# Codebook contents

## Motivation of Project

This dataset is a first systematic, comprehensive, and long-term tracking of the post-exile fate of political leaders who have lost power due to political upheaval. In recent years, a growing number of studies have focused on individual political leaders, in particular their post-tenure fate as both an independent and dependent variable. One important premise in these studies is that leaders do not prioritize maintaining their position in office, but rather avoiding "punishments" such as exile, execution, and imprisonment after losing power.

However, it is not obvious that exile can be categorized as punishment, lumped together with execution and imprisonment. Unlike the other two, the fate of political leaders after exile can be extremely diverse. In other words, previous studies have focused too short a time frame on the post-tenure fate of leaders; they have focused only on the treatment immediately after the loss of power.
This dataset will not only fundamentally rethink the findings of existing studies that have considered exile as a form of punishment, but will also open up possibilities for further research on when and why exile functions as punishment, and how exile as punishment and non-punishment affect the subsequent political process.

## Scope of Dataset

The target of this dataset is the post-exile fate of 101 political leaders who lost power and went into exile due to political upheaval between 1970 and 2015 through 2020.

The identification of the political leaders covered was essentially based on Archigos, but some modifications were made by checking the details of each case (see "List of Cases Modified from Archigos" section for details).

### ***Definition***

The definitions below are basically based on Archigos.

*Leader*

By *political leader*, this dataset follows Archigos, and means "the *effective* leader of each independent state," that is, "the person that de facto exercised power in a country" (Goemans et al. 2009: 271).

*Political upheaval*

Loss of power due to *political upheaval* means that a political leader "was removed in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions," or that "a foreign state directly removes a leader" (Goemans et al. 2016: 3). This corresponds to an *irregular* loss of power or *foreign* removal in

Archigos, although some cases are excluded, such as those caused by assassination, in which no post-tenure fate exists. Specifically, the following patterns of loss of power in Archigos' *exitcode* are included:

*Popular Protest* (with or without Foreign Support)
*Removed by Military* (with or without Foreign Support)
*Removed by Other Government Actors* (with or without Foreign Support)
*Removed by Rebels* (with or without Foreign Support)
*Removed in Military Power Struggle Short of Coup*
*Removed through Threat of Foreign Force*
*Irregular, Other*

*Exile*

*Exile* in this project refers to the situation in which a political leader's post-tenure fate is to settle in an overseas territory. Specifically, we basically followed Archigos' coding of "exile" in the *posttenurefate* variable.

If a leader fled to a foreign embassy in his/her own country, we considered that an exile, following Archigos, because embassies are under extraterritorial jurisdiction. Also, if a political change occurs while a leader is out of the country, he or she will automatically be counted in exile. Exile can be a result of a leader's temporary arrest and forcible removal, as well as a leader's decision to go into exile on his or her own.

***Period of Analysis***

Our dataset covers the period from 1970 to 2020. Specifically, we cover all political leaders who went into exile due to political upheaval between 1970 and 2015, and we track their post-exile fate until December 31, 2020.

***Identifying Exiled Leaders Due to Political Upheaval***

Based on the definitions above, we took the following steps to determine the universe of our dataset.

According to Archigos, there are 85 leaders whose *posttenurefate* is "exile" and *exitcode* is not "regular" among those who lost their power between 1970 and 2015.[1] Based on this, we have checked

[1] In defining the universe, our focus is essentially on the date of the leader's exile, not the date of the leader's loss of power, although in many cases the two dates are quite close. However, if a leader lost power before 2015 and went into exile after 2016, we decided to include them in our universe to cover as many cases as possible. One case, Yingluck of Thailand, falls into this category. See the full list of cases.

each case in detail and have also compared them with the existing datasets on political changes to determine the number of cases.

First, we added the cases in which *exitcode* is coded "regular" by Archigos but can be regarded as irregular leadership changes due to the treatment by the existing works, and/or *posttenurefate* is not "exile" but could be regarded as exile in substance.

Second, we excluded the cases with the *posttenurefate* of "exile" that could not be considered exile in a substantive sense.

Third, we added the cases that are not covered by Archigos but can be regarded as irregular forms of loss of power and exile.

As a result of the above steps, 101 political leaders who went into exile due to political upheavals that occurred between 1970 and 2015 were identified as the subjects of our dataset. For a full list of cases covered by our dataset, see "Full List of Cases."

## Sources

Data were collected from a variety of sources, including press materials (international and local) that can be collected mainly in the Lexis/Nexis database, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Archigos, Colpus, REIGN, Lentz III (1995), and case-specific secondary materials.

## Variables

As discussed in the main text, our dataset divided the fate of leaders after exile into three time periods: ***During exile***, ***Returning home country***, ***After returning home and beyond***. Note that some of the variables included in these are not mentioned in the main text.

***Identification variables***

*Leader*

The name of the exiled leaders.

*Home Country*

The name of the home country of the exiled leader.

*Destination*

The country to which the leader went into exile. Countries where the exiled leader was temporarily in transit before reaching the final destination were excluded. For the determination of the destination of exile, we also referred to Escribà-Folch and Krcmaric (2017). If the destination was changed, it was listed in the following order: Destination 2, Destination 3…. The maximum number of destination changes was 6 in Mohammad Rezā

Shāh Pahlavi, Iran.

*Start date*

The date the leader was exiled. This is not necessarily the same as the date the leader lost power. For example, after the loss of power, negotiations may take place with the new government over the treatment of the leader. In cases where a leader loses power due to a political upheaval while out of the country, the date of the political upheaval is used as the start date.

*End date*

The date on which the leader's exile status ended. The end of exile can be the return to the home country or death in exile. If the exile was ongoing as of December 31, 2020, the date was listed as December 31, 2020.

***During exile***

*Exercise of Political Influence*

Whether the exiled leader exercised any substantive political influence over the home country while in exile. Krcmaric and Escribà-Folch (2023) offers several patterns of "indirect strategies" for how leaders can engage in homeland politics from exile. We have taken this into account while examining leaders' post-exile behavior in more detail. Specifically, the following patterns of political influence are included in this dataset.

*Engaging in activities aimed at overthrowing the home government*

Examples include: continuing anti-government struggle, planning and ordering a coup d'état in the home country.

*Working to maintain or expand support at home*

Examples include: mobilizing remaining supporters, participating in elections in the home country.

*Supporting opponents of the incumbent regime*

Examples include: expressing support and providing financial aid for the incumbent's rivals.

*Engaging in diplomatic activities to garner international support*

Examples include: speeches to international organizations and meetings with the leaders of other countries.

*Promoting reconciliation in the home country*

Examples include: participating in peace talks, calling for an end to fighting and

reconciliation.

*Continuation of political party leader*

Whether the leader continued to hold the party leadership position after exile.

*Change of the country of exile*

Whether the leader changed the country of exile. This excludes cases where the leader merely passed through another country before arriving at the exile destination. Also, a brief visit to another country without moving the base from the country of exile, such as for diplomatic activities, is not considered a change of the country of exile.

*Prosecution in the home country*

Whether the leader was prosecuted in the home country while in exile. Coded regardless of whether the leader was convicted as a result of the prosecution.

*Amnesty in the home country*

Whether the leader was granted amnesty by the home government. Amnesty for exiled leaders may be explicitly legal, such as a congressional decision to grant immunity for human rights abuses during their tenure, or may involve political decisions, such as allowing a prohibited return to promote domestic reconciliation.

*Anti-acceptance protests in the county of exile*

Whether there were anti-acceptance protests in the host country when the leaders defected.

*Justification for acceptance by the country of exile*

Whether the host government provided any justification for accepting the leaders into exile.

*Prosecution in the country of exile*

Whether the exiled leader was prosecuted in the country of exile. Coded regardless of whether the leader was convicted as a result of the prosecution.

*Conviction in the country of exile*

Whether the leader was convicted as a result of prosecution in the country of exile.

***Returning home country***

*Repatriation*

Whether the leader returned home, died in exile, or was still in exile as of December 31, 2020.

*Duration*

The number of days in exile. For leaders whose post-exile fate was "continued," the number of days was counted up to December 31, 2020.

*Type of repatriation*

If the exiled leader returned home, whether with permission from the home government, without permission, or by extradition.

Exiled leaders often return home *with permission* from their home government, usually due to political changes in their home country, such as the end of a civil war.

In other cases, they may return home on their own initiative *without permission* from their home government. Some, like Ahmed Abdallah of Comoros, return by force as part of a military operation, while others, like Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, cross the border clandestinely and suddenly appear in their home country.

Finally, in cases where the home government pursues crimes committed during the leader's tenure, the leader may return home through *extradition* by agreement between the home and exile governments.

*Repatriation under the next regime*

If the exiled leader returned home, whether the new regime that ousted them was still in power in their home countries at the time of their return.

***After returning home and beyond***

*Return to public office*

Whether the exiled leader was reinstated in public office after returning to the home country. Public office here refers to any position in a political organization, including government agencies, political parties, and international and regional organizations. Examples include presidents and prime ministers, party leaders, government advisors, ambassadors, and special envoys to regional organizations.

*Return to leadership positions*

Whether the exiled leader was reappointed to a national leadership position, such as

president or prime minister, upon return to the home country.

## Full list of cases

| Leader | Home Country | Start date | End date | Repatriation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yingluck Shinawatra | Thailand | 2017/8/24 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Campaore | Burkina Faso | 2014/10/31 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Yanukovych | Ukraine | 2014/2/25 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Djotodia | CAR | 2014/1/11 | 2020/1/10 | returned |
| Francois Bozize | CAR | 2013/3/24 | 2019/12/16 | returned |
| Raimundo Pereira | Guinea-Bissau | 2012/5/12 | 2020/5/12 | returned |
| Amadou Toure | Mali | 2012/4/19 | 2017/12/24 | returned |
| Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali | Tunisia | 2011/1/14 | 2019/9/19 | dead |
| Bakiyev | Kyrgyzstan | 2010/4/20 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Dadis Camara | Guinea | 2009/12/4 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Zelaya | Honduras | 2009/9/21 | 2011/5/28 | returned |
| Marc Ravalomanana | Madagascar | 2009/3/17 | 2014/10/24 | returned |
| Thaksin Shinawatra | Thailand | 2006/9/19 | 2008/2/28 | returned |
| Sidi Ahmed Taya | Mauritania | 2005/8/3 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Akayev | Kyrgyzstan | 2005/3/25 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Aristide | Haiti | 2004/2/29 | 2011/3/18 | returned |
| Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada | Bolivia | 2003/10/18 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Taylor | Liberia | 2003/8/11 | 2006/3/29 | returned |
| Patasse | CAR | 2003/3/15 | 2009/10/30 | returned |
| Ratsiraka | Madagascar | 2007/7/5 | 2011/11/24 | returned |
| Fujimori | Peru | 2000/11/13 | 2007/9/23 | returned |
| Guei | Ivory Coast | 2000/10/25 | 2000/11/13 | returned |
| Mahuad | Ecuador | 2000/1/20 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Konan Bedie | Ivory Coast | 1999/12/26 | 2001/10/15 | returned |
| Vieira | Guinea-Bissau | 1999/5/7 | 2005/4/1 | returned |
| Cubas Grau | Paraguay | 1999/3/29 | 2002/2/22 | returned |
| Koroma | Sierra Leone | 1998/2/12 | 2003/6/1 | returned |
| Lissouba | Congo | 1997/10/20 | 2020/8/24 | dead |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ranariddh | Cambodia | 1997/7/5 | 1998/3/30 | returned |
| Kabbah | Sierra Leone | 1997/5/25 | 1998/3/10 | returned |
| Mobutu | Congo (DRC) | 1997/5/18 | 1997/9/7 | dead |
| Strasser | Sierra Leone | 1996/1/16 | 2000/11/27 | returned |
| Bob Denard | Comoros | 1995/10/5 | 2007/10/13 | dead |
| Khalifah Ath-Thani | Qatar | 1995/6/27 | 2004/10/12 | returned |
| Cedras | Haiti | 1994/10/13 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Jawara | Gambia | 1994/7/22 | 2002/6/3 | returned |
| Sindikubwabo | Rwanda | 1994/7/19 | N/A | dead |
| Serrano Elias | Guatemala | 1993/6/3 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Mutalibov | Azerbaijan | 1992/5/18 | 2012/7/7 | returned |
| Momoh | Sierra Leone | 1992/4/29 | 1997/2/23 | returned |
| Gamsakhurdia | Georgia | 1992/1/6 | 1993/9/24 | returned |
| Aristide | Haiti | 1991/9/30 | 1994/10/15 | returned |
| Gebre Kidan | Ethiopia | 1991/5/31 | 2004/6/4 | dead |
| Mengistu Marriam | Ethiopia | 1991/5/21 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Choonhavan | Thailand | 1991/3/12 | 1991/8/2 | returned |
| Siad Barre | Somalia | 1991/1/29 | 1995/1/1 | dead |
| Habre | Chad | 1990/12/5 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Aoun | Lebanon | 1990/10/13 | 2005/5/7 | returned |
| Jabir As-Sabah | Kuwait | 1990/8/2 | 1991/3/14 | returned |
| Avril | Haiti | 1990/3/12 | 1993/9/2 | returned |
| Bob Denard | Comoros | 1989/12/15 | 1995/9/28 | returned |
| Honecker | East Germany | 1990/4/3 | 1994/5/29 | dead |
| Sadeq al-Mahdi | Sudan | 1996/12/11 | 2000/11/25 | returned |
| Stroessner | Paraguay | 1998/2/5 | 2006/8/16 | dead |
| Namphy | Haiti | 1988/9/17 | 2018/6/26 | dead |
| Manigat | Haiti | 1988/6/20 | 1990/10/15 | returned |
| Bagaza | Burundi | 1987/9/3 | 1993/7/28 | returned |
| Karmal | Afghanistan | 1986/5/5 | 1991/6/20 | returned |
| Marcos | Philippines | 1986/2/25 | 1989/9/28 | dead |
| Duvalier, Jean-Claude | Haiti | 1986/2/7 | 2011/1/16 | returned |
| Ali Nassir Hassani | South Yemen | N/A | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Godfrey Binaisa | Uganda | 1980/12/26 | 1985/9/29 | returned |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Obote | Uganda | 1985/7/27 | 2005/10/10 | dead |
| Jaafar Muhammad an-Nimeiry | Sudan | 1985/4/6 | 1999/5/22 | returned |
| Ould Haidalla | Mauritania | 1984/12/12 | 1984/12/13 | returned |
| Tsedenbal | Mongolia | 1984/8/24 | 1991/4/21 | dead |
| Torrelio Villa | Bolivia | N/A | 1999/4/24 | dead |
| Oueddei | Chad | 1982/6/7 | 2009/8/20 | returned |
| Garcia Meza Tejada | Bolivia | 1982/10/12 | 1986/4/7 | returned |
| Majano Ramos | El Salvador | 1981/3/20 | 2020/12/31 | continued |
| Cabral | Guinea-Bissau | 1981/12/31 | 1999/11/15 | returned |
| Ferrier | Suriname | 1980/8/13 | N/A | returned |
| Lidia Gueiler Tejada | Bolivia | 1980/10/8 | 1982/10/10 | returned |
| Natusch Busch | Bolivia | 1981/5/13 | 1981/7/2 | returned |
| Romero Mena | El Salvador | 1979/10/15 | N/A | returned |
| Bokassa | CAR | 1979/9/20 | 1987/10/23 | returned |
| Anastasio Somoza Debayle | Nicaragua | 1979/7/17 | 1980/9/17 | dead |
| Amin | Uganda | 1979/4/25 | 2003/8/16 | dead |
| Malloum | Chad | 1979/4/4 | 2002/5/31 | returned |
| Eric Gairy | Grenada | 1979/3/13 | 1984/1/21 | returned |
| Mohammad Reza | Iran | 1979/1/16 | 1980/7/27 | dead |
| Pereda Asbun | Bolivia | 1978/11/25 | N/A | returned |
| Banzer Suarez | Bolivia | 1978/10/6 | 1979/3/16 | returned |
| James Mancham | Seychelles | 1977/6/5 | 1992/4/13 | returned |
| Micombero | Burundi | 1976/11/1 | 1983/7/17 | dead |
| Abdallah | Comoros | N/A | 1978/5/21 | returned |
| Gowon | Nigeria | 1975/7/29 | 1983/12/6 | returned |
| Van Thieu | Republic of Vietnam | 1975/4/21 | 2001/9/29 | dead |
| Lon Nol | Cambodia | 1975/4/1 | 1985/11/17 | dead |
| Makarios | Cyprus | 1974/7/17 | 1974/12/7 | returned |
| Al-Iryani | North Yemen | N/A | 1981/10/7 | returned |
| Caetano | Portugal | 1974/5/20 | 1980/10/26 | dead |
| Thanon Kittakachorn | Thailand | 1973/10/14 | 1976/9/19 | returned |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ahmed Ath-Thani | Qatar | 1972/2/22 | 1977/11/25 | dead |
| Velasco Ibarra | Ecuador | 1972/2/18 | 1979/2/17 | returned |
| Busia | Ghana | 1972/1/10 | 1978/8/28 | dead |
| Torres | Bolivia | N/A | 1976/7/1 | dead |
| Obote | Uganda | 1971/1/24 | 1980/5/27 | returned |
| Ovando Candia | Bolivia | 1970/10/7 | 1970/10/8 | returned |
| Sa`id ibn Taimur | Oman | 1970/7/23 | 1972/10/19 | dead |
| Sihanouk | Cambodia | 1970/3/18 | 1975/9/9 | returned |

List of Cases Modified from Archigos

| Case | Way of losing power | | Post-tenure fate | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Archigos ("exitcode") | Our coding | Archigos ("posttenurefate") | Our coding |
| Compaore | regular | **irregular** (popular uprising) | exile | exile |
| Yingluck | regular | **irregular** (coup d'état) | OK | **exile** |
| Yanukovych | regular | **irregular** (popular uprising) | exile | exile |
| Djotodia | regular | **irregular** (rebellion) | exile | exile |
| Lozada | regular | **irregular** (popular uprising) | exile | exile |
| Taylor | regular | **irregular** (rebellion) | exile | exile |
| Fujimori | regular | **irregular** (popular uprising) | exile | exile |
| Cubas | regular | **irregular** (popular uprising) | exile | exile |
| Sindikubwabo | regular | **irregular** (rebellion) | exile | exile |
| Honecker | regular | **irregular** (popular uprising) | imprisonment | **exile** |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Koroma | irregular (Threat of Foreign Force) | irregular (other) | OK | **exile** |
| Aristide | irregular (Removed by Military) | irregular (coup d'état) | imprisonment | **exile** |
| Aoun | regular | **irregular** (rebellion) | exile | exile |
| Cabral | irregular (Removed by Military) | irregular (coup d'état) | imprisonment | **exile** |
| Natusch | regular | **irregular** (other) | exile | exile |
| Somoza | irregular (Removed by Military) | irregular (rebellion) | death | **exile** |
| Jonathan | irregular (Removed by Military) | – | exile | **not exile** |
| Najibullah | irregular (Removed by Military) | – | exile | **not exile** |
| Gairy | – | **irregular** (coup d'état) | – | **exile** |
| Mancham | – | **irregular** (coup d'état) | – | **exile** |

**[Table 1] List of cases coded without relying on Archigos**

***Bolded text indicates where our coding differs from Archigos.**

**(1) Cases where Archigos did not code *exit* as "irregular" or "foreign," and/or *posttenurefate* as "exile," but we included in our universe**

We added 16 cases in which *exitcode* is coded "regular" by Archigos but can be regarded as irregular leadership changes due to the treatment by the existing works, and/or *posttenurefate* is not "exile" but could be regarded as exile in substance.

**Yingluck Shinawatra (Thailand, 2014)**

Amid political turmoil over the amnesty bill for pro-Thaksin politicians and constitutional

amendments, the Thai army declared martial law and announced measures "to take control of governing the country" on May 22, 2014 (*The Guardian*, May 22, 2014) after the Constitutional Court decided the dismissal of Yingluck (*Bangkok Post* (Thailand), May 7, 2014). Although the direct procedure for Yingluck's resignation was the decision by the court to dismiss her, the actual political process can be considered part of a military coup d'état:

> "Thailand's military forces staged a coup against the beleaguered civilian government led by Yingluck Shinawatra in late May" (Tow 2015: 15).
>
> "On 22 May 2014, the military junta, under the name National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha (henceforth Prayuth) assumed power after staging a coup that toppled the elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra" (Kongkirati and Kanchoochat 2018: 279).

As for her post-tenure fate, Yingluck was detained by the military (*Telegraph.co.uk*, May, 23 2014) but soon fled to Dubai in September 2014 to avoid being convicted in court (*Associated Press*, September 28, 2017). Thus, although she was detained for a short period of time (and yet Archigos' coding is "OK"), in reality it is appropriate to consider Yingluck's fate as exile:

> "Yingluck, too, went into exile rather than face the risk of jail" (Cribb and Kim 2018: 12).
>
> "Both Thaksin and Yingluck went into exile to escape jail terms on controversial corruption-related charges" (McCargo 2018: 3).

**Compaore (Burkina Faso, 2014)**

Large-scale protests by citizens against Compaore's attempts to extend his presidential term erupted in Ouagadougou, which ultimately led to Compaore's resignation and exile (*Associated Press*, November 1, 2014). Existing studies also treat this political upheaval as a popular uprising, as follows:

> " ...when Burkina Faso's longtime president Blaise Compaore attempted to have the constitution amended in October 2014 so that he could run for a third term, a massive popular uprising forced him into exile" (Yarwood 2016: 51).
>
> "In 2014, Compaore announced plans to modify the constitution to allow himself yet another term, which triggered a massive backlash. Compaore, who held power for 27 years via shrewd co-option rather than brute force, fled to the safety of the Ivory Coast once protestors set fire to parliament and marched on the presidential palace" (Krcmaric 2018: 490).
>
> "Citizens poured into the streets, leading to five days of mass protests and the Burkinabé revolution of November 2014" (Carter 2016: 36–37).
>
> "...there was Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, whose late-October 2014 attempt to change the country's constitution via referendum provoked huge popular protests and ultimately led to his ouster" (Gyimah-Boadi 2015: 108).

"President Blaise Compaore was forced to resign amid popular protests over his attempt to run for reelection in 2015" (Puddington 2015: 135).

**Yanukovych (Ukraine, 2014)**

Massive protests calling for Yanukovych's resignation arose in November 2013 when the Yanukovych administration withdrew from signing the Association Agreement with the EU in favor of strengthening relations with Russia. Anti-government protests continued to grow, resulting in Yanukovych fleeing Kiev to Kharkov on February 22, 2014 (*BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union*, April 29, 2014). That same day, the Ukrainian parliament began impeachment of Yanukovych, and subsequently Yanukovych fled to Moscow (*The Times* (London), February 28, 2014). Procedurally, he was removed from office by impeachment by the parliament, but as the sequence of events is widely referred to as the "Maidan Revolution" (Diuk 2014), it is appropriate to regard this political upheaval as a popular uprising:

"The overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych at the hands of protesters was widely hailed as a victory for Ukrainian civil society" (Way 2014: 35).

"Massive public protests against President Yanukovych's authoritarianism and pro-Russia alignment oust the President & his government" (Diamond 2021: 29).

**Djotodia (Central African Republic, 2014)**

Djotodia led the rebel group Seleka, which overthrew the Bozizé government and became president of Central Africa in March 2013. However, violence by Séléka members did not stop after that. In September 2013, Djotodia declared the dissolution of Seleka, but the rebellion spread to other parts of the country by fighters who opposed the dissolution (*Reuters*, January 9, 2014). Djotodia was unable to contain the situation, and in January 2014, he announced his resignation and went into exile in Benin.

Archigos codes his loss of power as "regular," but in reality, he was forced to resign amid ongoing conflict" (Welz 2014: 603). Many studies have interpreted his loss of power as a forced resignation as a result of Djotodia losing control over his militias as violence intensified during the conflict (Weyns et al. 2014: 23; Weber and Kaim 2014: 2; Carayannis and Fowlis 2017: 226; Arieff 2014: 8).

**Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Bolivia, 2003)**

In Bolivia under the Lozada administration, disputes over natural gas export routes and other issues have turned violent since September 2003, leading to a large-scale protest movement known as the "Gas War." As a result of the escalating political crisis, which included a nationwide general strike, an economic crisis caused by roadblocks, and casualties due to clashes between demonstrators and police forces, Lozada announced his resignation on October 17, 2003, and subsequently went into exile in

the United States. Thus, Lozada's resignation was the result of massive anti-government protests (Lehoucq 2020: 130, 134), not a regular loss of power as in the Archigos' coding.

> "…the political crisis that had forced then-president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign on October 17, 2003, in the midst of a broad popular uprising" (Centellas 2013: 88).
>
> "The government's heavy-handed repression of the indigenous protest galvanized public sentiment against the regime, leading to a cascade of mobilizations that drove Sánchez de Lozada to resign his presidency and go into self-imposed exile in the United States. By October 2003, the conflict was baptized the gas war (Guerra del Gas) and framed as a national-popular uprising in defense of the country's national resources and in opposition to a corrupt neoliberal regime" (Centellas 2013: 94).
>
> "Mass protests continued in 2003 with the first Gas War, which led to Sánchez de Lozada's resignation" (Anria 2013: 27).

**Taylor (Liberia, 2003)**

A second Liberian civil war began in 1999, and in 2003, rebels advanced into Liberia's capital, Monrovia. After heavy fighting, President Charles Taylor announced his resignation on August 11, 2003, and subsequently went into exile in Nigeria.

Taylor's resignation was clearly brought about by the deteriorating war situation in the capital siege. In the final phase of the conflict, the rebels issued an ultimatum for Taylor to step down, and the common interpretation is that its accomplishment marked the end of the Second Liberian Civil War. Geddes et al. (2014) also coded the collapse of the Taylor regime as "ousted by insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants fighting a civil war".

> "Fourteen years of nearly relentless war in Liberia ended in August 2003 with the flight into exile of former president Charles Taylor" (Bøås 2005: 73).

**Fujimori (Peru, 2000)**

In Peru under Fujimori, there was growing dissatisfaction with the president's repressive rule, and in July 2000, a massive mass demonstration, known as la Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos (the March of the Four Suyos), took place over measures that would allow Fujimori to be reelected. Although the march failed to topple the regime, protests became a regular occurrence, and were further intensified in September 2000 when video footage captured corruption in the regime (*Cox News Service*, November 3, 2000). In November 2000, in the midst of a deepening political crisis, Fujimori attended the APEC summit in Brunei, and upon arriving in Tokyo, en route to his next destination in Panama, he announced his resignation and went into exile. While scholars differ on the degree to which the street protests influenced Fujimori's resignation, many prominent studies of the region point to the popular movement as the cause of Fujimori's loss of power (Hochstetler 2006).

"The democratic movements of 2000 gave many citizens, regardless of age, gender, or socioeconomic status, a chance to exercise their newly found political will" (Calderón 2001: 57).

"When evidence from this archive of bribery leaked, the domestic and international outcry was massive and forced Fujimori's resignation" (Weyland 2022:26).

**Cubas Grau (Paraguay, 1999)**

President Cubas, who came to power as General Lino Oviedo's figurehead, faced the so-called Paraguayan March in March 1999, a massive anti-government protest by citizens who suspected him of involvement in the assassination of his political opponent, Vice President Luis María Argaña. When anti-government protesters clashed with pro-government citizens, the police and military intervened and suppressed them, causing casualties and aggravating the political crisis; on March 28, Cubas, unable to contain the situation, announced his resignation, requested asylum at the Brazilian Embassy in Asunción, and went directly to Brazil to go into exile on a Brazilian Air Force plane. It is therefore reasonable to regard Cubas as having been forced to resign by a popular uprising. Many experts have treated him similarly, as follows.

"Argaña's killing triggered a wave of protests (known as the "Paraguayan March") that ended with the resignation of Cubas and the installation of Luis González Macchi as interim president" (Molinas et al. 2004: 75).

"On Sunday morning, the prodemocracy demonstrators gathered even more support. Entire families came to the plazas. Pressure on Cubas to resign mounted. In desperation, Oviedo frantically appealed to his paramilitary forces to come to the plazas to end the popular uprising once and for all. Orders were also given to execute a plan to assassinate senators known to favor impeachment, but to no avail. At around 2.30 p.m. Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso telephoned Cubas and asked him to leave. By 5 p.m. Cubas had decided to go" (Abente-Brun 1999: 98-99).

**Sindikubwabo (Rwanda, 1994)**

Sindikubwabo succeeded President Habyarimana, who was assassinated on April 6, 1994, as acting president. Genocide ensued in Rwanda, and when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) offensive overran the country on July 19, 1994, ending the genocide, Sindikubwabo fled to Zaire. Thus, Sindikubwabo's loss of power was clearly not regular, but the result of the defeat of government forces in the civil war.

"When his government was defeated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, Sindikubwabo fled to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), where he later died" (Twagilimana 2016: 209).

**Honecker (German Democratic Republic, 1989)**

"In 1989, a series of popular protests in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) forced the resignation of Erich Honecker" (Gleditsch and Ward 2008: 261). Although the resignation was in accordance with party procedures, we coded this political change as a popular uprising, as it was clearly the result of pressure from mass protests. Beissinger includes this case in his list of "urban civic revolutions" (Beissinger 2013), as well as many previous studies calling it the "East German Revolution" (Joppke 1993; Kern 2011) or "a peaceful revolution" (Pond 1990: 37; Wendt and Friedheim 1995: 707).

After his resignation, Honecker was placed under house arrest, but soon thereafter was admitted to a hospital in East Berlin for kidney cancer; in January 1990, after being discharged from the hospital following surgery, he was arrested on charges of treason, but again was released after the court refused to hold him because of his illness. Then, in April, he was admitted to a Soviet army hospital and moved directly to Moscow in March 1991. Thus, although he was briefly placed under house arrest or detained after his resignation, he was not imprisoned. It is more appropriate to understand his medical condition as delaying the decision on how to treat him, and that he ended up in exile.

> "Demonstrations demanding reforms took place throughout East Germany in October of 1989, and Honecker was forced to resign as Communist party leader on October 18, 1989. …He was admitted to a Soviet military hospital in April of 1990. The Communist government of East Germany attempted to arrest Honecker in December of 1990, but Soviet authorities claimed that Honecker was too ill to leave the hospital and refused to turn him over to the German authorities. Honecker went to Moscow following the reunification of the East and West Germany" (Lentz III 1995: 306).

**Koroma (Sierra Leone, 1998)**

Colonel Koroma, who overthrew the Kabbah regime and established the National Revolutionary Council in a coup in May 1997, was defeated in February 1998 in an invasion by ECOMOG, led by the Nigerian military; on February 12, when the Nigerian military seized the capital, Freetown, Koroma fled by boat to neighboring Liberia (*Associated Press International*, February 15, 1998; *Associated Press*, February 17, 1998). Thus, although the Archigos codebook states only briefly that "He was removed thanks to ECOWAS" (Goemans et al. 2016: 558), Koroma actually went into exile soon after the political upheaval.

**Aristide (Haiti, 1991)**

After the coup d'état by General Cedras on September 30, 1991, Aristide was temporarily detained by the military (*United Press International*, September 30, 1991). However, on the same day, Venezuela and France negotiated with the military to proceed with Aristide's transfer (*Associated Press*,

September 30, 1991), and he left Haiti on October 1 and arrived in Washington on October 2 via Venezuela (*The Independent* (London), October 3, 1991: 11). Therefore, it is more appropriate to consider Aristide's detention by the military as temporary custody until a decision was made on his treatment.

> "On 30 September 1991, the Haitian military, led by General Raoul Cedras, overthrew Haiti's first elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The situation was critical as the military not only forced Aristide into exile but also gunned down pro-Aristide demonstrators in Port-au-Prince" (Boniface 2002: 369).
>
> "On 30 September 1991, the armed forces of Haiti launched a military coup that sent that country's first freely elected president, radical priest Jean Bertrand Aristide, into exile" (Parish and Peceny 2002: 237).

**Aoun (Lebanon, 1990)**

On March 14, 1989, General Michel Aoun declared the start of the "War of Liberation" against the Syrian army occupying Lebanese territory. However, after a series of defeats, the Syrian army invaded the presidential palace, and on October 13, 1990, he requested asylum at the French embassy in Beirut. Aoun's loss of power was the result of his military defeat in the final phase of the Lebanese Civil War and cannot be considered a regular ouster.

> "Lebanon's 16 years of civil war came to an end in the fall of 1990 when, with silent approval from Washington, Syrian forces assaulted the presidential palace in Baabda and crushed the rebellion of General Michel Aoun" (Norton 1997: 6).
>
> "During his short term as prime minister, Aoun strongly opposed Syria's military presence in Lebanon. Two years after his launch of what he called the "War of Liberation" against Syria, the Syrian army entered the presidential palace in Baabda where he was residing and forced him into exile in Paris" (Rowayheb 2014: 185).

**Cabral (Guinea-Bissau, 1980)**

President Cabral was ousted and detained in a coup d'état by Chief of Staff Vieira in November 1980. Cabral was placed under house arrest on the coastal island of Bubaque (*United Press International*, November 15, 1980) but was released by the Vieira regime in 1981 and went into exile in Cuba (*Globe and Mail* (Canada), December 31, 1981) and then to Portugal (*The Guardian*, June 8, 2009).

> "Vieira had rounded up enough supporters in the army to stage a successful coup d'état, forcing Cabral to flee to Portugal" (Forrest 2003: 229).

**Natusch Busch (Bolivia, 1979)**

On November 1, 1979, Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch staged a coup. The violent overthrow of the

government, however, was met with strong domestic and international opposition（*Associated Press*, November 15, 1979). In addition to sanctions from the U.S. and Venezuela, Natusch faced criticism from many quarters at home, including a massive general strike and condemnation from the religious community, forcing him to announce his resignation on November 16, just two weeks after the political upheaval. He then went into exile in Argentina. This case, in which a leader who initiated a coup was unable to maintain his grip on power and was forced to flee the country, can reasonably be considered an irregular loss of power.

> "After less than three months in office, Guevara was forced out by Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch, who was so violent and inept that civilian resistance toppled him in only two weeks" (Mitchell 1981: 76).
>
> "With the country shut down by a general strike and his own palace besieged by pro-democracy activists, Natusch Busch acknowledged who actually wielded the most political power at that point by responding, "Yours!" Labor leaders, however, rejected the adoption of their program under military rule and instead insisted on Natusch Busch's resignation and the return to democracy. He stepped down after only sixteen days in office" (Zunes 2018: 56).

**Anastasio Somoza Debayle (Nicaragua, 1979)**

President Somoza resigned on July 17, 1979, after losing the battle against leftist guerrillas, and went into exile in Miami, Florida, on the same day (*Associated Press*, July 17, 1979). Somoza then changed his country of exile to Paraguay via the Bahamas and Guatemala (*Associated Press*, July 22, 1979). He was eventually assassinated in Paraguay in September 1980 (*New York Times*, September 18,1980: 1). Escribà-Folch and Krcmaric (2017) include Somoza as an exile case (Escribà-Folch and Krcmaric 2017: 565); Lentz III also describes Somoza's fate as exile: "A bloody civil war ensued that resulted in Somoza's ouster by Sandinistas on July 17, 1979. Somoza went into exile in Asuncion, Paraguay" (Lentz III 1995: 591).

**(2) Cases in which *posttenurefate* is coded "exile" but is not considered to be exile**

We excluded the following cases with the *posttenurefate* of "exile" that could not be considered exile in a substantive sense.

**Joseph Leabua Jonathan (Lesotho, 1986)**

On January 20, 1986, Major General Justin Metsing Lekhanya, with the backing of South Africa, overthrew Jonathan's regime in a coup d'état. After the coup, Jonathan was placed under house arrest in Lesotho; in April 1987, Jonathan was transferred to South Africa for treatment of cancer, but died two days later (*New York Times*, April 6, 1987: 14; *Los Angeles Times*, April 11, 1987). The move to South Africa was purely for medical purposes and could not be considered exile.

**Mohammed Najibullah (Afghanistan, 1992)**

In April 1992, facing a rebel offensive, President Najibullah announced his resignation and took refuge in a UN office in the city of Kabul after an attempt to seek asylum was thwarted by the military council (*New York Times*, April 29, 1992: 1). He continued to stay at the UN office until he was tortured and killed by the Taliban in September 1996 (*The Independent* (London), September 28, 1996: 10). Because the UN office cannot be regarded as an object under the jurisdiction of a foreign nation, we judged that Najibullah did not go into exile.

**(3) Cases that are not covered by Archigos but can be regarded as irregular leadership changes and exile**

We added cases that are not covered by Archigos but can be regarded as irregular forms of loss of power and exile.

**Eric Gairy (Grenada, 1979)**

On March 13, 1979, while Gairy was visiting New York to address the United Nations, the New Jewel Movement, a Marxist ideological party, seized power after a firefight with the army and party leader Maurice Bishop established the New Revolutionary Government (*Associated Press*, March 13, 1979). In addition to existing data sets listing this as a coup d'état (Powell and Thyne, 2011; Peyton et al., 2021), the term coup d'état is also commonly used in the press (*Associated Press*, March 14, 1979; *Globe and Mail* (Canada), March 14, 1979; *Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, March 15, 1979).

After the coup, Gairy remained in the U.S. and spent years as a political refugee in southern California (*New York Times*, March 20, 1979: 18; *Associated Press*, January 19, 1984); when Bishop was murdered in 1983 and the regime collapsed with the invasion of Grenada, Gairy returned to his native country the following year in 1984 (*United Press International*, January 21, 1984). See also Lentz III's description: "Gairy's party maintained a majority in parliamentary elections in December of 1976. The opposition claimed that widespread fraud and corruption tainted the elections. Gairy was ousted from office by the leftist New Jewel Movement while he was on a visit to the United States on March 13, 1979. He remained exile until the revolutionary government was ousted by the United States military in October of 1983" (Lentz III 1995: 339).

**James Mancham (Seychelles, 1977)**

On June 5, 1977, while Mancham was visiting the United Kingdom to attend the Commonwealth Conference, an armed group supporting France-Albert René's presidency rose up and seized power (*New York Times*, June 7, 1977: 11). This political change was widely recognized as a coup d'état, as the group that carried it out itself stated in a statement, "The authors of the coup d'état wish for the

moment to stay anonymous" (*Facts on File World News Digest*, June, 11 1977). Similarly, many media reports also described it as a coup (*Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, June 8, 1977; *New York Times*, June 6, 1977: 1), and existing data sets also code this political change as such (Powell and Thyne 2011; Albrecht et al. 2021; Peyton et al. 2021). See also Lentz III's description: "Mancham became president when the Seychelles become a republic on June 29, 1976. He was deposed by a coup led by his prime minister, France Albert Rene, on June 5, 1977" (Lentz III 1995: 677).

After the coup, Mancham remained in the UK and entered into exile. He spent the next 15 years in London before returning home to run for president in 1992 (Mancham 1998; *The Independent* (London), February 23, 1992: 16; *Associated Press*, April 13, 1992).

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