Does Information Lead to Emulation?
Spatial Dependence in Anti-Government Violence

Forthcoming in Political Science Research and Methods

Supplementary Materials

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In our article we reference alternative specifications of our models that examine other outcomes of social conflict from SCAD. These results are presented in Table 1. Following the suggestion from reviewers, we also considered outcomes of terrorism, both in general and specifically when the government was the target. These results are presented in Table 2. Finally, following suggestions from reviewers on alternative interactions with our spatial lag, we considered additional interactions with some of our control variables including levels of urbanization, percentage of the population that is made up of refugees and GDP per capita (affluence). We present these models with basic interactions in Table 3 and three-way interactions with mobile in Table 4. All of these results can be replicated using the files located on the PSRM Dataverse. Feel free to contact us with any questions.

Table 1: Supplementary Models for Other SCAD Events

	Demonstrations		Strikes		Riots	
	Mobile	Internet	Mobile	Internet	Mobile	Internet
Mobile	.00473		.00315		.00247	
	(.00381)		(.00416)		(.00425)	
Internet		.00545		-.0117		.0037
		(.0101)		(.0205)		(.0103)
Demonstrations slag	-.0143	-.0212				
	(.0241)	(.017)				
Demonstrations slag × Internet		.00346				
		(.003)				
Demonstrations slag × Mobile	.000293					
	(.000687)					
$\text{Demonstrations}_{t-1}$	.566***	.524***				
	(.0709)	(.0765)				
Strikes slag			-.013	-.0307		
			(.0439)	(.0387)		
Strikes slag × Mobile			.00014			
			(.00161)			
Strikes slag × Internet				.0072		
				(.00761)		
Strikes_{t-1}			.877***	.872***		
			(.113)	(.107)		
Riots slag					-.0602	-.0844**
					(.0477)	(.0415)
Riots slag × Mobile					-.000548	
					(.000845)	
Riots slag × Internet						.00414
						(.00337)
Riots_{t-1}					.584***	.57***
					(.0823)	(.0768)
Repression_{t-1}	.294**	.323**	.377**	.394**	.577***	.567***
	(.146)	(.152)	(.154)	(.153)	(.187)	(.184)
Polity	-.0173	-.0132	.0468*	.0458*	.0228	.0265
	(.0107)	(.0124)	(.0277)	(.0262)	(.0192)	(.0196)
Polity^2	-.00106	-.00055	-.00624	-.00634	-.00408	-.00475
	(.00259)	(.00278)	(.00491)	(.00481)	(.0034)	(.00354)
ln(GDP per capita)	.112	.112	.0277	.0793	.0032	-.0165
	(.123)	(.117)	(.132)	(.138)	(.135)	(.127)
ln(Population)	.271***	.252***	.0959	.101	.396***	.39***
	(.0546)	(.0583)	(.0632)	(.0697)	(.0661)	(.0691)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-.0988	-.0128	-.0154	-.0467	.244	.296
	(.269)	(.29)	(.505)	(.442)	(.301)	(.283)
Election in Year	.214*	.175	.0473	.0381	.491***	.477***
	(.116)	(.117)	(.157)	(.155)	(.14)	(.138)
Urbanization	-.00775	-.00427	.00237	.00214	.00148	.00236
	(.00621)	(.00582)	(.00725)	(.00773)	(.00669)	(.00707)
% Refugees	-14.1	-16.2*	3.56	3.98	5.78	6.91
	(9.18)	(9.8)	(9.75)	(9.69)	(8.75)	(8.38)
Constant	-4.45***	-4.23***	-2.18**	-2.49*	-6.96***	-6.7***
	(1.04)	(1.09)	(1.09)	(1.35)	(.949)	(1.04)
N	477	474	477	474	477	474

Negative binomial parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed, despite directional hypotheses)

Table 2: Supplementary Models for Terrorism

	Total Terror		Government Target Terror	
	Mobile	Internet	Mobile	Internet
Mobile	.00202 (.00403)		.00214 (.00354)	
Internet		.0236 (.0265)		.0474* (.0255)
Terror Total slag	.00822 (.0306)	-.00367 (.026)		
Terror Total slag × Mobile	-.000812 (.000989)			
Terror Total slag × Internet		-.00323 (.00782)		
Terror Total$_{t-1}$	.964*** (.0497)	.963*** (.0504)		
Government Target slag			.0934* (.0544)	.0138 (.0572)
Government Target slag × Mobile			-.00447*** (.00139)	
Government Target slag × Internet				-.0142 (.0111)
Government Target$_t$ − 1			1.3*** (.0902)	1.27*** (.0946)
Repressions$_{t-1}$	-.0415 (.127)	-.0974 (.131)	.136 (.124)	-.07 (.16)
Polity	-.0355* (.019)	-.032* (.0188)	-.0325 (.0222)	-.0372* (.0219)
Polity^2	-.00106 (.00503)	-.00108 (.00497)	.00487 (.00632)	.00508 (.00551)
ln(GDP per capita)	-.0507 (.175)	-.125 (.14)	-.0305 (.15)	-.176 (.134)
ln(Population)	.317*** (.0896)	.309*** (.0834)	.357*** (.105)	.35*** (.107)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-.417 (.289)	-.422 (.271)	-.345 (.458)	-.274 (.492)
Election in Year	.372** (.168)	.349** (.15)	.645*** (.152)	.567*** (.157)
Urbanization	-.00201 (.0075)	-.0012 (.00728)	-.0056 (.00859)	-.00762 (.00788)
% Refugees	6.8 (14.29)	9.73 (14.57)	3.59 (17.76)	8.91 (15.83)
Constant	-4.99*** (1.65)	-4.34*** (1.62)	-7.09*** (1.79)	-5.69*** (1.85)
N	477	474	477	474

Negative binomial parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed, despite directional hypotheses)

Table 3: Alternative Interactions on Anti-Government Violence (AGV)

	Urbanization	Refugees	Affluence
AGV slag	-.329*	.0526	-1.5***
	(.185)	(.0831)	(.412)
Urbanization	-.0237*	-.00553	.00601
	(.0134)	(.0114)	(.00922)
% Refugees	5.37	33.8	.727
	(16.4)	(26.7)	(13.2)
ln(GDP Per Capita)	-.0752	.0709	-.576**
	(.214)	(.204)	(.252)
AGV slag × Urbanization	.0114***		
	(.00427)		
AGV slag × % Refugees		-10.9*	
		(6)	
AGV slag × ln(GDP Per Capita)			.242***
			(.0633)
Internet	.028*		
	(.0145)		
AGV_{t-1}	1.06***	1.13***	1.14***
	(.142)	(.16)	(.136)
$Repression_{t-1}$	.351	.352	.334
	(.3)	(.294)	(.31)
Polity	.0176	-.00412	.00926
	(.0298)	(.0261)	(.0264)
$Polity^2$	-.00267	-.00124	.00306
	(.00535)	(.00534)	(.00629)
ln(Population)	.295**	.328**	.415***
	(.145)	(.138)	(.135)
Ethnic Fractionalization	.289	.293	-.112
	(.442)	(.477)	(.449)
Election in Year	.209	.354	.194
	(.232)	(.217)	(.217)
Constant	-6.52***	-8.71***	-6.37***
	(2.29)	(2.16)	(1.93)
N	474	481	481

Negative binomial parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed, despite directional hypotheses)

Table 4: Alternative 3-Way Interactions on Anti-Government Violence (AGV)

	Urbanization	Affluence
Mobile	.0266	.1*
	(.0252)	(.0522)
Urbanization	.00638	.00623
	(.0155)	(.0117)
ln(GDP Per Capita)	-.169	-.341
	(.242)	(.453)
AGV slag	-.0782	-.623
	(.237)	(.928)
AGV slag × Urbanization	.00172	
	(.00569)	
AGV slag × Mobile	-.00626	-.032*
	(.00657)	(.0186)
Urbanization × Mobile	-.000787**	
	(.000375)	
AGV slag × Urbanization × Mobile	.00022*	
	(.000123)	
AGV slag × ln(GDP Per Capita)		.116
		(.147)
ln(GDP Per Capita) × Mobile		-.0141**
		(.007)
AGV slag × ln(GDP Per Capita) × Mobile		.00439*
		(.00258)
AGV_{t-1}	1.04***	1.08***
	(.155)	(.142)
Internet	.0373**	.0291
	(.0178)	(.0191)
$Repressions_{t-1}$	.324	.323
	(.3)	(.31)
Polity	.0121	.0165
	(.0324)	(.0324)
$Polity^2$	-.00158	.00199
	(.00578)	(.0063)
ln(Population)	.27*	.336**
	(.148)	(.162)
Ethnic Fractionalization	.513	.161
	(.491)	(.605)
Election in Year	.194	.151
	(.204)	(.217)
% Refugees	4.37	-.848
	(16.2)	(15.2)
Constant	-6.69***	-6.65***
	(2.19)	(2.33)
N	470	470

Negative binomial parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed, despite directional hypotheses)