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Vol.

pp.

MC 326

PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION

FOR

POLEX-DAIS II

POLITICAL EXERCISE
POLEX DAIS II

January 4, 1963.

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PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION

FOR

POLEX-DAIS II

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, Presiding

HAROLD R. AARON
WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH
GEORGE B. HIGH
FRED C. IKLE
WILLIAM C. KINSEY
ERNEST W. LEFEVER
JOHN A. MARCUM
WILLIAM H. MEANIX, Jr.
MAX F. MILLIKAN
MICHAEL NEWLIN
MELVIN J. NIELSEN
THOMAS OKUMA
WESLEY POSVAR
JOHN S. SALOMA III
DAVID SCHWARTZ
ERIC STEVENSON
HERBERT F. WEISS
BARTON WHALEY
CARROLL L. WILSON
ROBERT C. WOOD
MARVIN ZONIS

Endicott House
4 January 1963

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(3:15 p.m., Friday, January 4, 1962.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The first thing I would like to say is that I do not propose to take very much part in this discussion except to moderate it and I propose to limit my own comments and observations. I am much more interested in yourselves. But the one thing I do want to say is that I was most impressed with the highly-professional performance of all of the teams here. I just cannot praise too highly the serious professional execution of this operation on the part of the teams. My own research objectives have been met or exceeded. Whatever else is said or whatever detailed criticisms I may have or others may have regarding strategies and techniques, I am extremely pleased myself with what has happened here in three days.

Now, at this point the last time around I remember saying that: typically, teams come out of this operation with feelings toward Control ranging from mild annoyance to outrage and that this was in a sense a form of psychotherapy in which we were about to engage, and someone accused me of spoiling all their fun by understanding them. I withdraw all of those comments. Now that the secrets are all revealed, why don't we ask the chairman of each team, in sequence, to take 15 or 16 minutes each for appreciation of what happened as he saw it.

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Carroll, why don't you start first on behalf of the US side?

MR. WILSON. Well, I think you have all seen all of the papers. It probably is not necessary to review the various steps of the chain. I would like first to review how it appeared as we went through it; secondly, to see what the secret cables which we had just looked at revealed in the way of either confirming or changing the assumptions we were going on; and thirdly, perhaps, to make a few observations as to the rationale behind our strategy.

As to the first, we had a brief strategic plan in response to the crises and the questions and the immediate situation confronting us, which was a call by the Secretary General of a meeting of the Security Council. At that time we defined our basic strategic plan. I would just like to run through briefly the points in it.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Good.

MR. WILSON. The first objective was to settle the crisis, localize military operations, and avoid escalation.

(General laughter.)

MR. WILSON. Any such operation like this is disorderly. I would say, in terms of Angola, that this harassment was largely localized to the South-West Africa frontier. This is such a vast no man's land of desert. This is a kind of spillover, but it lies within the US control

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of support to draw back enough so that it should be largely contained within Angola.

2. Exert pressures to form a national government, that is, an independent Angola with a viable power structure. Well, due to the machinations of the Soviet agents, it was a little hard to keep Roberto in the picture.

(General laughter.)

MR. WILSON. Some of the troops had gotten out of hand, but at least at the end of the game Roberto was still breathing. In terms of the opportunity to develop some kind of a national government, there were a good many elements which could be used. The place obviously was going to need economic assistance. The US presence, in terms of support, ought to provide at least a fair opportunity to see that that kind of a government can develop -- at least, if you can compare that opportunity with others with which we might be confronted.

3. Achieve a coalition government with a Western orientation. That is doubtful. It's going to be localist-Socialist-African.

4. Protect white African minority in Angola -- that is, avoid direct black-white race war -- both to serve as precedents for long-term solution to the racial problems of South Africa and to avert domestic criticism of a

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pro-black policy. Well, I expect that a good many of the whites left the place. As compared with an operation conducted in the absence of UN presence, I think perhaps the whites got out all right. In any case, this is a limited achievement.

5. Prevent establishment of Soviet influence and prevent the subversion of nationalist movements. Well, they are doing their damnedest. The ground is ripe. The whole condition of fluidity favors the kind of technique which the Soviets use. We seem to be singularly unsuccessful in using our arm of government for such purposes to any good effect. This will be a constant problem. But as compared with the situation that would exist had we not taken the major step of supporting the UN operation, I think one can say that perhaps we achieved what could be done.

6. Prevent use of Angolan war by pan-Africans to fan a race war in South Africa. Well, the very geography of the place, with African troops panting to get at the border at the South Africans, and with the intervention of the South Africans during the early part of the game, makes it a very sensitive, uncomfortable situation, pregnant with opportunities for trouble. Well, in terms of what we did, it seemed to us that our movements in the Security Council and in the General Assembly at least won us a very

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substantial vote of 93 in favor of the resolution which we were favoring and I think a defeat for the Soviet Union. We may have been a little misled by the nature of the real support this implied from the nations which voted with us. Secondly, our wholehearted support of the UN operation was essential to its success, even the drastic move we took of wiping out the Luanda air force. The moves we took in terms of our forces in the South Atlantic were timely. Generally, our action in support of this permitted us to fulfill our obligations in the UN. Presumably, we would find ourselves allied with the black Africans.

Well, these are various aspects of what we think we did achieve by our policies. I am leaving out a lot of problems. Some of these problems must be solved through the UN Command. But these problems may be no worse than those which might be found if another route had been taken.

On the broader question of the other parts of the world where the Soviet Union brought pressure to bear, their action in bottling up the Indian troops was a real handicap because of the quality of the Indian troops we would have had. Their cranking up of the Berlin situation heightened tensions and also made us more conscious of the multiple commitments around the world that we had.

On the eastern side of the continent, the unilateral

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action of the Soviets in moving this force, I suppose, from Dar-es-Salaam down to Mozambique took us by surprise. I think that it is fair to say that we did not have our attention concentrated on that side of the continent. Yet, one could predict that this was a situation that offered opportunity. Somehow we apparently were not watching those Soviet forces in the South Atlantic. We did not ask for "intelligence"; we did not get any. We were surprised by this.

I think that the second move, the move in which the South Africans had mobilized and moved in and taken the place over, gave us sort of a feeling of relief. This probably indicates what our future problems are in terms of relationships, but it seemed to us that we were then confronted with this UN resolution on a UN presence in Mozambique. It seemed to us that in view of the nature of the national government there being clearly apparently a heavily-committed Soviet-supported and Soviet-influenced regime, that we found ourselves in the strange position of supporting this regime.

Furthermore, in view of the movement into Mozambique, we certainly did not fancy mounting an assault operation against determined South African forces and getting into Mozambique.

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It was for these and other reasons that we told the Secretary General that we had reservations about this and that it was our decision to line up as much support as we could to favor a resolution with which we could live. We felt that the Soviet Union, as was indicated by later cables, would find it very difficult to render much logistic support to any major commitment in that area. That is why we threatened to make it more difficult for them to do this.

Well, without drawing any conclusions, I might say that one general comment which I can make is that first we were pretty much precipitated at the beginning in climbing aboard this thing. I suppose the very impedance of a real system would have made the making of decisions much slower than was possible in our group of five.

The second thing which this revealed was the deep problem of the US vis-a-vis South Africa. Although, frankly, we did not resolve this, yet it was at the center of so many things that came up.

We postulated this, for example: Suppose there was a "nationalist" government in South-West Africa which appealed to the UN for the UN to come in. Is this substantially different from what existed in Angola? Yes, to the extent that Angola was a newly-independent nation without a visibly-legitimate government. But at some point --

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and it is very close down the road -- we are likely to ask ourselves: "Are we for going in and liberating the black Africans in South Africa?" It is our feeling that we are not. We could not be. Yet, we did not feel that we had formulated a strategy or a policy or a modus operandi to meet that situation.

I think I will stop there and ask my colleagues to add a few comments if they care to.

MR. MILLIKAN. Can I ask one question?

MR. WILSON. Yes.

MR. MILLIKAN. Were there any moves from Nature or Control that impressed you as highly improbable or unrealistic?

MR. WILSON. Just mean.

(General laughter.)

MR. LEFEVER. Illustrate.

MR. WILSON. Oh, when our astronauts got shot down in the Pacific, for instance. I think we can say for our team that we did not feel that any of the Control inputs were improbable. They were difficult but that is what we were intended to be there for.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. There are some days when you just can't make a nickel, Carroll, is that it?

MR. WILSON. Yes.

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MR. IKLE. I felt improbable the dead action of the South African government to the long negotiations of Johnson. Maybe it was not spelled out clearly what you had in mind regarding Johnson's angling for a defense agreement with South Africa, possibly in return for South African disengagement in Angola. Maybe you should have made clearer the amount of pressure and urging and so forth which he brought with him when he came to South Africa.

MR. WILSON. No counterproposals came back?

MR. IKLE. No, like nyet.

MR. WOOD. There was violence and intransigency. The Johnson figure, we felt, was an ambivalent figure to the public which may be sympathetic to South Africa. We feel that this might have elicited more response.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let me just say this about that: There will be plenty of opportunity to challenge each team, including Control, on specific imperfections in their own performance.

Now, at this point I would like to say that even though the newspaper strike, lamentably, ran for another two years, we did hear rumors of some differences of opinion within the US camp. Is this something that would illuminate further what Carroll said in indicating how you all thought you did?

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MR. WILSON. I don't know. Maybe I misinterpreted the reaction of my colleagues, but I thought that we reached a position without great difficulty, considering the time deadlines we were against. I don't know. (To US team colleagues) Did we have any deep cleavages?

MR. SALOMA. South African policy?

MR. WILSON. It was sort of in a vacuum.

MR. WOOD. Long range.

MR. WILSON. Bill?

MR. MEANIX. Not in respect to South Africa.

MR. WILSON. We had trouble this morning.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The democratic process was at work.

MR. MILLIKAN. We tried hard to give you trouble this morning.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Should we then ask the Soviet team how they thought they did -- as though we don't know -- and how they would sum up from their standpoint the crucial configurations of this piece of history that we have just gone through.

Bill?

MR. GRIFFITH. I would say that we did better than I anticipated and that Carroll has just stated the crux of why we did better. The US had a very deep problem concerning its policy in respect to participation in a

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struggle for the liberation of South Africa. This struggle inevitably affects US participation in the various preludes of the struggle. Our policy from the very beginning was based on the anticipation that exactly this would happen. We intended to try to keep things going and spreading and not being settled or stabilized by UN force until the South Africa question itself was increasingly posed. The involvement of the African states, the UN, and the US in armed conflict with South Africa would be of a prolonged nature. Adding to this would be the clear unwillingness of the US to make maximum commitments. Our great hypothesis was that this would be the US reaction. The African government would become radicalized and would become convinced that only the Soviet Union could guarantee their victory and that the alternative would be their defeat by the South Africans and therefore they must allow the Soviet Union to help them.

This was, I think, from the very beginning, the strategy of the Soviet government. I think it showed that if it did not work immediately in the first place, that it was working more in the second place. I think it also showed that the change in American attitude toward South Africa and toward the UN and toward involvement in the UN exactly paralleled our increased involvement in the UN.

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So that the final result, I would say, was that we had achieved a government favorable to us in Angola, arising in South Africa.

MR. NEWLIN. You had not achieved it. Elections had not taken place.

MR. GRIFFITH. There would not have been any.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. We will have a chance to discuss Move VII.

MR. GRIFFITH. The question of elections never entered our calculations. The UN was not able to stabilize Angola. We were pushing the Ghanaians to go over the border into South Africa. In other words, the Angola-South Africa border had not been closed. The key purpose in our going into the UN force was to assure the security of our base in Northern Mozambique. We calculated that the Africans would not like this but that the alternative would be no UN force against South Africa because the US would not join it or would not effectively join it. So we would join it because nobody else would join it or pay for it or make it work.

In effect, what we achieved initially was relatively little. We did not prevent the UN force. We did get a largely African contingent in, particularly by knocking out the Indians. Then we got a favorable government in Angola. We got a base in Northern Mozambique. We got the

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US increasingly dissatisfied with the UN. We got a majority in the UN, consisting of African-Asian states and the Soviet Union. We got the US deliberately cutting its position in the UN and its supply of planes, after the same kind of sabotage which we were in effect playing up to them. We discredited the position of the Secretary General because it attempted to intervene against the African forces, including the forces in Nigeria, which is one of the African states most likely to support an African position and support Ghana.

Therefore, we would have encouraged UN intervention as long as and until it had happened, and then we would have used this as a means to prove to the Africans that they would be destroyed by the UN before they would be destroyed by the South Africans. That is the general view that I had.

MR. WOOD. I would accept all that if you would add that you were "at the point of securing this", because in Angola and also in our last task force movement in Mozambique there existed countermoves at this time which might have affected this.

MR. GRIFFITH. By the Americans?

MR. WOOD. Yes.

MR. GRIFFITH. That is why we decided to call off the Berlin blockade and resume the disarmament talks and everything else. We figured that by getting in the UN force

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there, and calling off these other things, we would effectively preclude a US unilateral movement against Mozambique or Angola. Although the US would not have withdrawn from the UN force, the majority in the UN would change so that the Secretary General would be directed to stop intervening against the black Africans and to intervene against the South Africans.

MR. IKLE. We would have tried to prevent any force against Mozambique.

MR. GRIFFITH. There would be a majority in the General Assembly.

MR. IKLE. Question mark.

MR. GRIFFITH. I leave this to Control.

I might conclude by answering very briefly some of the questions which I suppose one might direct to our strategy. In the first place, why didn't we join the UN force before? The answer is that we would not have had enough influence and we had no control base from which to operate. We had no guarantee that it would become involved directly with South Africa, which was the key thing we wanted.

As to the question of why we would never go into Stage II of disarmament, it would have impeded our economic capability of assisting in wars of liberation, especially

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with conventional arms delivery.

As to why we did join the UN force in the final stage, we had much more reason to do so because we were convinced that we would be in the majority, that the US would be in the minority, that it would become involved in South Africa, and that we would be able to secure Northern Mozambique. Also, I felt that this would lower the danger of war or of US unilateral interventiin. Since the UN would attack the African troops, especially the Algerians and the Nigerians, our two great opponents previously in the African bloc, this would automatically throw them on our side. We would be able to control the Indians by letting up on the Chinese pressure. Then they would at least not lead the Afro-Asian bloc, and we would be able to prevent the US force from attacking Mozambique and we would get them to recognize the Republic of Mozambique. The US would be, on a major confrontation, in the minority; and in the process of going into this minority, the US would more and more identify itself with the South Africans in the eyes of black Africans, thereby cementing the black African alliance with us.

Now, as to the UN generally, we would probably be able to discredit it, if not change it. We would be able to curtail the powers of the Secretary General to act

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independently because of his being disavowed by the new majority which would be produced. This would weaken the influence of the US and the UN in Africa, but it would strengthen the influence of Africans and ourselves.

Our naval force was never intended to act as a naval force would. It was merely a gesture to the effect that we might resume thermonuclear tests.

As to why we kept saying that the UN resolution was illegal, the answer is that we thereby got the UN to vote a resolution against South Africa and could then maintain that this really was our objective all along. Since they already voted a motion against South Africa, the refusal of the US to agree to the resolution, as opposed to our suddenly agreeing with the UN resolution, again puts us on the side of the UN resolution, puts the Secretary General in the position of violating the UN resolution, and puts the US in the position of refusing to support it -- all at a time, of course, when we would be involved with South Africa.

As to the Stalinist tendencies in Harriman's cable, it was no more Stalinistic than in the first few days of the Cuban crisis. In spite of the definite change in ideology, the repetition of the position of peaceful coexistence would be an indicator, of course, that one

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could change, and I think we were perfectly capable of this.

Comparing this with the Congo, I would say that Angola is much more directly involved in and with South Africa, which I would regard as the key Soviet opportunity in Africa. There are other Soviet opportunities in Latin America.

As to my complaints about Control, I think that their estimate of the effectiveness of American ability to intercept our messages is an "unestimate", as compared to their estimate that we could not intercept any American messages.

MR. MILLIKAN. Conceded.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think Control considered that there might have been some plausible technological surprises by 1965.

MR. GRIFFITH. The whole thing again shows up, I think, much more clearly than I ever understood it before, the fact that American policy in respect to this kind of crisis is in a terrible bind in terms of national interests, Western pressure, Western European pressure, and everything else; and the Soviet Union has an opportunity which goes so far as to be able to defect Nigeria, for example.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Do any of your colleagues want to add anything to what you said as to how they think the

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Soviet team did in the game?

MR. GRIFFITH. I should add one more thing about Control. I think they greatly underestimate the possibilities of assassination.

John or Mel, do you want to say anything?

MR. MARCUM. No.

MR. NIELSEN. I want to make clear that we regarded a major military confrontation with the US as a hazard which we definitely wanted to avoid. We were prepared to hold back, for example, in Berlin very quickly if we thought that this was possibly leading to that.

MR. GRIFFITH. I would add that this is an example of the Soviet Union's willingness to join a UN force and thereby, in effect, deter the US from unilateral action of almost any kind that might be involved in this kind of crisis.

MR. WOOD. I don't know whether I am right, Carroll, or not, but I would say that there really was no strong feeling of being deterred this morning. On the other hand, the feeling was that we could "mucky up" the UN. But we were quite prepared to make --

MR. GRIFFITH. This is before you knew we were going to join the force.

MR. WOOD. No. This was after.

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MR. GRIFFITH. And you would then postulate that the US would act unilaterally in relation to Mozambique or Angola?

MR. MILLIKAN. I am puzzled by this. The Soviet message that they were prepared to join the force wasn't until the end.

MR. WOOD. No. There was a visit by the Deputy Secretary of the UN.

MR. WILSON. He came in to see us.

MR. GRIFFITH. Us, too.

MR. WOOD. When he presented this, we also suspected the Roberto business.

MR. MARCUM. One more thing: you placed a great deal more emphasis on the Americans -- and rightly so -- upon working inside nationalist movements through people coming back in.

MR. GRIFFITH. Through a UN military contingent.

MR. MARCUM. Right. We were prepared to win one way or the other.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Anything more from your group?

MR. GRIFFITH. No.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I was going to say that, to get the full story on the table, we could move on to the UN group and then particular questions can be directed to the several

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groups.

MR. KINSEY. I was going to say that perhaps you (the Soviet Union) might have attempted to overemphasize the facility with which you could control the vote.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Why don't we come back to the questions of different strategies and have the UN group lay out on the table its perception of the world in the course of all of this and the crucial turning points and how you think the UN came out.

Mike?

MR. NEWLIN. Well, looked at in retrospect, I do not know that the US would have proceeded differently, given our basic commitment to the purposes and principles of the charter and our necessity to maintain the UN as an effective peacekeeping operation. It was fundamentally this role that we saw, plus the necessity of the Secretary General's maintaining the integrity of his office and also making sure that in a colonial question of this type he had first and foremost the pretty solid backing of the Afro-Asian majority. These were the things that he had to keep in mind. Subsidiary to that was the need not to do anything that would be regarded as inimicable to the basic security interests of either East or West, thereby imperiling the disarmament talks or leading to unilateral action which could trigger

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East-West military confrontations. It was because of our desire to facilitate a peaceful settlement that we did what many people might have considered naive in initially trying to get a negotiated settlement between Luanda and the Cabinda regime. This did not work out. We then tried to put together a UN force that would not -- while it would have quite a few Africans in it -- be completely African. Control hampered us in this. The thing that we could not accept was the African desire to completely dominate the entire show, that is, to designate who the commander would be, and, in effect, use the Secretary General. It was on this issue that we finally had to come to a parting of the ways with the head of the Afro-Asian group, with the Secretary General insisting on his own force commander out there.

The moves by Control to knock out the airfield et cetera set us back. We were alarmed when we heard -- fortunately it was an unfounded rumor -- that Control was going to deny us the use of the airfields in neighboring countries with which to continue our campaign. This turned out not to be the case.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. There must be a Supercontrol group.

MR. NEWLIN. It was one of those unfounded corridor rumors which turned out to be not well based in fact. In

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general, the UN felt that things in Angola came out about as well as could be expected. We would anticipate that the UN would be there for quite a while, would assist in reconstruction and development, and would eventually have some sort of a plebiscite with or without Roberto, certainly with the UPA and the MPLA campaigning. Then after the African government was established, we would phase out, provided that there was no great difficulty in South-West Africa.

After this, there was, of course, the situation in Mozambique. Because the camera speeded up so rapidly during the last hour, there was not enough time to fully consult and explain what we had in mind to either the US or the Soviet Union. In retrospect, now that all the documents are on the t able, I feel that the goals of the UN and the Secretary General were perhaps much more parallel to the goals of the UN than it appeared to the US at the time. We did not wish to be a party to or see the establishment of a Soviet satellite on the African continent. We would regard this as being a reversal which the US could very ill accept. Therefore, one of our objectives in getting the UN involved in this situation was to see that this did not occur. The African states, the Secretary General feels, would have gladly gone in on a UN operation in which they

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would more or less nominate to take over Mozambique. The Secretary General was prepared to put together a large African force and move it in. Under those circumstances, he felt that the South Africans would be compelled to withdraw to their own territory. You must remember that here you had a situation of not just South Africa carrying out internal policy in South Africa or South-West Africa, their mandated territory, but actually crossing an international frontier. The Secretary General had in mind for Mozambique a similar operation as in the Angola case. The US and the USSR were to be asked to supply logistic support only. If either of these refused, then the other was not to be taken up. So I am afraid that the Soviet plans to take over this operation would have been ditched at the outset. We would have turned to other UN members, building always on a solid consensus within the Afro-Asian group. There were other UN members, we feel, that would have supplied the logistic ability to get their African force in there in the interest of maintaining peace in this particular area.

Control felt -- and perhaps rightly so -- that the world did not change very much between 1962 and 1965. A problem which we foresaw was the problem of the initial entry of UN forces into foreign territories. The UN has

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never gone into a country without being invited by some group representing a legitimate government, either the head of the government or the head of the state. In the case of Angola, you did not have two recognized states. You had two regimes with minimal support. Neither was a UN member. It turned out that the one with the most support in the backing of the Africans was willing to admit the UN and we were able to go in. But I do feel that if that were not the case, that by 1965 the world community, in an analogous situation, might make a decision to go in there without being invited.

In the case of Mozambique, we sought to get around that by being invited in, or, if necessary, to get the Africans to apply pressure to get us in there.

In retrospect, if the US and the USSR, either for reasons of internal policy or for doctrinaire reasons, could not support what the UN wanted to do, I feel that we could have still got the solid backing of the Africans here since we were prepared, in essence, to turn the operation largely over to the Africans in Mozambique, always undertaking to make sure that they did not go on into South Africa, or the Secretary General would have done what he could to make sure that the conflict was localized there. I do not know whether or not Eric Stevenson and Harold Aaron have anything

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to add to that. Perhaps more so than either the US or the Soviet Union we gave considerable weight to keeping down East-West tension and to doing everything possible to enable us to go on to Stage II of the disarmament agreement.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Hal or Eric, did you want to add to that at this point?

MR. STEVENSON. No.

MR. GRIFFITH. May I make one comment?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. GRIFFITH. This would all fit in, I think, fairly well with our plans except that we assumed that we would be able to get the Africans and at the very minimum the Gwombe (phonetic) government not to go into Northern Mozambique, and the UN would try to enter Southern Mozambique and would be initially clobbered by the South Africans because the US would presumably, from their own statement, not provide him with planes and therefore you (the UN) would not take ours.

MR. NEWLIN. The intelligence we had from Control was that he was not a Communist. He was first and foremost an African nationalist. That being the case, I think that his self-interest would lie in the direction of throwing in his lot with the other African states into a neutral international force, rather than in the direction of making

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himself the tool of International Communism.

MR. GRIFFITH. In question here, I think, is the estimate of the South Africans.

MR. WOOD. He has the estimate of the South Africans.

MR. GRIFFITH. That is why you wanted to go in.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's return to these matters of substance. Gentlemen, let there be order in the house. No animation in the hall, please. No stormy applause.

Just to round out the presentation, Max, on behalf of Control, could you lay out the celestial view of this problem?

MR. MILLIKAN. I will keep this very brief because I think most of this would come out better in the subsequent discussion, but I would like to make a few remarks.

First, let me indicate how Control or at least how I as Chairman of Control -- this is not a co-ordinated picture; my pals may not agree with this -- saw what it was that we were supposed to do. There were a number of restraints on what we could or should or wanted to introduce into the situation. The first restraint was that it seemed to me that we always ought to act in such a way that our actions would be reasonably plausible to people reasonably acquainted with the scene. That is, they should not be

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grossly unrealistic and that insofar as possible they should be the kinds of actions that ex post facto might reasonably have been expected to grow out of this sort of a situation. Unless it was absolutely necessary, we did not want to introduce gods outside the works or to introduce adventitious events that really did not seem to have connection with the game. We were constantly aware of the fact that this might be required to achieve some of our objectives; but it would be my hunch -- just to be smug about this -- that in this game we did not introduce any such events. I would be very much interested if anybody else felt that we did. This leaves you with a lot of latitude because, as we are aware, a lot of different things can happen in Nature.

Which kind of things did we want to happen? Well, my feeling was that we ought, as a second point, to minimize events that were not strictly relevant to the local situation in which all the participants were engaged. There might be in the real world all kinds of things happening around the periphery which would have complicated the problem in part for the participants, but we felt that this was a game which was limited in time and attention, that it was hard to get through a move as it was, and that as long as the situation with which we were locally confronted still seemed complicated enough, we ought to

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minimize the complications on the outside. This is why we did not pick up some problems that particularly the Russians gave us. We did not do much with the Berlin situation. We did not do much with other situations because we felt that we wanted to keep the attention concentrated for the time being. This was unrealistic in some ways, if you like.

A third objective which we had constantly in front of us was to try to throw hookers into all the teams as far as we could. Certainly part of the purpose of gaming is to have the unexpected confront people in the course of this sequence. Therefore, we quite cautiously tried to do this occasionally, whenever it looked as though one of the teams were doing pretty well and as though their strategy were really likely to prevail. We wanted to go on. We wanted the game to go on for six moves and to continue to be rather interesting for six moves. In reality, it might very well have stopped at earlier points. I think this is particularly true of Move VI, the last move. We really handed a great bouquet to the Soviet Union in Move VI. I think it was a wholly-plausible bouquet, a reasonably-plausible bouquet. I think that I should say here that it should be recognized that things of this kind could very well have happened. We designed

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them in order to embarrass the US because the US had seemed to be getting fairly far along with its game.

Now, one other requirement was to keep the situation unfolding rapidly without pre-empting the roles of the teams themselves. For this reason, we moved by fairly-small bites until the last bite; and there, because it was a final bite, we thought we wanted to get far enough ahead. Also, we felt we knew enough about the strategies of the American and Soviet teams so that we could risk a passage of time in assigning some intervening action to them without violating their strategies. Whether we succeeded in this, I do not know. But for most of the rest of the game, up to Move VI, we did this. It was probably unrealistic in the sense that there probably would have been longer delays in these things, but we did not want to provide delays that were too long because then a lot of other things would have happened which would have taken additional time for members of Control to write up, and we did not have that many members to whom to assign papers.

Now, as to some of the strategic issues, we, in part, were -- I did not realize this until the game was almost over -- playing a game ourselves with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was -- possibly consciously, possibly not -- playing a game with us.

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One of the interesting questions in gaming technique is whether it is reasonable and acceptable procedure for a playing team, understanding the kind of restraints that are imposed on the Control team, to play a game against the Control team. Our early reactions were -- mine, at least, personally -- that one of the key issues, in the first instance, was whether the Russians were going to participate, of course, in this UN exercise or not. Our early reactions were ones of some surprise that their position was as extreme and violent against this as it was. In particular, it reflected, it seems to me, what was perhaps a perfectly-realistic failure on the part of the Soviet team fully to recognize the domestic forces in the US.

The fact that the Soviet Union was being aggressive and was aggressively not playing with the UN, it seemed to us, made it an awful lot easier for the US to take a very dominant role in this UN exercise and to push the exercise forward rapidly and, therefore, to obtain more African support for the exercise than it would have obtained if the Soviets had been involved in the game in the first place.

However, if the Soviets were playing a game against Control, they might very well have seen that their best gambit was to give the US a lot of successes so that Control would really be forced to embarrass the US at a later stage,

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which is what we were forced to do by making the South Africans really very adamant and unreasonable. We might not have had to do this. I think this was perfectly plausible. I think the South Africans did not behave, as we made them behave, in a way that was quite unreasonable in nature, given all the other events that were going on. They could have been more responsive to Lyndon Johnson. They could at least have tried to taper this off a bit. But by this time, we, in Control, saw one of our key opportunities to embarrass the US for which, otherwise, things seemed to be going well. We felt that the US was not taking seriously at all the collapse of the disarmament negotiations or the Soviet hard shift. We thought that they did not seem to be taking this very seriously. This, as I looked at it, was perhaps quite reasonable strategy on the part of the US because, as the US Chairman explained to us, they looked upon this as a propaganda move by the Soviets without any real assets to back it up. Therefore, we saw our primary option for creating some problems here. We decided to stiffen up South African resistance, and we did this by a series of moves. One was the bombing of the airfield. We thought this, in any case, was a reasonable thing for the Luanda regime to do. But the South African participation in this did create problems for the US, in addition to stalling

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the thing.

Finally, one point about the palm we handed to the Soviets in Move VI was that the Angola situation did appear to be getting quite stabilized. So we did a series of things in Move VI to destabilize this. In the first place, we radicalized the African governments. I now feel that both the Soviet and the American teams took these messages probably more seriously than they would have if they had been completely objective. But the image on which both Soviet and American strategy was built and which we tried to create in part in order to make trouble for these people, was that the Africans really fell into two very clear camps. Some African groups which we let take over in Move VI were really quite reliably Soviet, and some other African groups -- Roberto et als -- were really quite reliably American. The way we saw this in Control was that we were supplying some kind of CIA and Soviet intelligence messages. These messages, carrying this implication, would go back to their headquarters. We did not ourselves feel -- I think my African experts will correct me if I am wrong about this -- that this situation was anything as simple as black and white. We did want to frighten the US into feeling that they had backed something which might perhaps slip out of their reach or slip out of

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their grasp. We did have a feeling that the Move VI operations were a little too confident of the firm alignment of the participating African states.

I do not think that there is anything else that I want to say on the effectiveness of sabotage and the assassination, Bill. Our feeling on that was that it was reasonable for it to go in any direction and that Soviet control was not all that good. One reason why we did not act more sharply on the assassination moves was the feeling which I at least got from the African experts on the Control team that assassinations would not make all that amount of difference and that the Soviet team was somewhat exaggerating what they could get out of this. Therefore, there was no point in carrying this too far.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Thanks, Max. I sense extrasensorially some tensions and crosscurrents under the surface here that we really ought to release. I am just waiting for a signal from Bart. There is coffee out there (in the hall). The question is whether we ought to take 30 seconds to go out, get cups of coffee if we want them, and bring them back. That might be a good idea. But I mean literally just to get the coffee and bring it back. All right. Let's do that.

(Coffee break.)

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Some very valuable things are being said on both sides. I think we ought to share them because these are the things that in many ways are the real payoff of this exercise. In fact, there are some who feel that the critique session is what the game is for. In other words, you can't critique the problem without having experienced it, but that in many ways the value lies here. I am going to open the floor to completely-free discussion with one injunction: although all of the members of the Control group are welcome to join in this discussion, they will have ample opportunity to do so later. Our feeling is that inasmuch as Control had more information and had been in on the whole story, that it might be of particular value to continue for a while to let the members of the several teams bring out those things which are bothering them and to let them pose questions to other teams as to what they meant. For instance, one question might be whether they had communicated successfully their intentions to one another. I do not think it is clear yet how well each side understood the other's strategies. The members of the Control group, of course, are free to take such part in this as they consider appropriate. The floor is now wide open.

Eric?

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MR. STEVENSON. I just wanted to criticize the Control group for not bringing interesting dilemmas soon enough into the game. It seems to me that the Mozambique situation was much the most interesting, but that did not develop until today. We really had no time to spell that out. I want to illustrate just a couple of things.

If, for instance, the Luanda government had been less racist or if it had been willing to negotiate, the US would have been in a very difficult position, particularly under pressure from Congress. It would have been in a dilemma and would not have known whether or not to back the UN force.

Now, let's take another example. The UN was given the right to use its own earmarked forces. We could pick a force that would be sufficient for this job. When we lost the base at Carmona, we were given the opportunity to bring in forces from somewhere else. We should have had the dilemma in the UN of conflicting directives or possibly of an inability to get forces or perhaps of a commander who would not follow his UN instructions. Control should have given us more of a problem that we had. As for the Soviet Union, they had a more difficult time. They would have had a dilemma, I think, if they had found two groups of Africans in the beginning stage of the scenario -- possibly Kasavubu

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coming in and claiming the Congo, and a group of Africans supporting him. Perhaps they might find themselves in the middle of an African group rather than in the middle of an African situation and not knowing which side actually to support. I think that more exciting aspects of this game could have been raised today, yesterday, and the day before.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Should anyone in Control comment on what seems to be a somewhat surprising announcement that there were not challenged or that Control allowed the UN to go scot-free in choosing its forces? I remember losing the Brazilians. Does this call for comment from Control?

MR. POSVAR. We did everything in our superhuman power to mess it up for you.

MR. MILLIKAN. I am very much interested in his comment.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. MILLIKAN. Maybe we ought to devise during the course of the game some kind of an index -- maybe our index was quite poor -- as to how much pressure the teams are under. It was my impression that we were rather damping down additional complications on the first day or so during the first two or three moves on the premise that we thought the situation was complicated enough as it was and that the

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normal course of moves that the participating teams were throwing forward were creating enough issues. Particularly in the first two or three moves of a game, you cannot, I would have thought, move awfully fast inasmuch as your teams are shaking down to see what their alternatives are and what their contingencies are and so forth. That was less true of the UN team than it was of the US and Soviet teams. It may well be that the UN team's feeling -- if this is a uniform feeling -- that they were not thrown enough challenges was a consequence of our preoccupation with keeping the Soviets and the Americans busy.

MR. NEWLIN. I would like to say that while I think you could have had political complications in the sense of Kasavubu asserting claims to the Congo, I certainly did not feel that Control let us go scot-free. We did have these complications. On the whole, I felt that the kind of problems that we were faced with were entirely realistic under the circumstances.

MR. MILLIKAN. We denied you the Brazilian forces. We tried to emphasize as hard as we could that if you did not make this a damned African force with very little white participation, that you were going to get into trouble with our friends from the African group. We thought that that was a dilemma. We agreed that it was not entirely possible

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to put together an effective African force, so we thought that you would be presented with some problems there.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Do you want to comment on that, Herb?

MR. WEISS. First I will say what I am going to try to say and then you can rule me out of order. It seems to me --

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. How long do I have?

MR. WEISS. A minute.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All right.

MR. WEISS. It seems to me that there is a team which implicitly is playing here, namely, the African states, which is not a team in the game. The positions of all parties are always in a sense reflective of an assumed position of these states; yet they do not get a consistent opportunity to express their goals et cetera. Now, this, I think, has been a frustration for some people who in a sense have been looking out for their interests. It would be possible now, it seems to me, to make somewhat of an appraisal of this situation inasmuch as there have been assumptions made by each of the three teams which seemed implausible in terms of political motivations of this group; yet they are terribly dependent on the response of this

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group.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think we ought to flag until later the question which we have on the agenda. That is one of the few specific questions which we have about technique that we thought worth discussing here rather than on the questionnaire as to whether there should have been some additional teams or whether Control should have furnished more consistent information as though from a playing team, but can we hold that briefly?

Wes, did you want to say something about that point?

MR. POSVAR. Yes. I have had a feeling in all of these games that one of the basic problems is a propensity toward tranquillity, toward peace, toward not stirring things up. For this reason, I think Control has the particular problem of trying to exacerbate tensions. I look at it a little differently than the others (pointing to Mr. Millikan). I thought that things were sort of lying foul and that we continually had to prod. To begin with, there was a surprising tendency for the US and the Soviets not to confront one another directly. I think that throughout this game and particularly in the other game there was a tendency not to think about the real threat of atomic war.

I would like to turn this into a question, if I

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could, to the Soviet team on this subject. You (Mr. Griffith) said that you took into account the threat of atomic war. I would like to ask you to elaborate on this because I would like to know when and how you thought of it. Did you think of it, for example, in terms of firing off that ballistic missile? Were you afraid of Mr. Kennedy coolly and calculatingly deciding to go for broke?

MR. GRIFFITH. As I remember it, I think that the only time -- Mel, you correct me here -- that we were seriously influenced by this was in the final move when we felt, from what little we knew of what was going on in the American team, that it would be a very useful insurance against the apparent difficulties in which the US was getting. We felt that we could deter general or atomic war by the US by suddenly rejoining the UN force, particularly since it seemed likely to me that the US would not join it, so that it would not really eventually carry out its job.

MR. POSVAR. In other words, it was a safety-valve approach?

MR. GRIFFITH. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mel?

MR. POSVAR. It is really impossible in Room 22 to be scared of atomic war, I'm sure, nevertheless.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mel, do you want to add something? And then Hal Aaron.

MR. NIELSEN. Yes. I think our general feeling throughout this was that we were operating in an area in which we had very limited military capability and that in almost any large military action we would be defeated. Therefore, we never seriously considered trying to bring Soviet or bloc forces into Angola. We hoped to avoid situations that would result in this. We calculated and hoped that our threatening moves throughout the world would influence the African nations in there, but we did not really expect that they would really influence the moves of the US government to any extent.

MR. GRIFFITH. We even sent the US government a note of assurance on this subject.

MR. AARON. I would like to address this to the Soviet team. We had a tendency during the playing of the game to focus on Africa and Angola in this particular time frame. I wonder if they (the Soviet team) looked at the question of Stage II and the disarmament process that was taking place. For example, planning was now started for the UN peace force at this point. Now, here one reaches a critical stage of this UN peace force because here you are determining how the political direction of the UN peace

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force is going to evolve. In order to satisfy Soviet aspirations in Africa in wars of national liberation, you have jeopardized this very important part because by being late and delaying your aspirations, you may have created a situation with the US to a certain extent. I will come to that in a minute. You had an opportunity to create an environment in which the political direction might have been altered to your advantage.

The second point was that we were trying to get the US and the USSR to engage in a joint venture because we wanted to see how far you would be willing to operate in concert. Now, had that been done and had that taken place, it would have further enhanced this environment and you would have had a great advantage. There would have been sweetness and light, and you could have pursued your ultimate objective inasmuch as there is nothing in the treaty which is going to prevent these wars of national liberation. I think you were premature. You focused too much on the initial problem instead of looking at the whole problem. I was wondering if that had occurred to you.

MR. GRIFFITH. Our conclusion was that we had never wanted to have Stage II or a UN peace force because this would inhibit if not wars of national liberation, then Soviet covert activities of arms supplying, manufacturing,

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transportation, and so on and so forth. These activities would be required in order for these wars -- and particularly the one in South Africa -- to be successful. Given Stage II, the amount of inspection, and so on, the carrying out of such operations would be extremely difficult. Furthermore, it would be in the interest of the Soviets in any case to drag out the negotiations until they (the Soviets) were at such a stage of military and political power and majority in the UN and until the US had gotten in such trouble, that they would really have a superiority in any agreements of this sort.

MR. AARON. I personally think that you can argue that you had a lot more power and potential in Stage II than you thought you had. I think it would have been to your advantage.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bob Wood.

MR. WOOD. I just wanted to feed in for a minute something which relates back to where Carroll ended in the American dilemma. A great deal of our strategy was keyed on the assumption of your inferiority of forced application there. You assumed that severe restraints would be operating on this government for unilateral action and for disengagement from the UN. If you face, domestically, the South African situation, you face, I think, a political balance in general.

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It is a situation in which it is almost impossible to move decisively to one side or the other.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. WOOD. You are faced with that situation. That is why we stressed in our initial moves the constitutional property rights, minority rights, sort of a one man-one vote kind of proposition. But we were faced with the radical right in the South vis-a-vis the Negro senators in the North and the strong so-called intellectual liberal movement. From a domestic point of view, the way to move out of this is to have one or two different kinds of values. One of these can be a protest against violence. We were relying on this when there was the air raid against South African fighters, and it was something which had wide appeal. The second one is latent suspicion of and contempt for the UN and the 30 previous crises a la Cuba. No American government, depending on how it played its cards in a particular crisis, lost on a choice between these two values as long as it used one of these.

The confrontation of South African troops versus black troops -- particularly Mozambique -- really tied us up into knots at the end. But from our point of view, to be forced to apply force, knowing you were in an inferior position and knowing also that nuclear war was unlikely,

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was not a terrible outcome. Indeed, it was a relief from the domestic political pressures under which we had been.

MR. GRIFFITH. May I add to that?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. GRIFFITH. I just want to add that this was essentially our diagnosis as well. We were convinced that when the US would be confronted with this problem of confrontation with the South Africans, that it would not be able to decide to go drastically one way or the other. We felt, therefore, that this would throw this Africans over to our side because the Africans would have to fight the South Africans inasmuch as the South Africans would fight them. Therefore, it would be very unlikely that the situation would be generalized.

MR. WOOD. You had the answer to that.

MR. IKLE. They would get licked.

MR. GRIFFITH. Then they would ask our aid.

MR. IKLE. They would not let you in.

MR. GRIFFITH. Who wouldn't?

MR. IKLE. The last move.

MR. GRIFFITH. In other words, the US would unilaterally break across whatever the Afro-Asian and Soviet majority in the UN decided and refuse to let us into South Africa? This also would probably in the long

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run be in the Soviet interest.

MR. MILLIKAN. Of course.

MR. GRIFFITH. Because this would even commit you more to that minority trying to make this a partitioned land.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

MR. GRIFFITH. Therefore, the Soviets would again not have fought. They would not have engaged the US in military conflict at this point. They would in some way or another have brought about a lowering of the tension again and they would have again begun covert operations to try to break up the truce lines, get the UN in again, and so on and so forth. If exactly this had happened, it might have been very much in our interest.

MR. IKLE. The first line of defense would be to prevent a clear UN decision on this so that we would not have to face the domestic and national implication of going against the UN on the matter of internal position inside Africa.

MR. GRIFFITH. That is real apartheid.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mike?

MR. NEWLIN. I would like to comment on what seems to me to be a rather surprising element of the US strategy. They said that their objective was a white-dominated

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government in Angola which would protect the rights of the white minority. This, to me, is unrealistic. It seems to me that the only goal that the US in its own self-interest can legitimately have in Africa is a completely African-dominated government which is, hopefully, pro-West or neutral or, at least, not Communist dominated. This, I think, should have been the focus of American policy here, but where, I think, it was a weakness.

Also, because we have not been able to have parliamentary situations, I think that everybody has lost sight of the nature of parliamentary diplomacy here and that each side tends to overestimate the impact that its force has in the world organization. The Africans, whether you like it or not, are more or less in control in this situation. What they decide that they want to do with the local leaders is going to have a tremendous amount of weight here; and both sides, in the last analysis, are going to have to pay a tremendous amount of attention to this and defer to it. The Secretary General certainly is going to have to, and the rest of the Afro-Asian majority -- which is a numerical majority in the UN -- and the Latin Americans also will back him up. He is not without resources in this regard. That is why I think that you are overestimating the political situation in the US. If the South Africans

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were to walk in and occupy half of Mozambique and if Africans were to come down from Tanganyika, you would have a racial civil war in the heart of Africa, with the Soviet Union intervening on one side. In that type of situation, the American government would consider long and hard before it would reject any initiative of the Secretary General that would try to get the South Africans to go back.

This, I think, was the failure of US policy here. You came up taut when it came to striking down the South African interference in Angola. This enabled the US to have a success in Angola, but you put the Secretary General under a severe handicap. It was like biting the bullet. I would be interested in what Control has to say when it says that the UN is one of the groups which underestimated African sensibilities here, as to whether or not they (Control) felt that the UN was not paying adequate attention to African views here.

MR. WOOD. I think that strikes at the heart of the problem, Mike, and it was a point that Carroll made from the outset. But it seems to me that your appraisal of the character of African government, without knowing anything about Africa in terms of how it was in the central portion or the northern portion, has got to change as it pushes closer to Cape Town. In terms of the capacity in real life

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of the US government to respond, given the structure of the congressional committees and given our own domestic problem here, you have to recognize, I think, that maybe we were chickenhearted but none of us would have been in office 48 hours later if we had continued. Maybe we had too big an input on the domestic side.

MR. NEWLIN. This is just a difference in assessment.

MR. WILSON. May I just add a little to what I said originally?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. WILSON. This is not a defense of the position we took or what we did, but it seemed to me that this reminded me of perhaps the process through which we had been walking out on the plank -- step by step by step, observing the fine principle of democratic one man-one vote type of thing -- up to the point where there are only two places left. One is Southern Rhodesia with a ten per cent white population and 2,500,000 blacks. The other is the Union of South Africa with 3,000,000 whites out of a total population of 12,000,000 or 13,000,000.

One must also consider that this power -- industrially, economically, and militarily -- is wholly different from anything else in there. Now, it just seems

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to me that this final confrontation is something to which our past policies that apply in Kenya and Nigeria and so on just don't apply. I think the dilemma in which we found ourselves this morning is that maybe there was not any real difference between Mozambique and Angola. Maybe it was the fact that the Soviets had gone in and planted their guys in Northern Mozambique that made it seem different, but I think that we were confronted with a direct confrontation with white African troops.

MR. NEWLIN. If the US had gone in, you would not have had to fight them.

MR. HIGH. No. That's the question.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Order. John Marcum.

MR. MARCUM. This is not quite on point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Then would you yield for a moment to any motions to strike, motions to expunge, motions for personal privilege, or anything else on this subject?

MR. MARCUM. All right.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Herb?

MR. WEISS. Just in terms of general principle, it seems to me that throughout this game the African states attempted to pursue essentially three goals. The first goal was to internationalize any upheaval in the southern part of Africa -- and the focus here is from Angola to the

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major part of Southern Africa. The second goal, if possible, was to keep the cold war out, if not to play within its rules. The third goal -- and here the Congo experience is particularly important -- was to control the UN operation. Now, the African states also were aware of what the Secretary General just said, that is, that in fact they are the key to any majority in the UN and that no one can do anything -- except unilaterally -- without African support as long as the Africans are united. Nothing plausible happened to really divide the Africans. Therefore, it seems to me that in the context of this game the Africans are united.

I will now discuss the three positions. First of all, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, forgetting the initial negative response of African states to the refusal to participate in this great thrust, from the point of view of the Africans it is completely implausible that an African nationalist controlling part of Mozambique would refuse permission to the UN which at this point is completely under African control, I mean, in the field. The Secretary General has conceded that the Mozambique situation would be essentially an African endeavor. In any case, --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Essentially.

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MR. WEISS. Essentially. That is what is already true in Angola. That was played through. They did not get the Indians and they did not get the Brazilians. Therefore, with the major powers out, it was essentially an African endeavor on the land, which is an important thing. It is land control that is important, and land soldiers or volunteers are available to Africans.

Quite clearly, it seems to me that the assumption which the Soviet team made that one could get the Northern Mozambique regime to refuse permission to land so that then a UN force with Soviet backing would be necessary, is implausible. They would behave in the same fashion as the Roberto government did initially. Indeed, the line-up within the so-called cold war -- if this man is really a Soviet sympathizer -- would be exactly the same. Therefore, you have a perfect balance.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Herb, I do not want to cut you off, but there were one or two points to which I want to refer relative to the South African question before we move on to the broader issue. Were you going to address yourself to that?

MR. WEISS. Yes, but I feel, as I said, a bit frustrated.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. You are less frustrated than most.

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Frustration is relative.

MR. WEISS. I do not think this comes through in some of these discussions. I do not know how to deal with the details in this without giving some --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I understand.

MR. WEISS. -- some comprehension of a conscious policy on the part of the Africans.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Right.

MR. WEISS. I feel that certain of the things that have been suggested have been unreasonable because they run counter to a determined policy.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's go back to that later, Herb, because I have a list of speakers. There were some groaners on the subject of South Africa. Among those who groaned was George High. I think that we ought to hear his groan.

MR. HIGH. Well, from the Control point of view, I think that there was, first of all, the question of the position that the Luanda regime is going to take. Given the fanatical attitude of the Portuguese who are there in Angola, it seems to me that they are going to put up a hell of a fight for what they determine to be their best interests. Their best interests have never to date shown any inclination towards the idea of recognizing any kind of African support or participation.

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Now, it seems to me that you could have them take a hard line. South Africa is getting pushed back into their little corner of the African continent. I think their willingness to take part in the Angola affair is a support of the Luanda regime. One gets to the basic point that South Africa really is not a great world power. It has limited resources. So it gets to the stage of the game -- as Control made it -- that they have to cut their losses. That is logical. It is even more logical when they are attacked much more closely to home as they were by the rebellion that broke out in South-West Africa and the imminent take-over in Mozambique unless some action is taken by Rhodesia and South Africa. I do not think you can have a parallel situation in Angola and Mozambique. I think there may be parallel factors, but they are entirely different and they are certainly different in regard to South Africa's eastern region. South Africa can afford to cut off Angola. It has not had much contact through the years with the Portuguese in Angola, anyway. But when you get down to Mozambique, particularly the southern section, whether it is the Zambezi line or not, if you have a fanatical regime in Angola, one which is a much more determined regime than the one in South Africa, one which is united by this whole thing, then I think, as they

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themselves say, that they would be willing to fight. Also, I think that that was the attitude of Control, certainly to this date. I think that they are going to be willing to meet UN forces whether it is in Lorenzo Marques or Zambezi or elsewhere when it is that near to their own heartland.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. John Marcum, who has been very patient.

MR. MARCUM. This concerns the whole Soviet policy regarding the African parties. Let's refer back to Herb here on Mozambique. I do not think that it was crucial to Soviet strategy that UN troops not get in there. Our policy in all of these areas was to try to get rid of relatively-independent leadership and to make sure that pliable leadership -- and, where possible, friendly and educated Negroes -- got into power; and if the UN came in, that it (the UN) would fight a legitimate authority, one which we had either already arranged to be friendly toward us or one which we could in the process arrange to be friendly toward us, a regime that would be favorable toward us.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Who is "us", John, in this case?

MR. MARCUM. The Soviet Union.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All right.

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(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I was confused.

MR. MARCUM. As we move this down toward South Africa, then inevitably, as the story unfolds, the Soviet Union is going to be the only power that is going to do anything about it. If the UN goes into Northern Mozambique and if there is a government there which has been recognized by us, there is a good chance of our getting a foothold in at least one of several areas.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. John Saloma.

MR. SALOMA. This is not on South Africa.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think we can keep going. Go ahead.

MR. SALOMA. With reference to GCD and how seriously we considered the Russian moves on disarmament, I think there was an element of unreality at the beginning. I do not think that the American team seriously considered GCD in the second stage until it was actually forced on us in the last move. There was some concern and feeling on the team as to whether we should be playing by the rules of the game in relation to questions of disarmament. But I thought that the majority felt that our role was to play the US team from the view of the American national interest; and as a result of that, we tended to discount many of these

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Russian moves which we considered as propaganda and as not altering the balance of power in the immediate African situation. We discounted the actions in which the Russians engaged. For instance, we thought little of the military significance of the fleet. We tended to discount to some degree, I think, the infiltration of nationalist movements; and I do not think that there was as much control as the Russians undid us here at the end.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Just to make sure that we understand you, Jack, are you saying that you feel that the US team quite plausibly minimized some of these factors in their policy evaluation in favor of an interpretation of a national interest that focused on the crisis at hand, or are you saying that there was some technical error on the part of your operations inasmuch as you should have taken more account of this? I was not quite sure of what you were saying.

MR. SALOMA. This is perhaps more of a criticism of the design of the game. It was our understanding from the beginning, you see, that you were concerned about the international --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. But wholly apart from that, why didn't the US team take these (Russian moves) more seriously?

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MR. SALOMA. Because we did not seem to realize their interpretation.

MR. WILSON. We were too darn busy.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All right.

MR. WOOD. It has been stated that general disarmament has been a function of white realistic national interest. We were quite disposed to deal with this all the way.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I must say that you were in no sense betraying the objectives of the game by taking just that line. I think that that is most revealing and I would just insert in here the question of whether the fact that you minimized these values in assigning your priorities was a consequence of the structure of the game or whether this teaches us anything substantive about the strategic situation in the middle of Stage I under the American plan where there is not any really measurable change.

MR. SALOMA. We were commenting earlier -- maybe up to the second and third moves -- that there was not enough direct confrontation of American and Soviet forces. Control thought we might have been avoiding direct contact with the Soviets, but this was structured perhaps too closely to the Congo situation with which we were familiar. It did not really involve us in the guts of armed build-up

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vis-a-vis the Russians, and we were playing in our own backyard in the sense that we had more conventional armaments and leverage through the UN and so forth.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Carroll?

MR. WILSON. I would like to make the point that during the last move the only thing that might have saturated what we had was the reference to the massing of forces by the three powers in regard to West Berlin. No numbers were given; just a reference. This was the fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Hal?

MR. AARON. I think that implicitly everyone operated in the sense that there was no material change in our application of military power during this period. No one came to us and said, "Because of the Stage I reduction of the first two years, we are seriously limited in providing forces and/or we cannot execute this or that." I do not think that it came out explicitly in each case, but I think that that was in the back of everyone's mind. I think that that proves the point. We brought some papers on this problem of our troop deployment at the level of 2.1 or 2.4 and we see no material damage to our strategic position. We are limited in some areas, but in other areas we are wholly capable of meeting a challenge.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. I should say that everything that has been said on this subject is entirely consistent with the thinking of the game management. I want to make it crystal clear that there was never any intention that the teams be forced to adopt one strategy or another. It was simply our intention to confront them with very difficult alternatives. But even that being so, what I was trying to get from Jack (Saloma) and you was certain information. I think that it would be most interesting to find out the extent to which it had psychologically conditioned policy making. We knew from the scenario that it had not extremely affected policy making. That is my real question.

Fred?

MR. IKLE. I think we (the US) rejected the domestic interest and concern about disarmament that you would have given this kind of reduction. There would be a 30 per cent reduction felt across the country and there would be lots in favor of reversing it or maintaining it.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mike?

MR. NEWLIN. This was brought out earlier, but I think that the UN team did quite consciously keep -- as one of our very, very important goals -- our desire to promote as much collaboration between East and West as we, in a secondary capacity, could. We tried not to have them

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actually in the field due to their perhaps conflicting policy objectives once they got there.

I would like to make one comment on the South Africa problem, if I may. The Secretary General would not have permitted the Africans to continue to make incursions into the South-West from Angola. We did have white troops here and, if necessary, would have replaced the mutinous troops to make sure that there was no violation of the international border.

A very important element of our Mozambique plan was that the border between South Africa and Mozambique would have been sealed so that the South Africans would have had an international force standing between them and the Africans. Now, this is something that was not adequately brought out at the end of the game, but I do think that, given all of the things that you have said about the Voervord government, you have more of a choice when you make a stand in somebody else's country than you have when you make a stand in your own. You certainly have a different set of circumstances in international law.

MR. HIGH. They were invited there by the South African government.

MR. MILLIKAN. The South Africans would not have --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Max.

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MR. MILLIKAN. Surely the South Africans would not have taken at all seriously any border guarantee by the UN.

MR. NEWLIN. They might have or they might not have, but they certainly would have taken seriously the US going in there.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill?

MR. KINSEY. I would like to say that regarding the Soviet assumption toward the end of the game as to the switch in policy in deciding that now they wanted to join the UN force, that I think that we can underestimate the complications of this. I do not think that it is entirely up to them to suddenly decide, "Now we are ready to co-operate." In the first place, I think that the US, Europe, and the Latin Americans would object. In addition, I think that many of the African countries at this late state of the game would doubt the motives. Why should they come in now and decide to join in and get in on the profits? It would be very difficult for the Soviet Union, I think, to get this beautiful majority in the UN that they keep talking about, to get through any of their resolutions. I do not think that that can be a foregone conclusion at all.

I would like to make a point regarding the UN. As I recall, Mike, I think you said -- relative to the Soviet forces -- that the UN would still be able to go ahead

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with the US or without the US.

MR. NEWLIN. We are not completely dependent on the US.

MR. KINSEY. I would like to ask who is going to pay for it? I think that in any UN force thus far that has ever transpired or taken place, there always had to be at least one major financial power. This may be a small point, but I think that it is relatively important.

MR. NEWLIN. We would have floated a bond issue.

(General laughter.)

MR. KINSEY. I think that it is serious.

MR. NEWLIN. So do I.

MR. KINSEY. It is fine to say that; but I think in practice it's hard.

MR. NEWLIN. It would mean a fundamental recommission of the commitment to them. There might be overriding reasons as to why certain countries could not support something. This might even delay or block a resolution. But once it was adopted and action taken in furtherance of the principle for which the UN has fought so hard for consistently, it would mean a fundamental revision of the US attitude towards the UN. It would, obviously, even if they were overruled on a vote, if they were not good sports to go along and pay their debts.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. May I say a word about that?

MR. NEWLIN. Sure.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The question of financing has become acute in the last couple of years. Viewed as an exercise, I tried to think back to the sequence of events in all the previous great crises in which the US has participated, and I could not remember any single delegate or government in the crises I'm thinking of, namely, Korea, Lebanon, Suez, the Congo, mentioning the subject of money until after the force had been voted and mounted and fielded. The reason for this, it seems to me, is very obvious. If you are in enough trouble and it is three in the morning, you just simply do not worry about who is going to pay for it. I am not saying that this might not happen in the next crisis, but I was not as disturbed in this exercise as you were by the fact that history repeated itself once more.

MR. KINSEY. I think that the reason it did not come up was because it was known that the US would pay for it.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I would deny that. You might be right. I do not think that that was a relevant consideration in the crises of which I am thinking.

Nielsen and Eric.

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MR. NIELSEN. I would like to comment on our feelings relative to our entering the UN force. In the first instance, we tend to feel that intervention by US or UN forces tended to operate to our disadvantage in the past and would likely do so (now). We recognized that a force would probably go in, but we hoped that by keeping things stirred up and by not supporting it that the financial problem might become acute and either on this occasion or on a future occasion prevent one from being organized or from being effective.

In the second case, when we decided to join, our primary consideration was concern for the situation in Mozambique. We anticipated that at least we would be involved in supplying military forces in that area and that this would make it easier to do something we wanted very much to do, that is, to get armaments into the area in a semilegitimate fashion and to be able to introduce armaments into those elements that we were trying to support in Angola or in Mozambique.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. David, did you have a comment?

MR. SCHWARTZ. Yes. I had a question. With reference to this, at this rather late date, joining of the UN force by the Soviet Union, it seems to me that the benefits that would accrue to the Soviet Union in so doing

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are at least questionable. Initially, the assumption seems to have been made that this proferred co-operation would inhibit the US action either in effectively joining this operation with the UN or in taking unilateral action. In practice, it seems to me that both of these assumptions are questionable. In the first place, while there can be no doubt that there would be significant conservative if not reactionary comments on the part of the American public, I think that it is quite possible -- and under the present administration, conceivable, at the least -- that we would nevertheless join in such an operation if only to have the mediating effect that our presence would entail.

Secondly, I think that if the vital interests of the US were perceived as being in danger, I doubt that an adverse resolution in the UN would necessarily have shut off or precluded the possibility of a unilateral American action.

In the phasing of this sequence -- something about 30 days after the previous "x" plus 13 -- isn't it possible that the Soviet co-operation in this second military operation would at least be not snatched up too quickly? I can envision a situation in which the Soviet Union's proffer of co-operation would be very embarrassing

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while this was being seriously considered on the part of the African states involved.

MR. GRIFFITH. May I come in on this? I think it is important as to the Soviet action.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All right.

MR. GRIFFITH. Assuming that the resolution stipulated that the force would as a minimum go into Southern Mozambique -- in other words, involving a direct confrontation with South African troops -- this would have changed the whole Soviet position in general. Furthermore, it would have changed, I would think, the African position inasmuch as the Africans would be much more concerned than they would have been necessarily in Angola. This is not now 16 jets, but it is African ground troops.

As to the problem of the Soviet calculation of the American attitude, as it turns out the Americans were less inclined that we had assumed to join the force, but we were perfectly prepared to join the force whether or not the Americans joined. Again, our minimum assumption was that the Americans would join; that the South Africans would fight; that t he fighting would continue for some time; and that gradually, initial Soviet and American commitments being equal, more and more commitments would be required from the major forces -- at least air power,

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if not troop power -- and that the US would commit less and less. We would be perfectly willing to commit more and more. The Africans would have no alternative -- suspicious as they might be -- because the alternative was to be suspicious and be defeated or to drown their suspicions and accept our aid. I think that the position taken by the American team indicates even more than we had assumed that this is one of these dilemmas where, from the point of view of the US, the only thing to do would be to enter and keep up with the Soviet Union. The very fact that the Soviet Union was then in the force would have further inhibiting effects on the American public, who would then say, "We are fighting for something for which the Soviets are fighting."

MR. WILSON. One basic difference is that we would have fought with anything we had against any intervention in an area in which we were opposed. This came up in connection with Angola, and we took the firm position that we would not lend support for an assault landing against unfriendly forces.

MR. GRIFFITH. But there is the problem of --

MR. WILSON. No more than Mozambique.

MR. GRIFFITH. There is the problem of the UN resolution.

MR. WILSON. Yes.

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MR. GRIFFITH. Also, there is our minimal requirement for joining the force and accepting the UN resolution. I think that Herb is quite right. If the Northern Mozambique government is in power and recognized, okay, we will give in on that.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Excuse me.

MR. GRIFFITH. But we would not give in on everything about which you are speaking. I think that the ultimate Soviet objective is to force the US to take a position on an assault landing.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. There is a problem of clarification that troubles me and has throughout, and that is the motive of the Soviet Union in joining the force. Maybe this is the important point that Mike was going to make. It seems to me that the Soviet Union in this situation would have the option of joining the consensus, but I am not at all sure that they would have the option of joining the force. That is a crucial difference. Joining the consensus might mean that, as Korea contrasted with one phase of the Congo, they would have influence over the political decision making in the Secretariat and on the ground. But in the other instance, it means the presence of Soviet forces on the ground. Every tradition that has been developed thus far in UN peace keeping precludes this.

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Therefore, I think that that point should be sharpened a little bit.

MR. GRIFFITH. Wouldn't the Africans be clobbered by the South Africans? That is the question.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All right. That raises my final question, a question which I never really heard answered in the game. What would be the capability of a UN force -- excluding the US and the USSR -- to take on an increasing load vis-a-vis South Africa? I think that this remains a military problem.

MR. IKLE. Yes, a military problem.

MR. NEWLIN. I think that it is too bad that this Mozambique situation was sprung on us with only an hour and a half to go into it, because I think that the basic objectives of the US and the UN are very, very parallel indeed, and they are not incompatible with the objectives of the Afro-Asian majority. These problems could have been harmonized, I think, to achieve a result where there would be a possibility that you would not have had to use force against the South Africans. If you had had to use force, then it would have been a force made up of certain European states, but with more Africans on the ground. In this instance, neither the Soviet Union nor the US would have been asked by the UN to provide combat troops in any

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capacity due to the Soviet Union's ulterior motives here and due to the inhibitions that we knew would come to the surface in American policy.

But it is one thing for the US to traditionally loyally back up what the UN wants to do in the peace keeping field to save human lives and prevent a conflagration in Africa, and it is another thing for the US to be actually fighting there.

Therefore, I think that the flaw in the Soviet strategy here was in assuming that they could move in here and take over to the extent that the Africans would rally to their side. We do not in any sense see a situation developing where you would have the Africans and the Soviet Union on the same side in this particular situation.

MR. GRIFFITH. I think that I have answered that.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill Meanix, does your comment relate to this aspect of the game?

MR. MEANIX. I had one point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Why don't you go forward? You have been waiting.

MR. MEANIX. I think that the US demonstration of what the UN can do on behalf of the Africans in Angola had a pretty strong effect. The US had influence here, pretty strong influence, over the Africans in possibly getting a

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resolution in the UN that the US could buy. I feel that the US could control this Mozambique business. In contrast, if something went on without US support, there would develop a contrast between what happened in Angola with US support and what was not happening in Mozambique where the African majority was unable to take a position that the US would be able to support. Also, the US was unrealistic in not taking some precautionary measure in Mozambique. Actually, I think the US would have done it. I feel that my own failure to suggest that the US do something was partly due to the game's concentration on Angola.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill, what would you have done?

MR. MEANIX. Disarmament perished. It was not available at the end of this crisis as a means of rebelling. There were three separate crises: Berlin, the Chinese border attack, and the business in Southern Africa.

MR. KINSEY. We never really let Berlin develop.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Herb Weiss is next on my list.

MR. WEISS. I am so way out that I won't bore you with what I think, but it seems to me that both the UN team and the US team are simply not coming to grips with African realities. Only the Soviet team has. I do not yield the Mozambique --

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MR. GRIFFITH. Applause in the hall. All rise.

(General laughter.)

MR. WEISS. I do not yield the Mozambique situation at all. It seems to me that in a situation such as this we can sort of extract the bare essentials of the whole game. The bare essentials are that when the UN goes in, you have border after border falling with an essentially African ground force. Now, it has never been explained by the UN how on earth they are going to get 30,000 African troops who are refusing to follow the orders of the Secretary General out of the center of Angola when they are led by a concerted and united African plan to take this situation from one border to the next. I do not know how you are going to do that. You can say that the US will not back such an endeavor; we are told that the Soviet Union will. We do not need their Northern Mozambique allies, nor do we need Mozambique at all. South-West Africa is quite sufficient for the essential kernel of this game to be played. You go in Angola; next you are in Southeast Africa; and next you are in South Africa. You end up fighting South African troops.

MR. GRIFFITH. Yes, that is the point.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. A point of parliamentary procedure: The bartender is all set up in the back of the

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room. I think that Herb's remarks are provocative, and there are at least five people who have different responses to them. So let's take --

MR. IKLE. Ten minutes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. -- 90 seconds. We can't take ten minutes. All right, let's take five minutes to charge our glasses. Then we will come right back and resume inasmuch as our time is really moving along.

(Five-minute recess.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Please come to order. Herb?

MR. WEISS. I have fired my broadside.

MR. WOOD. For the moment.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Marcum?

MR. MARCUM. With reference to the question that was raised relative to the UN force necessary, I would like to say that in our calculations in the Soviet team about this we might have felt, I think, in an earlier instance that the Ovambo uprising would have been crushed more quickly than it was precisely because the Republic of South Africa -- which has now a good 200,000 mean readily available, well equipped, well trained, which by 1965 would be better prepared by better militia -- would have been an extremely formidable military machine. If the UN could not mobilize anything far beyond anything it has

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so far, then there would not be any likelihood that African contingents would be able to face up to anything better than a slaughter. A slaughter of Africans would be the reason why they would immediately call upon the Soviet Union. Of course, the psychology of African thinking and pan-Africanism which has created the Republic of South Africa is --

MR. MILLIKAN. Can I ask a question?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. MILLIKAN. This is directly on the point of military power. Suppose you had had very substantial UN air support. Could this have offset it?

MR. MARCUM. To begin with, the Republic of South Africa has very substantial air support.

MR. MILLIKAN. Ethiopian jets --

MR. GRIFFITH. These Italians --

(General laughter.)

MR. NIELSEN. I have one comment with reference to the statement that we were unrealistic in our assumptions as to how easy it would be for us to be accepted into the UN force. We may have been unrealistic, but we did not worry too much about this because certainly we felt that we should ask for this inasmuch as this certainly was the right move to make. We had nothing to lose. This was

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in line with our feeling that the time had come to try to pacify the over-all international situation and reduce tensions.

MR. WOOD. Let me pursue that.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's see. If it is directly in continuation of that point, why don't you go ahead?

MR. WOOD. I question two parts of your logic here. (a) If there is a slaughter and you are the force behind, it is going to take a major commitment, you know, other than identified with the slaughter here. (b) If you are in the UN situation on the ground, then you face the same position we face on the other side of having to decide whether you are going to decide yours were successful or unsuccessful (sic).

MR. MARCUM. By this time, we have already triggered some strikes in Africa which have brought about slaughters. We have tried to pin this on the South African regime. The other thing I want to say is that we would be counting on one well-organized Communist Party to be doing preparatory work there.

MR. HIGH. Except that Control has taken the step of having a firm crackdown which has been the key to African success to date.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think Control is unanimous

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on that.

MR. GRIFFITH. By our participation in the UN force, you see, we would offer to fulfill whatever requirements the Secretary General would wish to lay upon us provided that we maintain parity with the US, that the US would less and less participate, and that then the Africans would have no other alternative. By this time the UN majority would probably have no alternative because we would be willing to offer more than parity with the US.

MR. WEISS. Korea.

MR. GRIFFITH. Yes.

MR. WEISS. It exists; it is part of history.

MR. GRIFFITH. We would play the part of the US in Korea.

MR. NEWLIN. I would say in regard to that that I think that the UN would have been in a position -- particularly if we had had the co-operation of Luombay (phonetic) -- to mount a sizable force with respectable fightingmen. I do not think that I would yield to anyone in saying that the Algerians if they were in there in several-division strength would have the stuffing knocked out of them by the South Africans. You could certainly arrange for overwhelming UN air superiority. We don't have to rely solely on Western continental power to get you some

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air superiority.

Another thing that we had thrown into this game right at the last was our call for an international conference of foreign ministers to meet at headquarters on the problem of Southern Africa. This began to take some of the heat out of the situation.

I think that for strategic reasons both the US and the Soviets were looking primarily at South Africa. Maybe the Africans were, too, according to what Herb has said; but the UN would have required in its proceeding to focus on the particular problem within each territory as it developed. Our strategic interests were, of course, entirely different. They were related to the UN charter and to effective international action in order to maintain peace and security, rather than to any national ambitions one way or the other. As we already pointed out, we were oriented to getting on with the disarmament.

MR. MILLIKAN. I have one question. Realistically, what could a conference of ministers have accomplished?

MR. NEWLIN. It might not have accomplished anything, but I think that it would have helped to take some of the heat out of the situation. The US had indicated to us that they wanted to broaden such a conference to include Berlin and other matters. It might have developed

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into a general conference on outstanding world problems, but this was our way of calling for an international meeting.

MR. MILLIKAN. A conference takes heat out of things only if the parties want it to.

MR. GRIFFITH. We do not.

MR. MILLIKAN. The Russians do not.

MR. NEWLIN. Here I have to speak up again in the interest of the world community, which does. The Soviet Union does not; but Africa, the Indians, large parts of the world, certainly all of Latin America, India, most of the Asian states, and some of the African states, too, do. I certainly feel that a majority of the UN would have an interest in seeing that this African juggernaut running amuck in Southern Africa backed up by the Soviets never came about.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I must say that one reason I found the UN team's performance so plausible was that the UN Secretariat frequently does things which are considered unrealistic and which would not be "proposed", let's say, by the Joint Staff, the Pentagon, the policy-planning department of the State Department, or the Presidium. This is the sort of thing it does. Its batting average may be somewhere between .300 and .600. Nothing he said worried

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me, in other words. Although my feeling is that the conference could be dangerous, they would be derelict in their duty if they did not propose that or anything else.

MR. MILLIKAN. I do not think that it would be dangerous.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Freddy was next.

MR. IKLE. I have two questions. One is: Could the UN force get across some major river -- you argue that it could; it is a military question -- without US and Soviet support? The second is: Could it be stopped at that South Africa Yalu? And again you say that it could. But there we are perplexed with the problem of South Africa. We do not see any terminal stage. There is no solution in sight. Certainly there would be very great pressures later on against the country that has defied so many resolutions and that has, in the game, even left the UN.

MR. NEWLIN. There would be pressures.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. John Marcum.

MR. MARCUM. Well, I would just like to make a brief comment again on this war potential. I think politically that it would not be too likely that Scandinavia or other countries far away would commit a great deal to an action against South Africans. UN forces are going to be

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spread from Angola -- where they still have to maintain order -- all the way over to Mozambique. Remember, too, that Southern Rhodesia has been added to the Union of South Africa.

MR. AARON. This brings up a point which may emerge regarding the UN peace force in Stage II. Is this a valid solution? In other words, if the peace force had been made up at the beginning and if its direction had been reasonably good, perhaps the situation would not have occurred. I think that this might possibly emerge here, too. We have taken for granted that in Stage II the UN peace force emerges. This does not necessarily mean that this is a correct solution. Here was something that was immediately available. It was rather small and rather tenuous, but it was something. We might consider the fact that this force was not in existence in Stage I. A lot of people feel that it should have been created right at the beginning. I thought that I would throw that question out for what it is worth.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mr. Okuma?

MR. OKUMA. I would like to ask a question. How long did this UN operation take to defeat the South Africans? I am not clear on that. I cannot envision a quick victory in Ovambo and clear down the line. One might

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think that this would be a long drawn-out military operation.

MR. NEWLIN. I think that the thing that we can consider here is what your alternative would be if, for instance, both the Soviet and the US strategy had not worked out and, for different reasons, the US had blocked something that the Secretary General had wanted to do.

On the other hand, if the Secretary General was not willing to do what the Soviets wanted to do, you would have had a cancer there in Southern Africa with the Africans themselves flailing away at it. It would have provided all sorts of opportunities, I think, giving you a far worse situation. I feel strongly that this is something which the rest of the world community would not have been willing to stand idly by and see develop.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Eric Stevenson.

MR. STEVENSON. It seems to me that for quite some time we have been talking about the next move which would have followed the last move. If it is not out of order, I want to pose a different kind of problem. Referring back to the Angolan situation, I wonder what this group thinks would have happened if this had taken place three months from now, without the beginning of a disarmament program, but given the existing political situation.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is the next item on my agenda.

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Can we make that the first question on that item, Eric, just to see if there is any more strategic information about the game that needs to be put on the table?

George High.

MR. HIGH. Well, this point has been made, but I want to underline it because I think that it is of vital importance: I think that the Secretary General, for all of his effectiveness, has drastically underestimated the power of the South African forces. These fighters are the equivalent of any Western fighting force of which you can conceive. Any Americans who fought with them in Korea, in World War II, at the Berlin airlift, or otherwise have all come away with the highest regard for them. They send their officers up to attend staff college courses in the US. Their men inevitably are in the top of the class. If not No. 1, certainly in the first 10. Their pilots coming up for pilot training are always the leaders in pilot schools here. They are fantastic. They are at home in Southern Africa. Their lines of supply are much simpler than these others. And -- I don't know -- being a Swede myself, I'll put a dozen Swedes up against a couple of South Africans. And the Swedes won't have a chance.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is the best calculation of

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forces which we have had all week.

MR. GRIFFITH. Applause in the hall.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Applause in the hall, yes.

Herb Weiss?

MR. WEISS. I have two questions. I would like to know how the UN envisions getting those undisciplined UN African troops who have moved into South-West Africa out of there if they do not respond to orders. The second question relates to the US team. They, in regard to Mozambique, stated a whole lot of intentions which, I think you suggested, answered my objections to your strategy. But I do not see how you are going to: prevent pan-Africanism with the support and incitement of the Russians and with the direct hostility of the South Africans; and maintain, at least temporarily, a major-river line of demarcation. Are you sending a major unilateral force to do this? Are you preventing the use of UN forces to realize Soviet objectives? That is what the Soviets wanted to do in Angola.

MR. IKLE. Those are "objectives". We do not expect to attain them all.

MR. WEISS. In that case, how have you, realistically, taken into account the possibility of an extension of the Angola-type situation under UN auspices

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with either US or USSR backing from taking place?

MR. IKLE. By trying to prevent the creation of a UN action by action in the General Assembly so that there would not be a clear resolution for UN action in Mozambique at this time.

MR. WEISS. How do we do that?

MR. GRIFFITH. That is our point on the one-third bloc.

MR. MILLIKAN. It would take a two-thirds majority.

MR. GRIFFITH. And we figure that we can make a third.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Herb, you still have the floor, or are you through?

MR. WEISS. I would like an answer from the UN. It seems to me that the assumption that you can get Africans in Mozambique to play the UN game when you are fighting them with white UN troops after having brought --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Excuse me. Mike, would you listen to Herb's question? I suppose that it is addressed essentially to me.

MR. NEWLIN. Sorry.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Could we knock off the caucuses in the corner? It is hard to hear.

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MR. NEWLIN. I did not hear the question.

MR. WEISS. I want to know how you are going to get the Algerians and the Nigerians and the Ghanaians out of South-West Africa if they do not respond to your order.

MR. NEWLIN. They would respond to the order. That is where we have a divergence of opinion, I think. It would mean a demarche by the governments of the countries concerned to make sure they obey the discipline of the UN commander there. Otherwise, you have no UN operation. If you did not have this, you would have a complete collapse of UN command. This is the one thing that you could have had in this game.

MR. WEISS. We have had this several times in the Congo allegedly.

MR. NEWLIN. Allegedly.

MR. WEISS. We are having it right now, a collapse.

MR. NEWLIN. This is a confused situation.

MR. WEISS. This is not confused?

MR. NEWLIN. It is entirely different in the Congo. There you are operating in one territory. But where you have a group that has gone in to operate within one territory making incursions without the authority of the UN into other international territory, then this is a very serious thing. It goes beyond the mandate and would

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require the Secretary General's taking the sternest disciplinary measures to remove the troops, the commanders involved, and either replace them with troops from that country or probably from another country. I am reasonably certain that this would be forthcoming.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Max?

MR. MILLIKAN. I will help you out a bit. Although I fundamentally agree with Herb, I want to see the case put. I recall that most of the Angolan supply lines are in UN hands. Certainly the first thing that you would do would be to cut off all supplies, military and civil lines of supply, before you try to apply punitive action. Now, the Russians might very well try to substitute for this. I am almost certain that they would. But they would have very serious difficulties, it seems to me, trying to air-drop supplies into a group of UN troops in Northern South-West Africa.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Hal?

MR. AARON. When we discussed this problem, I think that our first position was that we should go back to the governments to see if we could get support for handling these irregulars. The second thing --

MR. WEISS. They are not irregulars. They are doing what their governments want them to do.

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MR. AARON. If this is true, then they are defeating the UN purpose. When I was in the Congo, I asked this question of the UN commanders -- and this happened to Van Horn in the Congo: "Would you be willing, if these troops refused to accede to UN action and UN command, to have a UN Code of Military Justice?" In every battalion -- Tunis, Ethiopian, and so forth -- they all agreed that this would be a great help and that they would be willing to abide by this if the court were acquainted as to cultural problems or other problems which would make an individual act in a certain fashion.

So I say that this is a long-term solution. I realize that it is very idealistic. That, in essence, is what you might get. If this were in existence, it might solve the problem.

MR. WEISS. I think that it addresses itself to a radically-different problem. I agree with you. But here are all the governments that are the major participants of a UN force the commander of which is one among them, which is making incursions that are reported by South Africa to the UN, which is under all kinds of condemnatory resolutions by the UN, and they are doing what they consider to be lifesaving expeditions on essentially an unmarked border to save people of their own blood and skin

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from getting massacred. This, it seems to me, has relatively little to do with it. One could very well say that not to do this, for a military commander who can see this from his binoculars across the way, would be inhuman.

MR. AARON. Why don't we condemn the SAC pilot for going to the Soviet Union with a 5-megaton bomb?

MR. WEISS. This is Africa; that is Berlin.

MR. GRIFFITH. Africans have a different kind of discipline.

MR. POSVAR. I have been amused by the conversation of the last half hour. We have been talking about major warfare, aggression against a major power, and so on. I would submit that nothing in the scenario or the discussion related to the abolition of the nation-state system. Between now and 1965 there is a Rubicon to be crossed before we move from a Congo-type operation to the type of operation about which we are talking right now. I think that the world order is going to have to undergo some changes about which we have not even begun to think. Your Code of Military Justice is maybe one per cent of the problem.

MR. GRIFFITH. Right.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes. Well, the clock is moving. I had one comment regarding the Soviet team. I would like

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to say, Bill, that I think the Soviet team entered the game in a state of even greater euphoria than anyone else. My impression was -- I have already discussed this with him privately -- that the zag back to the soft line after the long period of the zig, for instance, all this sweetness and light at the UN, a new representative in the UN, and a new ambassador in Washington, would be more than offset by renewed strains within the Communist bloc which would renew it and intensify the basic contradiction within the Communist bloc of China. I wonder if you would comment on that.

MR. GRIFFITH. My answer to that is that in my opinion you made, with realism of five per cent, China in the scenario so weak that the Soviet Union was able to force it to a disarmament agreement. If it is that weak, then the Soviet Union is certainly able to force it to do this, particularly when the force is so designed that it does not intend to go to Stage II, but, rather, that it intends to have a war of national liberation in Africa, intends to get the African powers in, and thinks that it is going to get a majority in the UN.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. My answer to that, as you recall, is that they, having had the NEP period, are now ready to go to a hard line.

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MR. GRIFFITH. That was not clear from Control.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Shall we move on to Stage VII, Move VII, to pose a question -- I think one question was already posed by Eric -- as to the problem of outcomes? Specifically, this requires a girding up of loins. I won't go into detail here. This is a family joke among some of us here. How different would the outcome have been? Well, I have three questions. One is: What would have happened at the end? But I do not like that question because history really has no end, or I hope that it does not. Therefore, one could simply project this a stage further. Another part of the question is: How differently would events have unfolded here if the problem had been set in January 2 or 4, 1963, rather than in May, 1965, without GCD? Those are two questions. I have been asked to raise a third question: How different would the basic strategies have been if it had been a completely disarmed world? I think that that requires a brand-new intellectual exercise, and I am prepared to rule that out at this particular point.

MR. GRIFFITH. Not capable.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Ernie?

MR. LEFEVER. I would like to make a summary

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conclusion for the purposes of stimulating this question. I will add, if you will permit me, one or two sentences on complete disarmament simply to throw the other environments into some perspective. It seems to me that if this game had been played, that is, if this crisis had been dealt with in the present world, that there would have been no significant difference in the outcome. I think a lot of people have said that. I wrote this (these notes) down before this discussion.

In the half-disarmed world, that is, a world where the militarily-significant states had half the arms and half the men that they now have, I still can see no significant difference because the level of arms and manpower required for this particular effort could well have been taken care of by the US, the USSR, and the other states with half of what they have now.

MR. MILLIKAN. Can I ask a question?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. MILLIKAN. Would this apply to a Stage VII, a Move VII, in which there were massive confrontation by UN and other free-world forces with a determined South Africa in an attempt to bring South Africa to heel?

MR. LEFEVER. I think that my conclusion would hold for that, but not for hotting up the Berlin crisis.

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MR. MILLIKAN. All right.

MR. LEFEVER. The third environment is the totally-disarmed environment. I am bringing this up because it is part of our assignment, the assignment of this game, and is part of our research equipment. In a totally-disarmed environment, according to the US plan of April 18, 1962, the nation-states would have forces only for internal security. They would have no military establishments, in the conventional sense of the term; but there would be an existing, presumably-standing, UN force with considerable capability -- with enough capability to deal with any threat or a threat from any one nation or plausible combination of nations. It seems to me that in such an environment there would be more emphasis on the immediately-powerful neighbor of a small state. That is, a small state would stand in greater jeopardy from immediately-powerful neighbors than they now stand because these stronger neighbors would have a bigger internal security force and a bigger rearmament capability. Furthermore, the smaller states would not be in a position to be befriended by a friendly neighbor some distance away which did not have that type of potential at the present time.

Therefore, Angola would have been very much endangered by an aggressive South Africa. Also, the

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disarmament agreement does not deal with covert means of expansion. It does not cover agents, assassination gangs, sabotage, indirect warfare, or insurgency. Consequently, those states which are committed primarily to these means would have a great advantage over those states which are not committed primarily to these means.

Finally, a subpoint of that would be that the international military force available would be a conventional-type force. You might have some nuclear weapons, that is true, but you would not have the capability to counter insurgency.

Therefore, I conclude that in a totally-disarmed world the US and our interests would have come off a great deal worse than they did in this game.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill Meanix, I am afraid that I cut you off before we left the last point.

MR. MEANIX. We were arguing about these Africans, but I think that we have passed the argument.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All right.

George High?

MR. HIGH. As I understand it, one of the things that you wanted to discuss was what would happen if the situation developed in the present world, is that right?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

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MR. HIGH. But does that assume that Salazar is dead and all of the rest of it?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. No.

MR. HIGH. Let's start the actual world as of January 2 through 4, 1963.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I see the difficulty posed. We have to write a new scenario without GCD but with enough time to kill Salazar. Portugal figured in this. If Angola had not been technically independent of Portugal, the configuration of the game would have been somewhat different politically -- possibly even militarily. Therefore, that decision was crucial.

MR. NEWLIN. And the Azores?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. And the Azores.

MR. HIGH. Assuming that we have trouble today, I just want to pose about four different factors which are not in your scenario but which I think are decisive.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Fine.

MR. HIGH. If it were the actual world today, this would not be that case at all. Portugal is strong. Portugal is determined to remain in there. Portugal still has lots of money. There is, as Mike Newlin mentioned, the question of the Azores. More important than that, in a sense, although the Azores is of substantial importance

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anyway, is the space arrangement we have with South Africa, together with military co-operation and all the rest of that sort of thing. A concomitant of that, and something which has not been talked about too much publicly or otherwise but which impresses me, is the vast importance of American public opinion being completely unprepared for any kind of military adventures in this area whatsoever.

Also, there are the factors of France and the UK which, in the scenario, are members of the EEC. England had something like over 50 per cent of its trade and investment tied up there. Therefore, any kind of enlightened attitude that it might have vis-a-vis South Africa is completely buried by the realization of the impact it would have on the London financial markets and all that sort of thing.

MR. KINSEY. Are you sure of the 50 per cent?

MR. HIGH. Yes, probably.

MR. KINSEY. I might settle on "perhaps".

MR. MILLIKAN. British "foreign" trade?

MR. HIGH. No. "The British financial picture is vastly affected by South Africa or Southern Rhodesia", if that makes it more palatable. Its economic reliance is in that area, rather than in South Africa.

MR. KINSEY. If that is the case, do you intend to

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dispute that economic interest would be in the East?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Not at present.

MR. KINSEY. But, in fact, three years from now, do you agree to that?

MR. HIGH. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Eric, was it not you who posed that in an earlier question to be raised under that heading? Do you recall what you said?

MR. STEVENSON. I did not bring up these questions, but I thought that they would be.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Wes Posvar?

MR. POSVAR. I would like to ask another question which I fear may be disruptive of your procedure. I cannot quarrel with the scenario or the outcome of the game. Under the circumstances, I think that is a matter of expertise. Because I know very little about these situations, I am dying to know what these experts about Africa who are here would predict would have happened if you had let them step out from behind -- if I may coin a phrase -- the fig leaf of this game --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The retroactive fig leaf.

MR. POSVAR. -- and say what their predictions are in 1965 in Angola and Mozambique.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Do you mean: given the events of

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the first six moves?

MR. POSVAR. No. Given nothing.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Do you mean that what happened in this game was a plausible extrapolation of the present trends in that region?

MR. POSVAR. I would like to avoid that fig leaf.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Which fig leaf?

MR. MILLIKAN. Wes is just interested in a wholly-different question.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. He wants to know what is really going to happen in Angola.

MR. POSVAR. This may be disruptive of your procedure; I don't know.

MR. IKLE. Yes.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I don't know, either.

MR. POSVAR. Could we give one minute to this sometime before we adjourn?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. All right. We have a few problems under these headings. If we can, let's come up with some answers. Hal Aaron, and then Nielsen.

MR. AARON. In the middle of Stage II there was a reduction of 50 per cent in everything -- ICBM's, bombers, and everything else. Would the Soviet Union under these circumstances have risked the confrontation at this stage

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over Angola and Mozambique, or would they have preferred to wait until a later date at which time there would be a much greater reduction in thermonuclear exchange capability?

MR. LEFEVER. I will assume that the nuclear deterrent still prevails at the halfway point?

MR. AARON. I agree.

MR. LEFEVER. Consequently, if they were willing to go ahead with it under the present degree of nuclear stability which we have, then they probably would have been willing to have risked it at that point. You are raising a fundamental question, as you did earlier, as to whether they should have not waited until both the present point and the midpoint had gone by, at which time they would have been able to operate with impunity in a safer world.

MR. AARON. What it boils down to is this: For the US and the USSR to mobilize these task forces as they did in the South Atlantic, it is going to take a lot of effort at this stage, the middle of Stage II, to do that. They would have to scrape everything from the Mediterranean and the Baltic to get their forces into position. Now, would they be willing, for the purposes of Angola and Mozambique, to go through this strange exercise, knowing that Berlin, India, China, and the rest of these areas are also inflamed?

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. We are going to solve that problem at the end of January during an exercise which starts in the middle of Stage II.

MR. LEFEVER. They would not have sent the task forces at Stage II.

MR. MILLIKAN. It would not have altered the outcome.

MR. LEFEVER. That was a byplay which did not contribute to the game, as I saw it.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mel Nielsen.

MR. NIELSEN. I want to address myself to the possible differences if this had happened in the near future.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is the way that I should have put it.

MR. NIELSEN. I think that there were certain things that might have influenced it. I believe that we felt that postulating a serious scare in the world over the possibility of a nuclear war, having gone through the first stage of the disarmament agreement, and raising hopes very high throughout the world, that all of this together did two things. It made the risk of nuclear war at this point somewhat less than at present and gave us a little more freedom to threaten. That point is likely

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to happen. At the same time, we felt that there was some capital here which we could use by threatening to reverse this whole process and dash the hopes of humanity, so to speak, yet at the same time feeling that we could again take advantage of these hopes by going back as though we were going to proceed with the disarmament agreement.

In summary, I think that we may have been a little less willing to act quite as belligerently and threatening tomorrow as we did in the game.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I think that this is an absolutely fascinating point because the conventional wisdom, as far as I can perceive it, is that one of the reasons why the Soviet Union is not really interested in or has not made up its mind as to how profitable it would be to go into a disarmament agreement is the implication that it would lose its manipulative power with regard to the threat of force. What you are saying is that its manipulative power with regard to the threat of force tends to increase with disarmament.

MR. NIELSEN. Our discussions about these threatening moves --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Excuse me. I just want to make this clear. I do not mean its manipulative force around the world in local situations. I mean its manipulative

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power relative to the use of strategic force. This is a very serious point: as it loses its strategic power, it loses this threat. I assume that what you are saying is that it would have an increased political capability under those circumstances. This is due, in part, to the outcome of the psychological atmosphere of which we perhaps did not have enough, namely, the threat of a rearmament race and the reversal of this process.

MR. NIELSEN. Yes, and also because it may feel freer and safer in making threats relative to nuclear war, knowing full well that the US does not --

MR. AARON. This is my question, because this is the hypothetical of your next game. This may or may not be a deterrent.

MR. POSVAR. And this is a US asset.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill Meanix is next.

MR. MEANIX. I thought that the Soviets refused to play at all. They shot disarmament down and they put the squeeze on Berlin after we had stripped to some degree our forces available in the European area. Even though it was only a little squeeze -- it was not as good a squeeze as one could have put -- I thought that they went way beyond what pressures the Soviets could realistically put and really shake the world within a context of a

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possibility of holding to the disarmament, within a possibility of going on. I thought they went way beyond where they could play this game and still play the desire of the world to keep disarmament. I thought they went way beyond.

MR. GRIFFITH. Point of fact there: We never denounced the disarmament agreement.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. You threatened to.

MR. GRIFFITH. What we threatened to do was to suspend the negotiations for going into Stage II and we threatened to withdraw from disarmament.

MR. MILLIKAN. May I add to that?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. MILLIKAN. I think that there is much too great a tendency to "assume", and that is something that a game like this is supposed to illuminate. One of the great values of this game is that it has illuminated this much-too-great tendency to assume that these are once-and-for-all, all-or-never decisions, and that if the Soviet Union once challenges a disarmament agreement, that they have thrown away the whole possibility of gaining any headway out of playing for disarmament.

Now, in fact, as the Move VI period clearly demonstrated, there was a real question in my mind as to

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whether they lost anything at all by this hard Stalinist line for the first five moves. I think the Soviet Union probably underestimates a little bit how much they lost by the hard line, but I think everybody else probably exaggerates how much they would have lost by this. There is a whole part of Leninist doctrine which has been reaffirmed over and over again as to its validity, that says that you can turn it on and turn it off and that you do not lose an awful lot from this. Suppose they had gone ahead and denounced the disarmament agreement quite openly? The idea that five weeks later or three months later they could not say, "We have changed our mind; we now want to go back into a disarmament conference", and that they would have lost anything significant by this, is preposterous.

MR. GRIFFITH. In our "Final Moves" we said that if we did not get what we wanted, we would resume discussions in order to keep the tension down a little more but we would haggle on procedure and get nowhere for a while.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Let's take Mel Nielsen out of order on this point.

MR. NIELSEN. I want to add one point that bears on this. Berlin turned out to be a more threatening gesture than we intended because 30 days went by very quickly. We

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had blockaded Berlin for 30 days and we did not intend to do that at the time.

(General laughter.)

MR. NIELSEN. In fact, we had intended to turn this off. What we tried to indicate is that we were taking a hard line, stirring up trouble all around the world. But we certainly were not seeking a confrontation anywhere. We were trying to avoid it, in fact.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Eric?

MR. STEVENSON. I'm back in Stage II.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Well, come on out.

MR. STEVENSON. In the middle of Stage II, in answer to Hal Aaron's question sometime ago, I think that the military factors are going to make very little difference and that the political factors will be drastically changed in Stage II. It would be almost impossible to predict what it would be. That is why I offer very little hope for this third game and very little hope for the purposes of prediction if we put Angola into Stage II.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill Kinsey, you were next.

MR. KINSEY. Since we are going back, I would like to go back to Ernie's point which I think we tended to slough off as being too difficult to face. I suppose that

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you all realize that the discussion relative to wars of liberation and the treaty at the end of Stage III was sort of sloughed over. I feel that the US is faced with two possibilities: either they take a firm line and insist that wars of liberation and that type of thing be included in this kind of treaty, or have a ban put on them, in which case the Soviets would not accept it; or they can go along, as in the present policy of the US, and ignore this question in the treaty on the assumption that, as you well pointed out, Mr. Chairman Khrushchev, the supplying of wars of liberation to any extent -- like Korea and South Vietnam -- would be increasingly difficult in Stage II and possibly in Stage III. However, the small arms -- pistols and things like that -- can go on. From the US point of view, that can be controlled, hopefully, by the internal security forces. Therefore, I do not think that this point is really of great importance. I do not want to minimize it, though. It is an important point but I do not think that it seriously threatens the stability of the world at the end of Stage III.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. We have time for, I think, one more question under this heading. Mike Newlin's name is conscribed on my list.

MR. NEWLIN. My comment is not related to

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disarmament. If anybody has something on disarmament, why don't you proceed?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. I suggest that we move along to a question which is of great interest to me and others, I know. Some of it has already come out in this conversation. Can we pinpoint as best we can what, if anything, increased the knowledge or insights which we may have acquired as a consequence of this exercise on certain specific policy issues on American foreign policy?

Some of this has already come out in different contexts. For example, is it possible to sum up any particular lessons for American policy in terms of a viable approach towards Africa that has come out of this game? Is it just as black as it looks to me without a very radically-different, rather high-risk, in political terms, American policy?

It has been suggested by somebody that this type of policy would be the only winning alternative and that we would at least be competing with the Russians, if not outdoing them. This has always been difficult, if not impossible for the US. Does this suggest that it is a losing game for Western policy as the intensity of the struggle in South Africa becomes higher? What sorts of things might we say have emerged in this exercise?

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Secondly, is it necessary to go back and sum up -- I am not sure it is -- anything that we have not covered already which one may have stumbled over regarding the problems of an international military force?

Thirdly, is there anything that this game has taught us? I know that it has taught me some things about the relationship of the disarming process under certain -- it seems to me -- very realistic conditions, if you can accept the initial premises. 2. The rooting out of very deep-set racial, economic, social, religious, geographical kind of historical events to come.

Let us take as much time as is necessary for anyone who is moved to say what his experience might have been or his intellectual experience, that is, along any of these lines.

MR. NEWLIN. I would like to make --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mike?

MR. NEWLIN. -- one comment. It is related to something which I wanted to add to the very cogent point that George High had made earlier about the various considerations that we would face here. That is something that I found personally deficient in the contingency planning of both the Soviet and American teams, and that is their position throughout the African continent. It

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seems to me that they concentrated on their strategic aims in a military sense and they did not adequately cover the position that they should have within each African country on this particular issue.

Now, the things that George has brought out, I think, are all valid considerations. However, I think that the US in the long run, as a matter of reality, if you wish, has an interest in seeing that there are African-dominated governments, dominated by the majority, the length and breadth of the continent, and in seeing that the Africans are masters in their own houses. This does not underplay the horrible problems that you have of these white settlers. How it is going to be solved, I do not know. There are going to be many thorny and difficult dilemmas.

One thing I appreciate in this game is the nature of the problem that is going to eventually confront us in South Africa; but I do think that perhaps some people have given a great deal of emphasis to certain domestic minority views that are prevalent in this country and which act as an inhibiting factor on our policy.

In the last analysis, I am not sure who is going to win out when the chips are down and you are facing a continent-wide type of decision.

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MR. MEANIX. I do not know if we --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Go ahead.

MR. MEANIX. -- we were very conscious of exercising influence with these governments. One move that the US made in making this air strike against South African aircraft -- although they could pretend that they weren't theirs to cut their losses -- was a big US move. I think that the US would have quite a bit of difficulty in reaching a decision like that in these circumstances. Is this not very practically letting African governments know where the US stands on this problem?

MR. HIGH. Good question.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. John Marcum?

MR. NEWLIN. Let me answer this. That is why it was so incomprehensible to the Secretariat when you did an about-face when you were forced to bite the bullet and face the issue in Mozambique. You had acted in your national interest, which was parallel with the interest of the Africans. In other words, an African-dominated government which would be tolerated both by East and West and by the other African states -- not by South Africa maybe, but by the other African states that could maintain themselves. The US did not go ahead. They could not see their way clear because they felt that they could not go

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against the South African government. This, I think, is something that was confusing to the UN. Maybe we did not fully understand the problem here. Maybe we did not make ourselves clear as to what we had in mind. But when you turned us down out-of-hand on this thing, we were considerably astonished.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. John Marcum?

MR. KINSEY. "Aghast" is the word.

MR. MARCUM. One of the things that ought to be avoided would be precisely the kind of situation that developed in this game where the situation has gotten out of hand. It has erupted in many places and we would have little chance of localizing it. For economic reasons and for racial reasons indigenous to the country and for military reasons, we might find our hands tied. This teaches us, in part, that policies ought to be designed to relate to these areas separately. The solution, hopefully, to our relationship with each African area should be piecemeal, if you want, as the forces sort of move down toward the Union. The final confrontation, obviously, comes with the Republic of South Africa.

I would like to say one other thing here and this has to do with something which the Soviet team thought about at one point, and I think that the American government

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would, in reality, have to think about it, too. I am personally convinced -- I know Control did not agree -- that it would be likely that there will be some kind of African umbrella that would come out. There will be an Addis Ababa meeting next May. Although this may not be an effective meeting, it would represent the lowest common denominator between the existing Monrovian, Casablancan, and other ethnic groups. There will be a certain amount of unity. We should try to relate our policy to this so that we can identify ourselves to the maximum degree with African aspirations and not minimize the Soviet advantage which still remains an advantage -- being ever able to take a hard line, as I suggested earlier, on this almost preoccupation fixation of many young Africans on the question of South Africa, the symbol of everything against which they have been fighting.

MR. HIGH. What I have to say has already been said, but I think that one point in the dilemma that the UN was facing in the apparent reversal of American policy between attacking at least South African aircraft and then suddenly coming dangerously close to fully erasing the South African government in the exercise is only too typical of what in practice has been the experience of the American government, if only in the Congo. That is one

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point.

Another one is that although this may be a minority group that would be opposed to the US taking a position unfavorable to the South African, it is an awfully important one. It is one that has spoken up very effectively in many regards in Katanga. I think that this minority is going to be expanded, but I do not think that it is going to be expanded as it was in Katanga.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. As we go through the agenda, the more we can comment regarding any surprises in these situations which emerged out of the game, the more valuable it will be for us.

Bob?

MR. WOOD. I wanted to underscore the feeling which most of the team had: In a moment of crisis, in an explosion on this, our best tools were not available to us. Indeed, if we got any long-run hope in this area, it was probably in terms of economic and cultural assistance, or a set of tools which are quite distinct, Bill, from the manipulations in setting up puppet governments and things like that. Whatever economic leverages are there get underscored because, in effect, half of the battery of resources which typically we rely on for our long-run decisions in the world was just

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unavailable to us in this sort of situation.

I would say on the second one, on your (Mr. Newlin's) concern on the flip flop on this, I do not think that we made clear in the final paper or up to now exactly what was intended here in the Move VII period because this was not embracing South Africa. We had bet on the UN all the way down and had taken an extraordinarily hard line on Africa. As I remember Bill's last military calculations on this, what we would have seen in Mozambique is unilateral military action on our part in which we, in effect, would interpose a force between the black-white confrontation and make it, indeed, a white-white problem for the South Africans.

I may be misconstruing what I think came out here in the last 15 minutes, but this was certainly not going to give way to a complete Soviet alliance with the Africans. Whether it would have been successful or not is another point. But it was not an alliance for South Africa, nor, indeed, as the Lyndon Johnson mission was publicly reported, which is ever the posture of the purpose of that mission.

MR. NEWLIN. Could I ask for clarification on this?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

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MR. NEWLIN. If you consider that this would be a white-white confrontation, then you are implying that the US would be confronting Africans, too, urging them to back down.

MR. WOOD. What we meant by "unilateral action" was --

MR. MILLIKAN. But you would be in a sandwich here.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. White-white confrontation on one side, and a white-black confrontation on the other.

MR. NEWLIN. The thing that I do not understand is why on earth you would not go whole hog for a UN force which would accomplish the same thing without your direct involvement.

MR. MEANIX. We did not have a chance to bargain on what was going to happen in Mozambique.

MR. WOOD. It was not explained to us at this time about the nature of the resolution. We were prepared to go in.

MR. NEWLIN. There was the time factor.

MR. WOOD. This probably would have been defeated, I think, anyway. This would not wash domestically.

MR. NEWLIN. This is illustrative of --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Because we have so little time left, I feel that we should stick to the surprises, if any,

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of the game.

Max?

MR. MILLIKAN. My question is over the dam.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill Griffith?

MR. GRIFFITH. I just want to say something on American policy. It seems to me that I would agree with Max Millikan. The dilemma is insoluble at the present time. American policy should be to postpone it until it becomes less of a dilemma.

MR. WOOD. Back to the long run.

MR. GRIFFITH. Now, to postpone it, one of the things one would presume should be done would be to lower the possibility, so far as one can, of this kind of explosion; or, if it did occur, of our having more influence on the ground. Therefore, it seems to me that the key element here --

MR. KINSEY. Speaking as an American?

MR. WHALEY. Out of his role as scholar.

MR. KINSEY. Out of his role.

MR. GRIFFITH. The American interest should be to postpone trouble, confrontation, and the increasing of Soviet influence among those people who could cause or control the trouble. It would seem to me that a much larger program than is now going on would be required to

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attain a major degree of American interference in the Portuguese territories and, to some extent, in the Union.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is a very interesting point. Hal?

MR. AARON. I have just one point: When we got to the end of this game -- unfortunately, we should have had Game 2A -- what we did for lack of time was just to throw something together, which was just completely hopeless, with bailing wire and Scotch tape.

The one point that I would like to raise is that here you have the political direction of forces -- a white-white and white-black configuration. This is in the political spectrum. By putting police in the military spectrum, I realize that I have a hell of a lot more troubles than you have in the political spectrum. What we tried to do was to employ a safety valve. I do not know whether you recognized it or not, but we were willing to go along, as Herb espoused, and to provide, as much as possible, an African force. But in back of this, we provided a fairly neutral white force which would reassert some coolness and logic. From the other point of view, I think that it would be an extremely difficult situation. I think Game 2A would have been ideal inasmuch as it hit all of us so fast that we did not have time to try it

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through. It was all visceral.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. John Marcum?

MR. MARCUM. This is fairly much of a repeat of what Bill Griffith was saying. I am merely underscoring what has been said before. I think too often we (the US) have ended up, in a situation like this, paying too little attention to the people concerned -- in this case, the Africans -- letting the Soviets have all the initiative in terms of contacts and in terms of both overt and covert actions. We should be building bridges -- not destroying them. We should not be creating situations where we will have to court people at a future date, while at this point we are rejecting them. This is very vital to American interests.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bart Whaley?

MR. WHALEY. I have a question for Hal Aaron. In the putting together of a UN force, was any consideration given on the part of the UN team to the possibility of, say, having white troops drawn from white countries so that they could possibly police the cities, inasmuch as the scenario had moved things along so that you really had all of the whites in Angola confined to the urban centers?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. WHALEY. With the greater part of the military

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and geographical areas of the rest of the country confined to Africans, was there any consideration given to the possibility of having white troops essentially sort of police the cities or actually try to take the cities in the area, the urban centers?

MR. AARON. I think that that is a good point. We did not have time to do that. I think that that is a good question.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Nielsen, and I think that this should be the last question under this heading.

MR. NIELSEN. You asked for surprises. One thing that surprised me was, I felt very keenly, the difficulty of operating in an area in which our power to act militarily was really extremely limited.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Soviet power?

MR. NIELSEN. Yes. In fact, about the only military advice I could give was, "Stay out of trouble; don't let this thing get away." The surprise was that we were not confronted with a believable threat in the area that really scared us, and I think there could have been (such a threat).

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Are you saying that a unilateral American move into the area would have stalemated you and that you would not have been able to meet that?

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MR. NIELSEN. I am just saying that we wanted very badly to avoid this.

MR. GRIFFITH. This is what we thought. Absolutely.

MR. NEWLIN. And the Secretary General.

MR. GRIFFITH. This is why we rejoined the force.

MR. NIELSEN. If we believed that this was imminent, it could mean a victory for us.

MR. GRIFFITH. We would have rejoined the UN force at any time if we believed that there was going to be a US unilateral force.

MR. WOOD. But if our astronaut had landed --

MR. BLOOMFIELD. He did.

(General laughter.)

MR. BLOOMFIELD. There are two more who want to speak. If this is on the question of surprises which emerged out of the game, I think that we should listen to them and then move on to another heading.

MR. HIGH. This is in regard to a surprise. What this game does to me, as an introverted State Department official, is to make me want to give encouragement to the Defense Department to go out and go all fours for unilateral US action; and I think there you have to take into consideration a gigantic reaction by the Africans.

MR. GRIFFITH. This is why we joined the UN force.

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MR. BLOOMFIELD. It was a military, rather than a political, appreciation, I gathered.

Herb, you are going to have the last word on this question. That ought to please you.

MR. WEISS. Well, much in the same direction as George High, I think that this idea of a unilateral action serves no purpose if its only success is to stalemate the Russians, because you then have territory with which you have to do something and the game continues. I think that there is sort of a false image given by the fact that the Soviet Union would have been stalemated by unilateral military action on the part of the US. What would the US then have done? This is different than Cuba, you see. Even Cuba is, of course, much more manageable, from the US point of view. We could have gone in and occupied it. After all, this has happened in the past, in history, in the South American area.

There were specific things which one could have done, but we would have become a new colonial power in Africa if we actually went in and stayed there. And, again, if we just went in and settled things and then left, we would be leaving behind a most fantastic vacuum, yet not having in any real way disturbed the Soviet Union.

Therefore, I think that this looks exciting because

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the Soviet team is saying, "Well then, we would have been stalemated", but I do not see where this takes us at all.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Mel would like the last word.

MR. NEILSEN. I did not say that we would have been stalemated. I said that I was surprised that we were not confronted with a serious threat of this.

MR. IKLE. Except at the end.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. The clock is our enemy -- also our friend. I suggest that we take a couple of minutes, with your indulgence, to get just your top-of-the-head, curbstone, horseback, et cetera opinions and judgments on a couple of devices which were used in this exercise. There is a questionnaire which I will hand out to you at the very end. It will ask for your ideas as to the techniques employed in the game. There are also a few other questions. There is a question regarding direct confrontation. It would be interesting to receive now a couple of reactions as to whether, in carrying out your program and your strategy, it would have been significantly more helpful or have made a significant difference to have been able to meet face to face. For example, the Soviet and American teams never saw each other.

MR. WOOD. Except as a rapporteur.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. That is right.

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MR. WOOD. And that was terrible.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Right. Does anyone have any reaction to that point, the isolation of the teams and the lack of face-to-face confrontation during the game?

MR. MEANIX. Yes, a most experienced one, but it tends to get more into a move.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

MR. MEANIX. I think that it would be valuable if you could talk to the other guy and to know, either by his failure to talk to you or by his talking to you, where he stands in a situation which Control would have given you. I would say that this, in effect, would be making something like a double move. At the same time, you see, he would know what you are thinking or he would know what you are willing to say, and you would know what he is willing to say. I think this would have been valuable; I think it would have moved the game along faster; and I tend to think the game would have moved more realistically.

MR. WHALEY. Point of information on this specific point here: For the record, the confrontation between James Reston and the Soviet ambassador was, as far as I know, an innovation in gaming technique.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. In this game.

MR. WHALEY. I think that it is a device which we

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might seriously consider for the future, and I think that this would perhaps answer Commander Meanix' point. It may be a device by which we could put this in during the game during the move period.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill Griffith?

MR. GRIFFITH. I maintain that this confrontation worked out very badly.

MR. WHALEY. In this specific case, yes.

MR. GRIFFITH. Because the written record of it presents an exactly opposite view of the view that I was trying to present, as I thought the Soviets would have viewed the situation. Now, maybe he was no good as a Soviet ambassador. I don't know.

I would also maintain that the Soviet team was in a very asymmetrical position inasmuch as we did not know certain things about which we normally would have known.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Bill Kinsey?

MR. KINSEY. I think that this might be a good technique because in real life this does happen: The President gives conferences and exclusive interviews as well as press interviews, and there are hundreds of people involved in this, and also Khrushchev, not to mention lesser lights in the world. I think that it might be helpful if you, as was done in this case, keep it down to a certain

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minimum of time.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Wes Posvar?

MR. POSVAR. I would just like to briefly express the viewpoint from an administrative standpoint, and I think that this is something about which we have talked previously in gaming. You very rapidly reach the point of losing control easily. You have to have discrete (separate) steps. If we are trying to do this, then we may want faster information, faster moves, or faster communication. But the more face-to-face communication that you have, the more chaos you have.

One distortion in this game -- which is not a reflection on the way anyone did his job -- was that there seemed to be a disproportionate degree of initiative in planning by the UN team.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. We also asked them to do some planning, of course.

MR. POSVAR. I know that we asked them to do some planning, but I think that this was a distorting factor.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Yes. Mike wants to comment on that and then Max and then I think we can move on to the last item.

MR. NEWLIN. I just want to say in regard to that that I was surprised at the degree of reality that -- I

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don't know; I hope my colleagues shared this -- we found in the entire situation, particularly in the various responses that were elicited. I feel that you normally would not have had in this kind of problem a direct confrontation between the Soviets and the US. It was entirely incumbent upon the UN in a situation like this to seize the ball and continue to take the initiative. If you do not, you are lost, you see, if either the East or the West gets the ball.

While the initial reaction of people in Control, we know, was that certain of the things we were throwing out were unrealistic, we felt that people were still forced to take that into account and react.

MR. POSVAR. My comment was on an abstract, procedural level.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Max?

MR. MILLIKAN. I have only one sentence. I have been in an early game which the Center put on in which we maximized this and were completely free about this sort of contact, and I would like to express as my view -- which I will explain to you later; there is no point in taking the company's time now -- that it would be disastrous to expand the personal contacts significantly beyond what they were in this game. Wes has explained some of the

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reasons, but there are lots of others.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Gentlemen, the time is rapidly approaching. I have one or two last words, and then Ernie Lefever would like a couple of minutes. I will repeat again what I said at the initial briefing. We have been dealing with a highly-sensitive problem from the standpoint of American interests at the moment. Even though this is not a formally-classified exercise, it is our solemn duty to handle it with the utmost privacy and discretion.

The distribution of the materials that have been used in this game, we feel, should be handled on the closest possible basis. Therefore, before you leave, we request you to leave your books and your papers on the table out in the hall. Now, if anyone has a need to have the papers, please let us know and we will arrange to send them appropriately.

MR. IKLE. Are you checking the rooms?

MR. BLOOMFIELD. We will debug and sweep, I think the expression is. But this is really quite mandatory and I am sure that you will understand. We would appreciate your leaving all papers which are in your possession from this game on the table out there, and let us know if you have a particular need to have them and we will deal with that. We can assure you of the security, to the best of

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our capacity, of the transcript and of the materials we have; but, obviously, this depends on everyone here.

Bart, I think David (Schwartz) was out of the room. You might just pass that on to him and to anyone else who was missing.

Ernie now wants to take a couple of minutes. Then I will hand out the questionnaire and we can dine.

MR. LEFEVER. In terms of the Institute for Defense Analyses, I think this game has suggested a number of things to us. In the first place, I think it suggested how very difficult it is to carry out a game which takes seriously the level of national arms. This is a problem which will be developed and which will perplex us in the two succeeding games. But the real variable that we are supposed to deal with in our study of the utility and feasibility of an international force is the level of national arms available.

Another thing which the game demonstrated, I think, was the US tendency or predisposition to work through the UN, where vital US interests are not directly involved, in contrast to our action in Cuba in recent weeks.

Furthermore, there was a tendency to continue working through the instrumentality of the UN even perhaps after the point where unilateral action was indicated. This suggests that the US takes a, some might say, more

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realistic view toward the UN, in contrast to the politically-pragmatic view which seems to be held by Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

The game suggests that serious conflicts of interest among significant military states throw into jeopardy progress on disarmament. But in light of the fact that both the USSR and the US shrank back from the brink of nuclear war suggests that there still remained a common interest in the avoidance of nuclear war, and this could prove to be a foundation for some progress toward disarmament.

My most important point has to do with a word of thanks on behalf of IDA for all of you who have participated in this game. IDA directly and, indirectly, ISA and the Pentagon are the chief beneficiaries of this enterprise. We are especially grateful to Lincoln Bloomfield and Bart Whaley for an exceptionally well-executed game, and to MIT for furnishing brains and hospitality.

I was especially grateful, as a member of the Control group, for the superchairmanship of Max Millikan.

I am grateful, as all of us are, for the chef here and her henchmen, and for the participation of all, including the messengers and the secretaries.

MR. BLOOMFIELD. Good. Well, on behalf of MIT first, I would like to thank IDA for the money which they provided,

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and, secondly, I want to thank all of you for really a very stimulating performance in which I was grateful to be a colleague.

I would like to say a word about Marvin Zonis and David Schwartz, who ran their heads off as our message center.

I also want to thank our four charming and efficient young ladies, who are gracing the back of the room, for all their help.

Please take a questionnaire and leave your books.

These proceedings are closed.

(Ended at 7:05 p.m., Friday, January 4, 1962.)

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