Do Elites Know Best? Candidate Selection and Policy Implementation in Post-independence Tanzania

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Replication of Tables and Figures

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1 Main paper

Table 1: Party elite and voter preferences across candidates

		A. Party elite preferences				B. Voter preferences				C. Difference
	N	μ_1	μ_2	β^{ADC}	p(β^{ADC}=0)	μ_{Winner}	μ_{Loser}	β^{Voters}	p(β^{Voters}=0)	p(β^{ADC}=β^{Voters})
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Selection outcomes										
ADC ranked first	414	1.00	0.00	1.00		0.60	0.40	0.21	[0.01]***	
ADC vote share	414	0.49	0.19	0.30	[0.01]***	0.40	0.29	0.11	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
ADC votes	414	129.35	46.62	82.73	[0.01]***	110.57	65.39	45.18	[0.01]***	[0.04]**
Demographic										
Male	414	0.96	0.96	0.00	[0.81]	0.96	0.96	0.00	[0.81]	[0.73]
Age	342	38.67	38.91	-0.24	[0.89]	37.92	39.80	-1.88	[0.07]*	[0.18]
Born in district	414	0.78	0.77	0.01	[0.81]	0.83	0.72	0.11	[0.01]***	[0.10]*
Local religious majority	186	0.77	0.73	0.03	[0.82]	0.77	0.72	0.05	[0.49]	[0.86]
Local ethnic majority	211	0.53	0.60	-0.07	[0.45]	0.62	0.48	0.14	[0.01]***	[0.04]**
Traditional authority	414	0.11	0.08	0.02	[0.40]	0.12	0.07	0.04	[0.13]	[0.63]
Education										
Vocational	414	0.25	0.22	0.03	[0.48]	0.27	0.20	0.07	[0.09]*	[0.51]
Overseas experience	414	0.25	0.13	0.12	[0.01]***	0.24	0.14	0.10	[0.01]***	[0.72]
Secondary	414	0.40	0.30	0.10	[0.03]**	0.41	0.29	0.13	[0.01]***	[0.66]
University	414	0.10	0.03	0.07	[0.01]***	0.10	0.02	0.08	[0.01]***	[0.77]
Occupation										
Farmer	414	0.40	0.43	-0.02	[0.62]	0.49	0.34	0.15	[0.01]***	[0.01]**
Teacher	414	0.15	0.14	0.01	[0.68]	0.15	0.13	0.02	[0.49]	[0.84]
Religious	414	0.02	0.04	-0.01	[0.41]	0.04	0.02	0.01	[0.41]	[0.23]
Business	414	0.14	0.19	-0.06	[0.10]	0.14	0.19	-0.06	[0.10]	[1.00]
Bureaucrat (junior)	414	0.17	0.16	0.01	[0.79]	0.20	0.13	0.08	[0.03]**	[0.19]
Bureaucrat (senior)	414	0.22	0.12	0.10	[0.01]***	0.21	0.13	0.08	[0.02]**	[0.71]
National political roles										
MP	414	0.36	0.10	0.26	[0.01]***	0.26	0.20	0.05	[0.24]	[0.00]***
Minister	414	0.13	0.01	0.12	[0.01]***	0.09	0.05	0.04	[0.13]	[0.02]**
Local party roles										
Local elected leader	414	0.30	0.33	-0.03	[0.54]	0.29	0.34	-0.06	[0.22]	[0.65]
Local appointed leader	414	0.20	0.16	0.03	[0.36]	0.18	0.18	0.00	[0.90]	[0.47]
Union/Cooperative leader	414	0.41	0.37	0.04	[0.39]	0.45	0.32	0.14	[0.01]***	[0.15]
Years of membership	252	10.20	10.01	0.20	[0.72]	9.78	10.49	-0.71	[0.80]	[0.21]
Election outcomes										
Elected	414	0.60	0.40	0.21	[0.01]***	1.00	0.00	1.00	[0.01]***	
Election vote share	414	0.54	0.46	0.09	[0.01]***	0.69	0.31	0.37	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
Election votes	414	13539.55	11469.96	2069.59	[0.01]**	17165.89	7843.62	9322.27	[0.01]***	[0.00]***

Notes: Panel A presents descriptive statistics on candidates ranked first (μ_1) and second (μ_2) by ADC. $\beta^{ADC} = \mu_1 - \mu_2$. Column 5 provides p-value from regressing candidate covariate onto indicator for being ranked first with constituency-year fixed effects. Panel B presents descriptive statistics on candidates who won election (μ_{Winner}) and lost (μ_{Loser}). $\beta^{\text{Voters}} = \mu_{\text{Winner}} - \mu_{\text{Loser}}$. Column 9 provides p-value from regressing candidate covariate onto indicator for winning election with constituency-year fixed effects. Column 10 provides p-value from a seemingly unrelated regression to test $\beta^{\text{ADC}} = \beta^{\text{Voters}}$. Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Differences in observations (column 1) due to variation in source accessibility (see Appendix A.3). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 3: Election outcomes for J-assigned candidates

Year	Constituencies	P(Winner | J)	P(J | Rank=1)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1965	107	0.61 [0.04]**	0.50 [1.00]
1970	120	0.63 [0.00]***	0.46 [0.40]
1975	96	0.72 [0.00]***	0.78 [0.00]***
1980	101	0.68 [0.00]***	0.78 [0.00]***

Heteroskedacity-robust p-values from testing each coefficient equal to 0.5 in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 4: First stage: Elite-preferred candidate is elected

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
J	0.255	0.242	0.245	0.234
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.059)
Controls	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓
F-statistic	15.52	15.94	14.21	15.93
DV Mean	0.486	0.486	0.486	0.486
DV SD	0.502	0.502	0.502	0.502
Observations	207	207	207	207

Outcome variable: Elite-preferred candidate is elected. All specifications are estimated using OLS with election-year fixed effects. Even-indexed columns add LASSO-selected controls. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5: Effects on supply of local public goods

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.72	0.64	0.73	0.63	0.30	0.27	0.04	0.06
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.66]	[0.68]	[0.96]	[0.93]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.16	2.16	2.16	2.16
DV SD	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	1.39	1.39	1.39	1.39
FS F-statistic	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in constituency in five years following 1965/1970. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table 6: Heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.72	0.64	0.71	0.64	0.30	0.27	0.43	0.37
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$ × ADC vote share			0.58	0.54			0.89	0.78
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.66]	[0.68]	[0.50]	[0.54]
			[0.09]	[0.08]			[0.11]	[0.15]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.16	2.16	2.16	2.16
DV SD	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	1.39	1.39	1.39	1.39
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in constituency in five years following 1965/1970. ADC vote share measures standardized ADC vote share received by the elite-preferred candidate. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Figure 2: Correlation between ADC vote share and election vote share across elections



Notes: For comparability, ADC vote share conditions on number of ADC votes received by two selected candidates. The same pattern holds when only considering races in which the elite-preferred candidate was not assigned J (see Figure A13).

2 Supplementary materials

2.1 Figures

Figure A1: Global distribution of legislative candidate selection methods



Notes: Data comes from V-Party database of political parties (`v2panom`). V-Party sample includes all parties receiving more than 5% vote share in national elections (3467 political parties across 178 countries). Right panel restricts to ruling parties.

Figure A2: Cross-national scope conditions



Notes: Sample restricted to 1960-1990. Redistributive policy measure comes from V-Party measure of left-wing/redistributive policy of ruling party in a given year (`v2parieglef`). Regime corruption index comes from V-Dem index of regime corruption (`v2xnp_regcorr`), including executive, legislative, and judicial. Presidentialism index comes from V-Dem index of the concentration of political power in one person (`v2xnp_pres`), defined as the "systemic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks." This is used to proxy for the ability of lower-level politicians to influence *some* degree of public resource allocation decisions.

Figure A3: Sincerity of ADC ranking behavior



Notes: Figure compares characteristics of selected candidates according to their raw ADC rank. Since NEC held veto rights, in some cases aspirants ranked below 2nd by ADC were ultimately advanced to candidacy.

Figure A4: Constituencies and instrument assignment



Notes: Left panel represents 1965 constituencies; right represents 1970 constituencies. Dark constituencies are assigned instrument, i.e. top-ranked candidate is assigned J ($1 \rightarrow J$); light constituencies are not assigned instrument, i.e. top-ranked candidate is assigned N ($1 \rightarrow N$). Unshaded constituencies have noncompetitive ADC selection stages, tied ADC votes between top two aspirants, or missing ADC voting outcomes in a handful of cases, and hence instrument assignment is undefined.

Figure A5: Validating administrative data on primary schools



Notes: X-axis records the number of primary schools existing in each district as reported by government sources in either 1967 or 1973. Y-axis records the number of primary schools, based on the facility-level administrative data where I observe year of foundation, which still exist and were founded prior to either year. 1967 source: Jensen & Mkama (1968); 1973 source: *Hansard*, 25-30 June 1973, pp. 1009-1111.

Figure A6: Provision of different local public goods by year, 1960-1980



Notes: Number of local public goods (by type) founded by year between 1960 and 1980 as observed in administrative datasets.

Figure A7: Distribution of outcome measures



Notes: Histograms of the number of local public goods (by type) aggregated to the constituency level founded in the five years following either the 1965 or 1970 election. 'Other local public goods' consists of dispensaries, other health facilities (primarily hospitals), secondary schools, and water points (bottom row).

Figure A8: Spatial distribution of outcome measures



Notes: Outcomes relating to supply of primary schools and other public goods provided. Left panel represents 1965 constituencies; right represents 1970 constituencies. Unshaded constituencies have noncompetitive ADC selection stages, tied ADC votes between top two aspirants, or missing ADC voting outcomes in a handful of cases, and hence instrument assignment is undefined (and so these constituencies are excluded from the analysis sample.

Figure A9: Estimates of first stage while excluding districts or regions



Notes: Figure plots β^{FS} from Equation (1) while sequentially excluding each district-year (left) or region-year (right). Coefficients ordered by magnitude. 95% confidence intervals plotted.

Figure A10: Heterogeneity in estimated first stage effect



Notes: Figure plots the distribution of predicted first stage treatment effects obtained through a causal forest (Wager & Athey, 2018). Estimating using cross-fitting by obtaining split-sample estimates from 1000 splits and taking the median across splits.

Figure A11: Correlates of first stage effect heterogeneity



Notes: Figure plots the 20 variables with the largest absolute coefficients arising from a regression of the predicted first stage treatment effect (based on causal forest) on that variable.

Figure A12: Baseline estimates from Table 5 while excluding districts or regions



Notes: Figure plots β^{IV} from Equation (2) while sequentially excluding each district-year (top) or region-year (bottom). Coefficients ordered by magnitude. 95% confidence sets from wild bootstrap permutations plotted.

Figure A13: Correlation between ADC vote share and election vote share across elections (in constituencies where elite-preferred candidate is not assigned J)



Notes: For comparability, ADC vote share conditions only on the number of ADC votes received by the two candidates ultimately running in the election.

Figure A14: Central government capital allocations across public goods



Notes: Measures constructed using programme-level data from Vols. II of *First Five-Year Plan (1964-69) and Second Five-Year Plan (1969-74).*

Figure A15: Distribution of distance to facilities in HRDS data (1993)



Notes: Figure provides the distance between each household in the HRDS sample and its closest facility. Averages for each type of facility are provided with the blue dotted lines. X-axis is log-transformed.

2.2 Tables

Table A1: Party elite preferences: Differences between candidates ranked first and second by ADC (by year)

	A. 1965					B. 1970					C. Difference
	N	μ_1	μ_2	β_{65}^{ADC}	p(β_{65}^{ADC}=0)	N	μ_1	μ_2	β_{70}^{ADC}	p(β_{70}^{ADC}=0)	p(β_{65}^{ADC}=β_{70}^{ADC})
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Selection outcomes											
ADC vote share	188	0.50	0.20	0.30	[0.01]***	226	0.49	0.19	0.30	[0.01]***	[0.90]
ADC votes	188	27.06	10.37	16.69	[0.01]***	226	214.43	76.77	137.66	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
Demographic											
Male	188	0.98	0.96	0.02	[0.42]	226	0.95	0.96	-0.01	[0.77]	[0.44]
Age	122	37.58	36.88	0.70	[0.58]	220	39.33	39.95	-0.62	[0.56]	[0.46]
Born in district	188	0.78	0.81	-0.03	[0.59]	226	0.78	0.73	0.04	[0.43]	[0.36]
Local religious majority	119	0.76	0.73	0.04	[0.78]	67	0.77	0.75	0.02	[0.41]	[0.87]
Local ethnic majority	137	0.53	0.62	-0.09	[0.09]*	74	0.54	0.54	0.00	[0.08]*	[0.55]
Traditional authority	188	0.10	0.11	-0.01	[0.80]	226	0.12	0.06	0.05	[0.18]	[0.27]
Education											
Vocational	188	0.24	0.24	0.00	[1.00]	226	0.25	0.19	0.05	[0.35]	[0.53]
Overseas experience	188	0.20	0.11	0.10	[0.05]**	226	0.28	0.15	0.13	[0.01]**	[0.63]
Secondary	188	0.45	0.37	0.07	[0.24]	226	0.35	0.24	0.12	[0.06]*	[0.66]
University	188	0.12	0.04	0.07	[0.07]*	226	0.08	0.02	0.06	[0.03]**	[0.79]
Occupation											
Farmer	188	0.30	0.39	-0.10	[0.16]	226	0.49	0.45	0.04	[0.61]	[0.17]
Teacher	188	0.10	0.11	-0.01	[0.82]	226	0.19	0.16	0.04	[0.48]	[0.50]
Religious	188	0.01	0.02	-0.01	[0.57]	226	0.04	0.05	-0.02	[0.53]	[0.84]
Business	188	0.17	0.29	-0.12	[0.05]**	226	0.11	0.12	-0.01	[0.84]	[0.13]
Bureaucrat (junior)	188	0.17	0.18	-0.01	[0.85]	226	0.17	0.14	0.03	[0.58]	[0.61]
Bureaucrat (senior)	188	0.26	0.18	0.07	[0.16]	226	0.19	0.06	0.12	[0.01]***	[0.50]
National political roles											
MP	188	0.27	0.04	0.22	[0.01]***	226	0.43	0.15	0.28	[0.01]***	[0.46]
Minister	188	0.18	0.02	0.16	[0.01]***	226	0.08	0.00	0.08	[0.01]***	[0.10]
Local party roles											
Local elected leader	188	0.30	0.26	0.04	[0.52]	226	0.30	0.39	-0.09	[0.19]	[0.15]
Local appointed leader	188	0.16	0.16	0.00	[1.00]	226	0.23	0.17	0.06	[0.23]	[0.42]
Union/Cooperative leader	188	0.36	0.30	0.06	[0.33]	226	0.44	0.42	0.02	[0.77]	[0.63]
Years of membership	45	6.52	6.73	-0.21	[0.04]**	207	11.05	10.68	0.37	[0.63]	[0.64]
Election outcomes											
Elected	188	0.53	0.47	0.06	[0.54]	226	0.66	0.34	0.33	[0.01]***	[0.01]***
Election vote share	188	0.52	0.48	0.04	[0.47]	226	0.56	0.44	0.12	[0.01]***	[0.05]**
Election votes	188	11575.50	11095.44	480.06	[0.72]	226	15173.36	11781.50	3391.86	[0.01]***	[0.06]*

Notes: Table presents pooled descriptive mean statistics on candidates ranked first (μ_1) and second (μ_2) by ADC. Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Differences in observations (column 1) are due to variation in source accessibility on candidate-level covariates (see Appendix A.3). $\beta^{ADC} = \mu_1 - \mu_2$. Column 5 provides p-value from regressing each candidate covariate onto an indicator for being ranked first with constituency-year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A2: Voter preferences: Differences between election winners and losers (by year)

	A. 1965					B. 1970					C. Difference
	N	μ_{Winner}	μ_{Loser}	$\beta_{65}^{\text{Voters}}$	p($\beta_{65}^{\text{Voters}}$=0)	N	μ_{Winner}	μ_{Loser}	$\beta_{70}^{\text{Voters}}$	p($\beta_{70}^{\text{Voters}}$=0)	p($\beta_{65}^{\text{Voters}}$=$\beta_{70}^{\text{Voters}}$)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Selection outcomes											
ADC ranked first	188	0.53	0.47	0.06	[0.54]	226	0.66	0.34	0.33	[0.01]***	[0.01]***
ADC vote share	188	0.36	0.33	0.03	[0.41]	226	0.42	0.26	0.17	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
ADC votes	188	19.39	18.04	1.35	[0.58]	226	186.42	104.78	81.65	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
Demographic											
Male	188	0.96	0.98	-0.02	[0.42]	226	0.96	0.95	0.01	[0.77]	[0.44]
Age	122	35.56	39.96	-4.40	[0.01]***	220	39.54	39.74	-0.20	[0.85]	[0.02]**
Born in district	188	0.88	0.70	0.18	[0.01]***	226	0.78	0.73	0.04	[0.43]	[0.10]*
Local religious majority	119	0.78	0.71	0.06	[0.41]	67	0.77	0.75	0.02	[1.00]	[0.74]
Local ethnic majority	137	0.64	0.47	0.17	[0.03]**	74	0.58	0.48	0.10	[0.08]*	[0.63]
Traditional authority	188	0.14	0.06	0.07	[0.07]*	226	0.10	0.08	0.02	[0.66]	[0.33]
Education											
Vocational	188	0.31	0.18	0.13	[0.03]**	226	0.23	0.21	0.02	[0.75]	[0.19]
Overseas experience	188	0.22	0.09	0.14	[0.01]***	226	0.25	0.19	0.06	[0.24]	[0.32]
Secondary	188	0.50	0.32	0.18	[0.01]***	226	0.34	0.26	0.08	[0.19]	[0.28]
University	188	0.14	0.02	0.12	[0.01]***	226	0.07	0.03	0.04	[0.13]	[0.13]
Occupation											
Farmer	188	0.48	0.21	0.27	[0.01]***	226	0.50	0.44	0.05	[0.44]	[0.03]**
Teacher	188	0.12	0.09	0.03	[0.50]	226	0.19	0.17	0.02	[0.73]	[0.84]
Religious	188	0.02	0.01	0.01	[0.57]	226	0.05	0.04	0.02	[0.53]	[0.84]
Business	188	0.18	0.28	-0.10	[0.11]	226	0.10	0.12	-0.03	[0.53]	[0.34]
Bureaucrat (junior)	188	0.22	0.13	0.10	[0.08]*	226	0.19	0.12	0.06	[0.20]	[0.64]
Bureaucrat (senior)	188	0.26	0.18	0.07	[0.16]	226	0.17	0.08	0.09	[0.06]*	[0.85]
National political roles											
MP	188	0.14	0.17	-0.03	[0.58]	226	0.35	0.23	0.12	[0.07]*	[0.06]*
Minister	188	0.12	0.09	0.03	[0.50]	226	0.06	0.02	0.04	[0.10]*	[0.80]
Local party roles											
Local elected leader	188	0.24	0.31	-0.06	[0.33]	226	0.32	0.37	-0.05	[0.43]	[0.91]
Local appointed leader	188	0.16	0.16	0.00	[1.00]	226	0.19	0.20	-0.01	[0.86]	[0.91]
Union/Cooperative leader	188	0.46	0.20	0.26	[0.01]***	226	0.45	0.42	0.04	[0.57]	[0.02]**
Years of membership	45	6.49	7.25	-0.76	[0.04]**	207	10.99	10.74	0.25	[0.72]	[0.50]
Election outcomes											
Election vote share	188	0.71	0.29	0.42	[0.01]***	226	0.67	0.33	0.33	[0.01]***	[0.02]**
Election votes	188	16268.48	6402.46	9866.02	[0.01]***	226	17912.41	9042.46	8869.95	[0.01]***	[0.47]

Notes: Table presents pooled descriptive mean statistics on candidates who won election (μ_{Winner}) and lost (μ_{Loser}). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Differences in observations (column 1) are due to variation in source coverage across candidates. $\beta^{\text{Voters}} = \mu_{\text{Winner}} - \mu_{\text{Loser}}$. Column 4 provides p-value from regressing each candidate covariate onto an indicator for winning election with constituency-year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A3: Party elite and voter preferences across candidates (J=0 constituencies)

		A. Party elite preferences				B. Voter preferences				C. Difference
	N	μ_1	μ_2	β^{ADC}	p(β^{ADC}=0)	μ_{Winner}	μ_{Loser}	β^{Voters}	p(β^{Voters}=0)	p(β^{ADC}=β^{Voters})
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Selection outcomes										
ADC ranked first	218	1.00	0.00	1.00		0.49	0.51	-0.03	[0.78]	
ADC vote share	218	0.50	0.18	0.31	[0.01]***	0.36	0.31	0.05	[0.21]	[0.00]***
ADC votes	218	121.59	41.81	79.78	[0.01]***	94.56	68.83	25.72	[0.09]*	[0.02]**
Demographic										
Male	218	0.96	0.93	0.04	[0.25]	0.94	0.94	0.00	[1.00]	[0.40]
Age	183	38.15	39.14	-0.99	[0.63]	38.32	38.95	-0.63	[0.47]	[0.82]
Born in district	218	0.77	0.75	0.02	[0.75]	0.83	0.70	0.13	[0.02]**	[0.18]
Local religious majority	107	0.79	0.71	0.08	[0.57]	0.79	0.71	0.08	[0.57]	[1.00]
Local ethnic majority	111	0.52	0.66	-0.14	[0.10]	0.65	0.51	0.13	[0.03]**	[0.04]**
Traditional authority	218	0.09	0.10	-0.01	[0.81]	0.11	0.08	0.03	[0.47]	[0.52]
Education										
Vocational	218	0.28	0.22	0.06	[0.35]	0.28	0.21	0.07	[0.21]	[0.82]
Overseas experience	218	0.23	0.13	0.10	[0.03]**	0.21	0.15	0.06	[0.18]	[0.62]
Secondary	218	0.36	0.26	0.10	[0.09]*	0.36	0.26	0.10	[0.09]*	[1.00]
University	218	0.07	0.02	0.06	[0.06]*	0.07	0.02	0.06	[0.06]*	[1.00]
Occupation										
Farmer	218	0.37	0.47	-0.10	[0.13]	0.46	0.38	0.08	[0.22]	[0.05]*
Teacher	218	0.17	0.12	0.05	[0.34]	0.14	0.15	-0.01	[0.85]	[0.41]
Religious	218	0.02	0.05	-0.03	[0.26]	0.05	0.02	0.03	[0.26]	[0.10]
Business	218	0.12	0.17	-0.05	[0.30]	0.13	0.16	-0.03	[0.54]	[0.78]
Bureaucrat (junior)	218	0.20	0.19	0.01	[0.86]	0.24	0.16	0.08	[0.12]	[0.34]
Bureaucrat (senior)	218	0.20	0.12	0.08	[0.08]*	0.21	0.11	0.10	[0.03]**	[0.79]
National political roles										
MP	218	0.36	0.15	0.21	[0.01]***	0.24	0.27	-0.03	[0.68]	[0.00]***
Minister	218	0.11	0.01	0.10	[0.01]***	0.06	0.06	0.01	[0.78]	[0.04]**
Local party roles										
Local elected leader	218	0.27	0.28	-0.02	[0.78]	0.24	0.31	-0.07	[0.26]	[0.52]
Local appointed leader	218	0.19	0.17	0.02	[0.72]	0.16	0.21	-0.06	[0.28]	[0.32]
Union/Cooperative leader	218	0.38	0.38	0.00	[1.00]	0.41	0.34	0.07	[0.26]	[0.43]
Years of membership	132	10.18	10.15	0.04	[0.81]	9.76	10.64	-0.88	[0.92]	[0.36]
Election outcomes										
Elected	218	0.49	0.51	-0.03	[0.78]	1.00	0.00	1.00	[0.01]***	
Election vote share	218	0.49	0.51	-0.02	[0.55]	0.67	0.33	0.35	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
Election votes	218	12378.52	13398.05	-1019.52	[0.35]	17308.86	8467.71	8841.16	[0.01]***	[0.00]***

Notes: Panel A presents descriptive statistics on candidates ranked first (μ_1) and second (μ_2) by ADC. $\beta^{ADC} = \mu_1 - \mu_2$. Column 5 provides p-value from regressing candidate covariate onto indicator for being ranked first with constituency-year fixed effects. Panel B presents descriptive statistics on candidates who won election (μ_{Winner}) and lost (μ_{Loser}). $\beta^{\text{Voters}} = \mu_{\text{Winner}} - \mu_{\text{Loser}}$. Column 9 provides p-value from regressing candidate covariate onto indicator for winning election with constituency-year fixed effects. Column 10 provides p-value from a seemingly unrelated regression to test $\beta^{\text{ADC}} = \beta^{\text{Voters}}$. Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Differences in observations (column 1) due to variation in source accessibility (see Appendix A.3). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A4: Confounding: Differences between constituencies wherein first-ranked candidate was elected and second-ranked candidate was elected

	N	$\mu_{\text{Winner=1}}$	$\mu_{\text{Winner=2}}$	β	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Election					
Number of aspirants	207	9.60	9.82	-0.22	[0.32]
Total ADC votes	207	284.39	198.87	85.53	[0.12]
Registered voters	207	36111.34	35358.89	752.45	[0.68]
Number of polling stations	207	91.33	87.93	3.40	[0.75]
Turnout	207	0.72	0.73	-0.01	[0.76]
Presidential vote share	205	0.95	0.94	0.01	[0.27]
Number of campaign meetings	79	33.93	37.26	-3.34	[0.39]
Geography					
Population (1957)	207	75205.05	76965.76	-1760.71	[0.91]
Area (km^2)	207	7959.20	7361.93	597.28	[0.55]
Longitude	207	34.98	35.17	-0.18	[0.60]
Latitude	207	-5.44	-5.51	0.07	[0.79]
Average distance to infrastructure					
Main road (km)	207	15.20	18.02	-2.82	[0.13]
Any road (km)	207	6.10	6.89	-0.79	[0.07]*
Railway (km)	207	173.33	155.12	18.22	[0.47]
Major town (km)	207	118.29	142.60	-24.31	[0.04]**
Any town (km)	207	48.84	51.50	-2.67	[0.41]
City (km)	207	100.05	119.47	-19.42	[0.06]*
Existing local public goods					
Primary schools	207	22.72	22.18	0.54	[0.91]
Secondary schools	207	0.72	0.33	0.39	[0.02]**
Dispensaries	207	2.78	3.09	-0.31	[0.33]
Health facilities	207	1.08	0.98	0.10	[0.66]
Water points	207	8.62	4.67	3.95	[0.09]*

Table presents differences in mean constituency characteristics across cases where first-ranked candidate won office ($\mu_{\text{Winner=1}}$) and second-ranked candidate won office ($\mu_{\text{Winner=2}}$). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). $\beta = \mu_{\text{Winner=1}} - \mu_{\text{Winner=2}}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A5: Balance: Differences between first-ranked candidates assigned J and N (by year)

	Pooled					1965					1970				
	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Selection outcomes															
ADC vote share	207	0.49	0.50	0.00	[0.93]	94	0.47	0.52	-0.05	[0.17]	113	0.51	0.47	0.04	[0.27]
ADC votes	207	137.98	121.59	16.39	[0.21]	94	25.19	28.94	-3.74	[0.27]	113	241.92	191.82	50.10	[0.18]
Demographic															
Male	207	0.96	0.96	0.00	[0.83]	94	0.98	0.98	0.00	[1.00]	113	0.94	0.95	-0.01	[0.81]
Age	176	39.28	38.15	1.14	[0.32]	66	37.73	37.44	0.29	[0.89]	110	40.20	38.58	1.62	[0.22]
Born in district	207	0.79	0.77	0.02	[0.79]	94	0.77	0.79	-0.02	[0.81]	113	0.80	0.76	0.05	[0.56]
Local religious majority	111	0.73	0.79	-0.06	[0.50]	68	0.72	0.81	-0.09	[0.41]	43	0.76	0.77	0.00	[0.97]
Local ethnic majority	124	0.54	0.52	0.02	[0.86]	74	0.52	0.53	0.00	[0.97]	50	0.57	0.52	0.05	[0.75]
Traditional authority	207	0.12	0.09	0.03	[0.46]	94	0.13	0.06	0.06	[0.30]	113	0.12	0.11	0.00	[0.94]
Education															
Vocational	207	0.21	0.28	-0.06	[0.31]	94	0.23	0.26	-0.02	[0.81]	113	0.20	0.29	-0.09	[0.25]
Overseas experience	207	0.27	0.23	0.04	[0.51]	94	0.26	0.15	0.11	[0.20]	113	0.27	0.29	-0.02	[0.85]
Secondary	207	0.44	0.36	0.08	[0.26]	94	0.49	0.40	0.09	[0.41]	113	0.39	0.32	0.07	[0.45]
University	207	0.12	0.07	0.05	[0.26]	94	0.15	0.09	0.06	[0.34]	113	0.10	0.06	0.03	[0.52]
Occupation															
Farmer	207	0.44	0.37	0.07	[0.23]	94	0.36	0.23	0.13	[0.18]	113	0.51	0.47	0.04	[0.66]
Teacher	207	0.13	0.17	-0.03	[0.57]	94	0.09	0.11	-0.02	[0.73]	113	0.18	0.21	-0.03	[0.66]
Religious	207	0.03	0.02	0.01	[0.53]	94	0.02	0.00	0.02	[0.32]	113	0.04	0.03	0.01	[0.85]
Business	207	0.15	0.12	0.03	[0.53]	94	0.15	0.19	-0.04	[0.59]	113	0.16	0.06	0.09	[0.13]
Bureaucrat (junior)	207	0.13	0.20	-0.07	[0.18]	94	0.15	0.19	-0.04	[0.59]	113	0.12	0.21	-0.09	[0.19]
Bureaucrat (senior)	207	0.23	0.20	0.03	[0.61]	94	0.26	0.26	0.00	[1.00]	113	0.22	0.16	0.05	[0.47]
National political roles															
MP	207	0.36	0.36	0.00	[0.91]	94	0.21	0.32	-0.11	[0.25]	113	0.49	0.39	0.10	[0.28]
Minister	207	0.14	0.11	0.03	[0.55]	94	0.17	0.19	-0.02	[0.79]	113	0.12	0.05	0.07	[0.20]
Local party roles															
Local elected leader	207	0.34	0.27	0.07	[0.27]	94	0.32	0.28	0.04	[0.66]	113	0.35	0.26	0.09	[0.28]
Local appointed leader	207	0.20	0.19	0.01	[0.79]	94	0.13	0.19	-0.06	[0.40]	113	0.27	0.19	0.08	[0.32]
Union/Cooperative leader	207	0.44	0.38	0.06	[0.33]	94	0.36	0.36	0.00	[1.00]	113	0.51	0.39	0.12	[0.20]
Years of membership	123	10.22	10.18	0.04	[0.30]	23	6.80	6.00	0.80	[0.65]	100	11.42	10.77	0.65	[0.36]

Table presents differences in mean predetermined candidate characteristics (of the elite-preferred candidate) between constituencies in which elite-preferred candidate was assigned J ($\mu_{1\to J}$) and where they were assigned N ($\mu_{1\to N}$). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). $\beta^J = \mu_{1\to J} - \mu_{1\to N}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A6: Balance: Differences between constituencies wherein first-ranked candidates assigned J and N (by year)

	Pooled					1965					1970				
	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Election															
Number of aspirants	207	10.04	9.37	0.67	[0.24]	94	8.89	7.40	1.49	[0.05]**	113	11.10	10.85	0.24	[0.83]
Total ADC votes	207	255.85	245.72	10.13	[0.30]	94	53.98	54.43	-0.45	[0.92]	113	441.88	390.73	51.16	[0.30]
Registered voters	207	34317.62	37157.98	-2840.36	[0.15]	94	31158.51	29137.96	2020.55	[0.38]	113	37228.96	43237.68	-6008.72	[0.01]***
Number of polling stations	207	88.60	91.22	-2.62	[0.81]	94	73.91	68.64	5.28	[0.34]	113	102.14	108.34	-6.20	[0.29]
Turnout	207	0.73	0.71	0.02	[0.41]	94	0.78	0.74	0.04	[0.17]	113	0.69	0.69	-0.01	[0.77]
Presidential vote share	205	0.95	0.94	0.00	[0.45]	92	0.95	0.95	0.00	[0.58]	113	0.94	0.94	0.00	[0.61]
Population (1957)	207	75295.93	76447.92	-1152.00	[0.71]	94	86626.04	75143.86	11482.18	[0.11]	113	64854.45	77436.48	-12582.03	[0.02]**
Geography															
Area (km^2)	207	7918.40	7546.56	371.83	[0.80]	94	7744.69	8720.25	-975.56	[0.64]	113	8078.48	6656.84	1421.65	[0.39]
Longitude	207	35.11	35.01	0.09	[0.79]	94	35.22	34.81	0.41	[0.46]	113	35.00	35.16	-0.16	[0.75]
Latitude	207	-5.36	-5.57	0.21	[0.61]	94	-5.76	-4.88	-0.88	[0.12]	113	-4.99	-6.08	1.09	[0.04]**
Main road (km)	207	16.71	15.97	0.74	[0.68]	94	15.09	16.83	-1.74	[0.52]	113	18.21	15.32	2.89	[0.27]
Average distance to infrastructure															
Any road (km)	207	6.41	6.42	-0.02	[0.98]	94	6.50	6.21	0.29	[0.64]	113	6.32	6.58	-0.26	[0.66]
Railway (km)	207	158.61	172.87	-14.26	[0.55]	94	175.01	144.97	30.04	[0.36]	113	143.49	194.01	-50.52	[0.11]
Major town (km)	207	125.74	129.88	-4.14	[0.72]	94	122.17	136.97	-14.80	[0.39]	113	129.02	124.50	4.52	[0.79]
Any town (km)	207	51.51	48.44	3.07	[0.37]	94	51.84	47.25	4.60	[0.38]	113	51.21	49.34	1.87	[0.69]
City (km)	207	103.41	111.63	-8.23	[0.43]	94	101.25	114.55	-13.30	[0.38]	113	105.39	109.42	-4.03	[0.78]
Primary schools	207	22.81	22.24	0.57	[0.69]	94	22.30	19.94	2.36	[0.38]	113	23.27	23.98	-0.71	[0.75]
Existing local public goods															
Secondary schools	207	0.66	0.48	0.19	[0.29]	94	0.51	0.47	0.04	[0.86]	113	0.80	0.48	0.32	[0.24]
Dispensaries	207	2.85	2.94	-0.10	[0.88]	94	2.53	2.47	0.06	[0.91]	113	3.14	3.31	-0.17	[0.77]
Health facilities	207	0.99	1.08	-0.09	[0.63]	94	0.94	0.96	-0.02	[0.94]	113	1.04	1.18	-0.14	[0.56]
Water points	207	7.05	7.06	0.00	[0.88]	94	4.11	2.74	1.36	[0.49]	113	9.76	10.32	-0.56	[0.88]

Table presents differences in mean predetermined constituency characteristics between constituencies in which elite-preferred candidate was assigned J ($\mu_{1\to J}$) and where they were assigned N ($\mu_{1\to N}$). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). $\beta^J = \mu_{1\to J} - \mu_{1\to N}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A7: Exclusion: Differences in competitiveness of election races wherein first-ranked candidates assigned J and N

	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^{FS}	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Election vote share	207	0.70	0.67	0.02	[0.22]
Election votes	207	17006.87	17308.86	-302.00	[0.84]
Turnout	207	0.73	0.71	0.02	[0.41]
Presidential vote share	205	0.95	0.94	0.00	[0.45]
Number of campaign meetings	79	36.24	34.73	1.51	[0.70]

Table presents differences in mean outcomes relating to electoral competitiveness between constituencies in which elite-preferred candidate was assigned J ($\mu_{1\to J}$) and where they were assigned N ($\mu_{1\to N}$). 'Election vote share' refers to vote share of winning candidate. Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Number of campaign meetings is only selectively reported for 1965 in Cliffe et al (1967). $\beta = \mu_{1\to J} - \mu_{1\to N}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A8: Elite-preferred candidate is elected (by election)

	1965				1970			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
J	0.213	0.178	0.206	0.231	0.291	0.233	0.305	0.249
	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.108)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.089)	(0.112)
Controls	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
F-statistic	4.38	4.31	3.62	9.67	12.14	5.04	11.85	4.97
DV Mean	0.426	0.426	0.426	0.426	0.532	0.532	0.532	0.532
DV SD	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.503	0.503	0.503	0.503
Observations	94	94	94	94	113	113	113	113

DV: Elite-preferred candidate is elected. Table A25 displays LASSO-selected control coefficients. All specifications are estimated using OLS with election-year fixed effects. Even-indexed columns add LASSO-selected controls. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A9: Disaggregating effects on supply of other local public goods

	Secondary schools				Health facilities			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.05	-0.06	-0.04	-0.06	-0.03	-0.01	-0.08	-0.05
	[0.79]	[0.72]	[0.80]	[0.70]	[0.90]	[0.97]	[0.76]	[0.83]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
DV SD	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44
FS F-statistic	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
	Dispensaries				Water points			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.25	0.18	0.20	0.14	0.34	0.35	0.15	0.21
	[0.48]	[0.59]	[0.58]	[0.67]	[0.68]	[0.66]	[0.86]	[0.79]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	1.71	1.71	1.71	1.71
DV SD	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	1.63	1.63	1.63	1.63
FS F-statistic	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of dispensaries; other health facilities; secondary schools; water points, founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A10: Effects on supply of local public goods (Sample exclusions)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
A. Including towns	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.62	0.55	0.59	0.51	0.28	0.25	0.01	0.03
	[0.08]	[0.08]	[0.11]	[0.14]	[0.69]	[0.71]	[0.98]	[0.96]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.18	2.18	2.18	2.18
DV SD	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	1.38	1.38	1.38	1.38
FS F-statistic	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
B. Excluding NEC vetos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.63	0.55	0.66	0.56	0.33	0.28	0.14	0.14
	[0.08]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.10]	[0.63]	[0.67]	[0.84]	[0.83]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.07	2.07	2.07	2.07
DV SD	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40
FS F-statistic	17.1	20.6	16.8	20.5	17.1	20.6	16.8	20.5
Observations	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. Panel A includes facilities in wards in major towns (excluded in baseline estimation). Panel B excludes all constituencies in which National Executive Committee exercised its veto over the aspirant ranked first by ADC (and hence *elite-preferred* candidate had ranked second or lower in ADC). All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A11: Effects on supply of local public goods (Varying outcomes)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
A. Inverse hyperbolic sine	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.86	0.77	0.88	0.76	0.37	0.32	0.08	0.09
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.65]	[0.67]	[0.92]	[0.90]
DV Mean	2.84	2.84	2.84	2.84	2.63	2.63	2.63	2.63
DV SD	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
B. Non-transformed count	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.59	0.53	0.67	0.58	0.08	0.11	0.04	0.15
	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.92]	[0.87]	[0.96]	[0.81]
DV Mean	11.80	11.80	11.80	11.80	19.56	19.56	19.56	19.56
DV SD	8.88	8.88	8.88	8.88	26.92	26.92	26.92	26.92
C. Log per capita	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.99	0.93	1.02	0.92	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.11
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.92]	[0.89]	[0.94]	[0.88]
DV Mean	-2.04	-2.04	-2.04	-2.04	-2.01	-2.01	-2.01	-2.01
DV SD	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓

Dependent variables: Panel A: Inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. Panel B: Non-transformed count of the same outcomes using a Poisson model second-stage. Panel C: Log per 1000 population (based on 1957 census) measure of the same outcomes. Specification in Panel A estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects; Panel B estimated with Poisson IV model following control function approach of Wooldridge (2010). Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A12: Effects on distance to closest facilities (HRDS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Primary school				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.42	-0.40	-0.30	-0.30
	[0.05]	[0.03]	[0.10]	[0.06]
DV Mean	6.59	6.59	6.59	6.59
DV SD	1.18	1.18	1.18	1.18
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543
B. Secondary school				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.04	-0.04	-0.13	-0.12
	[0.89]	[0.90]	[0.67]	[0.69]
DV Mean	9.51	9.51	9.51	9.51
DV SD	1.45	1.45	1.45	1.45
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543
C. Dispensary				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.03	-0.06	0.03	-0.02
	[0.91]	[0.82]	[0.91]	[0.95]
DV Mean	7.64	7.64	7.64	7.64
DV SD	1.39	1.39	1.39	1.39
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543
D. Health facility				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.31	-0.32	-0.36	-0.36
	[0.27]	[0.26]	[0.10]	[0.09]
DV Mean	9.38	9.38	9.38	9.38
DV SD	1.59	1.59	1.59	1.59
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543
E. Water point				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.44	-0.46	-0.56	-0.63
	[0.64]	[0.63]	[0.28]	[0.23]
Weights	×	✓	×	
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	5.45	5.45	5.45	5.45
DV SD	2.04	2.04	2.04	2.04
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543

Notes: Data source is the *Human Resource Development Survey* (1993). Dependent variables: Log-transformed distance in meters between respondent household and closest primary school (Panel A); secondary school (Panel B); dispensary (Panel C); health facility (Panel D); water point (Panel E). All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects and rural cluster fixed effect. Unit of observation is the household-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to households in constituencies not assigned to instrument. Standard errors clustered by constituency-election cycle. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A13: Effects on reported quality of closest primary school (HRDS)

	Z-score index				First principal component			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02
	[0.67]	[0.71]	[0.89]	[0.85]	[0.67]	[0.71]	[0.89]	[0.85]
Weights	×	✓	×		×	✓	×	
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
DV SD	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543

Notes: Data source is the *Human Resource Development Survey* (1993). Dependent variables: Aggregated index of questions about household head's perception of quality of closest primary school; comprising teachers' quality, headteachers' quality, school supplies, high quality facilities, student learning outcomes in literacy and numeracy. Columns 1-4 aggregate these using a standardized z-score; columns 5-8 aggregate these using the standardized first principal component. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects and rural cluster fixed effect. Unit of observation is the household-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to households in constituencies not assigned to instrument. Standard errors clustered by constituency-election cycle. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A14: Effects on educational attainment (HRDS)

	Ever went to school				Can read and write			
A. Baseline cohorts	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09
	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.14]	[0.12]	[0.04]	[0.02]
DV Mean	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80
DV SD	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
FS F-statistic	8.8	8.9	10.5	10.5	8.8	8.9	10.5	10.5
Observations	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155
B. Extended cohorts	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08
	[0.16]	[0.10]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.10]	[0.07]	[0.01]	[0.00]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
DV SD	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37
FS F-statistic	10.0	10.0	12.0	11.9	10.0	10.0	12.0	11.9
Observations	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742

Notes: Data source is the *Human Resource Development Survey* (1993). Dependent variables: Respondent has any formal education (columns 1-4); respondent can read and write (columns 5-8). Unit of observation is the individual-election cycle. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including fixed effects for election cycle, rural cluster, year of birth, and gender. Panel A restricts to cohorts who were seven years old at any point during a given electoral cycle; panel B extends to the five cohorts beyond this. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to individuals in constituencies not assigned to instrument. Standard errors clustered by constituency-election cycle. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A15: Effects on supply of local public goods (district-level)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Share $\widehat{\text{elite-preferred}}$	1.35	1.17	1.59	1.30	0.57	0.43	0.40	0.24
	[0.09]	[0.13]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.66]	[0.73]	[0.78]	[0.85]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	2.68	2.68	2.68	2.68	2.38	2.38	2.38	2.38
DV SD	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	1.38	1.38	1.38	1.38
FS F-statistic	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.9	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.9
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given district in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects following Equation (A3). Unit of observation is the district-election cycle. DV Mean and SD correspond to districts where no constituencies were assigned the instrument. Estimating sample excludes districts containing any non-competitive ADC selection processes. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A16: Effects on supply of local public goods (spillovers test)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.89	0.80	0.73	0.66	0.77	0.64	0.34	0.34
Share $\widehat{\text{other preferred}}_d^{-i}$	0.53	0.44			0.99	0.75		
Share $\widehat{\text{other preferred}}_r^{-i}$			2.29	1.89			6.61	7.01
	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.33]	[0.35]	[0.63]	[0.59]
	[0.24]	[0.23]	[0.22]	[0.31]	[0.19]	[0.26]	[0.20]	[0.15]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.18	2.18	2.16	2.16
DV SD	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.78	1.35	1.35	1.39	1.39
Observations	156	156	207	207	156	156	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects following Equation (A4). Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. DV Mean and SD correspond to districts where no constituencies were assigned the instrument. Estimating sample excludes districts containing any non-competitive ADC selection processes. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A17: Effects on local government employment

	New employees				New postings			
A. Binary outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.04	-0.18	-0.05	-0.01	-0.06	-0.10	-0.09	0.11
	[0.85]	[0.49]	[0.85]	[0.97]	[0.83]	[0.71]	[0.73]	[0.69]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.11	0.24	0.34	0.39	0.29	0.45	0.50	0.54
DV SD	0.31	0.43	0.48	0.49	0.46	0.50	0.50	0.50
FS F-statistic	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
B. Log-transformed outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.36	0.30	0.28	0.34	0.51	0.45	0.34	0.70
	[0.24]	[0.50]	[0.61]	[0.55]	[0.49]	[0.58]	[0.72]	[0.47]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.10	0.27	0.43	0.47	0.61	0.98	1.32	1.48
DV SD	0.32	0.53	0.70	0.72	1.00	1.19	1.44	1.50
FS F-statistic	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
C. Constituencies with any office	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.03	-0.39	-0.21	-0.15	-0.15	-0.28	-0.31	0.02
	[0.93]	[0.35]	[0.61]	[0.71]	[0.71]	[0.46]	[0.40]	[0.96]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.16	0.34	0.48	0.55	0.41	0.64	0.71	0.76
DV SD	0.37	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.46	0.43
FS F-statistic	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8
Observations	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157
D. Excluding Dar-es-Salaam	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.01	-0.24	-0.11	-0.07	-0.12	-0.13	-0.12	0.09
	[0.97]	[0.36]	[0.69]	[0.82]	[0.67]	[0.66]	[0.67]	[0.75]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.10	0.24	0.34	0.39	0.30	0.45	0.50	0.54
DV SD	0.30	0.43	0.48	0.49	0.46	0.50	0.50	0.50
FS F-statistic	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8
Observations	202	202	202	202	202	202	202	202
E. Excluding elite-preferred incumbents	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.09	-0.31	-0.20	-0.15	-0.18	-0.12	-0.20	0.11
	[0.74]	[0.33]	[0.56]	[0.67]	[0.58]	[0.74]	[0.58]	[0.75]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.13	0.22	0.35	0.39	0.31	0.46	0.54	0.59
DV SD	0.34	0.42	0.48	0.49	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.50
FS F-statistic	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1
Observations	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133

Dependent variables: Any new government employees are observed within 1-4 quarters of election in local government offices within constituency; Any new postings (i.e. existing bureaucrats given new jobs) are observed within 1-4 quarters of election in local government offices within constituency. Panel A: Outcomes are indicators for any new employees/postings; Panel B: Outcomes are log+1 number of new government employees/number of new postings; Panel C: Excluding constituencies not observed as containing a local government office at any point; Panel D: Excluding Dar es Salaam; Panel E: Excluding cases where elite-preferred candidate was incumbent. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A18: Differences in characteristics of elected candidates as a function of instrument assignment

	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^{FS}	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Selection outcomes					
ADC ranked first	207	0.73	0.49	0.25	[0.01]***
ADC vote share	207	0.43	0.36	0.07	[0.02]**
ADC votes	207	128.39	94.56	33.83	[0.04]**
Demographic					
Male	207	0.97	0.94	0.02	[0.39]
Age	185	37.49	38.32	-0.83	[0.55]
Born in district	207	0.83	0.83	0.00	[0.94]
Local religious majority	106	0.75	0.79	-0.04	[0.60]
Local ethnic majority	123	0.59	0.65	-0.05	[0.50]
Traditional authority	207	0.12	0.11	0.01	[0.82]
Education					
Vocational	207	0.24	0.28	-0.04	[0.48]
Overseas experience	207	0.27	0.21	0.05	[0.35]
Secondary	207	0.47	0.36	0.11	[0.13]
University	207	0.13	0.07	0.06	[0.19]
Occupation					
Farmer	207	0.52	0.46	0.06	[0.37]
Teacher	207	0.17	0.14	0.04	[0.44]
Religious	207	0.03	0.05	-0.02	[0.60]
Business	207	0.14	0.13	0.01	[0.83]
Bureaucrat (junior)	207	0.16	0.24	-0.08	[0.16]
Bureaucrat (senior)	207	0.20	0.21	-0.01	[0.84]
National political roles					
MP	207	0.28	0.24	0.04	[0.43]
Minister	207	0.11	0.06	0.05	[0.26]
Local party roles					
Local elected leader	207	0.34	0.24	0.10	[0.11]
Local appointed leader	207	0.20	0.16	0.05	[0.36]
Union/Cooperative leader	207	0.50	0.41	0.09	[0.21]
Years of membership	138	9.81	9.76	0.05	[0.24]

Table presents differences in mean characteristics of ultimately elected legislators between constituencies in which elite-preferred candidate was assigned J ($\mu_{1\to J}$) and where they were assigned N ($\mu_{1\to N}$). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). $\beta = \mu_{1\to J} - \mu_{1\to N}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A19: Correlates of ADC vote share among elite-preferred candidates

	N	μ_1^{Weak}	μ_1^{Strong}	β	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Demographic					
Male	207	0.96	0.96	0.00	[0.88]
Age	176	38.40	38.93	0.10	[0.85]
Born in district	207	0.75	0.81	0.04	[0.12]
Local religious majority	111	0.78	0.75	-0.02	[0.64]
Local ethnic majority	124	0.54	0.52	-0.01	[0.90]
Traditional authority	207	0.13	0.08	-0.02	[0.24]
Education					
Vocational	207	0.19	0.31	0.05	[0.15]
Overseas experience	207	0.26	0.23	0.00	[0.96]
Secondary	207	0.40	0.39	0.01	[0.87]
University	207	0.10	0.09	0.00	[0.93]
Occupation					
Farmer	207	0.38	0.42	-0.01	[0.86]
Teacher	207	0.15	0.15	0.00	[0.93]
Religious	207	0.04	0.01	-0.01	[0.36]
Business	207	0.15	0.12	-0.01	[0.82]
Bureaucrat (junior)	207	0.13	0.22	0.04	[0.14]
Bureaucrat (senior)	207	0.15	0.30	0.10	[0.01]***
National political roles					
MP	207	0.27	0.45	0.13	[0.01]***
Minister	207	0.07	0.19	0.10	[0.01]***
Local party roles					
Local elected leader	207	0.31	0.29	-0.04	[0.23]
Local appointed leader	207	0.16	0.24	0.05	[0.12]
Union/Cooperative leader	207	0.46	0.34	-0.03	[0.32]
Years of membership	123	9.81	10.61	0.47	[0.18]

Table presents differences in mean candidate characteristics between elite-preferred candidates receiving more than the mean ADC vote share (μ_1^{Strong}) and those elite-preferred candidates receiving less than mean ADC vote share (μ_1^{Weak}). β comes from a regression of a given elite-preferred candidate characteristic on their ADC vote share (vote share conditioned on the top two candidates for comparability) using OLS with election year fixed effects. Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Column 5 provides p-value associated with β. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A20: First stage heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
J	0.255	0.242	0.268	0.258
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.064)
J × ADC vote share			-0.012	0.015
			(0.063)	(0.066)
Controls	×	✓	×	✓
F-statistic	15.52	15.94	17.28	15.99
DV Mean	0.486	0.486	0.486	0.486
DV SD	0.502	0.502	0.502	0.502
Observations	207	207	207	207

DV: Elite-preferred candidate is elected. ADC vote share measures the standardized ADC vote share received by the elite-preferred candidate during the selection stage. All specifications are estimated using OLS with election-year fixed effects. Even-indexed columns add LASSO-selected controls. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A21: Other local public goods: Heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate

		Secondary schools				Health facilities			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$		-0.05	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.01
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$ ×	ADC vote share			0.43	0.38			0.26	0.23
		[0.79]	[0.72]	[0.91]	[0.83]	[0.90]	[0.97]	[0.99]	[0.95]
				[0.01]	[0.01]			[0.22]	[0.25]
Weights		×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean		0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
DV SD		0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44
Observations		207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
		Dispensaries				Water points			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$		0.25	0.18	0.28	0.21	0.34	0.35	0.49	0.47
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$ ×	ADC vote share			-0.09	-0.07			1.08	0.98
		[0.48]	[0.59]	[0.36]	[0.47]	[0.68]	[0.66]	[0.52]	[0.52]
				[0.79]	[0.83]			[0.12]	[0.14]
Weights		×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean		0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	1.71	1.71	1.71	1.71
DV SD		0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	1.63	1.63	1.63	1.63
Observations		207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of dispensaries; other health facilities; secondary schools; water points, founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A22: Heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate (by tercile)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.72	0.64	0.24	0.14	0.30	0.27	-0.01	-0.05
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}} \times \text{ADC}^1_{p33-p66}$			0.30	0.48			-0.56	-0.33
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}} \times \text{ADC}^1_{p67-p100}$			0.93	0.86			1.35	1.20
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.69]	[0.81]	[0.66]	[0.68]	[0.99]	[0.96]
			[0.70]	[0.51]			[0.70]	[0.82]
			[0.22]	[0.22]			[0.33]	[0.37]
Weights	×	✓			×	✓		
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.16	2.16	2.16	2.16
DV SD	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	1.39	1.39	1.39	1.39
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. ADC vote share measures the tercile of the ADC vote share received by the elite-preferred candidate during the selection stage. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A23: Effects on supply of local public goods (by election)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	1.07	0.93	0.51	0.47	0.54	0.60	0.16	0.07
	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.24]	[0.26]	[0.67]	[0.60]	[0.86]	[0.93]
Year	1965	1965	1970	1970	1965	1965	1970	1970
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	1.82	1.82	2.83	2.83	1.75	1.75	2.64	2.64
DV SD	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.60	1.34	1.34	1.31	1.31
FS F-statistic	4.4	5.0	12.1	14.7	4.4	5.0	12.1	14.7
Observations	94	94	113	113	94	94	113	113

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given district in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.