was going in pursuit of the East German plane. Two hours later the world was startled at a USSR announcement that Allied plane straffed GDR airbase; this has all characteristics of "undeclared war" on an ally of the USSR; GDR has full military support of USSR in any action it deems necessary to its integrity and security.

At 4 P.M. local time East German Radio broadcast message from GDR to Allied Governments, along following lines:

> Henceforth--starting midnight--any combat aircraft will be summarily despatched upon entrance to GDR airspace. Transport aircraft will be permitted but only subject to the following safeguard: to assure against any breach of the frontier, transport aircraft wishing to use the air corridors to Berlin must be manifestly unarmed. For this purpose, any transport aircraft wishing to cross the GDR frontier will submit to inspection by designated GDR diplomatic officials prior to take-off, or alternatively will submit to escort and land at designated GDR airfields for examination prior to proceeding to Berlin. Similar inspection by GDR will apply to military transport on surface routes.

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At 7 P.M. Mayor Willy Brandt broadcast a vigorous statement that a reckoning had come; that GDR was testing Allied resolve; that the West, however weak it has been in the past, would not accede to the GDR threat--to do so would be to surrender Berlin; that the Berliners should be confident in the face of this Soviet bluff and show by their actions the stuff the West is made of.

It is 8 P.M. Berlin time, Sunday, February 11, 1962.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

International Security Affairs

MEMORANDUM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN NATO PLANNING CONFERENCE

REFERENCE: ASD(ISA) Memorandum, 22 August 1961 - I-16,034/61

The Conference will be held at Camp David, the President's Mountain Retreat, from Friday evening, September 8th, through Monday evening, September 11th.

Government transportation from Washington to Camp David and return will be furnished for those who do not wish to take their own cars (there is local transportation available at the Camp if needed, to include transporting personnel back to Washington in the event of an emergency). Participants may expect to arrive in the Washington area about 1800 hours, 11 September.

Camp David is located approximately 65 miles north of Washington. Persons providing their own transportation should take Route U.S. 240 (Wisconsin Avenue) north to Frederick, Maryland, passing directly through Frederick and continuing north on [redacted]

The Conference will begin following dinner on Friday evening and persons should arrive prior to the evening meal at 1930 hours. A bar will be open at 1900 hours in Laurel Lodge. Cars will leave the Pentagon at approximately 1700 hours, Friday, 8 September, and will stop enroute to pick up participants from other agencies. Recipients of this memorandum are requested to inform Mr. Stanley or Mr. McQuade, Ext. 56273, or Colonel Goodman, Ext. 78126, as to whether they will require government transportation, no later than the close of business Thursday, 7 September.

Billeting will be provided at the Camp in the VIP Quarters and in the BOQ. Meals will be served in the VIP mess facility and participants will be billed subsequently for the cost of their meals which should total about $12 - $15.00 for the weekend. Persons normally eligible for overtime pay will be able to receive it for the overtime put in at Camp David.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.6
NLK-00-4A
By MRO NARA, Date 3/08

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Although the work of the Conference will consume most of the weekend, there should be several periods available for rest and relaxation. Facilities include a swimming pool and tennis court, and persons interested are requested to bring bathing suits and tennis shoes. Other tennis equipment is available at the Camp. Normal office working clothes or informal sportswear may be worn during the Conference. The temperature at Camp David is normally considerably cooler than Washington, especially in the evenings, and appropriate clothing should be taken.

Persons participating in the Conference who wish to leave a number where they can be reached in emergencies, may leave instructions to call STerling 3-0333 and to ask for the individual concerned by name, specifying that they are at Camp David.

All stationery, office supplies and equipment necessary for the Conference is being provided by the sponsoring office.

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PROBABLE PARTICIPANTS



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