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Vol.
pp.

PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION

for

DETEX I

Endicott House,
November 29, 1963.

IRENE MANOOGIAN
11 PEMBERTON SQUARE
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02108
TELEPHONE RICHMOND 2-4676

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PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION

for

DETEX I

BARTON WHALEY, Presiding

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, Chairman

MATTHEW BONHAM
H. ROBERTS COWARD
JOHN CRAVEN
LEE DENSON
JAMES L. DORSEY
DAVID L. EVANS
ALBERT FULLERTON
WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH
FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS
LOUIS D. HIGGS
PAUL HINIKER
FREDERICK E. JANNEY
ROBERT H. JOHNSON
LOUIS KUNZIG
ROBERT MELSON
LESLIE ROOS
MILTON SACKS
EUGENE B. SKOLNIKOFF
RICHARD E. USHER
WILLIAM WELLS
FREDERICK YU

Endicott House
29 November 1963

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(8 p.m., Friday, November 29, 1963.)

MR. WHALEY. For the next approximately 40 minutes I think that what we would all be interested in at this time, when we are in plenary session, would be hearing from each of the team chairmen in turn. I would think that from the Control standpoint, having been in the center of the operation, that they would want the sort of briefing that you would be giving at the end of the A Period and B Period moves; but I would hope that each of the team chairmen, in giving his debriefing, would recognize the fact that the other two teams were not privy to many of the messages that were sent to Control or to only one of the other teams, and, also, were certainly not privy, as I gather from the cocktail and dinner conversation, to much of the broad statements of goals, strategies, in the face of the specific crises we presented this evening, much less most of the contingency planning which went on within the teams. Therefore, I hope that each of the team chairmen would spend the bulk of his debriefing period in bringing all of the other teams up to date on these matters. This is what I mean by "hitherto-secret communications".

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The first one from whom I would like to hear would be the chairman of the United States team, Mr. Johnson.

MR. JOHNSON. Well, I will interpret this introduction to mean that I should give you a survey, sort of a basic outline of a basic outline of the US strategy and my own perception of the problem as we moved along.

Basically, our policy was one of stabilization of the situation in Southeast Asia. We were uncertain, although we left open, I should say, the possibility that we might marginally improve our situation by getting the remaining VC out of Vietnam, possibly by hanging on to the gains that the South Vietnamese had made in going across the 17th parallel, at least for bargaining purposes in any subsequent negotiations.

We were uncertain as to the precise Chinese intentions, whether they were primarily defensive to bail out the North Vietnamese or whether they were taking advantage of their opportunity to go for larger gains in the area.

We believe that the Soviets would have some anxiety -- perhaps not to the same degree that we

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did -- but some considerable anxiety to stabilize the situation for two reasons, basically. One, that continued escalation might create a situation where they would be forced to come to the aid of the Chinese; and second, the fact that the Chinese Communists coming to the aid of the North Vietnamese would tend to put the North Vietnamese in their pocket for a long time, indefinitely. This would be contrary to Soviet interests. Presumably, the Soviets would prefer to preserve some influence in North Vietnam.

Our general strategy throughout, I think, involved a mixture of two sorts of actions on the military plane. One was action to deal with the situation on the ground and prevent it from getting out of hand, because we were somewhat alarmed with the apparent size of the Chinese moves and were afraid that we might be put in the position where our alternatives would be very restricted and be restricted to accepting defeat or using nuclear weapons. Our other objective was to attempt to mount a threat to North Vietnam and Communist China which would cause them eventually to back down.

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At each decision stage in this process we faced again the question of how much, if at all, we should escalate from the point of view of mounting a deterrent threat to the Communist side in the hope that this would cause them to desist. We were quite aware of the fact, of course, that the conceivable action that we might take would not have this effect; but, basically, I suppose that our strategy was fairly cautious.

We considered in every move period the possibility of more radical action against North Vietnam or Communist China, and generally opted for a more conservative possibility.

As we see it, at the end of the game the issue really had not been resolved because our objective was more or less as the Soviets stated their objective to be publicly: a return to the Geneva accords. This meant the removal not only of Chinese and North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam and Laos, but also removal of Chinese troops from North Vietnam itself.

It is not at all clear the extent to which the Chinese would have been willing to go for that objective. For that reason, up to the very last,

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we continued to apply measured military pressure against the Chinese. We in the last move period, for example, undertook a limited blockade of Communist China designed to preclude Indonesian fuel shipments. We also undertook more extensive air action in support of ground actions.

We temporarily withheld action against Communist China itself, which was the next phase in our plan, because there were some indications -- from the information that we got -- that the Chinese were probing for some kind of negotiated settlement; and until we played that out, we did not think that we should mount such action. But we did, in the last move period, warn the Chinese that unless they were serious about a settlement that would be acceptable to us, we were prepared to go further in action against them.

So that, as I say, throughout, the effort was to deal with the situation on the ground and to apply sufficient pressure on the Communist side, as we perceived it, to cause them to believe that this carried risks that were disproportionate to the gains that they might hope for from the situation.

MR. WHALEY. All right. Are there any

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comments from members of the US team in terms of additional points that you might like to raise at this time?

(No response.)

MR. WHALEY. If not, then would Dean Sacks, the Chairman of the China team, debrief the group?

MR. SACKS. I think the Cninese team started out with the assumptions that were expressed in the original situation report. In the first instance, we had reason to believe that the action of the North Vietnamese Government would result in a victory if it were a localized affair, simply between North and South Vietnam in several months, having military superiority.

We also were confronted with the fact that the Burmese Government, after having responded to our advances in the previous period of time, had begun to take a hostile attitude toward us; and there were opportunities in Northeast Thailand, as well as in Burma, based on dissident forces, that we could count on.

The setback to the North Vietnamese troops demanded, on the part of the Chinese Government, some resistive response lest we lose the DRVN, and

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the object then was to overcome the political advantages and the position of the South Vietnamese Government that had grown so strong in the intervening five years since 1963.

On that basis, our objective was to strike as hard and as fast as we could to blunt the edge of the RVN attack and to create conditions that would be favorable from the political point of view to the CPR and the Communist DRV in the area of negotiations that would re-establish the predominance of China in this area and facilitate Chinese control of the area at a later stage.

So our whole strategy here was to get our troops as quickly as possible down below the 17th parallel, and then from that vantage point carry on an attempt at negotiations at the end of Stage III. Having delivered a death blow to the South Vietnamese Army, this would permit us to reap the advantages of political settlement at that point.

I would like to point out that in terms of the way the game was played, we had every indication to believe that some of our expectations with respect to Burma and Thailand and Indonesia worked out very well -- at least, the signals that we received

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indicated that that was so.

The Burmese Government, in fact, voted for withdrawal of all foreign troops, Western troops, from the area. Also, the Burmese Government did not go ahead with its movement against the northern people, against whom they were committed. They accepted the legitimacy, so to speak, of our attack by centering their fire against the Western invasion.

The Thai Government clearly was very careful about only committing a very small portion of its forces to aiding the Americans, and this was quite significant in view of the large number of troops that we had going down the corridor controlled by the Pathet Lao. Our whole objective here was to create a situation in which we could effectively gain real estate, hurt the South Vietnamese Army, and create conditions for favorable negotiations. It seems that we accomplished that objective by the time that the third period took place.

In terms of our relations with the Soviet Union, we understood that they were strained; but yet, on the other hand, we felt that the Soviet Union would not do anything that would, in effect, turn over Communist territory to the imperialist

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forces. We did not expect them at any point to inhibit the ability of the DRV to defend itself and to re-establish itself, once its position had been revealed at the beginning as being very precarious because of South Vietnamese forces entering North Vietnam. Their (the Soviet) realization of our moves here would be prompted primarily by their hope that this would not be escalated beyond the local situation, that it would be contained, and that Communist objectives locally would be satisfied by help to the DRV and by the weakening of the American position in that area.

As far as our relationships with other states, I feel that we received indications early in the game that the British Government certainly did not regard the attack against the Southern Government any too seriously and that they were ready to negotiate.

The French Government also wished to negotiate.

We were concerned with what aid the Americans could provide. Our feeling was clearly that both the British and French were disposed to some negotiations and that we would importune them toward this end, which would allow their interests in South Vietnam

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to be protected, based on any settlement that would take place at the peace table.

By and large, we did not bring to bear the full force of the dissident movement in South Vietnam until later because we wanted them to take advantage of the situation that would occur as a consequence of military blows being dealt to the South Vietnamese Army.

In fact, when we were informed that the South Vietnamese Army was in dire straits and that our own troops were below Hue, pressing limited American forces, we were perfectly prepared at this point to take advantage of the situation by calling for peaceful negotiations and settlement in which all political forces in Vietnam would be represented at the peace table in the hope that under those circumstances, given a new military position, the lowering of the line from the 17th parallel to a point below Hue, with the capital city in the hands of the DRV, with the Southern Government discredited because of its failure to maintain its initial impetus, that it (South Vietnam) would come out badly at the conference table.

With the agreement of the other states, there

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could then be a withdrawal of all foreign forces, for which we would be able to press under the circumstances, including our own (forces), because of the unequal political situation that now obtains with respect to the DRV and the RVN, with the DRV being in essentially a better position for any negotiations at that point.

The feeling was that we could then later proceed politically with respect to Burma and Thailand because of the blow that had been inflicted against the American forces on the assumption that the Americans would have to at that point settle for peaceful settlement of the situation because they were at a disadvantage militarily for some time to come in terms of what it could actually throw into the breach.

I think that more or less expresses our strategy. You might want to find out whether any other members of the team want to make any comments.

MR. CRAVEN. Do you want to comment on our relationship with Japan and Indonesia?

MR. SACKS. With respect to Indonesia, we achieved our objectives here. Signals had been sent up indicating that Western action in this area was going to cause the possibility of revolution in Indonesia.

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Order could not be maintained.

The Japanese movement had clearly indicated and caused political difficulties in Japan against using it as a staging base for any American operations; and, generally speaking, this created very favorable circumstances in Japan with respect to the activities of the Chinese People's Republic in Vietnam.

That is, our whole effort here was to convince Asian opinion that this was an Asian action directed against outside influence and that we have no desire here to assert Chinese Communist domination of Vietnam directly or, for that matter, anywhere else; but, rather, from an external relationship which would mean Chinese political controls in this area because of the weakening of American power in the area.

MR. WHALEY. Are there any other comments?

MR. CRAVEN. Yes. What about our relations to Taiwan and the Taiwan threat?

MR. SACKS. The Taiwan threat we discounted, frankly discounted, as being not a very serious one. When we received word of this, we checked with our able Defense Minister and he indicated quite clearly that this desperate act on the part of the Chinese Nationalists could easily be met militarily, and we

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doubted very much that anybody would be sucked in by that kind of effort at that point.

I think that about expresses it.

MR. CRAVEN. Yes.

MR. WHALEY. Then I take it that you thought of that message about Taiwanese involvement at this weak moment in the game entirely in terms of a mainland invasion and not in terms of any kind of way that the US team might have interpreted this message?

MR. SACKS. We were pretty well convinced that the Americans had fallen into more or less the trap that we had prepared -- in a sense, considered from the very beginning -- that their limited objective would be Vietnam and North Vietnam and nothing else. The worst that we would have to fear would be some bombing and other activities of that kind. We knew that we had predominant military force on the ground so that we could get enough real estate and then be able to raise, by the end of Stage III in this game, the proposal for political negotiation. Everybody wanted this at that time and everybody talked about this. We felt that we could then negotiate from our position of strength, rather than from theirs.

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MR. WHALEY. I see.

Dr. Johnson, did you at all interpret this message in any way other than just a somewhat implausible move from Thailand to the mainland?

MR. JOHNSON. Taiwan.

MR. WHALEY. -- from Taiwan to the mainland?

MR. JOHNSON. No. I think we interpreted it that way.

MR. WHALEY. I see. I think in the back of my mind was the thought that the US team might have responded to this by saying, "Gee, boys, don't go into the mainland in 72 hours, but can't we transport you to a more useful theater of action?"

MR. JOHNSON. I do not know whether that thought flashed through our minds, but I would consider it not a terribly useful action to take.

MR. WHALEY. That was only a thought in the back of my mind, not the forefront.

MR. CRAVEN. We thought you would think so.

MR. WHALEY. It was a straightforward communication.

MR. JOHNSON. I do not know whether you want comments at this stage or whether you want to reserve that for later.

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MR. WHALEY. If we could hold it for a moment, --

MR. JOHNSON. Sure.

MR. WHALEY. In fact, if there are no other comments from members of the China team, I should actually, after each debriefing of the team chairmen, as we had done during the regular game period, ask if there are any questions from members of Control.

Are there any questions from members of Control on the debriefing of the Chairman of the China team directly related to the points that he raised?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Excuse me. No one has seen the moves that anyone made in the C Period. Therefore, just to be sure that you reported the main steps that you took at the end of the game, --

MR. SACKS. At the end of the game, the moment that our troops overran the area and were pushing in that area, we let the French know that we were prepared to negotiate. We told the Russians that they should press the Americans for immediate negotiations under the same circumstances, and we pointed out the threat of escalation that could come, again, if the Americans persisted in this situation. We also pointed out that the war could spread and that there was a

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possibility of nuclear involvement.

Thereafter, in effect, what we assumed -- and I must confess this is the case -- was that we were dealing with a power that would respond to recognition of the real estate situation. Because of the advances that were made, we were willing to stop at that point because Communist objectives within that framework had been more or less achieved.

I think the other team will probably indicate that we misconstrued some of their signals, but we interpreted the signals in that way. I believe that practically all of our moves in the third period were designed to take advantage of the military situation that we had set up by calling for negotiations from a position of strength.

MR. CRAVEN. You gave Hong Kong their water back.

MR. SACKS. Yes, we gave Hong Kong their water back.

(General laughter.)

MR. JOHNSON. That was one we neglected to do anything about.

MR. WHALEY. Are there any other questions from Control members to the China Chairman?

(No response.)

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MR. WHALEY. If not, you had a question, Dr. Johnson.

MR. JOHNSON. I had a comment. Do you prefer to --

MR. WHALEY. Go ahead.

MR. JOHNSON. One of the things that strikes me about the account here is the almost total absence of any indication of sensitivity on the part of the Communist Chinese or the North Vietnamese to the fact that they were possibly taking increasing risks of attack upon themselves. This is something about which they would be concerned because, you see, a part of our strategy was based on the presumption that the Chinese were very sensitive -- and, in fact, I would believe that they would be very sensitive -- to indications that we were moving in this direction. We tried to build up a graduated series of actions that would lead to that conclusion -- both political actions and military actions. Yet, this was apparently not a calculation on the Chinese side.

MR. SACKS. It was, yes, but the point involved was that the graduated series of actions were restricted to Vietnam. Because they were restricted to Vietnam, as the Chinese state involved

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in this situation, we were prepared to accept such air strikes as you would make in terms of our own advance south. This, in fact, took place.

MR. JOHNSON. Even in North Vietnam -- you were prepared to lose quite a bit in North Vietnam.

MR. SACKS. In fact, we got some signals later that this had taken place, but our own armies had advanced well below Hue, before a retreating American force. Once that situation obtained, we wanted a truce as of that point and that is what we started to press for.

MR. WHALEY. All right.

MR. SACKS. May I make another comment?

MR. WHALEY. Please.

MR. SACKS. The assumption was that inasmuch as this was just before the election and the policy of the United States had been to talk about negotiation and so on, that the moment we now declare that we are ready for negotiation, that negotiation would commence on the basis that the military forces remain where they are.

MR. JOHNSON. You can accept that.

MR. SACKS. We did not know that, but the point is that it would still put you in a very

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uncomfortable position, given the amount of force that was deployed in the area and our capability to still push you further back. You would then have to at least face, it seemed to us, anyway, a further push by us southward before you could then begin to redress and move north. We did not think that you would want to conduct a war that long.

MR. JOHNSON. There would be only a threat from Mainland China itself.

MR. SACKS. Correct. As long as you kept it there, let's say, in terms of the Korean negotiations or any other negotiations, the further our military lines were advanced, on the basis of previous experience, the better position we would be in at the bargaining table.

MR. COWARD. I think as soon as you talk about the bargaining table, you get into one of the major asymmetries which I saw emerging from this, and that was this asymmetry in the idea of each side of what the other had committed. I think that one of the great difficulties was that the Chinese looked at the American commitment in absolute terms, in terms of how many divisions they could put in, ignoring completely the fact that this exhausted the American

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capability, and the Americans coming to the bargaining table would have believed that they had poured in everything that they had and had, therefore, taken a very strong position; whereas the Chinese were going to have completely different ideas as to just exactly what they put into the situation.

MR. JOHNSON. Well, the other members of the team can correct me if they disagree, but I think that part of the reason for our action on the ground was as a deterrent action. Basically, it was designed to stabilize the army on the ground. We were relying on other series of action to which the Chinese did not apparently react to create the real pressure against the Chinese that would be helpful to our bargaining position.

In other words, we were trying to imply the risks that were implied at the end of the Korean War, if the thing were not settled. It was not so much the commitment of forces, although that did raise this question, because it eventually got to the point where you had no alternatives.

MR. SACKS. May I point out here that at S plus 15 (referring to Control Document B13) it reads:

"The Seventh Fleet is deployed in the South

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China Sea and a number of 'Polaris' submarines are on station in the Western Pacific. US aerial reconnaisance is very active in North Vietnam and adjacent areas including Southern China. US Air Forces have made no attacks. Limited US mobilization is under way: six national guard divisions, fighter and transport squadrons, additional combat and service Naval ships plus supporting forces."

This indicated to us that there was not going to be a force powerful enough to top the Chinese. We had all the political sides in our favor: Japan, Indonesia, England, France, the Soviet Union. They all wanted to stop the fight -- at least, as we saw it. Under these circumstances, we assumed that we were going to face you at a bargaining table in which your conviction that by putting this amount into the business, you were really going to go further if you did not have your way. Further, we played this for three stages -- not for four or five.

MR. WHALEY. Having sat in on Control, I certainly had an impression that there was a serious inability to communicate intention between the US team and the Chinese team. Control conscientiously tried to beef up your respective messages, but somehow

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this impression, I guess, did not get through.

MR. CRAVEN. You got our message loud and clear.

MR. WHALEY. Control?

MR. CRAVEN. Control got our message loud and clear.

MR. WHALEY. I think so from what has been said now. There is no discrepancy between what you have said now and at least my impression at that time.

MR. SACKS. Control was asked at the end of the second session whether or not we were going to continue fighting in South Vietnam further south, and we said no. I specifically answered no. This was designed to improve our bargaining position and we were not going to continue this war indefinitely to take over the rest of Southeast Asia.

MR. WHALEY. Dean Sacks, at any time did you believe that a general war was even likely? Was this something that you considered at any point in the game?

MR. SACKS. Everything that the United States did confirmed our position that they were accepting the same ground rules of sanctuary, limited war, and so on that they had in Korea, with the sole exception of possible air attacks on North Vietnam; and that did not bother us too much under the circumstances.

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MR. WHALEY. Yes. Are there any other comments?

MR. KUNZIG. I think it would be useful if we could have the US team summarize what they were prepared to do right at the end of this problem.

MR. WHALEY. In Move IV, if we had one?

MR. KUNZIG. Yes, in that step.

MR. JOHNSON. Well, our objective in negotiation would have been the removal of all Communist forces not only from South Vietnam, but also removal of Chinese forces from North Vietnam. In other words, a return to the Geneva arrangements with no foreign forces; and that was, as we understood it, the Soviet position. We strongly backed that position. To probe the Chinese intention in this respect, we proposed in the last game move that we would indicate to the Chinese that unless they were prepared to accept an acceptable settlement, we would then move up to attack Communist China itself. In fact, we had just indicated that we were serious about this. In relation to this specific problem, we initiated a limited blockade of China.

MR. SACKS. We did not know anything about this.

MR. JOHNSON. This was designed to apply the

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pressure to continue what we had thought was a series of pressures leading up to action against Communist China, but they apparently were not perceived as involving that kind of a threat.

MR. WHALEY. Are there any other comments?

MR. SKOLNIKOFF. There were some fairly basic difficulties in this situation.

MR. WHALEY. Within the US team?

MR. SKOLNIKOFF. I think the US team and the Chinese team held view of the world which were very different.

MR. WHALEY. Yes.

MR. SKOLNIKOFF. I think we (the US team) tended to view the Communist Chinese as having made a much greater commitment than they, in fact, did -- a commitment so great that any settlement short of essentially taking over South Vietnam militarily and politically would look like a defeat to them and to the rest of the world.

In fact, the early tendency of the Thais and the Burmese and so on to move to the Chinese position was basically because of doubt as to the extent of the US commitment. Once convinced that the United States would, in fact, hold firm and put

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forces in and be willing to escalate to some extent, then this would change -- in Cambodia, as well.

In a sense, everything that Communist China did tended to confirm this. That is, by the second move, 15 days later, it still looked as though they were not willing to meet American forces.

We had been running reconnaisance forces over China. No planes had been shot down, presumably. There had been no overt fighting, and the United States was holding back only to the extent of waiting for Communist China to cross the 17th parallel.

So really by the second period it seemed that the Chinese Communists were very hesitant about engaging the US directly. It looked largely like a bluff on their part.

Even in the third period, when we saw that Communist China was willing to negotiate, we were not impressed by the fact that they were down below Hue. Rather, we were impressed by the fact that they were willing to negotiate when they still apparently had a position of strength.

It looked like they really saw that everything was going against them and then decided that it was time to give in.

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MR. JOHNSON. One perception that we started with -- it is perhaps in disagreement to some extent with the original scenario -- was the belief that basically the Chinese were pretty weak militarily and that their capability for mounting a sustained large-scale operation on the ground in Southeast Asia was very limited without renewal of substantial Soviet support.

One of the reasons that we tried to move as fast as we could on the ground was because we were afraid that the Chinese, perceiving this, would move quickly, knowing that they could not sustain a major operation for any length of time and that the game could be lost because of this.

MR. SACKS. Yes.

MR. JOHNSON. We believed that basically the Chinese were weak. We believed that if they could be stopped and then shown the dangers of their course, that we could recover the situation.

MR. WHALEY. Captain Janney, do you have a question?

MR. JANNEY. I do not want to contradict our leader, but I had an entirely-different impression. I could not understand the plausibility of the

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Chinese stopping. There was a build-up in North Vietnam and China of 15 to 20 divisions. They started this mess. First there was the incursion south; then the counterattack north; and then the avalanche came south. Then all of a sudden they stopped. Why did they stop? I thought the plan was to go the full route.

MR. CRAVEN. That was not our plan.

MR. JANNEY. Then why did you start it in the first place?

MR. WHALEY. The Chinese and the North Vietnamese started it?

MR. JANNEY. Well, Vietnam, Viet Minh, North Vietnam, started it on their own initiative.

MR. SKOLNIKOFF. This is not inconsistent. The Viet Minh did this entirely with Communist support. This was generally known. Therefore, any defeat, in this sense, was Communist China's, not North Vietnam's.

MR. JANNEY. If everything goes back to the status quo ante, you then ask the question: Well, why the heck did it start in the first place?

MR. CRAVEN. We were below the 17th parallel; we defeated the South; we had upset the political balance; we had completed a military action; and we

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were then waiting for time to pass.

MR. SKOLNIKOFF. It was just beginning. It was not over.

MR. JANNEY. It takes us a little longer to build up in that area.

MR. CRAVEN. Yes, and we did not want to test you in that regard. We did not have any debate; we were all unanimous in this.

MR. KUNZIG. Like good comrades.

MR. EVANS. There were two things that have not been mentioned that were fundamental in our approach, namely, that we saw in this situation an opportunity to make definite but very limited gains, recognizing our shortcomings of perhaps an inability to sustain a large, massive attack of several months and not knowing what the gains would be. Half the game was going to be played, timewise, during the three moves.

We tried to calculate our primary move in such a manner that it would keep the war at an iron-bomb level. In that sense, the deterrents of the United States were successful. We wanted to be very careful not to enlist a US nuclear attack on Mainland China.

The Soviets did a fine job during this game, I think, in keeping us on the hot seat as to whether

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or not they were going to be with us or not.

(General laughter.)

MR. EVANS. We tried to get a Soviet commitment.

MR. SACKS. That is right.

MR. EVANS. But as far as we know, we failed at every attempt.

MR. WHALEY. Colonel Evans, I take it, then, that this was quite deliberate and quite calculated, and that the only nuclear-weapons waving that you did in the game that I was aware of -- although there may have been some other messages that passed me by -- were deliberately limited and were deliberately directed toward Japan and Taiwan in these two cases. In other words, you had no intention of bringing in any kind of US counterresponse?

MR. CRAVEN. That is right.

MR. EVANS. That is right. We were not going to initiate a nuclear attack.

MR. WHALEY. You had no expectation that this would even get to that point?

MR. CRAVEN. That is correct.

MR. WHALEY. That is how I interpreted it, but I wanted it for the record.

MR. HIGGS. Can I ask a question?

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MR. WHALEY. Yes.

MR. HIGGS. My question is limited to the Chinese team. When you got the message that the US was bombing in a rather serious way in North Vietnam, did you look upon this as a potential threat to reverse the situation? In other words, you can look at this scenario, in one way, as Korea in reverse. The Chinese and the North Vietnamese went over the line. Eventually, there was the beginning of a counteroffensive which could have driven you back and cause you great losses. This was, in fact, partially a desire to prevent this as well as to take advantage of the political situation. In other words, supposing that the Americans had said, "If you guys don't want to move back and bargain, we're going to keep coming"?

MR. CRAVEN. We felt that if we kept moving, they would keep coming. We felt that by making our quick limited objective and then offer to negotiate, that we would pull the rug out from under them.

MR. HIGGS. There was no background material, there was no evidence, there was no really firm evidence, you see, as to what the American tactical layer of the situation was.

MR. SACKS. There was evidence, but it did not

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hinder our look at the way that the thing was set up here. (Reading from Control Document C20) "Bulk of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam have met Chinese forces in area of Hue, suffering fairly heavy casualties and being pushed back." This is S plus 30.

"After Chinese forces crossed south of 17th parallel US tactical and carrier aviation carried out extensive strikes against military communications and targets in North Vietnam and supported Vietnamese and US ground forces in coastal plain."

Then on the next page it reads: "South Vietnamese ground forces are still providing bulk of resistance in coastal area but units are greatly weakened and morale is low. South Vietnamese Air Force is practically gone. It is apparent to US advisors and to Chicom attackers that South Vietnamese forces are rapidly approaching a critical stage."

This means that from a military point of view, you have not inhibited us enough from reaching a situation in which the South Vietnamese are pretty well shot. Under those circumstances, it is perfectly made to order for a political action on our part to negotiate from a position of strength.

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Why not?

MR. HIGGS. But you are assuming that you had some tactical layer to prevent total control of the air by the Americans.

MR. CRAVEN. No.

MR. SACKS. No, we did not assume that at all. We assumed that we had enough control of the ground to keep a punitive action going against the South Vietnamese and American forces for some time, you see, under circumstances where we would be calling for negotiations and they would be insisting on fighting.

To make a parallel, I would simply raise the question: Why didn't the Chinese Government go further in its attack on India? It certainly could have gone further than it did. From my point of view, it was apparently the perfect case of a military operation for political ends; and I suggest that this is a military operation for political ends here. The United States knew that it was outmaneuvered.

Also, we were attempting to show that the political position of North Vietnam had not paid off and that there was a problem here of redressing the balance. It was clearly set forth in the scenario, I would say.

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MR. CRAVEN. I think that our unanimity of view on this situation was remarkable. I think that we all had the dogma pretty well. Further, I do not think that anybody in our group would have changed a major issue.

MR. HIGGS. But the assumption was that you were in a superior military position in the short range. That assumes that the United States could have hindered your logistic support in the future.

MR. CRAVEN. They could have knocked us out.

MR. HIGGS. They could have cut your supply lines off.

MR. CRAVEN. Yes. We let it be known to you that we were prepared to negotiate back to the 17th parallel.

MR. YU. In fact, we were in a weak position and we were a little bit frightened. Our strategy was to have several fronts, and then we would pick out one place for a quick victory. There would be enough of them. If we won, we would pass on. If we lost, --

MR. CRAVEN. Then we would go back to the 17th parallel and the Geneva Accords or whatever the heck they wanted. Control deliberately, I think, sort of intervened at that particular point. I think that

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Control tried to play it at that point somewhat short of your maximum point, and we tried to fall somewhere between the two stools -- the US contingency plans and the Chinese contingency plans -- but this was certainly difficult to do.

MR. WHALEY. At this point, I would like to hear from the Chairman of the Soviet team, Dr. William Griffith.

How did you view all of this?

MR. GRIFFITH. I think one could say that the tactics of all the three teams were relatively conservative and that we were the only ones who had a radical strategy -- certainly, a strategy uncommunicated to either of the other teams, although I would maintain that we signaled it fairly clearly and I think that Control probably understood it.

We had, of course, a maximum and a minimum strategy. It was the maximum one that was radical from the generally-assumed point of view. This maximum strategy was based upon an assumption of Soviet unwillingness as of 1968, in terms of relations, to accept indefinitely the kind of situation which is now and would by then also continue to be the case with relation to Moscow and

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Peking; that the Soviet Union would by then have come to a strategic decision that China was a greater menace to the Soviet Union than was the United States; and that, therefore, the maximum and fundamental Soviet objective had to be the overthrow of the Chinese leadership and a major diminution in the actual power of China as a state.

MR. CRAVEN. We would have been more scared of that if Control had not informed us of that. Our Government was informed of that.

MR. GRIFFITH. They had informed us of that, too. Our strategy was to do whatever we could. Although we were not too optimistic that we could succeed, we were perhaps too overoptimistic than we should have been because we underestimated the timidity of the Americans.

(General laughter.)

MR. GRIFFITH. The maximum Soviet objective was to bring about, with or without the use of nuclear weapons on the part of the Americans, a defeat of China by the United States and the at least temporary occupation of part of China by the United States, the moving of the Soviet Union into Sinkiang and Manchuria, and the de facto partition of China, with the establishment of a new Communist party in the Soviet-influence part, which party would be under Soviet control.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. I suppose the record will show at this point animation in the hall.

(General laughter.)

MR. CRAVEN. We thought you were not quite co-operative.

MR. GRIFFITH. The preliminary objective was the status quo. We did not want the status quo in effect destroyed by what we would consider to be a Chinese victory in the game, and, therefore, to some extent a Soviet defeat.

(General laughter.)

MR. GRIFFITH. Now, within this general strategy, our purpose was constantly to aid the weaker force or the force which appeared to be the weaker. For example, we wanted to deter the United States from creating a situation of general thermonuclear war, which is why we said we wanted time. We did not, however, mean it. Animation in the hall.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Stormy applause.

MR. GRIFFITH. All rise and cry, "Glory to the Soviet Union."

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

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MR. GRIFFITH. When it appeared that the Chinese were in grave danger, for a while we thought that they were being defeated by the United States too rapidly, and that the war was coming to an end. We did not want that. We wanted the war to continue, to be protracted, but to be conventional. We were not very successful in this, I think, and we tried at first to inhibit the Chinese. When we thought they were doing well, we cut off some of their oil. When it appeared that there was grave danger that the United States might use thermonuclear weapons -- and here we underestimated American timidity; they (Communist China) did not -- we did such things as restoring the Chinese oil.

When we learned about Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to attack the mainland -- and we wanted this -- we, therefore, suppressed the news and denied the news to the Chinese that it was going to take place. We were gravely disappointed when it did not (take place). Again, we underestimated the American's timidity, --

(General laughter.)

MR. GRIFFITH. -- which is apparent. I guess they stopped it. Otherwise, I cannot figure out why

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it did not occur.

At the end of the game, the final moves that we made were: to sink an oil tanker coming from Indonesia to China, hoping that it would be considered that the United States did it; to restore the oil to China; and to prevent them from negotiating, because we by then were afraid that they were going to negotiate and we wanted to keep them fighting. This did not work, either, because their strategy, I think, was very much in their own interests and very similar to their strategy in the Sino-Indian conflict.

The third thing that we did, of course, was to suppress all news about the Chiang Kai-shek attack and hope that it would occur.

So that, I would say, on balance, assuming that the Americans stopped fighting and probed the Chinese without fighting, in other words, in a political and a military, rather than just a military, sense, without forcing them back to the 17th parallel but trying to persuade them to go back. I cannot imagine why they (Communist China) should, if they were not forced to.

MR. JOHNSON. We did not do that.

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MR. GRIFFITH. There was no firm indication at the end of the game that the Americans would refuse the Chinese offer of negotiation. This, I think, would be a Chinese victory and a Soviet defeat and an American defeat. The Soviets have relatively few resources in this whole thing, in terms of decisively influencing one or the other, because they are over-all inhibited by their overriding objective of preventing escalation to thermonuclear war, which is the thing that prevents them from doing things which might lead to that.

MR. CRAVEN. Conversely, we could not find anything to force you to come to our aid.

MR. GRIFFITH. Yes. To force us to support you, there was nothing you could do.

MR. CRAVEN. What was your reaction to our getting Castro to fly over Miami? You did not hear about that?

MR. GRIFFITH. No, I did not hear about that.

MR. SKOLNIKOFF. We could not understand it.

MR. WHALEY. Are there any further comments by members of the Soviet team?

(No response.)

MR. WHALEY. Are there any questions from

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members of Control?

(No response.)

MR. SACKS. I am --

MR. WHALEY. Go ahead.

MR. SACKS. I am a little confused as to the ability of the Russian team to take this particular line in view of the limitations that, it seems to me, would hold in a situation where there were formal relations between China and the Soviet Union. There was still some notion of solidarity of the Communist bloc and some concern on the part of the Russians with respect to Indonesia and Japan and all these other areas in the Communist Movement. It seems to me that this is great power politics on the part of the Soviet Union -- vengeance as against any conception of relationship to a Communist bloc and the requirements of the Communist bloc.

I might point out that the only point where they show this is in the communication which they sent us about the situation and in which, in fact, while they rebuke us, they call attention to the need for, at the public level, simulating their concern, but, in effect, saying: "As far as the oil you need, we're giving this to you and go ahead." I mean, it

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does not in any way tell us or communicate to us that they hope that we would cut down on our objectives or that we would in some way consult them about what ought to be done.

MR. GRIFFITH. My answer to that specific point is: We gave you back the oil, which is the message about which you are speaking, because we did not want you to start negotiating with the Americans. We wanted you to continue fighting with the Americans.

As to the more general question that the imperatives of Soviet allegiance to the International Communist Movement would preclude its (the Soviet Union's) following what might otherwise be its own interest as a great power, I would maintain, on the contrary, that they reinforce its interest as a great power because any majority power in an ideological or semireligious movement should consider heretics more dangerous than pagans. This is essential, and the Soviets must take greater risks to expel and excommunicate the heretics, even, if necessary, by turning them over to the pagans -- tender mercies thereof.

The natural instincts of the Soviet Union as as state require that something be done because of

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the geophysical threat of Communist China to its border.

MR. JOHNSON. This is what I find hard to believe -- that the Soviet Union would consider the geopolitical threat of the Chinese to themselves to be of sufficient importance that they would adopt this kind of radical strategy.

MR. SACKS. That is right.

MR. JOHNSON. I mean, under what circumstances of growth of Chinese power and under what kind of threat would this strategy be justified?

MR. GRIFFITH. It cannot be justified or explained, I think, on reasons of raison d'etat alone. It can only be justified from a raison d'etat point of view because of the necessity of expelling the heretics.

MR. WELLS. You have other large problems, I think. Communist China poses the only problem to the Soviet Union since the Soviet Union well recognizes that it will not attack it. History is on its side. But China will attack anyone. History is on that side, too.

We, the Soviet Union, have a long, unguarded frontier. We do not have to worry about the United

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States; we know about that; we have that frontier guarded. But we do not have the frontier guarded against one billion Chinamen.

MR. GRIFFITH. But it is a frontier the legitimacy of which the Chinese have just as totally challenged as they have challenged the legitimacy of the Soviet Union as the vanguard of the International Communist Movement. Our legitimacy as a state and as a Communist Party has been totally rejected by the Chinese. The combination of this double rejection would, I maintain, in the long run require an equally-strong response.

MR. SACKS. I would like to take exception to that. The legitimacy has been challenged to that extent because formal relationships have deterioriated, but there has been no expulsion from the International Communist Movement. The assumption that was made there was that there was pressure on both parties concerned to moderate for the interests of this Movement, and the two protagonists were gotten rid of, that is, Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev, to alleviate tension.

There is no indication anywhere that there were any further five-year-plan periods made by the Chinese

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to pass the Soviet Union. That was the only indication that there was some amelioration of any tension between the two -- at least, in the framework of "Live and let live".

If you say that the Soviet Union, in order to punish China, would be willing to see the DRV disappear, Communist China occupied by American forces in South China, and the ending of a war in which China would be relatively dismembered, in the hope that out of this some Communist Chinese Government would emerge that would be friendly to the Soviet Union, and that after the Soviet Union has behaved this way, after (Communist) China has been sat upon by the United States, and without any consideration at all for the objectively-favorable situation that had been created as a result of what you correctly understood was a limited Chinese move in this area, and for Japan and Indonesia and the rest of these small states that had been bucked up by the Americans to the point where they were beginning to move in another direction, well, I just cannot see that kind of behavior. But if you want to define your rationale in that way, okay.

MR. WHALEY. Thank you. I am glad to see that we have explicitly brought out that certain

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something that comes out in all our games, and that is the mutual misperceptions and confusion and muddling along that does tend to occur. It is always a bit mysterious to me because from the Control viewpoint -- which we will explicitly hear from soon -- this does seem to be something that is present in all our games. My guess, from a limited experience, is that this has something to do with simply your involvement in the various roles while you are here, as well as whatever biases you bring into these roles. But I do find that the communications passed between the teams seem very often to be clear enough to Control but never interpreted in the same way that Control interprets them. Control tends to interpret them in the way that the teams tend to interpret them, but the recipient team does not often seem to share this.

MR. GRIFFITH. May I say specifically that clearly the estimation of the seriousness of the Sino-Soviet dispute now in 1968 between Dean Sacks and myself is very different, but I think that this estimation was shared by most of our people.

MR. CRAVEN. I would say this from my standpoint: I do not think that we quite recognized how bad the situation was as far as the Soviets were

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concerned. It was clear from our standpoint that the Soviets were being 100 per cent nonco-operative, 100 per cent nonco-operative.

MR. WHALEY. From the Chinese viewpoint?

MR. CRAVEN. Yes.

MR. GRIFFITH. Actually, we become much worse.

MR. CRAVEN. We just thought you were 100 per cent nonco-operative.

MR. JOHNSON. As far as the US team was concerned, it seems that we got only two or three rather vague and very general things which indicated the general trend of Dr. Griffith. We kept telling the Japanese that we would only use atomic deterrents against Soviet territory, and we issued a statement which was totally neutral on the subject. We called for all foreign forces to withdraw.

MR. SACKS. In the meantime, the Japanese people were practically revolting against their government.

MR. WELLS. No. That was the leftist, Communist front. This was a Communist front which reacted. The Japanese people were not doing a thing.

MR. GRIFFITH. No.

MR. SACKS. No.

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MR. WHALEY. Excuse me. At this point let's move from the parochial views of individual teams to the omniscient view as perceived by Control. I wonder if Professor Bloomfield would give us the Control viewpoint.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. You said that God will now speak?

MR. WHALEY. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The most interesting thing --

MR. WHALEY. By simulation.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The most interesting thing, as far as I have been able to see, is that Control always comes out of these games with a conviction that God is not really omnipotent after all. I think our next project is going to be to program a computer to play Control. This is Hermann Kahn's little doctrine -- the dialogue with the computer, where the man says to the computer, "Is there a God?" And the computer says, "There is now."

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Well, back to earth. As my colleagues on Control will want to check me on this, let's talk procedurally for a minute. Control had very modest aims in this game. The aims were essentially to

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keep this show on the road, keep the problem on the rails.

To be loyal to our research objectives, which was difficult, we played our hand in a way that would concentrate the maximum pressure on the United States to have to make difficult choices. This was our conscious strategy and, indeed, I think this was the rationale for these matters. We were not trying to improve Chinese policy or the Soviet's ability to perceive the future in any way, but we sure are trying to learn more about the constraints upon American strategic planning and policy planning.

Wherever it came to a branch point or a choice point of any kind, I think we opted for maximizing the troubles of President Johnson and his colleagues.

We tried to pump out the maximum data from the problem as it developed.

Now, there were finite limits to this; and that means, specifically, that Control could have introduced random catastrophes, which is typically done in some other less reputable quarters -- strike that -- other quarters.

(General laughter.)

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. We saw no need, really, to louse this up with assassinations -- for instance, the assassination of King Hussein in Jordan, which happens in every other game. He has been assassinated 83 times now, by my count. We saw no need to add things like that because the way the problem took shape, it had a lot of meat in it.

The only thing was that constant tendency for the edges to become blunt, to fall back to the negotiating table instead of getting out there with the strategic forces. We recognize that we had a real problem, just as the teams did, in trying to be "realistic". Everyone understands that this is not reality. It is a model. If it is a good model, it teaches us something. If it is not, it does not. But it is not necessarily realistic.

The dilemma that Control had in playing its hand was very precise: It was to mediate between two conflicting pressures. One was the pressure of pushing the problem into a more acute phase, on the one hand; and on the other, of not doing anything that would pre-empt the team's own integrity, strategy.

This was very difficult because we had a very

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conscientious military advisor who just would not let us, you know, send six divisions in 24 hours through a cowpath in Southeast Asia, and he held us in check and forced us to stick to fairly-real times in this.

To get any action, we would have had to step the thing up, say, by 30 days or, preferably, 60 days. Yet, to do that, there would have to be a whole consecutive sequential history of actions and counteractions which would have taken place, and it just was not right to do that with our teams, which had a momentum, which had a strategy, and which had objectives. So we were cautious, and that was the way we tried to play it.

So far as the technique that the Control team used was concerned, one way of doing this is to pass the messages, just shuffle them, just be a switching station, just pass the American messages to the Soviets, and the Soviet messages to the Americans. We could not do that because we got too far away from real times.

Therefore, what we had to do was restructure the situation each time, but we tried very hard to make the teams live with the implications of their own chosen strategies. This we tried to do. I am not sure we succeeded. But where you had a contingency plan, we

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accepted that as what you were really going to do and we made you do it, that is, it got done.

Now, substantively and finally, we were really trying to push this problem toward a military confrontation; and yet, we were unwilling to force it towards a military confrontation. If the inclination of the teams was to play a limited strategy to achieve limited objectives and to avoid high-risk policy, then we were not about to force a change in that. We could have done it. We could have had a nuclear accident or all kinds of things.

MR. GRIFFITH. You should have co-operated with us.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Now, the final point is that, even so, I felt throughout that the strategic environment was very much in the foreground of the problem, even though it was not what the law has called, "res gestae". This is not what we were talking about. I mean the unspoken as well as the spoken deterrents of the components of this picture. The strategies would have been difficult. The Soviet Union might have taken over Berlin. There were all sorts of things that might have happened in a

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diversionary way if it were not for the background of strategic deterrents. We played one of these typically-sloppy, in effect, military-political problems.

I must say, Bill, that it was very hard to know what to do with the Soviets, who sat there countenancing the problem, just waiting to pick up. They were the scavengers of the problem.

MR. GRIFFITH. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think that maybe if we had five or six move periods, that we could even have influenced the Soviets to become a little more worried about their own prospects instead of being so euphoric.

Let me stop there, Bart, to see if any of my colleagues on Control want to add to that or deny it or argue with it.

MR. WHALEY. I am not going to call for any questions from the floor to Control at this moment because I feel very protective about Control. Control is often conceived of as the villain in the piece, so I will not call on Professor Bloomfield now to respond to your questions as Control Chairman. I will let him do this after a couple of procedural conditions in his other role as Game Director, if he chooses.

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Actually, at the moment, as time is running on rapidly, I will simply make two announcements and simply pass the Chair and the hot potato to Professor Bloomfield.

The first point is simply about the possibility of your receiving a questionnaire. Normally, we pass out at the end of the meetings a short questionnaire asking you about questions of procedure in the game, questions of substance in terms of the research focus of the game, and so on. We have decided not to depart from that procedure this time and try to think up a more appropriate questionnaire than one that we could have designed a couple of days ago in light of the discussions that have come out and in light of the way the game has been played.

Therefore, sometime within the next fortnight you will receive or very likely receive from us a short questionnaire with a return envelope, and we hope that you will give it your attention. It is not, obviously, obligatory because it was not one of the original conditions of your participation; but in the past we have gotten good response from them and they have been extremely helpful to us in redesigning games for future participants.

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The last point that I would like to mention, in terms of procedure, is that when you leave this evening, to leave your books on the table outside. If you want to have a complete set of materials, simply drop us a note. This will give us a chance to verify the fact that all the documents are present and that any particular errors of substance in the printing that occurred have been corrected, and we will attempt to give this our attention.

At this point (rising) --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Don't get up yet. I am going to keep you in the Chair for a minute. Why don't you just take a couple of more minutes for any comments that might be expressed as to what people think Moves IV, V, VI, VIII, and X might have been in this particular problem, or for any comments on deterrents?

Why don't we just have a few minutes on that to see if there is more on the floor that we ought to get out?

MR. WHALEY. It was my hope that this would come out in terms of the people on the floor pounding away on Control.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That may be.

MR. WHALEY. I was hoping to slide you in here

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gracefully as Game Director out of your otherwise onerous role. Well, this might not be the case.

MR. KUNZIG. How about an attack "from" Control?

MR. WHALEY. Yes, very good.

MR. KUNZIG. I will induce a counterattack.

I have been very impressed with the fact that the Chinese team did not seem to appreciate the seriousness of the US team's purposes and intentions, even though the US team had limited objectives, as did the Chinese team; and I would suggest that this is due to either one or a second possibility.

The first possibility may be the lack of full significance of the military moves taken by the US team. The way I would read them -- and I think this was the US team's intention -- would be that they were very serious, deadly serious. They took maximum moves short of unrestricted aerial and nuclear warfare -- maximum moves within their physical capabilities. Perhaps this was not quite realized. Now, these physical capabilities were not great initially in an area which is 8,000 or 9,000 miles away from the United States. It takes time and we only went up to 30 days after hostilities started. But they were

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pretty strong moves, and I would suggest that when any US Government takes such moves, they show a very serious intention to accomplish its purpose, whether limited or not so limited.

The other possibility may be that what is needed is stronger signaling action on the US side. Because of the sheer distance and the mechanics and the fact that the physical results cannot be very great unless you go to, say, nuclear warfare or even conventional bombing on the Chinese mainland, it is very important to signal this serious intention by -- I don't know what -- some kind of demonstration that has a greater effect on people who are trying to place themselves here in the Communist frame of mind, in the Chinese frame of mind, and who are well acquainted with it and who are trying to react as they think the Chinese would.

MR. WHALEY. Dean Sacks, did you recognize that the US team had done this within the timeframe of the game itself, or did you feel that the US team had pretty much committed itself in terms of conventional arms as far as it could, particularly on the ground, within that time period; and if so or if not, did you also consider what might have been in the pipeline behind this in terms of further US commitment?

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DEAN SACKS. I guess that it is a very difficult question to answer in terms of the presentation which I made earlier. We were playing a game in three stages, not in five, six, seven, or eight.

MR. WHALEY. Right.

MR. SACKS. I think that this bound us considerably. We set our game pattern within that.

The second thing is: I think that we did not discuss some of this. I can give you a personal answer which would be a reply to the question that was raised, and that would run something along the following lines: If history-like experience has any bearing, then it is clear that at several times in the past where the United States apparently were serious about particular issues in the Vietnamese area, it still permitted major strategic losses to the Communist camp. It did so even though it was quite clear that we had invested some $15,000,000. We (the US) let that go without maybe an air strike or without in any way raising the ante. We operated it within the framework of the Vietnamese-French war.

I would like to point out right now that the Geneva Agreement has been violated. The Americans

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have committed themselves to South Vietnam. But the Chinese are allowing escalation to go on as long as they can gain from that kind of escalation and arrive at some kind of political solution. The fighting is not in Hanoi. It is not in North Vietnamese territory. It has taken place in the South. They have escalated the war there. It has paid off. But they know that there is a danger of somebody in the United States pushing for a strike at Hanoi. A lot of people have talked about it. The United States Government has given no indication that it is going to do anything but restrict itself to this kind of operation -- and this may mean 1,000 troops, 2,000 troops, 16,000 troops. From a political point of view, the Chinese and the Russians, incidentally, both have regarded this as a pretty good paying operation. Within that framework, a limited political-military war made perfectly good sense.

Now, if you wanted to give us a signal loud and clear on this, then after we said, "It is a fable that the Chinese have interfered", you should have said, "It is not a fable. We regard this as CPR intervention there. We are going to interdict your lines right from South China. You better call it off."

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At this point, we would have had to face a very serious problem because the war was now going to be on Chinese territory, Chinese circumstances.

The quick move would have been completely taken care of by a new strategic decision on the part of the United States. We calculated your decisions within a very limited framework, and we responded to them within a limited framework. You gave us no indication that you were prepared to go beyond it; and I would seriously, really, ask any specialist, in terms of foreign affairs, international relations, and their understanding of the Communist mind in this kind of operation, given all of the other signals we had -- Indonesia, Japan, Burma, Thailand -- the situation in which all of these countries were responding in terms that were favorable to the Chinese Communists, at the end of a month's period, with an American army fighting a delaying action, and the whole stage set for negotiation, why in Heaven's name should we worry about a couple of air strikes at Hanoi or a couple of air strikes at the interdicting supply lines?

MR. HIGGS. At that stage?

MR. SACKS. Yes.

MR. HIGGS. I would like to take violent

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disagreement with that in terms of the United States, not from the Chinese viewpoint. We did not take a strong stand. Basically, in terms of defense and in raising the ante so that these guys could not accomplish the most limited goal that they would have, we did not. We did not mobilize as fast as we could; we did not deploy as fast as we could; and we did not take any steps --

MR. JANNEY. Oh.

MR. HIGGS. I do not understand why you cannot deploy divisions in the same manner in 1968 as fast as you sent divisions to Germany within four days, three, seven days, instead of 3 days.

MR. JANNEY. That was fantastic. It took six months to send them to Europe in four days.

MR. HIGGS. We will be building up from now to '68. One of the things in the scenario was that your air-target capability was increasing.

MR. CRAVEN. We considered that, but that was not enough.

MR. HIGGS. There was no attempt to raise this ante at all.

MR. SACKS. There is a fundamental American disinclination to fight ground wars in the area. That

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was clear. Do you remember your Geneva Accords? You were back almost at Geneva. The scenario was 2,000. Geneva was 1,000. There was hardly any force there at all, in being, on the ground.

Therefore, the prospect of a quick action with a payoff was very tempting, unless there was some raising of the ante that would make up for whatever gains might be possible.

This was the argument that I would make, and I think that the rest of the Chinese team agrees with this, even though we never really probed each other's mind on this. We thought, so to speak, we would prefer to go. Our calculation was, "I will pass this experience with the Americans."

MR. CRAVEN. Would you dispute how much the Americans could put in --

MR. SACKS. Yes.

MR. CRAVEN. -- in a short period of time?

MR. SACKS. In a short period.

MR. JANNEY. I think we pushed it a little. We did a little more.

MR. KUNZIG. It was stretched.

MR. JANNEY. We had four divisions in there in 15 days, and I do not think we have that capability.

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I am darn sure of it.

MR. KUNZIG. May I say a word, because I suggested that maybe part of the problem here was a lack of understanding of the fact that the United States was making a maximum mechanical effort.

Now, I must digress and talk about the division that went to Europe. We sent an armored division to Europe. That is, we sent a passenger movement of the soldiers of an armored division, carrying their field equipment and their small arms. Their tanks, their trucks, their artillery, anything that took any weight, in other words, all the things that would be difficult to ship, had been sent there in late 1961. They had been positioned there with 1,000 men to keep them in shape and to keep them ready so that these people could step off the plane and go right to them.

MR. HIGGS. Sure.

MR. KUNZIG. There was nothing in this scenario to suggest that this had been done. It had not. If it had been done for one division, fine. You could send one division there not in three days, but maybe four or four and a half days. But if you start flying their tons of ammunition, their trucks, their artillery

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-- you cannot fly their tanks; maybe in '68 we will be able to fly a few of them.

MR. HIGGS. Not many.

MR. KUNZIG. But you cannot today. It just does not pay off. When you start flying all the POL they need, that's something. If you could, as was done in this case, send two divisions to Vietnam in two weeks, 15 days, and another two to the Phillipines coming from the United States, with all their equipment, and I think the intention was to ship another division by sea, perhaps from Hawaii to Guam, well, okay. To do all that in 15 days, even in 1968, I doubt. I do not see any portent in our capability that would enable us to say, "This is an extreme performance." But if you make an extreme performance like that, then you are deadly serious, and that is what I am saying. This was the US intent as I read it. You are doing your maximum effort and you are going to follow; and while you may not have much in two weeks or 30 days, in two months or six months you mean something.

MR. WHALEY. Dr. Johnson.

MR. JOHNSON. It seems to me that this business of the US desire not to fight a ground war in Asia cuts two ways, and that was the way we proceeded and that was

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one of our concerns. We did not want to get committed and bogged down in a war on the ground that we would be committed to indefinitely. Therefore, we were moving, as we perceived it, up this other line at the same time. Also, it seems to me that when we have made this maximum ground commitment and are still unable to hold, that the Chinese might begin to become worried about what would be the next move by way of action, assuming that the United States was not prepared to accept a defeat.

MR. KUNZIG. There was an error, a sizable error, in naval deployment, all the same.

MR. WHALEY. One question, Dr. Johnson.

MR. JOHNSON. Yes.

MR. WHALEY. Did the US team specify its mobilization capabilities beyond what the scenario gave it? In other words, the scenario did give you two or three divisions that you could get in in some amazingly-fast time or in the amazingly-fast time of three days. Beyond that, we did not give you any capability. You really had to generate this. You did give us deployment moves. Did these signal to Control what would be in the pipeline?

MR. JOHNSON. I do not know.

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MR. JANNEY. The mobilizing of the National Guard, everything.

MR. SACKS. Limited mobilization.

MR. WHALEY. I would say that this a point where I missed out.

MR. JANNEY. This is in all our effort.

MR. WHALEY. I should have caught this point and specified to the other teams what you had in the pipeline in terms of further conventional ground forces.

MR. SACKS. There was one discussion that we did have about that, and I would say that it threw us off because you had here an election campaign. If there was this deadly American seriousness, you would assume that the presidential candidates would suspend their differences and give every indication to the Chinese that they were of the same mind. But you had a conventional Goldwater-Johnson dispute in which Goldwater was saying, "We are going to unleash our armed might", and Johnson is talking about negotiations back to the 17th parallel. This is not conducive to the Chinese understanding. Under those circumstances that you have here, the alternative may be this: "If he got elected" and so on. But that is after the scenario is over, so to speak.

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MR. WHALEY. Right.

MR. SACKS. In the meantime, we did not see Johnson -- do you remember the earlier discussion? -- stealing Goldwater's thunder by doing what Goldwater was proposing. We did not see this. Therefore, this is one place in which the signals indicated to us that there was not really a maximum American commitment of everybody involved to put a stop to this.

MR. CRAVEN. We felt that Johnson would press for a nonnuclear strong line, that a nonnuclear strong line before the election could not do anything, and that we would resolve the issue by that time -- and I think we did.

MR. JOHNSON. Would you be scared of a conventional attack?

MR. CRAVEN. At that time, no. In the long range, we would certainly worry. In the long range, you could overcome us without any trouble.

MR. GRIFFITH. Plus the fact that the American team was, if anything, inhibited by fear of some Soviet deterrent, while, in fact, it should have been encouraged.

MR. JANNEY. They lost confidence.

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MR. CRAVEN. As soon as it was a fait accompli, then we wanted to put it in the negotiation stage.

MR. USHER. What struck me as important was the attitude of the Southeast Asia states. The Chinese, after achieving what they considered to be a victory, felt that it was time for them to quit fighting. The Americans were so worried about this that they restrained themselves in terms of their nuclear threats to Communist China. Therefore, Communist China did not get the signal from us. All this was done by the attitude of the Southeast Asia states. This gave them (Communist China) a false idea of their victory, and the Americans were restrained from giving them the signal of the danger that they faced.

MR. WHALEY. I would like to return to a point which Mr. Higgs inadvertently made in passing, and that was when you introduced your last question and spoke immediately about "we Americans". Well, all day I have assumed that you have been on the Control team. This is actually a somewhat exceptional experience for me. It really startled me because I recall that at one game we had a participant who, as much as two weeks after the game, would come to me and speak about

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"we"; and when he said, "we", he meant, "we Russians".

(General laughter.)

MR. WHALEY. So I think at that point I had better really pass the Chair back to a reluctant Control Chairman and Game Director.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Thanks, Bart.

The time is getting along. Let's just take about three minutes to close these proceedings. The panic button has just been hit.

John (Craven), let me just single you out, just at random -- but not really -- to ask you a question. Do you have any comments that you would like to make from your observations of this exercise other than those that you have made?

MR. CRAVEN. I think from the navy standpoint, I am sorry that we did not go to Moves IV, V, VI, and VII. I really think that this game from the national standpoint had certainly a lot of value. Certainly, I learned an awful lot from it, and I think other people did, also.

I really do feel that from the game standpoint we probably did behave not too distantly from the way the nations might plausibly behave. I do feel that Control could have exerted a little more in a one-way

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game. Control is going to have to take the initiative to push the scenarios along. You did a very good job in allowing the scenarios to move as they did; but in so doing, you prevented us from facing some of the more critical decisions that we would have had to face. As you moved the scenario along, there was a little further protection in it than actually occurred.

I would like to see you go on with these games. I think that if you increase the number of sessions, if only to exhaust the people, if only to put them in an exhausted state, that it would be valuable.

I notice that already our chairman, towards the end of the meeting, was neglecting more and more of our advice, although he took it very well, and was writing almost continuously. I felt that this was indicative of crisis behavior. Had we gone one more session, I think that he would have been writing with both hands.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Thank you.

Mr. Higgs?

MR. HIGGS. The thing that struck me was the fact that China was playing a three-move game. Was the United States?

MR. CRAVEN. No.

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MR. JOHNSON. The thing that really threw us off and prevented us from mounting a deterrent action more quickly was the fact that we assumed that in the second move we would be in a condition where the political situation would be favorable. We did not want to commit ourselves to the DRVN's action in going across the 17th parallel. We were only prepared to defend on this side of the parallel. It was only at that point that we were prepared to seriously defend South Vietnam against China, other than warnings. The delay in reaching that stage affected our thinking that it would be escalated.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. While you have the floor, Bob, I would like to ask you this question: From a policy standpoint, do you have any words of wisdom about this --

MR. JOHNSON. No.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. -- that you want to say?

MR. JOHNSON. No.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think that we will close down. I would like to say that I think from our standpoint we overfulfilled our quota both in a negative and positive sense. We learned quite a lot about one-day games. I learned something about

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deterrence in Southeast Asia. I learned more about the politicization of war by the Communists, and the different ways that the Western mind, playing the Eastern mind, looks at war. I think it was a highly-professional, skillful performance by all those present.

You know, it is always a wonder. You can always get high-school students -- if you want thermonuclear war to break out in a game, you just get some high-school students in and you get a thermonuclear war. But with responsible people you get ambiguous, gray, shadowy situations where you do not look at your weapons as closely as you want to. That may be the fault of Control.

On behalf of MIT, I want to thank you all and I would like to thank the staff -- particularly Jim Dorsey, Ken (Gorton), the girls, and the message center for helping us out; and, particularly, to thank all of you for joining us in this experiment.

These proceedings are closed.

(Ended at 9:55 p.m.)

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