Appendix

(Not for Print Publication)

Overview of Appendix

The appendix includes summary statistics, supplementary figures and tables, and a number of robustness checks not included in the main text. Specifically, we show the following:

- Our results are robust to the use of similarity scores calculated from two-digit, rather than four-digit, SITC codes.
- Our results are robust to alternative calculations of similarity scores that exclude commodities not traded by either or not traded by both members of the dyad.
- Our results are robust to the use of only “politically relevant" dyads (dyads that are contiguous or contain at least one major power), rather than all dyads.
- Our results are robust to a number of minor tweaks to our modeling assumptions, including:
  - removing extreme values of export similarity;
  - removing major power dyads;
  - reducing the model to a minimalist specification that includes only similarity, dependence, contiguity, and the capability ratio;
  - including an indicator for the Bretton Woods era (pre-1972);
  - and using an alliance dummy, rather than UN voting similarity.
- Our results are robust to the calculation of trade dependence as a function of GDP, rather than total trade.

- Our results are robust to the inclusion of measures of trade network concentration.
- Our results are robust to the inclusion of a control for the contract intensiveness of the dyad.
- Our results are robust to a control for the level of intra-industry trade.
- Our results are robust to the exclusion of highly-dependent dyads.
- Our results are robust to the use of year-level fixed effects.
- Our main results, with respect to commodity types, tend to hold for fatal and hostile MIDs, in addition to all MIDs.
- Our results are robust to the imputation of missing data.
- Export similarity in the current period is not correlated with past dyadic conflict.

Summary Statistics

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the three dependent variables, our variable of interest, and our control variables.

[Table 1 about here.]

Dyadic Similarity Values

To provide the reader with some visualization of our dyadic similarity measure, we present the following graphic, which provides similarity values over time for nine interesting dyads, using the format employed by Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006). Figure 1 depicts scores that run nearly the entire empirical range of our measure (from near-perfect correlation to slight negative correlation), and comport well with our expectations *a priori*. For example, the sharp downward

spike in the Iraq-Iran plot is related to the drop in Iraqi oil production following the first Gulf War. Iraq's oil industry was crippled in the years immediately after the conflict, while Iran continued to export massive quantities of petroleum. The relationships between the U.S. and Russia on one hand and the U.S. and China on the other are also interesting. In the former case, we see a decline in similarity following the end of the Cold War. This is consistent with Russia's increased reliance on raw materials, and especially oil, in recent years. At the same time, Chinese industrialization and economic reforms have brought it much closer to the U.S. in terms of goods exported.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Real-World Cases

In addition to the hypothetical case depicted in Figure 2 of the main text, we find it instructive to examine counterfactual predictions for some empirical cases. Below, we present the predicted probabilities of conflict for India and Pakistan in 1971 and Iraq and Kuwait in 1988. The former dyad-year represents the third in a series of major clashes between India and Pakistan, following their partition in 1947. The hostilities between the two countries suggested a significant likelihood of war, regardless of the level of export similarity (at its empirical minimum, the estimated probability of conflict is over 0.3). Yet the slope for export similarity remains steep, with the estimated probability increasing across the empirical range of the variable by nearly two-thirds, suggesting a strong (and significant) effect, even after accounting for the other features of the Indo-Pakistani relationship. At the true value for export similarity—indicated by the red point on the plot—the estimated probability of conflict is just under 0.4, which represents a substantial likelihood, given the relative rarity of conflict in the data. The expected probability of conflict for Iraq and Kuwait in 1988 was similarly large. We selected 1988 as it marks the end of Iraq's war with Iran. Here, the probability range is lower than with India and Pakistan. However, the extreme similarity of exports between the two states, along with the steep slope of the probability curve, sets the stage for conflict. While Iraq and Kuwait did not experience war in 1988, diplomatic

tensions did begin to emerge soon after the Iran-Iraq War ended, as detailed in the main text. And indeed, only a few years later, the tensions between the two countries would boil over into conflict.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Using Two-Digit SITC Codes

Our main analysis calculates similarity across the 1,298 commodities coded at the four-digit level. However, the reader might be concerned that many of these commodities are not sufficiently distinct to be treated differently. Thus, we repeat the analysis using the less granular, two-digit coding, for which there are 94 distinct commodities. As Table 2 shows, our substantive results remain unchanged when switching to this specification.

[Table 2 about here.]

Alternative Similarity Calculations

In computing correlations in our main analysis, we assign a value of zero to commodities not traded by a state. However, this decision risks allowing zeros to drive our results. To ensure that this is not the case, we recalculate similarity scores in two ways: by looking only at commodities traded by at least one of the states in the dyad, and by examining only those commodities traded by both members of the dyad. Both of these measures correlate highly with the variable used in the main analysis (approximately 0.998 and 0.714, respectively), suggesting that this coding rule likely had little impact on our results. However, to be certain, we reexamine our main analysis, using these two alternative measures. Table 3 shows, changing the way that we treat untraded commodities has no substantive effect on our results.

[Table 3 about here.]

Restrict the Sample to Politically Relevant Dyads

The tests we report in the main text are run on a sample of all dyad-years in our data, but there is no reason our results should not be hold if we restrict our focus to those dyads most capable of fighting (the so-called "politically relevant dyads"). Table 4 shows that our main findings are robust in nearly all cases to the restriction of our analysis to this smaller sample of dyads.

[Table 4 about here.]

Minor Alternative Specifications

In the main text, we mention robustness to a number of minor alternatives to our primary model: the removal of extreme values of export similarity, the removal of major power dyads from our sample, the reduction of the model to a minimalist specification, the inclusion of a dummy variable for the Bretton Woods era, and the use of an alliance dummy in place of UN vote similarity. We present those here. As the results in 5 demonstrate, our substantive results are robust to all such changes.

[Table 5 about here.]

Replace Trade Dependence with Ratio of Bilateral Trade to GDP

In our main analysis we measure the trade dependence as a function of bilateral trade and total trade. However, a plausible alternative definition of dependence would be the ratio of bilateral trade to the size of a country's economy. To ensure that our results are not driven by this coding decision, we run tests similar to those reported in the main text but replace our measure of trade dependence with the alternative, which we calculate as the lower trade-to-GDP ratio in the dyad. The results in Table 6 show that our substantive results for similarity remain unchanged, and our results for trade dependence are similar.

[Table 6 about here.]

Including Related Conceptual Variables

A number of authors have recently written about other factors that can mediate the relationship between trade and conflict. Dorussen and Ward (2010) and Lupu and Traag (2013) argue that trade networks can be more important to conflict prevention than direct trade. In a dense trade network, a loss by one state can affect all states to which its connected, even if they do not have as significant dyadic trading relationship. Indeed, Lupu and Traag find that, when controlling for trading communities, dyadic trade does not significantly affect conflict onset. We are aware of the potential implications that this has on our own work, as trade networks could explain away the effects of export similarity. For this reason, we estimate our model using both Lupu and Traag's *trading community* variable,which indicates whether the two states are members of the same network, and Dorussen and Ward's *maxflow* variable, which captures the centrality of the least embedded member of the dyad. The results for these models are given in columns 1 and 2, respectively, of Table 7.

Mousseau (2013) makes the case that dyadic peace is a result of market norms, which are causally prior to international trade. States with high volumes of international trade will tend to be more capitalist in nature, and will thus be more reliant on these commercial norms to resolve disputes. He proposes identifying the degree to which a society is contract-intensive, by examining the per capita volume of life insurance contracts in force in a given state. He demonstrates that factors such as trade and wealth become mostly irrelevant, once we account for this factor. To ensure that our results are not also devastated by the inclusion of market norms, we estimate our model in the presence of Mousseau's contract intensiveness variable, and report the results in column 3 of Table 7.

Finally, an important related concept is the role of intra-industry trade (IIT). Our argument rests on the assumption that states who export commodities in similar categories are competing in the global marketplace. However, it is also possible that these states are trading with *each other*, in order to enhance the final product. For example, both motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts and accessories fall into SITC category 78. It is conceivable that certain parts may be assembled in

one country and exported to another, in order to construct the full motor vehicle. This would be more of a case of interdependence and mutual gain than one of competition. We are sensitive to this possibility. Additionally, scholars have found that IIT can, on its own, reduce the likelihood of interstate disputes (Peterson and Thies 2012). As we use the highly-disaggregated four-digit version of the SITC classifications, we think that this is unlikely to be a problem. However, to ensure that this is not the case, we estimate our general model and include Peterson and Thies' measure of IIT, which is given in column 4 of Table 7.

The results across all four columns are indicative of a strong and a robust relationship for our variable of interest. The effects are similar to those of our main analysis when controlling for any of the factors mentioned above, suggesting our results cannot be explained by any of these concepts. Interestingly, of the four variables we include, only Mousseau's contract intensiveness attains statistical significance. Dyads in which both states have contract-intensive economies are less likely to go to war, as are dyads in which the states do not export similar commodities.

[Table 7 about here.]

Excluding Highly-Dependent Dyads

In calculating export similarity, we look at the total values of goods traded by a given pair of states to the entire world. Importantly, this measure includes intra-dyadic trade. This means that for dyads that trade significantly with one another, our measure our portfolio similarity may not be an accurate measure of our concept (trade competition). The ideal way to account for this possibility would be to recalculate similarity, using only extradyadic trade. Unfortunately, such an approach is not computationally feasible at this time. Thus, we approach the problem in a less direct manner, by excluding those dyads that are heavily dependent on one another (i.e., those dyads for which one state accounts for more than 15% of its partner's trade). This removes the most potentially-problematic cases from the analysis. As Table 8 indicates, our results remain robust after dropping these cases, suggesting that intra-dyadic trade is not driving our results.

[Table 8 about here.]

Using Year-Level Fixed Effects

Our main analysis includes decade-level fixed effects. We include these to account for changes in the world that occur over time. However, there is a possibility that the decade unit is not sufficiently granular to account for such changes appropriately. For this reason, we reestimate our main models using year-level, rather than decade-level fixed effects. The results from Table 9 demonstrate that this change does not affect our substantive results.

[Table 9 about here.]

Separation by Type for Fatal and Hostile MIDs

In our main analysis, we show that our results hold for both raw and manufactured commodities, and that they are not driven by oil or strategic goods for the case of all MIDs. Here, we report results for fatal and MIDs and hostile MIDs, respectively. The results are substantively similar to those we report for all MIDs, with some minor exceptions. Perhaps most importantly, we find that non-strategic similarity has no discernible effect on the likelihood of fatal MID onset, while strategic similarity does. This is an interesting finding, and one that may call for additional examination in the future. With respect to hostile MIDs, non-oil and non-strategic export similarity continues to increase the likelihood of conflict, but so does similarity in the export of oil and strategic goods.

[Table 10 about here.]

[Table 11 about here.]

Dealing with Missing Data

We may also wish to assess the robustness of our results to an alternative method of dealing with missing data (besides listwise deletion). One possibility is multiple imputation. In looking at all dyads between 1962 and 2000, there are 482,240 total observations. Of these, we are missing data on similarity for approximately 20% (98,075). However, many of these values are completely missing until or after a given year for a given dyad. That is, imputing these values would require extrapolation (rather than interpolation). We purposely avoid extrapolating, as such values are less likely to satisfy the missing-at-random requirement. Thus, we begin by pruning observations for which the (lagged) similarity value is missing, and there are no non-missing values either before or after it. We also remove dyad-years in which a dispute was ongoing (as mentioned in the primary analysis). This leaves us with a total of 371,088 remaining observations, of which only 552 are missing similarity values, and 69,913 are missing values on other items. Thus, our dataset is still diminished by nearly one-fifth. We address this problem by using Amelia II (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2008) to impute $m = 5$ datasets, using all relevant variables and a cubic time trend.

The results from Table 12 show effects for similarity that are broadly consistent with our findings in the main analysis. In all cases, they are signed appropriately, and in nearly all cases are significant at the $p < .05$ level. The exceptions include two sets of results for fatal MIDs: all dyads snd politically relevant, non-major power dyads (in both cases, $p \approx 0.27$). This suggests that the results presented in the primary analysis are not being driven by missing data.

[Table 12 about here.]

Export Similarity is Exogenous to Dyadic Conflict

We treat export similarity as an exogenous variable in our GMM models. This is a plausible assumption, because the export similarity of any dyad is derived from each state's trade with every country in the world in tens of commodity categories. It is unlikely for the political relations between two countries to systematically affect what each sells to the rest of the global market.

We support this claim with several regressions of a dyad's export portfolio similarity on various measures of past conflict. In none of the models the conflict variable seems to have a significant effect.

Our measures of past conflict include an indicator of whether the dyad experienced a MID in the past year or in the past 5 years. We replicate this analysis for each of the three types of MIDs we have used so far in our analysis. Lastly, we measure past conflict with an indicator of strategic rivalry created by (Thompson 2001). We regress the level of export similarity for a given dyad in a given year on each of the measures of conflict mentioned above, the level of portfolio similarity for the dyad in the previous year, and the control variables used in the main analysis. Table 13 shows that previous conflict —as captured by the three MID variables and the strategic rivalry indicator—is not related to the similarity of dyadic exports. As explained above, we did not expect export similarity between two countries to be significantly affected by their dyadic conflict history. Evidence from Table 13 provides us with additional confidence that, although trade and conflict may be endogenous to one another, similarity and conflict are exogenous.

[Table 13 about here.]

References

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

Figure 1: Dyadic similarity levels, 1962–2000



Figure 2: Predicted conflict probabilities

Table 1: **Summary Statistics**

	No of Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
All MIDs Onset	494,016	0.003	0.055	0	1
Fatal MID Onset	494,016	0.001	0.028	0	1
High Hostility MID Onset	494,016	0.002	0.046	0	1
Export Similarity	384,165	0.091	0.190	−0.05	1
Trade Dependence	371,811	0.048	0.289	0	16.41
Contiguity	494,016	0.021	0.144	0	1
Distance (logged)	494,016	8.122	1.364	0	9.42
Capabilities Ratio	494,015	0.839	0.151	0.5	1
Joint Democracy	400,531	0.129	0.335	0	1
UN Voting Similarity	441,525	0.649	0.298	−1	1
Both Major Powers	494,016	0.001	0.029	0	1
Major-Minor Dyad	494,016	0.062	0.241	0	1
Both in Europe	494,016	0.045	0.208	0	1
Rivals	494,016	0.004	0.065	0	1
Year	494,016	1983	11.37	1960	2000
Years Since Last MID	494,016	20.10	14.62	0	60
Years Since Last Fatal MID	494,016	20.48	14.73	0	60
Years Since Last High Hostility MID	494,016	20.21	14.65	0	60

Table 2: **Two-Digit Export Similarity Measure**

	All MIDs		Fatal MIDs		High Host MIDs	
	Baseline	Expanded	Baseline	Expanded	Baseline	Expanded
Export Similarity (2-digit)$_{t-1}$	0.722***	0.709***	0.499**	0.534**	0.776***	0.752***
	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.203)	(0.213)	(0.188)	(0.191)
Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	−0.023	−0.043	−0.320*	−0.246	−0.075*	−0.103***
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.179)	(0.169)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Contiguity	0.651	0.121	0.446	−0.513	1.296	0.657
	(1.034)	(0.978)	(1.430)	(1.960)	(0.929)	(0.973)
Distance (logged)	−0.314**	−0.364***	−0.426**	−0.528**	−0.266**	−0.332***
	(0.129)	(0.123)	(0.175)	(0.242)	(0.112)	(0.118)
Capabilities Ratio$_{t-1}$	−0.809*	−0.897**	−0.615	−0.651	−0.792	−0.853*
	(0.434)	(0.431)	(0.624)	(0.664)	(0.488)	(0.484)
Both Democracies	−0.522***	−0.592***	−0.948***	−0.848**	−0.278	−0.339*
	(0.183)	(0.175)	(0.335)	(0.346)	(0.193)	(0.188)
UN Vote Similarity$_{t-1}$	−1.479***	−1.475***	−1.619***	−1.706***	−1.552***	−1.543***
	(0.173)	(0.183)	(0.232)	(0.248)	(0.183)	(0.197)
Both Major Powers	1.781*	1.702*	0.332	0.141	0.850	1.006
	(1.008)	(0.941)	(0.539)	(0.534)	(0.843)	(0.876)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.417***	1.327***	1.164***	1.116***	1.295***	1.209***
	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.283)	(0.308)	(0.222)	(0.215)
Rivalry$_{t-1}$	1.307***	1.181***	1.859***	1.779***	1.358***	1.185***
	(0.184)	(0.179)	(0.233)	(0.239)	(0.205)	(0.201)
Both in Europe	−0.497**	−0.618***	−1.520***	−1.427***	−0.727***	−0.784***
	(0.216)	(0.213)	(0.418)	(0.478)	(0.249)	(0.262)
Lower GDP per capita$_{t-1}$		0.137**		−0.135		0.112
		(0.062)		(0.090)		(0.069)
Joint GATT/WTO members$_{t-1}$		0.028		−0.118		0.109
		(0.111)		(0.189)		(0.128)
Lower Openness$_{t-1}$		−0.454		−0.053		−0.432
		(0.605)		(1.236)		(0.778)
Constant	−0.521	−0.787	−1.349	0.742	−1.557	−1.489
	(1.099)	(1.201)	(1.569)	(2.217)	(1.047)	(1.198)
Number of Observations	300,623	278,517	300,623	278,517	300,623	278,517
Log-Likelihood	-4119.492	-3762.477	-1883.607	-1721.487	-3107.734	-2833.492

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 3: **Similarity Calculations with Zeros Removed**

	Traded by both states	Traded by at least one state
Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	−0.016	−0.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.567***	0.738***
	(0.207)	(0.230)
Contiguity	1.063*	1.070*
	(0.636)	(0.635)
Distance (logged)	−0.170**	−0.168**
	(0.081)	(0.081)
Capabilities Ratio$_{t-1}$	−1.050**	−1.015**
	(0.510)	(0.513)
Both Democracies$_{t-1}$	−0.558***	−0.579***
	(0.192)	(0.191)
UN Vote Similarity$_{t-1}$	−1.082***	−1.079***
	(0.244)	(0.242)
Both Major Powers	1.373*	1.350*
	(0.726)	(0.724)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.328***	1.304***
	(0.192)	(0.193)
Rivalry$_{t-1}$	1.180***	1.179***
	(0.238)	(0.236)
Both in Europe	−0.579**	−0.605**
	(0.262)	(0.266)
Constant	−0.637	−0.686
	(0.873)	(0.868)
Number of Observations	121,996	121,998
Log-Likelihood	-2408.304	-2406.221

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.
Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.
* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 4: **Politically Relevant Dyads - Export Similarity and International Conflict**

	All MIDs		Fatal MIDs		High Host MIDs	
	Baseline	Expanded	Baseline	Expanded	Baseline	Expanded
Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.292*	0.410**	0.269	0.489**	0.413**	0.550***
	(0.169)	(0.164)	(0.239)	(0.248)	(0.198)	(0.201)
Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	0.057	0.054	−0.255	−0.161	0.005	0.010
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.172)	(0.150)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Contiguity	1.344***	1.015**	1.154	0.691	1.802***	1.498***
	(0.448)	(0.413)	(0.767)	(0.854)	(0.409)	(0.410)
Distance (logged)	−0.021	−0.049	−0.154*	−0.184*	−0.029	−0.049
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Capabilities Ratio$_{t-1}$	−0.626	−0.630	−0.033	0.048	−0.603	−0.506
	(0.462)	(0.475)	(0.727)	(0.807)	(0.541)	(0.554)
Both Democracies	−0.591***	−0.523***	−0.906***	−0.714**	−0.472**	−0.352
	(0.196)	(0.185)	(0.316)	(0.325)	(0.223)	(0.217)
UN Vote Similarity$_{t-1}$	−1.085***	−1.148***	−1.382***	−1.611***	−1.225***	−1.322***
	(0.180)	(0.185)	(0.254)	(0.269)	(0.200)	(0.207)
Both Major Powers	0.307	0.117	−0.589	−0.904**	−0.292	−0.367
	(0.373)	(0.342)	(0.428)	(0.391)	(0.246)	(0.261)
Major-Minor Dyad	0.036	−0.074	−0.046	−0.287	0.195	0.030
	(0.228)	(0.221)	(0.367)	(0.388)	(0.238)	(0.242)
Rivalry$_{t-1}$	1.106***	1.046***	1.687***	1.627***	1.160***	1.040***
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.214)	(0.223)	(0.173)	(0.176)
Both in Europe	−0.156	−0.218	−1.163***	−1.043**	−0.530**	−0.468*
	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.384)	(0.438)	(0.232)	(0.244)
Lower GDP per capita$_{t-1}$		0.061		−0.172*		−0.014
		(0.063)		(0.102)		(0.071)
Joint GATT/WTO members$_{t-1}$		−0.181		−0.363*		−0.151
		(0.120)		(0.221)		(0.144)
Lower Openness$_{t-1}$		−1.765**		−2.406		−1.804*
		(0.776)		(1.845)		(1.054)
Constant	−1.160*	−1.040	−2.097*	−0.025	−1.864**	−1.201
	(0.659)	(0.784)	(1.168)	(1.266)	(0.732)	(0.864)
Number of Observations	28,739	26,791	28,739	26,791	28,739	26,791
Log-likelihood	-2532.989	-2305.181	-1210.836	-1081.610	-1940.042	-1759.634

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

$^{*}p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 5: **Minor Tweaks to Primary Model**

	No Extreme Values of Export Similarity	No Major Powers	Minimalist Specification	Bretton Woods Indicator	Alliance Instead of Voting Similarity
Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.507**	0.704***	0.605***	0.766***	0.524***
	(0.234)	(0.200)	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.180)
Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	−0.031	0.063	0.073	−0.033	0.015
	(0.053)	(0.073)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.043)
Contiguity	1.347	−3.228	3.142***	0.638	0.131
	(0.865)	(2.396)	(0.138)	(1.061)	(0.875)
Distance (logged)	−0.234**	−0.874***		−0.318**	−0.304***
	(0.108)	(0.311)		(0.132)	(0.112)
Capabilities Ratio$_{t-1}$	−0.655	−0.073	−0.328	−0.775*	−1.041**
	(0.483)	(0.440)	(0.336)	(0.431)	(0.423)
Both Democracies	−0.370**	−0.249		−0.480**	−0.818***
	(0.187)	(0.190)		(0.188)	(0.199)
UN Vote Similarity$_{t-1}$	−1.507***	−1.141***		−1.503***	
	(0.188)	(0.204)		(0.177)	
Both Major Powers	1.409			1.713	2.494**
	(0.940)			(1.056)	(1.040)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.171***			1.387***	1.898***
	(0.206)			(0.196)	(0.217)
Rivalry$_{t-1}$	1.202***	1.259***		1.302***	1.528***
	(0.210)	(0.175)		(0.182)	(0.193)
Both in Europe	−0.383*	−0.693***		−0.447**	0.103
	(0.197)	(0.244)		(0.217)	(0.210)
Bretton Woods				−0.343*	
				(0.203)	
Allies$_{t-1}$					−0.106
					(0.155)
Constant	−1.093	2.696	−3.707***	−0.455	−0.837
	(1.002)	(2.387)	(0.292)	(1.119)	(0.933)
Number of Observations	183,210	278,820	370,539	300,623	333,197
Log-Likelihood	-3015.783	-2904.706	-5731.682	-4119.000	-5065.406

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

$^{*}p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 6: **Trade Dependence Calculated as Bilateral Trade / GDP**

	All MIDs		Fatal MIDs		High Host MIDs	
	Baseline	Expanded	Baseline	Expanded	Baseline	Expanded
Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.768***	0.779***	0.515**	0.585**	0.838***	0.835***
	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.231)	(0.228)	(0.209)	(0.211)
Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	−0.128	−0.206	−1.929	−1.363	−0.644**	−0.821***
	(0.347)	(0.396)	(1.262)	(1.088)	(0.253)	(0.251)
Contiguity	0.635	0.098	0.461	−0.534	1.313	0.665
	(1.055)	(1.002)	(1.483)	(2.068)	(0.947)	(1.005)
Distance (logged)	−0.316**	−0.366***	−0.421**	−0.528**	−0.265**	−0.330***
	(0.131)	(0.125)	(0.182)	(0.256)	(0.114)	(0.122)
Capabilities Ratio$_{t-1}$	−0.772*	−0.853**	−0.577	−0.608	−0.760	−0.816*
	(0.430)	(0.428)	(0.621)	(0.662)	(0.485)	(0.483)
Both Democracies	−0.499***	−0.578***	−0.943***	−0.830**	−0.233	−0.301
	(0.186)	(0.179)	(0.345)	(0.354)	(0.190)	(0.186)
UN Vote Similarity$_{t-1}$	−1.476***	−1.475***	−1.609***	−1.702***	−1.555***	−1.551***
	(0.174)	(0.185)	(0.234)	(0.251)	(0.184)	(0.200)
Both Major Powers	1.718	1.625*	0.171	−0.022	0.741	0.896
	(1.047)	(0.978)	(0.544)	(0.543)	(0.880)	(0.920)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.389***	1.291***	1.133***	1.095***	1.271***	1.179***
	(0.195)	(0.193)	(0.277)	(0.303)	(0.211)	(0.208)
Rivalry$_{t-1}$	1.309***	1.185***	1.864***	1.783***	1.362***	1.188***
	(0.180)	(0.175)	(0.231)	(0.237)	(0.200)	(0.196)
Both in Europe	−0.442**	−0.562***	−1.486***	−1.379***	−0.658***	−0.707***
	(0.218)	(0.216)	(0.417)	(0.480)	(0.250)	(0.262)
Lower GDP per capita$_{t-1}$		0.136**		−0.149*		0.108
		(0.061)		(0.090)		(0.068)
Joint GATT/WTO members$_{t-1}$		0.026		−0.115		0.111
		(0.112)		(0.193)		(0.130)
Lower Openness$_{t-1}$		−0.499		−0.010		−0.391
		(0.620)		(1.239)		(0.794)
Constant	−0.484	−0.749	−1.363	0.858	−1.544	−1.459
	(1.112)	(1.214)	(1.611)	(2.311)	(1.059)	(1.213)
Number of Observations	300,623	278,517	300,623	278,517	300,623	278,517
Log-Likelihood	-4121.006	-3763.033	-1885.779	-1722.566	-3107.643	-2832.704

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 7: **Controlling for Recent Factors Related to Trade and Conflict**

	Lupu & Traag	Dorussen & Ward	Mousseau	Peterson & Thies
Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.751***	0.750***	0.910***	0.859***
	(0.196)	(0.192)	(0.189)	(0.227)
Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	−0.030	−0.028	0.001	0.010
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.056)
Contiguity	0.736	0.729	−2.598	0.681
	(1.059)	(1.055)	(1.707)	(0.880)
Distance (logged)	−0.299**	−0.301**	−0.731***	−0.245**
	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.218)	(0.112)
Capabilities Ratio$_{t-1}$	−0.713	−0.708	−0.265	−0.713
	(0.451)	(0.448)	(0.470)	(0.493)
Both Democracies	−0.388**	−0.382**	−0.284	−0.643***
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.203)
UN Vote Similarity$_{t-1}$	−1.402***	−1.401***	−1.480***	−1.075***
	(0.199)	(0.201)	(0.192)	(0.231)
Both Major Powers	1.753	1.751	2.532***	1.821**
	(1.083)	(1.086)	(0.736)	(0.751)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.445***	1.448***	1.450***	1.368***
	(0.212)	(0.220)	(0.236)	(0.201)
Rivalry$_{t-1}$	1.277***	1.276***	1.323***	1.124***
	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.174)	(0.227)
Both in Europe	−0.601**	−0.600**	−0.379	−0.444*
	(0.266)	(0.265)	(0.231)	(0.255)
STC Medium$_{t-1}$	0.028			
	(0.116)			
Max Flow$_{t-1}$		−0.029		
		(0.290)		
Lower Contract Intensive Economy$_{t-1}$			−0.196**	
			(0.091)	
Intra-Industry Trade$_{t-1}$				−0.593
				(0.863)
Constant	−0.726	−0.704	2.584	−0.713
	(1.154)	(1.130)	(1.793)	(1.027)
Number of Observations	282,416	282,416	250,169	162,228
Log-Likelihood	-3805.752	-3805.793	-3137.448	-2719.751

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 8: **Excluding Heavily-Dependent Dyads**

	All MIDs	Fatal MIDs	Hostile MIDs
Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.840***	0.450*	0.874***
	(0.203)	(0.242)	(0.226)
Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	2.034***	0.730	1.881***
	(0.560)	(0.812)	(0.614)
Contiguity	0.603	0.448	1.233
	(0.901)	(1.434)	(0.865)
Distance (logged)	−0.338***	−0.434**	−0.281***
	(0.113)	(0.176)	(0.105)
Capabilities Ratio$_{t-1}$	−0.497	−0.486	−0.557
	(0.457)	(0.642)	(0.526)
Both Democracies	−0.502**	−1.029***	−0.313
	(0.197)	(0.394)	(0.226)
UN Vote Similarity$_{t-1}$	−1.598***	−1.689***	−1.654***
	(0.169)	(0.241)	(0.183)
Both Major Powers	1.583*	0.300	0.842
	(0.877)	(0.658)	(0.822)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.260***	1.156***	1.199***
	(0.200)	(0.277)	(0.219)
Rivalry$_{t-1}$	1.247***	1.858***	1.313***
	(0.190)	(0.246)	(0.218)
Both in Europe	−0.623**	−1.370***	−0.689**
	(0.260)	(0.415)	(0.294)
Constant	−0.608	−1.329	−1.541
	(1.034)	(1.574)	(1.016)
Number of Observations	294,143	294,143	294,143
Log-Likelihood	−3596.697	−1780.559	−2782.648

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 9: **Year-Level Fixed Effects**

	All MIDs	Fatal MIDs	Hostile MIDs
Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.763***	0.467**	0.830***
	(0.189)	(0.234)	(0.209)
Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	−0.026	−0.352*	−0.079**
	(0.058)	(0.186)	(0.039)
Contiguity	0.603	0.398	1.311
	(1.048)	(1.459)	(0.947)
Distance (logged)	−0.321**	−0.438**	−0.267**
	(0.131)	(0.179)	(0.114)
Capabilities Ratio$_{t-1}$	−0.776*	−0.639	−0.752
	(0.429)	(0.623)	(0.484)
Both Democracies	−0.495***	−0.964***	−0.256
	(0.191)	(0.345)	(0.200)
UN Vote Similarity$_{t-1}$	−1.513***	−1.698***	−1.599***
	(0.177)	(0.232)	(0.189)
Both Major Powers	1.710	0.136	0.724
	(1.044)	(0.564)	(0.886)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.364***	1.119***	1.244***
	(0.194)	(0.276)	(0.210)
Rivalry$_{t-1}$	1.292***	1.856***	1.355***
	(0.183)	(0.236)	(0.204)
Both in Europe	−0.437**	−1.497***	−0.662***
	(0.219)	(0.424)	(0.254)
Constant	−1.120	−1.627	−1.845*
	(1.091)	(1.583)	(1.036)
Number of Observations	300,623	300,623	300,623
Log-Likelihood	−4084.178	−1834.981	−3080.167

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 10: **Separating Commodities by Type - Fatal MIDs**

	Oil and Non-Oil Goods	Strategic and Non-Strategic Goods	Raw and Manufactured Goods
Oil Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	0.030		
	(0.189)		
Non-Oil Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	-1.102^{**}		
	(0.445)		
Oil Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.314		
	(0.254)		
Non-Oil Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.760^{***}		
	(0.295)		
Strategic Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$		-0.724^{*}	
		(0.376)	
Non-Strategic Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$		-0.002	
		(0.092)	
Strategic Export Similarity$_{t-1}$		0.577^{*}	
		(0.331)	
Non-Strategic Export Similarity$_{t-1}$		0.190	
		(0.180)	
Raw Goods Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$			-0.680
			(0.414)
Manuf Goods Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$			-2.216^{**}
			(1.023)
Raw Goods Export Similarity$_{t-1}$			2.313^{**}
			(0.953)
Manuf Goods Export Similarity$_{t-1}$			1.040^{***}
			(0.382)
Number of Observations	300,284	208,153	295,420
Log-Likelihood	-1877.681	-1481.632	-1871.687

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

$^{*}p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 11: **Separating Commodities by Type - High Hostility MIDs**

	Oil and Non-Oil Goods	Strategic and Non-Strategic Goods	Raw and Manufactured Goods
Oil Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	0.068		
	(0.129)		
Non-Oil Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$	-0.258^{*}		
	(0.143)		
Oil Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	0.541^{**}		
	(0.219)		
Non-Oil Export Similarity$_{t-1}$	1.036^{***}		
	(0.223)		
Strategic Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$		−0.140	
		(0.123)	
Non-Strategic Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$		0.008	
		(0.075)	
Strategic Export Similarity$_{t-1}$		0.685^{***}	
		(0.240)	
Non-Strategic Export Similarity$_{t-1}$		0.274^{*}	
		(0.153)	
Raw Goods Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$			−0.025
			(0.342)
Manuf Goods Trade Dependence$_{t-1}$			-1.673^{*}
			(1.017)
Raw Goods Export Similarity$_{t-1}$			2.011^{**}
			(0.951)
Manuf Goods Export Similarity$_{t-1}$			0.633^{**}
			(0.300)
Number of Observations	300,284	208,153	295,420
Log-Likelihood	-3097.320	-2502.187	-3097.001

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

$^{*}p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 12: **Multiple Imputation for Missing Data**

	All Dyads			Politcally Relevant Dyads			Non-Major Power Relevant Dyads		
	All MIDs	Fatal MIDs	Host. MIDs	All MIDs	Fatal MIDs	Host. MIDs	All MIDs	Fatal MIDs	Host. MIDs
Export Similarity	0.261**	0.227	0.382***	0.777***	0.554***	0.888***	0.281**	0.228	0.392***
	(0.129)	(0.185)	(0.143)	(0.114)	(0.168)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.186)	(0.144)
Contiguity	1.062***	0.380	1.441***	0.348	−0.413	0.907***	1.025***	0.717	1.609***
	(0.233)	(0.456)	(0.277)	(0.247)	(0.540)	(0.306)	(0.276)	(0.532)	(0.321)
Distance (logged)	−0.036	−0.178***	−0.052	−0.315***	−0.468***	−0.308***	−0.051	−0.138**	−0.043
	(0.029)	(0.054)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.063)	(0.037)
Capability Ratio	−1.029***	−0.432	−0.896***	−1.288***	−1.160***	−1.059***	−1.032***	−0.432	−0.960***
	(0.301)	(0.460)	(0.344)	(0.237)	(0.369)	(0.281)	(0.305)	(0.460)	(0.346)
Joint Democracy	−0.658***	−0.839***	−0.609***	−0.700***	−1.101***	−0.427***	−0.642***	−0.843***	−0.606***
	(0.152)	(0.279)	(0.176)	(0.134)	(0.286)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.279)	(0.177)
UN Voting	−1.197***	−1.317***	−1.252***	−1.635***	−1.612***	−1.644***	−1.198***	−1.335***	−1.268***
	(0.128)	(0.179)	(0.133)	(0.120)	(0.153)	(0.117)	(0.128)	(0.174)	(0.134)
Both Major Powers	0.586**	−0.209	0.514*	1.933***	0.561	1.596***			
	(0.232)	(0.380)	(0.266)	(0.243)	(0.376)	(0.286)			
Major and Minor Power	0.116	−0.046	0.090	1.526***	1.205***	1.313***	0.193	−0.052	0.172
	(0.150)	(0.245)	(0.177)	(0.093)	(0.148)	(0.111)	(0.156)	(0.250)	(0.180)
Both European	1.120***	1.406***	1.559***	1.475***	1.839***	1.944***	1.111***	1.384***	1.547***
	(0.091)	(0.134)	(0.102)	(0.092)	(0.134)	(0.103)	(0.092)	(0.134)	(0.103)
Trade Dependence	−0.126	−0.332**	−0.019	−0.043	−0.477***	0.082	−0.091	−0.334**	0.020
	(0.099)	(0.153)	(0.117)	(0.087)	(0.137)	(0.105)	(0.099)	(0.154)	(0.118)
Rivals	0.062*	−0.389***	−0.022	0.017	−0.518***	−0.132***	0.056*	−0.373**	−0.023
	(0.032)	(0.147)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.146)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.146)	(0.042)
Constant	−0.967***	−1.542**	−2.339***	−0.530	−0.737	−2.177***	−0.932**	−1.844***	−2.418***
	(0.363)	(0.625)	(0.424)	(0.351)	(0.639)	(0.412)	(0.382)	(0.671)	(0.445)
Number of Observations	371,088	371,088	371,088	33,386	33,386	33,386	33,014	33,014	33,014

Standard errors in parentheses.

Decade dummies and t, t^2, t^3 included in all models.

$^{*}p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 13: **Effect of Conflict on Similarity**

	All MIDs	Fatal MIDs	Hostile MIDs	Rivalry
Any MID in Last 5 Years	−0.001			
	(0.002)			
Any Fatal MID in Last 5 Years		−0.001		
		(0.003)		
Any High Hostility MID in Last 5 Years			−0.001	
			(0.002)	
Rivalry_{t-1}				0.002
				(0.003)
$\text{Export Similarity}_{t-1}$	0.949***	0.949***	0.949***	0.949***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Contiguity	−0.000	−0.001	−0.000	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Distance (logged)	−0.001***	−0.001***	−0.001***	−0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Both Democracies	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\text{UN Vote Similarity}_{t-1}$	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Both Major Powers	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Major-Minor Dyad	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Both in Europe	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$\text{Lower GDP per capita}_{t-1}$	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\text{Lower Openness}_{t-1}$	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$\text{Joint GATT/WTO members}_{t-1}$	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of Observations	278,499	278,499	278,499	278,499
R^2	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

Decade dummies included in all models.

$^{*}p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.