Appendix

"Women's Political Representation in African Rebel Parties"

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1 Dataset on Women's Party-Level Political Representation in Post-Conflict Africa

1.1 *Data Collection*

This paper introduces a new dataset on women's party-level representation in post-conflict Africa. The sample includes all African countries that experienced a rebel group to political party transformation between 1970 and 2020. To identify the sample of countries, I relied on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) and Zuckerman Daly's (2021) Civil War Successor Dataset.

I then collected data on the number of candidates fielded and the number of seats received by each party for every post-conflict multi-party election. I collected additional data on the number of women candidates and elected representatives in each election in the sample. This data was collected from a variety of sources, including from the African Democracy Encyclopedia Project of the Electoral Institute of Sustainable Democracy in Africa, the African Election Database, the Inter-parliamentary Union, Parliamentary documents and records, academic sources, and news reports. Much of these sources derive their data from official election records, though some such as new reports or academic scholarship occasionally reported data obtained through interviews or political party press releases.

The dataset does contain some non-random missingness, especially among the candidacy data. Certain countries were generally more difficult to obtain information on, such as Chad, the Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. These countries generally were not as well represented within academic work or policy reports. Further, there were fewer archived news reports that could be relied on. There is more widespread missingness for candidacy data. It was difficult to find candidacy data for smaller countries that generally receive less attention from western scholars and news conglomerates, and for elections in dating back to the 1970s, 80s, and occasionally 90s.

Even though the missingness in the candidacy data is not random, the sample should



Figure 1: Missing Data in Candidacy Variable

still be fairly representative, as each include variation in geography, conflict outcome, rebel party seat share, and women's representation. Further, the non-random missingness is not a product of any of the factors of interest, and instead represents the ease of access to electoral records. Though the missing data poses a difficult problem to the analysis, without evidence that the missing data is related to systematically lower or higher proportions of women candidates, there is not reason to believe it should undermine the finding.

2 Effect of Conflict-Specific Contexts

2.1 *Time*

Table 1: Multilevel Linear Regression Model – Time

	Prop. of Women Candidates			Prop. of Women Elected		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rebel Party	0.07**	0.05	0.07**	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
log(Seat Share)				0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Level of Democracy	−0.11	−0.11	−0.12	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender Quotas	−0.08	−0.08	−0.06	0.04**	0.04**	0.04*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Candidate Selection	−0.01	−0.01	−0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Opposition Party	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party Institutionalization	0.51**	0.50**	0.51**	0.17*	0.17*	0.15
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
log(GDP per Capita)	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.03*	−0.03*	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Women's Civil Society Part.	0.35*	0.36*	0.27	0.13**	0.13**	0.14*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Time	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.00	0.00***	0.00***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time^2			−0.00			0.00
			(0.00)			(0.00)
Rebel Party*Time		0.00			0.00	
		(0.00)			(0.00)	
Constant	−0.16	−0.15	−0.16	0.12	0.12	0.11
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Country Variance	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AIC	−104.20	−92.33	−87.54	−405.18	−393.36	−388.29
Log Likelihood	67.10	62.17	59.77	218.59	213.68	211.14
Num. obs.	124	124	124	802	802	802

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$
Time splines omitted

2.2 *Conflict Outcome (Candidacy)*

Table 2: Hierarchical Linear Regression Model – Candidacy & Conflict Outcome

	Prop. of Women Candidates		
	(7)	(8)	(9)
Rebel Party	0.06	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Democracy	−0.06	−0.05	−0.01
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Gender Quotas	−0.05	−0.05	−0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Candidate Selection	−0.03	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Opposition Party	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party Institutionalization	0.12	0.10	0.09
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.23)
log(GDP per Capita)	0.03	0.04	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Women's Civil Society Part.	0.13	0.12	−0.15
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.42)
Rebel Victory	−0.02		
	(0.09)		
Rebel Party x Rebel Victory	0.01		
	(0.05)		
Peace Agreement		−0.00	
		(0.15)	
Rebel Party x Peace Agreement		−0.02	
		(0.05)	
Low Activity			−0.17
			(0.21)
Rebel Party x Low Activity			−0.03
			(0.11)
Constant	−0.11	−0.14	−0.11
	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.33)
Country Variance	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
AIC	−97.53	−98.91	−101.81
Log Likelihood	64.76	65.45	66.90
Num. obs.	124	124	124

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$

Time splines omitted

2.3 *Conflict Outcome (Election)*

Table 3: Multilevel Linear Regression Model – Election & Conflict Outcome

	Prop. of Women Elected		
	(10)	(11)	(12)
Rebel Party	0.04	0.03	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
log(Seat Share)	0.02***	0.02**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Democracy	−0.00	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender Quotas	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Candidate Selection	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Opposition Party	−0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party Institutionalization	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
log(GDP per Capita)	−0.03*	−0.04*	−0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Women's Civil Society Part.	0.14*	0.16**	0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Rebel Victory	0.02		
	(0.02)		
Rebel Party x Rebel Victory	0.01		
	(0.04)		
Peace Agreement		−0.00	
		(0.03)	
Rebel Party x Peace Agreement		0.07	
		(0.04)	
Low Activity			0.01
			(0.04)
Rebel Party x Low Activity			−0.13*
			(0.06)
Constant	0.14	0.17	0.15
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Country Variance	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AIC	−393.83	−395.33	−399.32
Log Likelihood	213.92	214.67	216.66
Num. obs.	805	805	805

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$. *Time splines omitted*

2.4 *Gender Inclusivity, Rights, & Respect*

Table 4: Multilevel Linear Regression Model – Wartime Civilian Victimization

	Prop. Women Candidates			Prop. Women Elected		
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Leftist Rebel Party	0.17			0.11		
	(0.12)			(0.07)		
Rebel Party w/ Humanitarian Aid		0.17			0.08	
		(0.12)			(0.08)	
Rebel Party w/ Forced Recruits			0.05			0.05
			(0.04)			(0.03)
log(Seat Share)				0.02***	0.02***	0.01**
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Level of Democracy	−0.06	−0.03	−0.07	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender Quotas	−0.03	−0.03	−0.02	0.04*	0.03*	0.04*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Candidate Selection	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Opposition Party	−0.02	−0.03	−0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party Institutionalization	0.10	0.15	0.12	0.27***	0.29***	0.25***
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
log(GDP per Capita)	0.04	0.03	0.04	−0.03**	−0.04**	−0.03**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Women's Civil Society Part.	0.14	0.09	0.09	0.18***	0.17***	0.16***
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	−0.20	−0.11	−0.15	0.15	0.20*	0.17
	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Country Variance	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AIC	−102.09	−103.92	−88.68	−393.83	−400.51	−378.07
Log Likelihood	65.05	65.96	58.34	211.92	215.25	204.04
No. Obs.	119	122	112	788	798	769

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$
Time splines omitted

2.5 *Wartime Civilian Victimization*

Table 5: Multilevel Linear Regression Model – Wartime Civilian Victimization

	Prop. Women Candidates	Prop. Women Elected
	(19)	(20)
Rebel Parties	0.05**	0.04**
using Civilian Victimization	(0.02)	(0.01)
log(Seat Share)		0.02***
		(0.00)
Level of Democracy	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.09)	(0.02)
Gender Quotas	−0.02	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.02)
Candidate Selection	−0.01	−0.03
	(0.06)	(0.02)
Opposition Party	−0.03	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Party Institutionalization	0.20	0.25***
	(0.22)	(0.08)
log(GDP per Capita)	0.03	−0.03*
	(0.04)	(0.01)
Women's Civil Society Participation	0.07	0.17***
	(0.28)	(0.05)
	(0.91)	(0.44)
Constant	−0.11	0.17
	(0.30)	(0.09)
Country Variance	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.03)
AIC	−100.58	−377.96
Log Likelihood	64.29	203.98
No. Obs.	117	777

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$
Time splines omitted



Figure 2: Predicted Estimates of the Proportion of Women Running by Civilian Victimization



Figure 3: Predicted Estimates of the Proportion of Women Elected by Civilian Victimization

2.6 *Ongoing Violence*

Table 6: Multilevel Linear Regression Model – Ongoing Violence

	Prop. of Women Candidates	Prop. of Women Elected	
	(21)	(22)	(23)
Rebel Party	0.07**	0.05*	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
log(Seat Share)		0.01**	0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Democracy	−0.07	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender Quotas	−0.08	0.03*	0.04*
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Candidate Selection	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Opposition Party	−0.02	−0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party Institutionalization	0.05	0.29***	0.29***
	(0.23)	(0.08)	(0.07)
log(GDP per Capita)	0.04	−0.04**	−0.04**
	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Women's Civil Society Part.	0.24	0.12*	0.13*
	(0.31)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ongoing Conflict	0.06	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Rebel Party *x* Ongoing Conflict			−0.05
			(0.04)
Constant	−0.24	0.24*	0.22*
	(0.34)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Country Variance	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AIC	−104.07	−397.39	−392.44
Log Likelihood	67.03	214.70	213.22
Num. obs.	124	802	802

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$

Time splines omitted

2.7 *Women's Participation in Rebel Groups*

Table 7: Multilevel Linear Regression Model – Women's Participation in Rebel Groups

	Prop. Women Candidates	Prop. Women Elected
	(24)	(25)
Female Wartime Membership	0.03**	0.03*
in Rebel Parties	(0.01)	(0.01)
log(Seat Share)		0.01**
		(0.00)
Level of Democracy	−0.05	−0.02
	(0.10)	(0.02)
Gender Quotas	−0.05	0.04*
	(0.06)	(0.02)
Candidate Selection	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.02)
Opposition Party	−0.02	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Party Institutionalization	0.09	0.27***
	(0.23)	(0.07)
log(GDP per Capita)	0.04	−0.03**
	(0.05)	(0.01)
Women's Civil Society Participation	0.11	0.17***
	(0.28)	(0.05)
Constant	−0.14	0.14
	(0.32)	(0.09)
Country Variance	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.03)
AIC	−107.67	−407.49
Log Likelihood	67.83	218.74
No. Obs.	124	801

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$
Time splines omitted



Figure 4: Predicted Estimates of the Proportion of Women Running by Wartime Participation



Figure 5: Predicted Estimates of the Proportion of Women Elected by Wartime Participation

3 Additional Robustness Checks

3.1 *Alternative Democracy Operationalizations*

Table 8: Multilevel Linear Regression Model – Alternative Democracy Operationalizations

	Prop. of Women Candidates			Prop. of Women Elected		
	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)
Rebel Party	0.07*	0.07**	0.07**	0.03	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
log(Seat Share)				0.02**	0.01**	0.02***
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Democracy	−0.05			−0.02		
	(0.10)			(0.02)		
Gender Quotas	−0.05	−0.05	−0.06	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Candidate Selection	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Opposition Party	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party Institutionalization	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.26***	0.28***	0.28***
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
log(GDP per Capita)	0.04	0.06	0.06	−0.03*	−0.03*	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Women's Civil Society Part.	0.14	0.32	0.44	0.18***	0.25***	0.25***
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Rebel Party x Democracy	−0.00			0.04		
	(0.05)			(0.04)		
Electoral Democracy		−0.32			−0.18**	
		(0.23)			(0.07)	
Liberal Democracy			−0.42			−0.16
			(0.25)			(0.09)
Constant	−0.14	−0.32	−0.43	0.14	0.09	0.07
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Country Variance	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AIC	−102.67	−112.05	−112.91	−401.73	−416.28	−412.62
Log Likelihood	66.33	70.02	70.45	216.86	223.14	221.31
Num. obs.	124	124	124	805	805	805

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$
Time splines omitted

3.2 *Alternative Gender Quota Operationalizations*

Table 9: Multilevel Linear Regression Model – Alternative Gender Quotas Variables

	Prop. of Women Candidates			Prop. of Women Elected		
	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)
Rebel Party	0.07**	0.07**	0.04	0.08***	0.05*	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
log(Seat Share)			0.01		0.02**	0.01**
			(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.01)
Democracy	−0.05	−0.06	−0.01	−0.03*	0.00	−0.03
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Implemented Quotas	−0.05			0.03		
	(0.06)			(0.02)		
Effective Quotas		−0.04			0.08**	
		(0.08)			(0.03)	
Party Quota			0.04			0.12*
			(0.05)			(0.06)
Rebel Party x Party Quota			−0.05			0.03
			(0.06)			(0.07)
Candidate Selection	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	−0.04*	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Opposition Party	−0.02	−0.02	−0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party Institutionalization	0.09	0.19	0.15	0.24***	0.15	0.17
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
log(GDP per Capita)	0.04	0.02	0.04	−0.03*	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Women's Civil Society Part.	0.14	0.14	0.06	0.20***	0.16**	0.15*
	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Constant	0.06	0.05	0.12			
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Country Variance	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AIC	−108.77	−108.86	−95.10	−415.87	−414.51	−414.97
Log Likelihood	68.39	68.43	63.55	221.94	222.25	223.48
Num. obs.	124	124	124	811	805	805

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$
Time splines omitted

3.3 *Alternate Specifications*

Table 10: Linear Regression Model

	Prop. Women Candidates	Prop. Women Elected
	(38)	(39)
Rebel Party	0.07**	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)
log(Seat Share)		0.02**
		(0.00)
Level of Democracy	0.02	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.02)
Gender Quotas	−0.02	0.04*
	(0.04)	(0.02)
Candidate Selection	0.11**	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.02)
Opposition Party	−0.03	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Party Institutionalization	0.26*	0.28***
	(0.13)	(0.07)
log(GDP per Capita)	0.00	−0.04**
	(0.03)	(0.01)
Women's Civil Society Participation	0.32	0.18***
	(0.16)	(0.05)
(Intercept)	−0.21	0.15
	(0.17)	(0.09)
AIC	−156.75	−492.51
Log Likelihood	91.37	260.25
Deviance	1.66	24.69
No. Obs.	124	805

*$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$
Time splines omitted