Supplemental Appendix for "Interpersonal Relationships, Bipartisanship, and January 6th"

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Additional Descriptive Statistics

Below are two tables which provide additional descriptive information about our data. The first, Table 1.1 presents data on the general sponsorship behavior of each group of members. The second, Table 1.2 shows how many members of Congress, and from each of our categories, served in each of the three congresses we analyzed. Overall, 45% served in all three congresses, 23.5% served in two congresses, and 30.8% served in only one.

Table 1.1: Average Number of Bills Sponsored

	Democrats	Regular Republicans	Certification Objectors
115th Congress	17.35	16.71	14.08
116th Congress	25.55	15.34	12.69
117th Congress	24.96	17.4	17.55

Table 1.2: Members by Group

	Democrats	Regular Republicans	Certification Objectors
115th Congress	197	166	80
116th Congress	243	103	105
117th Congress	232	86	139

Additional Covariates Models

We conducted several additional regression analyses that include covariates not included in the models reported in the manuscript.

First, we considered how support for Trump and changes in support for Trump in each members' House district are related to our outcome variables. Specifically, we measured how pro-Trump each House district was in two ways: First, the percent vote for Trump in 2020 in each district (*Trump vote (2020)*) and, second, the change in percent vote for Trump between 2016 and 2020 (*Trumpier*). In simple terms, the mean Trump vote in a congressional district increased by just over 1% from 2016 to 2020 in seats held by Democrats, by 0.6% in seats held by non-election denying Republicans, and by just 0.1% in seats held by election denying Republicans, which suggests to us that district becoming "Trumpier" is not driving the change in behavior we are seeing.

We refit our models from the main text and added in these variables as controls. These results are in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below. The parameter estimates for the variables are mixed across our various models. In some cases, the Trump vote or the change in Trump vote are statistically significant predictors of a decline in collaborative behavior and others they are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Importantly, however, the inclusion of these new variables does not change our main finding regarding the effect of being an election denier in any meaningful way. Some of the parameter estimates are attenuated by 0.01 or so, but in terms of substantive or statistical significance there is no discernible change.

We also fit models that included whether or not a member was a committee chair, a party leader, or a member of a power committee (Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means). These results are in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 below. The new variables were significant in some models, particularly the ones based on the components of legislative effectiveness (and consistent with **?**. Including these variables did not, however, alter the statistical or substantive significance of our main findings.

Table 2.1: Predicting Bipartisan Collaboration

	Bills and Resolutions		Bills Only	
	Rate	Count	Rate	Count
GOP Objector	-0.15**	-0.29**	-0.07**	-0.58**
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	0.09
Trump vote (2020)	-0.002	-0.02**	0.001	-0.02*
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Trumpier	-0.006	-0.15	0.006	-0.39**
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.13)
N	1,311	1,311	1,311	1,311
Adj. R^2	0.62	–	0.51	–
Psuedo R^2	–	0.29	–	0.20

Note: $* = p \leq .05$; $** = p \leq .01$

Table 2.2: Predicting Legislative Success

	Committee Action	Action Beyond Committee	Passed House
GOP Objector	-0.88**	-0.94**	-0.79**
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Trump vote (2020)	-0.017	-0.02*	-0.024
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.012)
Trumpier	-0.45*	-0.38	-0.51
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.23)
N	1,320	1,320	1,320
Psuedo R^2	0.24	0.23	0.27

Note: $* = p \leq .05$; $** = p \leq .01$

Finally, we also models in which we substitute our measure of bipartisan original cosponsorship with a measure of *all bipartisan cosponsors*. In Table 2.5 below we refit the model from Table 2 of the paper with the number of bipartisan cosponsors of Republican introduced identical bills as the outcome variable. We find very similar results. Certification objectors lose, on average, just over 4 more bipartisan cosponsors in the 117th Congress than do their colleagues who did not object to certification.

Table 2.3: Predicting Bipartisan Collaboration

	Bills and Resolutions		Bills Only	
	Rate	Count	Rate	Count
GOP Objector	-0.15**	-0.28**	-0.07**	-0.56**
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	0.09
Power Committee	0.07*	0.32**	0.03	0.33**
	(0.002)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.11)
Committee Chair	0.07*	0.35	0.02	0.38**
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.11)
N	1,311	1,311	1,311	1,311
Adj. R^2	0.63	–	0.51	–
Psuedo R^2	–	0.29	–	0.21

Note: $* = p \leq .05$; $** = p \leq .01$

Table 2.4: Predicting Legislative Success

	Committee Action	Action Beyond Committee	Passed House
GOP Objector	-0.78**	-0.81**	-0.67**
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Power Committee	0.28*	0.13	-0.03
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Committee Chair	1.02**	1.18**	1.14**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)
N	1,320	1,320	1,320
Psuedo R^2	0.26	0.36	0.28

Note: $* = p \leq .05$; $** = p \leq .01$

Table 2.5: Bipartisan Cosponsorships on Identical GOP Bills

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
GOP Objector	-4.39* (1.73)
DW-NOMINATE (first dimension)	-10.49 (7.13)
Change in Trump Vote in Sponsor's district	0.07 (0.28)
Intercept	13.43** (4.05)
N	446
R^2	0.02
$F_{(3,135)}$	2.99