Sources and Notes for
Rebel Contraband Dataset, 1990-2015
Version 1.0
http://www.civilwardynamics.org

This document lists the sources and explains the coding decisions used in the construction of the Rebel Contraband Dataset, and short notes that explain specific coding decisions. The unit of analysis for the Rebel Contraband Dataset is the dyad-year. This document is organized by the government side. Each section reports notes and sources for a government involved in a conflict dyad. After extensive research, we did not find evidence that the rebel side of a conflict dyad in any of the following countries earned income from natural resources or from crime: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malaysia, Moldova, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. This document does not contain sections for these countries. This file lists the rebel sides in each country reported in the UCDP dyad-year dataset; if notes are not recorded for the rebel side, we search for but found no credible evidence that the rebels earned income from natural resources or crime.

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Afghanistan

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Afghanistan:
Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar): 1990-1995; 2003-2013
Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction: 1990-1991
Hizb-i Wahdat: 1990-1995
Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan: 1990-1996
Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami: 1993-1995
United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA): 1996-2001
Military faction (forces of Shahnawaz Tanay): 1990
Taliban: 1995-96; 2003-2015
Islamic State (IS): 2015

Natural Resources

HIZB-I ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN

Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan received substantial financial and military support from multiple countries in its early years, including the U.S., the U.K., and Saudi Arabia (Ireland: Refugee Documentation Centre, 2010; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 2015). The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence handled the majority of the military aid. However, in 2003 the U.S. declared the leader Hekmatyar a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, and the group Hizb-i-Islami a Group of Concern (Institute for the Study of War, n.d.).

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Hizb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar)
Natural Resource: Opium
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-2013
Keywords: Heroin
Location:
Geographic keywords: Khyber Pass
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple credible sources
2=One source

Notes:
Hizb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) (HIG) smuggled opium as a financial strategy from 1990 to 2013 (Kaplan, Fang, and Sangwan 2005; UNODC 2009; UNODC 2014). Sometimes the opium was in the form of heroin (Rupert and Coll 1990). This included using the Khyber Pass to Kabul (Weiner 1994). Some sources indicate that this brought in high amounts of income (The Global Afghan Opium Trade, 2011); however it is not clear the amount they earned or if it was greater than $5 million. Opium smuggling was still a substantial problem in Afghanistan in later years (UNODC, 2016), but there is no evidence that HIG profited from this.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Hizb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar)
Natural Resource: Opium
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2009 and 2013**Keywords:**
Location: Kunar and Laghman
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple credible sources
Opium extortion_kw=poppy/opium

Notes:
Hizb-i-Islami(Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) engaged in the extortion of opium as a financial strategy in 2009. This included exerting taxes in border areas and involvement in processing (UNODC 2009; UNODC 2014). The amount of funding they earned is unknown. Opium extortion was still a substantial problem in Afghanistan in later years (UNODC, 2016), but there is no evidence that HIG profited from this.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Hizb-i-Islami
Natural Resource: gems (specific gems unknown)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2012-2015
Keywords:
Location:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6=Uncertain about timing, multiple credible sources

Notes:
Hizb-i-Islami was financed by extorting mining companies. They regularly threatened violence against legal mining and extractive companies unless the companies paid them (UN Security Council Report, 2015). Exact years and funding amounts are uncertain.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Hizb-i-Islami
Natural Resource: gems (specific gems unknown)
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2003-2010
Keywords: Tourmaline, Lapis Lazuli
Location: Kunar, Nuristan
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes:
Hizb-i-Islami has engaged in smuggling semi-precious gemstones, mainly tourmaline and lapis, in Kunar and Nuristan (Peters and Rassler, 2010). The source is unspecific about the time period, claiming they have been "long tied to protecting shipments," so a lower certainty variable has been coded for the years 2003 to 2010. Amounts are unknown.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Hizb-i-Islami
Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2003-2013
Keywords:
Location: Kunar
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)
timber_smuggling_geokw for 2013 = Korengal Valley

Hizb-i-Islami engaged in timber smuggling in the Kunar province, though the source is unspecific about the timing, causing us to code from 2003 to 2013 with a lower certainty value (Peters and Rassler, 2010; Peters, 2016). We did not find evidence that this activity continued in 2014 or 2015. Amounts are unknown.

UNITED ISLAMIC FRONT FOR THE SALVATION OF AFGHANISTAN (UIFSA)

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA)
Natural Resource: Opium
Strategy: Smuggling
Years:1996-2001
Keywords:
Location:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 6=Uncertain about timing, multiple credible sources

Notes:
The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) smuggled opium as a financial strategy from 1996 to 2001 (Entekhabi-Fard 2002). This was largely in the form of taxing smugglers. The amount of funding they earned is unknown, although Chouvy indicates that 30 to 40 percent of their funding came from opium extortion and smuggling (2002).

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA)

Natural Resource: Opium
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1996-2001
Keywords:
Location: Panjshir Valley
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 6=Uncertain about timing, multiple credible sources

Notes:
The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) smuggled opium as a financial strategy from 1996 to 2001 (Entekhabi-Fard 2002). This was largely in the form of taxing production activities. The amount of funding they earned is unknown, although Chouvy indicates that 30 to 40 percent of their funding came from opium extortion and smuggling (2002).

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA)
Natural Resource: Gems
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1996-2001
Keywords: emeralds and lapis lazuli
Location: Panjshir Valley
Funds: 2=Over $5 million
Amounts: $40-60 Million/year
Certainty: 6=Uncertain about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) smuggled precious and semi-precious gems such as emeralds and lapis lazuli as a financial strategy from 1996 to 2001 (Entekhabi-Fard 2002). They earned between $40 and $60 million a year from taxes levied on trade (Chouvy 2002; Rubin, 2000).

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA)
Natural Resource: Gems
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1996-2001
Keywords: emeralds and lapis lazuli
Location: Panjshir Valley
Funds: 2=Over $5 million
Amounts: $40-60 Million
Certainty: 6=Uncertain about timing, multiple credible sources

Notes:

The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) used extortion of gems as a financial strategy from 1996 to 2001. They levied taxes on the extraction of precious and semi-precious stones such as emeralds and lapis lazuli from the Panjsher Valley (Entekhabi-Fard 2002). They earned between $40 and $60 million a year from taxes levied on production and trade (Chouvy 2002).

UIFSA overthrew the Taliban government in late 2001, with the assistance of a US-led a multinational coalition (Eriksson, Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2003; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 2015).

Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Jamiat-I-Islami
Natural Resource: gems
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1991
Keywords: Emeralds
Location (First Order Administrative District): Panjshir Province
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source
Notes:
Jamiat-I-Islami used extortion of emeralds in 1991 as a financial strategy. They taxed miners in Panjshir Province (Bowersox, et al., 1991). Funding amounts are unknown.

TALIBAN

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Extortion, Smuggling
Funds: More than $5 million per year
Lowest: $50 million Highest: $500 million (2005-2008)
Lowest: $70 million Highest: $500 million (2009)
Lowest: $200 million Highest: $200 million (2010)
Lowest: $100 million Highest: $100 million (2011)
Lowest: $100 million Highest: $155 million (2012)
Lowest: Highest: $667 million (2013-2015)

Notes:
Regarding the amounts estimated for the resource opium across the strategies of extortion and smuggling:
The amounts the Taliban made from opium seems to be estimated at between $50 million to $125 million between 2005 and 2008 (UNODC 2009, Peters 2009). Peters (2009) has the highest

estimate for the amount the Taliban brings in on Opium at $500 million. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime initially estimated Taliban opium income to be between $200 million and $400 million per year but in 2008 revised their calculation methods changing their estimate to $125 million per year (Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate 2009). The estimates for amounts for the years 2009 to 2012 range from $70 million to $300 million depending on the source and year (Rubin 2012, Armstrong 2009, Moreau 2010, Risen 2009, Filkins 2009, The Economist article 2014). In 2015, opium production was the highest it has been (Hall, 2015). The Taliban continued to earn as much as 60 percent of its funding from opium (World Tribune, 2017). Military historian Micallef reports that the heroin trade in Afghanistan generated approximately $2 billion, with one third of the money going to the Taliban (e.g. ~$667 million) (2017). These sources also indicate that the actual amounts made by the Taliban might be higher than these estimates. Also while the certainty value that the Taliban engaged in this strategy for these years is quite high, the certainty for the amounts values is not.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1995-1996; 2004- 2015
Keywords: Ushr (farm-gate taxation), laboratories
Location: Helmand, Kandahar
Geographic Keywords: Musa Qala, Nowzad, Baghran, Sangrin district; Panjwai; Zherai; Maiwand
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $175 million (2008)
$155 million (2012)
-99 (2004-2007, 2009-2011; 2013-2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes:
The Taliban engaged in extortion of opium as a primary funding strategy. The recent UN Security Council report documents the Taliban's involvement in the narcotics industry since the beginning of the 1990's (2015). Multiple sources document this from 2004 to 2015 (UNODC 2009; Peters 2009; Shayer 2008; Kaplan, Fang, and Sangwan, 2005; Rubin 2012; Constable 2011; Moreau 2010; New York Times 2012; Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate 2009; Armstrong 2009; Risen 2009; Filkins 2009; Kenyon 2010; The New York Times, 2014; Williams and Felbab-Brown, 2012; Collins and Ali, 2010; Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 2010; Ahmed, 2015; Daniel, 2015). The Taliban instituted a 10% tax, known as an Ushr fee, on opium growers at the farm-gate level in provinces under their control, primarily Helmand. In return, the Taliban protected the workers as they worked to harvest the poppy fields. Once the harvest was through, the opium was sold to traffickers, with all business remaining at the farm-gate level (Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate 2009). Between 2005 and 2008, the Taliban collected $60 million to $100 million from Ushr taxes (UNODC 2009). In 2008 they earned $50 million (Peters 2009) and in 2012 they earned at least $155 million (Rubin 2012). These estimates vary widely depending on the source the information comes from. The Taliban also participated in

maintaining and protecting heroin laboratories in territories under its control (Daniel, 2015). In 2008, there were over 50 laboratories in Taliban-held areas that paid the Taliban a tax of $250 per kilogram refined (Peters 2009). According to Peters (2009), this brought them in about $125 million from laboratories alone in 2008. There also may be reason to suspect that the Taliban was participating in the production of cannabis (UNODC 2009), but so far documentation on Taliban involvement in drugs has focused primarily on opium.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1995-1996; 2003- 2015
Keywords: protection of drug shipments; taxation of drug shipments moving through Taliban area; smuggler payments to Taliban leadership; import tax on chemical precursors
Location: Helmand, Kandahar, Baluchistan (Pakistan)
Geographic Keywords: Quetta
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $250 million (2008)
-99 (2003-2007, 2009-2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes:
The Taliban engaged in smuggling of both raw opium and heroin from 1995 to 1996 (UN Security Council, 2015), and in 2003 to 2015 (Peters 2009; Filkins 2009; UNODC 2009; Shayer 2008; UNODC 2011; The New York Times 2012; Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate 2009; Collins and Ali, 2010; Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 2010; Daniel, 2015; UN Security Council, 2015). Opium smugglers payed the Taliban a protection fee to move drugs through their territory unharmed. Large drug smuggling organizations were also required to make regular payments to the Taliban leadership in Quetta in order to be allowed to continue operating in Taliban controlled areas (Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate 2009; Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 2010). Based on overall estimates of the Taliban's drug trafficking activities, we coded this activity as making the Taliban over $5 million per year. Gretchen Peters (2009) claims they made $250 million per year with this strategy.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Natural Resource: cannabis
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2012-2015
Keywords:
Location: Paktia Province
Geographical Keywords: south-east Afghanistan
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
In poppy-free areas of Afghanistan, such as the Paktia Province and south-east Afghanistan more generally, the Taliban levied *ushr* on cannabis cultivation, similar to their methods with opium (UN Security Council Report, 2015). Exact years and funding amounts are unknown

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2006-2015
Keywords:
Location: Kunar
Geographical Keywords: Kunar River Valley, Peshawar
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes:
The Taliban engaged in extortion of timber from 2006 to 2015 (Trofimov 2010; Collins and Ali, 2010; Felbab-Brown 2013; Azamy 2015; Javaid, 2016). In 2006, the Afghani government passed a decree banning logging and the sale of timber in Afghanistan. The local clans of the Kunar province, who had relied on timber cutting for the livelihood for centuries, were forced to turn to the Taliban in order to do business. The Taliban helped the loggers ship their timber across the border to Pakistan and took a portion of their profits. A recent article states that non-state militants have been smuggling timber for decades (Javaid, 2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Natural Resource: gems
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2006-2015
Keywords: rubies, emeralds, lapis lazuli
Location: Badakhshan Province
Geographical Keywords: Kuran wa Munjan district; near Kabul;
Funds: 1=Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $1.24-$1.36 million annually
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes:
The Taliban was financed by illegal ruby and emerald mines, and legal mining companies. They protected illegal mining, including ruby mining near Kabul (Daniel, 2015). They charged illegal miners approximately 15 percent of mining proceeds in exchange for protection (UN Security Council, 2015). The Taliban also extorted legal mining companies, including tax the production of lapis lazuli (Daniel, 2015; UN Security Council, 2015). The Taliban regularly threatened

violence against mining and extractive companies unless the companies paid them, which led to one company leaving the country (UN Security Council, 2015). The Taliban earns an estimated $1 million annually through extortion of lapis lazuli mining operations, and an estimated $240,000-$360,000 per year by extorting transportation by enacting roadblocks (UN Security Council, 2015).. Exact years are uncertain.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Natural Resource: gems
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2006-2015
Keywords: emeralds, rubies
Location: Jagdalak
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1=Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $3.2 million +
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes:
The Taliban earned funding by charging transporters of illegally-mined emeralds and rubies (Daniel, 2015; UN Security Council, 2015). Unlicensced ruby mining operations in Jagdalak alone generate as much as $16 million annually. The Taliban charges 20 percent of the proceeds to transport the gems, resulting in an estimated $3.2 million each year from this area alone (UN Security Council, 2015). This amount applies only to one limited area, and they use these same tactics to smuggle illegally mined emeralds from northern Afghanistan as well (UN Security Council, 2015). However, because no additional funding details are provided, we coded this activity conservatively, as less than $5 million per year. Exact years are uncertain.

Crime

HIZB-I ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Hizb-i-Islami
Criminal Activity: Smuggling
Years: 2012
Keywords:
Location: Kunduz, Baghlan
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes:
Hizbi-i Islami used smuggling as a financial strategy in 2012. This involved taxing the movement of supplies into Afghanistan, with the U.S. and NATO among those paying this fee (The Messenger, 2012). The amount of funding earned from this is unknown.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Hizb-i-Islami
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 1990-2001
Keywords: extortion payments from local residents, taxing trucks
Location: Kabul, Kunduz, Baghlan
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 6=Uncertain timing, multiple credible sources

Notes:
Hizbi-i Islami used extortion as a financial strategy from 1990 to 2012 (Farrell and Hussain, 2001). This included checkpoints on convoys headed to the capital (Gilles, 2007). They also extorted local residents and taxing trucks headed for Tajikistan when it pushed into Kunduz and Baghlan in 2009 (Peters and Rassler, 2010). Amounts are unknown.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Hizb-i-Islami
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping local
Years: 1990
Keywords:
Location: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan)
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 2=One source

Notes:
Hizb-i-Islami engaged in kidnapping in May and July of 1990 (Human Rights Watch Report 1991). One of the kidnappings was Abdul Rahim Chinzai, a journalist and former government official under the deposed Shah. Funding amounts are unknown.

TALIBAN

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2003-2015
Keywords: shopkeepers, small business owners, mosque, trucks, resupply convoys, contractors, criminal operations, cell phone industry, security firms
Location: Helmand, Zabul
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year (2009-2010)
-99: Unknown (2003-2008, 2011,2015)
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (2003-2008)
1 (multiple credible sources) (2009-2015)

Notes:
The Taliban engaged in extortion from 2003 to 2015 (Peters 2009; Kenyon 2010; Green 2009; McKenzie 2010; Roston 2009; Collins and Ali, 2010; Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 2010; Nichols 2012; EU European Asylum Support Office 2012; UN Security Council, 2015). The Taliban collected taxes from shopkeepers, business owners, cell phone companies, mosques, and private citizens. Truckers had to pay the Taliban bribes in order to travel their roads safely and without fear of being kidnapped (Green 2009). The U.S. military hired local security firms to protect their trucks and convoys from Taliban attacks, but most of the firms just turned around and used this money to pay off the Taliban. In areas that the security firms consider too dangerous to work in, U.S. military convoys are forced to pay the Taliban off themselves to move across Taliban territory without being attacked. Host Nation Trucking contractors are also suspected of doing this (Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 2010). If the truck drivers refuse to pay the Taliban their bribe, the Taliban will take them hostage instead. In 2009, the Taliban kidnapped five truck drivers from Afghan haulage companies for a ransom of $35,000. The source implies this type activity has been going on for longer than just 2009, with somewhere between $10,000 and $50,000 being usually demanded as ransoms (Green 2009). Contractors working in various parts of Taliban are also forced to pay the Taliban a portion of their contract money in order to keep them from interfering (Collins and Ali, 2010) Funding amounts to more than $5 million per year for 2009 to 2010 (Kenyon 2010, Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 2010). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International Victims
Years: 2003-2015
Keywords: South Korean missionaries, Italian photojournalist
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year (2006)
2: More than $5 million per year (2007)
-99: Unknown (all other years)
Amounts: $2.8 million (2006)
$20 million (2007)
-99: Unknown (all other years)

Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes:
The Taliban engaged in kidnapping of foreigners from 2003 to 2015 (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, 2013; UNODC 2009; Collins and Ali, 2010; Daniel, 2015; UN Security Council, 2015). A recent UN report states that “between 2003 and 2014 the Taliban regularly abducted Afghans and foreigners in Afghanistan in increasing numbers” (UN Security Council, 2015). While some instances led to executions of victims on the spot, the majority were held to earn ransom payments (UN Security Council Report, 2015). Specific events include the following. In 2007, the Taliban kidnapped missionaries from South Korea for a ransom of $20 million (UNODC 2009). In October of 2006, the Taliban kidnapped an Italian photojournalist for a ransom of $2.8

million, though the Italian government refused to admit they paid the amount. The Taliban then kidnapped another Italian for a ransom of $2 million, but we are unsure as to the specific year of this kidnapping (Collins and Ali, 2010). Since 2005, total ransoms paid to the Taliban are at least $16 million, but the group claims to have earned over $20 million (UN Security Council, 2015). Because these amounts refer to the total generated over a period of years, we coded funding amounts as unknown, unless more information was provided.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
Years: 1995-1996
Keywords:
Location: Kandahar
Geographical Keywords: Spin Baldak
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes:
The Taliban engaged in smuggling of goods from 1995 to 1996 (Felbab-Brown 2007). Previous to the Taliban taking over territory, smugglers would have to pay various warlords to transport goods across their territories, sometimes having to stop 20 times on a route to do so. When the Taliban began taking over Kandahar in 1994, they eliminated this complex process and instead set up a one-toll system at Spin Baldak on the Afghani border, while also meeting a couple other demands of the Afghan transport mafia. The transport mafia paid the Taliban handsomely in return.Considering the Taliban had accumulated over $75 million from smuggling of goods by 1997, we coded funds as more than $5 million per year.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Taliban
Criminal Activity: Smuggling-Human
Years: 2010-2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Taliban uses human trafficking and illegal immigration to earn funding, (Un Security Council Report, 2015; Hornack, 2015). Funding amounts and exact timing are uncertain, although Hornack refers to this as part of the Taliban's "original crime portfolio" (2015).

Islamic State

Natural Resouces

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Islamic State (ISI)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling
Resource: Opium
Years: 2015
Keywords: heroin, opium
Location: Nangahar province
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
Former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan commanders lead The Islamic State's Khorasan province (IS-K). IS-K receives funding from the Islamic State's central command (Johnson, 2016). Although some sources indicate the IS was profiting from extortion and smuggling of opium (Corr, 2017), others state that IS-K banned poppy cultivation in 2015 because the plant is prohibited in Islam (Johnson, 2016; Zahid, 2016). Even if the groups had religious qualms with poppies, several sources indicate that IS-K did engage in extortion of heroin processing and trading in 2015 (Hornack, 2015; Johnson, 2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Afghanistan
Rebel Group: Islamic State (IS-K)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling
Resource: Timber
Years: 2015
Keywords:
Location: Afghanistan
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic State (IS-K) smuggled timber to Pakistan in 2015 (Hasrat, 2016; Johnson, 2016; Johnson, Karokhail & Amiri, 2016; MEI, 2016). The group cuts down trees in the Achin, Naziyan and Dehbala districts of Nangahar province and smuggles them along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Funding amounts are unknown.

Crime

Group: Islamic State (IS-K)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2015

Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic State (IS-K) obtained funding through extortion and taxation (Bengali, 2017; Johnson, Karokhail & Amiri, 2016; MEI, 2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Group: Islamic State (IS-K)
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic State (IS-K) obtained funding from kidnapping for ransom (Bengali, 2017; Damora & Catto, 2016; Johnson, 2016; Johnson, Karokhail & Amiri, 2016; MEI, 2016; Shahamat, 2015). Sources provided few details, and unding amounts are unknown.

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Algeria

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups:
AIS: 1992-1997
Armed Islamic Group (GIA): 1993-2003
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): 1999-2015
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO): 2012
Takfir wa'l Hijra: 1991

GIA

Country: Algeria
Rebel Group: GIA
Natural Resource: Drugs
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1994 To: 2001
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: France
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1994-2001: 6

Coder Notes: GIA controlled significant territory but was eclipsed by GSPC in 1998 and after 2001 were only a marginal force (Inbar 2007). During the 1990s the GIA had an extensive network from North African expatriates in Europe, especially France, which raised money through smuggling (aphref). The GIA was actively include in drug smuggling with support from it's European networks (Tangled web terrorist and organized crime CITE). Other sources find that GIA earned income from dealing stolen cars, drugs, arms, and forged documents. (cites Vogt (1995) p. 97; Pujadas & Salam (1995), p. 100; "Global Terrorism Decoded; The Arab Afghans; "Police Arrest 35 in Antiterrorist Raids"). The exact timing, funds, and amounts are unknown.

Country: Algeria
Rebel Group: GIA
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 1993 To: 1994
Keywords: bank robbery
Location (First Order Administrative District): Wilaya d' Alger
Geographical Keywords: Algiers
Funds: -99

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1993-1994: 5

Coder Notes: In 1993-94 in the Algiers region and other locations where the militaries strength was waning. The GIA engaged in robbed banks (‘Gilles 1997). The exact timing, amounts, and funds are uncertain.

Country: Algeria
Rebel Group: GIA
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1994 To: 2001
Keywords: war taxes, blackmarket, false documents, cars
Location (First Order Administrative District): Wilaya de Blida
Geographical Keywords: France, Mitidja
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1994-1997: 1; 1998-2001: 5

Coder Notes:
GIA controlled significant territory but was eclipsed by GSPC in 1998 and after 2001 were only a marginal force (Inbar 2007). From 1994 to 1995 the GIA controlled a major highway which they used to raise funds through roadblocks and extortion (Martinez p.213-214 CITE). The GIA demand war taxes and protection payments for individuals in Algeria and France. In the mid-1990s shop owners in France filed charges against GIA supporters for extortion attempts (Vogt (1995) p. 97; Pujadas & Salam (1995), p. 100; David Leppard, “Algerians in London Fund Islamic Terrorism”; Fisk 1995; Little know of Islamic militant group blamed for massacres). The GIA operated as a government and collected taxes, in territory not under their control they extorted individuals and buinesses (Schulhofer-Wohl 2007). The GIA also treated to kill Muslims who refused to pay zakat (Islamic tax) (Algerian militants to impose Islamic tax at threat of death). Other sources suggest GIA earned funds through black market operations including getting percentages of pirated goods in Europe, and dealing stolen cars and forged documents (Vogt (1995) p. 97; Pujadas & Salam (1995), p. 100; “Global Terrorism Decoded; The Arab Afghans; “Police Arrest 35 in Antiterrorist Raids”). The funds and amounts are uncertain.

Country: Algeria
Rebel Group: GIA
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Other (Weapons)
From: 1994 To: 2001
Keywords:

Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: France
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1994-2001: 6

Coder Notes: GIA controlled significant territory but was eclipsed by GSPC in 1998 and after 2001 were only a marginal force (Inbar 2007) During the 1990s the GIA had an extensive network from North African expatriates in Europe, especially France, which raised money through smuggling (aphref). The GIA became actively involved in drugs and weapons trafficking with support from these networks in Europe (Tangled web terrorist and organized crime CITE). Other sources find that GIA earned income from dealing stolen cars, drugs, arms, and forged documents. (cites Vogt (1995) p. 97; Pujadas & Salam (1995), p. 100; "Global Terrorism Decoded; The Arab Afghans; "Police Arrest 35 in Anti Terrorism Raids"). The exact timing, funds, and amounts are unknown.

AQIM: (1999-2015)

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a group based in Algeria that affiliated with Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda (AQ) in 2006. AQIM is a main branch of AQ. (Other AQ affiliates include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP], Jabhat al-Nusra [JN], and al-Shabab) (Zelin, 2017). Before associating with AQ, the group begain in 1998 when generals in the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) split from the larger GIA organization and formed the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The GSPC officially changed its name to AQIM in January 2007. AQIM is based in Northern Algeria, but has expanded its operations into Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Libya, and Mali (Mapping of Militant Organizations:AQIM, 2016). Besides Algeria, the UCDP dataset includes AQIM in Mali and Mauritania. However, because the group is based in Algeria, we code AQIM in these countries the same, and have included the strategies with Algeria.

Prior to 2001, al-Qaeda relied on its relationship with the Taliban and external donations for funding. After the fall of the Taliban regime, the centralized al-Qaeda funding mechanisms were forced to change (Schindler, 2017), and AQIM used the strategies outlined below.

Natural Resources

Rebel Group: AQIM
Natural Resource: Drugs-Unknown
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2006 To: 2015
Keywords: narcotics

Location (First Order Administrative District): Djelfa
Geographical Keywords: Gao, Mali; Mauritania
Funds: 2 = Over $5 million
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Coder Notes:
AQIM engaged in drug smuggling from 2006 to 2015 (Duffy, 2015; Harmon 2014; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016). AQIM was thought to be involved in drug smuggling before 2007 (Harmon 2014). From 2006-2011 they raised more than $50 million from illicit activities including drug smuggling and the protection of drug smugglers (Al-Qaeda looks to Sahel for new funding sources). There is some evidence that AQIM's protection of drug trafficking led to several clashes with army forces in the late 2000's (Chikhi 2010). AQIM was connected to drug smuggling through Mohamed Ould Ahmed Deya 'Rouji', Cherif Ould Taher, and Sultan Ould Badi who operated in Gao. Rouji and others were arrested for smuggling in 2010 (Lacher 2013). AQIM serves as a station in the Sahel between Latin American suppliers and European markets (Laub and Masters, 2015). AQIM earned more than 5 million dollars a year, though exact amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: AQIM
Natural Resource: Coca
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2005 To: 2015
Keywords: cocaine
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: Gao
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Coder Notes:
AQIM profited by taxing cocaine smugglers in Northern Africa from 2005 to 2015. A key town is Gao in northern Mali, which is nicknamed "Cocainebougou" ("cocaine town"). The area is a stopping point for smugglers from Colombia to European markets. Mokhtar Belmokhtar (nicknamed the Marlboror Man) is thought to have expanded from cigarratte smuggling to narcotics trafficking (Caulderwood, 2015; Freeman, 2013; Duffy, 2015). Funding amounts are unknown.

Crime

Rebel Group: AQIM
Criminal Activity: Smuggling

From: 2000 To: 2015
Keywords: Cigarettes, vehicles, arms
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 2000-2015: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Coder Notes:
AQIM engaged in smuggling as a financial strategy from 2000 to 2015. This is generally in the form of taxing criminal smugglers (Duffy, 2015; Schindler, 2017). The group smuggled vehicles, cigarettes, and arms (Laub and Masters, 2015). The cigarette smuggling operation was led by Belmokhtar who joined the GSPC (now AQIM) in 2000 and was given control of the GSPC's southern zone. His duty was to raise funds for GSPC. He accomplished this by smuggling and taxing cigarettes. He engaged in this act so much he earned the nickname "Mr. Marlboro" (Black 2009). Harmon (2014) notes that AQIM began to engage in cigarette smuggling in the early 2000'a. In 2003 Belmokhtar used money earned in ransom money to develop a more extensive trading network, used prominently to smuggle cigarettes (Doward 2013). The funds and amounts of income gained from smuggling are unknown.

Rebel Group: AQIM
Criminal Activity: Smuggling-human
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
AQIM engaged in smuggling people as a financial strategy in 2013 from 2015 (Duffy, 2015; Laub and Masters, 2015; Mapping Militant Organizations: AQIM, 2016). Refugees and migrants pay smugglers to help them cross the Mediterranean to Eurpoe (Osborne, 2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: AQIM
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2000 To: 2015
Keywords: car theft, credit card fraud
Location (First Order Administrative District):

Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Coder Notes:
AQIM engaged in industry theft, car theft, and credit card fraud as funding strategies (Boudali, (2007; Isaacs, 2009; Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, 2017). Few details are provided, and the exact yearsand funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Algeria
Rebel Group: AQIM
Criminal Activity: extortion
From: 2000 To: 2015
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District): Bordj Bou Arréridj
Geographical Keywords: Kabylia
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 2000-2015: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Coder Notes:
AQIM used exrotion as a funding strategy from 2000 to 2015 (Boudali, 2007; Joscelyn, 2013; Inboden and Waterfield, 2016; Counter Extremism Project. 2016; Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page). This included “protection rackets” and using roadblocks to extort money from individuals who travel through their territory (Boudali 2007; Counter Extremism Project, 2016). The GSPC (now AQIM) is also involved in the black market, extortion, and have relationships with la mafia du sable (the sand mafia) in Kabylia. (Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page). The timing and exact funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Algeria
Rebel Group: AQIM
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping - International
From: 2000 To: 2015
Keywords: Aid worker, tourists, diplomats
Location (First Order Administrative District): Tindouf,
Geographical Keywords: Sahrawi refugee camps, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Tunisia
Funds: 2 = Over $5 million

Amounts: Total value between 2011-2014 is $75 million
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Coder Notes:
AQIM engaged in kidnapping for ransom from 2000-2015 (Bauer and Levitt, 2017), including humanitarian aid workers, diplomats, tourists, and employees of multinational corporations. Harmon (2014) suggests that AQIM switched to kidnapping for ransom in the early 2000s. There is evidence that kidnapping accounted for the bulk of AQIM's funding (Algerian diplomats). The group earns as much as 90% of its revenue from kidnapping. Sources suggest that AQIM has earned 90 million since 2003, while other sources estimate they earned between $40m and $65m from 2008 and 2012 (Lacher 2014). Others estimated that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates earned approximately $145 million from kidnapping between 2010 and 2014 (Laub and Masters, 2015; Pauwel, 2016). Individual ransoms earn $3 million on average. There are allegations that Italy and Spain paid $19.4 million for three aid workers taken from the Saharawi refugee camps (AQIM's Funding Sources; Al Qaeda frees Spanish hostages after nine months in captivity), while the German government reportedly paid five million euros for the release of European tourists taken in 2003 (Boudali 2007; Al-Qaeda looks to Sahel for new funding sources). The kidnappings targeted aid workers, tourists, diplomats, and workers in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Tunisia and Algeria (Van Der Merwe 2014). AQIM earned more than 5 million per year, though the exact amounts are unknown. According to the European Union Institute for Security Studies in June 2016, international kidnapping for ransom accounted for nearly 90% of its financial revenues, with a total value from 2011-2014 being $75 million (Pauwels, 2016).

MUJAO: 2012

Country: Algeria
Rebel Group: MUJAO
Natural Resource: Drugs
Strategy: smuggling
From: 2012
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District): Djelfa
Geographical Keywords: Niger-Mali border; Gao
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2012: 6

Coder Notes:MUJAO engaged in drug smuggling in 2012 (Lacher, 2013; Freeman, 2013). Lacher (2013) suggests that drug smuggling may have been a significant funding source for MUJAO. Lebovich (2013b: 51-52; Lacher (2012: 9) make the case that MUJAO was involved in

drug smuggling through three main individual's Mohamed Ould Ahmed Deya ‘Rouji’, Cherif Ould Taher, and Sultan Ould Badi, who carried out smuggling operations north of Gao. Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: MUJAO
Natural Resource: Coca
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2012
Keywords: cocaine
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: Gao
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Coder Notes:
MUJAO profited by taxing cocaine smugglers in Northern Africa in 2012. A key town is Gao in northern Mali, which is nicknamed “Cocainebougou” (“cocaine town”). The area is a stopping point for smugglers from Colombia to European markets. Mokhtar Belmokhtar (nicknamed the Marlboror Man) is thought to have expanded from cigarratte smuggling to narcotics trafficking (Caulderwood, 2015; Freeman, 2013). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Algeria
Rebel Group: MUJAO
Natural Resource: Cannabis
Strategy: theft
From: 2012
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: northern Mali, Niger-Mali border area
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1

Coder Notes: MUJAO has often been connected to drugs shipped across northern Mali. In November 2012, near the Niger-Mali border MUJAO captured a convoy that was carrying Moroccan hashish. (Dépêches (2013) and Rühl (2013). The funds and amount of funds are unknown.

Country: Algeria
Rebel Group: MUJAO

Criminal Activity: Kidnapping - International
From: 2012
Keywords: Canada, Europe
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1

Coder Notes: MUJAO made significant profits from kidnapping. Canadian and European governments are thought to have paid ransoms that amounted to between $40 and $65 million from 2008 to 2012 [This passage refers to both AQIM and MUJAO] (Lacher (2012: 9); Lacher 2013). MUJAO is likely to have earned more than 5 million from kidnapping, thought the exact amount is unknown.

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Angola

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups:
FLEC-FAC: 1994, 1996-1998, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009
FLEC-R: 1991, 1994, 1997, 2002
UNITA: 1990-2002

UNITA
Country: Angola
Rebel Group: UNITA
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1990 **To:** 2002
Location: Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Bié Province, Kwanza Sul, Cuando Cubango, Uige, Malanje
Geographical Keywords: Luzamba, Cuango Valley
Funds: 1 – Less than $5 million per year (1990-1991, 2001-2002)
2 – More Than $5 million per year (1992-2000)
Amounts: $400 million - $600 million (1992, 1994, 1997)
$300 million - $600 million (1993)
$320 million - $600 million (1995)
$300 million - $660 million (1996)
$200 million - $300 million (1998)
$150 million - $600 million (1999)
$100 million (2000)
-99: Unknown (1990-1991, 2001-2002)
Certainty: 2 (one source) (1990, 2002)
1 (1991-2001)

Notes: UNITA engaged in extortion of diamonds (alluvial) from 1990 to 2002 (Dietrich 2000a, Dietrich 2000b, Malaquias 2001, UN Security Council Report 2000, Diamond Industry Annual Report 2007, Boeck 2001, Hodges 2001, Sherman 2000, Olsson 2006). From 1990 to 1991 UNITA was able to take advantage of diggers in its diamond rich zones, but it wasn't until 1992, when UNITA had gained control of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul (including the Cuango Valley), that it had access to the most valuable diamond deposits. UNITA earned over $5 million per year from 1992 to 2000, usually making somewhere between $100 million and over $600 million each year from alluvial diamond deposits. UNITA's diamond sales began to decline more and more from 1999 until its demise in 2002.

Country: Angola

Rebel Group: UNITA
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1990 **To:** 2002
Keywords: food, medicine, clothing, mining equipment, other commercial commodities
Funds: Unknown (1990-1995, 1998-2002)
2 – More than $5 million per year (1996-1997)
Amounts: -99: Unknown (1990-1995, 1998-2002)
Max: $60 million (1996-1997)
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, reliable source) (1990-1995, 1998-2002)
1 (1996-1997)

Notes: UNITA engaged in extortion from 1990-2002 (UN Security Report 2000) in the form of landing fees imposed upon aircraft bringing food, medicine, clothing, mining equipment, and other commercial commodities. The taxes ranged from $2,000 to $5,000 and in 1996 and 1997 UNITA collected as much as $5 million per month using this funding strategy.

FLEC-FAC

Country: Angola
Rebel Group: FLEC-FAC
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International Victims
From: 1997 **To:** 2000
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1 - Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: 1997: $400,000, 1998: $500,000, 1999-2000: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: FLEC-FAC engaged in kidnapping international victims from 1997 to 2000 (Ojakorotu 2011). In a 1997 attack FLEC-FAC kidnapped workers from a construction company and released them after getting $400,000 ransom. In a 1998 attack FLEC-FAC kidnapped hostages and released them after getting $500,000 ransom. In 1999 and 2000 attacks FLEC-FAC kidnapped workers from a Portuguese and French companies gaining an unknown amount of ransom (Ojakorotu 2011).

FLEC-R
Country: Angola
Rebel Group: FLEC-R
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International Victims
From: 2001 **To:** Choose an item.

Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 - Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: FLEC-R engaged in kidnapping international victims in 2001 for an unknown amount (Ojakorotu 2011). FLEC-R kidnapped 5 Portuguese employees of a construction company in 2001.

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Azerbaijan

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Azerbaijan:
Military faction: 1993
OPON forces: 1995
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh: 1991-1994, 2012, 2014-2015

We found evidence that kidnapping and other crimes occurred in the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, there was no direct evidence linking this to the rebel group. Atrocities that involved looting of cities and towns occurred during the early 1990s, but it was not clear from the sources we consulted if this activity was aimed at terrorizing the population or at raising revenue for the group. The group appears to have received extensive support from Armenia; this support is documented in the UCDP External Support Database as well.

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Bangladesh

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups:
Jana Samhati Samiti/Shanti Bahini (JSS/SB): 1990-1991
Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP): 2005
Purbo Banglar Communist Party-Janajuddha Faction (PBCP-Janajudhha): 2005-2006

Jana Samhati Samiti/Shanti Bahini (JSS/SB)
Country: Bangladesh
Rebel Group: **Jana Samhati Samiti/Shanti Bahini (JSS/SB)**
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 1990-1991
Keywords: Taxes, Business
Location: Chittagong
Geographical Keywords: Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban districts
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
Shanti Bahini made the majority of its money from taxation of the local population. They also enacted tolls on Bengali traders and contractors (Adnan 2008; DeRouen and Heo 2007; *Evening Chronicle. 2001;* Nepram 2003; Rahman 1992; The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission 1997; Wilkinson 2008). Though news sources were scarce, they all seem to point to extortion as a primary funding source. Sources did not indicate precise timing of the taxation and extortion. Contractors were expected to pay TK 6,000 each (Rahman 1992). However, annual funding amounts are unknown.

Sources mention that JSS also engaged in kidnapping (DeRouen and Heo 2007) and theft (Rahman 1992). However, there are no details provided, and other sources did not substantiate this. Thus we did not code these activities.

Purbo Banglar Communist Party-Janajuddha Faction (PBCP-Janajudhha)
Country:Bangladesh
Rebel Group: **Purbo Banglar Communist Party-Janajuddha Faction (PBCP-Janajudhha)**
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2005-2006
Keywords: contractors, landowners, local populace, taxation
Location: Rajshahi Division
Geographical Keywords: Chalan Beel

Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Purbo Banglar Communist Party-Janajuddha Faction (PBCP-Janajudhha) engaged in extortion from 2005 through 2006. This included extorting the local populace (Start n.d.), landowners and contractors (SATP n.d.a; SATP n.d.b; UCDP n.d.). Extorting contractors has impeded development work in the country (SATP n.da.).

They also engaged in theft (UCDP n.d.) and kidnapping (SATP n.d.b; START n.d.; UCDP n.d.). Theft was mentioned but sources did not indicate that this was a primary financing strategy. At times kidnapping resulted in murdering the victims when the ransom was not paid (SATP n.d.b.). Because the few details provided indicated that this may not have been a successful funding strategy, we did not code kidnapping or theft.

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Burundi

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Burundi:
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu): 1991-1992
National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD): 1994-1998
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People – Forces for National Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL): 1997-2008
National Liberation Front (Frolina): 1997
National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD): 1998-2003
Military faction of General Godefroid Niyombare: 2015
Republican Forces of Burundi (Forces républicaines du Burundi) (FOREBU): 2015

Military faction of General Godefroid Niyombare

General Godefroid Niyombare led an unsuccessful coup d'etat in spring of 2015. Niyombare was never arrested, but four other leaders of the coup were sentenced to life in prison on January 15. 2016 (BBC, 2015; Global Security, 2016) Because this was a coup, the faction likely used the resources to which they had access as military leaders. There is no evidence that they earned income from natural resources or crime.

Republican Forces of Burundi (Forces républicaines du Burundi) (FOREBU)

The Republican Forces of Burundi (FOREBU) came together December 23, 2015 with the goal of removing President Pierre Nkurunziza from office, who was serving a controversial third term. They also aimed to protect citizens who were being killed because of protesting Nkurunziza's presidency. General Godefroid Niyombare became the head of FOREBU. Combatants seized weapons through attacks on military camps (Global Security, 2016). There is no evidence that FOREBU has earned income from natural resources or crime.

National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD)

Country: Burundi
Rebel Group: National Council for the Defense of Democracy(CNDD)
Natural Resource: coffee
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1994 **To:** 1998
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 4 (uncertain if armed group is involved)

Notes: The CNDD engaged in smuggling of coffee from 1994 to 1998 (Nindorera 2012, Johnston Summit Oketch & Polzer 2002). Large amounts of coffee beans have been smuggled from the DRC into Burundi by security forces.

National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy

Country: Burundi
Rebel Group: National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
Natural Resource: coffee
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1998 **To:** 2003
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (1994-2000)
5 (uncertain about timing, one source) (2001-2003)

Notes: The CNDD-FDD engaged in smuggling of coffee from 1998 to 2003 (Nindorera 2012; Oketch 2001, Johnston Summit Oketch & Polzer 2002). They smuggled coffee from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into Burundi where it was then sold on the international market. The CNDD-FDD was never able to take control the coffee growing industry within Burundi (Oketch 2001). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Burundi
Rebel Group: National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
Natural Resource: tea
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1998 **To:** 2003
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The CNDD-FDD engaged in smuggling of tea from 1998 to 2003 (Nindorera 2012). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Burundi
Rebel Group: National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
Natural Resource: agriculture

Strategy: Extortion
From: 1998 **To:** 2003
Keywords: watermelons
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Mitakaka
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The CNDD-FDD engaged in extortion of agriculture from 1998 to 2003 (Nindorera 2012). They owned watermelon fields in Mitakaka. Funding amounts for this activity are unknown. The CNDD-FDD also forced families in the refugee camps to donate food (beans and maize), often received from international donors, and cattle to their movement (Nindorera 2012). Since this did not generate the group much income we did not code this information, even though this probably provided the troops with substance so they did not have to waste funds on buying food.

Country: Burundi
Rebel Group: National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 1998 **To:** 2003
Keywords: weapons, military goods
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The CNDD-FDD engaged in theft of weapons and other military goods from 1998 to 2003 (Nindorera 2012). They stole these weapons and military goods from the Burundi armed forces. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Burundi
Rebel Group: National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1998 **To:** 2003
Keywords: road tax, Hutu civilians
Location:
Geographical Keywords: trunk roads
Funds: Unknown

Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The CNDD-FDD engaged in extortion from 1998 to 2003 (Nindorera 2012; Dilworth 2006). They imposed a road tax on vehicles traveling on Burundi's main trunk roads (Nindorera 2012). They also forced the Hutu civilian population to contribute money to their cause (Dilworth 2006). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

National Liberation Front (Frolina)

Country: Burundi
Rebel Group: Frolina
Natural Resource: coffee
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1997 **To:**
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords: DRC
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 4 (uncertain if armed group is involved)

Notes: Notes: The Frolina engaged in smuggling of coffee from 1997 (Nindorera 2012, Johnston Summit Oketch & Polzer 2002). Large amounts of coffee beans have been smuggled from the DRC into Burundi by security forces.

Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People – Forces for National Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL)

Country: Burundi
Rebel Group: Palipehutu-FNL
Natural Resource: coffee
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1997 **To:** 2008
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords: DRC
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 4 (uncertain if armed group is involved)

Notes: Notes: The Palipehutu-FNL engaged in smuggling of coffee from 1997 (Nindorera 2012, Johnston Summit Oketch & Polzer 2002). Large amounts of coffee beans have been smuggled from the DRC into Burundi by security forces.

Country: Burundi
Rebel Group: Palipehutu-FNL
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1997 **To:** 2002
Keywords: road tax
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Palipehutu-FNL engaged in general extortion from 1997 to 2002 (ICG 2002). The Palipehutu-FNL forces contributions from individuals and imposes taxes on businessmen who need to use Palipehutu-FNL controlled roads.

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Cambodia

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups:
FUNCINPEC 1990-1, 1997
KPNLF 1990-91
KR 1990-98

FUNCINPEC
Country: Cambodia
Rebel Group: **FUNCINPEC**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-1991; 1997
Type or Resource: Timber
Keywords: rosewood, pine, and teak
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1990-1991*:* 2 = One source
1997: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes: Funcinpec engaged in extortion of the timber industry from 1990 through 1991. This extortion may have also been occurring in 1997. Primary types of timber included rosewood, pine and teak. They earned an unknown amount of funding (ICE 1997).

Country: Cambodia
Rebel Group: **FUNCINPEC**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-1991; 1997
Type or Resource: Timber
Keywords: rosewood, pine, and teak
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1990-1991: 2 = One source
1997:5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes:
Funcinpec smuggled timber from 1990 through 1991. This may have continued in 1997. They smuggled mostly across the border to Thailand. They earned an unknown amount of funding (ICE 1997).

Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF)

Country: Cambodia
Rebel Group: **Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-1991
Type or Resource: Timber
Keywords: rosewood, pine, and teak
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes:
KPNLF engaged in extortion of the timber industry from 1990 through 1991. Primary types of timber included rosewood, pine and teak. They earned an unknown amount of funding (ICE 1997).

Country: Cambodia
Rebel Group: **Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-1991
Type or Resource: Timber
Keywords: rosewood, pine, and teak
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes:
KPNLF smuggled timber from 1990 through 1991. They smuggled mostly across the border to Thailand, and earned an unknown amount of funding (ICE 1997).

Khmer Rouge (KR)

Country: Cambodia
Rebel Group: **Khmer Rouge (KR)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-1998
Type or Resource: Timber
Keywords: rosewood, pine, and teak
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown

Certainty: 1990-1998: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Khmer Rouge engaged in extortion of the timber industry from 1990 to 1998. This included rosewood, pine and teak timber. They earned over $5 million annually, though the exact amount of funding is unknown (Collier 2003; Global Witness 1995; Global Witness 2001; ICE 1997; McCullough 1990; Saranda 2013; Waddington 2004).

Country: Cambodia
Rebel Group: **Khmer Rouge (KR)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-1998
Type or Resource: Timber
Keywords: rosewood, pine, and teak
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: $120-240 million annually
Certainty: 1990-1998: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Khmer Rouge smuggled timber from 1990 to 1998, primarily to Thailand. Timber types included rosewood and teak (Collier 2003; Global Witness 1995; Global Witness 2001; ICE 1997; McCullough 1990; Saranda 2013; Waddington 2004). They earned between $120 million to $240 million annually (Global Witness 1995).

Country: Cambodia
Rebel Group: **Khmer Rouge (KR)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-1998
Type or Resource: Gems
Keywords: Rubies, sapphires
Geographical Keywords: Pailin, Ban Laem
Funds: 2 = Over $5 million
Amounts: 1990: $12 million/year
other years: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1990-1995: 1 = Multiple credible sources
1996-1998: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes: The Khmer Rouge (KR) controlled the regions where gems were extracted from 1990 to 1998. Important places to their activities include the town of Pailin and the Thai district of Ban Laem. Gems included rubies and sapphires. The KR earned over $5 million per year from their activities (Global Witness 1995; McCullough 1990; PoKempner 1995; Saranda 2013; Waddington 2004). In 1990 they earned $12 million a year from the gem industry (Global Witness 1995). Although it is not entirely clear whether this amount is from control or smuggling of gems, sources seem to indicate that these amounts are due to the sale of the gems as opposed to smuggling. It is unclear if the extortion of gems continued after the KR's demobilization (Global Witness 2001; Waddington 2004); thus we lowered the certainty variable.

Country: Cambodia
Rebel Group: **Khmer Rouge (KR)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-1998
Type or Resource: Gems
Keywords: Rubies, sapphires
Geographical Keywords: Pailin, Ban Laem
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99 Unknown
Certainty: 1990-1995: 1 = Multiple credible sources
1996-1998: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes: The Khmer Rouge (KR) smuggled gems from 1990 to 1998. Gems included rubies and sapphires (McCullough 1990; PoKempner 1995; Saranda 2013; Waddington 2004). The amounts of funding the KR earned specifically from smuggling is unknown. It is unclear if these activities continued after the KR's demobilization (PoKempner 1995); thus we decreased the certainty variable.

Country: Cambodia
Rebel Group: **Khmer Rouge (KR)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1996
Type or Resource: Opium
Funds:: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes:
One source indicates that the KR engaged in smuggling of opium into Thailand or Vietnam (Piansi 1996). We were unable to substantiate this with other sources.

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Cameroon

The following groups and years are in the UCPD dataset:
Islamic State (IS): 2015
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad: 2015

The ISWAP/BH enters the UCDP dataset in 2015 for Cameroon. Sources typically discuss funding sources for the group in general, often occurring across the Lake Chad region. Therefore, we code ISWAP/BH identically across the four countries. See Nigeria for the activities coded.

Note: The information code for ISWAP is the same as the data coded in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. If analysis is being conducted at the organizational level, this data should be dropped to avoid duplication.

Central African Republic

The following groups and years are in the UCPD dataset:
Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP):2009-2011
Forces of Francois Bozize: 2002
Forces of André Kolingba: 2001
Union des Forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR): 2006
Seleka: 2012-2015
Anti-Balaka: 2013-2015

Forces of André Kolingba
The Forces of André Kolingba were involved in an unsuccessful military coup that lasted ten days in 2001. The military faction likely relied on the arms and resources to which they already had access. There is no evidence that they earned income from natural resources or crime (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: Central African Republic 2015).

Forces of Francois Bozize
The Forces of Francois Bozize were involved in a military coup in 2002. The military faction likely relied on the arms and resources to which they already had access. In 2003 Bozize executed a coup that made him president (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: Central African Republic 2015). No source detailed any domestic funding or use of the strategies in which we are interested.

Union des Forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR)
Country: CAR
Rebel Group: **Union des Forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR)**
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2006
Keywords:
Location: Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga provinces
Geographical Keywords: Sam Ouandja, Haute-Kotto, villages of Tiroungoulou, Gordil, Mélé, and Boromota
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The Union des Forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR) used extortion of alluvial diamonds as a financial strategy. The UFDR drove out previous miners and installed their own mining team. When the UFDR financed a digging operation, they stationed soldiers at the mine to ensure the diamonds are not stolen (Dalby 2011; Global Security 2012; Human Rights Watch 2007; International Crisis Group 2010; Southward, Weyns, Hoex and Hilgert 2014; Spittaels and Hilgert 2009). According to the International Crisis Group, the UFDR gained around 600 new recruits from Sam Ouandja by promising better opportunities. These new recruits almost immediately began to use their weapons to extort diamonds from miners. In November 2006, the UFDR, lead by Captain Yao, advanced on diamond mining village in Sam Ouandja. Once in the town they began to collect money from various local businessmen. Each diamond collector was forced to pay $2000 upfront and then $40 monthly (International Crisis Group 2010). However, the annual amount of funding the UFDR earned from this is unknown.

Country: Central African Republic
Rebel Group: **Union des Forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR)**
Criminal Activity: Theft
Years: 2006
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The UFDR engaged in theft from towns and villages. This included homes, businesses, farms, and medical facilities. The UFDR stole livestock, food, weapons, as well as money (Dalby 2011; Human Rights Watch 2007; Olson 2007). We suspect that the funding amount is high as witnesses claim the UFDR especially targeted wealthy individuals such as businessmen (International Crisis Group 2010), but were unable to find specific information on the amount the group earned from this activity.

Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP)
Country: CAR
Rebel Group: **Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP)**
Natural Resource: Diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2009-2010
Keywords:
Location: Ndele
Geographical Keywords: Rounga, Sangba
Funds: -99: Unknown

Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2009: 1 = Multiple credible sources
2010: 2 = One source

Notes:
The Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP) engaged in extortion of alluvial diamonds from 2009 through 2010 (Central African Republic Bangui government document 09BANGUI273_a. 2009). The CPJP took control of the of the Rounga area. Sources indicate that the group paid local Runga youth to work the mines (Global Security 2012; International Crisis Group 2010). However, the amount of funding the CPJP earned from this is unknown.

Seleka
Country: CAR
Rebel Group: **Seleka**
Natural Resource: Diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2012-2015
Keywords: taxes, mining fees, protection payments
Location: Bamingui-Bangoran, Haute-Kotto, Mbomou, Ouaka, Basse-Kotto
Geographical Keywords: Manovo-Gounda National Park, Ndele, Bria, Sam-Ouandja, Dimbi, Nzako
Funds: 1 – Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: Seleka engaged in extortion of alluvial diamonds from 2012 to 2015 (Ebertz, 2013; Supple, 2016; Amnesty International, 2015; Agger, 2015; United Nations Security Council, 2014; Weyns, 2014; Africa News, 2015). Seleka first took control of diamond mines in eastern Central African Republic during their offensive in December of 2012. After taking control of a town, they would often supplant the existing mining administration and set up their own mining authorizations and taxations (Weyns, 2014). In early 2013 they continued to take over diamond mining sites in Bria and Sam-Ouandja (Amnesty International, 2015). They maintained many mining sites after they were forced out of government office in 2014. They received profit from diamonds in two ways: first, by forcing the people to mine for them and then selling the diamonds, and, second, by applying taxes, mining fees, and protection payments on the miners (Agger, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015). Armed groups in all made about $3.87 million to $5.8 million per year from the diamond trade in the Central African Republic (Agger, 2015). This means that Seleka's funding amounts are less than $5 million per year. One sentence of a United Nations source claims that individual Seleka commanders control part of the diamond trade and "take" diamonds to Sudan (United Nations Security Council, 2014). This could be implying that individual Seleka commanders smuggle diamonds to Sudan, but without more concrete wording, and proof that they actually make money from this activity, we decided not to

code based on this sentence alone.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Seleka
Natural Resource: Gold
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords:
Location: Ouaka Province
Geographic Region: Ndassima
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6

Notes: Seleka engaged in extortion of gold from 2013 to 2015 (United Nations Security Council, 2014; Agger, 2015; Hoije, 2014; Flynn, 2014; Africa News, 2015). Seleka controlled the gold mine in Ndassima in Ouaka Province, as well as possibly other mines in the province (United Nations Security Council, 2014; Agger, 2015). They earned money by taxing the miners and then taking much of the miners' gold and selling it for themselves. From taxation alone, they earned about $150,000 a year (Agger, 2015). Overall funding amounts are unknown. In the course of our research we found short mentions of possible looting and smuggling of gold by Seleka commanders, but we did not find enough evidence of these activities to be able to code them.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Seleka
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2014-2015
Keywords: cattle
Location: Nana-Mambéré, Ombella-M'Poko, Nana-Grébizi
Geographical Keywords: Bouar, Bangui, Kaga Bandoro
Funds: 1 – Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $210,000 - $420,000
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Seleka forces engaged in extortion of cattle from 2014 to 2015 (Weyns, 2014; Agence France Presse, 2016; Agger, 2015; Africa News, 2015; Flynn, 2014). Seleka placed taxes on cattle herders, forcing them to pay for settling disputes, for arbitrary infractions, or for transportation and trade of their cattle (Weyns, 2014; Agger, 2015). Transporting a head of cattle could cost from $16 to $50 (Agence France Presse, 2016; Agger, 2015). The Union for Peace in

the Central African Republic (UPC) faction of Seleka earned $210,000 to $420,000 per year, putting the likely funds below $5 million per year (Agger, 2015).

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Seleka
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2012-2014
Keywords: bush meat, antelope, ivory
Location: Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran, Ombella-M'Poko, Mambéré-Kadéï
Geographical Keywords: northeast, Am Dafok, Ndélé, Bangui, Chad, Sudan, Sangba
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Seleka engaged in smuggling of animals (bush meat and antelope) in 2014 (Weyns, 2014; United Nations Security Council, 2014). Seleka has been involved in poaching bush meat (or supplying arms for hunters to do so) and transporting the meat for sale across the Central African Republic and neighboring countries (Weyns, 2014). Funding amounts are unknown.
Seleka engaged in smuggling of Ivory from 2012 to 2013 (Weyns, 2014; Christy, 2015). Seleka stocked and sold ivory tusks to help fund their overthrow of President François Bozizé in 2013. In February of 2013, it was reported that they had killed 12 elpehants in the Mambéré-Kadéï prefecture. When Seleka lost power in 2014, their poaching efforts appeared to be either highly reduced or non-existent, most likely due to the low number of surviving elephants in the eastern part of the country (Weyns, 2014). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Seleka
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Theft
From: 2014-2015
Keywords: cattle
Location: Nana-Mambéré, Ouham
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Seleka engaged in theft of cattle from 2014 to 2015 (Weyns, 2014; Furcoi, 2017; Jennings, 2015). They frequently raided cattle from territory under their control. In the Nana-Mambéré prefecturate, Seleka were responsible for taking about a third of the cattle, partly through raiding (Weyns, 2014). They also raided cattle from Fulani cattle herders (Furcoi, 2017). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Seleka

Natural Resource: coffee
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2014 - 2015
Keywords:
Location: Ouaka
Geographical Keywords: Bambari
Funds: $200,000 - $240,000
Amounts: 1 – Less than $5 million per year
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Seleka engaged in extortion of coffee from 2014 to 2015 (Agger, 2015; Africa News, 2015; Jennings, 2015; Flynn, 2014). The Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) faction of Seleka earned about $200,000 to $240,000 annually from taxing coffee traders who like to buy coffee in the market of Bambari in order to transport it to Sudan (Agger 2015). This put the funds under $5 million per year.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Seleka
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
From: 2014
Keywords: director of the National Federation of Central African cattle breeders
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Bouar
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: In roughly 2014, Seleka engaged in kidnapping (Agger 2015). Seleka kidnapped the director of the National Federation of Central African Cattle Breeders and demanded a ransom. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Seleka
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2012-2015
Keywords: roads, trucks, civilians, businesses, public institutions, humanitarian aid
Location: Nana-Mambéré, Mambéré-Kadéï, Haute-Kotto, Ouaka, Nana-Grébizi, Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran
Geographical Keywords: Beloko, Gamboula, Bria, Bambari, Kaga Bandoro, Birao, Am Dafok, Ndélé
Funds: 1 – Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $1.5 million - $2 million (2014-2015)
-99 (2012-2013)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2014-2015)
6 (2012-2013)

Notes: Seleka engaged in extortion from 2012 to 2013 and 2014 to 2015 (Weyns, 2014; United Nations, 2014; UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015; Agger, 2015; Africa News, 2016). They set up road blocks along major routes to the capital (Bangui) and on border crossings in the east and west of the country, collecting taxes on trucks, cars, and motorbikes carrying goods to trade or, sometimes, humanitarian aid (Agger, 2015). Divers are usually charged $200 to $1,000 per vehicle, as well as a share of their fuel (Weyns, 2014). They also tax private citizens, businesses, and public institutions. The Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) faction of Seleka collects about $150,000 – $200,000 on the road going north from Kaga Bandoro. Patriotic Front for the Renaissance in the Central African Republic (FPRC) faction of Seleka makes about $150,000 – $200,000 on the road north of Bambari and about $150,000 – $200,000 on the road north of Ndélé. Combined, the different Seleka factions earn about $1.5 million to $2 million per year (Agger, 2015). This puts funding under $5 million per year. Humanitarian Aid was not put in its own category because it was not specifically targeted. Instead it seems to be one of the many items caught in Seleka's road blocks.

Anti-Balaka

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Anti-Balaka
Natural Resource: Gold
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2014-2015
Keywords:
Location: Nana-Mambere, Ombella-M'Poko, Lobaye, Ouham-Pendé
Geographical Keywords: Niem, Gbakana, Yaloké, Ndolobo, Bozoum, Mbaiki
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1

Notes: Anti-Balaka engaged in extortion of gold from 2013 to 2014 (Weyns, 2014; Agger, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015). They employed a range of different techniques for controlling and extorting gold mines which included charging money to protect the site, taking five percent of production, and mining the gold themselves. Anti-Balaka have focused more on gold than diamonds, because it easier to extract and sell. Unlike their rival group, Seleka, they have not set up parallel mining authorities and organized taxation systems (Weyns, 2014). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Anti-Balaka
Natural Resource: Diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2014-2015
Keywords:
Location: Lobaye, Mambere-Kadeï
Geographical Keywords: Boda, Guen, Carnot, Berberati
Funds: -99

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1

Notes: Anti-Balaka engaged in extortion of diamonds from 2014 to 2015 (Amnesty Internation, 2015; United Nations Security Coucnil, 2014; Agger, 2015; Weyns, 2014). Their methods ranged from taxing miners and traders to operating the mine themselves (Amnesty International, 2015). According to local traders, the diamond trade in western Central African Republic fell fifty to seventy percent in 2014 when Anti-Balaka took over and drove out all the Muslim collectors (United Nations Security Council, 2014). Anti-Balaka lacked the expertise and connections to properly assess and sell the diamonds without the help of local traders and collectors (who have all since fled). They have also failed to pre-finance diamond mines (Agger, 2015). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Anti-Balaka
Natural Resource: Diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Theft
Years: 2014-2015
Keywords:
Location: Mambere-Kadeï
Geographic Keywords: Carnot
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1

Notes: Anti-Balaka engaged in theft of diamonds from 2014 to 2015 (Amnesty International, 2015; Weyns, 2014). Anti-Balaka stole diamonds from collectors, mineral buying houses, and mining sites (Weyns, 2014). At mining sites, they would wait until the workers were done with the digging and then they would show up with guns to kick out the workers and take the diamonds (Amnesty International, 2015). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Anti-Balaka
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords: road taxation
Location: Ombella-M'Poko, Kémo
Geographical Keywords: Damara, Sibut, Béloko
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (2014-2015)
6 (2013)

Notes: Anti-Balaka engaged in extortion from 2013 to 2014 (United Nations Security Council, 2014; Agger, 2015; Weyns, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014). They set up road blocks to

tax goods, trucks, motorbikes, and private vehicles, receiving about US$2 to US$10 per truck. They also taxed logging trucks and river transportation. One commander would collect as much as US$200 per barrier per week. The increased presence of United Nations peacekeepers has lately made taxation more difficult for Anti-Balaka (Agger, 2015; Weyns, 2014). They extorted money from rural villages, making about US$600 to US$1,000 (Weyns, 2014). They also taxed legitimate diamond traders, collectors, and buying houses (Amnesty International, 2015; United Nations Security Council, 2014). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Anti-Balaka
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Theft
From: 2013-2015
Keywords: cattle
Location: Nana-Mambéré, Ouham
Geographical Keywords: Bossangoa
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Anti-Balaka engaged in theft of animals (cattle) from 2013 to 2015 (Agger, 2015; Weyns, 2014; Bouckaert, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2017). The cattle were stolen from Muslim communities, mainly the pastoral Fulani. In 2013, Anti-Balaka was able to steal over 5,000 heads of cattle (Bouckaert, 2013). Anti-Balaka ended up flooding the market with all the cattle and meat they stole, driving down prices (Weyns, 2014). The meat was sold in markets in Bangui and in Cameroon near the border (International Crisis Group, 2014). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: CAR
Rebel Group: Anti-Balaka
Criminal Activity: Humanitarian Aid
From: 2014
Keywords: medicines
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Bambari-Grimari road, Bangui-Boali road
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: Anti-Balaka engaged in humanitarian aid theft in 2014 (International Crisis Group, 2014). International Non-Governmental Organizations have reported robberies of medicine and other essential goods by Anti-Balaka militias. Funding amounts are unknown.

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Chad

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Chad:
Islamic Legion: 1990
Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS): 1990
Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD): 1991-1997
National Council for Recovery (CNR): 1991992-1994
Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD): 1992-1994
Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas): 1991
Chad National Front (FNT): 1992-1994
Armed Forces of the Federal Republic (FARF): 1997-1998
Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT): 1999-2002
Rally for Democracy and Liberty (FUCD): 2005-2006
Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD): 2006
Union Force for Democracy and Development (UFDD): 2006-2007
National Alliance (AN): 2008
Union of Forces for the Resistance (UFR): 2009
Popular Front for National Renaissance (PFNR): 2010
Islamic State (IS): 2015

The ISWAP/BH enters the UCDP dataset in 2015 for Chad. Sources typically discuss funding sources for the group in general, often occurring across the Lake Chad region. Therefore, we code ISWAP/BH identically across the four countries. See Nigeria for the activities coded.

Note: The information code for ISWAP is the same as the data coded in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. If analysis is being conducted at the organizational level, this data should be dropped to avoid duplication.

Rally of Democratic Forces

Country: Chad
Rebel Group: Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD)
Criminal Activity: Humanitarian Aid
From: 2006
Location: Ouaddaï Region
Geographical Keywords: Abeche
Funds: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Rally of Democratic Forces (FAFD) engaged in theft of humanitarian aid in 2006 in Abeche (Africa Research Bulletin 2006). At least three humanitarian compounds were targeted during the extensive looting by the RAFD. They made less than $5 million per year with this strategy. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

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China

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in China:
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM): 2008

East Turkestan Islamic Movement

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is an Uygher separatist organization operating primarily in the province of Xinjiang, home to China's largest Uygher population. Both China and the United States have designated the ETIM as a terrorist organization and China has ascribed many violent attacks in the Xinjiang province to the organization. The movement appears to attain a large percentage of its funding from the Uygher diaspora population and sympathetic organizations in Europe, North America, and other parts of Asia (Gunaratna 2006; Gunaratna 2011; Pereire 2006). China and the United States have also alleged that the ETIM has close ties with groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan and receives funding and training from Al Qaeda (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN 2001; U.S. Department of State 2006; Gunaratna 2006). These funding strategies, while interesting, are not counted for the purposes of our dataset since they are not attained through natural resource exploitation or crime. China has made some claims in the early 2000s that the ETIM was involved in smuggling drugs to Xinjiang (Haider 2005; Sun 2010), but coming from only Chinese sources with no other evidence to back this up, we were unwilling to code drug smuggling for 2008.

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Focused Lexis Nexis searches

Colombia

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups:
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN): 1990-2010; 2013; 2015
Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL): 1990, 2004
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC): 1990-2015

ELN

Rebel Group: **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Coal
Years: 1990-2015
Location: Santander, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Boyaca, Cundinamarca

Funds: 1990-2010: 2 - Over $5 million threshold
2011-2015: -99
Amounts: 1990-2010: 10 million+
2011-2015: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Ejército de Liberación Nacional engaged in extortion of coal from 1990 through 2015 (Bargent 2013, Cohen, 2013; U.S. Department of State, 2011-2016). Each year, from 1990 to 2010, it earned over the $5 million threshold. From all of the ELN's activities in the coal industry, they earned over $10 million (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Kline, 1999; Offstein, 2003). Funding for the years 2011 to 2015 is unknown.

Rebel Group: **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Gold
Years: 1990-2015
Location: Antioquia, Chocó, Nariño, Santander, Bolívar
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2- Over $5 million threshold
Amounts: 1990-2010: 10 million+
2011-2015: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Ejército de Liberación Nacional engaged in extortion of gold from 1990 through 2015 (Bargent 2013, Cohen, 2013; Wagner, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2014; Bargent,

2013; Ramsey, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 2011-2016). They taxed illegal gold miners and gold mines, forcing the miners to pay various fees to them and taking part of the miners' profits (Wagner, 2016). Each year it earned over the $5 million threshold. From all of the ELN's activities in the gold industry, they earned over $10 million from 1990 to 2010 (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Kline, 1999; Offstein, 2003). The exact amounts they earned from 2011 to 2015 are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Oil
Years: 1990-2015
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1994: 2: Over $5 million
all other years: -99: unknown
Amounts: 1994: $18.6 million
all other years: -99: unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:The Ejército de Liberación Nacional engaged in extortion of oil from 1990 through 2015 (Ross, 2012; BBC, 2013; Cuéllar, 2016; Sullivan, 2014). They extort money from oil companies by bombing or threatening to bomb pipelines (Ross, 2012). Offstein shows that the ELN earned $18.6 million from oil extortion in 1994 (2003). Other research did not indicate amounts earned from this activity. We have thus coded funding amounts for 1994, with all other years unknown.

Rebel Group: **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Coca
Years: 1990-2015
Location: Nariño, Norte de Santander, Cauca, Bolívar
Geographical Keywords: northern Pacific coast, southern Bolívar, Catatumbo
Funds: 1990-2010: Over $5 million
2011-2015: Unknown
Amounts: unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Ejército de Liberación Nacional engaged in extortion of coca from 1990 through 2015 (Fox, 2012; Kline, 2012; Yagoub, 2015; Chalk, 2011; U.S. Department of State, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014). They taxed cocoa plants and provided protection to cocaine laboratories (International Crisis Group, 2014). Each year, from 1990 to 2010, it earned over the

$5 million threshold (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Kline, 1999). Funding amounts for 2011 to 2015 are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)**
Activity: Smuggling
Resource: Coca
Years: 1990-2015
Geographical Keywords: Venezuela
Funds: 1990-2010: 2-Over $5 million
2011-2015: Unknown
Amount: unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Ejército de Liberación Nacional smuggled coca from 1990 through 2015 (Fox, 2012; Kline, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 2015; Sullivan, 2014; Otis, 2014; InSight Crime, 2017). They facilitate shipments of drugs through Venezuela (U.S. Department of State, 2015). A report notes that one cocaine production and trafficking ring received as much as $1 million per month (Fox, 2012). Thus, we extended this high funding amount for all of the years from 1990 to 2010. Funding amounts for 2011 to 2015 are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)**
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2015
Location: Nariño, Cauca, Huila, Tolima, Cesar
Geographical Keywords: northern Nariño, southern Cauca
Funds: 1990-2006: Over $5 million
2007-2015: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) engaged in extortion of opium from 1990 to 2015 (International Crisis Group, 2002; International Crisis Group, 2004; International Crisis Group, 2005a; International Crisis Group, 2005b; Zackrison, 1997; Ospina, 2018; Rowe, 2006; Buscaglia, 2001; Alsema, 2018; Farah, 1992). They can be found in almost every opium cultivation region where they provide protection to farmers and engage in cultivation themselves (International Crisis Group, 2002; International Crisis Group, 2005a). According to various sources, the ELN made over $5 million per day at least until 2006 (Zackrison, 1997; Rowe, 2006). Funding after 2006 is unknown.

Rebel Group: **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)**
Criminal Activity: Extortion

Years: 1990-2007
Keywords: businesses, peasants
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1990-1997: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)
1998-2007: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) engage in extortion from 1990 to 2007 (Human Rights Watch, 1998; International Crisis Group, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2003). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)**
Activity: Kidnapping and kidnapping international
Years: 1990-2015
Funds: 1990-2005: Over $5 million
2006-2015: -99
Amounts: 1990-1999: $10 million +
2000-2015: -99
Certainty: 1990-2012: 1 = Multiple credible sources
2013-2015: 6

Notes:The ELN engaged in kidnapping from 1990 through 2015 (Fox, 2012; Kline, 2012). During the 1990's they earned over $10 million per year (Dube and Vargas, 2013; FBI 2013; Kline, 2012; Offstein, 2003; Sullivan, 2014; Felter, 2017; InSight Crime, 2017). After 2005, the ELN turned away from using kidnapping as a principal financing strategy and turned more towards drug trafficking (Kline 2012). The group kidnapped Colombian and international victims on a regular basis. It is difficult to parse out the exact amounts for each type of kidnapping. We conclude that the group earned over $5 million per year until later years, as kidnapping was then their second largest source of revenue.

Rebel Group: **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)**
Activity: Theft
Years: 1990-2010
Funds: unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:The Ejército de Liberación Nacional engaged in theft from 1990 through 2010. Scholars describe their activities as predation on public funds (Dube and Vargas, 2013;Richani, 1997).

FARC

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Coca
Years: 1990-2015
Geographical Keywords: Guaviare, Caqueta, Putumayo
Funds: Over $5 million
Amounts: $10 million +
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia engaged in extortion of coca from 1990 through 2015 (Chernick, 2007; Cilluffo, 2000; U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2006; Murphy and Acosta, 2013; Phippen, 2016; U.S. Department of State, 2016; McDermott, 2015; Brodzinsky, 2017; International Crisis Group, 2014). They controlled the coca-growing areas of Guaviare, Caqueta, Putumayo (Chernick, 2007). They also targeted the growers and producers and demanded royalties (Chernick, 2007; Dube and Vargas, 2013). In June 2016, the FARC signed a peace accord with the Colombian government. Up until that point, the FARC controlled 60 to 70 percent of coca production (Phippen, 2016; McDermott, 2015). Each year they earned over $5 million from controlling coca production (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Offstein, 2003, Kline, 1999, Chernick, 2007; Phippen, 2016). The FARC earned over $10 million from its activities in the coca industry (Chernick, 2007; Offstein, 2003; Steinitz 2002). Except in certain years for which detailed information is available, it is difficult to separate the exact funding amounts the FARC received from extorting coca production versus income from coca smuggling. We coded the "funds" variable for both coca extortion and coca smuggling as 2. For all uncertain years, we coded $10 million or more for extortion of coca, and coded -99 (unknown) for smuggling of coca to avoid duplication

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Gold
Years: 1990-2015
Location: Antioquia, Bolivar
Geographical Keywords: Bajo Cauca, Cordoba
Funds: 2 - Over $5 million
Amounts: $10 million +
10.2 million (1991)
12.7 million (1992)
13.3 million (1993)
10 million (2013-2015)
-99 Unknown

Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion of gold mines from 1990 through 2015 (Dube and Vargas, 2013; McDermott, 2012; Pettersson, 2013; Romero, 2011, Richani, 1997; Alaco, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2014; McDermott, 2017; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2015; United States Department of State, 2011-2016; Wagner, 2016; Daugherty, 2015). It earned over $10 million from its extortion of gold mines, exceeding our $5 million threshold (Kline, 1999; Offstein, 2003, Richani, 1997). It was active in the Bolivar, Bajo Cauca, Cordoba regions of Colombia (Pettersson, 2013). Since 2012, the FARC has increased their involvement in gold mining, with some sources claiming its profits now exceed those of drug trafficking (International Crisis Group, 2014; McDermott, 2017; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2015).

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Animal
Keywords: Cattle
Years: 1990-2015
Funds: 2 - Over $5 million
Amounts: $10 million +
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion of the cattle industry from 1990 through 2015. Each year they earned over $10 million (Chernick, 2007; Holmes, Gutierrez de Piñeres and Curtin, 2010; McDermott, 2017; Bargent, 2014).

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Coffee
Years: 1990-2012
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99 unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion of the coffee industry from 1990-2012 (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Holmes, Gutierrez de Piñeres and Curtin, 2010).

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Oil
Years: 1990-2015

Funds: 1991-1994: 2: Over $5 million
all other years: -99: Unknown
Amounts: 1991: $5.3 million
1992: $6.2 million
1993: $6.5 million
1994: $13.0 million
all other years: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion of the oil industry from 1990 through 2015 (Holmes, Gutierrez de Piñeres and Curtin, 2010; Kline, 1999; Offstein, 2003; Sullivan and Beittel, 2014; Bargent, 2014; Cuéllar, 2016). Offstein gives specific funding amounts for the years 1991-1994 (2003). However, no other sources indicate funding amounts for oil extortion. Thus, we have coded funding for the years 1991-1994, with the other years as unknown.

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Coltan
Years: 2007-2015
Location: Guainia, Vichada
Funds: 2 - Over $5 million (2007-2012)
-99 (2013-2015)
Amounts: $12 million (2007-2012)
-99 (2013-2015)
Certainty: 2 = One source (2007-2010)
1 = Multiple credible sources (2011-2015)

Notes: The FARC used extortion of coltan mines in the regions of Guainia and Vichada. They made $1 million a month, or $12 million annually from this at least until 2012 (O'Neill McCleskey, 2012; McDermott, 2017; Daugherty, 2015; U.S. Department of State, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 2013; U.S. Department of State, 2014; U.S. Department of State, 2015; U.S. Department of State, 2016). Funding amounts for 2013 to 2015 are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Tungsten/Wolframite
Years: 2007-2015
Location: Guainia
Geographical Keywords: Tiger Hill/Cerro Tigre
Funds: -99: Unknown

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: From 2007 through 2015 the FARC earned funding earned from extortion of Tiger Hill, the only known tungsten mine in Colombia (Bargent 2013b; Michaud 2013; Smith 2013; McDermott, 2017; Daugherty, 2015). The amount of funding is unknown. However, one source shows that Raul Linares, who was working for Geo Copper, paid 52.3 million pesos (about $27,382 USD) for tungsten ore in April 2011 alone (Smith 2013).

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Smuggling
Resource: Coca
Years: 1990-2015
Funds: 2 - Over $5 million
Amounts: $90 million (2012)
-99: Unknown (all other years)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The FARC was involved in smuggling and trading coca from 1990-2012 (Cilluffo, 2000; Cook, 2011; McDermott, 2014; U.S. Department of State, 2015; U.S. Department of State, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2014). Each year they earned over $5 million (Cilluffo, 2000; Hanson, 2009). Based on the United Nations' estimate for Colombian cocaine production in 2012, the FARC earned about $90 million that year from the movement of cocaine (McDermott, 2014). Exact amounts for all other years is unknown. This is because most figures given on the FARC's earnings from the drug trade are not separated into smuggling and extortion. We coded the "funds" variable for both coca extortion and coca smuggling as 2.

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1995-2015
Keywords:
Location: Nariño, Cauca, Huila, Tolima
Geographical Keywords: Bota Caucana, Tolima's Las Hermosas Canyon
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (1997-2015)
6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (1995-1996)

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion of opium from 1995 to 2015 (Otis, 2014; Cawley, 2013; McDermott, 2017; Tellez, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2002; International Crisis Group, 2001; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2001; Chalk, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2004; Vargas, 1999; Zackrison and Siege, 1997). They taxed poppy farmers who harvested opium latex (Otis, 2014). Poppies were grown in Nariño, Bota Caucana, Huila, and Tolima (International Crisis Group, 2005). 2001 represented the height of opium production in Colombia (Chalk, 2011). The FARC is probably making at least $5 million a year from this activity (McDermott, 2017). Exact amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Natural Resource: cannabis
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1990-2015
Keywords:
Location: Cauca
Geographical Keywords: Cauca highlands, Corinto
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion of cannabis from 1990 to 2015 (McDermott, 2017; Otis, 2014; Gagne, 2015; Pachico, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2012; Beittel, 2013; Duque, 2011; InSight Crime, 2017). They began their involvement in the marijuana trade in the 1970s when they began taxing marijuana farmers and growers (InSight Crime, 2017). For about the last decade, much of the FARC marijuana production has taken place in the Cauca highlands under the 6th Front (McDermott, 2017). Here they produce an extra potent strain of marijuana known as “creepy,” which contains higher levels of THC, the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana (Pachico, 2011). A 2011 source (Pachico, 2011) reported that a kilogram of the drug costs about $56 while a 2017 source (McDermott, 2017) now reports that price at $170. Most of the Marijuana is produced for internal consumption, though a small portion of it has made its way to the Caribbean islands, Venezuela, and Ecuador (Gagne, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2012). Funding amounts are unknown

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Natural Resource: coal
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2010-2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99

Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion of coal from 2011 to 2015 (McDermott, 2016; U.S. Department of State, 2011-2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Natural Resource: copper
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2010-2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion of copper from 2010 to 2015 (U.S. Department of State, 2011-2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Natural Resource: other
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2010-2015
Keywords: nickel
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion of nickel from 2010 to 2015 (U.S. Department of State, 2011-2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Kidnapping and kidnapping international
Years: 1990-2012
Funds: Over $5 million
Amounts: $300 million (2002)
-99 (all other years)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The FARC used kidnapping as a funding strategy from 1990 through 2012 (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Hanson, 2003; Offstein, 2003. Each year they earned over $5 million (Cilluffo, 2000; Offstein, 2003; Sullivan and Beittel, 2014; McDermott, 2017). The group kidnapped by Colombian and international victims on a regular basis. It is difficult to parse out the exact amounts for each type of kidnapping. We conclude that the group earned over $5 million per year until later years, as kidnapping was then their second largest source of revenue. At the height of their kidnapping in 2002, they earned about $300 million (McDermott, 2017). Exact amounts for all other years are unknown. In 2012, the FARC abandoned this practice (McDermott, 2017).

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Activity: Theft
Years: 1990-2012
Criminal Activity: divert public funds, bank robberies
Funds: 2 - Over $5 million
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The FARC engaged in theft from 1990 through 2012. Sources describe their activities as predation on public funds or diverting public funds (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Richani, 1997). Other sources state that they engage in bank robberies, and show that they earn over $5 million (Chernick, 2007).

Rebel Group: **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)**
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 1990-2015
Keywords: contractors, businesses, transport companies, small shops, public contracts, beauty salons, lawyer offices, bus companies, multinational corporations
Location: Caquetá, Antioquia, Cauca, Meta
Geographical Keywords: Campamento, Bajo Cauca, Tarazá, La Uribe, despeje zone
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99 (1990-2014)
$75 million (2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The FARC engaged in extortion from 1990 to 2015 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016; McDermott, 2017; Lohmuller, 2016; De Paz, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2012; Pachico, 2011; U.S. Department of State, 2001; United Kingdom Home Office, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 1998; InSight Crime, 2017). They began this activity in the 1970s when they started taxing small and large businessmen (InSight Crime, 2017). In April of 2000, the

FARC announced “Law 002” which said that any businesses in Columbia with assets totaling at least $1 million had to pay a tax to the FARC or risk kidnapping (U.S. Department of State, 2001; United Kingdom Home Office, 2001). The FARC extort a wide variety of businesses of all sizes in Colombia, including, but not limited to, contractors, transport companies, small shops, beauty salons, lawyer offices, bus companies, and multinational corporations. They also take a percentage of the contract value for any public contracts to build public roads, bridges, sewers, or other infrastructure (McDermott, 2017). A 2017 source reported the potential value of their extortion activities to probably be over $75 million a year (McDermott, 2017). Therefore, we coded the FARC as making over $5 million per year from this activity. Exact values are unknown.

EPL

Rebel Group: **Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL)**
Activity: Extortion
Years: 1990
Keywords: Banana labor union, cattle
Funds: -99 unknown
Amount: -99
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes: The Ejército Popular de Liberación engaged in crime, earning an unknown funding amount from extortion of banana labor unions. (De La Pedraja, 2013).

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Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL): 1996-1997
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC): 1998-2001
Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD): 1998-2001
National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP): 2006-2008
Bunda dia Kongo (BDK): 2007-2008
March 23 Movement (M23): 2012-2013
Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS): 2013-2014
Forces of Paul Joseph Mukungubila: 2013
Kata Katanga: 2013-2014
Partí pour l'action el la recontructíon du Congo-Forces armées alleluia (PARC-FAAL): 2014

Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
Natural Resource: copper
Strategy: Booty Futures
From: 1997
Keywords: American Mineral Fields, Anglo American, Gécamines, Union miniere, Eurocan Consolidated Ventures, a Canadian copper mining firm
Location: Katanga, Shaba
Geographical Keywords: Kolwezi, Ruashi, Étoile, Tenke Fungurume Mine
Funds: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: At least $50 million
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) engaged in booty futures for copper in 1997 prior to completing its overthrow of the Mobutu regime (Reno 1998; Englebert 2003; Montague 2002; Africa Research Bulletin 1997; McKinley 1997). The AFDL made an agreement with the Hope, Arkansas based firm America Mineral Fields (AMF) in April of 1997. One of the conditions of the deal was the construction of a copper treatment plant in Kolwezi for $200 million to $220 million (Englebert 2003; Africa Research Bulletin 1997). The AFDL also signed a deal with a Canadian copper mining firm for an up-front payment of $50 million and a future promise of $250 million (Reno 1998). In the beginning of April they granted Anglo American (a South African company) two agreements, one to partner

with Gécamines to mine the Ruashi-Etoile copper and cobalt field near Lubumbashi, and the other to partner with Union miniere (a Suez group) for a waste reprocessing plant at Kolwezi (Montague 2002). Eurocan Consolidated Ventures signed an agreement with the AFDL allowing them to mine copper and cobalt from the Tenke Fungurume mine (McKinley 1997). The AFDL made more than $5 million per year, making at least $50 million in 1997 (Reno 1998).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
Natural Resource: cobalt
Strategy: Booty Futures
From: 1997 **To:** Choose an item.
Keywords: American Mineral Fields, American Mineral Fields, Anglo American, Gécamines, Union miniere, Eurocan Consolidated Ventures
Location: Katanga, Shaba
Geographical Keywords: Kolwezi, Kipushi, Ruashi, Étoile, Tenke Fungurume Mine
Funds: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) engaged in booty futures for copper in 1997 (Reno 1998; Englebert 2003; Montague 2002; Africa Research Bulletin 1997; McKinley 1997). The AFDL made an Agreement with the Hope, Arkansas based firm America Mineral Fields (AMF) in April of 1997. One of the conditions of the deal was the construction of a cobalt treatment plant in Kolwezi for $200 million to $220 million and the rehabilitation of a cobalt plant in Kipushi for $30 million (Englebert 2003; Africa Research Bulletin 1997). In the beginning of April they granted Anglo American (a South African company) two agreements, one to partner with Gécamines to mine the Ruashi-Etoile copper and cobalt field near Lubumbashi, and the other to partner with Union miniere (a Suez group) for a waste reprocessing plant at Kolwezi (Montague 2002). Eurocan Consolidated Ventures signed an agreement with the AFDL allowing them to mine copper and cobalt from the Tenke Fungurume mine (McKinley 1997). Considering all the contracts they made with corporations, we coded the AFDL as making more than $5 million per year, though specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
Natural Resource: zinc
Strategy: Booty Futures
From: 1997

Keywords: American Mineral Fields
Location: Katanga, Shaba
Geographical Keywords: Kolwezi, Kipushi
Funds: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) engaged in booty futures for copper in 1997 (Reno 1998; Englebert 2003; Montague 2002; Africa Research Bulletin 1997; McKinley 1997). The AFDL made an Agreement with the Hope, Arkansas based firm America Mineral Fields (AMF) in April of 1997. One of the conditions of the deal was the construction of a zinc production plant in Kipushi for $550 million to $650 million (Englebert 2003; Africa Research Bulletin 1997). Considering this agreement, we coded the AFDL as making more than $5 million per year, but specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
Natural Resource: gold
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1997
Keywords:
Location: Eastern Province, South Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Bunia, Kamituga
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) engaged in extortion of gold in 1997 (Africa Research Bulletin 1997a; Africa Research Bulletin 1997b). The AFDL were able to take over a portion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's gold mines, located around Bunia and Kamituga, in January of 1997. One of these mines was President Mobutu's private gold mine in which the AFDL resumed gold production to fund their military campaign. They also began offering gold concessions shortly after gaining control of the territory. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)

Strategy: Extortion
From: 1997
Keywords:
Location: Kasaï-Oriental
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) engaged in extortion of diamonds in 1997 (Africa Research Bulletin 1997; Le Billon 2008). The AFDL were funded by diamond mines seized in the Kasaï-Oriental province. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Theft
From: 1997
Keywords:
Location: Kasaï-Oriental
Geographical Keywords: Mbuji-Mayi
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) engaged in theft of diamonds in 1997 (Africa Research Bulletin 1997). When the AFDL took over the city of Mbuji-Mayi, capital of the Kasaï-Oriental province, the troops stole diamonds from trading houses. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Booty futures
From: 1996 **To:** 1997
Keywords: De Beers
Location:
Geographical Keywords:

Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) engaged in booty futures of diamonds from 1996 to 1997 (Africa Research Bulletin 1997; Le Billon 2008). De Beers, a subsidiary of Anglo American, made deals with the AFDL to maintain their interests in the diamond sector (Africa Research Bulletin 1997). Many companies supported them in hope that they would be able to exploit diamond mining at a later date (Le Billon 2008). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
Natural Resource: Cobalt
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1996 **To:** 1997
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) engaged in smuggling of cobalt from 1996 to 1997 (Africa Research Bulletin 1997). The AFDL set up trade networks of cobalt in the DRC(Africa Research Bulletin 1997).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
Natural Resource: Timber
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1996 **To:** 1997
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) engaged in smuggling of timber from 1996 to 1997 (Africa Research Bulletin 1997). The AFDL set up trade networks of timber in the DRC(Africa Research Bulletin 1997).

Movement for the Liberation of the Congo

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1998 **To:** 2001
Keywords:
Location: Équateur, Orientale
Geographical Keywords: Gbadolite, Bengamisa
Funds: Less than $5 million per year (1998-2000)
Unknown (2001)
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) engaged in extortion of diamonds f rom 1998 to 2001 (Amnesty International 2003; Emizet 2002; UN Security Council Report 2001; International Crisis Group 2000; Dietrich 2000; Smillie 2014; Africa Research Bulletin 2000; Home Office Border and Immigration Agency 2007; Global Witness 2004; OHCHR 2010; Ndikumana 2003). They controlled diamond mines throughout the Équateur and north-western Orientale provinces, including the areas of Gbadolite (where they were based) and Bengamisa (north of RCD held Kisangani). They were forced to move their diamonds through Uganda and the Central African Republic to avoid taxes imposed by the RCD in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The MLN do not appear to have been making more than $5 million per year using this strategy, considering their annual earnings in 2000 (fiscal year) only amount to $1.5 million (Africa Research Bulletin 2000). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Natural Resource: Coltan
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1998 **To:** 2001
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Gbadolite, Bengamisa
Funds: More than $5 million per year (1998-2001)

Amounts: $12,000,000 a Year
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) engaged in extortion of coltan from 1998 to 2001 (Emizet 2002). The MLC reported raising close to one million dollars a month from the extortion of coltan(Emizet 2002).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Natural Resource: gold
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1998 **To:** 2001
Keywords:
Location: Équateur
Geographical Keywords: Bondo
Funds: Less than $5 million per year (1998-2000)
Unknown (2001)
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) engaged in extortion of gold from 1998 to 2001 (UN Security Council Report 2001; Home Office Border and Immigration Agency 2007; International Crisis Group 2000; Global Witness 2004; OHCHR 2010; Ndikumana 2003). In Équateur province, they forced local artisanal miners to work in their gold mines (Global Witness 2004). In the Bondo locality, they recruited teenage boys into their "army of development" where they trained these new recruits and then and made them dig up gold on their behalf (UN Security Council Report 2001). The MLN do not appear to have been making more than $5 million per year using this strategy, considering their annual earnings in 2000 (fiscal year) only amount to $1.5 million (Africa Research Bulletin 2000). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Natural Resource: coffee
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1999 **To:** 2001
Keywords:
Location: Équateur
Geographical Keywords: Gbadolite

Funds: Less than $5 million per year (1999-2000)
Unknown (2001)
Amounts: $750,000 (2000)
-99 (1999, 2001)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo engaged in extortion of coffee from 1999 to 2001 (International Crisis Group 2000; UN Security Council Report 2001; Africa Research Bulletin 2000; Reno 2002; Home Office Border and Immigration Agency 2007). Jean-Pierre Bemba (leader of the MLC) had a de facto monopoly on the coffee trade in Équateur, even harvesting coffee from plantations that he did not own (UN Security Council Report 2001). In 2000 (fiscal year), money earned from coffee exports made up more than half of the MLC's $1.5 million earnings (Africa Research Bulletin 2000).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Natural Resource: coffee
Strategy: Theft
From: 1999
Keywords:
Location: Équateur
Geographical Keywords: Bumba, Lisala, Bosonzo, Binga, Mindembo
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) engaged in theft of coffee in 1999 (UN Security Council Report 2001). Jean-Pierre Bemba (leader of the MLC) organized a large scale confiscation of coffee beans in the Équateur province (producer of 60% of the country's coffee). For a year afterwards, many localities in the province did not have any coffee stock to export due to the theft. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Theft
From: 1998
Keywords:

Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) engaged in theft of timber in 1998 (Global Witness 2004). Industrial-level exploitation of timber came to a halt at the onset of the Second Congo War when rebels destroyed or looted logging equipment. The MLC rebels were able to seize stockpiles of leftover timber belonging to various companies (Global Witness 2004). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1998 **To:** 2001
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (multiple sources, uncertain timing)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) engaged in extortion of timber from 1998 to 2001 (Reno 2002; International Crisis Group 2000; OHCHR 2010; Ndikumana 2003; Home Office Border and Immigration Agency 2007). The MLC profited from taxes levied on timber exports. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Natural Resource: tea
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1998 **To:** 2001
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Less than $5 million per year (1998-2000)

Unknown (2001)
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) engaged in extortion of tea from 1998 to 2001 (International Crisis Group 2000; OHCHR 2010; Home Office Border and Immigration Agency 2007). We are uncertain as to the exact years this funding source was used but we do know that the MLC did engage in taxing of the tea trade during their existence. The MLN do not appear to have been making more than $5 million per year using this strategy, considering their annual earnings in 2000 (fiscal year) only amount to $1.5 million (Africa Research Bulletin 2000). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1998 **To:** 2001
Keywords: tariffs, taxes, bicycles
Location: Orientale, Équateur
Geographical Keywords: Lindi river
Funds: Less than $5 million per year (1998-2000)
Unknown (2001)
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2001)
6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (1998-2000)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) engaged in extortion from 1998 to 2001 (UN Security Council Report 2001; Amnesty International 2003). They created administrative organizations for the territories they controlled and instituted a system of tax collection within these areas. They also imposed tariffs on traders travelling on the Lindi river. The MLN do not appear to have been making more than $5 million per year using this strategy, considering their annual earnings in 2000 (fiscal year) only amount to $1.5 million (Africa Research Bulletin 2000).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 1998
Keywords:

Location: Équateur
Geographical Keywords: Bumba, Lisala, Gemena
Funds: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $1,500,000
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) engaged in theft in 1998 in the Équateur province (UN Security Council Report 2001). The stole money from many of the banks in the territories they controlled. They took $400,000 from the Banque commerciale du Congo in Bumba, $500,000 from Lisala, and $600,000 from Gemena.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
Criminal Activity: Other Crime
From: 1999
Keywords: counterfeiting 100-franc Congolese notes
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) engaged in counterfeiting of money in 1999 (UN Security Council Report 2001). Jean-Pierre Bemba (leader of the MLC) ordered the production of 100-franc Congolese notes. Funding amounts are unknown.

Rally for Congolese Democracy

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Natural Resource: gold
Strategy: Booty Futures
From: 1998 **To:** 1999
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Kisangani, Maniema
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99

Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in booty futures of gold from 1998 to 1999(Africa Research Bulletin 1999). The RCD gave mining entrepreneurs guarantees of safety in exchange for mining profits(Africa Research Bulletin 1999).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Natural Resource: tin
Strategy: Booty Futures
From: 1998 **To:** 1999
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Kisangani, Maniema
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in booty futures of tin from 1998 to 1999(Africa Research Bulletin 1999). The RCD gave mining entrepreneurs guarantees of safety in exchange for mining profits(Africa Research Bulletin 1999).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** Choose an item.
Keywords: Kenya-based company
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Pinga
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: at least $148,344
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in extortion of timber in 2001 (Amnesty International 2003; UN Security Council Report 2001). The RCD shipped the timber from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and then to Greece and Belgium (UN Security Council 2001). They also awarded a Kenya-based company with

contract rights to timber in Pinga in North Kivu for $35,000, followed by an annual tax of $113,344 (Amnesty International 2003).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2000 **To:** 2001
Keywords:
Location: Eastern Province, Kasaï-Oriental, Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)
Geographical Keywords: Bengamisa, Kandole
Funds: 1: less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $2,400,000
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in extortion of diamonds (alluvial) from 2000 to 2001 (Tull 2003; Herman 2002; UN Security Council Report 2001; Koyame 2005; Samset 2002). In late 2000, the RCD took control of the diamond abundant areas of Bengamisa and Kandole (Koyame 2005). RCD diamonds were shipped to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and sold on the international market by RCD representatives (UN Security Council Report 2001). The RCD also forced diamond dealers to pay it a share of the money that would normally be paid to the Congo desk for diamond-mining licenses (UN Security Council Report 2001; Koyame 2005). Considering that they made only about $200,000 per month from diamonds (Herman 2002), we coded the RCD as making less than $5 million per year. Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Natural Resource: gold
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1999 **To:** 2001
Keywords:
Location: Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: more than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in extortion of gold from 1999 to 2001 (UN Security Council Report 2001a; UN Security Council Report 2001b; Amnesty International 2003; Tull 2003). The RCD levied a number of taxes on gold and the comptoirs responsible for extracting it. In 1999, about 60 kg of gold was extracted per month in RCD controlled territory. They shipped the gold to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and used RCD representatives to negotiate deals on the international market (UN Security Council Report 2001). Considering that their gold comptoirs made over $11 million in 2000 (Dietrich 2001), we coded the RCD as making more than $5 million per year. Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Natural Resource: coltan
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1998 **To:** 2001
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: over $5 million (2001)
-99 (1998-2000)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in extortion of coltan from 1998 to 2001 (UN Security Council Report 2001a; UN Security Council Report 2001b; Montague 2002; Ndikumana 2003; Tull 2003; Tegera 2002; Herman 2002; Global Witness 2005). The RCD began by forcing all coltan comptoirs operating in its territories to purchase a $15 twelve-month license and pay an 8% tax on all their exports. Between January and October of 2000, RCD comptoirs exported about $6.7 million worth of coltan. In November 2000, the RCD monopolized the coltan trade in a newly created company called SOMIGL, which allowed them to substantially increase their revenue to about $1 million per month collected from coltan. The monopoly came to an end in April 2001, when coltan prices dropped significantly. Overall funding amounts are unknown. The group also profited from cassiterite in Walikale (in the province of North Kivu), but this began in 2004 (Garrett 2009; Johnson 2005; Global Witness 2005).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Natural Resource: coltan

Strategy: Theft
From: 1998 **To:** 1999
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: more than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in theft of coltan from 1998 to 1999 (UN Security Council Report 2001; Global Witness 2005). At the outbreak of the Second Congo War, the RCD looted the stock piles of the former Belgium company, SOMINKI, which held about seven years worth of coltan. From 1998 to 1999, the RCD transported between 1,000 and 1,500 tons of coltan to Kigali in Rwanda. Considering the amount of coltan looted, we coded the RCD as making more than $5 million per year. Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Natural Resource: cassiterite
Strategy: Theft
From: 1998 **To:** 1999
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: more than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in theft of cassiterite from 1998 to 1999 (UN Security Council Report 2001). At the outbreak of the Second Congo War, the RCD looted the stockpiles of the former Belgian company, SOMINKI. From 1998 to 1999, the RCD transported between 2,000 and 3,000 tons of cassiterite to Kigali in Rwanda. Considering the amount of cassiterite looted, we coded the RCD as making more than $5 million per year. Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Criminal Activity: Extortion

From: 1998 **To:** 2001
Keywords: local businesses, fishermen, customs tariffs
Location: North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Kasaï-Oriental
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2001)
6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (1998-2000)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in extortion from 1998 to 2001 (UN Security Council Report 2001a; UN Security Council Report 2001b; United Nations General Assembly 2001; International Crisis Group 2003; Amnesty International 2003). In territories it controls in the North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Kasaï-Oriental provinces, the RCD has taken over administrative functions and levied business taxes and customs tariffs (Amnesty International 2003). They also demanded a monthly war tax on the local Congolese people (UN General Assembly 2001). They took advantage of local fishermen by stealing their equipment and making them pay a fee to have it returned (Amnesty International 2003). In 2001, the RCD was forced to raise taxes in their territories in an effort to continue generating revenue after a drop in coltan prices (UN Security Council Report 2001b). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
Criminal Activity: Humanitarian Aid
From: 2001
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) profited from humanitarian aid in 2001 (UN Security Council Report 2001). Short on money, due to the drop in coltan prices, the RCD imposed customs duties on relief aid being brought in by humanitarian organizations. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)

Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 1998
Keywords: banks
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Kisangani
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) engaged in theft in 1998 (UN Security Council Report 2001; Amnesty International 2003). When the RCD and Rwandan troops took over Kisangani in August of 1998 they went looking the Kisangani Bank, a branch of the central bank. They stole anywhere between $1 million and $8 million worth of Congolese francs. We are unsure how much money the RCD was able to keep and how much went to Rwanda.

National Congress for the Defense of the People

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)
Natural Resource: coltan
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2008 **To:** Choose an item.
Keywords: Bibatama mine
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Masisi Territory
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) engaged in extortion of coltan in 2008 (United Nations Security Council 2008; Bleischwitz 2012; Schnurr 2012). The CNDP established control over the Bibatama mine in the Masisi Territory in 2008 after two years of fighting with FARDC and PARECO over it. The mine is owned by Edouard Mwangachuchu, a national senator, who is forced to tolerate CNDP's presence at the mine. CNDP is paid $0.20 per kilogram of coltan exported out of the mine (United Nations Security Council 2008). Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rebel Group: National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)
Natural Resource: charcoal
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2006 **To:** 2008
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Goma, Kingi, Burungu, Kitchanga, Rupangu, Masisi, Kirolirwe
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2007-2008)
6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (2006)

Notes: The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) engaged in extortion of charcoal from 2006 to 2008 (UN Security Council Report 2008a; UN Security Council Report 2008b; Somit 2012; Jenkins 2008; Stearns 2007). The CNDP taxed bags of charcoal in various markets near Virunga National Park, along with other rebel groups such as the FDLR (Stearns 2007). The Kingi market generated the CNDP about $36,000 per month (UN Security Council Report 2008a). Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2006 **To:** 2008
Keywords: cattle
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Masisi Territory, Rutshuru
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) engaged in extortion of animals (cattle) from 2006 to 2008 (United Nations Security Council 2008; Stearns 2007). Landowners and ranchers, many of whom owned or invested in CNDP controlled land, in North Kivu paid the CNDP protection money to protect their cattle herds. Nkunda (leader of the CNDP) and other CNDP officers also owned over 1,500 heads of cattle themselves (United Nations Security Report 2008). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2006 **To:** 2008
Keywords: administrative taxes, road tolls, poll tax, land tax, security tax, border crossings, farmers, hotel owners, commercial landlords, security companies, petrol wholesalers and retailers, traders, internally displaced persons
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Goma-Rutshuru road, Sake-Mweso roads, Sake-Masisi roads, Bunagana, Goma, Mushaki, Kichanga, Masisi, Rutshuru
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) engaged in extortion from 2006 to 2008 (UN Security Council Report 2008a; UN Security Council Report 2008b; UN Security Council Report 2008c; Stearns 2007). The CNDP taxed households, farmers, hotel owners, commercial landlords (many of whom were renting to members of international organizations and NGOs), security companies, petrol wholesalers and retailers, traders, and internally displaced persons trying to leave humanitarian camps. They levied administrative taxes, poll taxes, land taxes, and security taxes. They created road tolls where the amount paid was based on the type of vehicle being driven; some of these vehicles carry natural resources such as timber and minerals. They also extorted customs offices at border crossings, making over $700,000 at Bunagana customs between 2006 and 2007. Businessmen smuggling cement into North Kivu have to pay the CNDP $1.45 per bag (with at least 150 bags coming in per day). Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
From: 2006 **To:** 2008
Keywords: border crossings
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: 2006: -99,At least $700,000 in 2007-2008
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) engaged in smuggling goods from 2006 to 2008 (UN Security Council Report 2008a; UN Security Council Report

2008b). The CNDP taxed border crossing and traders in their controlled areas and made $700,000 in 2007 and 2008 combined (UN Security Council Report 2008a; UN Security Council Report 2008b).

March 23 Movement

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: March 23 Movement (M23)
Natural Resource: gold
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2012-2013
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu, Central Region (Uganda), Nairobi (Kenya)
Geographical Keywords: Bunagana, Kampala, Nairobi
Funds: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $15 million
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The March 23 Movement (M23) engaged in smuggling of gold in 2012 through 2013 (UN Security Council Report 2012; Koning 2013; VOA News, 2013). M23 smuggled gold from mines run by its allies in Walikale and Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo, across the border of Uganda, and then to Kampala or Nairobi, Kenya. They shipped at least 325 kilograms of gold, worth $15 million, into Uganda in 2012. They made approximately $500 million dollars in the year of 2013 in Eastern Congo (VOA News, 2013). It is worth noting that although some sources document gold smuggling in 2013 (Koning, 2013; VOA News, 2013), a special UN group found that the M23 did not use minerals for profit in 2013 (UN Security Council Report, 2014).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: March 23 Movement (M23)
Natural Resource: minerals unknown
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Masisi
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The March 23 Movement (M23) engaged in extortion of minerals (exact minerals are unknown) in 2012 (US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2012; Global Witness 2012). General Bosco Ntagnada, leader of the M23 movement, controlled mines in the Masisi territory. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: March 23 Movement (M23)
Natural Resource: coltan
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu, Kigali (Rwanda)
Geographical Keywords: Goma
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The March 23 Movement (M23) engaged in smuggling of coltan in 2012 (US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2012; ; Global Witness 2012; IPIS 2012). The coltan was smuggled across the border to Kigali in Rwanda where it was marketed as a Rwandan good (US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2012; Global Witness 2012). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: March 23 Movement (M23)
Natural Resource: Timber
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The March 23 Movement (M23) engaged in smuggling of timber in North Kivu in 2012 (UN Security Council Report 2012).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: March 23 Movement (M23)
Natural Resource: cassiterite
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu, Kigali (Rwanda)
Geographical Keywords: Goma
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The March 23 Movement (M23) engaged in smuggling of cassiterite in 2012 (US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2012; Global Witness 2012;). The cassiterite was smuggled through Goma and across the border of Rwanda to Kigali where it was marketed as a Rwandan good. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: March 23 Movement (M23)
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2012-2013
Keywords: ivory, elephants, cows
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Virunga National Park
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes: The March 23 Movement engaged in the extortion of animals in 2012 through 2013 (Jackson, 2013; Krause 2015). They poached elephants in areas they controlled in Virunga National Park, often attacking ranger patrols to do so (Krause, 2015). The M23 may also have been engaged in extortion of cattle (Jackson, 2013). However, one source (Jackson, 2013) is likely biased; thus we coded this activity with a certainty of 5 (uncertainty about timing, only one source).Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: March 23 Movement (M23)

Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2012 - 2013
Keywords: vehicles, traders, farmers
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Rutshuru, Rwindi
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The March 23 Movement (M23) engaged in extortion in 2012 (Human Rights Watch 2012; US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2012; Stearns 2012; Goggins 2012; UN Security Council Report 2014). M23 set up a tax collection system in the territories it controlled (UN Security Council Report 2014), such as in North Kivu (Stearns 2012). They taxed vehicles ($300 for trucks and $50 for smaller vans), traders, and farmers (Human Rights Watch 2012; Goggins 2012).The majority of the M23 income came from household taxes, transport taxes, and revenue from businesses (UN Security Council Report 2014). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: March 23 Movement (M23)
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2012 - 2013
Keywords: money; goods
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The March 23 Movement (M23) looted money and goods from the local population. They robbed houses and people (UN Security Council Report 2014). Funding amounts are unknown

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: March 23 Movement (M23)
Criminal Activity: Humanitarian Aid
From: 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords: Rutshuru
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99

Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The March 23 Movement (M23) profited from humanitarian aid in 2012 (Amnesty International 2013). M23 officers forced non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to pay illegal taxes in order to operate and set up offices in areas under their control in North Kivu. Funding amounts are unknown.

Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS)

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: APCLS
Natural Resource: gold
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2013-2014
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) was a local militia group operating in the North Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013 and 2014. One source identified small gold and cassiterite mining operations as a source of revenue for APCLS, with the bulk of their funding coming from Hunde politicians, landowners, and businessmen (GlobalSecurity).

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: APCLS
Natural Resource: cassiterite
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2013-2014
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) was a local militia group operating in the North Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013 and 2014. One source identified small gold and cassiterite mining operations as a source of revenue

for APCLS, with the bulk of their funding coming from Hunde politicians, landowners, and businessmen (GlobalSecurity).

Kata Katanga

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Kata Katanga
Natural Resource: minerals unknown
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2013-2014
Keywords: taxes
Location: Katanga
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: Kata Katanga engaged in extortion of minerals from 2013 to 2014 (United States Department of State, 2014). The specific types of minerals are unknown. Kata Katanga forced men and children to work in the mines. They then stole their mineral production and imposed illegal taxes over them (United States Department of State, 2014). Funding amounts are unknown.

Partí pour l'action el la recontructíon du Congo-Forces armées alleluia (PARC-FAAL)

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Partí pour l'action el la recontructíon du Congo-Forces armées alleluia (PARC-FAAL)
Criminal Activity: Piracy
From: 2014
Keywords: fuel, boat engines, cargo, passengers
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Lake Tanganyika
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Partí pour l'action el la recontructíon du Congo-Forces armées alleluia (PARC-FAAL) engaged in Piracy in 2014 (United Nations Security Council, 2015). PARC-FAAL's naval forces consisted of about 70 men and 7 motorized pirogues equipped with 12.7 mm machine guns, at its height. They attacked ships on Lake Tanganyika, looting their fuel and cargo and taxing their passengers. In one example they apparently made about US$170 from passengers on four boats in two weeks in August (United Nations Security Council, 2015). Funding amounts are unknown.

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Egypt

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Egypt:

al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya: 1993-1998
Ansar-Bayt al-Maqdis: 2014
Islamic State (IS:) 2015

al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya: 1993-1998

We found not evidence that al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya earned significant income from natural resources or crime.

Ansar-Bayt al-Maqdis

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis engaged in conflict with the Egyptian security forces, and the majority of clashes occurred in the Sinai Peninsula. The group declared allegiance to Islamic State (IS) in November, 2014 and became part of IS (UCDP, 2017). The group may rely on funding from external military actors (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016). There is no evidence that the group earned income from natural resources or crime while Ansar-Bayt al-Maqdis was a group independent of IS.

IS

The Egyptian branch of IS formed in 2011 and is known as “Sinai Province” (IS-IP). In addition to activities listed below, IS-IP may receive significant funding from IS-Central and other external actors (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016).

Country: Egypt
Rebel Group: Islamic State (IS)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Source: Oil
Years: 2015
Keywords: extortion, oil
Location: Sinai
Funds: 2 = Over $5 million
Amounts: 1.5 million per year
Certainty: 2 = One credible and independent source

Notes:
The Egyptian branch of IS formed in 2011 and isknown as “Sinai Province” (IS-IP) (Hayward, 2015; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016). IS central receives significant funding from

extortion of oil wells within Iraq (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016), and there is limited evidence that IS-IP uses these funding strategies inEgypt (Hayward, 2015). Funding amounts are unknown. IS-IP likely receives funding from the primary IS group (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016).

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El Salvador

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in El Salvador:
FMLN: 1990-1991

The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) was a rebel group in El Salvador that fought against the government from 1980 through 1991. The UN-sponsored Chapultepec Peace Accords ended the conflict in 1992 (Dudouet and Giessmann 2010; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 2014). The FMLN are in our dataset for 1990 and 1991. This time period marks the end of the conflict, and there is no evidence that the FMLN were engaging in any of the funding strategies of interest.

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Former Yugoslavia

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups Former Yugoslavia:

Bosnia-Herzegovina
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia: 1993-1995
Croatian Irregulars: 1993-1994
Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzeg: 1993-1994
Serbian Irregulars: 1992-1995
Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzeg: 1992-1995

Croatia
Serbian Irregulars: 1992
Serbian Republic of Krajina: 1992-1995

Serbia
Croatian Irregulars: 1991
Republic of Croatia: 1991
Republic of Slovenia: 1991
UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army): 1998-1999

In some cases, there were multiple armed groups claiming to represent the same ethnic identity. For example, the UCDP dataset identifies both "Croatian Irregulars" and "The Croatian Republic of Bosnia" as operating in Bosnia. When we found evidence of profiting from natural resources or crime, it was often difficult to determine if one or both of the armed groups was involved. For this reason, we coded both groups as engaging in the same activities. In these cases, the certainty variable is a "4" for all activities, indicating that there is uncertainty about group involvement.

Bosnia
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel group: **Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1993-1995
Type: Goods
Keywords: fuel, coffee, shampoo, vegetables, skin cream, toothpaste, bathing suits, staples, radios
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: over $5 million
Amounts: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia smuggled goods such as fuel, coffee, shampoo, vegetables, skin cream, toothpaste, bathing suits, staples, and radios from the years 1993 to 1995 (Andreas 2009; Cohen 1994; Hajdinjak 2002; Pomfret 1993). The specific amount of funding is unknown but appears to be greater than $5 million per year.

Croatian Irregulars

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1993-1994
Resource: Opium
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Croatian irregulars smuggled drugs including heroin from 1993 to 1994 (Hajdinjak 2002). They earned an unknown amount from this activity.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1993-1994
Resource: Oil
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords: Cazinska Krajina, Tuzla, Vares
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Croatian irregulars smuggled oil from 1993 to 1994 (Andreas 2004; Hajdinjak 2002). They earned an unknown amount from this activity.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**
Strategy: Smuggling other
Years: 1993-1994
Keywords: food, cigarettes, fuel, and other goods
Geographical Keywords: Cazinska Krajina, Tuzla, Vares
Funds: -99 (unknown)

Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Croatian irregulars smuggled food, cigarettes, fuel, and other goods from 1993 to 1994 (Andreas 2004; Barry 2006; Hajdinjak 2002). They earned an unknown amount from this activity. One source mentions that the Croatian irregulars may have engaged in money-laundering (Barry 2006); however, we did not find other evidence to substantiate this.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**
Strategy: Smuggling human
Years: 1993-1994
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: There is evidence that human trafficking was occurring, and that it expanded in scale after the conflict ended (Kligman and Limoncelli 2005; Surtees 2008). However, sources do not link this directly to the rebel group. Thus we have coded a certainty level of 4, indicating uncertainty about the direct involvement of the armed group.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**
Strategy: Humanitarian aid
Years: 1993-1994
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amount: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Croatian irregulars manipulated humanitarian aid from 1993 to 1994. They earned over $5 million (Andreas 2004; Kaldor 1999).

Croatian Republic of Bosnia

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1993-1994

Resource: Opium
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina smuggled drugs including heroin from 1993 to 1994 (Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1993-1994
Resource: Oil
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords: Cazinska Krajina, Tuzla, Vares
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina smuggled oil from 1993 to 1994 (Andreas 2004; Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity..

One source mentions that the Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina may have engaged in money-laundering (Barry 2006); however, we did not find other evidence to substantiate this.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Smuggling other
Years: 1993-1994
Keywords: food, cigarettes, fuel, and other goods
Geographical Keywords: Cazinska Krajina, Tuzla, Vares
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina smuggled food, cigarettes, fuel, and other goods from 1993 to 1994 (Andreas 2004; Barry 2006; Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity..

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Smuggling human
Years: 1993-1994
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: There is evidence that human trafficking was occurring, and that it expanded in scale after the conflict ended (Kligman and Limoncelli 2005; Surtees 2008). However, sources do not link this directly to the rebel group. Thus we have coded a certainty level of four.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Humanitarian aid
Years: 1993-1994
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amount: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina manipulated humanitarian aid from 1993 to 1994. They earned over $5 million (Andreas 2004; Kaldor 1999).

Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-1995
Resource: Drugs-unknown
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars smuggled drugs from 1992 to 1995 (Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-1995
Resource: Oil
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: $30,000 per oil tanker
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars smuggled oil from 1992 through 1995. They earned $30,000 per oil tanker from this activity (Andreas 2004; 2005; 2009). Without further information on funding amounts, we coded this as under $5 million per year from this activity.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1992-1995
Keywords: Looting, identity papers
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars engaged in theft from 1992 through 1995, including identity papers such as drivers licenses and passports (Andreas 2004; 2005).

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Humanitarian aid
Years: 1992-1995
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars manipulated humanitarian aid from 1992 through 1995 (Andreas 2004). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-1995
Type: Goods
Keywords: Cigarettes, identity papers
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars smuggled goods, including cigarettes and identity papers (Andreas 2009; Hozic 2004; Kaldor 2013).

Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-1995
Resource: Drugs-unknown
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina smuggled drugs from 1992 to 1995 (Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-1995
Resource: Oil
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: $30,000 per oil tanker
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina smuggled oil from 1992 through 1995. They earned $30,000 per oil tanker from this activity (Andreas 2004; 2005; 2009). Without further information on funding amounts, we coded this as under $5 million per year from this activity.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1992-1995
Keywords: Looting, identity papers
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina engaged in theft from 1992 through 1995, including identity papers such as drivers licenses and passports (Andreas 2004; 2005).

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Humanitarian aid
Years: 1992-1995
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina manipulated humanitarian aid from 1992 through 1995 (Andreas 2004). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-1995
Type: Goods
Keywords: Cigarettes, identity papers
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina smuggled goods, including cigarettes and identity papers (Andreas 2009; Hozic 2004; Kaldor 2013).

Croatia
Serbian irregulars

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992
Resource: Drugs-unknown
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars smuggled drugs in 1992 (Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992
Resource: Oil
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: $30,000 per oil tanker
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars smuggled oil in 1992. They earned $30,000 per oil tanker from this activity (Andreas 2004; 2005; 2009). Without further information on funding amounts, we coded this as under $5 million per year from this activity.

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1992
Keywords: Looting, identity papers
Geographical Keywords:

Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars engaged in theft in 1992, including identity papers such as drivers licenses and passports (Andreas 2004; 2005).

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Humanitarian aid
Years: 1992
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars manipulated humanitarian aid in 1992 (Andreas 2004). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian irregulars (Republika Srpska [RS])**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992
Type: Goods
Keywords: Cigarettes, identity papers
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian irregulars smuggled goods, including cigarettes and identity papers in 1992 (Andreas 2009; Hozic 2004; Kaldor 2013).

Serbian Republic of Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina)

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-1995
Resource: Drugs-unknown
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:

Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Krajina smuggled drugs from 1992 to 1995 (Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-1995
Resource: Oil
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: $30,000 per oil tanker
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Krajina smuggled oil from 1992 through 1995. They earned $30,000 per oil tanker from this activity (Andreas 2004; 2005; 2009). Without further information on funding amounts, we coded this as under $5 million per year from this activity.

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina)**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1992-1995
Keywords: Looting, identity papers
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Krajina engaged in theft from 1992 through 1995, including identity papers such as drivers licenses and passports (Andreas 2004; 2005).

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina)**
Strategy: Humanitarian aid
Years: 1992-1995
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)

Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Krajina manipulated humanitarian aid from 1992 through 1995 (Andreas 2004). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Croatia**
Rebel Group: **Serbian Republic of Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-1995
Type: Goods
Keywords: Cigarettes, identity papers
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Serbian Republic of Krajina smuggled goods, including cigarettes and identity papers (Andreas 2009; Hozic 2004; Kaldor 2013).

Serbia (Yugoslavia)
Croatian Irregulars
1991

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1991
Resource: Opium
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Croatian irregulars smuggled drugs including heroin in 1991 (Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1991

Resource: Oil
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords: Cazinska Krajina, Tuzla, Vares
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Croatian irregulars smuggled oil in 1991 (Andreas 2004; Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

One source mentions that the Croatian irregulars may have engaged in money-laundering (Barry 2006); however, we did not find other evidence to substantiate this.

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**
Strategy: Smuggling other
Years: 1991
Keywords: food, cigarettes, fuel, and other goods
Geographical Keywords: Cazinska Krajina, Tuzla, Vares
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Croatian irregulars smuggled food, cigarettes, fuel, and other goods in 1991 (Andreas 2004; Barry 2006; Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**
Strategy: Smuggling human
Years: 1991
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: There is evidence that human trafficking was occurring, and that it expanded in scale after the conflict ended (Kligman and Limoncelli 2005; Surtees 2008). However, sources do not link this directly to the rebel group. Thus we have coded a certainty level of four.

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Croatian irregulars**

Strategy: Humanitarian aid
Years: 1991
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amount: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Croatian irregulars manipulated humanitarian aid in 1991. They earned over $5 million (Andreas 2004; Kaldor 1999).

Republic of Croatia

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Republic of Croatia**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1991
Resource: Opium
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Republic of Croatia smuggled drugs including heroin in 1991 (Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Republic of Croatia**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1991
Resource: Oil
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords: Cazinska Krajina, Tuzla, Vares
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Republic of Croatia smuggled oil in 1991 (Andreas 2004; Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

One source mentions that the Republic of Croatia may have engaged in money-laundering (Barry 2006); however, we did not find other evidence to substantiate this.

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Republic of Croatia**
Strategy: Smuggling other
Years: 1991
Keywords: food, cigarettes, fuel, and other goods
Geographical Keywords: Cazinska Krajina, Tuzla, Vares
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Republic of Croatia smuggled food, cigarettes, fuel, and other goods in 1991 (Andreas 2004; Barry 2006; Hajdinjak 2002). We were not able to determine the specific amount of income earned from this activity.

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Republic of Croatia**
Strategy: Smuggling human
Years: 1991
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: There is evidence that human trafficking was occurring, and that it expanded in scale after the conflict ended (Kligman and Limoncelli 2005; Surtees 2008). However, sources do not link this directly to the rebel group. Thus we have coded a certainty level of four.

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Republic of Croatia**
Strategy: Humanitarian aid
Years: 1991
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amount: -99 (unknown)
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The Republic of Croatia manipulated humanitarian aid in 1991. They earned over $5 million (Andreas 2004; Kaldor 1999).

Republic of Slovenia
1991

The Republic of Slovenia engaged in activities such as looting and pillaging. However, these were war-related activities rather than mainly funding strategies. Therefore, we did not code these activities.

Ushtria çlirimtare ë kosovës (UCK) (Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA])
1998-1999

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Ushtria çlirimtare ë kosovës (UCK) (Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA])**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1998-1999
Resource: Opium
Geographical Keywords: Balkan Route
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The UCK/KLA smuggled heroin from 1998 to 1999. They earned $5 million each year. They utilized the Balkan Route which connects the opium production area in Afghanistan and Pakistan known as the Golden Crescent to the drug markets in Europe (Cilluffo 2000; Chossudovsky 2010; Cornell 2009; Makarenko 2004; Özerdem 2003; Pugh 2004).

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Ushtria çlirimtare ë kosovës (UCK) (Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA])**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1998-1999
Keywords: Labor market, child prostitution
Funds: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The UCK/KLA engaged in extortion from 1998-1999. They controlled the labor market and also profited from the child prostitution industry (Özerdem 2003; Pugh 2004).

Country: **Serbia (Yugoslavia)**
Rebel Group: **Ushtria çlirimtare ë kosovës (UCK) (Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA])**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1998-1999
Keywords: Organs, kidney
Funds: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The UCK/KLA engaged in theft from 1998 to 1999. They harvested kidneys and other organs and sold them on the black market (Keaten 2010; Schimidle 2013; The Bismarck Tribune 2011; Turton 2014; U.S. Department of State 2013).

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Georgia

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Georgia:
National Guard and Mkhedrioni: 1991-1992
Zviadists: 1992-1993
Republic of Abkhazia: 1992-1993
Republic of South Ossetia: 1992, 2004, 2008

National Guard and Mkhedrioni

Rebel Group: **National Guard and Mkhedrioni**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1991-1992
Resource: Drugs-unknown
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

The National Guard and Mkhedrioni earned funding from smuggling unknown drugs from 1991 to 1992 (Dawisha and Parott 1997; Ireland: Refugee Documentation Centre 2011).

Rebel Group: **National Guard and Mkhedrioni**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 1991-1992
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

The National Guard and Mkhedrioni earned funding from kidnapping from 1991 to 1992 (Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze 2004; U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993).

Rebel Group: **National Guard and Mkhedrioni**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1991-1992
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

The National Guard and Mkhedrioni engaged in theft from 1991 to 1992. This largely including stealing from civilians (Dawisha and Parott 1997; Koehler and Zurcher 2003; Kukhianidze 2009; U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993; Wheatley 2009). The amount of funding they unearned is unknown.

Rebel Group: **National Guard and Mkhedrioni**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1991-1992
Keywords: economy, factories
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

The National Guard and Mkhedrioni engaged in extortion from 1991 to 1992. They controlled a large portion of the factories and economy in Georgia (Dawisha and Parott 1997; Koehler and Zurcher 2003;Wheatley 2009; York 1995). The amount of funding is unknown.

Rebel Group: **Republic of South Ossetia**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1996-2006
Keywords: businesses, cars, cigarettes, gasoline, sugar
Geographic Keywords: Ergneti Market, Roki Tunnel
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

The Republic of South Ossetia engaged in extortion from 1996 to 2006. They used extortion of cars, cigarettes, gasoline, sugar, and other goods, primarily in the Ergneti Market and Roki Tunnel. They exerted fees such as customs duties, and import and export taxes over goods. They earned over $5 million (Closson 2010; Dzhikaev and Parastaev 2004; Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005; International Alert 2006; Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze 2004).

Rebel Group: **Republic of South Ossetia**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2005-2006
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

The Republic of South Ossetia earned an unknown funding amount from kidnapping from 2005 to 2006 (Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze 2004; U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005; U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006).

Zviadists

The Zviadists had minimal power and very little support from the public. Any power that they did have was eliminated in the days following the clash with the Georgian military (Pringle, 1992; Rowell, 1993). There is no evidence that they engaged in any of the strategies we are interested in.

Republic of Abkhazia

The Republic of Abkhazia is a break-away republic. The Georgian government does not recognize them. We found no evidence that they used any of the funding strategies of interest to this project.

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Guatemala

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Guatemala:
URNG: 1990-1995

Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)
Rebel Group: **Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)**
(Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-1995
Keywords: War taxes
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca engaged in extortion as a financial strategy from 1990 to 1995. They required wealthy landowners to pay "war taxes" (Rohter 1996; Start 2014). The amount of funding is unknown.

Rebel Group: **Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)**
(Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit)
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 1990-1995
Keywords: Wealthy landowners
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca engaged in kidnapping as a financial strategy from 1990 to 1995. They targeted members of wealthy families and demanded ransom (Rohter 1996; Start 2014). The amount of funding is unknown.

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India

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in India:
ABSU (All Bodo Student Union): 1990
ATTF (All Tripura Tribal Front): 1992-1993;1994-1996;1997-1999
CPI-Maoist (Communist Party of India-Maoist): 2005-2015
DHD-BW (Dima Halam Daogah - Black Widow faction): 2008
GNLA (Garo National Liberation Army): 2012; 2014-2015
Kashmir Insurgents: 1990-2015
KCP (Kangleipak Communist Party): 2008-2009
KNF (Kuki National Front): 1997
MCC (Maoist Communist Centre): 1992-1993; 1994-1995; 1996; 1997; 1998-2004
NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland): 1993-2004; 2005-2009; 2010
NDFB-RD (National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Ranjan Daimary): 2009-2010
NDFB-S (National Front of Boroland Songbijit): 2013-2014
NLFT (National Liberation Front of Tripura): 1995; 1996; 1997-2004; 2005; 2006
NSCN-IM (National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction):
1992-1997; 1998-1999; 2000
NSCN-K (National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang faction): 2005-2007
PLA (People's Liberation Army): 1990-1991;1992-1993; 1994; 1995-1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001-2003; 2004; 2005; 2006
PREPAK (People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak): 2008-2009
PULF (People's United Liberation Front):2008
PWG (People's War Group): 1990-1994; 1995; 1996-2004
Sikh insurgents: 1990-1993
ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam): 1990-1991; 1992-1993; 1994-2010
UNLF (United National Liberation Front): 1994; 1995-1996; 1997; 1998; 1999-2000; 2001-2002; 2003-2007; 2008; 2009
UNLFW (United National Liberation Front of Western South East India): 2015

*Note: The above lists the groups alphabetically as they are in the dataset. However, the notes that follow are categorized according to the region(s) in which the groups formed or operated.

ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam)

Group: **ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2010
Resource: Tea
Keywords:
Location: Assam
GeoKeywords: Tinsukhia district
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: 1990: $14 million

1991-2010: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) engaged in extortion of tea plantations from 1990 through 2010. This largely consisted of extortion threats to the owners of the estates (Asian News International 2009; Asia Watch 1993; Global Security 2015; Gurung and Maitra 1995; Routray 2003; Stratfor Global Intelligence 2007; ThaIndian News 2010). They earned over five million per year. In 1990, they earned $14 million (Agnihotri and Ray 2002; Hazarika 1992). Specific amounts for other years are unknown. As a general note, sources indicate that the ULFA earned about $6.5 million in 2009 (Global Security 2015). However, this is the amount earned from all of their activities, so we are unable to disaggregate it for coding.

Group: **ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2010
Resource: Oil
Keywords:
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The ULFA engaged in extortion of oil companies and exploration groups from 1990 through 2010 (Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections 2006; Sulaiman and Kumar 2009). In 2006 they targeted the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and demanded Rs. 500 crore in January. Overall, they earned an unknown funding amount (Asian Centre for Human Rights 2007).

Group: **ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2010
Keywords: businessmen, demand notes
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords: Lower Assam
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The ULFA engaged in extortion from 1990 through 2010 (Furtado 2008; Security-Risks 2008; Sulaiman and Kumar 2009; The Shillong Times 2011). This included using sex workers to extort or kidnap businessmen (Asian News International 2010), and generally extorting businessmen (BBC Monitoring South Asia 2009). They also demanded money from state employees and engineers (SATP 2012a). They earned over five million from extortion, though exact amounts are unknown (Asian News International 2010).

Group: **ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 1990-2010
Keywords: government officials, businessmen
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The ULFA engaged in kidnapping from 1990 through 2010. This included using sexworkers to attract businessmen and then either extorting them or kidnapping them (Asian News International 2010). They kidnapped government officials and officials working in the tea industry (Asia Watch 1993; Furtado 2008; Global Security 2015; Gurung and Maitra 1995; Routray 2003; Stratfor Global Intelligence 2007). Amounts of funding are unknown.

National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)

Group: **National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1993-2010
Resource: Tea
Keywords:
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: 2009: 126 lakhs
all other years: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple Credible Sources

Notes:
The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) engaged in extortion of officials in the tea industry (Bhaumik 2009; Chatterjee 2009a; Routray 2003; Sen 1997; The Telegraph 2003F).

They demanded Rs 30 lakh from Mackneil and Magor Tea Company per year (Jain 2003). Another article states that they earned 126 lakhs from extorting various tea companies in 2009 (Chatterjee 2009a). For all other years,the funding is unknown.

Group: **National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1993-2009
Keywords: government infrastructure project, protection money
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1993-1996: 1=Multiple credible sources
1997-2009: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) engaged in extortion from 1993 to 2009, and earned over five million dollars. They siphoned government funding that was meant for government infrastructure projects (Sen 1997), notably from the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council (Asian Centre for Human Rights 2007; Das 2015). 1,000 crore is equal to about $8 million USD. These funds went to both the DHD-BW and the NDFB (Das, 2015; Sen 2013); therefore, we have coded the specific amounts for this and other years as unknown.

Group: **NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2010
Keywords:
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords: Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) engaged in kidnapping as a financial strategy in 2010 (Matson 2009). They demand amounts ranging from Rs one to five 5 crore for each ransom (The Assam Tribune 2010), though the exact amounts they earned from this annually is unknown.

National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Ranjan Daimary Faction (NDFB-RD)

Group: **National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Ranjan Daimary Faction (NDFB-RD)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2009-2010
Keywords: businessmen
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords: Chariduar, Rangapara, Gohpur, Balipara, Lokhra, Sonitpur district, Udalguri, Darrang District
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes:
The National Democratic Front of Bodoland-RD Faction used extortion as a financing strategy from 2009 to 2010. This included targeting businessmen (DY365 2013, The Telegraph 2009). Funding amounts are unknown.

Group: **National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Ranjan Daimary Faction (NDFB-RD)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2009-2010
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes:
The National Democratic Front of Bodoland-RD Faction used kidnapping as a financing strategy from 2009 to 2010 (DY365 2013). Funding amounts are unknown.

National Front of Boroland Songbijit (NDFB-S)

Rebel Group: **National Front of Boroland Songbijit (NDFB-S)**
Natural Resource: tea
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2013-2014
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: National Front of Boroland Songbijit (NDFB-S) engaged in extortion of from 2013 to 2014 (Behera, 2015; Tezpure, 2014). They collected taxes from the owners of tea estates. Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **National Front of Boroland Songbijit (NDFB-S)**
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2013-2014
Keywords: businessmen, traders
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords: Chirang District, Kokrajhar District, Sonitpur District, Bongaigaon District, Darrang District, Bodoland Territorial Area Districts
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The National Front of Boroland Songbijit (NDFB-S) engaged in extortion from 2013 to 2014 (Behera, 2015; Tezpure, 2014; SATP, 2013; SATP, 2014). They were particularly active in Assam on the border with Bhutan. Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **National Front of Boroland Songbijit (NDFB-S)**
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
Years: 2013-2014
Keywords:
Location: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh
Geographical Keywords: Tawang
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The National Front of Boroland Songbijit (NDFB-S) engaged in kidnapping from 2013 to 2014 (SATP, 2013; SATP, 2014). Funding amounts are unknown.

Dima Halam Daogah-Black Widow Faction (DHD-BW)

Group: **Dima Halam Daogah-Black Widow Faction (DHD-BW)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2008
Resource: Tea
Keywords:

Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords: Cachar district
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Dima Halam Daogah-Black Widow Faction (DHD-BW) engaged in extortion of the tea industry in 2008. They particularly targeted villages in the Cachar district. Those most affected include Thaligram, Tikolpar, Khaspur, Bagherkona, Madhuranagar, Amranagar, Chandighat, Pangram, Arunabond and Salganga (Outlook India 2007; South Asia Terrorism Portal [SATP] 2015).

Group: **Dima Halam Daogah-Black Widow Faction (DHD-BW)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2008
Keywords: government infrastructure project
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords: North Cachar Hills
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Dima Halam Daogah-Black Widow Faction (DHD-BW) used extortion in 2008. This principally included diverting government funds meant for infrastructure projects (Anurak 2008; Sen 2013). They earned a major source of funding from this (SATP, N.D.), and earned over five million. One infamous incidence of this is known as the Rs 1,000 crore North Cachar Hills financial scam (Sen 2013). 1,000 crore is equal to about $8 million USD. These funds went to both the DHD-BW and the NDFB (Das, 2015; Kolkata and Guwahati 2010; NDTV 2009; Outlook India 2007; Routray; SATP 2015b; Sen 2013; Talukdar 2009); therefore, we have coded the specific amounts for this and other years as unknown.

GNLA (Garo National Liberation Army)

Group: **GNLA (Garo National Liberation Army)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2012-2015
Resource: Coal
Keywords:

Location: Meghalaya
Geographical Keywords: West Khasi Hills District, Garo Hills, South Garo Hills District, West Khasi Hills District

Funds: 2 = Over $5 million
Amounts: up to $13 million annually
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Garo National Liberation Army engaged in extortion of coal dealers and others in coal mining in 2012 through 2015 (Anurag 2012; Baruah 2013; Khangchian 2012; Meghalaya Times 2012a; Nath 2012; Rediff News 2012; SATP 2012; SATP 2015a; Tacstrat 2011; SATP 2013; SATP 2014). They earned up to $37,500 a day in recent years (Kumar Sharma, 2016), which is roughly $13 million annually.

In 2004 the People's War Group merged with the Maoist Communist Center to become the Communist Party of India (U.S. Department of State N.D.; Dubey 2013; Singh 2010).

Group: **GNLA (Garo National Liberation Army)**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 2014
Resource: Coal
Keywords: coal trucks
Location: Meghalaya
Geographical Keywords: West Khasi Hills District
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 = one credible source

Notes: The Garo National Liberation Army engaged in theft of coal in 2014 (SATP 2014). They looted coal from trucks in the West Khasi Hills District in Meghalaya. Funding amounts are unknown.

Group: **GNLA (Garo National Liberation Army)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2012-2015
Keywords: businessmen, petrol pump owners, traders, government officials
Location: Meghalaya, Assam

Geographical Keywords: East Garo Hills District, West Khasi Hills, Ri Bhoi District, Goalpara District, East Khasi Hills, West Garo Hills District, South Garo Hills, Dhubri District, North Garo Hills
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) used extortion as a funding strategy from 2012 to 2015 (Anurag 2012; Baruah 2013; Khangchian 2012; Khangchian 2012; Lim 2012; Meghalaya Times 2012a; Meghalaya Times 2012b; Meghalaya Times 2012d; Nath 2012; Tacstrat 2011; Times of India 2012; SATP 2013; SATP 2014; SATP 2015). They targeted businessmen, petrol pump owners, traders, government officials, and the general populace. They did this in Meghalaya and Assam. They earned an unknown amount of funding from this activity.

Group: **Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2012-2015
Keywords: businessmen, civilians, employees of private sector, government employees, teachers
Location: Assam, Meghalaya
Geographical Keywords: Jangrapara, Tikrikilla, West Garo Hills, South Garo Hills, East Garo Hills, South Garo Hills
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) used kidnapping as a funding strategy from 2012 to 2015 (Khangchian 2012; Kumar Sharma, 2016; Meghalaya Times 2012b; Meghalaya Times. 2012d; Nath 2012; SATP 2012; The Telegraph 2012; Times of India 2012; SATP 2013; SATP 2014; SATP 2015). They kidnapped businessmen (Meghalaya Times 2012c; Kumar Sharma, 2016), civilians, employees of the private sector, government employees, and teachers (Kumar Sharma, 2016). This largely took place in the Assam region of India and the Garo Hills districts in Meghalaya. In the last 5 years (from 2015), over 200 people have been kidnapped for ransom by the GNLA (SATP 2015). They earned an unknown amount of funding from this.

People's War Group (PWG)

Group: **People's War Group (PWG)**
Strategy: Extortion

Years: 1990-2004
Resource: Cannabis
Location: Odisha
Geographical Keywords: Bargarh District, Ganjam, Gajpati, Malkangiri
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes:
The People's War Group (PWG) engaged in extortion of cannabis from 1990 through 2004 (Singh 2010). This largely occurred in the state of Odisha. The amount of funding is unknown.

Group: **People's War Group (PWG)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2004
Resource: Agriculture
Keyword: Tendu, bindee leaf
Location: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
From 1990 through 2004 the People's War Group (PWG) used extortion of tendu, which is related to tobacco (Mishra 2002; Observer Research Foundation 2012, Ramana 2003b). This also included extortion of beedi leaf traders (Ghosh 1995), which is used in the tobacco and cigarette industry.

Group: **People's War Group (PWG)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2004
Resource: Timber
Keyword:
Location: Odisha (Orissa)
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: 2003: minimum: 60 million rupees (1.1 million USD)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The People’s War Group (PWG) engaged in extortion of workers in timber felling and forest contractors (Ghosh 1995, Observer Research Foundation 2012, Ramana 2003b; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006). Sources indicate that they earned under $5 million from this activity, estimating a minimum of 60 million rupees, which is about 1.1 million USD (Ramana 2003b).

One source mentions that the PWG engages in extortion of cotton (Ghosh 1995). However, we were able to substantiate this with additional evidence and therefore did not code this.

Group: **People's War Group (PWG)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2004
Keywords: businesses
Location: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa
Geographical Keywords: Dantewada, Jagdalpur
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: minimum: $11 million
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The People’s War Group (PWG) engaged in general extortion from 1990 through 2004. This included extorting money from businesses, industrialists, petrol pump owners, and brick-kiln owners (U.S. Department of State N.D. FAS Intelligence 2000, Ghosh 1995, Observer Research Foundation 2012, Ramana 2003b, SATP 2006). The PWG earned at least $11 million annually from these activities (Ghosh 1995, Ramana 2003b).

Group: **People's War Group (PWG)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 1990-2004
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The PWG engaged in kidnapping for ransom from 1990 through 2004. The amount of funding earned is unknown (Observer Research Foundation 2012; Ramana 2003a).

We found suggestive evidence that the PWG engaged in arms smuggling across the border to Nepali Maoists (South China Morning Post 2003*)*. However, there was not enough clear evidence to substantiate and code this.

Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2005-2015
Resource: Agriculture
Keyword: Tendu leaves, tobacco, bamboo, rice
Location: Chhattisgarh
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: minimum: 200 million rupees (2005-2012)
-99 (2013-2015)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
From 2005 through 2015 the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) used extortion of tendu, which is related to tobacco (Anoop 2011; Jain 2010; Kumar 2009; Nayak 2014; Observer Research Foundation 2012; Ramana 2014; Rediff News 2010; Tripathi 2013; Dubey 2013; Loyd 2015; Ramana 2013). While annual funding amounts are unknown, they earned at least 200 million rupees from this (Nayak 2014). They also taxed bamboo and rice (Dubey 2013; Loyd 2015; Ramana 2013).

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2005-2013
Resource: Timber
Keyword:
Location: Chhattisgarh
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: minimum: 150 million rupees ($2.4 million) (2005-2012)
-99 (2013-2015)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The CPI engaged in extortion of the timber industry as a financial strategy from 2005 to 2013 (Dubey 2013; Nayak 2014; Rediff News 2010; Tripathi 2013; Mullick 2013; Ramana 2013). While annual funding amounts are unknown, they earned at least 150 million rupees from this, which is about $2.4 million USD (Nayak 2014).

One source mentions that the CPI engages in extortion of cotton. However, we were able to substantiate this with additional evidence. Another source lists natural gas as one of the natural resources the CPI controls, but this we could also not substantiate (Mullick 2013).

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2005-2015
Resource: Opium
Keyword: Cultivation
Location: Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, West Bengal
Geographical Keywords: Aurangabad District, Gumla District, Kishanganj, Murshidabad District, Nadia District, Purnia District
Funds: 2: Over $5 million (2005-2012)
-99 (2012-2015)
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist) engaged in extortion of opium from 2005 through 2015. This included targeting poppy cultivation, largely in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Bihar (Banerjee 2012; Dubey 2013; Rediff News 2010; Shina 2005, Singh 2010, Smith 2010; Tripathi 2013; Gupta 2014; Nanjappa 2017; United News of India 2017). They earned over $5 million from opium extortion (Rediff News 2010; Singh 2010). Although total funding amounts are unknown, the poppy crop in the Murshidabad and Nadia Districts in West Bengal had an estimated value of INR 12 billion ($191.174 million) (Rediff News 2010; Singh 2010).

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2005-2015
Resource: Cannabis
Keyword: Cultivation, hashish
Location: Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown

Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist) engaged in extortion of cannabis from 2005 through 2015. This included targeting cannabis cultivation, largely in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra (Banerjee 2012; Rediff News 2010; Shina 2005; Smith 2010; Tripathi 2013; Dasgupta 2017a; Dasgupta 2017b; Manoharan 2015; Gupta 2014). They earned an unknown amount of funding.

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2005-2015
Resource: Iron
Keyword: Mining
Location: Chhattisgarh, District of Palamau, Odisha (Orissa), West Bengal
Geographical Keywords: Jharkhand, Malkangiri, Palamau
Funds: 2: Over $5 million (2005-2012)
-99 (2013-2015)
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources (2005-2012)
5 = Uncertain timing, one source (2013-2015)

Notes:
The Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist) earned funding through extortion of the iron mining industry from 2005 through 2015 (Anoop 2011; Dubey 2013; Kumar 2009; Loyd 2015; Ramana 2014; Rediff News 2010; Rath 2017). This included extorting corporations such as Rungta Mines, Usha Martin and Torian Iron & Steel (Anoop 2011; Ramana 2014). They earned over $5 million from this activity (Jain 2010; Kumar 2009; Shina 2005; The Telegraph 2010; Tripathi 2013).

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2005-2015
Resource: Coal
Keyword: Mining
Location: Chhattisgarh, District of Palamau, Odisha (Orissa), West Bengal
Geographical Keywords: Jharkhand, Malkangiri, Palamau
Funds: 2: Over $5 million (2005-2012)
-99 (2013-2015)
Amounts: -99: Unknown

Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources (2005-2012)
6 = Uncertain timing, multiple sources (2013-2015)

Notes:
The Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist) earned funding through extortion of the coal mining industry from 2005 through 2015 (Anoop 2011; Dubey 2013; Kumar 2009; Loyd 2015; Ramana 2014; The Telegraph 2010; Loyd 2015; Rath 2017). This included extorting corporations such as Rungta Mines, Usha Martin and Torian Iron & Steel (Anoop 2011; Ramana 2014; Rediff News 2010). They earned over $5 million from this activity (Anoop 2011; Jain 2010; Shina 2005; Tripathi 2013).

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2005-2015
Resource: Opium
Keyword: heroin
Location: Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, Maharashtra
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = One source, uncertain timing (2005-2012)
1 = Multiple credible sources (2013-2015)

Notes:
The Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist) engaged in smuggling of opium from 2005 through 2015 (Shina 2005; Nanjappa 2017; Gupta 2014). This included smuggling opium and heroin on a drug route to Bangladesh, Assam, West Bengal and Nepal (Shina 2005). They earned unknown amounts of funding.

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2005-2015
Keyword: business houses, road contractors and shopkeepers
Location: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand
Geographical Keywords: Khunti District, New Delhi
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts:
2005-2006: Minimum:$22.304 Million (Ramana 2014)
2007: $159.312 Million (SATP 2010)
2008:$179.226 Million (SATP 2010)
2009: $318.624 Million (SATP 2010)

2010-2015: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist) engaged in extortion from 2005 through 2015. They extorted money from industry, businesses, road constructors, and government officials. This was a primary financing strategy for them, and they earned over $5 million annually from this (Anoop 2011, Dubey 2013; Jain 2010; Joshi 2010; Kumar 2009; Loyd 2015; Ramana 2014, Nayak 2014; Rediff News 2010; Refugee Review Tribunal 2006; South Asia Terrorism Portal [SATP] 2006; SATP 2010; Srivastava, 2017; The Pioneer 2011; Times of India 2011; Tripathi 2013; Jain 2016; Ramana 2013).

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2005-2013
Keyword:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The CPI engaged in kidnapping for ransom from 2005 to 2013 (Revolution in South Asia 2012; Tripathi 2013; U.S. Department of State 2014). The amount of funding is unknown.

Group: **Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 2005-2014
Keyword: Bank robbery
Location: Jharkhand, Orissa
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: 2007: minimum: 5 crores ($797,000)
all other years: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) engaged in theft from 2005 through 2014. This included bank robbery (Anoop 2011; The Indian Express). The CPI obtained 5 crores

($797,000) from robbing one bank alone in 2007 (Anoop 2011). Sources indicate that the CPI are involved in over 50 percent of all bank robberies in Jharkhand, which were increasing in frequency during the mid-2000's and continued into the 2010's. They also engaged in theft of public and private property. From all of these activities, the sources indicate that they have earned over $5 million (Anoop 2011; Banerjee 2012; Indo Asian News 2006).

Group: CPI Maoist
Country: India
Years: 2013-2015
Strategy: Extortion
Resource: minerals unknown
Keywords: emeralds, illegal mining
Location: East Singhbhum
Location keywords: Jharkhand; Odisha; Gudabanda, north east India
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 = multiple credible sources
Notes:
CPI (Maoist) rebels engaged in extortion of emeralds and other minerals from 2013-2015 (Sanatani, 2015; Bhaskar, 2017; Bhaskar, 2016; Ramana, 2013; Rath, 2017). They earn more than Rs 200 crore every year from illegal levies on mine owners and contractors working on government projects. The mining activity began in 2010 and they often transport these precious stones to polishing hubs and markets in other states (Sanatani, 2015). CPI-Maoist activity in the area keeps legitimate businesses away and prevents the building of roads, railway lines, police stations, hospitals, and other infrastructure that would bring scrutiny to the illegal mines in the area. (Bhaskar, 2016; Rath, 2017). In this way CPI-Maoist deters examination of the mines and profits from the taxation of them. The full range of minerals being mined is unknown. Funding amounts are unknown.

Kashmir Insurgents

Group: **Kashmir Insurgents**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-2003; 2013-20155
Resource: Opium
Keyword: heroin
Location: Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, NCT North Delhi, Punjab, West Bengal
Geographical Keywords: Calcutta
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1990-1993: 1 = Multiple credible sources
1994-2003: 4 =Uncertainty about group involvement

2013-2015: 4 =Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes:
The Kashmir Insurgents smuggled opium from 1990 through 2003. This included trafficking heroin (Baldauf 2015; Das 2012; Roman, Ahn-Redding and Simon 2005). Routes were in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, NCT North Delhi, Punjab, West Bengal (Hazarika 1993). The amount of funding is unknown. Poppy is commonly grown in Kashmir where the group was operating. However, several sources state that there is no evidence to tie the insurgents to the actual cultivation of poppy (Agence France Presse 2007; Associated Press Financial Wire 2007). There is evidence that the group continued to profit from opium smuggling from 2013 through 2015 (Business Standard, 1).

Group: **Kashmir Insurgents**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-2003; 2013-2015
Resource: Cannabis
Keyword: hashish
Location: Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, NCT North Delhi, Punjab, West Bengal
Geographical Keywords: Calcutta
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1990-1991: 1 = Multiple credible sources
1992-2003: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement
2013-2015: 4 =Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes:
The Kashmir Insurgents smuggled cannabis from 1990 through 2003. This included trafficking hashish (Agence France Presse 2003; Das 2012; Hazarika 1993). Routes were in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, NCT North Delhi, Punjab, West Bengal (Hazarika 1993). The amount of funding is unknown. There is evidence that the group continued to profit from cannabis smuggling from 2013 through 2015 (Business Standard, 1).
Group: **Kashmir Insurgents**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2015
Keyword:
Location: Jammu and Kashmir
Geographical Keywords: Kashmir, the Northeast
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Kashmir Insurgents engaged in extortion from 1990 through 2015 (Freedom House 2012.; Goodspeed 1994; Ganguly 2006; U.S. Department of State 1995; ; U.S. Department of State 2014; U.S. Department of State 2015; Pani 2017). This included extorting the general populace, which lost them popular support (Ganguly 2006). The amount of funding they earned is unknown.

One source mentions that Kashmiri militant groups engaged in theft (Goodspeed 1994). However, it was mentioned in a list of other activities that a number of other groups also engaged in. Theft is not clearly linked directly to the Kashmir Insurgents, and there were no further details. Other research did not corroborate this; thus we did not code this activity.

Multiple sources state the Kashmir Insurgents engaged in kidnapping (Freedom House 2012; U.S. Department of State 1995). They kidnapped Indian citizens and foreign nationals, including an American citizen and British nationals (U.S. Department of State 1995). However, it is unclear if they earned funding from this, so we did not code it. In some instances, the source explicitly states that the victims were released unharmed or freed by police (U.S. Department of State 1995).

Sikh Insurgents

Group: **Sikh Insurgents**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-1993
Resource: Opium
Keyword: heroin
Location: Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, NCT North Delhi, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal
Geographical Keywords: Calcutta, Terai region, Pilibhit
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1990-1991: 1 = Multiple credible sources
1992-1993: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources
Notes:
The Sikh Insurgents smuggled opium from 1990 through 1993. This included trafficking heroin (Das 2012), and occurred largely in the jungle in the Terai region (Human Rights Watch 1991). The amount of funding is unknown.

Group: **Sikh Insurgents**
Strategy: Smuggling

Years: 1990-1993
Resource: Cannabis
Keyword:
Location: Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, NCT North Delhi, Punjab, West Bengal
Geographical Keywords: Calcutta
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes:
The Sikh Insurgents smuggled cannabis from 1990 through 1993. This included trafficking hashish (Das 2012) , and occurred largely in the jungle in the Terai region (Human Rights Watch 1991). The amount of funding is unknown.

Group: **Sikh Insurgents**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-1994
Keyword:
Location: State of Punjab
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Sikh Insurgents engaged in extortion from 1990 through 1993 (Cochrane 2015; Fineman 1991; Mathur 2011; The Toronto Star 1992). This largely occurred in the State of Punjab (Fineman 1991; Mathur 2011). The sources do not indicate funding amounts or precise timing.

Group: **Sikh Insurgents**
Strategy: Smuggling Goods
Years: 1990-1994
Keyword:
Location: State of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh
Geographical Keywords: Pilibhit, Terai Region
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1990-1991: 1 = Multiple credible sources
1992-1994: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Sikh Insurgents earned funding through smuggling goods from 1990 through 1993 (Clarke 2011; Human Rights Watch 1991). This often occurred in the jungle areas of the Terai region.

Their activities also included smuggling arms from Pakistan to Punjab (he New York Times 1992). The amount of funding is unknown.

People's United Liberation Front (PULF)

Group: **People's United Liberation Front (PULF)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2008
Resource: Tea
Keyword:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes:
The People's United Liberation Front (PULF) earned an unknown amount of funding from extorting the tea industry in 2008 (Chatterjee 2009a).

Group: **People's United Liberation Front (PULF)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2008
Resource: Drugs-unknown
Keyword:
Location: Manipur
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes:
The People's United Liberation Front (PULF) engaged in smuggling drugs (Hindustan Times 2008a). The specific drugs they trafficked is unknown, as is the funding.

Group: **People's United Liberation Front (PULF)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2008
Keyword:
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords: Cachar district
Funds: -99: Unknown

Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The People's United Liberation Front (PULF) earned funding from extorting civilians and traders in 2008. They used youths, widows, and drug addicts to extort the public (The Telegraph 2008). Sources indicate that they earned a majority of their funding from extortion (Center for Development and Peace studies 2015; The Telegraph 2008; SATP N.D.c; SATP 2013); however, they did not indicate the actual amounts earned from this.

Group: **People's United Liberation Front (PULF)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2008
Keyword: Goods
Location: Assam, Manipur
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The PULF earned funding from smuggling goods, such as arms and explosives (Center for Development and Peace Studies 2015; SATP 2015c). They occasionally used youths to do this (SATP 2015c). The amount of funding they earned is unknown.

Source indicates that the PULF engaged in kidnapping for ransom, noting one infamous situation. However, all mentions of this particular incident state that PULF released the victim unharmed, with the ransom being unpaid (Hindustan Times 2008b; Press Trust of India 2008; The Tribune 2008). We did not code the PULF as engaging in kidnapping because accounts indicate that they did not earn funding from this.

United National Liberation Front (UNLF)

Group: **United National Liberation Front (UNLF)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1994-2009
Resource: Tea
Keyword:
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords: Cachar District
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) engaged in extortion of the tea industry. This occurred in the Cachar district (Chatterjee 2009b; The Telegraph 2002a). They earned an unknown amount of funding.

Group: **United National Liberation Front (UNLF)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1994-2009
Resource: Gems
Keyword: unknown gems
Location: Assam, Manipur, Mizoram
Geographical Keywords: Tamu region, Moreh, Myanmar border, Upper Assam
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1994-2002: 1 = Multiple credible sources
2003-2009: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source
Notes:
The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) smuggled gems from 1994 through 2009. Officials seized a stock of the gems from a hideaway in the Tamu area of India (Global Security, N.D.c). Routes also went through Moreh in Manipur, Upper Assam, and Mizoram (The Telegraph 2002b). The gems are being smuggled from Myanmar (Global Security, N.D.c; Khaund 2002). Amount of funding is unknown.

Group: **United National Liberation Front (UNLF)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1994-2009
Resource: Gold
Keyword:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1994-2002: 1 = Multiple credible sources
2003-2009: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source
Notes:
The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) smuggled gold from 1994 through 2009 (Global Security, N.D.c). Routes went through Moreh in Manipur, Upper Assam, and Mizoram (The Telegraph 2002b). The gold may have been smuggled from Myanmar (Global Security, N.D.c; Khaund 2002). Amount of funding is unknown.

One source mentioned that the UNLF smuggled opium (Balachandran 2008). However, there was little evidence for this. In addition, other sources indicate that the UNLF was not involved in the drug trade (Hindustan Times 2006a; Stop the Drug War 2006). One source states the the UNLF would put to death anyone involved in smuggling opium, heroin, or other related drugs (Hindustan Times 2006a). Therefore, we did not code this.

Group: **United National Liberation Front (UNLF)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1994-2002
Keyword: government employees, businessmen, contractors
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) used extortion from 1994 through 2002 as a primary source of income. Their targets included government employees, businessmen, and contractors (Global Security N.D.c.; Sharma and Anshuman 2014; Start N.D.). In 2002 the UNLF formally stated that they would stop engaging in extortion (Global Security N.D.c.). The amount of funding earned is unknown.

Group: **United National Liberation Front (UNLF)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1994-2009
Keyword: gun running, goods
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes:
The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) used smuggling from 1994 through 2009 as a primary source of income. This included goods and gun running. The amount of funding is unknown (Start N.D.).

All Tripura Tribal Front (All Tripura Tiger Force) (ATTF)

Group: **All Tripura Tribal Front (All Tripura Tiger Force) (ATTF)**

Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1994-1999
Resource: Tea
Keyword:
Location: Tripura
Geographical Keywords: north of Agartala
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The All Tripura Tribal Front, who are also known as the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), engaged in extortion of the tea industry from 1994 to 1999. They targeted planters as well as executives. The ATTF backed up their threats of extortion through kidnapping and murder if the extortion notices were unpaid. The ATTF served extortion notices ranging from Rs 50,000 to Rs 3 million (Alexander 2002; BBC News South Asia 2001; Hussain 2001; Indo-Asian News Service 2004; North East News Agency 2004; Prakash 2008). However, the actual amounts paid and the funding earned from this is unknown.

Group: **All Tripura Tribal Front (All Tripura Tiger Force) (ATTF)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 1994-1999
Keyword:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The All Tripura Tribal Front, who are also known as the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), engaged in kidnapping from 1994 to 1999. They targeted tea planters as well as executives (Alexander 2002; BBC News South Asia. 2001; Hussain 2001; North East News Agency 2004; Prakash 2008). One source notes that the tea industry estimates paying Rs 30 million in ransoms since 1994 (North East News Agency 2004). However, the specific annual amounts of funding earned per year is unknown.

National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)

Group: **National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)**

Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1995-2005
Resource: Tea
Keyword:
Location: Tripura
Geographical Keywords: north of Agartala
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) engaged in extortion of the tea industry from 1995 to 2004. They targeted planters as well as executives. The NLFT backed up their threats of extortion through kidnapping and murder if the extortion notices were unpaid. The NLFT served extortion notices ranging from Rs 50,000 to Rs 3 million (BBC News South Asia 2001; Hussain 2001; Indo-Asian News Service 2004). However, the actual amounts paid and the funding earned from this is unknown.

Group: **National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 1995-2006
Keyword: planters, executives, traders, railway employees, legislators
Location: Tripura
Geographical Keywords: Atharomura village, West Tripura
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) engaged in kidnapping from 1995 to 2006. They targeted planters as well as executives from the tea industry (Alexander 2002; BBC News South Asia. 2001; Hussain 2001; Prakash 2008). They also kidnapped traders, railway employees and legislators (Agence France Presse 1997; Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2004). In a 2002 incident, railway contractors reportedly paid 8 million rupees in ransom for employees (Agence France Presse 2002). However, the total amount of funding earned is unknown.

Group: **National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1995-2006
Keyword: tax
Location: Tripura
Geographical Keywords: Indo-Bangladesh border

Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) engaged in extortion of the general populace as a funding strategy from 1995 through 2006. This often occurred at the border with Bangladesh (Talukdar 2004), and was frequently in the form of a tax (Alexander 2002; North East News Agency; Prakash 2008). Funding amounts are unknown.

National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction) (NSCN-IM)

Group: **National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction) (NSCN-IM)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-2000
Resource: Opium
Keyword: Heroin
Location: Manipur
Geographical Keywords: Moreh
Funds: 2= Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction) (NSCN-IM) engaged in smuggling opium, often in the form of heroin, from 1992 to 2000. This including implementing a 20 percent tax on the drugs smuggled in the area (Forest 2012; Harris 1997; Labrousse, Laniel and Block 2002; Minorities at Risk (MAR) 2010; Sadangi 2008). One source states that they earned Rs200 to Rs250 million annually across their activities, and that drug trafficking is a major source for this income (SATP N.D.f). Thus we coded funding amounts as over $5 million, though the amount earned from this activity in a year is unknown.

One source reports an incident of the NSCN smuggling cannabis (Bhaumik 2005). It was unclear as to which faction of the NSCN the article was referring to. Upon further targeted searching, we were unable to substantiate this with further evidence. Thus we did not code the activity.

Group: **National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction) (NSCN-IM)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1992-2000
Resource: Timber
Keyword:

Location: Peren
Geographical Keywords: Jalukie, Sanzuiram
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction) (NSCN-IM) engaged in extortion of timber from 1992 to 2000 (Minorities at Risk 2010; The Telegraph 2004). They have since announced a campaign against illegal logging (Minorities at Risk 2010). The amount of funding they earned is unknown.

Group: **National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction) (NSCN-IM)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1992-2000
Resource: Timber
Keyword:
Location: Peren
Geographical Keywords: Jalukie, Sanzuiram
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction) (NSCN-IM) smuggled timber from 1992 to 2000 (Minorities at Risk 2010; The Telegraph 2004). They have since announced a campaign against illegal logging (Minorities at Risk 2010). The amount of funding they earned is unknown.

Group: **National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction (NSCN-IM)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1992-2000
Keyword: taxes, government employees, traders, contractors, rickshaw pullers
Location: Nagaland, Manipur
Geographical Keywords: Dimapur, Imphal
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) engaged in extortion from 1992 through 2000. This included enacting taxes against the general populace

(Forest 2012; Goswami 2015; Kumar 2006; SATP. N.D.f), including against the Kukis (Minorities at Risk 2010), government employees, traders, contractors and rickshaw pullers (Global Security 2011; Lisam 2011). They collected 25 percent of total salary earned (Lisam 2011). However, the total amount of funding earned is unknown.

Group: **National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction (NSCN-IM)**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1992-2000
Keyword: Bank robbery
Location: Assam
Geographical Keywords: Sontipur
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1994-1995: 1 = Multiple credible sources
all other years: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) engaged in theft as a funding strategy (Agence France Presse 1994; Global Security 2011; United Press International 1995.). This included bank robberies (Forest 2012; SATP N.D.f.). In 1994, they stole 2.7 million rupees ($90,000 USD) in two raids alone (Agence France Presse 1994). However, the total amount of funding earned in this year or other years is unknown.

National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)

Group: **National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2005-2007
Keyword: taxes, government employees, traders
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertain timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) engaged in extortion from 2005 through 2007 (SATF N.D.g). This included tax collection and extorting government employees and traders. They collected a 24 percent tax from government employees, and Rs 120 to 150 from households (Lisam 2011). However, the total amount of funding earned is unknown.

There is evidence that the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) engaged in kidnapping (SATP N.D.g). However, there are no details provided, and it is not clear if they earned funding from this. Therefore we did not code this activity.

Kuki National Front

The Kuki National Front (KNF) have been fighting for a separate state within India since the 1980's (Sadangi 2008). In the early 1990's, the KNF battled with the NSCN-IM over control of the heroin trade (Sadangi 2008; Minorities at Risk 2010). However, we found no evidence that the Kuki National Front engaged in this or any of the funding strategies in which we are interested in 1997, the only year they appear in our dataset.

ABSU (All Bodo Student Union)

Group: **ABSU (All Bodo Student Union)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 1990
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes:
The All Bodo Student Union (ABSU) may have engaged in kidnapping as a financial strategy in 1990. One source names several militant organizations, including the armed wing of the ABSU, as using this and several other strategies. However, other sources do not confirm this; thus we have coded the certainty as being unclear on group involvement (Ghosh 1995).

Group: **ABSU (All Bodo Student Union)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes:
The All Bodo Student Union (ABSU) may have engaged in extortion as a financial strategy in 1990. One source names several militant organizations, including the armed wing of the ABSU, as using this and several other strategies. However, other sources do not confirm this; thus we have coded the certainty as being unclear on group involvement (Ghosh 1995).

Group: **ABSU (All Bodo Student Union)**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1990
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes:
The All Bodo Student Union (ABSU) may have engaged in theft as a financial strategy in 1990. One source names several militant organizations, including the armed wing of the ABSU, as using this and several other strategies. However, other sources do not confirm this; thus we have coded the certainty as being unclear on group involvement (Ghosh 1995).

Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)

Group: **Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1992-2004
Keywords: Protection, tax
Location: Bihar, Jharkhand
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2001-2003: 1 = Multiple credible sources
all other years: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) engaged in extortion from 1992 through 2004. This often included protection schemes (Shah 2006) or requiring villagers to pay a tax (Associated Press

2001; Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2003; U.S. Department of State N.D.; Ramana 2003b). This often occurred in Bihar or Jharkhand. The funding amount is unknown.

Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)

Group: **Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2008-2009
Keyword: local villagers, businessmen, worship centers, universities, hospitals
Location: Manipur
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) engaged in extortion from 2008 through 2009 (Global Security N.D.a; SATP NDb; SATP 2014; Srivastava 2009). This included extortion of local villagers and businessmen (SATP 2014), as well as places of worship, hospitals, and universities (Srivastava 2009). Amount of funding is unknown.

Group: **Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)**
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2008-2009
Keyword:
Location: Manipur
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
Sources indicate that the the KCP engaged in kidnapping (Jagirdar, 2009; Srivastava 2009). This includes an incident where Rs 25 lakhs were paid in ransom for the release of contractor Y. Krishnadas, who was subsequently killed despite the ransom being paid. There was large public outcry denouncing this violence (Jagirdar 2009). Overall amount of funding the KCP earned from kidnapping is unknown.

People's Liberation Army (PLA)

Group: **People's Liberation Army (PLA)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2006
Keyword: politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen
Location: Manipur
Geographical Keywords: Sadar Hill areas
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) used extortion to finance their activities from 1990 through 2006. They targeted politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen. The amount earned is unknown, although sources indicate that extortion and smuggling are the main sources of revenue for the PLA (Center for Development and Peace studies 2015; Global Security N.D.b; Hindustan Times 2006b; SATP. N.D.e; Sharma and Anshuman 2014).

Group: **People's Liberation Army (PLA)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-2006
Keyword: arms
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) earned funding from smuggling goods, including arms, from 1990 through 2006. The amount earned is unknown, although sources indicate that extortion and smuggling are the main sources of revenue for the PLA (Center for Development and Peace studies 2015; Sharma and Anshuman 2014; Singh 2006).

The **People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)** was also operating in the Manipur region of India from 2008 to 2009 (SATP n.d.). Several sources state that the PREPAK's main source of income was from extortion of businessmen and government employees (Center for Development and Peace studies 2015; GlobalSecurity, N.D.c). However, one of the same sources indicates that the PREPAK formally stated in 2007 that they would no longer engage in extortion (Center for Development and Peace studies 2015). Because they renounced this practice prior to their entry into the dataset, we did not code this activity.

United National Liberation Front of Western South East India (UNLFW): 2015
On April 17, 2015, four rebel groups joined together and signed a declaration, forming the United National Liberation Front of Western South East India (UNLFW). The groups were: the Independent arm United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA-I), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplan Faction (NSCN-K), the Songbijt branch of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S), and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO). The United National Liberation Front (UNLF), PREPAK, the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) later joined the UNLFW (UCDP, 2017).

Group: **United National Liberation Front of Western South East India (UNLFW)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2015
Resource: Tea
Keyword: Tea gardens
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 = uncertain about timing, one source

Notes:
The United National Liberation Front of Western South East India (UNLFW) extorted tea gardens in 2015 (The Free Press Journal, 2016). Funds are unknown.

Group: **United National Liberation Front of Western South East India (UNLFW)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2015
Resource: Timber
Keyword:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = uncertain about timing, one source

Notes:
The United National Liberation Front of Western South East India (UNLFW) coerced timber smugglers in 2015 (The Free Press Journal, 2016). Funds are unknown.

Group: **United National Liberation Front of Western South East India (UNLFW)**

Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2015
Keyword: businessmen, contractors, government officials
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = uncertain about timing, one source

Notes:
The United National Liberation Front of Western South East India (UNLFW) coerced timber smugglers in 2015 (The Free Press Journal, 2016). Funds are unknown.

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Indonesia

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Indonesia:

Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN)/
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor: 1992, 1997-1998
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)/Free Aceh Movement: 1990-1991, 1999-2005

The Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN) was a resistance group against Indonesian occupation of East Timor. They existed until 1998 when Indonesia left East Timor, which later became independent in 2002 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: Indonesia). We did not find any evidence that FRETILIN used any of the funding strategies in which we are interested.

Sources suggested Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) involvement in illegal logging (Anderson 2013; Dodd 2002; Large n.d.; Stange and Patock 2010); however, there were too few details available to conclude that this was a sizable or consistent source of funding for the group. Moreover, extensive searching did not corroborate this.

Country: Indonesia
Rebel Group: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Natural Resource: Cannabis
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2000 **To:** 2005
Keywords: Tax
Location (First Order Administrative District): Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta
Geographical Keywords: Jakarta
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)/Free Aceh Movement earns funding from extortion of the cannabis industry. The degree of their involvement is unclear because the Indonesian army is also involved in this trade (Dodd 2002). The GAM taxes cannabis producers, but does not seem to contribute in the production of the marijuana (Agence France Press 2003; Anderson 2013; Asmarani 2003; Greenless 2001; Hume 2005; *Illawarra Mercury* 2005; Schulze 2003; Schulze 2004a). The first report of involvement in the marijuana trade was 2000 (Dillon 2000). The GAM disputes involvement, but the US State Department indicates it believes the group was involved in 2005 and in earlier years (US State Department 2000-2003; US State Department

2005). Based on this, we have coded the GAM as extorting from 2000 to 2005. Amount of funding earned remains unclear.

Country: Indonesia
Rebel Group: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Natural Resource: Oil
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1999 **To:** 2004
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District): Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province
Geographical Keywords: Lhokseumawe
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple Credible Sources

Notes:
The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) engaged in extortion of oil workers and major oil companies, such as ExxonMobile, PT Arun, and Pertamina (Asmarani 2002; Dillon 2001; Schulze 2004a; Tempo 2001). This included extortion attempts, bombing pipelines, and kidnapping oil workers and executives (Dillon 2001). This began in May 1999 (Schulze 2004a). Extortion from GAM eventually forced ExxonMobile out of Indonesia in spring 2001 (Dillon 2001). However, GAM continued to extort other companies and workers. Amount of funding earned is unknown.

Country: Indonesia
Rebel Group: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1990 **To:** 2005
Keywords: Taxes, businesses
Location (First Order Administrative District): Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province)
Geographical Keywords: Aceh Besar, Lhokseumawe industrial zone, Kecamatan Peudada, Bireuen, West Aceh
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
GAM was involved in extorting the people of Aceh in the form of taxes (Agence France Presse 2003; Schulze 2004a). This largely consisted of taxing local businesses, members of the middle class, and civil servants (Anderson 2013; Asmarani 2003; Dillon 2001; Drexler 2006; Schulze

2003; Schulze 2004a; Stange and Patock 2010). In 2003, GAM collected around US$130,000 per month (Anderson 2013)(Rp40,000-RP50,000) from taxing certain sectors (Schulze 2004a). However, the exact time frame is uncertain and specific funding gained from the overall strategy is unknown.

Country: Indonesia
Rebel Group: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International
From: 1999 **To:** 2002
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District): Aceh
Geographical Keywords: Lhokseumawe
Funds: 1= under $5 million
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The GAM engaged in kidnapping from 1999 to 2002 as a funding strategy. Although some kidnappings were ideologically motivated, earning ransom was a primary motive (Schulze 2004a). This activity became a more significant strategy in the early 2000's for the GAM. The group typically targeted oil workers, public officials, or people of wealth (Asmarani 2002; Dillon 2001; Schulze 2003; Schulze 2004a; Schulze 2004b; START 2014). There is a mix of both local and international, with their perceived wealth being a focus for the group rather than the kidnapped person's country of origin. GAM demanded $500,000 for the release of one senior executive of a large company (Schulze 2004a); however, evidence indicates that GAM earned under $5 million a year from kidnapping (Asmarani; Schulze 2004a; START 2014). Specific amounts earned are unknown.

Country: Indonesia
Rebel Group: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
From: 1999 **To:** 2002
Keywords: local businessmen
Location (First Order Administrative District): Aceh
Geographical Keywords: Lhokseumawe
Funds: 1= under $5 million
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:

The GAM engaged in kidnapping from 1999 to 2002 as a funding strategy. Although some kidnappings were ideologically motivated, earning ransom was a primary motive (Schulze 2004a). This activity became a more significant strategy in the early 2000's for the GAM. The group typically targeted oil workers, public officials, or people of wealth (Asmarani 2002; Dillon 2001; Schulze 2003; Schulze 2004b; START 2014). There is a mix of both local and international, with their perceived wealth being a focus for the group rather than the kidnapped person's country of origin. GAM demanded $500,000 for the release of one senior executive of a large company (Schulze 2004a); however, evidence indicates that GAM earned under $5 million a year from kidnapping (Asmarani; Schulze 2004a; START 2014). Specific amounts earned are unknown.

Country: Indonesia
Rebel Group: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Criminal Activity: Piracy
From: 2003 **To:** 2005
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: Strait of Malacca
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: $100,000 per ship
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The GAM engaged in piracy as a funding strategy. They would commandeer a ship and hold the crew and/or ship for ransom (Luft and Korin 2004; Urquhart 2004a; Urquhart 2004b). During one incident in 2001 they kidnapped people from the "Ocean Silver" in the Strait of Malacca and demanded 300 million rupiah (USD$34,000) for their release (START 2014). Luft and Korin state that $100,000 was the average ransom paid per ship (2004). However, the total number of ships ransomed and overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Indonesia
Rebel Group: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Criminal Activity: Humanitarian aid
From: 2000 **To:** 2002
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown

Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources
Notes:
It seems likely that the GAM taxed or stole from humanitarian aid agencies as a financing strategy (Schulze 2003; Schulze 2004a). This is controversial because there is limited concrete evidence of its details. The GAM acted as a middle-man at times to help distribute the aid, and siphoned off between 50 to 75 percent from humanitarian assistance (Schulze 2003). The time frame and funding amount is uncertain.

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Iran

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Iran:
Jondullah: 2006-2010
Republic of Kurdistan (KDPI): 1990-1996
People's Mujahideen (MEK): 1991-2001
The Free Life Party of Kurdistan: 2005-2011

Jondullah

Country: Iran
Rebel Group: Jondullah
Natural Resource: drugs (specific drugs unknown)
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2006 **To:** 2010
Location: Sistan and Baluchestan Province
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2007-2010)
6 (2006)

Notes: Jondullah engaged in drug smuggling from 2006 to 2010 in the Sistan and Baluchestan Province (on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan) where most of the Sunni Baluchi minority live (Hersh 2008, Erdbrink 2008, Tharoor 2010, Fathi 2008, Fathi 2007, Back 2010). We were unsure about the timing for 2006, which is coded as a lower certainty. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Iran
Rebel Group: Jondullah
Criminal Activity: Smuggling
From: 2007 **To:** 2010
Keywords: weapons
Location: Sistan and Baluchestan
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: Jondullah engaged in smuggling of contraband goods, including arms, from 2007 to 2010 in the Sistan and Baluchestan Province (on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan) where most of the Sunni Baluchi minority live (Hersh 2008, Erdbrink 2008, Tharoor 2010). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Iran
Rebel Group: Jondullah
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping local
From: 2006 **To:** 2008
Location: Sistan and Baluchestan
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: Jondallah engaged in kidnapping as a financial strategy including 9 Iranian border security officials in 2006 (BBC 2006), 21 truck drivers in 2007 (The Jamestown Foundation 2007), and 28 Iranian border security officials in 2008 (Syed 2008). The certainty variable is coded as a 2 (one source) for each year since each source corresponds with one year. The funding amounts are unknown.

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Iraq

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Iraq:
Al-Mahdi Army: 2004-2008
Islamic Army of Iraq (RJF): 2005-2007
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP): 1990-1991
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): 1990-1996
Ansar al-Islam: 2004-7, 2011
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI): 1991-1996
Islamic State in Iraq (IS): 2004; 2005-2012;-2013-2015

Islamic State in Iraq (IS)

The Islamic State (IS) is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (UCDP: IS, 2017). They are the successor group to al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) (Johnston, et al., 2016), and are based primarily in Iraq and Syria. Because the main umbrella organization is based in these two countries, we have coded IS in Iraq and Syria the same. IS is responsible for attacks in Afghanistan, Egypt, France, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Many rebel groups in other countries have pledged allegiance to IS (UCDP: IS, 2017). Thus IS appears in the UCDP dataset for a number of countries. We did not assume that IS utilitized the same funding strategies in each of the countries in which they appear in the UCDP dataset. We only coded IS as engaging in an activity if there is evidence they did so within that specific country.

Note: The information coded for IS is coded for both Iraq and Syria for the years 2013-2015. If analysis is being conducted at the organizational level, this data should be dropped to avoid duplication.

Natural Resources

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2004-2015
Resource: Oil and gas
Keywords: protection money
Location: At Ta'mīm, Nīnawá, Saladin, al-Anbar, Homs (Syria)
Geographical Keywords: Kirkuk, Mosul, Ajil field, Himreen field, Akkas field, Palmyra (Syria)
Funds:
2004-2006: -99=Unknown
2008-2015: 2 = Over $5 million
2

Amounts:
2004-2013: -99=Unknown
2014: $739 million to $854 million per year
2015: $600 million to $715 million
Certainty: 2004: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources
2005-2015: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic State in Iraq (IS) used extortion of the oil industry as a primary funding strategy from 2004 to 2015 (Heibner et al, 2017). In earlier years, they perforated holes in oil pipelines and siphoned the oil (Samuels 2008; Williams 2009) or stole if from refineries (Bahney, et al. 2012), and then sold the stolen oil on black markets (Bahney, et al. 2012; Samuels 2008; Williams 2009). They earned an estimated $2 million a month (Samuels, 2008). This often occurred in Kirkuk in At Ta'mīm and in Mosul in Nīnawá. A report indicate that this was occurring in 2006 (Bahney, et al. 2012). It seems likely that this was then occurring in 2005 as well; thus we have higher certainty beginning in 2005. They also demanded protection money from oil companies (Samuels 2008).
IS gained control over important oilfields and refineries in northeastern Syria and northern Iraq in 2014. As of the middle of 2016, IS controlled approximately 5 percent of the oil wells in Iraq and 60 percent of the oil wells in Syria. The group sells oil, oil products and gas, and obtains most of its oil profits from local sales. Once the group gained control over oil fields and refineries, profit estimates range from $250 million to $500 million per year (Clarke, et al., 2016). However, the group's profit likely declined since spring of 2016, because IS no longer controlled any oil wells in Iraq as of September, 2016. Even so, Daniel L. Glaser from the U.S. Treasury Department estimated that the group earned $250 million from oil in 2015 (Clarke, et al., 2016). (Similarly, Heibner et al. estimate that IS profited $150-$450 million in 2014, $435-$550 million in 2015, and $200-$250 million in 2016). Sources providing estimates of the profits earned from activities involving oil were not broken out across strategies. Because in later years the group controlled (extortion) a large proportion of oil fields and garnered very high profits from this, we coded over $5 million and provide specific amounts for extortion of oil, and coded funding as over $5 million, but amounts as -99 (unknown) for theft and smuggling of oil to avoid duplication.
IS also controlled several natural gas fields. In Iraq, they controlled Ajil and Himreen fields in al-Anbar province (until losing them in 2015) and Akkas field in Saladin province. In Syria, they controlled fields in Palmyra in the Homs Province. Since IS does not possess the appropriate expertise and means to refine the gas, they brokered a deal with public companies and the Syrian regime to provide labor and equipment while they take a share of the production. They earned $489 million from natural gas in 2014 and $350 million in 2015 (Center for the Analysis of

Terrorism, 2016). These amounts have been added to the oil amounts to come up with a final monetary estimate for this coding.

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Strategy: Theft
Years: 2004-2012
Type or Resource: oil
Keywords:
Location: At Ta'mīm, Nīnawá
Geographical Keywords: Kirkuk, Mosul
Funds: 2008-2012: 2=Over $5 milion
All other years: -99=Unknown
Amounts: 2008: $24 million
All other years: -99 = unknown
Certainty: 2004: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources
2005-2012: 1 = Multiple credible sources
Notes:
The Islamic State in Iraq (IS) used theft of oil as a funding strategy from 2004 to 2012. They perforated holes in oil pipelines (Samuels 2008; Williams 2009) or stole if from refineries (Bahney, et al. 2012). This often occurred in Kirkuk in At Ta'mīm and in Mosul in Nīnawá (Samuels 2008; Williams 2009). Two reports indicates that this was occurring in 2006 (Bahney, et al. 2012; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2017). It seems likely that this was then occurring in 2005 as well; thus we have higher certainty beginning in 2005. One source states that they earned USD$2 million per month from "oil bunkering" (USD$24 million per year)(Samuels 2008). We coded this amount for the year cited. Given this substantial amount, it seems likely that the group earned over $5 million per year from this activity.

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2004--2015
Type or Resource: oil
Keywords: Bayji oil refinery, black market
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2=Over $5 million
Amounts: $200 million annually
Certainty: 2004-2005: 5=Uncertain timing, one source
2006-2010: 2=One Source 2011-2015: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) engaged in smuggling oil from 2004 through 2015 (Bahney, Benjamin, et. al 2012; Global Security, nd; Heibner et al., 2017) Sources indicate that this was a lucrative activity for them, and that they were able to send surplus funds to al-Qa'ida top leaders in the Pakistan border region. U.S. officials estimated that the ISI earned $200 million annually from this. A substantial portion of this came from oil stolen from the Bayji oil refinery and then sold on the black market (Bahney, Benjamin, et. al 2012). IS refines oil in small, mobile refineries and then takes it to the Turkish border to trade it (Swanson, 2015).

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Natural Resource: agriculture
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2014-2015
Keywords: farmland, grain, cotton, wheat, production, wheat processing machinery, cotton ginners, agricultural transportation vehicles
Location: Nineveh, Saladin, al-Anbar
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $20 million (2014)
-99 (2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Islamic State in Iraq (IS) engaged in extortion of agriculture from 2014 to 2015 (Almukhtar, 2016; Solomon, 2015; Kalin, 2016; Alhamza, n.d.; Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016). IS placed a tax on grain, cotton, and wheat where they taxed the farmland, production, processing machinery, cotton ginners, and agricultural transportation vehicles in the provinces of Nineveh, Saladin, and al-Anbar (Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016). The Center for the Analysis of Terrorism (2016) reported that IS collected $200 million from the both the seizure and taxation of farmland and crops in 2014. Another source reported that $20 million of that $200 million came from taxation (Solomon, 2015). Specific funding amounts for 2015 are unknown but it is likely that they were higher than the 2014 amounts (Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016).

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Natural Resource: agriculture
Strategy: Theft
Years: 2014
Keywords: farms, wheat, grain
Location: Nineveh, Saladin, al-Anbar
Geographical Keywords: northern Iraq
Funds:2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $180 million
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Islamic State in Iraq (IS) engaged in theft of agriculture in 2014 (Solomon, 2015; Homeland Security Committee, 2016; Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016). IS confiscated local farmland, grain silos, and wheat stockpiles when they swept into the provinces of Nineveh, Saladin, al-Anbar. The Center for the Analysis of Terrorism (2016) reported that IS collected $200 million from the both the seizure and taxation of farmland and crops in 2014. Another source reported that $20 million of that $200 million came from taxation, leaving about $180 million that came from theft (Solomon, 2015).

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2009-2015
Keywords: fish, poultry
Location:
Geographical Keywords: north of Baghdad
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Islamic State in Iraq (IS) engaged in extortion of animals from 2009 to 2015 (Kalin, 2016). IS took over fishing and fish farms in the lakes north of Baghdad, which has generated millions of dollars since 2009. They also imposed a 10 percent tax on poultry (Kalin, 2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Natural Resource: other
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2014-2015
Keywords: phosphate, sulfuric acid, salt, cement
Location: al-Anbar, Homs (Syria), Aleppo (Syria), Raqqa (Syria)
Geographical Keywords: Akashat mine, Khnaifess mines (Syria), Palmyra (Syria), Ayn al-Arab (Syria), Raqqa (Syria), Kubaisa, al-Qa'im
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $350 million
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Islamic State in Iraq (IS) engaged in extortion of phosphate, sulfuric acid, salt, and cement from 2014 to 2015 (Homeland Security Committee, 2016; Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016). In 2014, IS controlled phosphate and sulfuric acid mines in Iraq in the al-Anbar province. In 2015, they seized control of the phosphate mines in Palmyra in Syria. They also controlled five cement plants in Iraq and Syria as well as Syria's main salt mine. As time went on, the phosphate industry became less profitable for IS since they did not have control of

the advanced technology needed for the refinement process and had difficulty with the transportation of the material (Homeland Security Committee, 2016; Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016). IS earned about $50 million from their Iraq phosphate mines in 2014. With the addition of their Syrian phosphate mines, IS earned about $250 million in 2015 despite the dwindling in phosphate production. The cement mines also netted IS $300 million in 2014 and $150 million in 2015 (Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016). When put together, this meant that IS earned about $350 million in both years from these activities.

Crime

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2004-2015
Keywords: protection money, mafia-like tax, taxes, fees, factories, car dealerships
Location: Anbar, Nīnawá
Geographical Keywords: Mosul
Funds: 2 = Over $5 million
Amounts: 2014-2015: $300 million – $800 million per year all other years: -99
Certainty: 2004-2006: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources
2007-2015: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic State in Iraq (IS) engaged in extortion as a primary funding strategy from 2004 through 2016 (*Al Arabiya* 2010; Bahney et al. 2012; Clark, et al. 2016; Miller 2007; Swanson, 2015; Stewart 2010; Williams 2009; Johnston, et al., 2016; Heibner et al, 2017). IS controls a substantial amount of territory in Iraq and Syria, and demands taxes and fees from the populations under its control (Heibner et al., 2017). As of 2016, the group earned between 2.5 and 20 percent of its revenue from extorting businesses in its territories, and other taxation and racket systems (Clarke, et al., 2016) IS obtained funding through exploiting the State contracts and projects. They demanded 10 to 20 percent of a contract's value in Ninewa. However, the proportion of revenue earned through contract extortion began to significantly decline in the latter part of 2008(Johnston et al., 2016). The group increasingly relied on funding from extortion and the threat of violence beginning in mid-2006, which may have turned many people against IS (Bahney et al. 2012). It was often in the form of protection fees (Miller 2007), and a mafia-like tax (Shamdeen 2012). They extorted money from businesses in general as well as gas stations (Samuels 2008; Johnston, 2016), locals, small market stalls (*Al Arabiya* 2010), and pharmacies (McEvers 2010). Mosul is a primary hub for the extortion and taxation system, largely from the commercial and reconstruction centers. IS earned $1.83 million in a 5-month period from extorting contracting work in and around Mosul (Johnston, et all, 2016). Extortion of the business sector included mobile phone companies, soft-drink manufacturers, and flour and

cement factories (Johnston, et al., 2016). The taxation scheme includes taxes or fines collected by IS's morality police (Clarket, et al., 2016). They also took control of government factories and car dealerships in Iraq (Kalin, 2016). The exact amount of funding earned is unknown. The Geneva Centre for Security Policyestimated that in 2014, ISIS made approximately 360 million dollars through illegal taxes on individuals and businesses in the areas they control. Similarly, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence estimates that IS earned $300 to $400 million from taxation activities in 2014, and $400-$800 million in 2015, although this decreased to $300 to $400 million in 2016 (Heibner et al., 2017) In 2015, it is estimated that they profited 800 million dollars through this practice (Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2015). Others also estimate that IS earned $350 million per year from extortion (Clarke, et al., 2016). However, this estimate pertains to activities in both Iraq and Syria. Thus, we coded between 360-800 million.

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
Years: 2013-2015
Location: Iraq, Ninewa
Keywords: Antiquities, fuel, levies on trade, Captagon
Funds: 2=Over $5 million
Amounts: $150 million - $200 million per year
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

Archeological sites are located in territories that IS controls (Heibner et al., 2017). There is evidence that IS profits from selling antiquities (Clarke, et al, 2016), issues permits for people to dig in these sites, and charges fees for transport of antiquities (Heibner et al., 2017Over 4,500 archeological sites in Iraq and Syria are controlled by the Islamic State, allowing the group to profit from the smuggling of artifacts and antiquities from these sites. According to Russia's ambassador to the UN, ISIS' profits are anywhere from 150-200 million dollars annually (Reuters,2016). IS also profits from smuggling fuel, including gasoline diesel, and cooking gas in the Ninewa province (Johnston et al., 2016). They also profit from smuggling and selling a synthetic amphetamine-based drug known as Captagon. Captagon can usually be sold for $65 for every 200 pills in Syria and $20 per pill in Saudi Arabia.

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2004-2015
Type or Resource:
Keywords:
Location: At Ta'mīm, Nīnawá

Geographical Keywords: Kirkuk, Mosul
Funds: 2 = Over $5 million
Amounts: 2015: $20 million - $45 million
All other years: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) engaged in kidnapping as a funding strategy from 2004 through 2015 (Miller 2007; Stewart 2010; Reuters, 2017; Heibner et al., 2017; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2017). High-profile cases have included Western journalists, but they also kidnap locals (Heibner et al., 2017). One source estimates that the ISI kidnaps hundreds of people each year for ransom (Burns and Semple 2006)..Sources indicate that this was a lucrative activity for the ISI (Williams 2009). IS earned between $20 million to $45 million in 2015 from kidnapping (Clarke, et al., 2016) Amounts for other years are unknown.

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Strategy: Theft
Years: 2004-2015
Keywords: Stolen goods, cars, gas stations, armed robbery, jewelry shops, currency exchanges
Location: Anbar
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2005-2006: 1=Under $5 million
2014-2015: 2=Over $5 millionall other years: -99: Unknown
Amounts: 2005: minimum: $2.25 million
2006: minimum: $4 million
2014: $400 million-$1 billion
2015: $200 million-$300 million
all other years: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2004: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources
2005-2015: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) engaged in theft from 2004 through 2015. IS profited by lotting banks, stores, and taking the property of invididuals when the group moved into a new territory (Heibner et al., 2017). Theft also occurred in the Anbar province and included cars, generators, construction equipment (Bahney et al. 2012; Miller 2007; Samuels 2008; Williams 2009; Johnston et al., 2016), banks, gold markets, and currency exchanges (Stewart 2010; McCoy, 2014). In early years, IS earned substantial funding from theft, but there is no evidence they earned above the $5 million threshold. ISI earned a minimum of $2.25 million from theft in 2005, and a minimum of $4 million in 2006 (Bahney, et al. 2012). In later years IS earned higher

funding amounts from theft. In the Anbar province alone, the group garnered approximately $2.3 million from selling stolen goods (Johnston, et al., 2016). The Washington Post reported that ISIS stole $425 million from a bank in northern Iraq in 2014 (McCoy, 2014). From bank robbery alone, IS earned at least $500 million (Clarke, et al., 2016). IS earned an estimated $500 million to $1 billion from theft overall in 2014, $200 to $300 million in 2015, and $110 to $190 million in 2016 (Heibner et al., 2017). IS may have stolen radioactive material from a Turkish oil and gas company in Iraq, although this is not confirmed (Rasheed, Mohammed and Kalin, 2016). Other sources indicate that overall this was an important source of funding (Williams 2009; Heibner et al, 2017), although the exact amount for remaining years in the data set are unknown.

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Humans
Years: 2014-2015
Keywords: Yezidi women, children, Assyrian Christian women
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Islamic State in Iraq (IS) engaged in smuggling of humans from 2014 to 2015 (The Guardian, 2015; Yoon, 2015; Hinnant, 2016; Warrick, 2016; United Nations, 2016; U.S. Department of State, 2016). IS abducted women and children from Yezidi, Assyrian, and Christian communities to be either kept as sex slaves or sold at "slave bazaars" for local Syrian communities to bid on (United Nations, 2016; U.S. Department of State, 2016). Sometimes they are moved from Iraq to Syria to be sold (United Nations, 2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Al-Mahdi-Army

Rebel Group: Al-Mahdi-Army
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2004-2007
Keywords: local businesses, stolen car rings, Jamila Market
Location: Baghdad
Geographical Keywords: Jamila Market
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = multiple credible sources

Notes:

The Mahdi Army engaged in extortion as a financial strategy from 2004 to 2007 (Partlow 2007; Williams 2009; Cochrane 2009). They extorted money from local business, merchants, and other individuals in the form of protection payments that granted them immunity from violence and kidnappings. In 2007, the Mahdi Army took over the Jamila Market in Baghdad which was the receiving point for millions of dollars of market bound goods. The Mahdi Army also controlled black market sales of gasoline and propane-gas canisters at gasoline stations (Williams 2009). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: Al-Mahdi-Army
Strategy: Theft
Years: 2004-2008
Keywords: vehicles, houses, furniture, religious funds, highway robbery
Location: Diyālá, Karbalā'
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2004-2007: 1 = multiple credible sources
2008: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Mahdi Army engaged in theft from 2004 to 2008 (Partlow 2007; Williams 2009; BBC 2006; BBC 2007; Fam 2005; Wilson 2004). Mahdi Army death squads, composed of unpaid Mahdi soldiers, usually financed themselves through stealing possessions of value from their victims. Cars especially were considered valuable and were typically sold for between $2,000 and $2,500 on the black market (Williams 2009). Mahdi Army members also evicted Sunnis from their homes and rented or sold their cars, houses, and furniture out to Shiites at a discounted price (Parlow 2007; Williams 2009). The founder of the Mahdi Army, Muqtada al-Sadr, has been accused of stealing religious funds from various mosques (Wilson 2012). Members of the group have also engaged in highway robberies (BBC 2006; Fam 2005). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: Al-Mahdi-Army
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2004-2008
Keywords:
Locations: Diyālá
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Mahdi Army engaged in kidnapping from 2004 to 2008 (Partlow 2007; Newsweek 2007; Fam 2005; BBC 2006; The Irish Times 2008; BBC 2007). The often kidnapped people along the highway linking the towns of Nahrawan and Medayna in the Diyālá province (Fam 2005). In 2008, the Mahdi army was paid a ransom of $22,000 for one kidnapping case (The Irish Times 2008). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: Al-Mahdi-Army
Strategy: Smuggling Goods
Years: 2004-2007
Keywords: weapons, vehicles, oil
Location: Basra
Geographical Keywords: Abu Flous
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2004-2006: 6 = uncertain about timing, multiple sources
2007: 1 = multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Mahdi Army engaged in smuggling of goods, including arms and vehicles, from 2004 to 2007 (Partlow 2007; Williams 2009). They smuggled cars from Dubai, sent there to them by sympathetic Iraqis abroad, into Iraq where they were apparently sold for a profit, rather than used for car bombs. They also levied taxes on oil smuggled into the Abu Flas port by the Ashur clan as well as oil smuggled in Basra by various tribes (Williams 2009). Funding amounts are unknown.

Ansar al-Islam:
Ansar al-Islam is also known as Ansar al-Sunnah Army, Jaish Ansar al-Sunna, and other variations of the name (Council on Foreign Relations 2008; Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium n.d.). The engaged in kidnapping in the second half of the 2000's. However, this seems to be primarily motivated for political reasons, such as demanding the release of prisoners or executing their kidnap victims (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2012). Thus we have not coded them as engaging in kidnapping as a financing strategy. They were not involved in any of the strategies in which we are interested.

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Israel

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Israel:
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): 2001
Fatah (Palestinian National Liberation Movement): 1990-92, 2002, 2005-7 (intervening years: 1993-2001, 2003-04)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): 1995-2012; 2014
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement): 1993-2012; 2014 (intervening years: 2013)
Palestinian National Authority (PNA): 1996-2002
al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB): 2002-2004
Popular Resistance Committees (PRC): 2006
Hezbollah (Party of God): 1990-99, 2006 (intervening years: 200-2005, 2007-2012)

Hezbollah

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Hezbollah
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Belgium, India, United Arab Emirates
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (1998-2007)
6 (1990-1997)
2 (2008-2012)

Notes: Hezbollah engaged in smuggling of diamonds (alluvial) from 1990 to 2012 in Western Africa. (Steinitz 2003; Farah 2001 ; Wege 2012; Staff 2004; Phillips 2007; Levitt 2013; ICSR 2012). In Sierra Leone they partnered with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to smuggle diamonds out of RUF held areas (Wege 2012). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Hezbollah bought diamonds from DRC miners or middlemen and smuggled them out of the country to be sold in Antwerp, Dubai, or Bombay (Farah 2001). In Liberia, Hezbollah backed the Charles Taylor regime in return for his protection of this criminal enterprise (ICSR 2012; Steinitz 2003). Hezbollah also often worked through Lebanese merchants and traders involved in the diamond trade (ICSR 2012; Levitt 2013). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Hezbollah
Natural Resource: cannabis
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: Beqaa (Lebanon)
Geographical Keywords: Bekaa Valley
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2006-2012)
6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (1990-2005)

Notes: Hezbollah engaged in smuggling of cannabis from 1990 to 2012 (Clarfield 2010; Phillips 2007; Winer 2008; Hernández 2013; Yishai 1997). It smuggled drugs from the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon to Europe, North America, and the rest of the world. It also received drug money from membership fees and donations from dealers. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Hezbollah
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: Beqaa (Lebanon)
Geographical Keywords: Bekaa Valley
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $100 million (1990)
-99 (1991-2012)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Hezbollah engaged in smuggling of opium from 1990 to 2010 (Clarfield 2010; Levitt 2012; Hudson 2003; Phillips 2007; Sanderson 2004; Winer 2008; Yishai 1997; EIR 1996; Albani 2003; Rijock 2012). It smuggled drugs from the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon to Europe, North America, and the rest of the world. It also received drug money from membership fees and donations from dealers. A U.S. Congressional investigation in 1990 estimated that Hezbollah was making $100 million per year from the sale of heroin. Funding amounts for all other years are unknown.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Hezbollah
Natural Resource: coca
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990 **To:** 2012
Keywords: cocaine
Location: Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), Paraná (Brazil)
Geographical Keywords: Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil), Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Venezuela, Colombia, West Africa, Syria, Europe, United States
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (1997-2012)
6 (1990-1996)

Notes: Hezbollah engaged in smuggling of coca from 1990 to 2012 (Clarfield 2010; Levitt 2012a; Levitt 2012b; Levitt 2013; Steinitz 2003; Hudson 2003; Treverton 2009; Wege 2012; Staff 2004; Phillips 2007; Hernández 2013; Yishai 1997; Becker 2011; Conery 2009; Kraul 2008). They largely relied on Lebanese expiate communities to carry out their operations on other continents (Levitt 2013). They have partnered and worked with the FARC, the Lebanese Mafia, and other drug smuggling groups to smuggle cocaine in the tri-border area (where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet) and other countries in South America, taking a percentage of the profits (Kraul 2008; Levitt 2012a; Hudson 2003; Levitt 2013). Hezbollah also stored and smuggled drugs through West Africa and then on to Europe (Wege 2012). They were also engaged in smuggling drugs into the United States using the same routes as the Mexican cartels (Conery 2009; Kraul 2008). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Hezbollah
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
From: 1995 **To:** 2012
Keywords: Cigarettes, pseudoephedrine, counterfeit goods, weapons
Location:
Geographical Keywords: North Carolina (United States), Michigan (United States), United States, Canada, Central America, South America
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Hezbollah engaged in smuggling of goods from 1995 to 2012 (Clarfield 2010; Billingslea 2004; Levitt 2005; Levitt 2013; Steinitz 2003; Treverton 2009; Hudson 2003; Sanderson 2004; Winer 2008). A group of men were arrested in 1996 for smuggling cigarettes from North Carolina to Detroit. Arrests were also made in Charlotte in 2002 and Detroit in 2006 for cigarette smuggling for Hezbollah. In 2002, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) arrested a group of Middle Eastern men who were running pseudoephedrine labs in the United States Midwest and smuggling the pseudoephedrine into Canada. The funds were being sent to Hezbollah (Clarfield 2010; Steinitz 2003; Sanderson 2004). Hezbollah also smuggled cigarettes, weapons, and pseudoephedrine (and its refined version of crystal Methamphetamine) in South America, Central America, The United States, and Canada. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Hezbollah
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1995 **To:** 2012
Keywords: shopkeepers, businessmen
Location:
Geographical Keywords: West Africa, Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2005-2012)
6 (uncertain timing, multiple sources) (1995-2004)

Notes: Hezbollah engaged in extortion from 1995 to 2012 (Levitt 2005; Levitt 2013a; Levitt 2013b; Treverton 2009; Wege 2012). Assad Barakat extorted shopkeepers and businessmen for Hezbollah in the tri-border area of South America, often by threatening the family members left in Lebanon (Levitt 2005; Levitt 2013a; Levitt 2013b; Treverton 2009). Hezbollah also extorted Lebanese merchants in West Africa (Wege 2012). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: Hezbollah
Criminal Activity: Other Crime
From: 1995 **To:** 2011
Keywords: counterfeit goods, counterfeit currency, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, credit card fraud, export schemes, money laundering, intellectual property theft
Location: Beqaa (Lebanon)
Geographical Keywords: Balbek, Barital, Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, Chile
Funds: -99: Unknown

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (1997-2011)
6 (uncertain timing, multiple sources) (1995-1996)

Notes: Hezbollah engaged in a form of crime not otherwise included in our dataset from 1995 to 2011 (Levitt 2005; Levitt 2013a; Levitt 2013b; Hudson 2003; Treverton 2009; Phillips 2007; Hernández 2013; Steinitz 2003; Romero 2013; Yishai 1997). Hezbollah has distributed counterfeit currency, sold counterfeit goods and counterfeit pharmaceuticals, and engaged in credit card fraud, money laundering, export schemes, and intellectual property threat. Assad Ahmad Barakat was involved in many of these crimes in the tri-border area of South America, generating money for Hezbollah, until his arrest in 2002. Funding amounts are unknown.

Hamas

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Hamas
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
From: 2000 **To:** 2013
Keywords: building materials, food, medicine, clothing, fuel, computers, livestock, cars, weapons, counterfeit goods
Location: Southern District
Geographical Keywords: Gaza, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $750 million (2006-2012)
-99 (2000-2005; 2013)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Hamas profited from the smuggling of goods from 2000 to 2012 (Verini 2012; Levitt 2008; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2005; Sharp 2009; Laub and Barzak 2009; Toameh 2006; International Crisis Group 2015). Hamas controlled the tunnel system leading into Gaza, which was the main point of entry for smuggled goods. Therefore they were able to tax all goods smuggled into the territory (Verini 2012; Sharp 2009; Laub and Barzak 2009; Toameh 2006). These goods included building materials, food, medicine, clothing, fuel, computers, livestock, and cars. Hamas earned up to $750 million per year using this strategy from 2006 to 2012 (Verini 2012). Earlier funding amounts are unknown, as well as funding amounts from 2013. Hamas also earned money from the movement and selling of counterfeit goods in the tri-border area of South America (Levitt 2008; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2005). All taxation and revenue earned from the tunnel trade is captured in this coding. This activity stopped in 2013 due to Egypt destroying the tunnels

leading to Gaza, throwing Hamas into a financial crisis (Abrams 2014; International Crisis Group 2014; International Crisis Group 2015). An Israeli military official, in an interview with the New York Times, claimed Hamas was still possibly making a few million dollars after the closure of the majority of the tunnels (Kershner, 2014). No evidence was found that that Hamas was earning any revenue from this activity in 2014.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Hamas
Criminal Activity: Other Crime
From: 1995 **To:** 2001
Keywords: Illegal Charitable Donations, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF)
Location: Texas (United States)
Geographical Keywords: Richardson
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Hamas engaged in a form of crime not otherwise included in our dataset from 1995 to 2001 (U.S. Department of Justice 2009; Kovach 2008). The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), based in Richardson, Texas, was once the largest Muslim charity in the United States with the aim of providing humanitarian aid for community welfare programs and Palestinian orphans (Kovach 2008; U.S. Department of Justice 2009). In 2001, the United States government discovered that the organization was actually created by the Muslim Brotherhood and was secretly funneling money to Hamas. The HLF knowingly played down their ties with Hamas in order to attract donations from people who thought the organization was legitimately involved in humanitarian support. From 1995 to 2001, the HLF sent Hamas about $12.4 million (U.S. Department of Justice 2009). Since we do not know how much the HLF sent Hamas in a given year, we left Amounts as unknown. For Funds we coded less than $5 million per year, since it seems unlikely they would have made more if the final funding amount for all years was $12.4 million.

Fatah

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Fatah
Criminal Activity: Theft

From: 1990 **To:** 2003
Keywords: embezzlement, cars
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 3 (biased sources only)

Notes: Fatah engaged in theft from 1990 to 2003 (Mannes 2003; Ehrenfeld 2003). The Palestinian Authority (PA) misappropriated PA funds and funneled them towards Fatah instead. The PA took funds from workers' salaries, donated aid money, and money granted to them from the MEDA program (Ehrenfeld 2003). Fatah also was involved in stealing cars from Israel (Mannes 2003). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Fatah
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990 **To:** 1994
Keywords: Beqaa (Lebanon)
Geographical Keywords: Bekaa Valley
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (multiple sources, uncertain timing)

Notes: Fatah profited from the smuggling of opium from 1990 to 1994 (Kushner 2006; Ehrenfeld 2003; Bruce 2001). They began smuggling drugs after gaining access to the poppy fields in the Bekka Valley, Lebanon (Kushner 2006). They used their connections with other illegal groups to smuggle the drugs up into Europe. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Fatah
Criminal Activity: Other Crime
From: 1990 To: 2002
Keywords: counterfeiting, coupon network, money laundering
Location: West Bank
Geographical Keywords: Ramallah
Funds: -99: Unknown

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 3 (biased sources only)

Notes: Fatah engaged in a form of crime not otherwise included in our dataset from 1990 to 2006 (Widlanski 2002; Mannes 2003; Kushner 2006; discoverthenetworks 2006). In 2002, Israeli officials discovered a secret money counterfeiting operation at Yasser Arafat's headquarters in the town of Ramallah in the West Bank. (Widlanski 2002). Funding amounts are unknown.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2001
Keywords: store owners
Location:
Geographical Keywords: United States
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) engaged in theft in 2001 (Mintz 2002). They stole revenue from Arab convenience store owners in the United States by skimming their drug sales profits, stealing and reselling baby formula, and illegally redeeming large amounts of coupons. Funding amounts are unknown.

Palestinian National Authority

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1996 **To:** 1998
Keywords: Taxes
Location: West Bank
Geographical Keywords: Hebron
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) engaged in extortion from 1996 to 1998 (Borger 1998). The PNA used wrongful imprisonment and torture as enforcement mechanisms in order to extort the local population under the pretext of collecting taxes. In December of 1996, they arrested a building contractor in the West Bank, supposedly for an unpaid tax, and did not release him until his family raised enough money. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2002 **To:** 2004
Keywords:
Location: West Bank
Geographical Keywords: Nablus
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 (uncertain timing, one source)

Notes: The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB) engaged in extortion from 2002 to 2004 (Potter 2004). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB)
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2002 **To:** 2004
Keywords: cars
Location: West Bank
Geographical Keywords: Nablus
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2002)
2 (one source) (2003-2004)

Notes: The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB) engaged in theft of cars from 2002 to 2004 (Potter 2004; Philps 2002). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Israel
Rebel Group: al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
From: 2002 **To:** 2004
Keywords: guns
Location: West Bank
Geographical Keywords: Nablus
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2002)
2 (one source) (2003-2004)

Notes: The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB) engaged in smuggling of guns from 2002 to 2004 (Potter 2004; Philps 2002). Funding amounts are unknown.

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Ivory Coast

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups:

FDSI-CI, 2011
FRCI, 2004 (referred to as FN in the notes below)
MJP, 2003
MPCI, 2002-3
MPIGO, 2002-3

Forces Nouvelles (FRCI)(FN) (2004)

Country: Ivory Coast
Rebel Group: Forces Nouvelles (FN)
Natural Resource: Agriculture- Cotton
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2004
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: North Ivory Coast
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 High Certainty/Timing

Notes: New Forces uses natural resources in their territory to fund their operations. Cocoa being smuggled to Ghana and Togo is taxed on roads controlled by the FN. In addition cotton, diamonds, timber, gold, sugar cane, and coffee production all fund the FN (United Nations Security Council). In the north The New Forces gain income from cotton which has garnered them income since they were cut off from cocoa and coffee that had funded the rebellion for decades (Eye on Calendar, Ivory Coast Rebels Mark Anniversary). The rebels also say that they gain income for from taxing cocoa, cotton and timber from their zone (Ivory Coast Rebels Deny Blood Diamond Trade).

Country: Ivory Coast
Rebel Group: Forces Nouvelles (FN)
Natural Resource: Cocoa
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2004
Keywords: taxation, roadblocks

Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: Boundiali
Funds: 2
Amounts: 30 million
Certainty: 1

Notes: New Forces uses natural resources in their territory to fund their operations. Cocoa being smuggled to Ghana and Togo is taxed on roads controlled by the FN. In addition cotton, diamonds, timber, gold, sugar cane, and coffee production all fund the FN (United Nations Security Council; Africa News). In the north The New Forces gain income from cotton which has garnered them income since they were cut off from cocoa and coffee that had funded the rebellion for decades (Eye on Calendar, Ivory Coast Rebels Mark Anniversary). The rebels also say that they gain income for from taxing cocoa, cotton and timber from their zone (Ivory Coast Rebels Deny Blood Diamond Trade). The FN created a cocoa blockade, to ensure they earned all the revenue from the taxes. To ensure this FN officials check trucks in Boundiali. There are estimates that since 2004, the FN has earned around 30 million per year from the cocoa trade from taxes on the product, export agreements, and taxing trucks. (Hot Chocolate).

Country: Ivory Coast
Rebel Group: Forces Nouvelles (FN)
Natural Resource: Coffee
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2004
Keywords: taxation, roadblocks
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 High Certainty/Timing

Notes: New Forces uses natural resources in their territory to fund their operations. Cocoa being smuggled to Ghana and Togo is taxed on roads controlled by the FN. In addition cotton, diamonds, timber, gold, sugar cane, and coffee production all fund the FN (United Nations Security Council; Africa News). In the north The New Forces gain income from cotton which has garnered them income since they were cut off from cocoa and coffee that had funded the rebellion for decades(Eye on Calendar, Ivory Coast Rebels Mark Anniversary).

Country: Ivory Coast
Rebel Group: Forces Nouvelles (FN)
Natural Resource: Diamonds- Alluvial
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2004
Keywords: taxation
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: Bobi-Se´ gue´ la and Tortiya
Funds: 2
Amounts: 12 millions
Certainty: 1

Notes: New Forces uses natural resources in their territory to fund their operations. Among these are diamond, which the UN claims are an important source of funding for the FN. Taxes are paid to the FN to produce diamonds, and the diamond pits in Seguela are protected by the FN (United Nations Security Council). The New Forces have controlled the northern half of Ivory Coast since 2002, were many of Cote D'Ivoire's diamond mines are located. Here the FN taxes the production and trade of diamonds (McClanahan 2011). In Bobi-Se´ gue´ la and Tortiya, FN earn as much as US $12 million per year from artisans diamond mines (Grant 2010).The U.N. group which drafted the Ivory Coast report states “There is no doubt that they [FN] are benefiting from their diamond production,” “It was clear from our visits... that (rebel) soldiers were running around and organizing the whole thing” (Ivory Coast Rebels Deny Blood Diamond Trade).

Country: Ivory Coast
Rebel Group: Forces Nouvelles (FN)
Natural Resource: Timber
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2004
Keywords: taxation
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6

Notes: New Forces uses natural resources in their territory to fund their operations. Among these are diamond, which the UN claims are an important source of funding for the FN. Taxes are paid to the FN to produce diamonds, and the diamond pits in Seguela are protected by the FN(United Nations Security Council). The rebels also say that they gain income for from taxing cocoa,

cotton and timber from their zone (Ivory Coast Rebels Deny Blood Diamond Trade). The FN sells permits to cut and sell lumber.(Illegal logging).

Country: Ivory Coast
Rebel Group: Forces Nouvelles (FN)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2004
Keywords: taxation
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: Abidjan, Korhogo, Bouake
Funds: 1
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1

Notes: From 2002 onwards the FN created an extensive extortion system called La Central to gain significant income (Hazen 2013). They reportedly made $137,600 in one week from sales of fuel and taxing convoys. Operators paid "protection" taxes to travel through FN controlled areas, as well as at numerous roadblocks on the road. This system extended to cover all aspects of economic life, an ice cream vendor pays $3 per week, for example. Travelling from Abidjan to Korhogo would cost several hundred dollars in taxes and roadblocks fees (Cote d'Ivoire; Rebels Impose Ban On Imported Products). The New Forces control Bouake, and some areas near Liberia. The FN check documents and demand cash to pass through, engage in extortion and charge $239 per truck and have around 20 roadblocks in the cocoa regions (US Fed News; United Nations Security Council; Hot Chocolate).

Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) (2002-2003)

While Hazen (2013) suggests MPCI and MPIGO engaged in extortion and bank robberies, we could not find additional support for these actions, especially within the limited timeframe they appear in the UCDP data.

Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest(MPIGO)(2002-2003)

Country: Ivory Coast
Rebel Group: Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest(MPIGO)
Natural Resource: Cocoa
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2002 To; 2003
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District):

Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest(MPIGO) engaged in extortion of cocoa from 2002 to 2003 (Hazen 2013). MPIGO controlled production and trade of cocoa in 2002 and 2003 (Hazen 2013).

Country: Ivory Coast
Rebel Group: Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest(MPIGO)
Natural Resource: Gold
Strategy: Theft
From: 2002 To; 2003
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest(MPIGO) engaged in theft of gold from 2002 to 2003 (United Nations Security Council Report 2006). MPIGO captured twenty-seven kilograms of already mined gold and then lost control of the mining town. (United Nations Security Council Report 2006).

Country: Ivory Coast
Rebel Group: Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest(MPIGO)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2002 To; 2003
Keywords: Checkpoints
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest(MPIGO) engaged in general extortion from 2002 to 2003 (Hazen 2013). MPIGO set up checkpoints and extorted money from travellers (Hazen 2013).

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Kenya

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Kenya:
Al-Shabaab: 2015

Note: The information code for Al-Shabaab is the same as the data coded in Somalia. If analysis is being conducted at the organizational level, this data should be dropped to avoid duplication.

Lebanon

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Lebanon:
Islamic State (IS): 2014-2015

The Islamic State (IS) has extensive funding sources, including extorting oil production, extorting people through tax collection, kidnapping and smuggling (Clarke, et al., 2016; Heibner et al., 2017; Johnston et al., 2016; Wagner and Stout, ND). However, it is not clear which, if any, of these strategies IS used in Lebanon specifically. Thus there are no activities coded. There are reports that Islamist groups kidnap people in Lebanon, including with the intention of earning funding (Alami, 2015; Di Giovanni, 2014). While it is likely that IS is one of these groups, evidence is not clear that IS in Lebanon was involved, or that the main goal was to obtain funding. It is likely IS in Lebanon relied on fuding from IS central in Iraq and Syria.

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Liberia

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Liberia:
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL): 1990
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD): 2000-2003
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL): 2003
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL): 1990-1993

Natural Resources

Rebel Group: National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Strategy: Extortion
Years:1991-1993
Resource: Iron
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2=Over $5 million
Amounts: $10 Million a Month/ $120 Million a Year
Certainty: 1=Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) engaged in extortion of iron from 1991 to 1993 (Huband 1993). They controlled the area through which the African Mining Company of Liberia (AMCL) transported iron ore. The AMCL paid the NPFL $10 million a month for the NPFL's iron ore and cooperation (Reno 1995).

Rebel Group: National Patriotic Front of Liberia
Strategy: Extortion
Years:1991-1993
Resource: Rubber
Keywords: Firestone
Location: Harbel
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple Credible Sources

Notes:

The NPFL engaged in extortion of rubber from 1991 through 1993 (African Research Bulletin [ARB] 1991; Gershoni 1997; Harris 1999), largely through Firestone's rubber plantation. The NPFL cooperated in rubber production and marketing for Firestone, and Firestone provided communications equipment (Allimadi 1992; Boas 2001). It is not clear that the Firestone plantation was producing rubber at the time, but company officials admit to having paid Taylor money starting in 1991. Sources indicate that the NPFL earned millions of dollars each month from iron ore, rubber, timber, diamonds and gold (Gershoni 1997; Harris 1999). However, it is not possible to disaggregate this amount. Thus the amount of funding they earned specifically from extortion of rubber is unknown.

Rebel Group: National Patriotic Front of Liberia
Strategy: Smuggling
Years:1991-1993
Resource: Diamonds
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty:1=Multiple Credible Sources

Notes:
The NPFL smuggled diamonds from 1991 through 1993 (ARB 1993; Aning 2003). They had control of a large part of Liberia, and were able to control the export of many commodities, including diamonds. They often used the Ivorian port of San Pedro to circumvent the blockade (Aning 2003). Many European and American companies went through the NPFL to conduct business (Block 1992; The Vancouver Sun 1992). This was an important source of NPFL's revenue (ARB 1991; Gershoni 1997). No other details are provided; thus the amount of funding is unknown.

Rebel Group: National Patriotic Front of Liberia
Strategy: Smuggling
Years:1991-1993
Resource: Gold
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty:1=Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The NPFL smuggled gold from 1991 through 1993 (ARB 1993). They had control of a large part of Liberia, and were able to control the export of many commodities, including gold. Many European and American companies went through the NPFL to conduct business (Block 1992; The Vancouver Sun 1992). They often used the Ivorian port of San Pedro to circumvent the blockade (Aning 2003). They earned substantial revenue from this (Gershoni 1997; Harris 1999). No other details are provided; thus the amount of funding is unknown.

Rebel Group: National Patriotic Front of Liberia
Strategy: Extortion
Years:1991-1993
Resource: Timber
Keywords: Ebony, Mahogany
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1= Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The NPFL used extortion of timber as a financing strategy from 1991 through 1993 (Aning 2003; Harris 1999; Reno 1995). They had control of a large part of Liberia, and were able to control the export of many commodities, including timber such as ebony and mahogany (The Vancouver Sun 1992). Many European and American companies went through the NPFL to conduct business (Block 1992; Richburg 1992; The Vancouver Sun 1992). A source notes that the NPFL earned $3.6 million in a six-month period from timber sales (Huband 1991). As this information was provided only for a six month period, the amount of funding they earned for the year is unknown. Other sources corroborate that they earned substantial funding from this (ARB 1991; Gershoni 1997).

Rebel Group: National Patriotic Front of Liberia
Strategy: Smuggling
Years:1991-1993
Resource: Timber
Keywords: Ebony, Mahogany
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Cote d'Ivoire
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown

Certainty:1= Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The NPFL used smuggling of timber as a financing strategy from 1991 through 1993 (Aning 2003; Harris 1999; Reno 1995). They had control of a large part of Liberia, and were able to control the export of many commodities, including timber such as ebony and mahogany (The Vancouver Sun 1992). Many European and American companies went through the NPFL to conduct business (Block 1992; Richburg 1992; The Vancouver Sun 1992). They often used the Ivorian port of San Pedro to circumvent the blockade (Aning 2003). A source notes that the NPFL earned $3.6 million in a six-month period from timber sales (Huband 1991). As this information was provided only for a six month period, the amount of funding they earned for the year is unknown. Other sources corroborate that they earned substantial funding from this (ARB 1991; Gershoni 1997).

Rebel Group: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2000-2002
Resource: Diamonds
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Sierra Leone, Guinea
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple Credible Sources

Notes:
The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) used extortion of diamonds as a financing strategy from 2000 to 2002. They attacked or occupied at least twelve mining districts in 2002 alone (UN Security Council Report 2002). The amount of funding they earned is unknown.

Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)

A source indicates that surrounding countries supported both LURD and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) (Saint Paul Pioneer Press n.d.). There is no evidence that MODEL engaged in any of the financing strategies in which we are interested.

Crime

Rebel Group: National Patriotic Front of Liberia

Strategy: Theft
Years: 1990
Keywords: Mining machinery
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2=One Source

Notes:
The NPFL engaged in theft of mining equipment in 1990. Leader Charles Taylor began funding the NPFL through the theft and sale of mining equipment from the German Bong Iron Ore Company (Reno 1995). The amount of funding is unknown.

Rebel Group: National Patriotic Front of Liberia
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990
Keywords: Mining machinery
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2=One Source

Notes:
The NPFL engaged in extortion of mining equipment in 1990. Leader Charles Taylor began funding the NPFL through the extortion and sale of mining equipment from the German Bong Iron Ore Company (Reno 1995). The amount of funding is unknown.

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Libya

The UCDP dataset includes the following armed groups in Libya:
National Transitional Council (NTC): 2011
Forces of Muammar Gaddafi: 2011
Forces of the House of Representatives: 2014-2015
Zintan Brigades: 2014
Islamic State (IS): 2015

National Transitional Council and Forces of Muammar Gaddafi

The 2011 conflict in Libya was over governmental power. The National Transitional Council (NTC) was involved in a conflict with the troops of Muammar Gaddafi. The NTC gained control of the capital Tripoli. Gaddafi was killed several months later, which ended the conflict (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: Libya 2015). There is no evidence that the NTC or the Forces of Muammar Gaddafi earned income from natural resources or crime.

Forces of the House of Representatives and Zintan Brigades

The General National Congress (GNC) came to power in late 2013. Demonstrations led the GNC to hold elections in 2014 and a new parliament—the House of Representatives—was elected. The House of Representatives moved to Tobruk in eastern Libya, and the GNC rejected this move, and established a government in Tripoli. This instigated violence between forces loyal to the new government of the GNC and the Zintan Brigades, who was loyal to the House of Representatives. Thus the Forces of the House of Representatives and the Zintan Brigades are in the dataset for 2014-2015 and 2014 (respectively) against the Libyan government (the GNC). (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: Libya 2017). Because the groups involved were connected to the government, they likely relied on resources to which they already had access. There is no evidence that the House of Representatives or the Zintan Brigades earned income from natural resources or crime.

Islamic State

The Islamic State gained control of the Libyan city of Derna in 2014 (Ernst, 2014), but by February of 2017, the group no longer controlled territory in Libya (Lewis, 2017). It is unclear how the group earned funding specifically in Libya. IS central receives significant funding from extortion of oil wells within Iraq (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2017). There are reports that IS was profiting from oil in Liya as well (Hayward, 2015; Kemp, 2016). Although IS controlled a portion of Libyan oil fields, most sources indicate that the group lacked the capacity to profit from this, or that their goal was to disrupt the oil industry rather than use it for funding (Lewis, 2017; Chothia, 2015; Kemp, 2016). Others note that there is *potential* for IS to use oil as a

funding strategy (Robins-Early, 2016). Because the evidence on IS profiting from oil in Libya is unclear, we did not code IS in Libya as engaging in this strategy.

Natural Resources

Group: IS
Strategy: Smuggling
Resource: Drugs-unknown
Years: 2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Islamic State earned funding by smuggling drugs in Libya in 2015 (Lewis and Elumami, 2016; Clarke, 2017). IS began to lose territory in recent years, and therefore had decreased access to many of its previous funding avenues, such as taxation of the local population. They began to turn to other financing mechanisms, including drug smuggling. A 2017 article describes how IS turned to drug smuggling in Libya, but is not explicit on years, only that this is a new strategy. Therefore, we coded certainty as a 6. Funding amounts are unknown.

Crime

Group: IS
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Sirte
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic State controlled the Libyan city of Sirte in 2015, and collected taxes in the city (Lewis and Elumami, 2016). IS took over city institutions and banks and forced business owners to pay taxes (Markey and Elumami, 2015). Funding amounts are unknown.

Group: IS
Strategy: Theft
Years: 2015
Keywords: jewelry; stolen property
Location:

Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
IS in Libya earned funding from theft, including looting jewelry and money from local homes, especially from wealthy residents (Sanchez, 2016). The group profits by then selling stolen property (Lewis and Elumami, 2016.) Funding amounts are unknown.

Group: IS
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: millions of dollars
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic State engaged in kidnapping for ransom in Libya in 2015 (Lewis and Elumami, 2016; Loveluck, 2015). One report states that IS has earned "millions of pounds" through kidnapping (Loveluck, 2015). This amount is in reference to over time, not only in 2015, and may not be limited to IS in Libya. Millions of pounds equates to millions of US dollars, but no further details are provided. Therefore, we coded funds as unknown, but included the ambiguous amount "millions of dollars." Funding amounts are unknown.

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Macedonia

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Macedonia:
UCK (National Liberation Army): 2001

Rebel Group: **Kosovo Liberation Army** (UCK) (Ushtria çlirimtare ë kosovës)
aka: **National Liberation Army** (NLA) (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kombëtare)
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2001
Type or Resource: Opium
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

The Kosovo Liberation Army was involved in smuggling heroin and other drugs. Some accounts (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2003; Hajdinjak 2002) suggest that one reason it engaged in armed conflict was to protect existing smuggling networks from the Macedonian military. The amount of funding they earned from this activity is unknown (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2003; Hajdinjak 2002; Barany and Moser 2005; Battersby et al. 2011; Stern 2011; Ilievski and Dobovsek 2013; Daskalovski 1993; Montanaro-Jankovski 2005; Gounev 2003; Curtis et al. 2002).

Rebel Group: **UCK**
Strategy: Smuggling humans
Years: 2001
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords: Macedonia-Albania border; Slupcane
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Multiple sources indicate involvement of the National Liberation Army in human smuggling, which was often connected to the sex trade. The amount of funding they earned from this activity is unknown (Battersby et al. 2014; Curtis et al. 2002; Department of State 2002; Gounev 2003;Hajdinjak 2002; ICG Balkans Report 2001; Ilievski and Dobovsek 2013).

Rebel Group: **UCK**
Strategy: Smuggling goods
Years: 2001
Keywords: Cigarettes, weapons

Geographical Keywords: Tanusevci; Aracinovo; Macedonia-Kosovo border; Balkan route
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Multiple sources indicate that the National Liberation Army profited from smuggling other goods, including cigarettes and weapons. It was unclear if the NLA was purchasing or selling arms during the conflict. It is possible that other criminal groups connected to the NLA were smuggling weapons prior to the outbreak of armed conflict in 2001 and that this activity was used to finance the NLA's activities. The amount of funding that the NLA earned from these activities is unknown (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2003; Hajdinjak 2002; Rubin 2001; Barany and Moser 2005; Stern 2011; Ilievski and Dobovsek 2013; Bellamy 2002; Curtis 2002; ICG Balkans Report 2001).

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Mali

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Mali:

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA): 1990
Islamic Arab Front (FIAA): 1994
May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change – Ibrahim Bahanga Faction (ATNMC): 2007-2009
Military Faction (Red Berets): 2012
Ansar Dine: 2012-2013, 2015
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement National pour la Libération de lAzawad) (MNLA): 2012
al-Murabitun: 2014
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): 2013-2015
Coordination of Azawad Movements (Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad) (CMA): 2014-2015
Macina Liberation Front (FLM): 2015
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest) (MUJAO): 2013
Signed in-Blood Battalion: 2013

Note: The information code for AQIM is the same as the data code in Algeria. If analysis is being conducted at the organizational level, this data should be dropped to avoid duplication.

May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change – Ibrahim Bahanga Faction

Country: Mali
Rebel Group: May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change – Ibrahim Bahanga Faction (ATNMC)
Natural Resource: drugs (specific drugs unknown)
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2007 **To:** 2009
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Azawad
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The Ibrahim Bahanga Faction of the May 23rd Democratic Alliance for Change engaged in smuggling of drug (specific drugs unknown) from 2007 to 2009. Amounts are unknown. "In interviews conducted with various Malian citizens, journalists and officials as well as members

of the Tuareg community (including former rebel elements of the war in the early 1990s), it became apparent that the majority of those interviewed suspect Ag Bahanga of engaging in criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking" (Souare 2010 p.10).

Ansar Dine

Strategy: Smuggling
Resource: Opium
Years: 2013
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One credible and independent source

Notes:
Ansar Dine engaged in opium smuggling as a funding strategy in 2013 (Mapping Militant Organizations: Ansar Dine, 2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Mali
Rebel Group: Ansar Dine
Natural Resource: drugs (specific drugs unknown)
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2013
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Ansar Dine engaged in smuggling of drugs in 2013 (Arieff, 2013; West African Commission on Drugs, 2014). The specific types of drugs are unknown. Funding amounts are unknown.

Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 2013
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One credible and independent source

Notes:
Ansar Dine engaged in kidnapping for ransom as a funding strategy in 2013 (Mapping Militant Organizations: Ansar Dine, 2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement National pour la Libération de lAzawad) (MNLA) and Coordination of Azawad Movements (Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad) (CMA)

National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement National pour la Libération de lAzawad) (MNLA) was a separatist rebel group of the ethnic Tuaregs. The groups were active in northern Mali in 2012. In 2014 the group split into two factions. One of these factions was CMA, and MNLA changed its name to Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad: Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) (UCDP, 2017b). There is no evidence that either group utilized any of the strategies in which we are interested.

al-Murabitun

Country: Mali
Rebel Group: Al-Murabitun
Strategy: Smuggling
Resource: Drugs (specific drugs unknown)
Years: 2014
Keywords: unknown
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: Al-Murabitun engaged in drug smuggling in 2014 (West African Commission on Drugs, 2014). The specific types of drugs smuggled are unknown. Al-Murabitun was formed in 2013 by al-Mulathamun Battalion and the Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). The group likely profits from drug smuggling, because MUJAO also relied on this as a funding strategy before becoming Al-Murabitun (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Mali
Rebel Group: al-Murabitun
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
Years: 2014
Keywords: ransom
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99: Unknown

Certainty: 1=Multiple credible sources

Notes: Al-Murabitun engaged in kidnapping for ransom (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.; Australian National Security, n.d.; U.S. Department of State, 2015; The Home Office, 2017). Funding amounts are unknown.

Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) began in October 2011, as a group that splintered from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In August 2013, MUJAO joined with the Masked Meg Brigade and formed Al-Murabitoun (START: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 2015).

Country: Mali
Rebel Group: MUJAO
Strategy: Smuggling
Resource: Coca
Years: 2013
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: MUJAO emerged from a split in AQIM in late 2011, but the two groups cooperated in northern Mali (UCDP, 2017a). MUJAO profited from cocaine smuggling in 2013 by protecting smugglers (Duffy, 2015; Harmon, 2016). Cocaine smugglers were allowed to move safely through MUJAO territory in exchange for a ten to fifteen percent tax on the total value of their drugs (Dreazen, 2013). Funding amounts are unknown.

Macina Liberation Front (FLM)

The Macina Liberation Front (FLM) is based in Mali's central region, and is comprised mostly of Fulani, a disadvantaged nomadic people. They are partially supported with guns and cash by Ansar Dine (Watling and Raymond, 2015). There is no evidence that FLM earned income from natural resources or crime.

Signed in-Blood Battalion

Country: Mali
Rebel Group: Signed in-Blood Battalion
Strategy: Smuggling

Resource: Drugs (specific drugs unknown)
Years: 2013
Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
Mokhtar Belmokhtart founded Signed in-Blood Battalion in late 2012. The group was from a split with AQIM. The Signed in-Blood Battalion smuggled unknown drugs as a funding strategy in 2013 (Mapping Militant Organizations: The Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade, 2016; Comolli, 2013; Hoffman, 2013). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Mali
Rebel Group: Signed in-Blood Battalion
Criminal Activity: Smuggling-Other
Years: 2013
Keywords: cigarettes, arms
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One credible and independent source

Notes:
The Signed in-Blood Battalion smuggled cigarettes and arms as a funding strategy in 2013 (Mapping Militant Organizations: The Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade, 2016). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Mali
Rebel Group: Signed in-Blood Battalion
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
Years: 2013
Keywords: ransom
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
Signed in Blood Battalion engaged in kidnapping for ransom as a funding strategy in 2013 (Mapping Militant Organizations: The Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade, 2016; U.S. Department of State, 2014). Funding amounts are unknown.

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA): 1990

No codable information

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Mauritania

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Mauritania:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): 2010-2012

Note: The information code for AQIM is the same as the data code in Algeria. If analysis is being conducted at the organizational level, this data should be dropped to avoid duplication.

Mexico

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Mexico:
EPR: 1996
EZLN: 1994

Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR) (Popular Revolutionary Army)

Rebel Group: **Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR)** (Popular Revolutionary Army)
Strategy: Kidnapping
Keywords: been accused
Years: 1996
Funds:-99: unknown
Certainty: 4 = Uncertainty about group involvement

Notes: The EPR was involved in conflict with the Mexican government in 1996. They were accused of using kidnapping as a financial strategy (Dudley 2010). However, there is no strong evidence to confirm this.

Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) (Zapatista Army of National Liberation)

The EZLN was a guerrilla group comprised of largely indigenous peasants in the state of Chiapas, Mexico. In 1994 they declared war against the Mexican government and called for economic and social reforms. There is no evidence that they engaged in any of the funding strategies we are interested in (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: Mexico 2014).

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Mozambique

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Mozambique:
Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) (RENAMO): 1990-1992, 2013

RENAMO

The Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) (RENAMO) fought to overthrow the government between 1977-1992. After signing the Rome peace agreement in 1992, RENAMO became a political party but continued to be a military organization. There is some evidence that RENAMO kidnapped civilians (Global Security, 2017); however, it is unclear if they did this with a financial motive. Timing is also uncertain. RENAMO reveices its funding from external actors, namely right-wing political parties in coutries that have a large Mozambican Diaspora, such as Portugal and South Africa, but also the USA (UCDP, 2017).

Country: Mozambique
Rebel Group: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
Natural Resource: oil and gas
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1990-1992
Keywords: Lonrho, Beira pipeline
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million per year
Amounts: $6 million (1990-1991)
$5 million (1992)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) engaged in extortion of oil from 1990 to 1992 (Vines, 1998; Vines, 1999; Ralph, 2015). In 1998, Lonrho signed an agreement with RENAMO granting them protection payments of US$500,000 per month in return for them not attacking Lonrho's Beira pipeline. These payments lasted until October 1992 (Vines, 1998; Ralph, 2015). This would have earned them about $6 million per year.

Country: Mozambique
Rebel Group: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
Natural Resource: tea
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1990-1992

Keywords: Lonrho
Location:
Geographical Keywords: northern Mozambique
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) engaged in extortion of tea from 1990 to 1992 (Vines, 1998; Vines, 1999). Lonrho came to a deal with RENAMO over their tea estates. The deal remained in effect until 1992. In all RENAMO earned about $5 million from this activity (Vines, 1998; Vines, 1999). Since we do not know the year this activity started, we cannot determine about how much they earned per year from this activity. We can only safely code that they earned less the $5 million per year from this activity.

Country: Mozambique
Rebel Group: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
Natural Resource: gems (specific gems unknown)
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990-1992
Keywords: precious stones
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) engaged in smuggling of minerals from 1990 to 1992 (Goredema, 2013; Vines, 1998). An agreement RENAMO signed with the Malawian government granted them permission to conduct cross-border trade where they smuggled precious stones (Vines, 1998). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Mozambique
Rebel Group: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990-1992
Keywords: hardwood
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) engaged in smuggling of timber from 1990 to 1992 (Goredema, 2013; Vines, 1998). An agreement RENAMO signed with the Malawian government granted them permission to conduct cross-border trade where they smuggled timber and hardwood (Goredema, 2013; Vines, 1998). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Mozambique
Rebel Group: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990-1992
Keywords: elephants, ivory, animal skins
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) engaged in smuggling of animals, mainly in the form of ivory, from 1990 to 1992 (Goredema, 2013; Vines, 1998; Somerville, 2016). An agreement RENAMO signed with the Malawian government granted them permission to conduct cross-border trade where they smuggled ivory and animal skins (Goredema, 2013; Vines, 1998). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Mozambique
Rebel Group: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
Natural Resource: agriculture
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-1992
Keywords: cashew nuts
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) engaged in smuggling of cashew nuts from 1990 to 1992 (Vines, 1998). An agreement RENAMO signed with the Malawian

government granted them permission to conduct cross-border trade where they smuggled cashew nuts (Vines, 1998). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Mozambique
Rebel Group: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
Years: 1990-1992
Keywords: dug-out canoes
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) engaged in smuggling of goods from 1990 to 1992 (Vines, 1998). An agreement RENAMO signed with the Malawian government granted them permission to conduct cross-border trade where they smuggled dug-out canoes (Vines, 1998). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Mozambique
Rebel Group: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 1990-1992
Keywords: railway, civilians
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) engaged in extortion from 1990 to 1992 (Vines, 1998; Goredema, 2013). They extorted money from the Malawian government by signing an agreement with the government promising to cease attacks against the Nacala railway line in return for payment (Vines, 1998). They also extorted money through taxation of civilians (Goredema, 2013). Funding amounts are unknown.

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Myanmar (Burma)

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Myanmar:
All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF): 1990-1994
Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF): 1991-1992
Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO): 1991, 1994
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO): 1990-1992, 2011 (intervening years: 1993-2010, 2012); 2013-2015
Karen National Union (KNU): 1990-2012
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA 5): 2010-2011; 2013
God's Army: 2000
United Wa State Army (UWSA): 1997
Mong Tai Army (MTA): 1993-1995
Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS)/Shan State Army-South (SSA-S): 1996-2002, 2005-2011; 2013
Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP): 2011; 2013; 2015
Beik Mon Army (BMA): 1996
New Mon State Party (NMSP): 1990
Kokang People's Liberation Army (MNDAA): 2009; 2014-2015
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP): 1992, 1996, 2005
Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF): 2013-2015
Rakhine state (formerly the Arakan region)
All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF): 1990-1994

Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF): 1991-1992

Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO): 1991 & 1994

We found no evidence that the ABSDF, ARIF, or RSO engaged in any of funding strategies on which we collect data. All are based outside of the country in refugee camps. In general, there were few sources available for all of these groups; this may be due to government restrictions on the activities of reporters.

Kachin
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)

Two sources briefly mentioned drug smuggling by the KIO in the early 1990s (Bray 1992; Cantrell 1992). These sources included too little information for us to be confident that the group profited from this activity; thus we did not code it.

Rebel Group: **Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-2015
Resource: Timber
Keywords:
Location: Kachin State
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99 = unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The KIO profited from the cross-border trade in timber. We coded this as smuggling rather than extortion because the KIO was active in taxing the movement of timber on roads and across borders. Sources indicate that much of the timber was harvested in government-controlled areas, suggesting that the KIO was not heavily involved in the extortion of loggers. We are reasonably confident that the KIO engaged in this in the early 1990s and the early and mid-2000s (BEWG 2009; Global Witness 2005a; Global Witness 2005b; Global Witness N.D.; Holland 2014; McLeod 2013; Radio Free Asia 2011). We could not positively document income from smuggling for each year, so we have decided to count the group as smuggling for the entire period. Due to the high value of the illegal timber exports, the KIO appears to be earning over $5 million annually from this (Global Witness 2005a; Global Witness 2005b; Holland 2014). The KIO may also have profited from taxing the movement of other goods, but we found too few sources to document this (Naing 2013; The New York Times 2012; The Sunday Times 2011).

Rebel Group: **Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)**
Strategy: Extortion
Resource: Gems
Years: 1990-1994, 2011-2015
Location: Kachin
Geographical Keywords: Hpakant
Funds: -99 = unknown
Amounts: -99 = unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The KIO extorted jade producers until a cease-fire with government forces in 1994. This resumed after the breakdown of the ceasefire in 2011. Sources make us confident about the timing of these activities but uncertain about the amount that the KIO earned from jade (BEWG 2009; Bray, 1992; Davis 2014; Dean 2012; International Crisis Group 2003; Kachin News 2014;

Martov 2012; Peters, et al. 2007; Radio Free Asia 2011; Weng; Davis 2016; Dapice 2016). KIO continued to extort jade producers through 2015 according to the Myanmar Peace Monitor and sources in Global Witness (Davis, 2014; Davis, 2016).

Rebel Group: KIO
Strategy: Extortion
Resource: Gold
Years: 2010-2015
Location:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 6 = uncertain about timing, multiple sources

Notes: The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) engaged in extortion of gold from 2010 to 2015 (Leithead 2010; Radio Free Asia 2017). Since not as much information was found about the KIO's gold mining practices, it was difficult to determine when exactly this activity was taking place. Because of this we dropped the certainty variable down to a 6 to reflect the uncertainty in timing. Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: KIO
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2008-2015
Keywords: checkpoints, roadblocks, dams, businesses, trade
Location: Kachin
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 1 = multiple sources

Notes: The Kachin Independence Movement (KIO) engaged in extortion from 2008 to 2015 (Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis 2008; International Crisis Group 2011; Leithead 2010; Amnesty International 2017; Child Soldier International 2015). The KIO put up checkpoints, levied taxes on cross-border trade with China, and used their military wing, the Kachin Independence Army, to extort local civilians. They have also forced villagers to pay in exchange for not recruiting the villages' citizens into their armed forces (Leithead 2010; Amnesty International 2017; Child Soldier International 2015). Between 2008 and 2011, the KIO extorted a Chinese company for $2 million in order to receive permission to build dams on KIO controlled territory (Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis 2008; International Crisis Group 2011). Funding amounts are unknown.

Karen (Kayin State)

Karen National Union (KNU)

There were some reports indicating that the KNU was involved in the extortion, or smuggling, or both of minerals such as gold, zinc, and antimony (Azan 2012; Parry 2009), but we were unable to find enough information to reliably identify if and when this might have been occurring. We found no evidence that the KNU engaged in drug extortion or smuggling.

Rebel Group: **Karen National Union (KNU)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2012
Resource: Timber
Keywords: teak
Location: Kayin
Geographical Keywords: Kawkareik District, Mae Kathr Forest
Funds: 1990-1998: 2: Over $5 million
1999-2012: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: $40-$120 tax on one ton of timber, $500mil USD to Thailand annually
Certainty: 1990-1998: 1 = Multiple credible sources
1999-2012: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Karen National Union (KNU) profited from both extortion of timber production and from the smuggling of timber to China and Thailand. Until 1998, the group likely earned more than $5 million from timber. Sources estimate the $500 million worth of teak logs is transported annually to Thailand (Sydney Morning Herald 1998; Skehan 1998). Other sources indicate that the KNU earned $40 to $120 from a tax on one ton of timber (Bryant 1997; Weng 2009). We are unable to estimate how much it earned separately from extortion and from smuggling; since the amount of income is very large, we assume that the amounts from each is greater than $5 million. After 1998, the Burmese Army became involved with the timber trade and at least some of the KNU's activities became more legitimate, including the authority to negotiate concessions with logging organizations. We lack specific details on how this influenced the KNU's profits from timber. We have assumed that it reduced their income to less than $5 million after this date for both extortion and smuggling. We also lack specific information for each year after 1998, and have assumed based on the sources that the group maintained its involvement in extortion and smuggling through 2012 (Azan 2012; BBC Worldwide Monitoring 2009; Brown 2013; Bryant 1998; South China Morning Post 1996; Parry 2009).

Rebel Group: **Karen National Union (KNU)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-2012

Resource: Timber
Keywords: teak
Location: Kayin
Geographical Keywords: Kawkareik District, Mae Kathr Forest
Funds: 1990-1998: 2: Over $5 million
1999-2012: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: $40-$120 tax on one ton of timber, $500mil USD to Thailand in one year
Certainty: 1990-1998: 1 = Multiple credible sources
1999-2012: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
KNU profited from both extortion of timber production and from the smuggling of timber to China and Thailand. Until 1998, the group likely earned more than $5 million from timber. Sources estimate the $500 million worth of teak logs is transported annually to Thailand (Sydney Morning Herald 1998; Skehan 1998). Other sources indicate that the KNU earned $40 to $120 from a tax on one ton of timber (Bryant 1997; Weng 2009). We are unable to estimate how much it earned separately from extortion and from smuggling; since the amount of income is very large, we assume that the amounts from each is greater than $5 million. After 1998, the Burmese Army became involved with the timber trade and at least some of the KNU's activities became more legitimate, including the authority to negotiate concessions with logging organizations. We lack specific details on how this influenced the KNU's profits from timber. We have assumed that it reduced their income to less than $5 million after this date for both extortion and smuggling. We also lack specific information for each year after 1998, and have assumed based on the sources that the group maintained its involvement in extortion and smuggling through 2012 (Azan 2012; BBC Worldwide Monitoring 2009; Brown 2013; Bryant 1998; South China Morning Post 1996; Parry 2009).

Rebel Group: **Karen National Union (KNU)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2003-2012
Natural Resource: Other
Keywords: Lead
Location: Kayin
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes:

The KNU have earned income from a lead mine concession in the territory they control in the Karen State. This mine began operating in 2003; our sources indicate it was still in operation in 2006. We have assumed that it continued to operate after this date and that the KNU continued to earn income from the concession. Total funds that come from their involvement remain unclear as well as the exact timing (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 2011).

We also found reference in some sources to KNU extortion of illegal markets and the movement of goods through its territory (Brown 2013; Lintner 1995; South 2010). It was not clear if these included many goods other than timber. Due to this uncertainty and lack of detail in the sources, we have decided not to record this activity.

Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA 5)

Rebel Group: **Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA 5)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2010-2013
Keywords: goods
Location: Karen State
Geographical Keywords: Kawkareik Township
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
Sources indicate that the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA 5) profited from revolutionary taxes and related forms of extortion (Horstmann n.d.; Horstmann 2011; Worland and Vaddhanaphuti 2013; Child Soldier International, 2013; Frelick and Saltsman, 2012; Kyaw and Ei, 2014; Karen Human Rights Group, 2015). They taxed goods entering their territory from Thailand (Kyaw and Ei, 2014). Citizens who wanted to keep their children from being forcibly recruited into the DKBA military also had to offer payment (Child Soldier International, 2013). The amount of funding is unknown. We did not find evidence that they profited from natural resources, or from other sources of crime.

Rebel Group: DKBA 5
Strategy: Smuggling-Human
Years: 2010-2013
Location: Karen State
Keywords: trafficking deportees from Thailand
Funds: -99

Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple Credible Sources

Notes: Sources indicate that in Myanmar, the DKBA 5 engaged in human trafficking from 2010 to 2013 with victims who were deported from Thailand(Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, 2017; Robertson, 2010; Frelick and Saltsman, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 2013). Some deportees from Thailand are sent to DKBA controlled territory where they are forced to pay a fee, often having to call family and friends to do so, which is then shared between the DKBA, Thai officials, and the brokers. Those unable to pay the fee are forced into labor or sold to brokers to be re-trafficked. Funding amounts are unknown.

God's Army
2000

There is no evidence to suggest that God's Army was involved in any criminal activity or funding activities in which we are interested. The major attack that they committed in 2000, during which they surrounded a Thai hospital and held the people within it hostage for hours, seemed to be an attempt to make a statement to the government, but ended in the killing of all their soldiers that were involved. Their demands to the negotiating team included cigarettes and food, suggesting that they were not well funded, if at all (The New York Times 2000).

Wa
United Wa State Army (UWSA)

Rebel Group: **United Wa State Army (UWSA)**
Natural Resource: Timber
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2004-2005
Keywords:
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Pangsan, Kenglom
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The United Wa State Army (UWSA) controlled much of the Shan State from 2004 to 2005 and earned substantial funding from extorting the logging industry, which is comprised largely of

Chinese companies (Global Witness 2005a). The logging industry is an important funding source for the UWSA (Global Witness 2005b), though exact amounts are unknown.

Country: Myanmar
Rebel Group: **United Wa State Army (UWSA)**
Natural Resource: Timber
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2005 - 2005
Keywords:
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Chinese border, Pangsan, Kenglom
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The United Wa State Army (UWSA) controlled much of the Shan State from 2004 to 2005 and earned substantial funding from smuggling timber across the border to China (Global Witness 2005a; The Globe and Mail 2004). The entire illegal logging industry earn over $200 million USD annually from this (Global Witness 2005a), which is well over the $5 million threshold. However, it is unclear how much the UWSA earned from this.

Rebel Group: **United Wa State Army (UWSA)**
Natural Resource: Rubber
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2011-2012
Keywords:
Location: Kachin and Shan States
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
There are 600,000 acres of rubber plantations in the Wa Self-Administered region, and sources indicate that the UWSA engaged in extortion of rubber from 2011 to 2012 (South China Morning Post 2011; Woods 2012). However, the amounts they earned from this is unknown.

Rebel Group: **United Wa State Army (UWSA)**
Natural Resource: Opium

Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1996-2012
Keywords: poppy fields, heroin
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Mong Yan, Mekong River, Myawaddy, Kanchanaburi province, Chinese and Thai borders, The Golden Triangle
Funds: 2=Over $5 million
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The UWSA controlled much of the Shan State, including the poppy fields there. They engaged in protection of the poppy fields, and extorted the production of heroin (Ball 2003; Bhattacharjee 2008; Chouvy, Meissonnier,Baa 2004; Degenhardt et al. 2005; Global Witness 2005a; South China Morning Post 2011; Tagliacozzo 2002; The Weekend Australian. n.d.). The UWSA likely earned significant funding from this; the Golden Triangle region dominates the heroin industry, and the entire industry is estimated to be worth US$160 billion (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2008). The United Wa State Party (UWSP), the political wing of the UWSA has used funding obtained from extortion taxes on opium (Global Witness 2005b).We are unsure of the exact amount that the UWSA earns, but assume it is more than $5 million per year given the scale of opium production in the area, and sources indicate they control a substantial portion of this.

Rebel Group: **United Wa State Army (UWSA)**
Natural Resource: Opium
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1996- 2012
Keywords:
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Kanchanaburi province, Laos, Mong Yawn, Mekong River, Myawaddy, Chinese and Thai borders, Pangshang, The Golden Triangle
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The UWSA was heavily involved in the opium trade (Ball 2003; Bhattacharjee 2008; Global Security 2015;United States Department of State 2001; United States Department of State 2002), and gained substantial funding from smuggling opium (IIP Digital 2005), although exact amounts are unknown. They smuggled heroin into China, Laos and Thailand (Global Witness

2005b; Kurlantzick 2007). The United States recognized the UWSA as the largest traffickers of heroin in Southeast Asia (South China Morning Post 2011), and some estimate that the UWSA controls 80 percent of the heroin trade (Emmers 2003). Mong Yawn is the center for UWSA's drug smuggling and production network (Ball 2003). However, the amounts the UWSA earned from smuggling opium is uncertain, as is the timing.

Rebel Group: **United Wa State Army (UWSA)**
Natural Resource: Drugs
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1996- 2012
Keywords: Drugs-other/unknown. Methamphetamine, Yaba
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Mong Yan, Mekong River, Myawaddy, Kanchanaburi province, Chinese and Thai borders, The Golden Triangle
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The UWSA earned a substantial revenue stream from controlling a large portion of the drug industry (Jonsson and Brennan 2014; Kurlantzick 2012). This includes running a majority of methamphetamine-producing laboratories (Ball 2003; Emmers 2003; Global Witness 2005b; IIP Digital 2005; Wyler 2007; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2009). They earn substantial profits from this (Ferguson 2010), though exact amounts are unknown. This activity also includes the production of yaba pills, a combination of methamphetamine and caffeine (Grundy-Warr and Wong 2001; The Vancouver Times 2011; The Weekend Australian. n.d.; United States Department of State 2001; United States Department of State 2002). The United Wa State Party (UWSP), the political wing of the UWSA has used funding obtained from extortion taxes on the Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) industry (Global Witness 2005b).

Rebel Group: **United Wa State Army (UWSA)**
Natural Resource: Drugs-unknown/other
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2000-2012
Keywords: Unknown/Miscellaneous; Methamphetamine; yaba
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Three Pagodas Pass, Mezali, Mong Yan, Mekong River, Myawaddy, Kanchanaburi province, Chinese and Thai borders, The Golden Triangle
Funds: -99: Unknown

Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The UWSA engaged in smuggling drugs, notably methamphetamine or yaba, from 2000 to 2012. They gained substantial funding from drug smuggling (Ball 2003; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs [INL] 2009; Emmers; Ferguson 2010; Ralf. 2003; Grundy-Warr and Wong 2001; Selth 2004; Turnell N.D.; United States Department of State 2001; United States Department of State 2002). Mong Yawn is the center for UWSA's drug smuggling and production network. Some of these drugs include methamphetamine, and a variant of methamphetamine known as yaba (Ball 2003; Dupont 1999). They are often smuggled along the Mekong River to China and Thailand (McKetin et al. 2008; Wyler. 2007) or through the Three Pagodas Pass into the Kanchanaburi province (Ball 2003; Kurlantzick 2002; Kurlantzick 2007).

Rebel Group: **United Wa State Army (UWSA)**
Criminal Activity: Crime-Other
Years: 1995-2006
Keywords: Gambling; black market, bootleg dvds
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Panghsang, Sop Lui, Mekong River, Mong La; Mae Sai-Tachileik
Funds: 1: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The UWSA ran casinos along border areas. Mong La is a town that was well-known for the UWSA's gambling industry. Annual funding amounts are unknown, but there is one incident during which investigators found $1.7 million USD in cash at a casino run by the UWSA (The Vancouver Sun 2011). Another source states that the casinos in Mong La earned $5 billion in revenue between 1998 and 2004 (Kurlantzick 2007). However, many of these casinos closed in spring 2006 after China restricted travel visas (Kurlantzick 2007). The UWSA is also involved in the black market, notably selling bootlegged Hollywood DVDs in the marketplace of Mae Sai-Tachileik along the Thai-Shan border (Ferguson 2010).

Shan
Mong Tai Army (MTA)

Rebel Group: **Mong Tai Army (MTA)**
Strategy: Extortion

Years: 1990-1997
Natural Resource: Opium
Keywords: heroin, amphetamine
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Ho Mong, Tachilek, Mae Hong Son
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Mong Tai Army **(**MTA) oversaw and profited from the production of drugs in Myanmar (Brown 1999; Cater 1995; Jones 2004; Lintner 1995; Seekins 2006; The Ottawa Citizen 1996; Triangle 2011). This included opium, heroin and amphetamine pills (Buckland 1995; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Grundy-Warr and Wong 2001; McCoy 1998). The amount of funding they earned from this is unknown.

Rebel Group: **Mong Tai Army (MTA)**
Strategy: Smuggling
Natural Resource: Opium
Years: 1990-1997
Keywords: heroin, amphetamine
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Ho Mong, Tachilek, Mae Hong Son
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The MTA oversaw and profited from smuggling opium and related drugs (Brown 1999; Buckland 1995; Cater 1995; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Jones 2004; McCoy 1998; Seekins 2006; The Ottawa Citizen 1996). Sources indicate that they controlled the border from west of Tachilek to Mae Hong Son, on the border with Thailand (Lintner 1995; Triangle 2011). The amount of funding they earned from this is unknown.

Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS)/Shan State Army-South (SSA-S)

Rebel Group: **Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS)/Shan State Army-South (SSA-S)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2008- 2013
Natural Resource: Gold

Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes:
The Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS), also known as the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), provided security for gold mines in Shan State. We are confident that this activity continued through 2012, but are uncertain when it began or how much income the group earned (Nyein 2014). The RCSS has also been accused of being involved in the opium trade (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2007). While some individual members may have been involved in drug activities, we could not find evidence that the RCSS, as a group, engaged in the drug trade and used it as a form of revenue (BBC, 2007; Naing, 2013).

Rebel Group: **Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS)/Shan State Army-South (SSA-S)**
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 1999-2013
Keywords: Taxes
Location : Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Loi Tailang
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS), also known as the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), profited from taxing villages, and goods that were shipped in from Thailand, but the amount of funds they received is unclear. The RCSS admitted to taxing villagers in a report in 2012 (Jirattikorn 2008; Jirattikorn 2011; Keenan 2012; Nadi 2015; Naing and Kha 2013; Amnesty International 2017). We coded this as extortion rather than smuggling, because the goods they taxed appeared to be legitimately traded goods, as opposed to smuggled goods. Funding amounts are unknown.

Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF)
The Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) is a group that splintered from the Palaung State Liberation Organization/Party/Army (PSLA) as a result of a ceasefire agreement with the government. The Palaung (or Ta'ang) people are from northwestern Shan State. In 2015 the PSLF allied with the MNDAA and the Arakan Army to fight against the Burmese army (UCDP: Myanmar: Palaung, 2017).

Rebel Group: **Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF)**
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords: shops, vehicles, major businesses
Location: Shan State
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) engaged in extortion from 2013 to 2015 (Amnesty International 2017). The PSLF taxed shops, vehicles, and major businesses. They also allowed some villages to pay a tax to keep their citizens from being forcibly recruited into the PSLF's armed forces, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLF). The timing of this activity is uncertain, so we have decided to lower the certainty variable to a 5. Funding amounts are unknown.

Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP)
2011

Extensive searches did not result in any evidence that the SSPP profit from natural resources or crime using the strategies in which we are interested. Two sources mentioned that they profit from extortion (The Economist 2014; Shan Human Rights Foundation 2013); however, we were unable to conclusively link the SSPP to using this activity as a financial strategy.

Mon
Beik Mon Army (BMA)
1996

Extensive searching found no information about how this group funded its activities. We found no evidence that it profited from natural resources or crime using the strategies in which we are interested.

New Mon State Party (NMSP)

Rebel Group: **New Mon State Party (NMSP)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990
Natural Resource: Timber

Keywords:
Location: Mon State
Geographical Keywords: Ye River, Thaton District, Moulmein District, Mawlamyine Township, Ye township
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The New Mon State Party (NMSP) engaged in extortion of timber in 1990. The amounts earned from this are unknown. The timing is more certain due to the sources that suggest that this involvement was granted by the government in 1995, although the end date remains unclear. The NMSP signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1995 (South 2007b). This allowed them economic concessions for various activities. From this, we assume that the group engaged in these activities in 1990. This included extortion of timber production and taxation of the fishing trade and other economic activity (Global Witness, n.d.; International Crisis Group 2003; *Myanmar Peace Monitor*. n.d.b.; Smith 1999; South 2007b.; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2014). (Fish is a natural resource, but we do not count it here as one since our focus is on higher-value resources). We saw one report that they profited from gold mining (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2014), but there were too few details to conclude that this actually occurred or was an important source of funding.

Rebel Group: **New Mon State Party (NMSP)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990
Keywords: taxes
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Three Pagodas Pass
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The New Mon State Party (NMSP) engaged in extortion in 1990 (South 2007b). They implemented taxes in the form of tolls on motorists passing through the Three Pagodas Pass (Amnesty International 2002; Rehmonya.org 2013). They also taxed villagers (Amnesty International 2002) and cross-border trade (Chongkittavorn 2001). The amount of funding earned from this is unknown.

Kokang

Kokang People's Liberation Army (MNDAA)
2009

Rebel Group: **Kokang People's Liberation Army (MNDAA)**
Natural Resource: Opium
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2009-2015
Keywords: Laundering drug money into the economy
Location: Kayah (Karenni) State, Shan State
Geographical Keywords: Mawchi, Kokang
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes: This group long profited from control of the production of opium (Lintner 2000; Lipes 2015; Meehan 2011; Office of the U.S. Federal Register 1998; South 2007a; Zaw 2015). We did not find direct evidence that it engaged in smuggling of this resource. There was little evidence on the amount of income the group earns; based on information about the UWSA, with whom the MNDAA is mentioned, we assume that this group earned more than $5 million in 2009. They continued this practice through 2015 (Global Security, 2015).

Karenni
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)

The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) was active in the Karenni state. Tin and tungsten mines existed there, the number of which increased following a ceasefire agreement between the government and the KNPP in March 2012 (Burma Partnership 2013; Karen News. 2013). However, there was no evidence that the KNPP used these mines as a financial resource.

Rebel Group: **Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)**
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 1990-1996
Keywords: Taxes
Location: Karenni
Geographical Keywords: Salween, Mae Hong Son Province
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) engaged in extortion from 1990 to 1996. They established checkpoints and collected taxes from goods moving across the border (Grundy-Warr 2003; Reh 2005). The amounts they earned from this are unknown. Most of this activity ended in 1996 after the signing of a ceasefire agreement (Reh 2005).

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Nepal

The following group is in our dataset:
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M): 1996-2006

Some sources indicate that the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) engaged in smuggling of timber. These sources suggest that the profiting from timber began in 2005 or 2006, and occurred in collaboration with government officials around the same time that the civil war ended (SATP n.d.; Upreti 2006; Upreti and South 2006). We have decided not to include timber as a major source of income for the group during the civil war, as it appears that they moved into this business in collaboration with some government officials as the war ended.

The group controlled much of the country during the conflict (Human Rights Watch 2004; Tiejun and Kinchi 2008), and regions it controlled received humanitarian aid (Human Rights Watch 2004). But there were not direct reports that the CPN-M extorted or otherwise directly profited from this aid. For this reason, we did not include such aid as a source of income.

Country: Nepal
Rebel Group: **Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist** (CPN-M)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 1996-2006
Keywords: Taxes
Location: Western Region
Geographical Keywords: Far-Western Development Region, Mid-Western Development Region, Darchula, Achham, Baitadi, Bajhang, Bajura, Dadeldhura and Doti districts of Far Western region and Dailekh, Dolpa, Humla, Jajarkot, Jumla, Kalikot, Mugu, Puthyan, Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, and Surkhet from Mid Western region, Dhading
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6=Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) engaged in extortion including targeting individuals, businesses, and tourists (Baldauf 2001; BBC 2003; BBC 2006; Global Security 2011; Hachhethu n.d.; Human Rights Watch 2004; International Crisis Group 2005; Lintner 2002; Loveman n.d.; Page 2006; Rohde 2002; SATP n.d.; Sloan and Anderson 2009; START n.d.; Tiejun and Kinchi 2008; UCDP n.d.; Upreti 2006; Z News 2006). There is much evidence that this activity continued until the end of the war in 2006 (BBC 2006; Tiejun and Kinchi 2008; Upreti 2006). It is less clear when it began. Tiejun and Kinchi (2008) provide evidence that systematic extortion of businesses and farms was occurring in the Western region in 1998. We

have assumed that this activity began with the onset of the large scale civil war in 1996, but set the certainty variable to 6 to reflect uncertainty about the start date. The group appears to have earned substantial income from extortion; a number of sources mention income of tens of millions of US dollars (Hachhethu n.d; International Crisis Group 2005; Lintner 2002; Loveman n.d.; Tiejun and Kinchi 2008; Upreti 2006). Other sources suggested that they specifically extorted producers of the medicinal plant Yarcha Gumba (International Crisis Group 2005); we have included this activity here under the more general category of extortion. The group engaged in kidnapping as well, although it seems this might be a tactic as part of the larger strategy of extortion described here (Rohde 2002; SATP n.d.; Sloan and Anderson 2009). Similarly, there was a report of arms smuggling (Small Arms Survey 2014), but it was not clear that the group pursued this activity as a way to earn income rather than as a source of weapons for themselves.

Country: Nepal
Rebel Group: **Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M)**
Criminal Activity: Theft
Years: 2002-2005
Keywords: Bank robbery
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
Robbery has been mentioned in a few sources, but the specifics of most robberies remain elusive. Reports mention bank robberies from 2002 to 2005 but not earlier than this (International Crisis Group 2005; Lancaster 2003; Lintner 2002; Loveman n.d.; SATP n.d.; START n.d.). We have assumed that these are the start and end date for such robberies. There was little information about the amounts that the group earned from robbing banks.

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Niger

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Niger:
Air and Azawad Liberation Front (FLAA): 1991-1992
Coordination of the Armed Resistance (CRA): 1994
Union of Forces of the Armed Resistance (UFRA): 1997
Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR): 1995
Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ): 2007-2008
Islamic State (IS): 2015

The ISWAP/BH enters the UCDP dataset in 2015 for Niger. Sources typically discuss funding sources for the group in general, often occurring across the Lake Chad region. Therefore, we code ISWAP/BH identically across the four countries. See Nigeria for the activities coded.

Note: The information code for ISWAP is the same as the data coded in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. If analysis is being conducted at the organizational level, this data should be dropped to avoid duplication.

We found no evidence that the FLAA, CRA, UFRA, and FDR were funded through natural resources or crime.

Niger Movement for Justice

Country: Niger
Rebel Group: Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ)
Natural Resource: drugs (specific drugs unknown)
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2007 **To:** 2008
Funds: 1 – Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6

Notes: The Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) engaged in smuggling of drugs (specific drugs unknown) from 2007 (Africa Research Bulletin 2007). They made less than $5 million per year through this strategy. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

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Nigeria

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Nigeria:
Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa- Followers of the Prophet: 2004
Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF): 2004
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram): 2009-2015
Islamic State: 2015

Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force

Country: Nigeria
Rebel Group: Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF)
Natural Resource: oil and gas
Strategy: Theft
From: 2004
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Southern Niger Delta
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple sources, high certainty)

Notes: The Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) engaged in theft of oil in 2004 (Olukoya 2004; Ross 2012; Watts 2007; Africa Research Bulletin 2004). Leader and founder of NDPVF, Dokubu-Asari, has admitted to tapping crude oil from pipelines. Funding amounts are unknown.

Boko Haram (Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad)/Islamic State

Boko Haram (BH)'s insurgency began in 2009 in Nigeria (The Mackenzie Institute, 2015), but their operations soon spilled into the Lake Chad region, including Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Financial Action Task Force [FATF], 2016). The group declared allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) in March 2015, and became known as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (FATF, 2016). (They are also known as Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah [Weiss, 2015]). In August 2016 Boko Haram split into two groups—the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) (FATF, 2016; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016).
Although Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad / Boko Haram declared allegiance to IS, ISWAP and Boko Haram are separate factions (Vox Peccavi, 2017), and IS is in the UCDP dataset as a separate entry. However, because the split between ISWAP and JAS did not occur

until August of 2016, and because most sources refer to the groups virtually interchangeably, we coded the groups identically. (A report published in May 2017 by the Center on Sanctions & Illicit Finance states that the rivalry between ISWAP and JAS stunted the groups' ability to combine resources [Fanusie and Entz, 2017]. Therefore it will be important to note the changing dynamics of these groups following the 2016 split.)

Furthermore, by the time ISWAP/BH enters the UCDP dataset in 2015, the group was operating in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, in addition to its home state of Nigeria (FATF, 2016; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016; The Mackenzie Institute, 2015). Sources typically discuss funding sources for the group in general, often occurring across the Lake Chad region. Therefore, we code ISWAP/BH identically across the four countries.

ISWAP/BH are involved primarily in theft, extortion, and kidnapping as funding strategies (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016; The Mackenzie Institute, 2015). The Mackenzie Institute (2015) states that the group is less dependent on financial resources than many other groups; the arms and explosives they use are generally arms abandoned by Nigerian security forces or stolen. However, ISWAP/BH engages in bank robberies, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom, which produce millions of dollars annually. The Center on Sanctions & Illicit Finance estimated that the group earned at least $10 million a year in 2014 and 2015, thought profits have since declined (Fanusie and Entz, 2017). From the information provided, it is not possible to infer how much of this profit is connected to each individual strategy. However, given annual profit across these 3 categories amounts to "millions of dollars" annually we have conservatively coded funding as at least a 1 for each activity, (unless additional information is available) although funding may be higher.

Natural Resources

Group: ISWAP/BH
Strategy: Extortion
Resource: Agriculture
Years: 2015
Keywords: Farms
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One credible and independent source

Notes:
ISWAP/Boko Haram (BH) profited from taxing farms and even taking over farms. This led to many famers in northern Nigeria to flee, which caused a humanitarian crisis by stunting

agriculture production and causing famine (Fanusie and Entz, 2017). Funding amounts are unknown.

Group: ISWAP/BH
Strategy: Extortion
Resource: Animal
Years: 2015
Keywords: Cattle rustling; fish trade
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2 = Over $5 million
Amounts: -$14.4 million
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
Boko Haram (BH) earned funding from extortion of cows (cattle rustling) in 2015. Activities included creating their own markets to sell stolen cows, selling the cows in small local markets, and hiding the cattle in nearby countries to be sold later. This occurred mainly in Nigeria, but was also happening in Cameroon (FATF, 2016; Obaji, 2017; Fanusie and Entz, 2017). Cattle rustling was a lucrative strategy. The FATF (2016) reports that in three instances alone, BH earned approximately $14.4 million. Two of these happened in Cameroon, and one in Nigeria. In addition, Nigerian authorities virtually banned the fish trade because they believed the group was extensively involved in it (Famusie and Entz, 2017)

Crime

Rebel Group: ISWAP/BH
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2009 **To:** 2015
Keywords: banks, pharmacist, convoys, businesses, gold coins, jewely
Location: Borno State, Bauchi State; Cameroon
Geographical Keywords: Maiduguri, Bauchi
Funds: 1 = Under $5 million
Amounts: 2009-2013, 2015: -99 = Unknown
2014: **$**6 million by 2014
Certainty: 2009: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple source
2010-2015: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
ISWAP/BH engaged in theft and bank robberies to fund its operations from 2010 to 2015 (Connell 2012; Agbiboa 2013; Walker 2012; McCoy, 2014; The Mackenzie Institute, 2015; Weber, 2014; FATF, 2016; Fanusie and Entz, 2017), including in their home province of Borno, Nigeria, and two northern regions of Nigeria (Weber, 2014). They stole from banks, cash-in-transit convoys, businesses, and (in 2011) a pharmacist. The group also conducts raids on

villages, and steals gold coins and jewelry (Fanusie and Entz, 2017).. The group had earned roughly 6 million dollars from theft by 2014 (Weber, 2014; Fanusie and Entz, 2017). Because the source is from 2014 and does not provide more details on the timing of this amount, we coded funding amounts as under $5 million for later years

Rebel Group: ISWAP/BH
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2009 **To:** 2015
Keywords: governors, businessmen, taxes, protection money
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Kano, Bauchi
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts-99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes:
ISWAP/Boko Haram engaged in extortion of individuals and businesses to fund its operations from 2009 to 2015 (de Montclos 2014, Hinshaw 2012, Ogundipe 2012, Aziken 2012; McCoy, 2014The Mackenzie Institute, 2015; Weber, 2014; FAFT, 2016; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2016; Fanusie and Entz, 2017). From 2009 to 2011, they collected $1.5 million per year from the governors of the Bauchi and Kano states in northern Nigeria in exchange for not attacking the states (Fanusie and Entz, 2017). They have also been involved in the extortion of local businessmen since 2011. They demand and receive protection money from governors, and are in control of local governments in some places (Weber, 2014). In places where the group has control, the group levied a tax system (Fanusie and Entz, 2017). Although sources indicate that this is a primary source of financing (FAFT, 2016) funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: ISWAP/BH
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
From: 2011-2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Cameroon; northwest Nigeria
Funds: 1 = Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: millions annually
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: Boko Haram engaged in kidnapping of locals and foreigners for ransom as a primary funding strategy from 2011-2015 (BBC News, 2013; The Mackenzie Institute, 2015; Weber,

2014; Walker 2012; Linshi, 2015; Reuters, 2015; Fanusie and Entz, 2017). In May of 2011, they kidnapped two people from the compound of an Italian construction company. They were paid £1 million in ransom money. In April 2013, the group kidnapped a French family who was vacationing in Cameroon. Two months later, after a $3.15 million ransom was paid, the family was released (Caulderwood, 2014; Fanusie and Entz, 2017). The group kidnaped the wife of Cameroon's vice prime minister in 2014. Later the group released her and Chinese hostages for a substantial ransom (Fanusie and Entz, 2017). They also abduct wealthy Nigerians (Fanusie and Entz, 2017). Some estimate that the group demands $10,000 per abductee (Weber, 2014). IS earns millions of dollars from kidnapping (Wroughton, 2014). Sources indicate kidnapping is a primary funding strategy, but because annual amounts are unknown, except for specific instances, we coded funds as less than $5 million per year.

Group: ISWAP/BH
Strategy: Smuggling-Other
Years: 2015
Keywords: Cars
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Nigeria-Cameroon border; Chad, Libya and Qatar
Funds: -99 = Unknown
Amounts: -99 = Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One credible and independent source

Notes:
ISWAP/BH engaged in smuggling cars in 2015. Cameroonian businessman Alhaji Abdalla had an extensive smuggling network that extended through Chad, Libya and Qatar. He helped provide funds to Boko Haram through this smuggling network. The amount of funding earned from this is unknown (Fanusie and Entz, 2017).

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Pakistan

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Pakistan:
Baluch Unity: 2005-2006
Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA): 2004-2015 (Intervening Years: 2005, 2010)
Baluch Liberation Front (BLF): 2012; 2015
Baluchistan Republican Army (BRA): 2008-2012; 2014-2015
Lashkar-e-Islam (Army of Islam): 2009-2014
Mohajir National Movement (MQM): 1990-1996 (Intervening Years: 1991-1994)
Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws (TNSM): 2007
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): 2007-2015
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan – Tariq Afridi faction (TTP-TA): 2012
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar: 2014
IMU: 2014

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Natural Resource: gems (specific gems unknown)
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2009
Keywords: Emeralds
Location: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Geographical Keywords: Swat district (Mingora, Shamozai), Shangla District (Gujjar Killi)
Funds: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The TTP engaged in extortion of emeralds in 2009 (Siddique 2010; BBC 2009; Yusufzai 2009; Peters 2010; Roul 2009; Collins 2010). In early 2009, the TTP seized and reopened a number of mines in the Swat district and a mine in the Shangla district. They employed locals as laborers and took one-third of their profits. The TTP's control of the mines were brief, as the TTP lost much of its control of the Swat province to government forces in 2009. It was reported that the TTP could have been making as much as $600,000 a week when they controlled the mines (Peters 2010). For this reason we coded the TTP as making more than $5 million per year, but left the specific funding amounts as unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Natural Resource: other mineral
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2008 **To:** 2010
Keywords: Ziarat Marble quarry
Location: FATA
Geographical Keywords: Ziarat (Mohmand Agency)
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The TTP engaged in extortion of marble from 2008 to 2010 (Siddique 2010; Kronstadt 2008; Peters 2010; Roul 2009; Shah 2008; Collins 2010). In April 2008 the TTP took over the Ziarat Marble quarry in the Mohmand Agency of the federally administered tribal areas (FATA), which produces some of the mostly highly prized marble in Pakistan. When the TTP took control of the mine, it mediated a dispute between two tribes over who was allowed to work the mine, and earned about $45,000 upfront commission from them. They also taxed each truckload of marble leaving the mine about $7, making about $500 per day (Shah 2008). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Natural Resource: agriculture
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2010
Keywords: Wheat
Location: FATA
Geographical Keywords: South Waziristan agency
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The TTP engaged in extortion of wheat in 2010 (Peters 2010). The TTP taxed wheat farmers in South Waziristan and carted off a portion of their harvest. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP

Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2007 **To:** 2009
Keywords:
Location: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, Swat Valley
Geographical Keywords: Swat District, Dir District, Malakand District
Funds: 2
Amounts: 100 million from 2013-2015
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The TTP engaged in extortion of timber from 2007 to 2009 (Siddique 2010; BBC 2009; Al Jazeera 2010; Roul 2009; Collins 2010; Qazi 2011). In the Swat district, they worked with the timber mafia and took from them about 10% of the value of each timber truckload they moved out. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2009
Keywords: heroin
Location: FATA
Geographical Keywords: South Waziristan Agency
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The TTP engaged in opium extortion in 2009 (Smith 2009). In the South Waziristan agency, the TTP produced heroin, probably through the control of heroin laboratories. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2007 **To:** 2015
Keywords:
Location: FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh

Geographical Keywords: South Waziristan Agency, Karachi
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2008-2010)
5 (2011-2015)
6 (2007)

Notes: The TTP engaged in opium smuggling from 2007 to 2015 (Smith 2009; BBC 2009a; BBC 2009b; BBC 2009c; UNODC 2010; Kronstadt 2008; Siddique 2010; Acharya 2009; Shah 2008; Felbab-Brown 2013; European Asylum Support Office 2016). They both smuggled the drugs directly and taxed other smugglers who tried to move drugs through their territories. They also often exported the drugs to foreign countries. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
From: 2007 **To:** 2015
Keywords: tobacco products, cigarettes, commodities, contraband
Location: FATA
Geographical Keywords: South Waziristan Agency
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2007-2010)
5 (2011-2015)

Notes: The TTP engaged in smuggling goods, such as cigarettes and other tobacco products, from 2007 to 2015 (Shah 2010; Peters 2010; Shah 2008; Felbab-Brown 2013; European Asylum Support Office 2016). Often times they extracted toll taxes and protection fees from smugglers trying to move contraband goods through their territories. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2007 **To:** 2015
Keywords: Sikh community, truckers, vehicles, builders, petrol pump owners, government contractors, families, shopkeepers, remittances from family abroad, crime penalties, commerce and toll taxes, protection taxes
Location: FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh

Geographical Keywords: Orakzai Agency, South Waziristan Agency, Mohmand Agency, Khyber agency, Karachi, Miramshah (North Waziristan), Rahdaari corridor (North Waziristan), Khwazakhela (Swat District)
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The TTP engaged in extortion from 2007 to 2012 (Felbab-Brown 2013; The Balochistan Times 2009; UNODC 2011; Rehman 2013; UNODC 2009; The Daily Times 2009; Siddique 2010; Acharya 2009; Peters 2010; Roul 2009; Collins 2010; Qazi 2011; Asylum Research Consultancy 2015; European Asylum Support Office 2016; U.S. Department of State 2016; U.S. Department of State 2015). The TTP imposed protection taxes on shopkeepers, families, and minorities throughout the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. While the sources document a lot of specific amounts from specific activities the TTP carried out, it is difficult to tell the overall amounts they gained in a given year. Therefore, Funds and Amounts remain unknown. Some specific activities include:
- collected 15 million to 50 million Pakistani Rupees from the Sikh community (The Bolachistan Times 2009; Roul 2009)
- demanded anywhere from $17 to $30 from every truck crossing into their territory, and $6 for small vehicles, on a monthly or bi-yearly basis (Collins 2010; Acharya 2009)
- demanded $84 from petrol pump owners twice a year (Acharya 2009)
- gathered 6% of commission from government contractors (Acharya 2009)
- instituted an $8,400 penalty on crimes such as theft (Acharya 2009)
- demanded $350 per month from shopkeepers in Khwazakhela (Peter 2010)
- collected a protection tax of about $2 dollars from every household in territories they control, with there being about 110,469 households in Waziristan alone (Peters 2010; Collins 2010)

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2007 **To:** 2012
Keywords: banks, vehicles (from civilians, government, and NGOs), moneychanger firm, private businesses, Askari Security Company, local Habib bank, salaries for locally-based teachers, hotels and resorts (computers, cutlery, carpets, furniture), Malam Jabba Ski Resort, provincial tourism development office (computers and office supplies), Gold (from National Bank of Pakistan armored truck), NATO supplies
Location: FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Punjab
Geographical Keywords: Bajaur Agency, Swat District, Gulibagh (city in Swat), Karachi (city), Lahore (city)
Funds: Unknown

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2007-2010)
5 (2011-2012)

Notes: The TTP engaged in theft from 2007 to 2012 (Siddique 2010; BBC 2009a; BBC 2009b; Acharya 2009; Peters 2010; Felbab-Brown 2013). The TTP put together squads to infiltrate and steal money from banks, moneychanger firms, private businesses, and security firms. They engaged in the looting of hotels, resorts, and offices. The TTP have also stolen gold, teachers' salaries, and NATO supplies as they were being transported. While the sources document a lot of specific amounts from specific activities the TTP carried out, it is difficult to tell the overall amounts they gained in a given year. Therefore, Funds and Amounts remain unknown. Some specific activities include:

- stole $2.4 million from a moneychanger firm in Karachi in January of 2008 (Acharya 2009)
- stole $170,000 from the Askari Security Company in Karachi in February of 2008 (Acharya 2009)
- stole $119,000 from a bank in Gulibagh in February of 2009 (Peters 2010)
- stole 8 kilograms of gold from a National Bank of Pakistan armored truck in March of 2009 (Peters 2010)
- robbed the Bajuar branch of the Habib Bank in 2008 (Peter 2010)
- auctioned off millions of Pakistani rupees worth of computers, carpets, cutlery, and furniture from the Malam Jabba ski resort in 2008 (Peters 2010)
- stole and sold computers and office supplies from a provincial tourism development office in (Peters 2010)

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
From: 2007 **To:** 2015
Keywords: trader, government employees, bank manager, security personnel, soldiers, Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan, NGO workers, landowners, politicians, businessmen, industrialists, academics
Location: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, Sindh
Geographical Keywords: Kohat-Hangu Highway, Bannu District, Swat District, North Waziristan Agency, South Waziristan Agency, Mohmand Agency, Khyber Agency, Lower Dir District, Karachi
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The TTP engaged in kidnapping from 2007 to 2012 (The Balochistan Times 2009; Walsh 2012; Siddique 2010; Acharya 2009; Peters 2010; Collins 2010; South Asia Terrorism Portal 2012; The Daily Times 2009; BBC 2009; UNODC 2011; Shah 2008; Mirahmadi 2010; European Asylum Support Office 2016; U.S. Department of State 2015; U.S. Department of State 2015). The Pakistani police claimed that 1 in 10 kidnappings in Pakistan was due to the TTP, with as many as 70 kidnappings being conducted by them in 2009, and ransoms ranging from $60,000 to $250,000 (Collins 2010). Kidnapping figures may have reached as high as 467 kidnappings in 2011, with the TTP earning millions of dollars (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2012). While the sources document a lot of specific amounts from specific instances of kidnapping the TTP carried out, it is difficult to tell the overall amounts they gained in a given year. Therefore, Funds and Amounts remain unknown. Some specific instances include:

- Received $20,000 each for an NGO worker, a government employee, and a bank manager in 2007 (Siddique 2010; Acharya 2009)
- Received $1 million for 280 kidnapped soldiers in 2007 (Siddique 2010; Acharya 2009)
- Received $2.5 million for Tariq Azizuddin, Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan, in 2008 (Siddique 2010; Acharya 2009; Collins 2010)
- Kidnapped 10 security personnel from the Mohmand Agency in 2007 (Acharya 2009)
- Kidnapped 18 Pakistani Soldiers from North Waziristan in 2008 (Acharya 2009)
- Kidnapped 35 Pakistani Soldiers from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province in 2007 (Acharya 2009)
- Received $240,000 for a deputy mayor from the Swat District (Peters 2010)
- Received $24,000 for a professor at Swat's Timergara Degree College (Peters 2010)
- Received $180,000 for a bank manager in 2009 (Peters 2010)
- Received $11,500 for a Pakistani television actor in 2009 (Collins 2010)

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: TTP
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International
From: 2010 **To:** 2012
Keywords: Swiss couple, western aid workers, NGO workers, Afghan ambassador to Pakistan
Location: FATA
Geographical Keywords: North Waziristan Agency, South Waziristan Agency
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

The TTP engaged in kidnapping of foreigners from 2010 to 2012 (Walsh 2012a; Walsh 2012b; Peters 2010; Siddique 2010; South Asia Terrorism Portal 2012). Ransom demands typically

ranged from $500,000 to $2.2 million, though the final amount was usually only one-tenth of the original asking price (Walsh 2012). Funding amounts are unknown.

The Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: Baluchistan Liberation Army
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
From: 2011 **To:** 2012
Keywords: 5 officials from Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation (PMDC), laborers
Location: Balochistan
Geographical Keywords: Sorange
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 3 (biased sources only)

Notes: The Baluchistan Liberation Army engaged in kidnapping from 2011 to 2012 (The Baluchistan Express 2011; The Nation 2012). In 2011 they kidnapped five officials from the Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation and in 2012 they were involved in kidnapping laborers. Funding amounts are unknown.

Lashkar-e-Islam

Rebel Group: Lashkar-e-Islam
Natural Resource: drugs unknown
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2010 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: FATA
Geographical Keywords: Khyber Agency
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple sources) (2010-2011)
2 (2012)

Notes: Lashkar-e-Islam engaged in drugs smuggling from 2010 to 2012 (Peters 2010; Hussain 2014; Nazir 2011). One source indicated that the drug smuggled is cannabis, but we have chosen

to code the specific drug as unknown given the wide availability of opium in the region. Drug smugglers paid Lashkar-e-Islam large amounts of money to move through their territory unhindered. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: Lashkar-e-Islam
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping local
From: 2009 **To:** 2014
Keywords:
Location: FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Geographical Keywords: Khyber Agency, Peshawar District, Nowshera District
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source) (2009)
1 (2010, 2012)
5 (2011)
6 (2013-2014)

Notes: Lashkar-e-Islam engaged in kidnapping of locals from 2009 to 2014 (Peters 2010; Zaidi 2010; Dawn 2012; Mapping Militant Organizations 2012; Asylum Research Consultancy 2015; The News International 2015). In 2009, Lashkar-e-Islam kidnapped 18 individuals and ransomed them to their families (Peters 2010). In 2012, they ransomed 8 local laborers that they were involved in kidnapping (Dawn 2012). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: Lashkar-e-Islam
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2009
Keywords:
Location: FATA
Geographical Keywords: Khyber Agency
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: Lashkar-e-Islam engaged in theft in 2009 (Acharya 2009). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: Lashkar-e-Islam

Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2009 **To:** 2014
Keywords: shopkeepers, businessmen, construction teams, aid projects, families, politicians, district leaders, truck drivers
Location: FATA
Geographical Keywords: Khyber Agency
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2009-2012)
6 (2013-2014)

Notes: Lashkar-e-Islam engaged in extortion from 2009 to 2014 (Peters 2010; Qazi 2011; Hussain 2011; Mapping Militant Organizations 2012; Asylum Research Consultancy 2015; The News International 2015). They extorted families, shopkeepers, businessmen, construction teams, truck drivers, aid projects, political party leaders, and district leaders. They fined anyone not wearing a head covering 100 Pakistani Rupees and forced all non-Muslims living in the Khyber Agency to pay a yearly fee of 1000 Pakistani Rupees. They referred to many of these fees as an Islamic tax. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Pakistan
Rebel Group: Lashkar-e-Islam
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
From: 2009 **To:** 2010
Keywords: cigarettes, ammonium nitrate, fertilizer, various commodities
Location: FATA
Geographical Keywords: Khyber Agency, Khyber Pass
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source) (2009)
2 (2010)

Notes: Lashkar-e-Islam engaged in smuggling of goods from 2009 to 2010 (Peters 2010). They taxed all the truck traffic moving through the Khyber Pass, making money off the smuggling of cigarettes, ammonium nitrate, fertilizer, and various other goods. They taxed the smugglers $50 to $150 per truck load. Funding amounts are unknown.

Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)

Country: Pakistan

Rebel Group: MQM
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1990 **To:** 1996
Keywords: businessmen, shopkeepers, traders, ordinary citizens
Location: Sindh
Geographical Keywords: Karachi
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The MQM engaged in extortion from 1990 to 1996 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996). They extorted businessmen, shopkeepers, traders, and ordinary citizens, often at gunpoint, in the city of Karachi. Funding amounts are unknown.

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Peru

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Peru:
Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA): 1990-1993
Sendero Luminoso: 1990-2010

Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA)

Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA)
(Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement)
Rebel Group: **MRTA**
Activity: Smuggling
Resource: Coca
Years: 1990-1993
Location: San Martin
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: $11,700,000/year
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: MRTA engaged in coca trafficking (Marcy, 2010). They earned over $5 million each year from smuggling coca from 1990 through 1993. They earned about $11,700,000 per year (Durand Ochoa, 2014).

Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA)
Rebel Group: **MRTA**
Activity: Kidnapping
Years: 1990-1993
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: MRTA engaged in kidnapping as a financing strategy from 1990 through 1993 (Baer, 2003; Marcy, 2010;Wright, 2009). The amount of funding is unknown.

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)

Rebel Group: **Sendero Luminoso**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Coca
Years: 1990-2010

Geographical Keywords: Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro River Valleys (VRAEM)
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: $30 million+
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: Sendero Luminoso engaged in the extortion of coca production from 1990 through 2010 in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro River Valleys (VRAEM) regions of Peru (US Drug Enforcement Administration 2014; Stern, 1998). They earned over the $5 million threshold, earning over $30 million annually (Fitz-Simons, 1993; Stern, 1998; Felbab-Brown 2005). Beginning in 1999, Sendero Luminoso became more involved in the coca industry and became stronger during the period between 1999 through 2007 (Burch 2013).

Rebel Group: **Sendero Luminoso**
Activity: Smuggling
Resource: Coca
Years: 1990-2010
Geographical Keywords: Upper Huallaga Valley
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: Sendero Luminoso engaged in coca smuggling from 1999 through 2010 (Burch, 2012; Fitz-Simons, 1993; Stern, 1998; US Drug Enforcement Administration, 2014).

Rebel Group: **Sendero Luminoso**
Activity: Extortion
Keyword: Airfields, Currency
Years: 1990-1999
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: up to $100 million
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: Sendero Luminoso engaged in extortion of airfields from 1990 through 1999. They earned over the $5 million threshold each year, earning up to $100 million (Durand Ochoa, 2014; Felbab-Brown 2005; Steinitz 2002; Stern 1998).

Rebel Group: **Sendero Luminoso**
Activity: Extortion
Keyword: Currency
Years: 1990-2005

Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes: Sendero Luminoso engaged in extortion of currency from 1990 through 2005 (Felbab-Brown, 2005). The amount of funding is unknown.

Rebel Group: **Sendero Luminoso**
Activity: Kidnapping
Keyword: 30 oil workers
Years: 1993
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes: In 1993 Sendero Luminoso kidnapped 30 oil workers and demanded money, food, and other resources from the company (Terrorism Watch and Warning, 2014). However, other sources note that kidnapping is not a typical strategy for Sendero Luminoso (Fox, 2012).

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Philippines

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in the Philippines:
Communist Party of Philippines (CPP): 1990-2015
Military Faction (forces of Honasan, Abenina & Zumel): 1990
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF): 1990-2012; 2015
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF): 1990-1994; 1997-1999; 2007-2009
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG): 1993-2015
Moro National Liberation Front-NM (MNLF-NM): 2001-2002; 2007; 2013
BIFM (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement): 2012-2015

Sources indicate that the Communist Party of Philippines used extortion as a principal funding mechanism from 2003 to 2012. There are multiple categories of extortion, some with limited information as to the timing. Therefore, when we coded an activity as extortion, we applied it from 2003 to 2012, according to the information regarding general extortion.

Several sources mentions that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) engaged in drug smuggling (Cumming-Bruce 1996; Mapping Militant Organization 2015). However, we were unable to substantiate this. Thus we did not code MILF as engaging in drug smuggling.

Between 1981 and 2000, the MILF encouraged all of its members to become self-reliant. This program was created after watching other movements fail due to economic constraints, particularly the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). On a micro level, the MILF practiced farming, opened small businesses, and even required their trainees to bring their own basic necessities to the camp. Cooperatives were also established and they would give farmers subsidies and pay for monthly expenses that were needed to farm. When the Philippine's President Estrada announced an "all-out-war" against the MILF, some of the self-reliance policies were stopped and the MILF engaged in other strategies (Taya 2009).

Communist Party of Philippines (CPP)/New People's Army Army (NPA)

Country: Philippines
Rebel Group: **(Communist Party of Philippines) (CPP)/New People's Army Army (NPA)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2003-2015
Type or Resource: agriculture
Keywords: banana vendors
Location: Davao
Geographical Keywords: Compostela, New Bataan
Funds: -99: Unknown

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source (2003-2012)
6 (2013-2014)
1 (2015)

Notes:
The CPP engaged in extortion of banana vendors in New Bataan, located in the Compostela Valley from 2003 to 2015. The source states that they charged vendors a ten cents tax per kilogram on bananas (International Crisis Group 2011; The Manila Times 2016; Philippines Daily Inquirer 2015). Total funding that they earned from this is unknown. There is high uncertainty regarding the timing for most years.

Country: Philippines
Rebel Group: **Communist Party of Philippines (CPP)/New People's Army Army (NPA)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2003-2015
Type or Resource: Mineral-unknown
Keywords:
Location: Caraga, Davao
Geographical Keywords: Compostela Valley
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: $5.4 million (2003-2012)
-99 (2013-2015)
Certainty: 5 (2003-2012; 2015)
1 (2013-2014)

Notes:
The Communist Party of Philippines (CPP) earned significant funding from the extortion of the mining industry, primarily in Caraga the Compostela Valley (International Crisis Group 2011; United Stated Department of State 2014; United States Department of State 2015). They earned at least $5.4 million from this activity for the years 2003 to 2012 (International Crisis Group 2011).

Country: Philippines
Rebel Group: **Communist Party of Philippines (CPP)/New People's Army Army (NPA)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2003-2015
Type or Resource: Timber
Keywords:

Location: Caraga
Geographical Keywords: Eastern Luzon
Funds: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources (2003-2011)
1 (2012-2015)

Notes:
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaged in extortion of timber from 2003 to 2015, targeting both logging companies and illegal miners. (International Crisis Group 2011; Philippine Daily Inquirer 2010; U.S. Department of State 2013; U.S. Department of State 2014; U.S. Department of State 2015; U.S. Department of State 2016). The Philippine government accused the CPP of actually conducting the illegal logging, which the CPP denied (Disaster Diplomacy 2015). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Philippines
Rebel Group: **Communist Party of Philippines (CPP)/New People's Army Army (NPA)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2003-2015
Keywords: Revolutionary taxes
Location: Bicol, Calabarzon, Caraga, Cagayan Valley, Central Luzon, Davao, Isabela, Metro Manila, Northern Mindanao, Soccsksargen, Western Visayas, Zamboanga Peninsula
Geographical Keywords: Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Barangay, Province of Bukidnon, Province of Camarines Norte, Province of Camarines Sur, Province of Catanduanes, Compostela Valley, Province of Davao Oriental, Manila, Luzon, Masbate, Manila, Mindanao, Province of Negros Occidental, Province of North Cotabato, Province of Pampanga, Province of Surigao del Sur, Visayas, Province of Zamboanga del Sur
Funds: 2 (2009)
1 (remaining years)
Amounts: $5.52 million (2009)
$2.15 million (2010)
-99 (remaining years)
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The CPP engaged in extortion from 2003 through 2015. This was a principal funding strategy. They frequently demanded that businesses and local government officials pay a revolutionary tax (Amnesty International 2005; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2005; GMA News 2010; Philippine Daily Inquirer 2010; START: New People's Army 2015; US Department of State 2013; US Department of State 2014; US Department of State 2015; US Department of State

2016). They earned over $5 million from this in 2010 but lower amounts in earlier years. For this reason, we have coded the funding variable at 1 rather than 2 for the remaining year (International Crisis Group 2011). Specific funding amounts are unknown, with the exception of certain years. The military estimates that the CPP earned $5.52 million in 2009 (International Crisis Group 2011).

Country: Philippines
Rebel Group: **Communist Party of Philippines (CPP)/New People's Army (NPA)**
Natural Resource: cannabis
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2010
Keywords:
Location: Luzon, Mindanao
Geographical Keywords: Cordilleras Autonomous Region
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaged in extortion of cannabis from 1990 to 2010 (U.S. Department of State 2010; Mogato 2008; Felbab-Brown 2009; Kan 2009). They controlled marijuana plantations where they provided protection for the workers and then collected a "revolutionary tax" on the sale of the marijuana (Kan 2009). Our sources state that this activity stretches all the way back to the 1980s (Mogato 2008; Felbab-Brown 2009). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **CPP**
Strategy: Kidnapping

The US Department of State mentions that the CPP engages in kidnapping for ransom (US Department of State 2013), but we found no indication that this was a significant source of funding. It appears that the CPP used kidnapping primarily as a consequence if people did not pay extortion money. Therefore, we decided not to code it as a funding strategy.

Rebel Group: **CPP**
Strategy: Theft

Several sources indicate that the CPP engaged in theft sporadically from 2008 to 2015 (GMA, 2015). They targeted banana crops, communication equipment and firearms (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2010; START: New People's Army 2015). However, it is unclear if they were earning significant funding from this activity. We therefore chose not to include theft.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Country: Philippines
Rebel Group: **Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)**
Strategy: Kidnapping-International
Years: 2000-2015
Keywords: Australian, German, and Malaysian hostage, Canadian
Geographical Keywords: Sulu archipelago, Mindanao, Basilan, Jolo, Tawi Tawi
Funds: 2000: 2: Over $5 million
All other years: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty:
2000-2004; 2010-2011: 1 = Multiple credible sources
All other years: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes: The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) used international kidnapping from 2000 through 2015 as a funding strategy (Abuzu 2005; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board 2006). They earned over $5 million in 2000 (Abuza 2005; Elegant 2004; Mayola 2014; US Department of State 2013). In other years they also earn substantial funding from this strategy, though it is unclear if they earned over five million (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board 2006; Freedom House 2012; Mullen 2013; US Department of State 2012; US Department of State 2014). Some sources indicate that beginning in 2003, ASG engaged in kidnapping less and turned towards more terrorist tactics (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board 2006). In April 2014, ASG kidnapped a German couple and generated 5.6 million dollars from the German government (Abuza, 2016).

Sources indicate that ASG also engaged in kidnapping of local citizens (Mayola 2014). However, we did not code this activity because it is unclear if they used this as a sustained funding mechanism. Some of these kidnappings may have been a consequences of failed extortion attempts recorded below.

Country: Philippines
Rebel Group: **Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1993-2015
Keywords:
Location: Zamboanga Peninsula
Geographical Keywords: Basilan, Sulu, Zamboanga City
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 (1993-1999), 1 (2000-2015)

Notes:
The ASG engaged in extortion of businesses and government workers from 1993 and continued through at least 2007, and likely continued after that; thus we coded extortion until 2015. They earned substantial funding from this, though under five million dollars (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Freedom House 2002; Mayola 2014; US Department of State 2014; US Department of State 2016; US Department of State 2015; U.S. Department of State 2014).

Country: Philippines
Rebel Group: **Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)**
Natural Resource: cannabis
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2000-2010
Keywords:
Location: Basilan, Sulu
Geographical Keywords: Jolo
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Abu Sayyaf Group engaged in extortion of cannabis from 2000 to 2010 (Banlaoi 2010; Cruz De Castro 2009; Mogato 2008; Felbab-Brown 2009; Kan 2009). They operated marijuana plantations where they provided protection to the workers and controlled the production process. Sources indicate that they began this activity in 2000 (Banlaoi 2010; Felbab-Brown 2009). Funding amounts are unknown.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Rebel Group: **Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)**
Strategy: Kidnapping-International
Years: 1997-2002; 2011-2012
Keywords: Italian priest
Location: Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Sur
Geographical Keywords: Magsaysay, Marawi, Margosatubig
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) used kidnapping as a financing strategy from 1997 to 2002. (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; GTD N.D.; Manila Times 2009; Mapping Militant Organizations N.D.; Shanty and Picquet 2000; US State Department 1997). Sources

indicate that this continued in later years, from 2011 through 2012, including six reported kidnappings in Central Mindanao (Romero 2011; US Department of State 2013). It is unclear how much income they earned from this activity, but the available evidence does suggests it was typically less than $5 million per year.

Rebel Group: Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Strategy: Extortion
Resource: Cannabis
Years: 1990-2009
Keywords:
Location: Bukidnon, Lanao Del Sur, Lanao del Norte
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99 : unknown
Certainty: 6

Notes:
Though MILF denied engaging in illegal financing activities, they reportedly profitted from the extortion of cannabis (BBC World Wide Monitoring 2008; Wilson 2009; Felbab-Brown 2009). We coded this activity for the years 1990 to 2009 due to a source that claims the MILF began this activity in the 1980s (Felbab-Brown 2009). Since we are not sure about the specific timing of this activity we coded the certainty variable as a 6. The amount that they profit from this practice is unknown.

Rebel Group: **Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1998-2010
Keywords: Protection tax
Location: Northern Mindanao, Soccskargen, Zamboanga Peninsula
Geographical Keywords: Linamon, Matungao, Mindanao, Province of Lanao del Norte; Province of Zamboanga del Norte
Funds:1 < $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The MILF used extortion as a financing strategy from 1998 through 2010. This included pledges from private corporations and public officials (Australia: Federal Magistrates Court, 2008; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2007, 2010; Cumming-Bruce 1996; Holden 2007; Mapping Militant Organizations N.D.; Podder 2012; Scarpello 2010; Tuminez 2007).

Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Rebel Group: **Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)**
Strategy: Kidnapping-International
Years: 1992-1994; 1997-1999; 2007-2009
Keywords: German businessman, Irish and Belgian priests
Location: Zamboanga del Sur
Geographical Keywords: Margosatubig
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) engaged in kidnapping as a financing strategy from 1992 to 1994 (Ghosh 1994; Murdoch 1992) and from 1997 through 1999 (GTD N.D.;; US Department of State 1998). More recent reports indicate that the MILF continued this in later years (Holden 2007; Philippine Daily Inquirer 2009; US Department of State 2013).

Rebel Group: **Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1994; 2009
Keywords: businessmen
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Balabac, Province of Palawan
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) engaged in extortion as a financing strategy from 1994 through 1996 (Cumming-Bruce 1996; Ghosh 1994) and in 2009 (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2009; Podder 2012). This included extorting businessmen (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2009).

BIFM (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement)

Rebel Group: **BIFM (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement)**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2012-2015
Keywords: required charity contribution
Geographical Keywords:

Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources (2012-2014)
6 (2015)

Notes:
The Bangsamor Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) engaged in extortion to fund its activities (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2014; Philippines News Agency 2014; Stanford Mapping Militant Organizations 2015). The BIFM claimed that the money it received from businessmen, politicians, and community leaders were donations while the Philippine army claimed it was extortion (Stanford Mapping Militant Organizations 2015). Nevertheless, their "charity contribution" from the community was mandatory, not optional (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2014). Funding amounts are unknown. A Philippine news article also mentioned that the BIFM might engage in kidnapping as a funding strategy (Philippines News Agency 2014). Since this was only a one word mention of kidnapping in one source we decided not to code this though.

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Republic of the Congo

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups:
Cobras: 1997
Ninjas: 1993-1999
Cocoyes: 1997-1999
Ntsiloulous: 1998-2002

Cobras

Country: Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Cobras
Natural Resource: oil and gas
Strategy: Booty Futures
From: 1997
Location: Commune de Brazzaville
Geographical Keywords: Brazzaville
Funds: 2 - More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $150 million
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Cobras engaged in booty futures of oil in 1997 (Ross 2004). Denis Sassou-Nguesso, former president and leader of the Cobras, allegedly received $150 million from Elf-Aquitaine (a French oil company) to help him seize power from the incumbent president in exchange for future access to Congolese oil (Ross 2004). Experts on Congo whom we consulted to review our data are not convinced by the amount quoted by Ross (2004) nor that there was an explicit promise of future oil access, but the perception of French support for the Cobras was widespread and the Elf chairman visited Sassou the day after his subsequent inauguration (Clark 2002).

Country: Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Cobras
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1997
Keywords: roadblocks
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Cobras engaged in extortion in 1997 (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999). They used roadblocks to extort money out of the local population, usually charging about 500 CFA francs for anyone holding the wrong identification document. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Cocoyes

Country: Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Cocoyes
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1997
Keywords: roadblocks
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Cocoyes engaged in extortion in 1997 (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999). They used roadblocks to extort money out of the local population, usually charging about 500 CFA francs for anyone holding the wrong identification document. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Ninjas

Country: Republic of the Congo
Rebel Group: Ninjas
Natural Resource: cannabis
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1997 **To:** 1999
Location: Pool
Geographical Keywords: Mindouli
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple sources)

Notes: The Ninjas engaged in extortion of cannabis from 1997 to 1999 in Mindouli of the Pool region (1998/99 Geopolitical Drugs Dispatch Report, Shungu 1998). The Ninjas fled to Mindouli and began growing cannabis on a large scale in 1997 after Sassou won power. They then used the cannabis to fund their fight with the government's military forces through 1999. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Republic of the Congo

Rebel Group: Ninjas
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1993 **To:** 1999
Keywords: roadblocks, river crossings
Location: Commune de Brazzaville, Pool
Geographical Keywords: Brazzaville
Funds: 1 - Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Ninjas engaged in extortion from 1993 to 1999 (Englebert 2004). They collected money at Brazzaville's main ports and at roadblocks. They made less than $5 million per year using this strategy. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

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Russia

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Russia:
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria: 1994-2007
Forces of Caucasus Emirate: 2007-2015
Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk: 1999
Parliamentary Forces: 1993
APF: 1990
Islamic State: 2015

Note that in the UCDP Database, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria becomes the Forces of the Caucasus Emirate after 2006. In what follows, we term the group Caucasus Emirates for activities that began after 2006.

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

Rebel Group: **Chechen Republic of Ichkeria**
Activity: Extortion
Resource: Oil
Years: 1996-2000
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria controlled oil extracting and refining from 1996 through 2000 and earned more than the $5 million threshold. (Borisova, 2000; Galeotti, 2007; Kaldor, Kan and Said, 2007; Musayev, 1999).

Rebel Group: **Chechen Republic of Ichkeria**
Activity: Smuggling
Years: 1996-2007
Resource: Opium
Geographical Keywords: Afghanistan, Iran, Georgia, Russia, and Pankisi Gorge
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amount: -99 Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: They engaged in smuggling heroin from 1996-2007 in Afghanistan, Iran, Georgia, and

Russia. Pankisi Gorge was the center of much of their narcotics activity (Curtis, 2002; Galeotti, 2007; Wittig, 2009).

Rebel Group: **Chechen Republic of Ichkeria**
Activity: Kidnapping
Years: 1996-2007
Geographical Keywords: Chechnya, Dagestan, Moscow, Russia
Funds: 1996-2000: 2: Over $5 million
2001-2007: -99: Unknown
Amounts: $3000-$20000 per victim
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: Many sources indicate that they received funding from ransoms collected through kidnapping from 1996-2007 (Cohen, 2014; Galeotti, 2007; Shermatova and Nikitinsky, 2000). Victims were from Chechnya, Dagestan, Moscow, other Russian cities, and Georgia. Ransoms ranged from $3,000 to $20,000, although other cases entailed much higher amounts (Cohen, 2014; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). After 2000, there is less evidence available as to the amount of funding they received. It is likely that kidnapping became a less important financing strategy because radical Islamic groups developed strong ties with the Chechen rebels and provided funding (Cronin, 2007; Hahn, 2011; Mapping Militant Organizations-Stanford University, 2014). We thus coded -99 beginning in 2001.

Rebel Group: **Chechen Republic of Ichkeria**
Activity: Humanitarian aid
Years: 2001
Geographical Keywords: Afghanistan, Iran, Georgia, Russia, and Pankisi Gorge
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: They stole humanitarian aid in 2001 in Chechnya, especially in Afghanistan, Iran, Georgia, Russia, and Pankisi Gorge (Cohen, 2014; UN Office on Drugs and Crime).

Rebel Group: **Chechen Republic of Ichkeria**
Activity: Other
Keyword: Counterfeiting
Years: 1994-2002
Geographical Keywords: Chechnya, Georgia, Ingushetia
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown

Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: They were engaged in counterfeiting from 1994 through 2002 in Chechnya (Kornya, 2000; Library of Congress, 2003; Wittig, 2009).

Wahhabi Movement of Buinaksk District

Although this group recruited fighters and received funds from abroad, it was closely connected to the rebel movement in Chechnya. We have thus coded this group as engaging in the same activities as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria only for the year 1999.

Caucasus Emirate

Rebel Group: **Forces of the Caucasus Emirate**
Activity: Kidnapping
Years: 2007-2011
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: After 2007, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria became the Forces of the Caucasus Emirate (Mapping Militant Organizations-Stanford University, 2014; UCDP Conflict Database: Russia). From 2007-2011, they continued to use kidnapping as a funding strategy (U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-Russia, 2007-2011).

Rebel Group: **Forces of Caucasus Emirate**
Activity: Extortion
Keywords: Religious tax, businessmen, bureaucrats
Location: North Caucasian
Geographic Keywords: Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Chechnya
Years: 2007-2015
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99 unknown
Certainty: 1 (2010-2015)
6 (2007-2009)

Notes: The Forces of Caucasus Emirate engaged in extortion from 2007 to 2015 in the North Caucasian federal district of Russia (U.S. Department of State, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2012; Ter, 2015; Ratelle, 2013; IHS Markit, 2014). They often extorted money from local

businessmen and bureaucrats under the guise of a religious tax. A Russian government official claimed that the Foces of Caucasus Emirate extorted US$3.5 million in Dagestan alone in 2010 (U.S. Department of State, 2013; HIS Markit, 2014). Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Azerbaijani Popular Front**

Notes:The Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) was a short-term clash and there was no evidence that the group engaged in any of the strategies we are interested in (UCDP Conflict Database: Russia).

Rebel Group: **Parliamentary Forces**

Notes: This was a short-lived coup attempt by members of parliament and other government officials. There is no evidence that the coup members relied on natural resources or crime to directly fund the coup attempt (UCDP Conflict Database: Russia).

Rebel Group: **Republic of Armenia**

Notes: The Republic of Armenia is the Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR) before the fall of the Soviet Union. They became NKR in 1992 (UCDP Conflict Database: Russia).

Islamic State

The Forces of the Caucasus Emirate appear in the UCDP dataset through 2015. The Islamic State (IS) also appears in 2015. In November 2014, many commanders and militants of the Forces of the Caucasus Emirate pledged allegiance to IS, and the official spokesman of IS accepted this pledge in 2015. Many of the groups in the North Caucasus united under an umbrella group: the Islamic State's Caucasus Province (Borshchevskaya, 2016; The Mackenzie Institute, 2015). This faction was also known as Wil â yat Qawqâz (Pellegrino, 2015). There is evidence the group engaged in kidnapping in Russia (Joscelyn, 2016), but it is unclear if the motive was financial or political. Further searches did not find evidence of kidnapping for ransom in Russia. It is likely the faction relied on funding generated from the associated group, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, and IS central in Iraq and Syria.

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Rwanda

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Rwanda:
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF): 1990-1994
People in Arms for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR/AliR): 1996-2000
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR): 2001-2012

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: charcoal
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Virunga National Park, Rutshuru
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $2 million
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2005-2012)
6 (2001-2004)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of charcoal from 2002 to 2012 (International Crisis Group 2009; Jenkins 2008; Lovgren 2011; UN Security Council Report 2008; UN Security Council Report 2009; Boas 2014; Tasamba 2012). The FDLR provided protection for charcoal illegally produced by cutting down forests in Virunga National Park. They then charged $4 to $6 per sack leaving the park, which was transported and sold in places such as Goma. They likely earn around $2 million from this activity (UN Security Council Report 2008). When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded charcoal extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Extortion

From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Walikale district, Goma, Lubero
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (2002-2007)
1 (multiple credible sources) (2008-2009)
5 (uncertain about timing, one source) (2010-2012)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of timber from 2002 to 2012 (International Crisis Group 2009; Boas 2014; UN Security Council Report 2008a; UN Security Council Report 2008b; UN Security Council Report 2009). The FDLR exploited several forests for logging. The logs were sawn into planks and shipped across the border to places such as Uganda (Boas 2014). Funding amounts are unknown. When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded timber extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: cannabis
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC), South Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Lubero, Ikobo, Walikale, Lushamabo, Bushalingwa, Bunyatenge, Buleusa, Miriki, Uvira
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2007-2012)
6 (2001-2006)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of cannabis from 2002 to 2012 (International Crisis Group 2009; Lovgren 2011; Boas 2014; UN Security Council Report 2008a; UN Security Council Report 2008b; UN Security Council Report 2009, UNODC 2011; Romkema 2007). The FDLR harvested cannabis throughout North Kivu and parts of South Kivu, which was sold to local markets where they were bought by the

wives of Congolese army officers or by the officers themselves. The cannabis was also often shipped and sold in Uganda and Rwanda (Boas 2014; UN Security Council Report 2008). Funding amounts are unknown. When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded cannabis extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC), South Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (2002-2011)
5 (uncertain about timing, one source) (2012)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of diamonds from 2002 to 2012 (Rodriguez 2011; McGreal 2008; Pretoria News 2015; Gilpin 2009; Romkema 2007). The FDLR levied taxes on mine workers and mine owners of diamond mines in the Kivu region (McGreal 2008). Funding amounts are unknown. When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded diamond extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: gems (specific gems unknown)
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: South Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Fizi, Minembwe
Funds: -99: Unknown

Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (2002-2011)
5 (uncertain about timing, one source) (2012)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of gems from 2002 to 2012 in South Kivu (Rodriguez 2011; Global Witness 2009; Rwagatare 2014; Romkema 2007). In southern South Kivu (of the Democratic Republic of the Congo), in the territory of Fizi, the FDLR controls some mines of precious stones (Global Witness 2009).. Funding amounts are unknown. When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded gems extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: coltan
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2002 **To:** 2011
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC), South Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Fizi, Minembwe, Shabunda, Kalehe, Walikale, Burhinyi
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2005-2011)
6 (2001-2004)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of coltan from 2002 to 2011 (Rodriguez 2011; Africa Research Bulletin 2008; Global Witness 2009; UN Security Council Report 2008a; UN Security Council Report 2008b; Rice 2008; DefenceWeb 2010; US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010; US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007; International Crisis Group 2007; US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011; Africa Research Bulletin 2005). The FDLR one controlled the majority of the principle artisanal mining sites in South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as a large number of sites in North Kivu (UN Security Council Report 2008b). At one point, in Shabunda, they were collecting 2 kg of coltan (along with cassiterite) a week from each mining site, with a total of at least 250 mining sites in the area (Global Witness 2009). By 2011, the FDLR's revenues from coltan had decreased (US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011) Funding amounts are unknown. When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved

in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded coltan extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: coltan
Strategy: Theft
From: 2001 **To:** 2003
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Kibabi
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in theft of coltan from 2001 to 2003 (International Crisis Group 2003). FDLR troops hidden in Katoyi forest looted coltan from the Kibabi area. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: wolframite
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: South Kivu (DRC), North Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Lutika, Uvira
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2007-2012)
6 (2001-2006)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of wolframite from 2002 to 2012 (Rodriguez 2011; Africa Research Bulletin 2008; Global Witness 2009; UN Security Council Report 2008a; UN Security Council Report 208b; Rice 2008; DefenceWeb 2010; US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007; UN Security Council Report 2012). The FDLR controlled a number of wolframite mine in North and South Kivu of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They often took a portion of the income of the miners and imposed illegal taxes on the production of the wolframite (UN Security Council Report

2012). Fund amounts are unknown. When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded wolframite extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: gold
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC), South Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Walikale, Shabunda, Mwenga, Walungu, Uvira, Fizi, Rusamambo, Minembwe, Lutika, Lulingu, Kalehe
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2006-2012)
6 (2001-2005)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of gold from 2002 to 2012 (Rodriguez 2011; Africa Research Bulletin 2008; Omar 2008; Global Witness 2009; UN Security Council Report 2007; UN Security Council Report 2008; UN Security Council Report 2012; US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007; McGreal 2008; Pretoria News 2015; Rice 2008; DefenceWeb 2010; Tasamba 2012; International Crisis Group 2007). The FDLR controlled many gold mines throughout North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in the territories of Shabunda, Mwenga, Walungu, Uvira and Fizi. In Shabunda, the FDLR at one point was able to collect, at minimum, a gramme of gold per week from each mineshaft (with each mining site having multiple mineshafts) (Global Witness 2009). Etablissement Namukaya, a gold comptoir in South Kivu, was involved in pre-financing gold purchases from the FDLR (UN Security Council Report 2008). Funding amounts are unknown. When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded gold extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: cassiterite

Strategy: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC), South Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Lwindi, Shabunda, Mwenga, Walungu, Uvira, Fizi, Lemera, Lutika, Walikale, Kalehe
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2005-2012)
6 (2001-2004)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of cassiterite from 2002 to 2012 (Rodriguez 2011; Africa Research Bulletin 2008; Global Witness 2009; UN Security Council Report 2007; UN Security Council Report 2008a; UN Security Council Report 2008b; US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007; US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2009; Rice 2008; DefenceWeb 2010; Tasamba 2012; Pretoria News 2012; International Crisis Group 2007; US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011; Global Witness 2005). The FDLR controlled cassiterite mines throughout North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in the areas of Shabunda, Mwenga, Walungu, Uvira and Fizi (Global Witness 2009). Government officials estimated that they controlled about 60% of the cassiterite production in Walikale either directly or indirectly. At one point, in Shabunda, they were collecting 2 kg of cassiterite (along with coltan) a week from each mining site, with a total of at least 250 mining sites in the area (Global Witness 2009). By 2011, the FDLR's revenues from cassiterite had decreased, even though they were still engaging in this activity (US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011). Funding amounts are unknown. When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded cassiterite extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: agriculture
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords: palm oil, potatoes, manioc, beans, vegetables
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown

Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of agricultural products (palm oil) from 2007 to 2011 (UN Security Council Report 2011; Bafilemba 2014; Omar 2008; Romkema 2007). They sold the palm oil to the local population and Rwandan refugees (Omar 2008). With the decrease in revenue earned from mining, the FDLR has had to rely more on the taxation and sale of agricultural products such as palm oil (UN Security Council 2011). They also grew potatoes, manioc, beans, and vegetables in some areas and sold them for a reduced price (Romkema 2007). Funding amounts are unknown. When Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, the FDLR lost much of its external support. Prior to this event, the FDLR was not actively involved in resource exploitation, but afterwards they were forced to adapt to their new situation. There is some evidence to suspect that the FDLR quickly began profiting from resources (Romkema 2007). Therefore, we coded agriculture extortion beginning in 2002 under a lower certainty.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2007 **To:** 2012
Keywords: ivory, elephants, okapis, fish, cattle
Location: North Kivu (DRC), South Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unkown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2007-2008)
6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (2009-2012)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion of animals from 2008 to 2012 (Krause 2015; Gooch 2011; Bafilemba 2014; allAfrica 2014; France 24 2012; The Gorilla Organization 2008; Romekema 2007; Laudati 2013). The FDLR poached elephants in order to sell their tusks as ivory. In 2012, a kilo of ivory was worth about 850 euros, with each tusk weighing about 30 to 40 kilos (France 24 2012). Most of this activity happened in Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They also poached okapis (Bafilemba 2014) and engaged in illegal fishing (allAfrica 2014). In South Kivu, the FDLR established control over the cattle trade (Romkema 2007). They instituted a cow tax which required travellers to pay a higher tax on cows passing through FDLR controlled barriers (Laudati 2013). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2001 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC), South Kivu (DRC), Eastern Province (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Mwenga, Bukavu, Kigulube, Mitala, Nyalubemba, Lubimbe, Kishatu, Chulwe, Kisuku, Kiliba, Baraka, Aru, Mahagi, Djugu, Shabunda
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)
2 (2011-2012)

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in extortion from 2001 to 2012 (Global Witness 2009, Africa Research Bulletin 2005, Spittaels 2008, Rafti 2006, Kemp 2009, Mukombozi 2010, Laudati 2013; Romkema 2007; International Crisis Group 2005). They set up checkpoints and roadblocks in various parts of the Kivu region in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and and on the Congo-Rwanda border. The controlled river crossings, forcing people to pay a tax to cross a bridge or traverse a certain river (Romkema 2007). They also imposed a war tax on the local populace in eastern Congo (Africa Research Bulletin 2005). The FDLR made less than $5 million per year using this strategy. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Rwanda
Rebel Group: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
From: 2004 **To:** 2011
Keywords: Congolese civilians
Location: South Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Walungu
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6

Notes: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) engaged in kidnapping from 2004 to 2005 (IRIN 2005; DefenseWeb 2010; Romkema 2007). For each combatant they kidnapped, they demanded up to $200. A battalion commander in South Kivu regularly kidnapped civilians and forced their families to pay between $50 and $500 for their release (Romkema 2007). In 2004, we discovered the FDLR held 3,000 Rwandan combatants hostage (Africa Research Bulletin 2004) but we could not verify that they demanded any ransom money

and therefore we did not code this information. In 2010, communities in South Kivu reported that the FDLR ransomed women that they abducted and raped (DefenseWeb 2010). Also, in February of 2011, the FDLR kidnapped a South African employee of a Soco subcontractor after attacking a convoy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The hostage was allegedly released after a payment of $2,000 (International Crisis Group 2012). We felt this did not make enough of an impact, finance wise, to code as its own separate category (kidnapping international). The FDLR made less than $5 million per year using this strategy. Specific amounts are unknown.

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Senegal

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Senegal:
Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance: 1990, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-1998, 2000-2001, 2003, 2011 (Intervening Years-1991, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004-2010)

Natural Resources

Rebel Group: Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1990-2011
Resource: Animal
Keywords: Bushmeat, Cattle
Location: Casamance Region
Geographical Keywords: Ziguinchor, Kolda, Sédhiou
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1990-2003: 1=Multiple Credible Sources
2004-2011: 4=uncertainty about group involvement

Notes:
The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance engaged in animal theft from 2004 through 2011. This included stealing livestock such as cattle, and hunting game such as antelope and monkey (Barry 2011; Evans 2003; Sullivan, 1998; Wally 2010). Sources do not explicitly link this to the Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance by name. However, given the group's presence in the region, it seems likely that these activities are attributable to the Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance. Thus we used 4 as the certainty variable. They earned an unknown amount of funding.

Rebel Group: **Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2003
Resource: Agriculture
Keywords: Cashews, Mangoes, Citrus Fruits, Palm wine
Location: Casamance Region
Geographical Keywords: Ziguinchor, Kolda, Sédhiou
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts:-99=Unknown
Certainty: 2 = One source

Notes:
The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance engaged in extortion of agricultural resources from 1990 through 2003. This included cashews, mangoes, and citrus fruits. The group harvested these resources or processed them locally (Evans 2003). The amount of funding earned is unknown.

Strategy: Theft
Years: 1990-2003
Resource: Agriculture
Keywords: Palm Wine
Location: Casamance Region
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts:-99=Unknown
Certainty: 2=One source

Notes:
The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance engaged in theft of agricultural resources from 1990 through 2003. This included forest products such as palm wine (Evans 2003). The amount of funding earned is unknown.

Rebel Group: **Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2011
Resource: Charcoal
Keywords:
Location: Casamance Region
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts:-99=Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance engaged in extortion of charcoal from 1990 through 2011 (Ceesay 2010; Evans 2003; Sora 2013). The amount of funding they earned is unknown. In addition, some sources do not make it clear that they were earning money from this, or receiving aid instead (Evans 2003).

Rebel Group: **Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance**
Strategy: Extortion

Years: 1990-2005
Resource: Timber
Keywords:
Location: Casamance Region
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts:-99=Unknown
Certainty: 1990 - 2005: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance engaged in extortion of timber from 1990 through 2005 (De Jong & Gasser 2005; Evans 2003). The amount of funding they earned is unknown. In addition, some sources do not make it clear that they were earning money from this, or receiving aid instead (Evans 2003). Later sources suggest that the illegal timber trade declined as forest resources were depleted (Hunt 2014). Declining availability of the resource further supports coding the strategy only through 2005.

Rebel Group: **Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2005
Resource: Cannabis
Keywords:
Location: Casamance Region
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts:-99=Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance engaged in extortion of cannabis from 1990 through 2005. This included direct involvement in production or taxing other producers (De Jong & Gasser 2005; Evans 2003). The amount of funding earned is unknown.

Crime

Rebel Group: **Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance**
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1990-2003
Keywords: armed robbery
Location: Casamance Region

Geographical Keywords: Ziguinchor, Kolda, Sédhiou
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1990 - 2003: 2 = One source

Notes:
The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance engaged in theft from 1990 through 2003. This largely included armed robbery of rural populations (Evans 2003). The amount of funding earned is unknown.

Rebel Group: **Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance**
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-2003
Keywords: road tax
Location: Casamance Region
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2=one source

Notes:
The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance engaged in extortion from 1990 through 2003. This entailed a road tax on public transportation vehicles or trade vehicles (Evans 2003). The amount of funding earned is unknown.

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Sierra Leone

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Senegal:
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC): 1997-1999
Kamajors: 1997-1998
Revolutionary United Front (RUF): 1991-2001
West Side Boys: 2000

Natural Resources

Rebel Group: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)

Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
Year: 1998
Keywords:
Location (First Order Administrative District): Eastern Province
Geographical Keywords: Kono District
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 2=One source

Notes:
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) used extortion of diamonds in 1998. They gained control of diamond fields from the RUF in this year (Utas, and Jörgel, 2008). Although the UN estimated that the RUF earned $25 million to $125 million from this activity with the same resource area (United Nations 2000), we have coded the AFRC as earning unknown funding because they would have had different organizational and other resources at their disposal. There is no evidence as to how much they earned from this.

Rebel Group: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)

Strategy: Extortion general
Years: 1997
Keywords: Checkpoints
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council(AFRC) engaged in general extortion in 1997 (Leboeuf 1993). The AFRC looted at checkpoints in Sierra Leone.

Rebel Group: Revolutionary United Forces (RUF)

Natural Resource: titanium
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1995 & 1997 To: 2001
Keywords:

Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords: Kono District, Tongo Fields, Kenema District, Pujehun, Kailahun, Tongo, Zimmi
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts:
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes: The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaged in extortion of coffee from 1995 & 1997 to 2001 (Francis 1999). The RUF attacked three mining sites in 1995 included a number of leased concessions in the Kono and Kenema diamond districts; the Swiss-owned Sierra Ore and Metal Company (SIEROMCO) bauxite mine at Mokanji; and the US/Australian-owned Sierra Rutile operations at Gbangbatok, both in the southern province. The RUF attack on these strategic resources was a major blow to the government's principal foreign exchange earned.

Rebel Group: Revolutionary United Front
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1991-2000
Resource: Agriculture
Keywords: Cash Crops, Forced Labor
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1991-92: 1=Multiple credible sources
1993-2000: 2=One source

Notes: The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaged in extortion of agriculture from 1991 to 2000. They cultivated crops for food and to sell, and often used forced labor to do so (Hazen 2013; Silberfein 2004). The amount of funding they earned from this is unknown.

Rebel Group: Revolutionary United Front
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1991-2000
Resource: Coffee
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaged in extortion of coffee from 1991 to 2000 (ARB 1997; Hazen 2013). The amount of funding they earned from this is unknown.

Rebel Group: Revolutionary United Front
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1991-2000
Resource: Cocoa
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaged in extortion of cocoa from 1991 to 2000 (ARB 1997; Hazen 2013). The amount of funding they earned from this is unknown.

Rebel Group: Revolutionary United Front
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1991-1992 & 1995 & 1997-2001
Keywords:
Location: Eastern Province, Southern Province
Geographical Keywords: Kono District, Kenema, Pujehun, Kailahun, Tongo, Zimmi
Funds:
1991-1992: 1: Under $5 million
1995: 2: Over $5 million
1997-2000: 2: Over $5 million
2001: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts:
1995: $25 million
1997-2000: $25 Million-$125 Million
2001: $2 million
Certainty:
1991-1992: 2 = One source
1995: 1 = Multiple credible sources
1997-2000: 1 = Multiple credible sources
2001: 2 = One source
Notes:
The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaged in extortion of diamonds from 1991 to 1992, in 1995, and again from 1997 through 2001 (ARB 1993; ARB 1994; Briggs 2003; Dickey 2000; Farah 2002; Gberi 2002; International Business Publications 2012; Rupert 1999; Silberfein 2004; Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton 2000; United Nations 2000; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015). Hazen notes that the RUF did not initially focus on diamonds as a financial strategy. They targeted diamond mining after almost being defeated in 1994. RUF did not maintain consistent control of diamond mines until 1997, but did take control of them for a few months at a time during that period (Hazen 2013). Others corroborate the timing of this strategy (Gberie 2002).

Thus we have coded the timing as intermittent between 1991 through 2001. This occurred in Kono District, Kenema, Pujehun, Kailahun, Tongo, and Zimmi (Silberfein 2004.) The UN estimated that they received over $5 million, earning $25 million to $125 million from this (2000).

Evidence suggests that the RUF also took control of areas with bauxite and rutile mining, where production stopped. They do not appear to have earned any money from these mines, but did prevent the government from profiting from these resources (Gberie 2002; Francis 1999; International Business Publications 2012).

Rebel Group: Revolutionary United Front
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2000
Resource: Opium
Keywords:.
Location: Eastern Province
Geographical Keywords: Kailahun District
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 2=One Source

Notes:
The RUF engaged in the extortion of opium in the year 2000. The RUF controlled the Kailahun District on the border of Liberia, which is an opium-growing region (Smillie, Gbrie, Hazleton, 2000). The amount of funding they earned is unknown.

Rebel Group: West Side Boys
Natural Resource: diamonds (alluvial)
Strategy: Theft
Year: 2000
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 5=One source, uncertain timing

Notes:
The West Side Boys engaged in theft of diamonds in 2000. They traded diamonds for arms, medicine and drugs (Utas and Jörgel, 2008). The amount of funding they earned is unknown.

Crime

Rebel Group: Kamajors

Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1997
Keywords: Checkpoints
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple Credible Sources

Notes:
The Kamajors engaged in general criminal extortion in 1997 (Erbrick 2012; Leboeuf 2008; No Peace Without Justice 2004; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004). This included establishing checkpoints to carry out their extortion (Leboeuf 2008; No Peace Without Justice 2004; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004). The amount of funding they earned from this is unknown.

Rebel Group: West Side Boys
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2000
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99=Unknown
Amounts: -99=Unknown
Certainty: 1=Multiple Credible Sources

Notes:
The West Side Boys engaged in criminal extortion in 2000. This included establishing roadblocks on the primary road going out from the capital and demanding extortion payments, among other criminal activities, such as rape, at these checkpoints (MacAskill 2000; Sengupta 2000). The amount of funding they earned from this is unknown.

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Somalia

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Somalia:
Somali National Movement (SNM): 1990-1991
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM): 1990-1991
United Somali Congress (USC/SSA): 1990-1991
United Somali Congress/ Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA): 1991-1996
Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC): 2001-2002
Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC): 2006-2008
Al-Shabaab: 2008-2015
Harakat Ras Kamboni: 2008
Hizbul-Islam: 2009-2010

Al-Shabaab

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Al-Shabaab
Natural Resource: charcoal
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2009 **To:** 2015
Keywords: exports
Location: Lower Juba, Lower Shabeelle, Middle Juba
Geographical Keywords: Kismaayo, Baraawe, Marka, Buur Gaabo, Eel Ma'an, Qudha, Badade District, Buulo Xaaji, Bu'aale District, Saakow District, Jamaame District, Jilib District, Weelweyn, Xagar, Kulbiyow, Kudhaa, Buulo Xaaji, Cabdala Biroole, Gaduud, Kamasuma, Jamaame, Bu'aale, Saakow, Jilib
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: over $14 million (2009-2010)
$25 million (2011-2012)
Over $25 million (2013-2014)
-99 (2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Shabaab engaged in the extortion of charcoal from 2009 to 2012 (UN Security Council Report 2011; UN Security Council Report 2012; Africa Research Bulletin 2010; Jamestown Foundation 2010; US Country Reports on Terrorism 2012). In 2009, Al-Shabaab took over the port of Kismaayo, along with some secondary ports, and began making over $14 million a year off revenue from charcoal exports (UN Security Council Report 2011). In 2011, despite Al-Shabaab losing a lot of territory and revenue bases, its profit from charcoal port revenues jumped to $25 million (UN Security Council Report 2012). They also made money from a 2.5% tax on

charcoal producers to receive production certificates (UN Security Council Report 2011). Despite losing the port of Kismaayo, Al-Shabaab's profits in 2013 and 2014 continued to soar past their previous levels due to Al-Shabaab's shareholding in the trade and its taxation of production sites. In 2013, charcoal production climbed from about 11 million sacks per year to 24 million sacks per year in Somalia (UN Security Council Report 2013; UN Security Council Report 2014). Strained relations between Al-Shabaab and those controlling the charcoal trade most likely led to a dip in profits in 2015 from previous levels (UN Security Council Report 2015). Funding amounts for 2015 are unknown.

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Al-Shabaab
Natural Resource: charcoal
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2011-2014
Keywords: checkpoints, Buulo Xaaji checkpoint, road tolls
Location: Lower Juba
Geographical Keywords: Badade district
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Shabaab engaged in smuggling of charcoal from 2011 to 2014 (UN Security Council 2011; UN Security Council 2013; UN Security Council 2014; Keatinge 2014). It generates revenue from smuggling by taxing road tolls on charcoal being moved from the production cites to the ports. At the Buulo Xaaji checkpoint near the Kenyan border, Al-Shabaab generates about $675,000 to $1.5 million per month (UN Security Council 2013). Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Al-Shabaab
Natural Resource: Agriculture
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2009 **To:** 2015
Keywords: Sugar
Location: Lower Juba, Lower Shabeelle
Geographical Keywords: Kismaayo, Marka, Baraawe, Bakaara, Suuq Baad
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $400,000 - $800,000 (2009-2011)
-99 (2012-2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Shabaab engaged in extortion of sugar from 2009 to 2015 (UN Security Council Report 2011). In 2009, Al-Shabaab took over the port of Kismaayo, along with some secondary ports, and began making between $400,000 and $800,000 a year from taxing sugar imports. They also levied taxes on maize, sesame, and other pastoral products as well as forcing farmers to pay $10 per cultivable acre of land. (UN Security Council Report 2011). After losing access to the port of Kismaayo in 2012, Al-Shabaab no longer profited from taxing imports, but they did continue to profit from taxing farms, agriculture, and livestock (UN Security Council Report 2015; Keatinge 2014). Funding amounts from 2012 to 2015 are unknown.

Rebel Group: Al-Shabaab
Natural Resource: Agriculture
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2009 **To:** 2015
Keywords: Sugar
Location: Lower Juba
Geographical Keywords: Dhobley-Liboi border crossing, Kismayo, Kenya, Ethiopia
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Shabaab profited from smuggling of sugar from 2009 to 2015 (UN Security Council Report 2011; UN Security Council Report 2015; Keatinge 2014). Once sugar imports were cleared at the port, they were moved by smugglers across the border into Kenya and Ethiopia. The smugglers were required to pay 2.5% of the estimated value of their commerce to local Al-Shabaab authorities, as well as an additional fee if they are stopped at an Al-Shabaab checkpoint. Despite losing access to the port of Kismayo in 2012, Al-Shabaab's revenue from the sugar trade has continued to grow. They taxed sugar smugglers on the roads out of the port and all the way up to the Dhobley-Liboi border crossing (UN Security Council Report 2015). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Al-Shabaab
Natural Resource: drugs (any drugs not otherwise listed here)
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2010
Keywords: qaad
Location: Banaadir
Geographical Keywords: Mogadishu West Airfield

Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $500,000
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Shabaab engaged in the extortion of drugs in 2010 (UN Security Council Report 2011). While Al-Shabaab was against the practice of quad chewing, it allowed quad to be imported into Mogadishu West Airfield under its control where it could be taxed. Al-Shabaab made about $500,000 from these taxes in 2010. The practice stopped in October of 2010. Quaad is not listed specifically in our dataset as a natural resource, so we coded it under "drugs not otherwise listed."

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Al-Shabaab
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2008 **To:** 2015
Keywords: airports, seaports, checkpoints, businesses, goods, services, war contributions, schooling, customs, citizens, stores
Location: Lower Juba, Middle Shabelle
Geographical Keywords: Bakaara, Suuq Baad, Kismayo, Jowhar, Jubba Valley
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year (2008-2011)
-99: Unknown (2012-2015)
Amounts: $55 million - $85 million (2008-2011)
-99 (2012-2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Shabaab engaged in extortion from 2008 to 2015 (UN Security Council Report 2011; US Country Reports on Terrorism 2011; US Country Reports on Terrorism 2012; UN Security Council Report 2013; Keatinge 2014; UN Security Council Report 2015). Al-Shabaab earned money from taxes placed on checkpoints, businesses, airports, seaports, goods, and services. They have also levied a consumer tax and forced people to donate money as war contributions and religious obligations. Taxation of businesses in Bakaara and Suuq Baad brought in about $30 million to $60 million a year for Al-Shabaab. In all Al-Shabaab earned about $70 million to $100 million per year (UN Security Council Report 2011) until 2012, when it experienced a drop in revenue due to the loss of large parts of its territory (US Country Reports on Terrorism 2012). Since this figure initially included port revenues made from charcoal and sugar we subtracted $15 million (the amount Al-Shabaab reportedly made from Charcoal and Sugar) from the $70 million to $100 million in order to arrive at a funding amount of $55 million to $85 million for the years 2008 to 2011. Funding amounts for 2012 to 2015 are unknown. This coding also captures money Al-Shabaab made from goods being illegally smuggled across Somalia and into

bordering states (UN Security Council Report 2011). Since Al-Shabaab taxed the smugglers at the checkpoints they had set up, we felt that it would be too difficult to deaggregate this from the general extortion amount and therefore chose, in this case, not to code smuggling goods as a separate category.

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Al-Shabaab
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International Victims
From: 2009 **To:** 2012
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Mandera, Dabaab
Funds: -99 for 2010 to 2012; 1 for 2009
Amounts: **$**1,361,668 in 2009
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Shabaab engaged in kidnapping international victims from 2009 to 2012 (UN Security Council Report 2010, UN Security Council Report 2012). On July 17, 2009 Al-Shabaab kidnapped three foreign aid workers near the Somalia/Kenyan border. Ransom was paid to the amount of **$**1,361,668 (UN Security Council Report 2010). In 2012 two aid workers were bought by pirates from Al-Shabaab and were later moved to a refugee camp (UN Security Council Report 2012).

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Al-Shabaab
Criminal Activity: Humanitarian Aid
From: 2008 **To:** 2015
Keywords: construction projects, food deliveries, security fees
Location: Lower Juba, Lower Shabeelle, Bay, Banaadir, Bakool, Hiiraan, Gedo
Geographical Keywords: Mogadishu
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Shabaab earned profits from humanitarian aid from 2008 to 2015 (UN Security Council Report 2011; UN Security Council Report 2010; US Country Reports on Terrorism 2011; UN Security Council Report 2013; UN Security Council Report 2014; UN Security Council Report 2015; Keatinge 2014). In 2008, Al-Shabaab began instituting a tax on humanitarian organizations working in areas under their control. Many refused to pay, but some succumbed to Al-Shabaab's demands. At one point they were making up to $90,000 per six-

month period per district per organization (UN Security Council Report 2011). Al-Shabaab also took a cut of the profit from contractors delivering food aid for the United Nations (UN Security Council Report 2010) and benefitted from taxing humanitarian aid shipments (US Country Reports on Terrorism 2011). A $10,000 fee is required for an aid agency to be allowed to deliver aid in an Al-Shabaab held area. Taxes are also placed on workers' salaries, rental of property, and use of transportation. A security fee may also be charged (Keatinge 2014). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Al-Shabaab
Criminal Activity: Piracy
From: 2008 **To:** 2012
Keywords: Mudug
Location: Xarardheere
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2009-2012)
6 (multiple sources, uncertain timing) (2008)

Notes: Al-Shabaab profited from piracy from 2008 to 2012 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2013; Yikona 2013; Africa Research Bulletin 2009; Africa Research Bulletin 2010a; Africa Research Bulletin 2010b; Africa Research Bulletin 2011). Al-Shabaab sometimes forced pirates to pay taxes and protection money (Africa Research Bulletin 2009; Africa Research Bulletin 2011) or to give up part of their ransom money (Africa Research Bulletin 2010a; Africa Research Bulletin 2010b). In Xarardheere, Al-Shabaab made a deal with the pirates for 20% of their ransom payments (Yikona 2013). In a 2010 report, the United Nations declared that they had not found evidence to support allegations of structured cooperation between pirates and Al-Shabaab, and that while linkages might exist, this probably did not make up a significant portion of Al-Shabaab's revenue (UN Security Council Report 2010). Therefore we coded Al-Shabaab as making less than $5 million per year from piracy. Funding amounts are unknown.

Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2006

Keywords:
Location: Middle Shabele, Lower Shabeelle, Banaadir
Geographical Keywords: Jowhar, Laanta Buuro, Mogadishu
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99: unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC) engaged in extortion in 2006 (United Nations Security Council Report 2006; Abbink 2009). The ARS/UIC operated checkpoints on the outskirts of various towns, earning about $1.3 million per year and $3.9 million per year from Jowar and Laanta Buuro respectively. They also instituted taxes on commodities, labor, and transportation at a seaport they controlled, as well as placing taxes on flying at the Mogadishu airport (and earning $550,500 per month). They lost this funding source when they were defeated by the Transitional Federal Government and driven out of Somalia at the end of 2006, forcing what was left of the group to look to external actors for support (UN Security Council Report 2007). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: ARS
Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2006 **To:** Choose an item.
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC) engaged in smuggling of timber (United Nations Security Council Report 2006). The ARS taxed the import and export of timber in areas it controlled.

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: ARS
Natural Resource: Charcoal
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2006 **To:** Choose an item.
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown

Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC) engaged in smuggling of charcoal (United Nations Security Council Report 2006). The ARS exported large amounts of charcoal on cargo ships in order to provide the bulk of their income.

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC)
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2006
Keywords:
Location: Lower Shabeelle
Geographical Keywords: Afgooye
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $100,000
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC) engaged in theft in 2006 (UN Security Council Report 2006). On July 10th, ARS/UIC member intercepted $100,000 dollars at a roadblock in Afgooye. The money came from the Transitional Federal Government who was attempting to send cash to a warlord fighting the ARS/UIC for control of Mogadishu.

Hizbul-Islam

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Hizbul-Islam
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2009 **To:** 2010
Keywords:
Location: Bay, Lower Juba
Geographical Keywords: Burhakaba, Kismayu
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Hizbul-Islam engaged in extortion from 2009 to 2010 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2013; Gettleman and Ibrahim 2010;The Washington Post 2009). They taxed public

transportation vehicles going from Buur Hakaba to Baidoa (Gettleman and Ibrahim 2010). Hizbul-Islam lost a major source of taxation revenue when it lost the port city of Kismayu to Al Shaabab in 2009 (Gettleman 2010; The Washington Post 2009), therefore we coded funds as less than $5 million per year. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Somalia
Rebel Group: Hizbul-Islam
Criminal Activity: Piracy
From: 2009 **To:** 2010
Keywords:
Location: Mudug
Geographical Keywords: Xarardheere, Haradhere
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Hizbul-Islam profited from piracy from 2009 to 2010 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2013; Gettleman 2010). They received monetary benefits (Mapping Militant Organizations 2013) and also, in Xaradheere, negotiated with the pirates to get a portion of their ransom money (Gettleman 2010). In a 2010 report, the United Nations declared that they had found no evidence to support that piracy was a significant source of revenue for armed opposition groups (UN Security Council 2010), therefore we coded funds as less than $5 million per year. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

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South Sudan

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in South Sudan:
South Sudan Defence Movement/Army (SSDM/A): 2011
South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A): 2011-2012
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A(: 2013-2015
South Sudan Defence Movement/Army –Cobra Faction (SSDM/A-Cobra Faction): 2013

South Sudan Defence Movement/Army

This group formed around the time of the independence of South Sudan in 2011 but did not last long. The new government of South Sudan accused the Sudanese government of providing support but did not produce evidence.

South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

This group broke away from the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) just before the independence of South Sudan from Sudan in July 2011. It is alleged to have received support from the Sudanese government in Khartoum, at least until an agreement between Sudan and South Sudan in late 2012 to stop supporting rebel groups in one another's countries. It was used by Khartoum in its battles against the SPLM-North in South Kordofan.

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Spain

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Spain:
ETA: 1991-1992

Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

Many sources mentioned that the ETA profited from smuggling drugs. However, sources did not provide detail on these activities. In particular, it was unclear if this activity occurred in the years 1991-1992, or if this became more important for the group in the 2000s. Neither was their information if this activity constituted a sizable source of income for the group. Some also mentioned that the ETA used violence against criminal drug smugglers (Defense Technical Information Center 2002; Makarenko 2004; Barros 2003; Shelley and Melzer 2008; Steinitz 1985). For these reasons, we have decided not to include drugs smuggling in the dataset.

Rebel Group: **Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna** (ETA)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1991-1992
Keywords: Revolutionary tax; Extortion racket
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: 196,000 euros per year
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The ETA engaged in extortion of business from 1991 to 1992; many sources document this activity (Anderson 2003; Kazanmaktadır 2014; Clark 2004; Jamestown Foundation 2009; Davison 1993; Bruton 1993; Jimenez 1992; Buesa and Baumert 2013; Cummins 2002; Tremlett 2000, 2006; Barber 1997). There is less certainty regarding the amount of funding that the ETA earned. Buesa and Baumert (2013) estimate that ETA earned 196,000 euros in 1991. We have used this as our funds estimate, although the actual amount may be higher. Other sources suggest that the income from extortion increased in subsequent years (Tremlett 2000).

Rebel Group: **Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna** (ETA)
Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 1991-1992
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The ETA engaged in kidnapping until at least 1996, which is documented by multiple sources (Sanchez-Cuenca 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1992; Amnesty International 1999; Jimenez 1992; Anderson 2003; Clark 2004; Buesa and Baumert 2013; Cummins 2002; Tremlett 2000). The amount of funding the ETA earned is less certain. Buesa and Baumert (2013) document income of roughly 200,000 euros in 1991; however, other sources (Jimenez 1992) suggest that income may be higher than this.

Rebel Group: **Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna** (ETA)
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1991-1992
Keywords: Vehicles; Bank robberies
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes:

Multiple sources suggest that the ETA engaged in bank robberies and systematic theft of other goods such as autos (Anderson 2003; Clark 2004; Jamestown Foundation 2009; Jimenez 1992; Buesa and Baumert 2013). We found no reliable estimates of the scale of income from all of these activities. In addition, it is difficult to ascertain if the ETA actually engaged in many bank robberies during the time period 1991-2.

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Sri Lanka

The UCDP lists the following groups and years:
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): 1990-2001 2002
2003 2004
2005-2009
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front)(JVP): 1990

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) engaged in extensive smuggling of goods. The evidence we found suggested that most of this involved smuggling of goods such as arms and gold coins to Sri Lanka for use by the group (Aljazeera 2009; Berry et al; 2002; Clarke 2011; Daily News 2007; Ghosh 2004; Gunaratna 1997; Joshi 1996; Rich 2006; National Post n.d.; Smith 2003; United States Congressional Research Service 2013). Since the LTTE does not appear to have profited extensively from this activity, we did not include it below.

We chose not to include activities including credit card fraud (Aljazeera 2009; Falksohn and Padma 2008; Human Rights Watch 2006; Mapping Militant Organizations 2013; Solomon and Tan 2007) and social security fraud (Mackenzie Institute 1995; South Asia Intelligence Review n.d.) because these were secondary activities that only resulted from extortion and smuggling activities, which have been coded. Furthermore, evidence does not show that these activities were a significant funding strategy for the LTTE.

There is evidence that Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) engaged in theft including bank robbery, as well as other criminal activity. However, the Sri Lankan government virtually wiped out the leaders of the JVP in 1989 (The Globe and Mail 1989), which is prior to entry of our dataset. In later years the JVP became a political party. There is no evidence that they engaged in any of the strategies in which we are interested.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Country: Sri Lanka
Rebel Group: **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**
Natural Resource: Opium
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-2009
Keywords: Heroin
Location: Jaffna Peninsula
Geographical Keywords: Madhya Pradesh district, Velvettiturai, Kerala State, Tamil Nadu, Myanmar, India, USA, Canada, Europe, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand

Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: $200 million yearly
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) engaged in opium smuggling (Aljazeera 2009; Aryasinha 2001; Cilluffo 2000; Davis 1996; Dishman 2001; Ghosh 2004; Hennayake 1993; Human Rights Watch 2006; Jayawardhana 2010 2010; Kartikeya 2009; Mackenzie Institute 1995; Mapping Militant Organizations 2013; Pickert 2009; Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka 2012; Sakhuja 2001; Solomon and Tan 2007; South Asia Intelligence Review 2001; State Department 2010; The Toronto Star 1996). Sources do not indicate that they also engaged in extortion or production activities. The exact dates of involvement are unknown. Multiple sources indicated annual income greater than $5 million, and some pointed to yearly funds of at least $200 million (Jayawardhana 2010; Peiris n.d.; Singh 2009; Tamil Tigers Activities 2014). Sources focus on opium smuggling, though some sources mention cannabis and narcotics (Jayawardhana 2010; Kartikeya 2009; State Department 2010). However, we did not code this because there was not enough substantial information.

Country: Sri Lanka
Rebel Group: **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**
Criminal Activity: Piracy
Years: 1998-2009
Keywords: Sea Piracy
Location :
Geographical Keywords: Indian Ocean
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The LTTE engaged in piracy as a funding strategy. Their navy was known as the “Sea Tigers.” They hijacked ships for their cargo, and used the ships for smuggling drugs, humans, and other other goods (Daily Mirror 2010; Khurana 2007; Mapping Militant Organizations 2013; Murphy 2013; Sakhuja 2001; South Asia Terrorism Portal n.d.; Uher n.d). In some instances, the piracy attacks were also suicide attacks; as they did not use this for funding, we do not include this in coding. In regards to the for-profit piracy, one source values the cargo taken at $3 million (Karunaratne 2009); thus we estimate that they earned over $5 million from this strategy. Exact amounts are unknown.

Country: Sri Lanka
Rebel Group: **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 1990-2009
Keywords: forced donations, revolutionary taxes
Location: Northern
Geographical Keywords: Kilinochchi, Jaffna, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya districts, and Puliyankulam checkpoint, Uyilankulam checkpoint; France Germany, Canada, India
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: 2010: $120,000,000
all other years: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The LTTE engaged in extortion including revolutionary taxes and extorting Sri Lankan immigrants living abroad (Aljazeera 2009; BBC News 2009; Human Rights Watch 2006; Mackenzie Institute 1995; Solomon and Tan 2007; South Asia Intelligence Review n.d.). The sources discussing LTTE involvement in taxing locals is diverse in timing, but there is no sense of how consistent the taxing was throughout this time. The LTTE taxed businesses and Tamils, even within government-controlled territories in the East (Sarvananthan 2003). When Tamils living in foreign countries came to visit Sri Lanka, they would be taxed and would have possessions taken until they paid the expected tax (Davis 1996; DeVotta 2009; Human Rights Watch 2006; Mapping Militant Organizations 2013; Ridley 2012; The Washington Post 1992).

Sources indicate that the LTTE earned the majority of their funding from abroad, including extortion of the diaspora (Aljazeera 2009; Aryasinha 2001; Davis 1996; Falksohn and Padma 2008; Human Right Watch 2006). Extortion of Tamils living abroad by the LTTE was a very structured system. The LTTE kept records of all Tamils living in a country and tracked their donations to the LTTE. Some donations were through legitimate organizations, but many donations were not voluntary. The LTTE extorted the general Tamil diaspora as well as businesses (CBC News 2006; Falksohn and Padma 2008; Mackenzie Institute 1995; Right Vision News 2009; South Asia Intelligence Review. n.d).

The LTTE earner over $5 million annually from extortion (Falksohn and Padma 2008; Ridley 2012; Right Vision News 2009; Solomon and Tan 2007; South Asia Intelligence Review n.d). One source estimated the funds earned through two checkpoints and arrived at a total of about $19 million a year (Sarvananthan 2003), but there was not another source that mentioned a specific amount. They earned millions from the Canadian diaspora alone (Human Rights Watch 2006).

Country: Sri Lanka
Rebel Group: **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**
Criminal Activity: Smuggling human
Years: 1993-2009
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: $85 million
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The LTTE engaged in smuggling humans as a financial strategy (Aljazeera 2009; Aryasinha 2001; Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka 2012; Mackenzie Institute 1995; New Straits Times Malaysia 2010; Samath 2010; Williams 2007). Tamils were smuggled into nations nations such as Russia, the Netherlands, Canada, and others (Human Rights Watch 2006). The LTTE made profits by charging the Tamils being smuggled for transportation and forged documents (South Asia Terrorism Portal n.d.). Additionally, the more nationals the LTTE send abroad, the more profit they can extort from Tamils living abroad. They earned over $5 million from human smuggling (Samath 2010). The UNODC estimates that the LTTE earned about $85 million per year from this activity (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2013), and multiple sources suggest the LTTE charged around $20,000 per person, and that they smuggled at least hundreds of individuals per year (Cornell 2009; Mapping Militant Organizations 2013). We can document this activity from 1993 onwards, although it is possible it began in earlier years.

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Sudan

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Sudan:
Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A): 1990-2004
National Democratic Alliance (NDA): 1996-2001
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM): 2003-2011
Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) (Darfur): 2003-2011
Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army Minni Minawi (SLM/A-MM) (Darfur): 2006
Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army-Unity (SLM/A-Unity): 2007-2008
South Sudan Defense Movement/Army (SSDM/A): 2010-2011
South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A): 2011
Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF): 2011-2015
National Redemption Front (NRF): 2006
Darfur Joint Resistance Forces: 2014-2015
Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARC): 2014

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army

Country: Sudan
Rebel Group: Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
Natural Resource: oil and gas
Strategy: Booty Futures
From: 2004
Location: Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, Greater Upper Nile
Geographical Keywords: Block B
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) engaged in booty futures of oil in 2004 (Patey 2010). The SPLM made deals and contracts with White Nile Ltd (a fledgling British corporation), ASCOM (a Moldovan company), and Jarch Capital (a U.S. firm) for parts of Block B oil. This was done without consulting the National Petroleum Commission (NPC). The SPLM made less than $5 million using this strategy. Specific amounts are unknown. There is also evidence that Riek Machar's forces controlled Block 5A from 1997 to 1999 (Rone 2003; Small Arms Survey 2010), but this was not coded because his relationship with the SPLM/A was unclear during this time and it is unknown whether his forces actually received payments for controlling this territory.

Country: Sudan

Rebel Group: Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
Criminal Activity: Humanitarian Aid
From: 1990 **To:** 2004
Geographical Keywords: South Sudan
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) engaged in extortion and theft of humanitarian aid from 1990 to 2004 (Riehl 2001, Reno 2010, Human Rights Watch 2003, Johnson 2003, Jaspers 1999, Kevlihan 2013). The SPLM taxed relief food intended for the local population and on at least one occasion, in 2000, looted a warehouse of $500,000 worth of food and non-food relief items. Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Justice and Equality Movement

Country: Sudan
Rebel Group: Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2010
Keywords: oil tankers, commercial trucks
Location: Northern Darfur, Southern Darfur
Geographical Keywords: Abu Gamra, Sania Afandu
Funds: Less than $5 million per year (1)
Amounts: -99: Unkown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) engaged in theft in 2010 (United Nations Security Council Report 2011). In May of 2010 attack and stole various supplies from a convoy of trucks carrying fuel and commercial supplies. The truck drivers were unharmed but had their money and mobile phones stolen. In January 2010, JEM attacked 7 commercial trucks. The JEM made less than $5 million using this strategy. Specific amounts are unknown. The JEM was also known for attacking humanitarian convoys during this period (Hoile 2008, Rice 2008), but it is unclear whether this generated any funding.

Sudan Liberation Movement /Army

Country: Sudan

Rebel Group: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Theft
From: 2005
Keywords: camels
Location: Northern Darfur
Geographical Keywords: Tabit
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) engaged in theft of camels in 2005 (Africa Research Bulletin 2005, Steele 2005). The SLM stole thousands of camels from a nomadic tribe (camels being their main source of wealth) in Northern Darfur. Amounts are unknown. The SLM was also known for attacking humanitarian convoys during this period (Hoile 2008, Rice 2008, Bechtold 2009), but it is unclear whether this generated any funding.

National Redemption Front

The National Redemption Front (NRF) was a coalition group formed in 2006 between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA), and a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) in opposition to the African Union-brokered Darfur Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the Minni Minawi faction of the SLM/A. As such, the funding strategies for this group have already been captured in the coding for each individual group and do not need to be coded again for the NRF's one year of 2006.

Sudan Revolutionary Front

The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) was formed in 2011 as a coalition and merging of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) Abdul Wahed faction, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM), and the SLM/A's northern sector. For this reason, JEM and the SLM/A cease to exist in 2011 in our dataset. The SRF exists from 2011 to 2012 but we find no evidence that they engaged in the funding strategies of interest.

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Focused searches of LexisNexis, Wikipedia, and Google for specific incidents

Syria

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Syria:
Free Syrian Army (FSA): 2011-2012
Jabhat al-Nusra: 2012
Islamic State: 2013-2015
Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yektiya Demokrat) (PYD): 2013; 2015
Syrian insurgents: 2013-2015

Free Syrian Army

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Free Syrian Army (FSA)
Natural Resource: agriculture
Strategy: Theft
From: 2012
Keywords: grain, wheat
Location: Aleppo
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Free Syrian Army (FSA) engaged in theft of agriculture in 2012 (Sherlock 2013; Wagner 2012; Eng 2014). The FSA stole wheat reserves from grain silos in Aleppo and sold them abroad to Turkish grain traders. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Free Syrian Army (FSA)
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2012
Keywords: antiquities
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Free Syrian Army (FSA) engaged in theft in 2012 (Luck 2013; Parkinson 2015; Baker 2012). They participated in the looting and illegal trade of antiquities, earning on average about $50,000 per haul on the black market (Luck 2013). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Free Syrian Army (FSA)
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
From: 2012
Keywords: soldiers
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Free Syrian Army (FSA) engaged in kidnapping in 2012 (Banco 2014; Human Rights Watch 2012). Due to the increase of extremist groups in Syria in 2012, the FSA was forced to increase their kidnapping for ransom in order to generate enough revenue to keep up with the other groups (Banco 2014). They commonly kidnapped soldiers to force a ransom from their parents (Human Rights Watch 2012). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: Islamic State in Iraq (IS)

The Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (UCDP: IS, 2017). They are the successor group to al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) (Johnston, et al., 2016), and are based primarily in Iraq and Syria. Because the main umbrella organization is based in these two countries, we have coded IS in Iraq and Syria the same. IS is responsible for attacks in Afghanistan, Egypt, France, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Many rebel groups in other countries have pledged allegiance to IS (UCDP: IS, 2017). Thus IS appears in the UCDP dataset for a number of countries. We did not assume that IS utilitized the same funding strategies in each of the countries in which they appear in the UCDP dataset. We only coded IS as engaging in an activity if there is evidence they did so within that specific country. See Iraq for activities coded.

Note: The information coded for IS is coded for both Iraq and Syria for the years 2013-2015. If analysis is being conducted at the organizational level, this data should be dropped to avoid duplication.

Jabhat al-Nusra

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Jabhat al-Nusra
Natural Resource: oil and gas
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2012
Keywords:
Location: Deir al-Zor
Geographical Keywords: Al-Ward oil field
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Jabhat al-Nusra engaged in extortion of oil in 2012 (Kelley 2013; Ignatius 2012; Meir Amit Intelligence and Information Center 2013). In late 2012, they took control of the Al-Ward oil field in the Deir al-Zor province (Ignatius 2012) and then sold oil to the local authorities in the area (Kelley 2013). Funding amounts are unknown.

Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yektiya Demokrat) (PYD)

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Democratic Union Party (PYD)
Natural Resource: oil and gas
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords: northern Syria, Rojava region
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Democratic Union Party (PYD) engaged in extortion of oil from 2013 to 2015 (Burchfield, 2017; Danish Immigration Service, 2015). The PYD produced and sold oil in the northern Syrian region under their control to help fund their administration. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Syria

Rebel Group: Democratic Union Party (PYD)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords: taxes, fees
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The Democratic Union Party (PYD) engaged in extortion from 2013 to 2015 (Burchfield, 2017). They imposed taxes and fees to help pay for public services in the areas under its control (Buchfield, 2017). Funding amounts are unknown.

Syrian Insurgents

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Syrian insurgents
Natural Resource: oil and gas
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords: al-Omar oil field
Location: Deir el Zour, Idlib
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year (2013-2014)
-99: Unknown (2015)
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Syrian insurgents engaged in extortion of oil from 2013 to 2015 (Hubbard, 2014; Tamimi, 2016; Glenn, 2016; Reuters, 2016; Fanusie, 2017). Beginning in 2012, the Nusra Front gained control of oil fields in Syria where they earned about $10,000 per tanker truckload. At some point they gained control of al-Omar oil field in Deir el Zour province as well as oil infrastructure in Idlib province (Fanusie, 2017). In July of 2014, the Nusra Front lost their oil fields and infrastructure in Deir el Zour to the Islamic State, at which point their revenue sharply declined (Tamimi, 2016). The Nusra Front, along with other groups, sold oil to the Syrian government (Hubbard, 2014). We coded the Syrian insurgents as making over $5 million a year for 2013 and 2014 due to the high value of the oil ($10,000 per tanker truck load) and the high amount being produced (10,000 barrels per day from al-Omar oil field alone) (Fanusie, 2017). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Syrian insurgents

Natural Resource: agriculture
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2013
Keywords:
Location: Raqqa
Geographical Keywords: Raqqa
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Syrian insurgents engaged in extortion of agriculture in 2013 (Spencer, 2013; Mcevers, 2013). The Nusra Front took control of flour production in Raqqa, which they sold to bakeries. They also owned some bakeries and offered others protection. This was part of their hearts and minds initiative (Spencer, 2013; Mcevers, 2013). We coded this activity as making less than $5 million per year because at time the Nusra Front sold flour at a loss (Spencer, 2013). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Syrian insurgents
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
From: 2013-2015
Keywords: antiquities, machinery equipment, tobacco, medicine, food, Captagon
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Syrian insurgents engaged in smuggling of goods from 2013 to 2015 (Bassam, 2015; Luck, 2013; Dettmer, 2013; Lesnnak, 2016; Lund, 2017; Lopez, 2015; Clarke, 2017). They smuggled many different types of goods such as tobacco, medicine, food, and even machinery equipment from factories they looted (Dettmer, 2013; Lesnnak, 2016; Lund, 2017). One of the biggest trades they engaged in was the looting and smuggling of antiquities. Artifacts are taken from archeological sites in places such as Idlib and moved to Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon where they are put on active markets. An average haul can net about $50,000 on the black market (Bassam, 2015; Luck, 2013). A number of Syrian insurgent groups also profited from selling the drug Captagon, a synthetic amphetamine-base drug (Lopez, 2015; Clarke, 2017). Funding amounts are unknown. One source also mentioned agriculture also being smuggled (Lund, 2017). Since this was a short mention, and we found no other evidence of livestock being smuggled, we decided not to code this in separate animal natural resource category.

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Syrian insurgents

Criminal Activity: Theft
Years: 2013
Keywords: Syrian Central Bank, construction vehicles
Location: Raqqa, Hasakah
Geographical Keywords: Raqqa, Ash Shaddadi
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Syrian insurgents engage in theft in 2013 (Fanusie, 2017; Gutman, 2013). When the Nusra Front captured Raqqa in 2013, it looted the Syrian Central Bank to pay administrative salaries (Fanusie, 2017). The Nusra Front also sold 400 captured construction vehicles for about $40 million (Gutman, 2013). This amounts to over $5 million per year for 2013 but exact amounts are not known.

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Syrian insurgents
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords: income, businesses, utilities, services, traffic violations, public services, industrialists
Location: Aleppo, Damascus
Geographical Keywords: Aleppo, Wafideen Crossing
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Syrian insurgents engage in extortion from 2013 to 2015 (Fanusie, 2017; Dettmer, 2013; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2013; Freedom House, 2015; Freedom House, 2016; Lund, 2017). Insurgent forces have engaged in widespread extortion of civilians, businessmen, and industrialists, to the point of driving people out of town (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2013). They also man checkpoints, such as the Wafideen Crossing in Damascus, which is known as the "million pound checkpoint" (Lund, 2017). The Nusra Front changes taxes on income, businesses, utilities, services, public services, and crime such as traffic violations and stealing electricity (Fanusie, 2017). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Syrian insurgents
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:

Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year (2014)
-99: Unknown (2013, 2015)
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Syrian Insurgents engaged in kidnapping from 2013 to 2015 (Fanusie, 2017; Dehghanpisheh, 2013; Banco, 2013; U.S. Department of State, 2015; U.S. Department of Stae, 2016; Reporters Without Borders, 2015; The Economist, 2014; Mahmoud, 2015). Insurgent groups kidnapped local Syrians for ransom throughout these years. The Nusra Front received $4 million to nearly $72 million in 2014 for some Syrian nuns (Fanusie, 2017). Due to this amount, the insurgents are coded as making more than $5 million per year for 2014. All other years are unknown. Specific amounts are unknown.

Country: Syria
Rebel Group: Syrian insurgents
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International Victims
Years: 2013-2015
Keywords: Turkish hostages, UN peacekeepers, American journalist, Fijian hostages, Lebanese hostages, Italian hostages
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $150 million (2013)
$48 million - $95 million (2014)
$41 million – $45 million (2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)
Notes: Syrian insurgents engaged in kidnapping international victims from 2013 to 2014 (Fanusie, 2017; U.S. Department of State, 2015; U.S. Department of State, 2016; Reporters Without Borders, 2016; Kirchgaessner, 2015). International journalists were a big target for insurgent groups to kidnap for ransom during these years (Reporters Without Borders, 2016). The Nusra Front is especially prevalent in kidnapping foreigners. A list of their kidnappings is as follows:
"2013: Up to $150 million from Qatar for Turkish hostages.
2014: $25 million from Qatar for UN peacekeepers; varying reports put the ransom request between $3 to $25 million for an American journalist who was later freed; $20 to $45 million for Fijian hostages.
2015: $30 million for Lebanese hostages; estimated $11-15 million for Italian hostages." (Fanusie, 2017).

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Tajikistan

The UCDP lists the following groups and years:

Forces of Khudoberdiyev (or Khudayberdiev)	1998
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	2010-2011
United Tajik Opposition (UTO)	1992-1996, 1998

The Forces of Colonel Makhmud Khudoberdiyev attacked the government in 1997 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: Tajikistan 2015). This was a military coup, and they likely used the resources to which they already had access as members of the military. Sources do not indicate other financial strategies.

United Tajik Opposition (UTO)

Country: Tajikistan
Rebel Group: **United Tajik Opposition (UTO)**
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1990-2001
Keywords: Heroin
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Northern Route of Afghan opiates
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The United Tajik Opposition (UTO) engaged in opium smuggling from 1990 through 2001 (Madi 2003). They made alliances with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Northern Alliance, which helped it firmly establish and maintain control through the northern region of Afghanistan (Cornell and Jonsson 2014). The leaders of the UTO, notably Mirzo "Jaga" Ziyoev, were later exposed as some of the biggest drug lords in the region (Cornell and Jonsson 2014; Paoli et al. 2007). The amount of funding earned from opium smuggling is unknown.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Country: Tajikistan
Rebel Group: **Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)**

Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1999-2000
Keywords: laboratories
Location: Republican Subordination
Geographical Keywords: Tavildara, Gharm
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan engaged in extortion of opium from 1999 to 2000 (Mohapatra 2007; Engvall 2006; International Crisis Group 2001; West 2002) through the use of drug laboratories to refine opium into heroin. Though the labs do not appear to be widespread or a significant source of funding, it was suspected that the IMU had labs in Gharm and Tavildara of Tajikistan (International Crisis Group 2001). Specific funding amount are unknown.

Country: Tajikistan
Rebel Group: **Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)**
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 1999-2011
Keywords:
Location: Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan), Osh (Kyrgyzstan), Batken (Kyrgyzstan)
Geographical Keywords: Khorog
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) engaged in smuggling of opium from 1999 to 2011 (Horsman 2005; Weitz 2004; Engvall 2006; Mohapatra 2007; Baran 2006; Cornell 2002; Mann 2002; International Crisis Group 2001; Cornell 2005; UNODC 2010; Falkenburg 2013; Institute for the Study of War; Ergueshev 2012; Vinson 2012; Chalk 2003; Peters 2009; Australian Government Attorney-General's Department 2012). The IMU smuggled drugs from Afghanistan along the Khorog – Osh route and the Batken route through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and eventually to Russia and Europe. They controlled the majority of the drugs that entered Central Asia in 2000 (Mohapatra 2007). After 2000, the IMU's involvement in the drug smuggling decreased dramatically, spurred by the death of IMU leadership most involved in the drug trade, as well as increased involvement of corrupt politicians and local militias that also wanted a role

in the drug trade (Cornell 2005; Falkenburg 2013). Regardless, it appears that the IMU has been able to retain at least a small presence in the drug trade through 2011. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Tajikistan
Rebel Group: **Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)**
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International Victims
Years: 1999
Keywords: Kyrgyz mayor and three officials, four Japanese geologists
Location: Osh (Kyrgyzstan), Batken (Kyrgyzstan)
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $2,050,000
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) engaged in kidnapping of international victims in 1999 (Horsman 2005; Weitz 2004; Engvall 2006; Australian Government Attorney-General's Department 2012; Cornell 2002; Mann 2002; Rashid 2001; Naumkin 2003; Rasizade 2002). In August of 1999, the IMU took a Kyrgyz mayor and three officials hostage in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan (Naumkin 2003) and released them for a ransom of $50,000 (Engvall 2006). Later that month, the IMU captured four Japanese geologists in Batken, Kyrgyzstan and released them for a ransom of $2 million (Rashid 2001). The IMU was unable to duplicate their kidnapping success in 2000 (Mann 2002). They were able to kidnap four American mountain climbers in 2000, but the climbers escaped before any money could be obtained for them (Erickson 2005; Rasizade 2006).

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Thailand

The UCDP lists the following groups and years:
Patani insurgents: 2003-2015

Country: Thailand
Rebel Group: Patani Insurgents (PULO, BRN-C, GMIP, BBMP)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2003 **To:** 2015
Keywords: Donations
Location (First Order Administrative District):
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources

Notes:
Summary: Multiple sources indicated the various Patani groups engaged in criminal extortion of individuals and businesses (Abuza, 2006; Askew, 2007; Gunaratna, 2012; Hammond, 2011; Storey, 2007; Money Jihad, 2012; World Almanac of Islamism, 2014; Yegar, 2002). Most of the victims of extortion lived in the region, but the groups also taxed those leaving the area as well as overseas diaspora populations. There was little detail in these sources on the timing of these activity and the amounts that they earned. Since the insurgent movement began before 2003, and some reports indicated that extortion was occurring in the early 2000s, we have assumed that this activity began before 2003 and continued through 2012.

We identified one source (Askew, 2007) that mentioned involvement in the drugs trade. We decided that this was insufficient evidence to include here, though, because it was not very detailed and relied heavily on the accounts of the police forces. In particular, the degree to which the rebels were directly linked to the drugs trade and drug organizations was unclear.

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Turkey

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Turkey:
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK): 1990-2015
Devrimci Sol: 1991-1992
Maoist Communist Party (MKP): 2005

Kurdistan Workers' Party

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1990 **To:** 2012
Keywords: laboratories, morphine base
Location: Istanbul, Tekirdag, Beqaa (Lebanon)
Geographical Keywords: Southeast Anatolia, Northern Iraq, Turkish-Iranian border, Northwestern Iran, Bekaa Valley
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in extortion of opium from 1990 to 2012 (Roth 2007; United Nations Economic and Social Council 1997; Curtis 2002; Onay 2008; Freedman 2009; Phillips 2009; Barnhart 2006; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; International Crisis Group 2014; Ekici 2011). The PKK set up mobile laboratories in Southeastern Anatolia (Barnhart 2006), Istanbul (Phillips 2009), and Tekirdag (Ekici 2011) in Turkey, as well as in Iraq (Barnhart 2006), Iran (Ekici 2011), and on the Turkish-Iranian border (Ekici 2011). They smuggled opium and morphine base from Afghanistan and Pakistan and refined them into heroin in their labs (Phillips 2009; Barnhart 2006). This funding strategy may have declined recently due to heroin being refined earlier on the smuggling routes in Southeast Asia (Ekici 2011). The PKK has also possibly been involved in cultivating opium in the Bekka valley in Lebanon (Barnhart 2006). Funding amounts are unknown.
Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990 **To:** 2015
Keywords: heroin, morphine base

Location:
Geographical Keywords: Europe, Balkans, Germany, Great Britain, Southwestern Turkey, Turkish Kurdistan, Middle East
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: $33.6 million (1993)
$50 million - $100 million (2009-2010)
-99 (1990-1992, 1994-2008, 2011-2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in smuggling of opium from 1990 to 2015 (Cornell 2008; Ozdemir 2012; Rugman 1994; Pope 1992; Cowell 1993; Bell 1994; Roth 2007; UNODC 1997; Barham 1997; Dikici 2008, Curtis 2002; Onay 2008; Robins 2008; UNODC 2010; Strauss 2010; EU Drug Markets Report 2013; U.S. Department of Treasury 2012; Hurriyet Daily News 2008; Hudson 2002; Feedman 2009; Phillips 2009; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; Barnhart 2008; Ekici 2011; Cengiz 2017; Felbab-Brown 2016; Hurriyet Daily News 2016). The PKK both smuggled heroin directly and taxed other heroin smugglers who moved through their territory. The British government asserted that the PKK was responsible for 40% of all heroin sold in Europe (Phillips 2009) while the Germans once asserted that the PKK was responsible for 80% of the narcotics in Europe (Curtis 2002). Reports claimed that the PKK made about 56 million Marks in 1993 (Roth 2007) and between US$50 million and US$100 million around 2010 (UNODC 2010). Due to these amounts, and the PKK's heavy involvement in the heroin trade, we coded funds as over $5 million per year.

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Natural Resource: cannabis
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1990 **To:** 2015
Keywords:
Location: Diyarbakir, Mardin, Sanliurfa, Bingol, Batman, Hakkari
Geographical Keywords: Ortac, Yalaza, Baglan, Kayacik, Yolcati, Dibek, East Anatolia, Southeast Anatolia, Northern Iraq, Northwestern Iran
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in extortion of cannabis from 1990 to 2015 (Cihan News Agency 2012; Pek 2007; Akgul 2014; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; International Crisis Group 2014; Ekici 2011; Cengiz 2017; Hurriyet Daily News 2016).

The PKK was involved in cultivating cannabis in the Diyarbakir province of Turkey (Cihan News Agency 2012; Pek 2007; Akgul 2014) but was also suspected of growing cannabis in Iraq and Iran (Pek 2007). While the PKK began by simply taxing cannabis farmers, in the early 1990s they took direct control of the cannabis fields and forced Kurdish peasants to work on their behalf (Ekici 2011). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Natural Resource: cannabis
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990 **To:** 2015
Keyword: hashish, marijuana
Location: Diyarbakir, Mardin, Sanliurfa, Bingol, Batman, Hakkari
Geographical Keywords: Batman, Northern Iraq, Balkans, Europe
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in smuggling of cannabis from 1990 to 2015 (Roth 2007; Curtis 2002; Dikici 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; US Department of Treasury 2012; Cihan News Agency 2012; Pek 2007; Akgul 2014; International Crisis Group 2014; Ekici 2011; Cengiz 2017; Hurriyet Daily News 2016). After the PKK cultivated the cannabis, they trafficked the harvested hashish through the Balkans and into Europe (Dikici 2008). For this reason, considering how heavily involved they were in the drug trade, we coded smuggling of cannabis for the same years that we coded extortion of cannabis. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Natural Resource: Coca
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990 **To:** 2015
Keyword: cocaine
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unkown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in smuggling of cocaine from 1990 to 2015 (Roth 2007; Today's Zaman 2011; Ekici 2011; Pek 2007; Cetingulec 2014; Cengiz 2017; Hurriyet Daily News 2016). The PKK only traded in cocaine; they were not involved in production since most of the world's cocaine is grown in South America. Cocaine is smuggled into Europe through Turkey (Today's Zaman 2011). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1990 **To:** 2015
Keywords: Kurdish businessmen, Kurdish immigrants, restaurants
Location: London
Geographical Keywords: Eastern Turkey, Southeastern Turkey, United Kingdom, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, France, Europe, Spain
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in extortion from 1990 to 2015 (Roth 2007; U.S. Country Reports on Terrorism 2007; Hurriyet Daily News 2010; Phillips 2009; Barnhart 2006; Kaya 2015; Cinar 2010; Criss 1995; Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior 2015; Today's Zaman 2013; Journal of Turkish Weekly 2016). They extorted people of Kurdish origin throughout Turkey and Europe. Those who resisted were in danger of being kidnapped and killed or of having their property vandalized. In Turkey, the tax was known as a "revolutionary tax" while in Europe the PKK organized protection rackets on Kurdish immigrants and businessmen, including restaurant owners. In 1993, the PKK extorted 2.5 million pounds just within Great Britain. In 1996, the German police found evidence that the PKK was earning 250 million deutsche marks per month through extortion activities in Europe (Roth 2007). Due to these amounts, we coded the PKK as making more than $5 million per year from extortion.

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Other
From: 1990 **To:** 2015
Keywords: guns, Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS), sodium carbonate, acetic anhydrite, cigarettes, blood from citizens of Kurdish origin, synthetic cannabis, methamphetamine, captagon

Location: Diyarbakir, Mardin, Batman, Sanliurfa
Geographical Keywords: Iraq, Southeast Turkey
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year (2008)
-99: Unknown (1990-2007, 2009-2015)
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2000-2015)
6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (1990-1999)

Notes: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in smuggling of goods from 1990 to 2015 (Roth 2007; Phillips 2009; Phillips 2007; Barnhart 2006; Ekici 2011; Kaya 2012; Kaya 2015; Billingslea 2004; Doward 2013; Cengiz 2017; Shelley 2016; Leuprecht 2016). The PKK smuggled contraband cigarettes with forged tax stamps and sold them for as much as $60 per carton (Roth 2007). They were also involved in smuggling weapons (Roth 2007; Phillips 2009; Phillips 2007; Barnhart 2006; Hurriyet Daily News 2008) and synthetic drugs such as Amphetamine, sodium carbonate, and acetic anhydrite (Ekici 201; Roth 2007). In 2005, it was discovered that the PKK was involved in smuggling blood. The blood was taken from Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, under the guise of charity, and then smuggled abroad and sold to foreigners (Roth 2007). In 2008, a top Turkish general claimed the PKK made 100 million to 150 million euros from smuggling of both goods and humans, so for this year we coded funds as over $5 million per year. Funding amounts for all other years are unknown.

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Humans
From: 1990 **To:** 2015
Keywords: workers, refugees, immigrants, children, Kurds
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Anatolia, Northern Iraq, Europe, Baltic States, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, Austria, France
Funds: 2: More than $5 million per year (2008)
-99: Unknown (1990-2007, 2009-2015)
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2000-2012)
6 (uncertain timing, multiple sources (1990-1999)
5 (uncertain timing, one source) (2013-2015)

Notes: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in human smuggling from 1990 to 2015 (Roth 2007; Hurriyet Daily News 2008; Phillips 2009; Barnhart 2006; Kaya 2015; Cinar 2010;

Cengiz 2017). Individuals paid 6,000 to 7,000 euros for the PKK to transport them to various European cities. The PKK forged fake visas and passports for the immigrants to pass into Europe and then continued to extort them once they had reached their final destination (Roth 2007). The immigrants were often smuggled from Northern Iraq, through Turkey and then either up through Italy to Western Europe (Kaya2015) or through the Baltic states into Eastern Europe (Cinar 2010). In 2001, the PKK transported 9,000 Kurds from Anatolia (in Turkey) to Europe (Roth 2007). In 2008, a top Turkish general claimed the PKK made 100 million to 150 million euros from smuggling of both goods and humans, so for this year we coded funds as over $5 million per year. Funding amounts for all other years are unknown.

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: PKK
Criminal Activity: Other Crime
From: 1993 **To:** 1997
Keywords: counterfeiting
Location: Ankara
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 (uncertain about timing, one source)

Notes: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in a form of crime not otherwise listed in our dataset from 1993 to 1997 (Roth 2007). In the mid-1990s, Interpol in Ankara discovered that the PKK had been involved in counterfeiting more than 2,500 $100 U.S. bank notes. We decided to define the mid-1990s as 1993 to 1997. Funding amounts are unknown.

Devrimci Sol

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: Devrimci Sol
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1991 **To:** 1992
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 99: Unknown
Amounts: 99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: Devrimci Sol engaged in smuggling of opium from 1991 to 1992 (Pope 1992; Galeotti 2012). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: Devrimci Sol
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 1991 **To:** 1992
Keywords: Kurds
Location:
Geographical Keywords: Great Britain, Europe
Funds: 1: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $630,000 (1992)
-99 (1991)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (1992)
6 (uncertain timing, multiple sources) (1991)

Notes: Devrimci Sol engaged in extortion from 1991 to 1992 (Pope 1992, Kirby 1992, Leppard 1994; Meho 2004; Burrell 1993). They extorted money from Kurds living in Europe. They reportedly made 350,000 pounds using this strategy in 1992 (Burrell 1993). Due to this amount we coded funds as less than $5 million per year.

Country: Turkey
Rebel Group: Devrimci Sol
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 1991 **To:** 1992
Keywords: banks, tax offices
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: Devrimci Sol engaged in theft from 1991 to 1992 (Rugman 1992; Meho 2004). In 1992, the Turkish police discovered that Devrimci Sol had stolen from banks and tax offices (Rugman 1992). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Turkey

Rebel Group: Devrimci Sol
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International Victims
From: 1992 **To:** 1992
Keywords:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $500,000
Certainty: 2 (one source)

Notes: Devrimci Sol engaged in kidnapping international victims in 1992 (Burrell 1993). Devrimci Sol raised $500,000 by kidnapping tourists in Turkey. They used this money to fund bombings and other terrorist attacks.

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Uganda

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Uganda:
Lord Resistance Army (LRA): 1990-2014
Uganda's People Army: 1990-1992
Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF): 1990-2011; 2013-2015
West Nile Bank Front: 1996
Uganda National Rescue Front II: 1997

Alliance of Democratic Forces

Country: Uganda
Rebel Group: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Natural Resource: timber
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2005 **To:** 2015
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Eringite, Beni, Butembo, Virunga National Park
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) engaged in extortion of timber from 2005 to 2015 (UN Security Council Report 2012; UN Security Council Report 2011; UN Security Council Report 2008; Scorgie 2011; Titeca 2012; Romkema 2007; IRIN 2006; International Crisis Group 2012; McGregor 2014; UN Security Council 2015; Höije 2016; IRIN 2013; Scorgie-Porter 2015; Ward 2015). This activity is first mentioned in 2005 in these sources; it is possible that it began earlier than this. The ADF mainly operated in the North Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to exploit timber and export it across the border of Uganda. They imposed a tax of $200 to $300 on all chainsaws, including those of FARDC officers, exploiting timber in areas they control, as well as a $500 fee if the tax is not paid (UN Security Council Report 2011; International Crisis Group 2012). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Uganda
Rebel Group: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Natural Resource: timber

Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2005 **To:** 2015
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Beni, Butembo
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (2005-2007)
5 (uncertain about timing, one source) (2008-2015)

Notes: The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) engaged in smuggling of timber from 2005 to 2015 (Romkema 2007; International Crisis Group 2012; Scorgie-Porter 2015). The ADF illegally exports timber from where they operate in North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, across the border into Uganda. We coded this as beginning in 2005 due to the fact that we coded extortion of timber by the ADF as beginning in 2005. Funding amounts are unknown

Country: Uganda
Rebel Group: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Natural Resource: gold
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2000 **To:** 2015
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC), Orientale Province (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Bialose, Kaynama, Kikingi, Chuchubo, Makembe
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2006-2015)
6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (2000-2005)

Notes: The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) engaged in extortion of gold from 2000 to 2012 (UN Security Council Report 2012; UN Security Council Report 2011; UN Security Council Report 2010; UN Security Council Report 2008; Scorgie 2011; Titeca 2012; Romkema 2007; IRIN 2006; International Crisis Group 2012; McGregor 2014; IRIN 2013; Scorgie-Porter 2015; Gladston 2017). The ADF exploited gold in North Kivu and Eastern Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The UN source from 2010 states that this activity has occurred for at least a decade, leading us to use 2000 as the starting date; it is possible that it began earlier than this. In some areas they taxed local gold miners about 1,000 Congolese francs per week per person (UN Security Council Report 2011), while in other areas they forced diggers to work for them (UN Security Council Report 2010). Sometimes the ADF rebels worked the mines

themselves. Congolese businessmen often equipped the rebels with military weapons and mining materials for controlling and mining mineral-rich territories in exchange for the marketing rights to the minerals mined (Romkema 2007). A 2015 United Nations Security Council report reported that no evidence could be found of gold mining in 2014, as it had in years prior to that (UN Security Council 2017). Therefore, we ended the coding for this activity in 2014. Funding amounts are unknown. One source made a short mention that the ADF also mined coltan (Scorgie-Porter 2015). Since this was only a short mention in one source we decided not to code it.

Country: Uganda
Rebel Group: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Natural Resource: coffee
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2007 **To:** 2015
Keywords:
Location: North Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Beni
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) engaged in extortion of coffee from 2007 to 2015 (UN Security Council Report 2011; Scorgie 2011; Titeca 2012; Romkema 2007; Scorgie-Porter 2015; Ward 2015). They cultivated coffee to sell in Beni of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and across the border in Uganda (UN Security Council Report 2011). This activity is first mentioned in 2007 in the World Bank source; it is possible that it began earlier than this. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Uganda
Rebel Group: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Natural Resource: agriculture
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2007 **To:** 2015
Keywords: rice, manioc, bananas
Location: North Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Beni, Ruwenzori Mountains
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99

Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) engaged in extortion of agriculture from 2007 to 2015 (UN Security Council Report 2011; Titeca 2012; Romkema 2007; Scorgie-Porte 2015; Stearns 2013; Ward 2015). This activity is first mentioned in 2007 in the World Bank source; it is possible that it began earlier than this. They maintained plantations of rice, manioc, and bananas, which were often harvested for their own consumption but also to sell in Beni of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and across the border in Uganda (UN Security Council Report 2011). They also cultivated chanvre, a local brand of marijuana, in the Ruwenzori Mountains to be sold in the local market of Watalinga (Titeca 2012; Romkema 2007). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Uganda
Rebel Group: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Criminal Activity: Smuggling Goods
From: 1996 **To:** 2015
Keywords: motorcycles, fuel, fish, pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, vehicle spare parts
Location: Western Region
Geographical Keywords: Bundibugyo District, Kasese District, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (1996-2003; 2013-2015)
1 (multiple credible sources) (2004-2012)

Notes: The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) engaged in smuggling of goods from 1996 to 2015 (Scorgie 2011; Titeca 2012; Romkema 2007; International Crisis Group 2012; Africa Research Bulletin 2004; Stearns 2013; Ward 2015; Scorgie-Porter 2015). When the ADF formed with the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) in 1996, NALU brought with them their cross-border trading relations. Since then the ADF has smuggled goods from areas under their control in the Democratic Republic of the Congo across the border to the Bundibugyo and Kasese districts of Uganda (International Crisis Group 2012; Africa Research Bulletin 2004). They have smuggled motorcycles, fuel, and fish across the border, and have also taxed local traders in their territories (Titeca 2012). Funding amounts are unknown. One source mentioned that the ADF was involved in poaching in Virunga National Park (Scorgie-Porter 2015). Since the mention was short, with very little context, and we could find no other sources that lists them as one of the groups poaching in Virunga National Park, we decided not to code this activity.

Country: Uganda
Rebel Group: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
From: 2010 **To:** 2012
Keywords: businesses, shops
Location: North Kivu (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Beni, Oicha, Kasindi, Erengeti, Butembo, Kantine
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) engaged in extortion from 2010 to 2012 (UN Security Council Report 2011; International Crisis Group 2012). The ADF has a number of shops and businesses supporting it throughout various towns in North Kivu in the Democratic of the Congo. The businesses were forced to give the money to the ADF for fear of retaliation if they didn't. Funding amounts are unknown.

Lord's Resistance Army

Country: Uganda
Rebel Group: Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Extortion
From: 2010 **To:** 2015
Keywords: elephants, ivory
Location: Eastern Province (DRC)
Geographical Keywords: Garamba National Park
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources) (2012-2015)
5 (uncertain about timing, one source) (2010-2011)

Notes: The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) engaged in extortion of animals from 2010 to 2012 (Agger 2013; Nellemann 2013; LRA Crisis Tracker 2013; LRA Crisis Tracker 2012; IRIN 2013; U.S. Department of State 2014; U.S. Department of State 2015). The LRA operated in Garamba National Park (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) where they poached elephants for the purpose of acquiring their ivory tusks to sell. In 2010 and 2011, Joseph Kony, head of the LRA, issued orders for fighters to kill elephants and bring him the ivory (Agger 2013; LRA Crisis

Tracker 2013). Since we are unsure to what extent these orders were actually carried out, if at all, we coded 2010 and 2011 under a lower certainty variable. Funding amounts are unknown.

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Ukraine

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Ukraine:
Donetsk People's Republic: 2014
Lugansk People's Republic: 2014
Maidan: 2014
United Armed Forces of Novorossiya: 2014-2015

Donetsk People's Republic

Country: Ukraine
Rebel Group: Donetsk People's Republic
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2014
Keywords: taxes, local businesses
Location: Donetsk Oblast
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Donetsk People's Republic engaged in extortion in 2014 (Zverev, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2016; International Federation for Human Rights, 2015; Luhn, 2014). They collected tax revenue in the territory they controlled in the Donetsk Oblast and they registered local businesses and entrepreneurs onto their tax roll. Those who refused to make these payments were threatened with violence (International Crisis Group, 2015; Luhn, 2014). Funding amounts are unknown. Russia also contributed funding to keep the Donetsk People's Republic operating (International Federation for Human Rights, 2016; Luhn, 2014).

Country: Ukraine
Rebel Group: Donetsk People's Republic
Natural Resource: coal
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2014
Keywords:
Location: Lugansk Oblast, Donetsk Oblast
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Donetsk People's Republic engaged in smuggling of coal in 2014 (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2018; Euromaiden Press, 2017; Varfolomeyev, 2017). Brothers Oleksandr and Serhiy Melnychuk have used several companies to export coal illegally from the territory of the Lugansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic. The coal was then exported to Poland through Russia. The companies used included Doncoaltrade and Ugolnye Tekhnologii (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2018). While timing of this activity is uncertain, Doncoaltrade was registered in 2012 in the Polish city of Katowice making it likely that this activity had started by 2014 (Euromaiden Press, 2017). Funding amounts are unknown.

Lugansk People's Republic

Country: Ukraine
Rebel Group: Lugansk People's Republic
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2014
Keywords: taxes, local businesses
Location: Lugansk Oblast
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Lugansk People's Republic engaged in extortion in 2014 (Zverev, 2016; Socor, 2015a; Socor, 2015b; International Federation for Human Rights, 2015). They collected tax revenue in the territory they controlled in the Lugansk Oblast and registered local businesses and entrepreneurs onto their tax roll. Those who refused to make these payments were threatened with violence (International Federation for Human Rights, 2015). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Ukraine
Rebel Group: Lugansk People's Republic
Natural Resource: coal
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2014
Keywords:
Location: Lugansk Oblast, Donetsk Oblast
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Lugansk People's Republic engaged in smuggling of coal in 2014 (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2018; Euromaiden Press, 2017; Varfolomeyev, 2017). Brothers Oleksandr and Serhiy Melnychuk have used several companies to export coal illegally from the territory of the Lugansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic. The coal was then exported to Poland through Russia. The companies used included Doncoaltrade and Ugolnye Tekhnologii (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2018). While timing of this activity is uncertain, Doncoaltrade was registered in 2012 in the Polish city of Katowice making it likely that this activity had started by 2014 (Euromaiden Press, 2017). Funding amounts are unknown.

United Armed Forces of Novorossiya

Country: Ukraine
Rebel Group: United Armed Forces of Novorossiya
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2014-2015
Keywords: taxes, local businesses
Location: Lugansk Oblast, Donetsk Oblast
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Notes: The United Armed Forces of Novorossiya engaged in extortion from 2014 to 2015 (Zverev, 2016; Socor, 2015a; Socor, 2015b; International Federation for Human Rights, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2016; Luhn, 2014). The United Armed Forces of Novorossiya was formed in 2014 when the Lugansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic combined their militia forces. They collected tax revenue in the territories they controlled in the Lugansk Oblast and the Donetsk Oblask and registered local businesses and entrepreneurs onto their tax roll. Those who refused to make these payments were threatened with violence (International Federation for Human Rights, 2015). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Ukraine
Rebel Group: United Armed Forces of Novorossiya
Natural Resource: coal
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2014-2015
Keywords:
Location: Lugansk Oblast, Donetsk Oblast
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: Notes: The United Armed Forces of Novorossiya engaged in smuggling of coal from 2014 to 2015 (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2018; Euromaiden Press, 2017; Varfolomeyev, 2017; Interfax-Ukraine, 2017). The United Armed Forces of Novorossiya was formed in 2014 when the Lugansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic combined their militia forces. Brothers Oleksandr and Serhiy Melnychuk have used several companies to export coal illegally from the territory of the Lugansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic. The coal was then exported to Poland through Russia. The companies used included Doncoaltrade and Ugolnye Tekhnologii (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2018). While timing of this activity is uncertain, Doncoaltrade was registered in 2012 in the Polish city of Katowice making it likely that this activity had started by 2014 (Euromaiden Press, 2017). Funding amounts are unknown.

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United Kingdom

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in the United Kingdom:
Provisional IRA: 1990-1998

Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA)

Rebel Group: **Provisional Irish Republican Army** (Provisional IRA)
Natural Resource: animal
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1990 To: 1998
Keywords: cattle, pigs
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes:

The Provisional IRA engaged in smuggling of cattle and pigs from 1990 to 1998 (Biersteker 2007; Rekawek 2011; Horgan 1999; Vittori 2011; Hough 2004). Since moving cattle across the border attracted an EU subsidy by head, the provisional IRA often helped farmers collect the subsidy twice by smuggling the cattle back in during the night. They taxed the farmers for every head of cattle they smuggled back (Biersteker 2007; Hough 2004). Funding amounts are unknown.

Rebel Group: **Provisional Irish Republican Army** (Provisional IRA)
Strategy: Smuggling goods
Years: 1990-1998
Keywords: Cigarettes, livestock, grain, fuels, antibiotics
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The Provisional IRA earned substantial funding from smuggling goods, including cigarette, livestock, grain, fuels, alcohol, antibiotics, and others throughout the 1990s. They earned over $5 million each year (Coker 2003; Horgan and Taylor 1997, 1999; Jackson et al. 2005; Vittori 2011; Biersteker and Eckert 2007; Rekawek 2011; Breen 1999).

Rebel Group: **Provisional Irish Republican Army** (Provisional IRA)

Strategy: Kidnapping
Years: 1980's

Notes:

The Provisional IRA engaged in kidnapping for ransom into the 1980s (Biersteker and Eckert 2007; Rekawek 2011), but this practice appears to have declined after this decade. We did not find direct evidence that the group earned substantial income from kidnapping after 1989, thus we have not coded for kidnapping.

Rebel Group: **Provisional Irish Republican Army** (Provisional IRA)
Strategy: Theft
Years: 1990-1998
Keywords: vehicles, construction equipment, antiques; robbing banks and post offices; welfare and income tax fraud
Funds: -99: Unknown
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes:

The Provisional IRA earned income from the theft of vehicles, construction equipment, antiques, and other goods. They engaged in robberies of banks and post offices during the 1990s. The group engaged in fraud as well, including welfare and income tax schemes. Vittor (2011) reports that fraudulent activities alone netted the group over $30 million, although it not clear if these earnings were constant over time or occurred in one or fewer years, thus we coded for the amount of funding as unknown (Lowe and Turk 2014; Horgan and Taylor 1997, 1999; Madinger 2012; Vittori 2011; Biersteker and Eckert 2007).

Rebel Group: **Provisional Irish Republican Army** (Provisional IRA)
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 1990-1998
Keywords: Protection rackets; Providing security services
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 1 = Multiple credible sources

Notes:

The Provisional IRA engaged in widespread extortion through protection rackets involving local businesses and other criminal actors, including local drug dealers. Their extortion activities also included providing security services to criminal groups, as well as related activities. Note that we did not code this as involvement in drug smuggling, as this was not the

centerpiece of the IRA's activity but incidental to its strategy of extorting businesses and criminal groups. According to Horgan and Taylor (1999), the group earned well over $5 million per year from extortion (Vittori 2011; Lowe and Turk 2014; Jackson et al. 2005, Biersteker and Eckert 2007; Cusack 1998).

Rebel Group: **Provisional Irish Republican Army** (Provisional IRA)
Strategy: Crime-other
Years: 1990-1998
Keywords: Sale of pirated videos and goods
Funds: 1: Under $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 5 = Uncertainty about timing, only one source

Notes:

The Provisional IRA sold illegally pirated videos and other pirated goods, and earned less than $5 million from this activity per year. The time period for this activity was unclear, thus we coded the certainty variable for uncertainty regarding timing (Biersteker and Eckert 2007, Horgan and Taylor 1997; Caunic and Prelipcean 2011).

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United States: al Qaeda Central

The UCDP lists the following group and years in their dataset:
al Qaeda Central (AQC): 2001-2015

There were reports that al Qaeda Central (AQC) engaged in credit card fraud (Makarenko 2004), drug trafficking (Pham 2011; The Guardian 2013), bank robberies, profiting from diamonds in western Africa (Hill 2002; Wannenburg 2003), and other activities (Agence France-Presse 2010; Basile 2004; Counter Extremism Project. n.d.; Hendin 2008; The Associated Press 2013; United Nations Security Council Committee 2002; United Press International 2011). Some of these activities are debated; the 9/11 Commission Report refutes that al Qaeda engaged in extortion of diamonds and drug trafficking (2004). Moreover, it was unclear whether it was AQC or their affiliates that was using these strategies. We did not code these activities, as we have al Qaeda factions coded elsewhere.

AQC engaged in theft from charities in the Persian Gulf region (9/11 Commission Report 2004; Basile 2004; Bruno 2010; Counter Extremism Project. n.d.; Greenberg, Wechsler and Wolosky 2002; Shelley and Picarelli 2002; United Nations Security Council Committee 2002). This was distinct from charity fronts that were established to illicitly channel funds to AQC. Details are too limited to include this activity in the dataset.

Crime

Country: United States of America
Rebel Group: **al-Qaeda Central**
Criminal Activity: International kidnapping
Years: 2008-2015
Keywords: Europeans
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2: Over $5 million
Amounts: -99: Unknown
Certainty: 6 = Uncertainty about timing, multiple sources (2008-2012)
2 (2013-2015)

Notes:
Al Qaeda Central (AQC) engaged in international kidnapping. They have often targeted Europeans, and demand ransoms in the millions. Many European governments have paid these ransoms. They earned over $5 million annually, although specific funding amounts are unknown. Timing on this is unclear, but there is good evidence that it was underway by 2008, and may have commenced earlier (Callimachi 2014; Counter Extremism Project. n.d.)..). A New York

Times article revealed that while the affiliate groups (such as AQAP and AQIM) conduct the actual kidnapping, it is AQC that handles the negotiation (Callimachi 2014). We code this activity from 2008 onwards.

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Uzbekistan

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Uzbekistan:
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): 1999-2011 (Intervening Years: 2001-2011)
Jihad Islamic Group (JIG): 2004

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Country: Uzbekistan
Rebel Group: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Extortion
From: 1999 **To:** 2000
Keywords: laboratories
Location: Republican Subordination (Tajikistan)
Geographical Keywords: Tavildara, Gharm
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources)

Notes: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan engaged in extortion of opium from 1999 to 2000 (Mohapatra 2007; Engvall 2006; International Crisis Group 2001; West 2002) through the use of drug laboratories to refine opium into heroin. Though the labs do not appear to be widespread or a significant source of funding, it was suspected that the IMU had labs in Gharm and Tavildara of Tajikistan (International Crisis Group 2001). Specific funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Uzbekistan
Rebel Group: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Natural Resource: opium
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 1999 **To:** 2011
Location: Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan), Osh (Kyrgyzstan), Batken (Kyrgyzstan)
Geographical Keywords: Khorog
Funds: -99
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) engaged in smuggling of opium from 1999 to 2000 (Horsman 2005; Weitz 2004; Engvall 2006; Mohapatra 2007; Baran 2006; Cornell 2002;

Mann 2002; International Crisis Group 2001; Cornell 2005; UNODC 2010; Falkenburg 2013; Institute for the Study of War; Ergueshev 2012; Vinson 2012; Chalk 2003; Peters 2009; Australian Government Attorney-General's Department 2012). The IMU smuggled drugs from Afghanistan along the Khorog – Osh route and the Batken route through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and eventually to Russia and Europe. They controlled the majority of the drugs that entered Central Asia in 2000 (Mohapatra 2007). After 2000, the IMU's involvement in the drug smuggling decreased dramatically, spurred by the death of IMU leadership most involved in the drug trade as well as increased involvement of corrupt politicians and local militias that also wanted a role in the drug trade (Cornell 2005; Falkenburg 2013). Regardless, it appears that the IMU has been able to retain at least a small presence in the drug trade through 2011. Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Uzbekistan
Rebel Group: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International Victims
From: 1999
Keywords: Kyrgyz mayor and three officials, four Japanese geologists
Location: Osh (Kyrgyzstan), Batken (Kyrgyzstan)
Funds: Less than $5 million per year
Amounts: $2,050,000
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) engaged in kidnapping of international victims in 1999 (Horsman 2005; Weitz 2004; Engvall 2006; Australian Government Attorney-General's Department 2012; Cornell 2002; Mann 2002; Rashid 2001; Naumkin 2003; Rasizade 2002). In August of 1999, the IMU took a Kyrgyz mayor and three official's hostage in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan (Naumkin 2003) and released them for a ransom of $50,000 (Engvall 2006). Later that month, the IMU captured four Japanese geologists in Batken, Kyrgyzstan and released them for a ransom of $2 million (Rashid 2001). The IMU was unable to duplicate their kidnapping success in 2000 (Mann 2002). They were able to kidnap four American mountain climbers in 2000, but the climbers escaped before any money could be obtained for them (Erickson 2005; Rasizade 2006).

Jihad Islamic Group

The Jihad Islamic Group (JIG), also sometimes referred to as *jamoat*, is the name given to the group that tried to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan in 2004. The group was founded in 2002 after splintering from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (Binnie 2009). After killing 47 people in an attack in 2004, it was reported that the group received training and

funding from the same Arab instructors that trained al-Qaida (NBC World News 2004). Many sources contend that this group is also known as the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) which has gone on to have an active role in Afghanistan and Pakistan, allied with the Haqqani network, after its failures in Uzbekistan (Sanderson 2010; Binnie 2009; Moore 2007).

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Venezuela

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Venezuela:
Military Faction (forces of Hugo Chavez): 1992

The conflict in Venezuela was a brief military coup in 1992. The military faction used the arms and resources to which they already had access. There is no evidence that they earned income from natural resources or crime.

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Yemen

The UCDP dataset lists the following armed groups in Yemen:
Democratic Republic of Yemen: 1994
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): 2009-2015
Ansarallah: 2014-2015
Forces of Hadi: 2015
Islamic State: 2015

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

Country: Yemen
Rebel Group: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Natural Resource: drugs (specific drugs unknown)
Strategy: Smuggling
From: 2009 **To:** 2015
Keywords:
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 6 (uncertain about timing, multiple sources) (2009-2012)
5 (2013-2015)

Notes: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) engaged in smuggling of drugs (specific drugs unknown) from 2009 to 2015 (Barfi 2010; Council on Foreign Relations 2015; Counter Extremism Project; Karadeli 2017). Funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Yemen
Rebel Group: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Criminal Activity: Kidnapping International
From: 2011 **To:** 2015
Keywords: Europeans
Location:
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: 2 - More than $5 million per year (2011-2013)
-99 (2014-2015)
Amounts: $10 million (2011-2013)
-99 (2014-2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) engaged in kidnapping of foreigners from 2011 to 2012 (Dilanian 2013; Council on Foreign Relations 2015; U.S. Department of Treasury 2014; U.S. Department of State 2011; U.S. Department of State 2012; Australian Government; Counter Extremism Project; GlobalSecurity.org; U.S. Department of State 2014; U.S. Department of State 2015; U.S. Department of State 2016; U.S. Department of Treasury 2014; Callimachi 2014). AQAP made over US$20 million between 2011 and 2012 through ransom payments for European hostages (Dilanian 2013; U.S. Department of Treasury 2014). Between 2012 and 2013 they earned $20.4 million (Callimachi2014). For the years 2011 to 2013 we coded the amount as US$10 million per year. Therefore, we coded the group as making over $5 million per year for those years. Specific amounts for 2014 and 2015 are unknown.

Country: Yemen
Rebel Group: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Criminal Activity: Theft
From: 2009 **To:** 2015
Keywords: banks
Location: Aden
Geographical Keywords:
Funds: Unknown (2009-2014)
More than $5 million per year (2015)
Amounts: -99 (2009-2014)
$100 million (2015)
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) engaged in theft from 2009 to 2012 (Council on Foreign Relations 2015; U.S. Department of State 2011; U.S. Department of State 2012; Australian Government; Counter Extremism Project; WikiLeaks 2009; GlobalSecurity.org; Bayoumy 2016; Horton 2018; U.S. Department of State 2014; U.S. Department of State 2015; U.S. Department of State 2016). Often the theft takes place in the form of bank robberies. In August of 2009, AQAP stole $500,000 from an Arab Limited Bank truck in Aden (WikiLeaks 2009). When AQAP took over the port city of Mukalla they looted about US$100 million from its central bank branch (Bayoumy 2016). Overall funding amounts are unknown.

Country: Yemen
Rebel Group: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Criminal Activity: Extortion
Years: 2015
Keywords: port taxes

Location: Hadhramaut
Geographical Keywords: Mukalla
Funds: 2 - More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) engaged in extortion in 2015 (International Crisis Group 2017; Bayoumy 2016). In 2015, AQAP took over the port city of Mukalla where they instituted a tax on any goods coming into the port. Reportedly, the earned about US$2 million per day from the taxes on goods and fuel. We coding the group as making more than $5 million per year, but specific amounts are unknown.

Country: Yemen
Rebel Group: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Natural Resource: oil and gas
Strategy: Smuggling
Years: 2015
Keywords: fuel
Location: Shabwa, Hadhramaut
Geographical Keywords: Mukalla, Arabian Sea Coast
Funds: 2- More than $5 million per year
Amounts: -99
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) engaged in smuggling of oil in 2015 (Bayoumy 2016; Browning 2016). AQAP taxed smuggled fuel coming into the port of Mukalla, which AQAP took control of in 2015. They reportedly made about US$2 million per day from taxing the smuggled fuel and other goods at the port (Bayoumy 2016). They also taxed fuel illicitly delivered to remote beaches along the Arabian Sea coast. Tribes in the area made a deal with AQAP not to get in each other's way while smuggling fuel and oil. AQAP also smuggled oil in the Shabwa province (Browning 2016). We coded AQAP as making more than $5 million per day but their specific amounts are unknown.

Country: Yemen
Rebel Group: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Natural Resource: oil and gas
Strategy: Extortion
Years: 2015
Keywords: fuel
Location: Hadhramaut
Geographical Keywords: Mukalla
Funds: 2- Less than $5 million per year

Amounts: $1.4 million
Certainty: 1 (multiple credible sources)

Notes: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) engaged in extortion of oil in 2015 (Bayoumy 2016; Browning 2016). In January of 2015, AQAP demanded $4.7 million from a national oil company. The bank in Mukalla claims that the company only paid $1.4 million while a top government security official claims they paid the whole amount (Bayoumy 2016). We decided to go with the more conservative amount and code $1.4 million. This means they earned less than $5 million in 2015 from this activity.

Islamic State

A group associated with the Islamic State was established in Yemen in 2014 (IS-Y) (Kuoti, 2016; UN Security Council, 2016). AQAP and IS may support each other operationally in Yemen (UN Security Council, 2016), while others report that IS-Y criticizes AQAP for its involvement in providing services to the local population (Kuoti, 2016). IS-Y has close connections with IS central, and they receive financing and leadership from IS central (UN Security Council, 2016). There is no evidence that IS-Y enganged in any of the funding strategies in which we are interested.

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