Do Elites Know Best? Candidate Selection and Policy Implementation in Post-independence Tanzania

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A Supplementary materials

A.1 The politics of primary education expansion

In the immediate post-independence period, the expansion of secondary and tertiary education was prioritized by the national government. This owed to the "very grave shortage of skilled manpower of the country at the time of independence," which implied that "If the country was to gain control over its own institutions, it had to replace expatriates with Tanzanians, and this meant that the production of skilled personnel had to be accelerated." (Clark, 1978, 81). As Nyerere (1967, 4) notes, "So little education had been provided that in December, 1961, we had too few people with the necessary educational qualifications even to man the administration of government as it was then." In the first five-year plan of 1964, illustratively, the government sought to limit expectations for primary school construction: "*In view of the limited funds available, it is not intended to embark upon a large scale primary school expansion*" (Vol II, p.112).

Following the publication of the *Arusha Declaration* and, particularly, *Education for Self-Reliance* in 1967, national policy came to increasingly prioritize primary education (Clark, 1978, 81). Viewed as a fundamental right of citizenship and a requirement for mass political participation (Nyerere, 1985, 45), Samoff (1990, 221) notes that "The development of high-level skills remained important, but providing a basic education to all Tanzanian citizens and developing adult literacy were now also high priorities." Basic education came to play a central role cutting across three of the government's national priorities: in developing human capital for modernization; in fostering self-reliance and reduced dependency on international actors; and in supporting Tanzanian socialism through organized rural development schemes such as villagization (Samoff, 1990, 230).

These shifting priorities are reflected by the dramatically increasing share of central government expenditures dedicated to primary education from 1967 (Clark, 1978, 81). As noted in Appendix A.2, central government capital allocations for primary education were initially to be supported by local authority co-funding; meanwhile, recurrent costs relating to education averaged 20% of all annual recurrent expenditures for the central government and around half of districts' (Cliffe and Saul, 1970). Centralized control over primary education gradually grew, with the National Education Act of 1969 granting government control over all schools. In turn, capital co-funding with local authorities was less emphasized by the second five-year plan of 1969, which noted that "*Obviously the emphasis in the new Plan must be shifted to primary education*" (Vol. I, xii) and budgeted for 1,900 new primary schools from the central government's budget (also see Figure A6). Throughout, the government emphasized that while it would provide building materials and skilled expertise to plan and construct facilities, communities would need to play a major role in providing unskilled labor to complete facilities, particularly auxiliary school buildings and teachers' houses (Samoff, 1990, 241).

Beyond the centrality of primary education for advancing the policy objectives of the national government, schools were at the core of voters' demands throughout this period—as was common across many post-independence settings (Zolberg, 1963). As Samoff (1990, 231) notes, "expansion [of primary education] has been regarded both as a widespread popular demand and as an independence promise of the nationalist movement." As Samoff (1990, 232) goes onto argue:

"*Providing clean water, or rural medical facilities, or paved roads, or electrification,*

or functioning agricultural extension centers was likely to take much longer. Hence, rapid expansion of schooling was commonly understood—by both leaders and the mass public—as a central element in the legitimization of the new government, and of the structure of the state itself."

Promises to expand access to basic education were, accordingly, among the most common topics in campaign speeches (Mushi, 1974, 111) and the most common topics of questions raised by representatives in parliament (Cliffe, 1967, 347). Even in the wake of the intensive expansion of primary education, Samoff (1990, 249) notes that "Even though schools have been expanded much more rapidly than anyone had thought possible [...] still the public pressure for more schooling persists." As a result, the expansion of primary education reflected both the longer-run objectives of the national government *and* the short-term imperatives to respond to citizens' demands and legitimate the new regime (Bienen, 1970).

A.2 Differences in the funding of public goods

The supply of public goods involved the combination of *capital* investments from the central or local governments with *labor* mostly provided by communities themselves through "self-help" schemes (Clark, 1978; Nye, 1963; Cliffe and Saul, 1970).*

The balance of central versus local capital investments varied by the type of local public good (the extent of labor supplied by local communities varied comparatively less). Throughout the post-independence period, Tanzania followed a highly centralized system of economic development planning (Cliffe and Saul, 1970). This is most clearly encapsulated by the *First Five-Year Plan (1964-69)* and *Second Five-Year Plan (1969-74)* which, together, defined the capital investment commitments of the central government across all sectors.

Using evidence from these plans and prior work based on them (e.g. Clark, 1978), I categorize: (1) the *level* of central versus local government capital investments across different public goods; (2) the extent of *discretion* in how the central government's capital allocations were to be spent. Figure A14 summarizes the exercise; finding that primary schools combined a relatively high share of central government capital expenditures across the two plans with consistently high levels of discretion in how these funds were to be actually spent.

Primary schools

Following a 1962 Ordinance, the central government devolved the management of primary education to District Education Authorities (Eliufoo, 1968). While local governments then managed its delivery, the central government continued to play an important role in providing capital investments to support the construction of new schools.

The extent of this funding varied between the two five-year plans. In the first plan, the central government committed £2.69m to capital expenditures, with an additional £1.4m expected to be supplied by local authorities. Additional funds were set aside as subventions for local authorities, while local authorities were expected to bear the majority of recurrent costs.

*As Bienen (1970, 334) illustrates with regard to water infrastructure, "Development does not consist in deciding that a village needs a new well and then telling the technical personnel to construct one. The decision to have a well, getting the villagers to accept the location of the well, and persuading individuals themselves to carry out much of the construction work in cooperation with technical specialists are all a matter of political concern."

In the second plan, a substantially greater emphasis was placed on the construction of new primary schools with capital investments from the central government. The central government committed a total of 121.2m Tanzanian shillings to primary school construction with no anticipated co-funding by local authorities stipulated in the plan.[†]

Relative to the total budget of each plan, primary school construction constituted 2.7% of the central government's total anticipated expenditures in 1964-69 and 4.2% in 1969. Across both plans there is a *high* level of discretion. None of the committed central government capital expenditures, in either plan, are assigned to specific projects, districts, or regions.

Secondary schools

The construction and management of secondary schools was tightly controlled by the central government with no local government role in funding. In the first plan, the central government committed £2.65m to secondary school capital costs in the plan and specified the precise division of these expenses *by facility*: "*While the provisional locations of schools and streams to be provided under this Plan are given here [...] it may well be necessary in practice to make some changes in the programmes arising from events which cannot now be anticipated. Such changes will, however, be kept to a minimum.*" In the second plan, while secondary schools received a smaller share of total capital expenses for education (with a total of 87.2m Tanzanian shillings), the extent of discretion in spending remained very low with all anticipated capital expenditures defined to the facility-level.

Relative to the total budget of each plan, secondary school construction constituted 2.7% of the central government's total anticipated expenditures in 1964-69 and 3.1% in 1969. Across both plans there is a very *low* level of discretion: all capital expenditures for the subsequent five years were already set in 1964 and 1969.

Dispensaries

The central government provided very limited capital expenditures towards the construction of dispensaries and rural health centers throughout this period. In the first plan, "the capital cost of rural health centres was shared between the central government and local governments, and the recurrent costs were borne by the local governments [...] The result was that few centres were built" (Clark, 1978, 84); for dispensaries, all capital expenses were to be covered by local authorities. The central government set aside a total of £0.64m in capital costs in the first plan for rural health centers (0.6% of total central government expenditures). These expenses were laid out at the facility-level, implying very little discretion in their targeting.

In the second plan, "the government took over the full cost of the rural health centre programme. This represented a major increase in the priority accorded to rural health." (Clark, 1978, 85). While dispensaries remained the responsibility of local authorities, the central government committed 31m Tanzanian shillings in capital costs overall (1% of total central government expenditures). The extent of discretion was modestly higher, with specific amounts of the capital funds allocated by region rather than by facility.

[†]Labor was still expected to be supplied by communities: "*It is clear, therefore, that the objectives of the Plan can only be achieved if the communities served by the schools contribute all the labour (other than skilled labour) required in the erection of premises as a voluntary contribution in a spirit of self-reliance.* " (Vol. II, p.63).

Health facilities

Hospitals, similar to secondary schools, were tightly controlled by the central government with no involvement of local authorities in providing capital expenditures. In the first plan, £0.88m was allocated in capital costs towards hospitals, which existed mostly in regional centers; in the second plan, 56.0m Tanzanian shillings was. In both plans, these capital costs are precisely set out to the facility level.

Relative to the total budget of each plan, hospital construction constituted 0.8% of the central government's total anticipated expenditures in 1964-69 and 2% in 1969. Across both plans there is a very *low* level of discretion: all capital expenditures for the subsequent five years were already set in 1964 and 1969.

Water infrastructure

Capital investments in water infrastructure cut across several functional areas, including the government's industrialization drive, agricultural programming, and rural water initiatives (Clark, 1978, 88). I focus on rural water supply as the most relevant proxy for the supply of public goods considered throughout the main manuscript. Across both plans, the central government took on primary responsibility for capital expenses rather than delegating to local governments.

In the first plan, £1.5m (0.6% of total central government expenditures) was allocated in capital costs to rural water supplies. This was done with a moderate level of discretion: while funds were earmarked in specific amounts by region, there was no project-level funding allocation. In the second plan, 83.6m Tanzanian shillings (3% of total central government expenditures) was allocated to rural water supplies. This was done with a high level of discretion, with no facility or regional allocations prescribed.

A.3 Candidate data construction

The key data sources used to construct the candidate-level electoral data are Cliffe (1967) for the 1965 election and Election Study Committee (1974) for the 1970 election. These volumes provide candidate-level data on (1) selection outcomes, including the number of ADC votes received by each aspirant, their overall rank, and whether they ran as a candidate; (2) ballot symbol assignment to the selected candidates; (3) election outcomes, including votes received and overall status as election winner or loser. The data sources described below are used as relevant to validate these three types of electoral data, but in practice only very negligible differences were found.

To assemble the dataset on candidates' background characteristics, an expanded set of data sources are employed to maximize coverage. For the candidates in 1965, I draw on two sources since each one reports only a few salient characteristics about each candidate. First, I use the biographical tables reported in Harris (1965), which provide information on occupations, education, party and union/cooperative leadership roles, traditional authority roles, political qualifications, ethnicity, and religion. Second, I use the constituency-level summaries reported in Cliffe (1967), which provide information on occupations, education, party and union/cooperative leadership roles, traditional authority roles, political experience, ethnicity, and religion. For the candidates in 1970, I use the comprehensive candidate biographies printed in the "Election Supplement 1970" from *The Standard*, 28 October 1970, which reports a largely standardized set of characteristics for each candidate (The Standard, 1970). This data ultimately comes from a

standardized set of forms that all candidates had to fill out during the selection process (Mwansasu, 1974). These candidate biographies provide information on candidates' ages, occupations, places of birth, education, party and union leadership roles, history in the party, traditional authority roles, and political experience. Ethnicity and religion are not reported in the 1970 newspaper data, since intensive nation-building efforts sought to eradicate the influence of these traditional cleavages (Miguel, 2004). For religion and ethnicity I therefore draw on the constituency-level summaries reported in Election Study Committee (1974), though these vary in whether they discuss the religion or ethnicity of the candidates in a given race. For candidates in both elections, I draw on data from McGowan and Bolland (1971) which pertains to those candidates featured in "Who's Who in East Africa" relating to Tanzania between 1963 and 1967, and incorporates similar data from Hopkins (1970). This provides information on candidates' ages, occupations, party and union/cooperative leadership roles, traditional authority roles, ethnicity, and religion.

These five key sources are then merged into a single dataset at the election-candidate-level, where I then link candidates across elections using their names, locational information, and information in the 1970 sources regarding whether they also ran for office in 1965. For characteristics unlikely to change between elections (such as age, education, religion, ethnicity, and occupational history), these characteristics are applied to the same candidate across both elections. For example, if I observe in the 1965 sources that a candidate has secondary education but the 1970 sources do not mention this, I code them as having secondary education in 1970 regardless. To reconcile characteristics across sources in the same election (e.g. education), I generally infer a candidate to have that characteristic if it is reported in at least one source (e.g. if a candidate is reported to have secondary education in one source for 1965 but this is not mentioned in another source for 1965, I code them as having secondary education). In the handful of cases where there are potentially conflicting categorizations and so it is necessary to reconcile values (e.g. main occupations), I prioritize characteristics reported in Harris (1965) for the 1965 election and The Standard (1970) for the 1970 election since each of these reports a consistent set of characteristics for all candidates. In a few cases where a given characteristic is not reported in any source for a candidate and there is no natural way to code this (e.g. religion not being reported might not necessarily imply that candidate being a member of the religious majority), I leave this as missing. The following characteristics are documented in Table 1:

- **Selection outcomes**

1. *ADC vote share*: Votes received by a given candidate in their ADC divided by the total number of votes cast across all aspirants.
2. *ADC votes*: Votes received by a given candidate in their ADC.

- **Demographic**

1. *Male*: Indicator for candidate being male.
2. *Age*: Age of a given candidate in years.
3. *Local ethnic majority*: Candidate is a member of the ethnic group which is largest in their district (as defined by 1967 census).
4. *Local religious majority*: Candidate is a member of the religion (either Christian or Muslim) which is largest in their district (as defined by 1967 census).
5. *Traditional authority*: Candidate is recorded in any source as (1) coming from a royal family; (2) being chief or sub-chief of a local ethnic group.

- **Education**

1. *Vocational*: Candidate has vocational education (e.g. teacher training; Kivukoni college).

2. *Overseas experience*: Candidate has either taken short courses overseas or obtained formal educational qualifications overseas.

3. *Secondary*: Candidate has at least some secondary education (Standard IX or greater during this period).

4. *University*: Candidate has a university undergraduate or postgraduate degree.

- **Occupation**

1. *Farmer*: Candidate's main occupation is coded as being a farmer or involved in agriculture.

2. *Teacher*: Candidate's main occupation is coded as being a teacher (either primary, secondary, or university lecturer).

3. *Religious*: Candidate's main occupation is coded as being a religious figure (e.g. pastor, catechist, padre).

4. *Business*: Candidate's main occupation is coded as working in private business (e.g. business manager, store owner).

5. *Bureaucrat (junior)*: Candidate's main occupation is coded as being a low-level bureaucrat involved in service delivery (below Executive Officer, following McGowan and Bolland (1971)).

6. *Bureaucrat (senior)*: Candidate's main occupation is coded as being a high-level bureaucrat working for the central government (either Executive Officer or more senior, following McGowan and Bolland (1971)).

- **National political roles**

1. *MP*: Candidate was a sitting MP at the time of the election.

2. *Minister*: Candidate was a minister or junior minister at the time of the election.

- **Local party roles**

1. *Local elected leader*: Candidate held elected roles at subnational levels (e.g. district council chairperson; village development committee chairperson; divisional chairperson) (defined as per Bienen (1970)).

2. *Local appointed leader*: Candidate held party roles appointed by the central party (e.g. area commissioner, area secretary) (defined as per Bienen (1970)).

3. *Union/Cooperative leader*: Candidate held affiliations, or direct leadership positions, with unions or cooperatives operating in their district (e.g. TAPA, TYL).

4. *Years of membership*: Years since a given candidate joined TANU (as recorded in The Standard (1970)).

- **Election outcomes**

1. *Elected*: Candidate won their election.

2. *Election vote share*: Election votes received by candidate divided by all valid votes cast in parliamentary election.

3. *Election votes*: Election votes received by candidate.

A.4 Descriptive evidence on the impact of the ballot symbols

To address fears that low levels of literacy would preclude voters from recognizing candidates when casting their vote, the National Executive Committee decided to use symbols to differentiate the two candidates on the ballot under the *Tanzania Election (Amendment) Act* of 1965. Harris

(1967) reports, ironically, that party leaders took five hours to deliberate over the most neutral symbols unlikely to confer electoral advantages to candidates. In each constituency, one candidate was assigned a hoe symbol (*jembe, J*) while the other received a house (*nyumba, N*). Figure 1a shows the actual design of one ballot for Arusha Rural constituency in 1965 and Figure 1b shows an example campaign flyer used in Morogoro South in 1965, with both prominently displaying candidates' symbols. Hyden (1967) reports there was no expectation that the symbols would be electorally consequential. However, their electoral impact was immediately noticed. As Bienen (1970) writes of the 1965 election, the differences in the electoral fortunes between candidates assigned *J* and *N* "is a large enough discrepancy to make one wonder whether or not the NEC had some pattern in their distribution of symbols [...] but distribution was done in order of constituencies, the first candidate being given alternatively a house or hoe; in the case of ministers an exact distribution was made."

The assignment of these symbols had immediate and dramatic effects in 1965, which have since been described as the "best evidence on the impact of seemingly neutral candidate symbols in elections" (Reynolds and Steenbergen, 2006) and attracted substantial academic attention at the time. As those authors explain, "The house represented on the ballot paper was a Western style rectangular house with four walls, a tiled sloping roof and windows. This was widely seen as a foreign modern house, unsuitable for local conditions and viewed as a superfluous luxury beyond the means of most Tanzanians." By contrast, in a period marked by Tanzania's dramatic turn towards socialism, the hoe symbol was perceived a progressive instrument of development (Molnos, 1967). While the beneficial effects of the symbol were rarely negative, its positive impact on the fortune of candidates was most acutely felt in regions inhabited by the Nyamwezi and Sukuma ethnic groups, for whom hoes played a central cultural role in local traditions and were a symbol of prosperity. The Nyamwezi-Sukuma comprised Tanzania's largest ethnic group and primarily lived in the in Mwanza, Shinyanga, Tabora, and Singida regions (Hall and Lucas, 1974; Jellicoe, 1967).

In spite of Nyerere assuring voters that the symbols carried no significance, candidates themselves frequently took advantage of their symbol allocation during their campaign speeches in 1965 (Hall and Lucas, 1974). For example, Hyden (1967) reports that candidates in Ngara constituency "At the very first campaign meeting with some 500 people present (two thirds women), the two candidates talked almost exclusively of the value of their two symbols. The main point made by the 'hoe' candidate was that the hoe is the first thing one needs in life. He even went so far as to say *Bila jembe hakuna binadamu* (Without the hoe there will be no mankind)." In Karagwe, Hyden reports one candidate claimed "I think it is enough for me to stand here and show you my symbol. It is quite enough to win your support." With campaigning monitored and controlled by party agents and debates over national policy forbidden, ideological issues were rarely salient in electoral contests. Campaign promises, overwhelmingly centered on the supply of public goods, tended to prioritize the same issues: "both candidates tended to talk about the same things—especially the provision of local services such as more primary schools, clinics, an additional secondary school, and water supplies" (Cliffe, 1967, 169).

These contests, therefore, typically revolved around candidates' personal records, backgrounds, and their symbols (Molnos, 1967). Prewitt and Hyden (1967), in a large-scale survey of citizens around the 1965 election, found that as many as 60% of citizens voted for candidates *primarily* because of their symbol, a finding reinforced by similar surveys administered during the 1970 election (Hall and Lucas, 1974). In the 1970 and subsequent elections, candidates were explicitly forbidden from campaigning on the basis of their symbol (Hyden and Leys, 1972).

Election Study Committee (1974) reports that only 15 constituencies saw any public efforts from candidates to link themselves to their symbols in the 1970 election. In spite of this, as noted by scholars at the time, candidates assigned a hoe symbol performed disproportionately well in both 1965 and 1970. Over time, as shown in Table 3, clear biases emerged in the allocation of the hoe symbol to candidates—for example, in the 1980 election every minister was assigned the hoe symbol. The *J* symbol was disproportionately assigned to the elite-preferred candidate, over 75% of the time compared to the 50% implied by the administrative rule, to ensure their victory in 1975 and 1980. The symbols were replaced in the 1985 election by candidates' photographs and not used again (Reynolds and Steenbergen, 2006).

A.5 Supplementary evidence on access to public goods

To provide supplementary evidence on access to public goods, I draw on data from the nationally representative *Human Resource Development Survey* administered in 1993. The first large-scale survey of access to public goods in Tanzania's history, the HRDS surveyed 5,184 households in 222 clusters across the country. After I geolocate the clusters and match them to the 1965 and 1970 constituency shapefiles, clusters are located in 79 (74%) of the 1965-defined constituencies and 82 (68%) of the 1970-defined constituencies. While already several decades after the elections I study, and limited somewhat by this partial geographical coverage, the HRDS enables me both to assess the persistence of effects on access to public goods while also evaluating their consequences for realized welfare outcomes relating to educational attainment.

First, I measure access to public services using the survey-recorded distance between each household in the sample and the closest facility measured. The types of facilities recorded in the HRDS exactly match those for which I employ administrative data sources in the main analysis, comprising primary schools, secondary schools, dispensaries, health facilities (hospitals), and water points. Reflecting Tanzania's rurality, the average household in the sample is recorded as being 1.1 km from a primary school, 21.2 km from a secondary school, 3.4 km from a dispensary, 20.7 km from a health facility, and 0.89 km from a water point (see Figure A15 for the distribution of these measures).

To assess treatment effects on access to public goods as a function of the natural experiment, I mimic the main analysis by "stacking" the data such that each household has two observations, with the values of the treatment and instrumental variables taking on one value for 1965 and one for 1970. I then estimate the following specification at the household level:

$$y_{hcy} = \beta^{IV} \widehat{\text{Preferred}}_{cy} + \eta_y + \mu_h + \epsilon_{cy}, \tag{A1}$$

where y_{hcy} measures the log-transformed distance between household h in constituency c based on election year y and the closest facility in 1993, $\widehat{\text{Preferred}}_{cy}$ is as defined in the main specifications, η_y is a fixed effect for which election the observation for a given household observations corresponds to (1965 or 1970), μ_h is a fixed effect for whether the household was in an urban or rural cluster (which was used for stratifying the HRDS sample), and standard errors are clustered at the constituency-electoral year level. Replicating the main specification, I vary the inclusion of compliance weights and region fixed effects.

Results are reported in Table A12. Households located in constituencies which quasi-randomly elected the elite-preferred candidate in 1965 or 1970, by 1993, had a primary school 0.40 log units ($p < 0.1$) closer to them. Treatment effects are not consistently observed across

any other type of public good. Leveraging data on households' reported perceptions of the *quality* of primary schools, Table A13 finds that households in treated constituencies report their nearest primary school as being no higher or lower quality compared to those in non-treated constituencies. These results, which strikingly align with the main results using administrative data in Table 5, imply substantial persistence: measured nearly two decades after the end of the time period used in the main analysis, the quasi-random election of elite-preferred candidates *still* leads to improved geographical access to primary education but not other local public goods.

Some observers expressed fears that Tanzania's expansion of primary schools in the 1960s and 1970s came at the cost of the quality of education, implying that the large-scale construction of facilities may not have led to meaningful improvements in education *outcomes* (e.g. Omari et al., 1983; Samoff, 1990). Second, therefore, I leverage individual-level data from the HRDS to evaluate the impact of treatment assignment on actual educational attainment. Following Carlitz et al. (2025), I leverage temporal variation using the cohort of birth of a given respondent: treated cohorts are those who were seven years old (the age of primary school entry) at any point during a given five-year term: that is, individuals born between 1958 and 1963 (for the 1965 election cycle) and those born between 1963 and 1968 (for the 1970 election cycle). For outcomes reflecting primary education, I consider indicators for whether the respondent reports having any formal education and whether they can read and write.

At the respondent level, again stacking the data to estimate the effect of each instrument and treatment, I therefore estimate the following specification:

$$y_{icy} = \beta^{IV} \widehat{\text{Preferred}}_{cy} + \eta_y + \mu_h + \alpha \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_{cy}, \tag{A2}$$

where the specification matches Equation (A1) aside from its estimation at the individual level, i, facilitating the inclusion of additional controls, $\mathbf{X}_i$, including the gender of the respondent and fixed effects for their year of birth.

Table A14 provides results. In the baseline specification in panel A, the quasi-random election of elite-preferred candidates induces those respondents in the "most-treated" cohorts (i.e. who were of primary school entry age during a given electoral term) to be 10 percentage points more likely to report having any formal education later in life ($p < 0.1$) and to be 9 percentage points more likely to report being able to read and write ($p = 0.11$). Each of these results gain substantially in precision with the inclusion of region fixed effects in columns 3-4 and 7-8. These treatment effects are substantively large, reflecting effect sizes of over 0.2 standard deviations relative to baseline levels. Because the results in Table A12 imply that increased access to primary schools persisted beyond each five year electoral term, in panel B I expand the sample by including all respondents who were seven years old at any point in one of the electoral terms or for the five following years. While the results attenuate slightly, though remain precise when including the region fixed effects, they continue to suggest meaningful treatment effects on actual educational attainment as a result of the election of elite-preferred candidates.

Overall, these supplementary results underscore that the election of elite-preferred candidates both had persistent medium-run effects on citizens' geographical access to primary schools, and that this increased access led to meaningful increases in educational attainment and literacy outcomes.

A.6 Supplementary evidence on spillovers

To test for the presence of negative spillovers, which would be consistent with substitution between constituencies explaining the results in Table 5, I adopt two approaches. Both approaches are based on the idea, as described in the main text, that the effective level at which such substitution was most likely was the district (e.g. Cliffe and Saul, 1970). Testing for the presence of within-district spillovers should, then, adjudicate the plausibility of an alternative explanation based on the substitution of effort and resources from constituencies *not* electing elite-preferred candidates to those that did.

The first approach, drawing on this intuition, aggregates the unit of analysis from the constituency to the district level. By computing the *share* of constituencies electing the elite-preferred candidate (and, for the first stage, the equivalent share assigned to the instrument), the resulting estimate of β^{IV} captures the total treatment effect incorporating such spillovers. For example, if the results in Table 5 were *purely* driven by this kind of substitution, we should expect the district-level estimate of β^{IV} to equal zero.

Formally, I estimate this using the following:

$$\sum_{c \in d} y_{cy}^{post} = \beta^{IV} \frac{1}{n_d} \cdot \sum_{c \in d} \widehat{\text{Preferred}}_{cy} + \eta_y + \epsilon_{dy}, \tag{A3}$$

where I consider the total supply of local public goods across all constituencies c in district d, and the average value of Preferred_{cy} across the n constituencies in district d is predicted by an analogous specification of the first stage. Intuitively, the symbol assignment process generates exogenous variation in the "intensity" of the instrument (and treatment) at this aggregated level.[‡] Table A15 presents results. While the aggregation naturally attenuates the first stage relationship, there is no evidence that the estimate of β^{IV} meaningfully shrinks compared to the disaggregated estimates in Table 5—indeed, the standardized effect size is somewhat *larger* in Table A15.

The second approach tests for the presence of spillovers drawing on recent work relating the estimation of general equilibrium effects (Egger et al., 2022; Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2023). These papers demonstrate that, rather than aggregation, spillovers can be estimated by controlling for the share of *other* units assigned to treatment within some determinate geographical range. Positive (negative) coefficients on this additional term then reflect the presence of positive (negative) spillovers. Applied here, the most natural geographical range is again the district—though this approach also enables me to test for within-*region* spillovers.

I therefore estimate the following:

$$y_{cy}^{post} = \beta_1^{IV} \widehat{\text{Preferred}}_{cy} + \beta_2^{IV} \frac{1}{n_d^{-c}} \cdot \sum_{i \neq c} \widehat{\text{Preferred}}_{iy}^{-c} + \eta_y + \epsilon_{dy}, \tag{A4}$$

where I regress the supply of local public goods in constituency c in year y onto the same instrumented treatment as Equation (2), the instrumented share of constituencies *other than* c in the same district, d, electing elite-preferred candidates, and election year fixed effects. An analogous first stage is used to predict both $\widehat{\text{Preferred}}_{cy}$ and the instrumented spillover term

[‡]I exclude the small share of districts with non-competitive ADCs in any constituency since this renders the aggregated instrument and treatment hard to define.

$\frac{1}{n_d^{-c}} \cdot \sum_{i \neq c} \widehat{\text{Preferred}}_{iy}^{-c}$. I vary the inclusion of compliance weights and provide an alternative where the instrumented spillover term is instead defined at the *region* level. Negative spillovers would imply $\beta_2^{IV} < 0$. Table A16 provides results. There is again no evidence of such negative spillovers at either level of aggregation and across either outcome.

A.7 Evidence on local government employment

Following the literature, I measure effects on local government employment as a proxy for patronage (e.g. Brierley, 2021). For outcome measurement, I digitize information relating to the universe of civil servants in Tanzania as recorded in 1968 and 1972. For each volume, I record information on each employee's first date of government employment, the date on which they began their current posting, and the location of their posted government office in the country. This generates a dataset of 5,800 employees across 195 posting locations across the two volumes.[§] I then geolocate and link these posting locations to constituencies in the 1965 and 1970 elections, which results in government offices being located in 157 out of 207 constituencies across the two elections in the analysis sample.

With these in hand, I examine whether more individuals became first employed, or received a new posting, in government offices in constituencies electing the elite-preferred candidate, which would be consistent with selection preferences being partially driven by the expectation of private benefits through government employment.[¶] To isolate these changes as being driven by patronage, rather than as an artifact of more intensive policy implementation (for example, more local education officers being needed to oversee increased school construction), I focus on a narrow time window before and after each election, with the intuition that patronage jobs might be quicker to materialize than other causes for changes in local government employment levels. Therefore, using the 1968 volume I consider effects between one and four quarters of the new legislator entering office in January 1966 and using the 1972 volume I do the same for legislators entering office in January 1971. For outcomes, I consider an indicator for whether any *new employees* are observed in a given government office within 1-4 quarters of their election (i.e. new bureaucrats with their first appointment date in this window) and whether any *new postings* are observed (i.e. existing bureaucrats given a new job).

The baseline estimates using indicators for the outcomes are reported in Panel A of Table A17 and show no evidence of treatment effects. In the same table, I show these null effects are robust to: (B) using the log-transformed number of the outcome variables; (C) restricting to only those constituencies where a government office is observed at any point; (D) excluding Dar-es-Salaam, where easily the most employees are observed; (E) conditioning on the elite-preferred candidate not being an incumbent prior to the election, which could condition their incentives to replace local government employees.

[§]While these volumes do not contain information on low-level government employees, where patronage appointments have been found to be most common (e.g. Brierley, 2021), the fact that party elites involved in candidate selection were relatively highly trained and educated (relative to the broader population) renders them unlikely to have been hired into very low-level government jobs to begin with.

[¶]Unfortunately no systematic data exists on the names of the local TANU elites participating in the ADC selection process, which would have otherwise enabled a more direct test of this channel.

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B Supplementary figures

Figure A1: Global distribution of legislative candidate selection methods



Notes: Data comes from V-Party database of political parties (`v2panom`). V-Party sample includes all parties receiving more than 5% vote share in national elections (3467 political parties across 178 countries). Right panel restricts to ruling parties.

Figure A2: Cross-national scope conditions



Notes: Sample restricted to 1960-1990. Redistributive policy measure comes from V-Party measure of left-wing/redistributive policy of ruling party in a given year (`v2parigef`). Regime corruption index comes from V-Dem index of regime corruption (`v2xnp_regcorr`), including executive, legislative, and judicial. Presidentialism index comes from V-Dem index of the concentration of political power in one person (`v2xnp_pres`), defined as the "systemic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks." This is used to proxy for the ability of lower-level politicians to influence *some* degree of public resource allocation decisions.

Figure A3: Sincerity of ADC ranking behavior



Notes: Figure compares characteristics of selected candidates according to their raw ADC rank. Since NEC held veto rights, in some cases aspirants ranked below 2nd by ADC were ultimately advanced to candidacy.

Figure A4: Constituencies and instrument assignment



Notes: Left panel represents 1965 constituencies; right represents 1970 constituencies. Dark constituencies are assigned instrument, i.e. top-ranked candidate is assigned J ($1 \rightarrow J$); light constituencies are not assigned instrument, i.e. top-ranked candidate is assigned N ($1 \rightarrow N$). Unshaded constituencies have noncompetitive ADC selection stages, tied ADC votes between top two aspirants, or missing ADC voting outcomes in a handful of cases, and hence instrument assignment is undefined.

Figure A5: Validating administrative data on primary schools



Notes: X-axis records the number of primary schools existing in each district as reported by government sources in either 1967 or 1973. Y-axis records the number of primary schools, based on the facility-level administrative data where I observe year of foundation, which still exist and were founded prior to either year. 1967 source: Jensen and Mkama (1968); 1973 source: *Hansard*, 25-30 June 1973, pp. 1009-1111.

Figure A6: Provision of different local public goods by year, 1960-1980



Notes: Number of local public goods (by type) founded by year between 1960 and 1980 as observed in administrative datasets.

Figure A7: Distribution of outcome measures



Notes: Histograms of the number of local public goods (by type) aggregated to the constituency level founded in the five years following either the 1965 or 1970 election. 'Other local public goods' consists of dispensaries, other health facilities (primarily hospitals), secondary schools, and water points (bottom row).

Figure A8: Spatial distribution of outcome measures



Notes: Outcomes relating to supply of primary schools and other public goods provided. Left panel represents 1965 constituencies; right represents 1970 constituencies. Unshaded constituencies have noncompetitive ADC selection stages, tied ADC votes between top two aspirants, or missing ADC voting outcomes in a handful of cases, and hence instrument assignment is undefined (and so these constituencies are excluded from the analysis sample.

Figure A9: Baseline estimates from Table 4 while excluding districts or regions



Notes: Figure plots β^{FS} from Equation (1) while sequentially excluding each district-year (left) or region-year (right). Coefficients ordered by magnitude. 95% confidence intervals plotted.

Figure A10: Heterogeneity in estimated first stage effect



Notes: Figure plots the distribution of predicted first stage treatment effects obtained through a causal forest (Wager and Athey, 2018). Estimating using cross-fitting by obtaining split-sample estimates from 1000 splits and taking the median across splits.

Figure A11: Correlates of first stage effect heterogeneity



Notes: Figure plots the 20 variables with the largest absolute coefficients arising from a regression of the predicted first stage treatment effect (based on causal forest) on that variable.

Figure A12: Baseline estimates from Table 5 while excluding districts or regions



Notes: Figure plots β^{IV} from Equation (2) while sequentially excluding each district-year (top) or region-year (bottom). Coefficients ordered by magnitude. 95% confidence sets from wild bootstrap permutations plotted.

Figure A13: Correlation between ADC vote share and election vote share across elections (in constituencies where elite-preferred candidate is not assigned J)



Notes: For comparability, ADC vote share conditions only on the number of ADC votes received by the two candidates ultimately running in the election.

Figure A14: Central government capital allocations across public goods



Notes: Measures constructed using programme-level data from Vols. II of *First Five-Year Plan (1964-69) and Second Five-Year Plan (1969-74).*

Figure A15: Distribution of distance to facilities in HRDS data (1993)



Notes: Figure provides the distance between each household in the HRDS sample and its closest facility. Averages for each type of facility are provided with the blue dotted lines. X-axis is log-transformed.

C Supplementary tables

Table A1: Party elite preferences: Differences between candidates ranked first and second by ADC (by year)

	A. 1965					B. 1970					C. Difference
	N	μ_1	μ_2	β_{65}^{ADC}	p(β_{65}^{ADC}=0)	N	μ_1	μ_2	β_{70}^{ADC}	p(β_{70}^{ADC}=0)	p(β_{65}^{ADC}=β_{70}^{ADC})
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Selection outcomes											
ADC vote share	188	0.50	0.20	0.30	[0.01]***	226	0.49	0.19	0.30	[0.01]***	[0.90]
ADC votes	188	27.06	10.37	16.69	[0.01]***	226	214.43	76.77	137.66	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
Demographic											
Male	188	0.98	0.96	0.02	[0.42]	226	0.95	0.96	-0.01	[0.77]	[0.44]
Age	122	37.58	36.88	0.70	[0.58]	220	39.33	39.95	-0.62	[0.56]	[0.46]
Born in district	188	0.78	0.81	-0.03	[0.59]	226	0.78	0.73	0.04	[0.43]	[0.36]
Local religious majority	119	0.76	0.73	0.04	[0.78]	67	0.77	0.75	0.02	[0.41]	[0.87]
Local ethnic majority	137	0.53	0.62	-0.09	[0.09]*	74	0.54	0.54	0.00	[0.08]*	[0.55]
Traditional authority	188	0.10	0.11	-0.01	[0.80]	226	0.12	0.06	0.05	[0.18]	[0.27]
Education											
Vocational	188	0.24	0.24	0.00	[1.00]	226	0.25	0.19	0.05	[0.35]	[0.53]
Overseas experience	188	0.20	0.11	0.10	[0.05]**	226	0.28	0.15	0.13	[0.01]**	[0.63]
Secondary	188	0.45	0.37	0.07	[0.24]	226	0.35	0.24	0.12	[0.06]*	[0.66]
University	188	0.12	0.04	0.07	[0.07]*	226	0.08	0.02	0.06	[0.03]**	[0.79]
Occupation											
Farmer	188	0.30	0.39	-0.10	[0.16]	226	0.49	0.45	0.04	[0.61]	[0.17]
Teacher	188	0.10	0.11	-0.01	[0.82]	226	0.19	0.16	0.04	[0.48]	[0.50]
Religious	188	0.01	0.02	-0.01	[0.57]	226	0.04	0.05	-0.02	[0.53]	[0.84]
Business	188	0.17	0.29	-0.12	[0.05]**	226	0.11	0.12	-0.01	[0.84]	[0.13]
Bureaucrat (junior)	188	0.17	0.18	-0.01	[0.85]	226	0.17	0.14	0.03	[0.58]	[0.61]
Bureaucrat (senior)	188	0.26	0.18	0.07	[0.16]	226	0.19	0.06	0.12	[0.01]***	[0.50]
National political roles											
MP	188	0.27	0.04	0.22	[0.01]***	226	0.43	0.15	0.28	[0.01]***	[0.46]
Minister	188	0.18	0.02	0.16	[0.01]***	226	0.08	0.00	0.08	[0.01]***	[0.10]
Local party roles											
Local elected leader	188	0.30	0.26	0.04	[0.52]	226	0.30	0.39	-0.09	[0.19]	[0.15]
Local appointed leader	188	0.16	0.16	0.00	[1.00]	226	0.23	0.17	0.06	[0.23]	[0.42]
Union/Cooperative leader	188	0.36	0.30	0.06	[0.33]	226	0.44	0.42	0.02	[0.77]	[0.63]
Years of membership	45	6.52	6.73	-0.21	[0.04]**	207	11.05	10.68	0.37	[0.63]	[0.64]
Election outcomes											
Elected	188	0.53	0.47	0.06	[0.54]	226	0.66	0.34	0.33	[0.01]***	[0.01]***
Election vote share	188	0.52	0.48	0.04	[0.47]	226	0.56	0.44	0.12	[0.01]***	[0.05]**
Election votes	188	11575.50	11095.44	480.06	[0.72]	226	15173.36	11781.50	3391.86	[0.01]***	[0.06]*

Notes: Table presents pooled descriptive mean statistics on candidates ranked first (μ_1) and second (μ_2) by ADC. Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Differences in observations (column 1) are due to variation in source accessibility on candidate-level covariates (see Appendix A.3). $\beta^{ADC} = \mu_1 - \mu_2$. Column 5 provides p-value from regressing each candidate covariate onto an indicator for being ranked first with constituency-year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A2: Voter preferences: Differences between election winners and losers (by year)

	A. 1965					B. 1970					C. Difference
	N	μ_{Winner}	μ_{Loser}	$\beta_{65}^{\text{Voters}}$	p($\beta_{65}^{\text{Voters}}$=0)	N	μ_{Winner}	μ_{Loser}	$\beta_{70}^{\text{Voters}}$	p($\beta_{70}^{\text{Voters}}$=0)	p($\beta_{65}^{\text{Voters}}$=$\beta_{70}^{\text{Voters}}$)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Selection outcomes											
ADC ranked first	188	0.53	0.47	0.06	[0.54]	226	0.66	0.34	0.33	[0.01]***	[0.01]***
ADC vote share	188	0.36	0.33	0.03	[0.41]	226	0.42	0.26	0.17	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
ADC votes	188	19.39	18.04	1.35	[0.58]	226	186.42	104.78	81.65	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
Demographic											
Male	188	0.96	0.98	-0.02	[0.42]	226	0.96	0.95	0.01	[0.77]	[0.44]
Age	122	35.56	39.96	-4.40	[0.01]***	220	39.54	39.74	-0.20	[0.85]	[0.02]**
Born in district	188	0.88	0.70	0.18	[0.01]***	226	0.78	0.73	0.04	[0.43]	[0.10]*
Local religious majority	119	0.78	0.71	0.06	[0.41]	67	0.77	0.75	0.02	[1.00]	[0.74]
Local ethnic majority	137	0.64	0.47	0.17	[0.03]**	74	0.58	0.48	0.10	[0.08]*	[0.63]
Traditional authority	188	0.14	0.06	0.07	[0.07]*	226	0.10	0.08	0.02	[0.66]	[0.33]
Education											
Vocational	188	0.31	0.18	0.13	[0.03]**	226	0.23	0.21	0.02	[0.75]	[0.19]
Overseas experience	188	0.22	0.09	0.14	[0.01]***	226	0.25	0.19	0.06	[0.24]	[0.32]
Secondary	188	0.50	0.32	0.18	[0.01]***	226	0.34	0.26	0.08	[0.19]	[0.28]
University	188	0.14	0.02	0.12	[0.01]***	226	0.07	0.03	0.04	[0.13]	[0.13]
Occupation											
Farmer	188	0.48	0.21	0.27	[0.01]***	226	0.50	0.44	0.05	[0.44]	[0.03]**
Teacher	188	0.12	0.09	0.03	[0.50]	226	0.19	0.17	0.02	[0.73]	[0.84]
Religious	188	0.02	0.01	0.01	[0.57]	226	0.05	0.04	0.02	[0.53]	[0.84]
Business	188	0.18	0.28	-0.10	[0.11]	226	0.10	0.12	-0.03	[0.53]	[0.34]
Bureaucrat (junior)	188	0.22	0.13	0.10	[0.08]*	226	0.19	0.12	0.06	[0.20]	[0.64]
Bureaucrat (senior)	188	0.26	0.18	0.07	[0.16]	226	0.17	0.08	0.09	[0.06]*	[0.85]
National political roles											
MP	188	0.14	0.17	-0.03	[0.58]	226	0.35	0.23	0.12	[0.07]*	[0.06]*
Minister	188	0.12	0.09	0.03	[0.50]	226	0.06	0.02	0.04	[0.10]*	[0.80]
Local party roles											
Local elected leader	188	0.24	0.31	-0.06	[0.33]	226	0.32	0.37	-0.05	[0.43]	[0.91]
Local appointed leader	188	0.16	0.16	0.00	[1.00]	226	0.19	0.20	-0.01	[0.86]	[0.91]
Union/Cooperative leader	188	0.46	0.20	0.26	[0.01]***	226	0.45	0.42	0.04	[0.57]	[0.02]**
Years of membership	45	6.49	7.25	-0.76	[0.04]**	207	10.99	10.74	0.25	[0.72]	[0.50]
Election outcomes											
Election vote share	188	0.71	0.29	0.42	[0.01]***	226	0.67	0.33	0.33	[0.01]***	[0.02]**
Election votes	188	16268.48	6402.46	9866.02	[0.01]***	226	17912.41	9042.46	8869.95	[0.01]***	[0.47]

Notes: Table presents pooled descriptive mean statistics on candidates who won election (μ_{Winner}) and lost (μ_{Loser}). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Differences in observations (column 1) are due to variation in source coverage across candidates. $\beta^{\text{Voters}} = \mu_{\text{Winner}} - \mu_{\text{Loser}}$. Column 4 provides p-value from regressing each candidate covariate onto an indicator for winning election with constituency-year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A3: Party elite and voter preferences across candidates (J=0 constituencies)

		A. Party elite preferences				B. Voter preferences				C. Difference
	N	μ_1	μ_2	β^{ADC}	p(β^{ADC}=0)	μ_{Winner}	μ_{Loser}	β^{Voters}	p(β^{Voters}=0)	p(β^{ADC}=β^{Voters})
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Selection outcomes										
ADC ranked first	218	1.00	0.00	1.00		0.49	0.51	-0.03	[0.78]	
ADC vote share	218	0.50	0.18	0.31	[0.01]***	0.36	0.31	0.05	[0.21]	[0.00]***
ADC votes	218	121.59	41.81	79.78	[0.01]***	94.56	68.83	25.72	[0.09]*	[0.02]**
Demographic										
Male	218	0.96	0.93	0.04	[0.25]	0.94	0.94	0.00	[1.00]	[0.40]
Age	183	38.15	39.14	-0.99	[0.63]	38.32	38.95	-0.63	[0.47]	[0.82]
Born in district	218	0.77	0.75	0.02	[0.75]	0.83	0.70	0.13	[0.02]**	[0.18]
Local religious majority	107	0.79	0.71	0.08	[0.57]	0.79	0.71	0.08	[0.57]	[1.00]
Local ethnic majority	111	0.52	0.66	-0.14	[0.10]	0.65	0.51	0.13	[0.03]**	[0.04]**
Traditional authority	218	0.09	0.10	-0.01	[0.81]	0.11	0.08	0.03	[0.47]	[0.52]
Education										
Vocational	218	0.28	0.22	0.06	[0.35]	0.28	0.21	0.07	[0.21]	[0.82]
Overseas experience	218	0.23	0.13	0.10	[0.03]**	0.21	0.15	0.06	[0.18]	[0.62]
Secondary	218	0.36	0.26	0.10	[0.09]*	0.36	0.26	0.10	[0.09]*	[1.00]
University	218	0.07	0.02	0.06	[0.06]*	0.07	0.02	0.06	[0.06]*	[1.00]
Occupation										
Farmer	218	0.37	0.47	-0.10	[0.13]	0.46	0.38	0.08	[0.22]	[0.05]*
Teacher	218	0.17	0.12	0.05	[0.34]	0.14	0.15	-0.01	[0.85]	[0.41]
Religious	218	0.02	0.05	-0.03	[0.26]	0.05	0.02	0.03	[0.26]	[0.10]
Business	218	0.12	0.17	-0.05	[0.30]	0.13	0.16	-0.03	[0.54]	[0.78]
Bureaucrat (junior)	218	0.20	0.19	0.01	[0.86]	0.24	0.16	0.08	[0.12]	[0.34]
Bureaucrat (senior)	218	0.20	0.12	0.08	[0.08]*	0.21	0.11	0.10	[0.03]**	[0.79]
National political roles										
MP	218	0.36	0.15	0.21	[0.01]***	0.24	0.27	-0.03	[0.68]	[0.00]***
Minister	218	0.11	0.01	0.10	[0.01]***	0.06	0.06	0.01	[0.78]	[0.04]**
Local party roles										
Local elected leader	218	0.27	0.28	-0.02	[0.78]	0.24	0.31	-0.07	[0.26]	[0.52]
Local appointed leader	218	0.19	0.17	0.02	[0.72]	0.16	0.21	-0.06	[0.28]	[0.32]
Union/Cooperative leader	218	0.38	0.38	0.00	[1.00]	0.41	0.34	0.07	[0.26]	[0.43]
Years of membership	132	10.18	10.15	0.04	[0.81]	9.76	10.64	-0.88	[0.92]	[0.36]
Election outcomes										
Elected	218	0.49	0.51	-0.03	[0.78]	1.00	0.00	1.00	[0.01]***	
Election vote share	218	0.49	0.51	-0.02	[0.55]	0.67	0.33	0.35	[0.01]***	[0.00]***
Election votes	218	12378.52	13398.05	-1019.52	[0.35]	17308.86	8467.71	8841.16	[0.01]***	[0.00]***

Notes: Panel A presents descriptive statistics on candidates ranked first (μ_1) and second (μ_2) by ADC. $\beta^{ADC} = \mu_1 - \mu_2$. Column 5 provides p-value from regressing candidate covariate onto indicator for being ranked first with constituency-year fixed effects. Panel B presents descriptive statistics on candidates who won election (μ_{Winner}) and lost (μ_{Loser}). $\beta^{\text{Voters}} = \mu_{\text{Winner}} - \mu_{\text{Loser}}$. Column 9 provides p-value from regressing candidate covariate onto indicator for winning election with constituency-year fixed effects. Column 10 provides p-value from a seemingly unrelated regression to test $\beta^{\text{ADC}} = \beta^{\text{Voters}}$. Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Differences in observations (column 1) due to variation in source accessibility (see Appendix A.3). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A4: Confounding: Differences between constituencies wherein first-ranked candidate was elected and second-ranked candidate was elected

	N	$\mu_{\text{Winner=1}}$	$\mu_{\text{Winner=2}}$	β	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Election					
Number of aspirants	207	9.60	9.82	-0.22	[0.32]
Total ADC votes	207	284.39	198.87	85.53	[0.12]
Registered voters	207	36111.34	35358.89	752.45	[0.68]
Number of polling stations	207	91.33	87.93	3.40	[0.75]
Turnout	207	0.72	0.73	-0.01	[0.76]
Presidential vote share	205	0.95	0.94	0.01	[0.27]
Number of campaign meetings	79	33.93	37.26	-3.34	[0.39]
Geography					
Population (1957)	207	75205.05	76965.76	-1760.71	[0.91]
Area (km^2)	207	7959.20	7361.93	597.28	[0.55]
Longitude	207	34.98	35.17	-0.18	[0.60]
Latitude	207	-5.44	-5.51	0.07	[0.79]
Average distance to infrastructure					
Main road (km)	207	15.20	18.02	-2.82	[0.13]
Any road (km)	207	6.10	6.89	-0.79	[0.07]*
Railway (km)	207	173.33	155.12	18.22	[0.47]
Major town (km)	207	118.29	142.60	-24.31	[0.04]**
Any town (km)	207	48.84	51.50	-2.67	[0.41]
City (km)	207	100.05	119.47	-19.42	[0.06]*
Existing local public goods					
Primary schools	207	22.72	22.18	0.54	[0.91]
Secondary schools	207	0.72	0.33	0.39	[0.02]**
Dispensaries	207	2.78	3.09	-0.31	[0.33]
Health facilities	207	1.08	0.98	0.10	[0.66]
Water points	207	8.62	4.67	3.95	[0.09]*

Table presents differences in mean constituency characteristics across cases where first-ranked candidate won office ($\mu_{\text{Winner=1}}$) and second-ranked candidate won office ($\mu_{\text{Winner=2}}$). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). $\beta = \mu_{\text{Winner=1}} - \mu_{\text{Winner=2}}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A5: Balance: Differences between first-ranked candidates assigned J and N (by year)

	Pooled					1965					1970				
	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Selection outcomes															
ADC vote share	207	0.49	0.50	0.00	[0.93]	94	0.47	0.52	-0.05	[0.17]	113	0.51	0.47	0.04	[0.27]
ADC votes	207	137.98	121.59	16.39	[0.21]	94	25.19	28.94	-3.74	[0.27]	113	241.92	191.82	50.10	[0.18]
Demographic															
Male	207	0.96	0.96	0.00	[0.83]	94	0.98	0.98	0.00	[1.00]	113	0.94	0.95	-0.01	[0.81]
Age	176	39.28	38.15	1.14	[0.32]	66	37.73	37.44	0.29	[0.89]	110	40.20	38.58	1.62	[0.22]
Born in district	207	0.79	0.77	0.02	[0.79]	94	0.77	0.79	-0.02	[0.81]	113	0.80	0.76	0.05	[0.56]
Local religious majority	111	0.73	0.79	-0.06	[0.50]	68	0.72	0.81	-0.09	[0.41]	43	0.76	0.77	0.00	[0.97]
Local ethnic majority	124	0.54	0.52	0.02	[0.86]	74	0.52	0.53	0.00	[0.97]	50	0.57	0.52	0.05	[0.75]
Traditional authority	207	0.12	0.09	0.03	[0.46]	94	0.13	0.06	0.06	[0.30]	113	0.12	0.11	0.00	[0.94]
Education															
Vocational	207	0.21	0.28	-0.06	[0.31]	94	0.23	0.26	-0.02	[0.81]	113	0.20	0.29	-0.09	[0.25]
Overseas experience	207	0.27	0.23	0.04	[0.51]	94	0.26	0.15	0.11	[0.20]	113	0.27	0.29	-0.02	[0.85]
Secondary	207	0.44	0.36	0.08	[0.26]	94	0.49	0.40	0.09	[0.41]	113	0.39	0.32	0.07	[0.45]
University	207	0.12	0.07	0.05	[0.26]	94	0.15	0.09	0.06	[0.34]	113	0.10	0.06	0.03	[0.52]
Occupation															
Farmer	207	0.44	0.37	0.07	[0.23]	94	0.36	0.23	0.13	[0.18]	113	0.51	0.47	0.04	[0.66]
Teacher	207	0.13	0.17	-0.03	[0.57]	94	0.09	0.11	-0.02	[0.73]	113	0.18	0.21	-0.03	[0.66]
Religious	207	0.03	0.02	0.01	[0.53]	94	0.02	0.00	0.02	[0.32]	113	0.04	0.03	0.01	[0.85]
Business	207	0.15	0.12	0.03	[0.53]	94	0.15	0.19	-0.04	[0.59]	113	0.16	0.06	0.09	[0.13]
Bureaucrat (junior)	207	0.13	0.20	-0.07	[0.18]	94	0.15	0.19	-0.04	[0.59]	113	0.12	0.21	-0.09	[0.19]
Bureaucrat (senior)	207	0.23	0.20	0.03	[0.61]	94	0.26	0.26	0.00	[1.00]	113	0.22	0.16	0.05	[0.47]
National political roles															
MP	207	0.36	0.36	0.00	[0.91]	94	0.21	0.32	-0.11	[0.25]	113	0.49	0.39	0.10	[0.28]
Minister	207	0.14	0.11	0.03	[0.55]	94	0.17	0.19	-0.02	[0.79]	113	0.12	0.05	0.07	[0.20]
Local party roles															
Local elected leader	207	0.34	0.27	0.07	[0.27]	94	0.32	0.28	0.04	[0.66]	113	0.35	0.26	0.09	[0.28]
Local appointed leader	207	0.20	0.19	0.01	[0.79]	94	0.13	0.19	-0.06	[0.40]	113	0.27	0.19	0.08	[0.32]
Union/Cooperative leader	207	0.44	0.38	0.06	[0.33]	94	0.36	0.36	0.00	[1.00]	113	0.51	0.39	0.12	[0.20]
Years of membership	123	10.22	10.18	0.04	[0.30]	23	6.80	6.00	0.80	[0.65]	100	11.42	10.77	0.65	[0.36]

Table presents differences in mean predetermined candidate characteristics (of the elite-preferred candidate) between constituencies in which elite-preferred candidate was assigned J ($\mu_{1\to J}$) and where they were assigned N ($\mu_{1\to N}$). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). $\beta^J = \mu_{1\to J} - \mu_{1\to N}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A6: Balance: Differences between constituencies wherein first-ranked candidates assigned J and N (by year)

	Pooled					1965					1970				
	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^J	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Election															
Number of aspirants	207	10.04	9.37	0.67	[0.24]	94	8.89	7.40	1.49	[0.05]**	113	11.10	10.85	0.24	[0.83]
Total ADC votes	207	255.85	245.72	10.13	[0.30]	94	53.98	54.43	-0.45	[0.92]	113	441.88	390.73	51.16	[0.30]
Registered voters	207	34317.62	37157.98	-2840.36	[0.15]	94	31158.51	29137.96	2020.55	[0.38]	113	37228.96	43237.68	-6008.72	[0.01]***
Number of polling stations	207	88.60	91.22	-2.62	[0.81]	94	73.91	68.64	5.28	[0.34]	113	102.14	108.34	-6.20	[0.29]
Turnout	207	0.73	0.71	0.02	[0.41]	94	0.78	0.74	0.04	[0.17]	113	0.69	0.69	-0.01	[0.77]
Presidential vote share	205	0.95	0.94	0.00	[0.45]	92	0.95	0.95	0.00	[0.58]	113	0.94	0.94	0.00	[0.61]
Population (1957)	207	75295.93	76447.92	-1152.00	[0.71]	94	86626.04	75143.86	11482.18	[0.11]	113	64854.45	77436.48	-12582.03	[0.02]**
Geography															
Area (km^2)	207	7918.40	7546.56	371.83	[0.80]	94	7744.69	8720.25	-975.56	[0.64]	113	8078.48	6656.84	1421.65	[0.39]
Longitude	207	35.11	35.01	0.09	[0.79]	94	35.22	34.81	0.41	[0.46]	113	35.00	35.16	-0.16	[0.75]
Latitude	207	-5.36	-5.57	0.21	[0.61]	94	-5.76	-4.88	-0.88	[0.12]	113	-4.99	-6.08	1.09	[0.04]**
Main road (km)	207	16.71	15.97	0.74	[0.68]	94	15.09	16.83	-1.74	[0.52]	113	18.21	15.32	2.89	[0.27]
Average distance to infrastructure															
Any road (km)	207	6.41	6.42	-0.02	[0.98]	94	6.50	6.21	0.29	[0.64]	113	6.32	6.58	-0.26	[0.66]
Railway (km)	207	158.61	172.87	-14.26	[0.55]	94	175.01	144.97	30.04	[0.36]	113	143.49	194.01	-50.52	[0.11]
Major town (km)	207	125.74	129.88	-4.14	[0.72]	94	122.17	136.97	-14.80	[0.39]	113	129.02	124.50	4.52	[0.79]
Any town (km)	207	51.51	48.44	3.07	[0.37]	94	51.84	47.25	4.60	[0.38]	113	51.21	49.34	1.87	[0.69]
City (km)	207	103.41	111.63	-8.23	[0.43]	94	101.25	114.55	-13.30	[0.38]	113	105.39	109.42	-4.03	[0.78]
Primary schools	207	22.81	22.24	0.57	[0.69]	94	22.30	19.94	2.36	[0.38]	113	23.27	23.98	-0.71	[0.75]
Existing local public goods															
Secondary schools	207	0.66	0.48	0.19	[0.29]	94	0.51	0.47	0.04	[0.86]	113	0.80	0.48	0.32	[0.24]
Dispensaries	207	2.85	2.94	-0.10	[0.88]	94	2.53	2.47	0.06	[0.91]	113	3.14	3.31	-0.17	[0.77]
Health facilities	207	0.99	1.08	-0.09	[0.63]	94	0.94	0.96	-0.02	[0.94]	113	1.04	1.18	-0.14	[0.56]
Water points	207	7.05	7.06	0.00	[0.88]	94	4.11	2.74	1.36	[0.49]	113	9.76	10.32	-0.56	[0.88]

Table presents differences in mean predetermined constituency characteristics between constituencies in which elite-preferred candidate was assigned J ($\mu_{1\to J}$) and where they were assigned N ($\mu_{1\to N}$). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). $\beta^J = \mu_{1\to J} - \mu_{1\to N}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A7: Exclusion: Differences in competitiveness of election races wherein first-ranked candidates assigned J and N

	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^{FS}	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Election vote share	207	0.70	0.67	0.02	[0.22]
Election votes	207	17006.87	17308.86	-302.00	[0.84]
Turnout	207	0.73	0.71	0.02	[0.41]
Presidential vote share	205	0.95	0.94	0.00	[0.45]
Number of campaign meetings	79	36.24	34.73	1.51	[0.70]

Table presents differences in mean outcomes relating to electoral competitiveness between constituencies in which elite-preferred candidate was assigned J ($\mu_{1\to J}$) and where they were assigned N ($\mu_{1\to N}$). 'Election vote share' refers to vote share of winning candidate. Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Number of campaign meetings is only selectively reported for 1965 in Cliffe (1967). $\beta = \mu_{1\to J} - \mu_{1\to N}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A8: Elite-preferred candidate is elected (by election)

	1965				1970			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
J	0.213	0.178	0.206	0.231	0.291	0.233	0.305	0.249
	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.108)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.089)	(0.112)
Controls	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
F-statistic	4.38	4.31	3.62	9.67	12.14	5.04	11.85	4.97
DV Mean	0.426	0.426	0.426	0.426	0.532	0.532	0.532	0.532
DV SD	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.503	0.503	0.503	0.503
Observations	94	94	94	94	113	113	113	113

DV: Elite-preferred candidate is elected. Table A25 displays LASSO-selected control coefficients. All specifications are estimated using OLS with election-year fixed effects. Even-indexed columns add LASSO-selected controls. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A9: Disaggregating effects on supply of other local public goods

	Secondary schools				Health facilities			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.05	-0.06	-0.04	-0.06	-0.03	-0.01	-0.08	-0.05
	[0.79]	[0.72]	[0.80]	[0.70]	[0.90]	[0.97]	[0.76]	[0.83]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
DV SD	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44
FS F-statistic	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
	Dispensaries				Water points			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.25	0.18	0.20	0.14	0.34	0.35	0.15	0.21
	[0.48]	[0.59]	[0.58]	[0.67]	[0.68]	[0.66]	[0.86]	[0.79]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	1.71	1.71	1.71	1.71
DV SD	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	1.63	1.63	1.63	1.63
FS F-statistic	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of dispensaries; other health facilities; secondary schools; water points, founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A10: Effects on supply of local public goods (Sample exclusions)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
A. Including towns	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.62	0.55	0.59	0.51	0.28	0.25	0.01	0.03
	[0.08]	[0.08]	[0.11]	[0.14]	[0.69]	[0.71]	[0.98]	[0.96]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.18	2.18	2.18	2.18
DV SD	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	1.38	1.38	1.38	1.38
FS F-statistic	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2	15.5	18.4	14.2	17.2
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
B. Excluding NEC vetos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.63	0.55	0.66	0.56	0.33	0.28	0.14	0.14
	[0.08]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.10]	[0.63]	[0.67]	[0.84]	[0.83]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.07	2.07	2.07	2.07
DV SD	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40
FS F-statistic	17.1	20.6	16.8	20.5	17.1	20.6	16.8	20.5
Observations	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. Panel A includes facilities in wards in major towns (excluded in baseline estimation). Panel B excludes all constituencies in which National Executive Committee exercised its veto over the aspirant ranked first by ADC (and hence *elite-preferred* candidate had ranked second or lower in ADC). All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A11: Effects on supply of local public goods (Varying outcomes)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
A. Inverse hyperbolic sine	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.86	0.77	0.88	0.76	0.37	0.32	0.08	0.09
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.65]	[0.67]	[0.92]	[0.90]
DV Mean	2.84	2.84	2.84	2.84	2.63	2.63	2.63	2.63
DV SD	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
B. Non-transformed count	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.59	0.53	0.67	0.58	0.08	0.11	0.04	0.15
	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.92]	[0.87]	[0.96]	[0.81]
DV Mean	11.80	11.80	11.80	11.80	19.56	19.56	19.56	19.56
DV SD	8.88	8.88	8.88	8.88	26.92	26.92	26.92	26.92
C. Log per capita	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.99	0.93	1.02	0.92	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.11
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.92]	[0.89]	[0.94]	[0.88]
DV Mean	-2.04	-2.04	-2.04	-2.04	-2.01	-2.01	-2.01	-2.01
DV SD	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓

Dependent variables: Panel A: Inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. Panel B: Non-transformed count of the same outcomes using a Poisson model second-stage. Panel C: Log per 1000 population (based on 1957 census) measure of the same outcomes. Specification in Panel A estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects; Panel B estimated with Poisson IV model following control function approach of Wooldridge (2010). Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A12: Effects on distance to closest facilities (HRDS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Primary school				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.42	-0.40	-0.30	-0.30
	[0.05]	[0.03]	[0.10]	[0.06]
DV Mean	6.59	6.59	6.59	6.59
DV SD	1.18	1.18	1.18	1.18
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543
B. Secondary school				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.04	-0.04	-0.13	-0.12
	[0.89]	[0.90]	[0.67]	[0.69]
DV Mean	9.51	9.51	9.51	9.51
DV SD	1.45	1.45	1.45	1.45
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543
C. Dispensary				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.03	-0.06	0.03	-0.02
	[0.91]	[0.82]	[0.91]	[0.95]
DV Mean	7.64	7.64	7.64	7.64
DV SD	1.39	1.39	1.39	1.39
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543
D. Health facility				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.31	-0.32	-0.36	-0.36
	[0.27]	[0.26]	[0.10]	[0.09]
DV Mean	9.38	9.38	9.38	9.38
DV SD	1.59	1.59	1.59	1.59
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543
E. Water point				
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.44	-0.46	-0.56	-0.63
	[0.64]	[0.63]	[0.28]	[0.23]
Weights	×	✓	×	
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	5.45	5.45	5.45	5.45
DV SD	2.04	2.04	2.04	2.04
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543

Notes: Data source is the *Human Resource Development Survey* (1993). Dependent variables: Log-transformed distance in meters between respondent household and closest primary school (Panel A); secondary school (Panel B); dispensary (Panel C); health facility (Panel D); water point (Panel E). All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects and rural cluster fixed effect. Unit of observation is the household-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to households in constituencies not assigned to instrument. Standard errors clustered by constituency-election cycle. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A13: Effects on reported quality of closest primary school (HRDS)

	Z-score index				First principal component			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02
	[0.67]	[0.71]	[0.89]	[0.85]	[0.67]	[0.71]	[0.89]	[0.85]
Weights	×	✓	×		×	✓	×	
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
DV SD	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
FS F-statistic	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4	11.0	11.3	13.3	13.4
Observations	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543	7,543

Notes: Data source is the *Human Resource Development Survey* (1993). Dependent variables: Aggregated index of questions about household head's perception of quality of closest primary school; comprising teachers' quality, headteachers' quality, school supplies, high quality facilities, student learning outcomes in literacy and numeracy. Columns 1-4 aggregate these using a standardized z-score; columns 5-8 aggregate these using the standardized first principal component. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects and rural cluster fixed effect. Unit of observation is the household-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to households in constituencies not assigned to instrument. Standard errors clustered by constituency-election cycle. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A14: Effects on educational attainment (HRDS)

	Ever went to school				Can read and write			
A. Baseline cohorts	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09
	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.14]	[0.12]	[0.04]	[0.02]
DV Mean	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80
DV SD	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
FS F-statistic	8.8	8.9	10.5	10.5	8.8	8.9	10.5	10.5
Observations	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155	3,155
B. Extended cohorts	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08
	[0.16]	[0.10]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.10]	[0.07]	[0.01]	[0.00]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
DV SD	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37
FS F-statistic	10.0	10.0	12.0	11.9	10.0	10.0	12.0	11.9
Observations	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742	6,742

Notes: Data source is the *Human Resource Development Survey* (1993). Dependent variables: Respondent has any formal education (columns 1-4); respondent can read and write (columns 5-8). Unit of observation is the individual-election cycle. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including fixed effects for election cycle, rural cluster, year of birth, and gender. Panel A restricts to cohorts who were seven years old at any point during a given electoral cycle; panel B extends to the five cohorts beyond this. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to individuals in constituencies not assigned to instrument. Standard errors clustered by constituency-election cycle. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A15: Effects on supply of local public goods (district-level)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Share $\widehat{\text{elite-preferred}}$	1.35	1.17	1.59	1.30	0.57	0.43	0.40	0.24
	[0.09]	[0.13]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.66]	[0.73]	[0.78]	[0.85]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	2.68	2.68	2.68	2.68	2.38	2.38	2.38	2.38
DV SD	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	1.38	1.38	1.38	1.38
FS F-statistic	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.9	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.9
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given district in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects following Equation (A3). Unit of observation is the district-election cycle. DV Mean and SD correspond to districts where no constituencies were assigned the instrument. Estimating sample excludes districts containing any non-competitive ADC selection processes. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A16: Effects on supply of local public goods (spillovers test)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.89	0.80	0.73	0.66	0.77	0.64	0.34	0.34
	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.33]	[0.35]	[0.63]	[0.59]
Share $\widehat{\text{other preferred}}_d^{-i}$	0.53	0.44			0.99	0.75		
	[0.24]	[0.23]			[0.19]	[0.26]		
Share $\widehat{\text{other preferred}}_r^{-i}$			2.29	1.89			6.61	7.01
			[0.22]	[0.31]			[0.20]	[0.15]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.18	2.18	2.16	2.16
DV SD	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.78	1.35	1.35	1.39	1.39
Observations	156	156	207	207	156	156	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects following Equation (A4). Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. DV Mean and SD correspond to districts where no constituencies were assigned the instrument. Estimating sample excludes districts containing any non-competitive ADC selection processes. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A17: Effects on local government employment

	New employees				New postings			
A. Binary outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.04	-0.18	-0.05	-0.01	-0.06	-0.10	-0.09	0.11
	[0.85]	[0.49]	[0.85]	[0.97]	[0.83]	[0.71]	[0.73]	[0.69]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.11	0.24	0.34	0.39	0.29	0.45	0.50	0.54
DV SD	0.31	0.43	0.48	0.49	0.46	0.50	0.50	0.50
FS F-statistic	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
B. Log-transformed outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.36	0.30	0.28	0.34	0.51	0.45	0.34	0.70
	[0.24]	[0.50]	[0.61]	[0.55]	[0.49]	[0.58]	[0.72]	[0.47]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.10	0.27	0.43	0.47	0.61	0.98	1.32	1.48
DV SD	0.32	0.53	0.70	0.72	1.00	1.19	1.44	1.50
FS F-statistic	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
C. Constituencies with any office	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.03	-0.39	-0.21	-0.15	-0.15	-0.28	-0.31	0.02
	[0.93]	[0.35]	[0.61]	[0.71]	[0.71]	[0.46]	[0.40]	[0.96]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.16	0.34	0.48	0.55	0.41	0.64	0.71	0.76
DV SD	0.37	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.46	0.43
FS F-statistic	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8
Observations	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157
D. Excluding Dar-es-Salaam	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.01	-0.24	-0.11	-0.07	-0.12	-0.13	-0.12	0.09
	[0.97]	[0.36]	[0.69]	[0.82]	[0.67]	[0.66]	[0.67]	[0.75]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.10	0.24	0.34	0.39	0.30	0.45	0.50	0.54
DV SD	0.30	0.43	0.48	0.49	0.46	0.50	0.50	0.50
FS F-statistic	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8
Observations	202	202	202	202	202	202	202	202
E. Excluding elite-preferred incumbents	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.09	-0.31	-0.20	-0.15	-0.18	-0.12	-0.20	0.11
	[0.74]	[0.33]	[0.56]	[0.67]	[0.58]	[0.74]	[0.58]	[0.75]
Quarters	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DV Mean	0.13	0.22	0.35	0.39	0.31	0.46	0.54	0.59
DV SD	0.34	0.42	0.48	0.49	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.50
FS F-statistic	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1
Observations	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133

Dependent variables: Any new government employees are observed within 1-4 quarters of election in local government offices within constituency; Any new postings (i.e. existing bureaucrats given new jobs) are observed within 1-4 quarters of election in local government offices within constituency. Panel A: Outcomes are indicators for any new employees/postings; Panel B: Outcomes are log+1 number of new government employees/number of new postings; Panel C: Excluding constituencies not observed as containing a local government office at any point; Panel D: Excluding Dar es Salaam; Panel E: Excluding cases where elite-preferred candidate was incumbent. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A18: Differences in characteristics of elected candidates as a function of instrument assignment

	N	$\mu_{1\to J}$	$\mu_{1\to N}$	β^{FS}	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Selection outcomes					
ADC ranked first	207	0.73	0.49	0.25	[0.01]***
ADC vote share	207	0.43	0.36	0.07	[0.02]**
ADC votes	207	128.39	94.56	33.83	[0.04]**
Demographic					
Male	207	0.97	0.94	0.02	[0.39]
Age	185	37.49	38.32	-0.83	[0.55]
Born in district	207	0.83	0.83	0.00	[0.94]
Local religious majority	106	0.75	0.79	-0.04	[0.60]
Local ethnic majority	123	0.59	0.65	-0.05	[0.50]
Traditional authority	207	0.12	0.11	0.01	[0.82]
Education					
Vocational	207	0.24	0.28	-0.04	[0.48]
Overseas experience	207	0.27	0.21	0.05	[0.35]
Secondary	207	0.47	0.36	0.11	[0.13]
University	207	0.13	0.07	0.06	[0.19]
Occupation					
Farmer	207	0.52	0.46	0.06	[0.37]
Teacher	207	0.17	0.14	0.04	[0.44]
Religious	207	0.03	0.05	-0.02	[0.60]
Business	207	0.14	0.13	0.01	[0.83]
Bureaucrat (junior)	207	0.16	0.24	-0.08	[0.16]
Bureaucrat (senior)	207	0.20	0.21	-0.01	[0.84]
National political roles					
MP	207	0.28	0.24	0.04	[0.43]
Minister	207	0.11	0.06	0.05	[0.26]
Local party roles					
Local elected leader	207	0.34	0.24	0.10	[0.11]
Local appointed leader	207	0.20	0.16	0.05	[0.36]
Union/Cooperative leader	207	0.50	0.41	0.09	[0.21]
Years of membership	138	9.81	9.76	0.05	[0.24]

Table presents differences in mean characteristics of ultimately elected legislators between constituencies in which elite-preferred candidate was assigned J ($\mu_{1\to J}$) and where they were assigned N ($\mu_{1\to N}$). Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). $\beta = \mu_{1\to J} - \mu_{1\to N}$. Column 5 provides p-value of difference using OLS with election year fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A19: Correlates of ADC vote share among elite-preferred candidates

	N	μ_1^{Weak}	μ_1^{Strong}	β	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Demographic					
Male	207	0.96	0.96	0.00	[0.88]
Age	176	38.40	38.93	0.10	[0.85]
Born in district	207	0.75	0.81	0.04	[0.12]
Local religious majority	111	0.78	0.75	-0.02	[0.64]
Local ethnic majority	124	0.54	0.52	-0.01	[0.90]
Traditional authority	207	0.13	0.08	-0.02	[0.24]
Education					
Vocational	207	0.19	0.31	0.05	[0.15]
Overseas experience	207	0.26	0.23	0.00	[0.96]
Secondary	207	0.40	0.39	0.01	[0.87]
University	207	0.10	0.09	0.00	[0.93]
Occupation					
Farmer	207	0.38	0.42	-0.01	[0.86]
Teacher	207	0.15	0.15	0.00	[0.93]
Religious	207	0.04	0.01	-0.01	[0.36]
Business	207	0.15	0.12	-0.01	[0.82]
Bureaucrat (junior)	207	0.13	0.22	0.04	[0.14]
Bureaucrat (senior)	207	0.15	0.30	0.10	[0.01]***
National political roles					
MP	207	0.27	0.45	0.13	[0.01]***
Minister	207	0.07	0.19	0.10	[0.01]***
Local party roles					
Local elected leader	207	0.31	0.29	-0.04	[0.23]
Local appointed leader	207	0.16	0.24	0.05	[0.12]
Union/Cooperative leader	207	0.46	0.34	-0.03	[0.32]
Years of membership	123	9.81	10.61	0.47	[0.18]

Table presents differences in mean candidate characteristics between elite-preferred candidates receiving more than the mean ADC vote share (μ_1^{Strong}) and those elite-preferred candidates receiving less than mean ADC vote share (μ_1^{Weak}). β comes from a regression of a given elite-preferred candidate characteristic on their ADC vote share (vote share conditioned on the top two candidates for comparability) using OLS with election year fixed effects. Sample restricted to constituencies in 1965/1970 with competitive selection stages (2+ aspirants). Column 5 provides p-value associated with β. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A20: First stage heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
J	0.255	0.242	0.268	0.258
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.064)
J × ADC vote share			-0.012	0.015
			(0.063)	(0.066)
Controls	×	✓	×	✓
F-statistic	15.52	15.94	17.28	15.99
DV Mean	0.486	0.486	0.486	0.486
DV SD	0.502	0.502	0.502	0.502
Observations	207	207	207	207

DV: Elite-preferred candidate is elected. ADC vote share measures the standardized ADC vote share received by the elite-preferred candidate during the selection stage. All specifications are estimated using OLS with election-year fixed effects. Even-indexed columns add LASSO-selected controls. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A21: Other local public goods: Heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate

	Secondary schools				Health facilities			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.05	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.01
	[0.79]	[0.72]	[0.91]	[0.83]	[0.90]	[0.97]	[0.99]	[0.95]
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$ × ADC vote share			0.43	0.38			0.26	0.23
			[0.01]	[0.01]			[0.22]	[0.25]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
DV SD	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
	Dispensaries				Water points			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.25	0.18	0.28	0.21	0.34	0.35	0.49	0.47
	[0.48]	[0.59]	[0.36]	[0.47]	[0.68]	[0.66]	[0.52]	[0.52]
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$ × ADC vote share			-0.09	-0.07			1.08	0.98
			[0.79]	[0.83]			[0.12]	[0.14]
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	1.71	1.71	1.71	1.71
DV SD	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	1.63	1.63	1.63	1.63
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of dispensaries; other health facilities; secondary schools; water points, founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A22: Heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate (by tercile)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.72	0.64	0.24	0.14	0.30	0.27	-0.01	-0.05
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.69]	[0.81]	[0.66]	[0.68]	[0.99]	[0.96]
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}} \times \text{ADC}^1_{p33-p66}$			0.30	0.48			-0.56	-0.33
			[0.70]	[0.51]			[0.70]	[0.82]
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}} \times \text{ADC}^1_{p67-p100}$			0.93	0.86			1.35	1.20
			[0.22]	[0.22]			[0.33]	[0.37]
Weights	×	✓			×	✓		
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.16	2.16	2.16	2.16
DV SD	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	1.39	1.39	1.39	1.39
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. ADC vote share measures the tercile of the ADC vote share received by the elite-preferred candidate during the selection stage. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A23: Effects on supply of local public goods (by election)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	1.07	0.93	0.51	0.47	0.54	0.60	0.16	0.07
	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.24]	[0.26]	[0.67]	[0.60]	[0.86]	[0.93]
Year	1965	1965	1970	1970	1965	1965	1970	1970
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	1.82	1.82	2.83	2.83	1.75	1.75	2.64	2.64
DV SD	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.60	1.34	1.34	1.31	1.31
FS F-statistic	4.4	5.0	12.1	14.7	4.4	5.0	12.1	14.7
Observations	94	94	113	113	94	94	113	113

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given district in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Tables including control coefficients

Table A24: Elite-preferred candidate is elected (including LASSO-selected control coefficients)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
J	0.255	0.242	0.245	0.234
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.059)
Candidate: ADC vote share		0.331		0.418
		(0.164)		(0.169)
Candidate: Born in district		0.237		0.200
		(0.075)		(0.086)
Distance to major town (km)		-0.001		
		(0.000)		
Candidate: University education		0.230		0.308
		(0.090)		(0.090)
Candidate: Vocational education		0.161		0.178
		(0.069)		(0.075)
Log Secondary schools		0.060		0.114
		(0.058)		(0.051)
NEC veto		-0.214		-0.203
		(0.160)		(0.178)
Controls	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	✓
DV Mean	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49
DV SD	0.502	0.502	0.502	0.502
Observations	207	207	207	207

DV: Elite-preferred candidate is elected. All specifications are estimated using OLS with election-year fixed effects. Even-indexed columns add LASSO-selected controls. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A25: Elite-preferred candidate is elected (by election, including LASSO-selected control coefficients)

	1965				1970			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
J	0.213	0.178	0.206	0.231	0.291	0.233	0.305	0.249
	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.108)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.089)	(0.112)
Candidate: Born in district		0.365		0.476				
		(0.093)		(0.110)				
Candidate: Secondary education		0.083		0.080				
		(0.096)		(0.089)				
Candidate: University education		0.435		0.501				
		(0.133)		(0.133)				
Candidate: Vocational education		0.292		0.335				
		(0.108)		(0.108)				
Number of polling stations		-0.003						
		(0.001)						
Main occupation: Farmer		0.167		0.258				
		(0.089)		(0.090)				
Candidate: Traditional authority		0.141		0.020				
		(0.157)		(0.170)				
Share Christian				-1.176		0.302		-0.195
				(0.344)		(0.219)		(0.345)
Candidate: Union/Cooperative leader				0.196				
				(0.080)				
Log Secondary schools				0.219		0.049		0.087
				(0.072)		(0.084)		(0.086)
Candidate: Minister				0.078		-0.147		-0.147
				(0.115)		(0.143)		(0.148)
NEC veto				-0.330				-0.208
				(0.249)				(0.190)
Prior occupation: Bureaucrat (senior)				0.089				
				(0.108)				
Number of registered voters				-0.000		0.000		0.000
				(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Candidate: ADC votes received						-0.000		0.000
						(0.000)		(0.000)
Candidate: ADC vote share						0.711		0.534
						(0.261)		(0.311)
Population (1957)						0.000		0.000
						(0.000)		(0.000)
2nd largest ethnicity population share						-0.738		-0.523
						(0.548)		(0.670)
Latitude						-0.007		
						(0.017)		
Candidate: Local appointed leader						0.108		0.105
						(0.092)		(0.097)
Prior occupation: Bureaucrat (junior)						-0.025		-0.039
						(0.127)		(0.152)
Prior occupation: Business						0.038		0.007
						(0.104)		(0.119)
Area (sq. km)								0.000
								(0.000)
Share Nyamwezi/Sukuma								-0.487
								(0.589)
Candidate: Local elected leader								-0.033
								(0.083)
Controls	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Region FE	×	×	✓	×	×	×	✓	×
DV Mean	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53
DV SD	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.503	0.503	0.503	0.503
Observations	94	94	94	94	113	113	113	113

DV: Elite-preferred candidate is elected. All specifications are estimated using OLS with election-year fixed effects. Even-indexed columns add LASSO-selected controls. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A26: First stage heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
J	0.255	0.242	0.268	0.258
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Candidate: ADC vote share		0.331		0.452
		(0.164)		(0.268)
Candidate: Born in district		0.237		0.229
		(0.075)		(0.078)
Distance to major town (km)		-0.001		
		(0.000)		
Candidate: University education		0.230		0.243
		(0.090)		(0.089)
Candidate: Vocational education		0.161		
		(0.069)		
Log Secondary schools		0.060		
		(0.058)		
NEC veto		-0.214		-0.162
		(0.160)		(0.180)
ADC vote share			0.076	0.005
			(0.043)	(0.059)
J × ADC vote share			-0.012	0.015
			(0.063)	(0.066)
Prior occupation: Religious				0.266
				(0.091)
Controls	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	0.486	0.486	0.486	0.486
DV SD	0.502	0.502	0.502	0.502
Observations	207	207	207	207

DV: Elite-preferred candidate is elected. ADC vote share measures the standardized ADC vote share received by the elite-preferred candidate during the selection stage. All specifications are estimated using OLS with election-year fixed effects. Even-indexed columns add LASSO-selected controls. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A27: Heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.72	0.64	0.71	0.64	0.30	0.27	0.43	0.37
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.66]	[0.68]	[0.50]	[0.54]
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$ × ADC vote share			0.58	0.54			0.89	0.78
			[0.09]	[0.08]			[0.11]	[0.15]
ADC vote share			-0.42	-0.38			-0.43	-0.37
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.16	2.16	2.16	2.16
DV SD	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	1.39	1.39	1.39	1.39
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in constituency in five years following 1965/1970. ADC vote share measures standardized ADC vote share received by the elite-preferred candidate. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A28: Other local public goods: Heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate

	Secondary schools				Health facilities			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	-0.05	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.01
	[0.79]	[0.72]	[0.91]	[0.83]	[0.90]	[0.97]	[0.99]	[0.95]
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}} \times$ ADC vote share			0.43	0.38			0.26	0.23
			[0.01]	[0.01]			[0.22]	[0.25]
ADC vote share			-0.27	-0.23			-0.14	-0.12
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
DV SD	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207
	Dispensaries				Water points			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.25	0.18	0.28	0.21	0.34	0.35	0.49	0.47
	[0.48]	[0.59]	[0.36]	[0.47]	[0.68]	[0.66]	[0.52]	[0.52]
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}} \times$ ADC vote share			-0.09	-0.07			1.08	0.98
			[0.79]	[0.83]			[0.12]	[0.14]
ADC vote share			0.12	0.11			-0.54	-0.49
Weights	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
DV Mean	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	1.71	1.71	1.71	1.71
DV SD	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	1.63	1.63	1.63	1.63
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of dispensaries; other health facilities; secondary schools; water points, founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.

Table A29: Heterogeneity by ADC vote share of elite-preferred candidate (by tercile)

	Primary schools				Other local public goods			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}}$	0.72	0.64	0.24	0.14	0.30	0.27	-0.01	-0.05
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.69]	[0.81]	[0.66]	[0.68]	[0.99]	[0.96]
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}} \times \text{ADC}^1_{p33-p66}$			0.30	0.48			-0.56	-0.33
			[0.70]	[0.51]			[0.70]	[0.82]
$\widehat{\text{Preferred}} \times \text{ADC}^1_{p67-p100}$			0.93	0.86			1.35	1.20
			[0.22]	[0.22]			[0.33]	[0.37]
$\text{ADC}^1_{p33-p66}$			-0.13	-0.22			0.66	0.47
$\text{ADC}^1_{p67-p100}$			-0.73	-0.62			-0.50	-0.42
Weights	×	✓			×	✓		
DV Mean	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.16	2.16	2.16	2.16
DV SD	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	1.39	1.39	1.39	1.39
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	207	207	207

Dependent variables: log+1 Number of primary schools/other local public goods founded in a given constituency in the five years following 1965 or 1970 elections. ADC vote share measures the tercile of the ADC vote share received by the elite-preferred candidate during the selection stage. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS including election year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the constituency-election cycle. Weights based on predicted compliance propensities. DV Mean and SD correspond to constituencies not assigned to instrument. Bootstrapped p-values in square brackets.