"Push and Pull on the Periphery: Inadvertent Expansion in World Politics": Appendix

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This appendix presents more detailed quantitative data and analyses than those presented in the main body of the article, as well as a brief description of each case of inadvertent expansion.

Table A1 presents summary statistics for the data on great power territorial expansion.

Table A1: Summary Statistics for Inadvertent Expansion Data

Variable	Range	Mean	Observations
year	1816-2014	1891	258
inadvertent	0/1	0.219	251
risky	0/1	0.426	258
telegraph	0/1	0.514	257
conflict	0/1	0.504	258
extra_regional	0/1	0.612	258
distance	201-19,137	5,965	258
polity	(-10)-10	0.612	258
democracy	0/1	0.357	258
autocracy	0/1	0.24	258
vdem_polyarchy	0.016-0.708	0.295	258
info_capacity	0.213-0.605	0.528	257
gainer_cinc	0.02-0.384	0.14	258
loser_greatpower	0/1	0.116	258
loser_regionalpower	0/1	0.256	258

Table A2 presents data on inadvertent expansion for each of the great powers.[1]

Table A2: Inadvertent Expansion by Great Power		
Actor	**Inadvertent/Total**	**(%)**
France	19/46	(41.3%)
UK	20/81	(24.7%)
Russia	7/35	(20.0%)
Japan	4/24	(16.7%)
Germany	4/27	(14.8%)
USA	1/13	(7.7%)
Austria	0/3	(0%)
Italy	0/19	(0%)
China	0/3	(0%)
Total	**55/251**	**(21.9%)**

Table A3 presents data on inadvertent expansion for each region of the world.[2]

Table A3: Inadvertent Expansion by Region		
Region	**Inadvertent/Total**	
South & Central Asia	9/23	(39.1%)
Sub-Saharan Africa	24/66	(36.4%)
Asia-Pacific	20/90	(22.2%)
Western Hemisphere	1/6	(16.7%)
Middle East & North Africa	1/16	(6.2%)
Europe	0/50	(0%)

Figure A1 presents data on the number of cases of intentional and inadvertent expansion by year. The figure only presents data to 1945, since there are so few cases of intentional expansion by the great powers after 1945 (just four[3]) and no cases of inadvertent expansion after 1932.

[1] Data (.csv) and replication files (.R) for this and all other tables, figures, and analyses are included with the supplementary materials for the article.

[2] I define regions broadly, dividing the world into just six regions: the Western Hemisphere, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East & North Africa, South & Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. Region classification derived from: Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2004), pp. 133-154 (Region data no longer available online).

[3] These are: China's conquests of Tibet in 1950 (id: 232), the Dachen Islands in 1955 (id: 233), the Paracel Islands in 1974 (id: 234), and Russia's conquest of Crimea in 2014 (id: 231).



Table A4 presents the results of the significance tests conducted for the comparisons presented in Figure 2 in the article. The analysis is conducted using a linear probability model. “Robust” standard errors clustered on the great power are reported in each model, in order to account for error heteroskedasticity. As is clear, the bivariate relationships between the telegraph, risk, and inadvertent expansion are highly statistically significant.

Table A4: Statistical Significance Tests for Telegraph, Risky, & Inadvertent Expansion

	Dependent variable:	
	inadvertent	
	(1)	(2)
telegraph	-0.299***	
	(0.058)	
risky		-0.228***
		(0.046)
Observations	251	251
R2	0.130	0.075
Adjusted R2	0.127	0.071
Residual Std. Error (df = 249)	0.387	0.399
F Statistic (df = 1; 249)	37.232***	20.175***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

I also examine the relationship between the telegraph, risk, and inadvertent expansion while controlling for potentially confounding variables. The unit of analysis is the great power expansion observation.[4] The outcome of interest is *inadvertent*, a dichotomous variable indicating whether the expansion observation was inadvertent or not (and therefore, implicitly "intentional"). One of the two independent variables is *telegraph*, a dichotomous variable indicating whether the territorial entity being acquired had a telegraph station that was connected to the global telegraph network at the time of territorial acquisition. The second independent variable is *risky*, another dichotomous variable indicating whether the expansion observation involved considerable risk.

The analysis also includes a number of control variables. To account for the possibility that the spread of the telegraph may simply be a function of time and confounded by something else that is correlated with time, I include a control for the *year* in which the expansion observation occurs. I also include a control for the *distance* (in kilometers) of the

[4] For full details on all variables, please see the Codebook.

territorial entity acquired from the great power's capital, which is a potential alternative operationalization for control by the capital over the periphery. I include a dichotomous variable indicating whether the expansion observation occurred as part of, or in the immediate aftermath of, a broader *conflict*,[5] the expectation being that wartime expansion may be less likely to be inadvertent. To account for state institutional capacity, I also include the great power's information capacity (*info_capacity*), a measure of the state's ability to collect and process information about its territory and populace.[6] Finally, I include a dichotomous variable indicating whether the great power is a *democracy*, as well as the great power's Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score (*gainer_cinc*), a standard measure of relative national power.[7]

The analysis is conducted using a linear probability model. Robust standard errors clustered on the great power are reported, in order to account for error heteroskedasticity. The results are presented in Table A5, below.

[5] For this, I use the Correlates of War's "Inter-state", "Intra-state", and "Extra-state" war lists. See: "COW War Data, 1816-2007 (v4.0)." Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War: 1816 - 2007* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010). Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
[6] Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall, and Jan Teorell, "The Lay of the Land: Information Capacity and the Modern State," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2020), pp. 175-213.
[7] I consider a great power a democracy when it has a Polity Index score of 6 or greater. See: Polity IV Annual Time Series Data, 1800-2018. Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018," Center for Systemic Peace (2019). Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. For CINC data, see: National Material Capabilities (v6.0). J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), pp. 19-48. Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.

Table A5: Linear Probability Analysis of Inadvertent Expansion

	Dependent variable:
	inadvertent
telegraph	-0.239**
	(0.097)
risky	-0.140**
	(0.067)
year	-0.001
	(0.001)
distance	-0.00000
	(0.00001)
conflict	0.077
	(0.093)
info_capacity	0.142
	(0.203)
democracy	-0.022
	(0.061)
gainer_cinc	-0.265
	(0.365)
Observations	250
R2	0.156
Adjusted R2	0.128
Residual Std. Error	0.388 (df = 241)
F Statistic	5.584*** (df = 8; 241)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

As the results show, the relationship between the telegraph, risk, and inadvertent expansion remains significant, even when controlling for potential confounding variables. The coefficient on *telegraph* suggests that expansion observations are 24 percent less likely to be inadvertent when there is a globally connected telegraph station in the acquired territory at the time of acquisition. The coefficient on *Risky* suggests that expansion observations are 14 percent less likely to be inadvertent when the observation in question involves considerable risk. Both of these results are statistically significant according to conventional standards, even with the inclusion of a number of important controls.

These results are robust to alternative model specifications, variable measures, and other kinds of controls. First, I reran the analysis using logistic regression rather than a linear model, to see whether the results are sensitive to statistical model choice. As indicated in Table A6, the results remain unchanged, though the coefficient on *telegraph* is now statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Table A6: Logistic Regression Analysis of Inadvertent Expansion

	Dependent variable:
	inadvertent
telegraph	-1.462***
	(0.491)
risky	-1.205**
	(0.561)
year	-0.017
	(0.012)
distance	-0.00002
	(0.0001)
conflict	0.579
	(0.715)
info_capacity	1.402
	(2.014)
democracy	-0.080
	(0.516)
gainer_cinc	-3.970
	(2.655)
Constant	31.276
	(21.464)
Observations	250
Log Likelihood	-109.484
Akaike Inf. Crit.	236.968
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Second, I reran the analysis with a dichotomous variable indicating whether the expansion took place in a region beyond the great power's own (*extra_regional*), rather than *distance* measured in kilometers from the capital. As indicated in Table A7, the results

are unchanged, though the coefficient on *telegraph* is now statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Table A7: Linear Probability Analysis of Inadvertent Expansion (extra_regional)

	Dependent variable:
	inadvertent
telegraph	-0.219***
	(0.076)
risky	-0.125**
	(0.056)
year	-0.001
	(0.001)
extra_regional	0.064
	(0.080)
conflict	0.086
	(0.086)
info_capacity	0.006
	(0.273)
democracy	-0.052
	(0.055)
gainer_cinc	-0.459
	(0.429)
Observations	250
R2	0.157
Adjusted R2	0.129
Residual Std. Error	0.387 (df = 241)
F Statistic	5.605*** (df = 8; 241)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Third, I reran the analysis using varied regime-type measures for the expanding great power. Rather than the *democracy* dummy, the analysis was run using an *autocracy* indicator,[8] a simple *polity* score, and a Varieties of Democracy Polyarchy score

[8] Operationalized as a Polity score of -6 or less.

(*vdem_polyarchy*) for electoral democracy.[9] As indicated in Table A8, the results are unchanged.

Table A8: Linear Probability Analysis of Inadvertent Expansion (regime type measures)

	Dependent variable:		
	inadvertent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
telegraph	-0.241***	-0.241***	-0.241**
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.095)
risky	-0.141**	-0.139**	-0.139**
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.066)
year	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
distance	-0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
conflict	0.082	0.078	0.077
	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.101)
info_capacity	0.170	0.138	0.118
	(0.216)	(0.265)	(0.297)
autocracy	0.032		
	(0.062)		
polity		-0.001	
		(0.005)	
vdem_polyarchy			-0.003
			(0.219)
gainer_cinc	-0.266	-0.255	-0.257
	(0.352)	(0.348)	(0.347)
Observations	250	250	250
R2	0.157	0.156	0.156
Adjusted R2	0.129	0.128	0.128
Residual Std. Error (df = 241)	0.387	0.388	0.388
F Statistic (df = 8; 241)	5.595***	5.566***	5.562***
Note:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01

[9] Michael Coppedge, et al., "VDem Country–Year Dataset v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (2022). https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22; Daniel Pemstein, et al., "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". *V-Dem Working Paper* No. 21. 7th ed. (2022), University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

Fourth, I reran the analysis dropping each great power one-by-one, to see if any specific actors are importantly driving the results. Tables A9 and A10 show that some actors, in fact, do play an influential role in driving the results. However, this shouldn't be particularly surprising given that the dataset consists of just nine great powers, only six of which have ever experienced inadvertent expansion (see Table A2). As Models 4 and 5 in Table A9 and all models in Table A10 show, the results remain largely unchanged when you remove Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, China, or Japan. As Models 1 and 2 in Table A9 show, removing the United States or the United Kingdom reduces (in the case of the U.S.) or eliminates (in the case of the U.K.) the statistical significance of the coefficient on *risky*. However, many observations are lost by dropping the U.K. (82, including 20 observations of inadvertent expansion), the sign of the coefficient in both models remains in the expected direction, and *telegraph* remains strong and significant in both models. As Model 3 in Table A9 shows, removing France reduces the statistical significance on the *telegraph* coefficient to the 0.1 level and eliminates the statistical significance of the *risky* coefficient. Note, however, that we are, again, losing quite a few observations with this specification (47, including 19 observations of inadvertent expansion), and that for both coefficients the sign is in the expected direction. In sum, the United Kingdom and France appear to be most influential in driving the results. Yet with 39 of the 55 cases of inadvertent expansion between them, this is not particularly surprising nor a cause for major concern. The results are robust to dropping most individual great power actors.

Table A9: Linear Probability Analysis of Inadvertent Expansion (Dropping Great Powers)

	Dependent variable:				
	inadvertent				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
telegraph	-0.268**	-0.305***	-0.177*	-0.203**	-0.242**
	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.102)
risky	-0.138*	-0.088	-0.095	-0.132**	-0.132**
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.066)
year	-0.001	-0.00000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
distance	-0.00000	-0.00001	0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
conflict	0.083	-0.039	0.079	0.104	0.081
	(0.091)	(0.070)	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.092)
info_capacity	0.004	-0.039	0.064	0.157	0.154
	(0.252)	(0.340)	(0.254)	(0.253)	(0.203)
democracy	-0.0002	0.058	-0.091***	-0.031	-0.023
	(0.081)	(0.058)	(0.029)	(0.062)	(0.061)
gainer_cinc	-0.265	-0.424	-0.062	-0.496	-0.304
	(0.433)	(0.604)	(0.414)	(0.370)	(0.383)
Observations	237	169	204	223	247
R2	0.155	0.196	0.157	0.146	0.158
Adjusted R2	0.126	0.156	0.122	0.114	0.130
Residual Std. Error	0.393 (df = 228)	0.373 (df = 160)	0.358 (df = 195)	0.396 (df = 214)	0.389 (df = 238)
F Statistic	5.244*** (df = 8; 228)	4.882*** (df = 8; 160)	4.533*** (df = 8; 195)	4.556*** (df = 8; 214)	5.601*** (df = 8; 238)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	(1) Without U.S.; (2) Without U.K.; (3) Without France; (4) Without Germany; (5) Without Austria(-Hungary)				

Table A10: Linear Probability Analysis of Inadvertent Expansion (Dropping Great Powers)

	Dependent variable:			
	inadvertent			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
telegraph	-0.227**	-0.195**	-0.238**	-0.271***
	(0.106)	(0.093)	(0.098)	(0.100)
risky	-0.172**	-0.195***	-0.145**	-0.149**
	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.063)
year	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
distance	-0.00001	-0.00001	-0.00000	-0.00001
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
conflict	0.084	0.138*	0.081	0.052
	(0.099)	(0.074)	(0.096)	(0.100)
info_capacity	0.275*	0.293	0.125	0.166
	(0.150)	(0.215)	(0.222)	(0.212)
democracy	-0.055	-0.029	-0.021	0.003
	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.057)
gainer_cinc	-0.544	-0.098	-0.269	-0.085
	(0.332)	(0.360)	(0.371)	(0.392)
Observations	231	216	247	226
R2	0.159	0.146	0.154	0.187
Adjusted R2	0.128	0.113	0.126	0.157
Residual Std. Error	0.399 (df = 222)	0.392 (df = 207)	0.390 (df = 238)	0.385 (df = 217)
F Statistic	5.230*** (df = 8; 222)	4.428*** (df = 8; 207)	5.417*** (df = 8; 238)	6.240*** (df = 8; 217)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

(1) Without Italy; (2) Without Russia/Soviet Union; (3) Without China; (4) Without Japan

Fifth, I reran the analysis dropping each region one-by-one, to see if any specific region is importantly driving the results. Table A11 shows that, like the actors, some regions are influential in terms of driving the overall results. But this, again, shouldn't be very surprising, given that cases of inadvertent expansion are so heavily clustered in just two or three of the world's six regions (see Table A2). Models 1, 2, and 4 in Table A10 show that the results are mostly unchanged when the observations in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, or the Middle East & North Africa are removed from the data. While in Model 1 (without the Western Hemisphere), the coefficient on *risky* is only statistically significant at the 0.1 level, the size of the coefficient is unchanged, the sign is in the expected direction, and the coefficient on *telegraph* remains strong and significant. Similarly, in Model 2 (without Europe), while the coefficient on *telegraph* is also only significant at the 0.1 level, the size of the coefficient is substantially similar, its sign is in the expected direction, and the coefficient on *risky* remains strong and significant.

Model 3 shows that removing Sub-Saharan Africa cases from the data render the coefficients on both *telegraph* and *risky* statistically indistinguishable from zero. That said, this region includes both many observations (66) and the largest number of cases of inadvertent expansion (24), and the signs of both coefficients remains in the expected direction. Models 5 and 6 show that removing South & Central Asia or Asia-Pacific observations from the data eliminates the statistical significance of the coefficient on *risky*, though the telegraph coefficient remains strong, statistically significant, and in the expected direction. These region includes both the highest proportion of cases of inadvertent expansion (9/24, for South & Central Asia) and a large number of observations overall (80 for Asia-Pacific), so it may not be surprising that they play such an influential

role in the results. In sum, the results are importantly influenced by observations in Sub-Saharan Africa, South & Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. Yet given that these regions account for virtually all observations of inadvertent expansion (53/55) and a fairly high proportion in each (22-39%), this should likely be expected.

Table A11: Linear Probability Analysis of Inadvertent Expansion (Dropping Regions)

	Dependent variable:					
	inadvertent					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
telegraph	-0.238**	-0.183*	-0.095	-0.283**	-0.221**	-0.376***
	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.124)	(0.112)	(0.087)	(0.046)
risky	-0.137*	-0.163***	-0.148	-0.108**	-0.114	-0.140
	(0.071)	(0.060)	(0.094)	(0.053)	(0.081)	(0.087)
year	-0.001	-0.003*	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.00001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
distance	-0.00000	-0.00001	-0.00000	-0.00001	-0.00000	0.00001
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00002)
conflict	0.067	0.148*	0.024	0.086	0.066	0.112
	(0.095)	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.080)	(0.087)	(0.138)
info_capacity	0.081	0.229	-0.079	0.186	0.307	0.116
	(0.194)	(0.226)	(0.271)	(0.209)	(0.215)	(0.299)
democracy	-0.022	-0.063	-0.049	-0.020	-0.027	0.014
	(0.073)	(0.047)	(0.082)	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.071)
gainer_cinc	-0.202	-0.538	-0.062	-0.118	-0.202	-0.859
	(0.367)	(0.436)	(0.406)	(0.353)	(0.343)	(0.608)
Observations	244	201	184	234	227	160
R2	0.156	0.144	0.158	0.170	0.141	0.231
Adjusted R2	0.127	0.108	0.119	0.140	0.110	0.190
Residual Std. Error	0.389 (df = 235)	0.422 (df = 192)	0.352 (df = 175)	0.392 (df = 225)	0.380 (df = 218)	0.373 (df = 151)
F Statistic	5.416*** (df = 8; 235)	4.026*** (df = 8; 192)	4.102*** (df = 8; 175)	5.742*** (df = 8; 225)	4.476*** (df = 8; 218)	5.665*** (df = 8; 151)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

(1) No Western Hemisphere; (2) No Europe; (3) No Sub-Saharan Africa; (4) No Middle East & North Africa; (5) No South & Central Asia; (6) No Asia-Pacific

Finally, Table A12 presents all cases of inadvertent expansion in the data and listed in Table 1 of the article, accompanied by a brief description of events. For full details and citation information for each of the 258 cases of expansion in the data, please see the Codebook.

Table A12: Inadvertent Expansion: Case Descriptions			
Great Power	*Date*	*Entity*	*Description*
United States	1818/5	Florida	The conquest of Florida was carried out by U.S. Army and state militia forces led by Andrew Jackson. Jackson had been authorized to cross the border, but not to take or hold Spanish territory.
United Kingdom	1818/6	Maratha Empire	The conquest of the Maratha Empire was carried out by British East India Company forces led by Francis Rawdon-Hastings. Hastings launched the war against an expressed desire in London to avoid it and only got approval after the fact.
	1819/2	Singapore	The annexation of Singapore was carried out by Sir Stamford Raffles of the British East India Company. Raffles annexed the territory without permission from his superiors in London.
	1825/12	Upper Burma	The conquest of Upper Burma was carried out by British East India Company forces led by Archibald Campbell. The conquest was at Campbell's initiative and was opposed by leaders in London.
	1842/4	Chatham Islands	The annexation of the Chatham Islands was carried out by the New Zealand Company, a British royal chartered company. It was claimed without authorization from leaders in London.
	1843/3	Sind	The conquest of Sind was carried out by British East India Company forces led by Charles James Napier. The conquest was at Napier's initiative, and against orders from leaders in London to avoid hostilities.
	1846/2	Eastern Punjab	The conquest of Eastern Punjab was carried out by British East India Company forces led by Hugh Gough. The war leading to the conquest was declared by the Governor-General of India, and was opposed by leaders in London.
	1847/12	Xhosa Territory	The conquest of Xhosa territory was carried out by forces under the command of Henry Pottinger. The war leading to the conquest was initiated without prior approval from London.
	1848/2	Orange River Territory	The annexation of the Orange River Territory was carried out by British Cape Colony governor Harry G. W. Smith. The territory was annexed without authorization from London.
	1849/3	Punjab	The conquest of Punjab was carried out by British East India Company forces led by Hugh Gough, and then the territory was annexed by Governor-General of India Lord Dalhousie. The annexation decision did not have prior approval from London.

	1852/12	Lower Burma	The conquest of Lower Burma was carried out by British East India Company forces led by George Lambert and Henry Godwin. Lambert initiated the war that led to the conquest without authority, and the Governor-General of India, Lord Dalhousie, then annexed the territory without approval from London.
	1857/3	Keeling (Cocos) Islands	The annexation of Keeling (Cocos) Islands was carried out by Stephen Fremantle. Fremantle had misinterpreted his orders and accidentally annexed the islands.
	1874/4	Western Peninsular Malaya	The annexation of Western Peninsular Malaya was carried out by British Straits Settlements Governor Andrew Clarke. Clarke had orders to merely report on local conditions, but he annexed the territory instead.
	1874/9	Fiji	The annexation of Fiji was carried out by a British government commissioner, James Goodenough. Goodenough had orders to merely report on conditions in Fiji, but he annexed the territory instead.
	1878/7	Xhosa Territory	The annexation of Xhosa territory was carried out by the British High Commissioner for South Africa and the Cape Colony Governor Henry Bartle Frere. Frere made the annexation decision without authorization from the government in London.
	1879/9	Zulu Kingdom	The conquest of the Zulu Kingdom was carried out by British forces under the command of Frederick A. Thesiger. The war that led to the conquest was initiated by Cape Colony Governor Bartle Frere, without the knowledge or approval of London.
	1884/11	Papua	The annexation of Papua was carried out under orders of the governor of British Queensland, Thomas McIlwraith. McIlwraith's annexation decision was made independently, without authorization from London.
	1888/5	North Borneo	The annexation of North Borneo was carried out by Alfred and Edward Dent of the British North Borneo Company, a British royal chartered company. The annexation was made without permission from the government in London.
	1890/9	Rhodesia	The conquest and annexation of Rhodesia was carried out over a number of years by British South Africa Company forces under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes. Rhodes' initial territorial acquisitions, and many subsequent claims, were taken without authorization from London.
	1900/3	Nigeria	The conquest and annexation of Nigeria was carried out over a number of years by British Royal Niger Company forces under the leadership of George Goldie. Goldie's initial acquisitions, and many subsequent claims by others such as Frederick Lugard, were not authorized beforehand in London.

	1914/8	Togoland	The conquest of Togoland was carried out by a joint British-French force in the opening weeks of World War I. The conquest was at the initiative of local commanders, without orders or authorization from London or Paris.
France	1840	Nosy Be	The annexation of Nosy Be was carried out by a naval officer under orders of French Réunion Governor Anne Chrétien Louis de Hell. De Hell made the annexation decision independently, without authorization from Paris.
	1841/4	Mayotte Island	The annexation of Mayotte was carried out by a naval officer under orders of French Réunion Governor Anne Chrétien Louis de Hell. De Hell made the annexation decision independently, without authorization from Paris.
	1842/8	Tahiti	The annexation of Tahiti and the Eastern Society Islands was carried out by French naval officer Abel Aubert du Petit-Thouars. Du Petit-Thouars made the annexation on his own authority, without orders from Paris.
	1843/6	Gabon Coast	The annexation of the Gabon coast was carried out piecemeal by French naval officers Édouard Bouët-Willaumez and Félix de Monléon. Bouët-Willaumez's initial territorial annexations in the area were conducted without authorization from Paris.
	1860/9	Senegal (part)	The conquest of parts of Senegal was carried out piecemeal by French forces under the command of Louis Léon César Faidherbe. Faidherbe had been ordered by leaders in Paris to establish trade relations in the area, but he independently opted for conquest instead.
	1862/3	Obock	The annexation of Obock was carried out by a French explorer Henri Lambert, without authorization from Paris. Lambert was killed and the French government would send representatives to investigate, who ultimately accepted the territory for France.
	1863/8	Cambodia	The annexation of Cambodia was carried out by French naval officer Pierre-Paul de la Grandière. De la Grandière made the annexation decision independently, without authority from the French government.
	1867/6	Western Cochinchina	The annexation of Western Cochinchina was carried out by French naval officer Pierre-Paul de la Grandière. De la Grandière annexed the area independently, without informing the French government.
	1880/6	Gabon	The annexation of Gabon was carried out by Italian-French explorer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza. Savorgnan de Brazza was only authorized by Paris to establish scientific stations in the area, but he annexed the territory nonetheless.
	1880/9	Congo	The annexation of Congo was carried out by Italian-French explorer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza. Savorgnan de Brazza was only authorized by Paris to

			establish scientific stations in the area, but he annexed the territory nonetheless.
	1883/2	Southern French Sudan	The conquest of Southern French Sudan was carried out by French forces under the command of Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes. Desbordes decided to conquer this area despite explicit orders from Paris to the contrary.
	1883/8	Annam	The conquest of Annam was carried out by French forces under the command of Amédée Courbet. The initial seizure of territory that prompted the war that led to this conquest was carried out by another French naval officer, Henri Rivière, who was acting without orders from Paris.
	1883/8	Tonkin	The conquest of Tonkin was carried out by French forces under the command of Amédée Courbet. The initial seizure of territory that prompted the war that led to this conquest was carried out by another French naval officer, Henri Rivière, who was acting without orders from Paris.
	1893/4	Northern French Sudan	The conquest of Northern French Sudan was carried out piecemeal by French forces under the command of Louis Archinard. Archinard launched this territorial campaign without the approval of leaders in Paris, though there was some collusion by sub-cabinet members of the colonial department.
	1894/8	Ubangi-Shari	The annexation of Ubangi-Chari was carried out by French explorer Paul Crampel. Crampel's annexation was conducted without the authorization of leaders in Paris, though there was some collusion by sub-cabinet members of the colonial department.
	1900/4	Chad	The conquest of Chad was carried out by French forces under the command of François Lamy. Lamy was authorized by Paris to go on a scientific expedition in the area, but he opted for conquest instead. There was some collusion by sub-cabinet members of the colonial department.
	1904/6	Eastern Morocco	The conquest of Eastern Morocco was carried out by French forces under the command of Louis Hubert Gonsalve Lyautey. Lyautey conquered this territory independently, despite direct orders from Paris to the contrary.
	1914/8	Togoland	The conquest of Togoland was carried out by a joint French-British force in the opening weeks of World War I. The conquest was at the initiative of local commanders, without orders or authorization from Paris or London.
	1916/1	Cameroon	The conquest of Cameroon was carried out by a joint French-Belgian force, the French forces being under the command of Joseph Aymerich, during World War I. The conquest was at the initiative of the French and Belgian forces, without orders from Paris.

Germany	1884/4	South West Africa	The annexation of South West Africa was carried out by a German merchant Adolph Lüderitz. The initial acquisitions were made without authorization from Berlin, and only approved by leaders there after-the fact.
	1884/7	Togoland	The annexation of Togoland was carried out by German explorer and imperial official Gustav Nachtigal. Nachtigal had been authorized by German leaders to annex Cameroon, but he independently added Togoland to his territorial gains.
	1885/5	East Africa	The annexation of East Africa was carried out by German explorer Karl Peters. Peters was acting on his own initiative, and was explicitly told the government did not support his actions.
	1885/5	Wituland	The annexation of Wituland was carried out by two German merchants, Clemens and Gustav Denhart. The Denhart brothers annexed the territory using private funds and without government support or authorization.
Russia	1850/8	Amur Region	The annexation of the Amur Region was carried out by Russian explorer Gennadii Ivanovich Nevelskoi, acting on orders of the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, Nikolai Nikolaevich Muraviev-Amursky. Neither Nevelskoi nor Muraviev-Amursky were authorized by St. Petersburg to annex the territory.
	1852/summer	Ussuri Region	The annexation of the Ussuri Region was carried out by Russian explorer Gennadii Ivanovich Nevelskoi. Nevelskoi conducted the annexation on his own initiative, without orders or authority from leaders in St. Petersburg.
	1864/9	Chimkent	The conquest of Chimkent was carried out by Russian forces under the command of Mikhail Grigorievich Cherniaev. While there were longer term plans for the government in St. Petersburg to acquire Chimkent, this particular conquest was conducted without government authorization.
	1865/6	Tashkent	The conquest of Tashkent was carried out by Russian forces under the command of Mikhail Grigorievich Cherniaev. Cherniaev conducted the conquest of Tashkent despite orders from St. Petersburg to the contrary.
	1866/5	Khujand	The conquest of Khujand was carried out by Russian forces under the command of the Governor General of Russian Turkestan, Dmitrii Ilyich Romanovskii. Romanovskii had been told that the tsar did not want any new conquests in the area.
	1868/6	Khanate of Bukhara	The conquest of Bukhara was carried out by Russian forces under the command of the Governor General of Russian Turkestan, Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman. Von Kaufman conducted the conquest despite orders from St. Petersburg to avoid further conquest in the area.

	1876/2	Khanate of Kokand	The conquest of Kokand was carried out by Russian forces under the command of the Governor General of Russian Turkestan, Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman. Von Kaufman's initial territorial gains in the area were conducted on his own authority, against the wishes of leaders in St. Petersburg.
Japan	1914/10	Caroline Islands	The conquest of the Caroline Islands was carried out by Japanese naval forces under the command of Yamaya Tanin. The cabinet in Tokyo had specifically instructed the naval task force not to acquire the islands, but the Navy General Staff overrode this order.
	1914/10	Mariana Islands	The conquest of the Mariana Islands was carried out by Japanese naval forces under the command of Yamaya Tanin. The cabinet in Tokyo had specifically instructed the naval task force not to acquire the islands, but the Navy General Staff overrode this order.
	1914/10	Marshall Islands	The conquest of the Marshall Islands was carried out by Japanese naval forces under the command of Yamaya Tanin. The cabinet in Tokyo had specifically instructed the naval task force not to acquire the islands, but the Navy General Staff overrode this order.
	1932/2	Manchuria	The conquest of Manchuria was carried out by Japanese Kwantung Army forces under the command of Honjō Shigeru. The invasion of Manchuria was independently planned and orchestrated by a small group of Kwantung Army officers, led by Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishirō, without informing or receiving authorization from Tokyo.