Supplementary Information

Respect the Process: The Public Cost of Unilateral Action in Comparative Perspective

October 6, 2023

Contents

A Summary Statistics **3**

B Balance Checks **3**

C Experimental Results – Regression Tables **4**
C.1 Main Effects 4
C.2 Main Effects by Issue Type 5
C.3 Partisan Subgroup Effects 6
C.4 Educational Subgroup Effects 8
C.5 Mechanism Effects 9
C.6 Main Effects Conditional on Public Opinion Poll 10
C.7 Democracy Subgroup Effects 11
C.8 Egypt Robustness Checks for Attitudes toward Executive 13
C.9 Long-Form Model and Executive Order CATEs 14

D Mediation Analysis **17**

E US Survey Questions **18**
E.1 Experimental Vignettes 18
E.2 Outcome and Mechanism Questions 19
E.3 Manipulation Check 19
E.4 Moderator Questions 20

F Egypt Survey Questions – English **21**
F.1 Experimental Vignettes 21
F.2 Outcome and Mechanism Questions 22
F.3 Manipulation Check 22
F.4 Moderator Questions 23

G Egypt Survey Questions – Arabic **25**
G.1 Experimental Vignettes 25
G.2 Outcome and Mechanism Questions 26
G.3 Manipulation Check 26
G.4 Moderator Questions 27

H Pre-Analysis Plan for Egypt Survey **28**
H.1 Overview 28
H.2 Hypotheses 28
H.3 Research Design 29
H.4 Analysis 30
H.5 References 30

I Pre-Analysis Plan for US Follow-Up Study 2 **31**
I.1 Study Information 31
I.2 Design Plan 31
I.3 Sampling Plan 32
I.4 Variables 32
I.5 Analysis Plan 33

J Results for US Follow-Up Study 1 **34**

K Results for US Follow-Up Study 2 **36**

L Observational Analysis **37**
L.1 List of Countries for Observational Analysis 37
L.2 Observataional Results – Variation by Individuals 38
L.3 Observational Results – Variation by Survey 41

A Summary Statistics

A.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
USA				
Age	45.04	16.55	18	99
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1
White	0.72	0.45	0	1
College	0.47	0.50	0	1
Republican	0.29	0.45	0	1
Democracy Important	2.24	0.83	1	3
Approve of Congress	4.30	1.67	1	7
Income	3.16	1.64	1	6
Northeast	0.19	0.39	0	1
Midwest	0.21	0.41	0	1
South	0.39	0.49	0	1
West	0.21	0.41	0	1
Egypt				
Birth Year	1984	14.83	1920	2002
Female	0.44	0.50	0	1
Muslim	0.95	0.23	0	1
College	0.58	0.49	0	1
Support Sisi	0.73	0.45	0	1
Democracy Important	1.96	0.84	1	3
Approve of Parliament	3.24	1.90	1	7
Cairo / Giza / Alexandria	0.53	0.50	0	1
Neighborhood Income	2.44	0.81	1	3

B Balance Checks

A.2: Balance Checks

Variable	Executive Order Treatment Mean	Legislature Treatment Mean	p-value
USA			
Age	44.23	45.85	0.01
Gender	1.53	1.51	0.37
White	0.72	0.72	0.82
College	0.49	0.46	0.13
Partisanship	1.91	1.92	0.68
Democracy Important	2.24	2.24	0.93
Approve of Congress	4.30	4.31	0.90
Approve of Trump	4.24	4.19	0.60
Income	3.13	3.19	0.30
Egypt			
Birth Year	1983.83	1984.18	0.52
Gender	0.44	0.43	0.67
Muslim	0.94	0.95	0.88
College	0.58	0.58	0.90
Support Sisi	0.73	0.72	0.43
Democracy Important	1.95	1.97	0.36
Approve of Parliament	3.23	3.24	0.91
Cairo / Giza / Alexandria	0.55	0.51	0.06
Neighborhood Income	2.44	2.43	0.65

C Experimental Results – Regression Tables

C.1 Main Effects

A.3: Main Effects of Executive Order Treatment

	USA	USA	Egypt	Egypt
Executive Order	-0.559***	-0.558***	-0.289***	-0.309***
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.057)
Constant	5.061***	6.067***	5.643***	5.929***
	(0.049)	(0.216)	(0.046)	(0.351)
Clusters	1,299	1,299	1,463	1,408
Observations	2,598	2,598	2,921	2,813
Controls		✓		✓

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.
US Controls: age, gender, white, college, partisanship,
support for democracy, Congressional approval, region.
Egypt Controls: age, gender, Muslim, college, support for Sisi,
support for democracy, Parliamentary approval, governorate.

A.4: Main Effects of Executive Order Treatment (Ordered Probit)

	USA	USA	Egypt	Egypt
Executive Order	-0.302***	-0.306***	-0.164***	-0.206***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Clusters	1,299	1,299	1,463	1,408
Observations	2,598	2,598	2,921	2,813
Controls		✓		✓

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.
US Controls: age, gender, white, college, partisanship,
support for democracy, Congressional approval, region.
Egypt Controls: age, gender, Muslim, college, support for Sisi,
support for democracy, Parliamentary approval, governorate.

C.2 Main Effects by Issue Type

A.5: Effects of Executive Order Treatment by Issue Type

	USA Domestic	USA Foreign	Egypt Domestic	Egypt Foreign
Executive Order	-0.503***	-0.621***	-0.250**	-0.331***
	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.085)	(0.093)
Constant	5.428***	4.696***	5.854***	5.433***
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.061)
Observations	1,299	1,299	1,462	1,459

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions

A.6: Effects of Executive Order Treatment by Issue Type (Ordered Probit)

	USA Domestic	USA Foreign	Egypt Domestic	Egypt Foreign
Executive Order	-0.304***	-0.330***	-0.159**	-0.178***
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Observations	1,299	1,299	1,462	1,459

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions

C.3 Partisan Subgroup Effects

A.7: Partisan Subgroup Effects of Executive Order Treatment

	USA Same Party	USA Cross Party	USA No Party	Egypt Support Sisi	Egypt Oppose Sisi
Executive Order	-0.456**	-0.558***	-0.611***	-0.259***	-0.433**
	(0.152)	(0.159)	(0.098)	(0.058)	(0.145)
Constant	5.250***	5.074***	4.984***	6.071***	4.549***
	(0.106)	(0.112)	(0.064)	(0.040)	(0.101)
Clusters	486	489	916	1,057	397
Observations	576	587	1,435	2,112	793

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

For context, the effect of the respondent being randomly assigned to a hypothetical president who shared their party was 0.31 ($p < 0.01$). This co-partisan effect was larger for the foreign policy issues ($0.41, p < 0.01$) versus the domestic issues ($0.21, p < 0.10$).

A.8: Partisan Subgroup Effects of Executive Order Treatment (Ordered Probit)

	USA Same Party	USA Cross Party	USA No Party	Egypt Support Sisi	Egypt Oppose Sisi
Executive Order	-0.243**	-0.305***	-0.334***	-0.194***	-0.208***
	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.076)
Clusters	486	489	916	1,057	397
Observations	576	587	1,435	2,112	793

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

We also analyzed whether responses on the mechanism questions varied by partisanship of the respondent. The results suggest that responses are similar, especially for the democratic procedure mechanism, regardless of the respondent's alignment with the party of the hypothetical US president or President Al-Sisi.

A.1: Democracy Mechanism Based on Partisanship: USA



A.2: Democracy Mechanism Based on Partisanship: Egypt



C.4 Educational Subgroup Effects

A.9: Educational Subgroup Effects of Executive Order Treatment

	USA University	USA No University	USA Interaction	Egypt University	Egypt No University	Egypt Interaction
Executive Order	-0.575***	-0.548***	-0.548***	-0.237**	-0.361***	-0.361***
	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.096)	(0.096)
University			-0.032			-0.092
			(0.097)			(0.093)
Interaction			-0.026			0.124
			(0.148)			(0.129)
Constant	5.044***	5.077***	5.077***	5.604***	5.697***	5.697***
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Clusters	611	688	1,299	851	612	1,463
Observations	1,222	1,376	2,598	1,698	1,223	2,921

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

A.10: Educational Subgroup Effects of Executive Order Treatment (Ordered Probit)

	USA University	USA No University	USA Interaction	Egypt University	Egypt No University	Egypt Interaction
Executive Order	-0.296***	-0.308***	-0.303***	-0.128*	-0.216***	-0.214***
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.060)
University			-0.020			-0.063
			(0.057)			(0.062)
Interaction			0.001			0.086
			(0.084)			(0.080)
Clusters	611	688	1,299	851	612	1,463
Observations	1,222	1,376	2,598	1,698	1,223	2,921

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

C.5 Mechanism Effects

A.11: Main Effects of Executive Order Treatment on Mechanism Outcomes

	USA Effectiveness	USA Durability	USA Democracy	Egypt Effectiveness	Egypt Durability	Egypt Democracy
Executive Order	-0.289***	-0.227***	-1.442***	-0.237***	0.189**	-0.646***
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.068)
Constant	4.923***	3.538***	5.324***	5.405***	4.582***	5.318***
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Clusters	1,299	1,299	1,299	1,463	1,463	1,463
Observations	2,598	2,598	2,598	2,922	2,920	2,922

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

A.12: Main Effects of Executive Order Treatment on Mechanism Outcomes (Ordered Probit)

	USA Effectiveness	USA Durability	USA Democracy	Egypt Effectiveness	Egypt Durability	Egypt Democracy
Executive Order	-0.171***	-0.159***	-0.887***	-0.146***	0.116**	-0.361***
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Clusters	1,299	1,299	1,299	1,463	1,463	1,463
Observations	2,598	2,598	2,598	2,922	2,920	2,922

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

C.6 Main Effects Conditional on Public Opinion Poll

A.13: Effects of Executive Order Treatment With and Without Opinion Poll

	USA Poll	USA No Poll	USA Interaction	Egypt Poll	Egypt No Poll	Egypt Interaction
Executive Order	-0.422***	-0.703***	-0.703***	-0.241**	-0.335***	-0.335***
	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Opinion Poll			0.044			0.044
			(0.097)			(0.085)
Interaction			0.282*			0.094
			(0.143)			(0.128)
Constant	5.083***	5.040***	5.040***	5.665***	5.621***	5.621
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Clusters	975	975	1,299	1,082	1,100	1,463
Observations	1,299	1,299	2,598	1,442	1,479	2,921

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

A.14: Effects of Executive Order Treatment With and Without Opinion Poll (Ordered Probit)

	USA Poll	USA No Poll	USA Interaction	Egypt Poll	Egypt No Poll	Egypt Interaction
Executive Order	-0.226***	-0.380***	-0.387***	-0.144*	-0.183***	-0.186***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Opinion Poll			0.011			0.018
			(0.057)			(0.056)
Interaction			0.166*			0.044
			(0.081)			(0.080)
Clusters	975	975	1,299	1,100	1,082	1,463
Observations	1,299	1,299	2,598	1,479	1,442	2,921

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

C.7 Democracy Subgroup Effects

A.15: Democracy Importance Subgroup Effects of Executive Order Treatment

	USA Dem High	USA Dem Med	USA Dem Low	Egypt Dem High	Egypt Dem Med	Egypt Dem Low
Executive Order	-0.902***	-0.289*	-0.166	-0.366**	-0.521***	-0.067
	(0.110)	(0.132)	(0.142)	(0.134)	(0.110)	(0.087)
Constant	5.278***	4.968***	4.736***	5.452***	5.810***	5.694***
	(0.068)	(0.091)	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.077)	(0.067)
Clusters	637	336	326	485	421	544
Observations	1,274	672	652	968	842	1,085

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

A.16: Democracy Importance Interaction with Executive Order Treatment

	USA	Egypt
Executive Order	-0.166	-0.067
	(0.142)	(0.087)
Democracy High	0.542***	-0.243*
	(0.122)	(0.115)
Democracy High Interaction	-0.736***	-0.299†
	(0.180)	(0.160)
Democracy Medium	0.232	0.116
	(0.136)	(0.102)
Democracy Medium Interaction	-0.123	-0.454***
	(0.194)	(0.140)
Constant	4.736***	5.694***
	(0.101)	(0.067)
Clusters	1,299	1,450
Observations	2,598	2,895

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

A.17: Democracy Importance Subgroup Effects of Executive Order Treatment (Ordered Probit)

	USA Dem High	USA Dem Med	USA Dem Low	Egypt Dem High	Egypt Dem Med	Egypt Dem Low
Executive Order	-0.464***	-0.170*	-0.089	-0.161*	-0.341***	-0.047
	(0.059)	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.063)
Clusters	637	336	326	485	421	544
Observations	1,274	672	652	968	842	1,085

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 - OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

A.18: Democracy Importance Interaction with Executive Order Treatment (Ordered Probit)

	USA	Egypt
Executive Order	-0.077	-0.041
	(0.081)	(0.059)
Democracy High	0.358***	-0.077
	(0.071)	(0.07)
Democracy High Interaction	-0.432***	-0.148
	(0.103)	(0.100)
Democracy Medium	0.116	0.086
	(0.076)	(0.071)
Democracy Medium Interaction	-0.071	-0.277**
	(0.108)	(0.091)
Clusters	1,299	1,450
Observations	2,598	2,895

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

C.8 Egypt Robustness Checks for Attitudes toward Executive

Because of Egypt's repressive environment, some respondents may have falsified their attitudes toward President Sisi. As discussed in the main text in footnote 16, we address this concern by analyzing whether subgroup effects are all negative when using various proxies for supporting the executive. These proxies include trust in the army, trust in the security forces, trust in the effectiveness of the government's covid response, and trust in the honesty of the government's covid response. We also use PCA to create an index of pro-executive attitudes and analyze subgroup effects based on this variable as well. The results all show consistently negative effects regardless of how respondents answer these questions.

A.19: Executive Order Treatment Effects with Positive Attitudes toward Executive

	Pro-Exec Index	Trust Army	Trust Security	Covid Effective	Covid Honest
Executive Order	-0.222***	-0.258***	-0.224***	-0.285***	-0.202***
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Constant	6.050***	5.886***	5.955***	5.900***	5.950***
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Clusters	1,041	1,254	1,164	1,250	1,095
Observations	2,077	2,504	2,324	2,496	2,187

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

A.20: Executive Order Treatment Effects with Negative Attitudes toward Executive

	Pro-Exec Index	Trust Army	Trust Security	Covid Effective	Covid Honest
Executive Order	-0.496***	-0.519*	-0.526**	-0.391†	-0.630***
	(0.146)	(0.215)	(0.183)	(0.220)	(0.160)
Constant	4.660***	4.163***	4.371***	4.149***	4.743***
	(0.100)	(0.153)	(0.127)	(0.161)	(0.114)
Clusters	422	201	287	204	363
Observations	844	402	574	408	725

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by respondent.

C.9 Long-Form Model and Executive Order CATEs

Our experiment uses a factorial design in which several components are randomized to assess the effects of unilateral action across different conditions. To ensure that our results are not masking important heterogeneity, we report results from long-form models in the domestic and foreign policy vignettes for both the US and Egypt. These models include all possible interactions among the treatment conditions for the executive order, partisan, issue, and opinion poll randomizations in the US, and the executive order, issue, and opinion poll randomizations in Egypt (where Al-Sisi was said to be the president and partisanship was not randomized).[1] These results are reported in Tables 21 and Tables 22. Because multiple interactions are difficult to interpret, we also plot the average treatment effect of the executive order treatment conditional on all possible combinations of the other randomizations. These results are plotted in Figures 3 and 4. They show that the executive order treatment consistently reduced approval of the executive in 23 of the 24 cases for the US study and in 8 of the 8 cases for the Egypt study, providing support for H1.

A.21: Fully Saturated Model with US Sample

Variables: Foreign Policy	Coefficients: Foreign Policy	Variables: Domestic Policy	Coefficients: Domestic Policy
Executive Order	-0.63**	Executive Order	-1.04***
	(0.21)		(0.21)
Opinion Poll	0.25	Opinion Poll	-0.02
	(0.21)		(0.21)
Republican	0.27	Republican	-0.26
	(0.29)		(0.30)
Border	0.65**	Marijuana	-0.31*
	(0.21)		(0.21)
Executive Order*Poll	0.25	Executive Order*Poll	0.68**
	(0.25)		(0.24)
Executive Order*Republican	-0.70	Executive Order*Republican	0.27
	(0.43)		(0.40)
Executive Order*Border	-0.33	Executive Order*Marijuana	0.46
	(0.25)		(0.24)
Republican*Poll	-0.29	Republican*Poll	0.53
	(0.41)		(0.41)
Poll*Border	-0.36	Poll*Marijuana	-0.41
	(0.25)		(0.24)
Republican*Border	-0.58	Republican*Marijuana	0.02
	(0.40)		(0.41)
Executive Order*Poll*Republican	0.98	Executive Order*Poll*Republican	-0.83
	(0.58)		(0.53)
Poll*Republican*Border	0.57	Poll*Republican*Marijuana	-0.20
	(0.55)		(0.54)
Executive Order*Republican*Border	1.21*	Executive Order*Republican*Marijuana	-0.23
	(0.55)		(0.54)
Executive Order*Poll*Republican*Border	-1.49*	Executive Order*Poll*Republican*Marijuana	0.42
	(0.71)		(0.67)
Constant	4.37***	Constant	5.73***
	(0.15)		(0.17)
Observations	1,299	Observations	1,299

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

OLS Regressions. Left panel shows results for foreign policy vignette, right panel shows domestic policy vignette.

[1]The variable for presidential partisanship in the United States is coded as an ordinal variable with values 0 = Democrat, 1 = No Party, 2 = Republican.

A.3: Conditional Average Treatment Effects: USA





A.22: Fully Saturated Model with Egypt Sample

Variables: Foreign Policy	Coefficients: Foreign Policy	Variables: Domestic Policy	Coefficients: Domestic Policy
Executive Order	-0.51**	Executive Order	-0.21
	(0.18)		(0.17)
Poll	-0.02	Poll	0.02
	(0.18)		(0.17)
Russia	0.09	Wage	0.03
	(0.18)		(0.17)
Executive Order*Poll	0.22	Executive Order*Poll	0.05
	(0.26)		(0.24)
Executive Order*Russia	0.25	Executive Order*Wage	-0.19
	(0.26)		(0.24)
Poll*Russia	0.15	Poll*Wage	-0.00
	(0.26)		(0.24)
Executive Order*Poll*Russia	-0.21	Executive Order*Poll*Wage	0.10
	(0.37)		(0.34)
Constant	5.36***	Constant	5.83***
	(0.12)		(0.12)
Observations	1,459	Observations	1,462

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

OLS Regressions. Left panel shows results for foreign policy vignette, right panel shows domestic policy vignette.

A.4: Conditional Average Treatment Effects: Egypt



D Mediation Analysis

This section complements the main paper's analysis of the three potential mediators (effectiveness, durability, and democracy) that may explain why unilateral action negatively affects public approval.

The main paper showed that the executive order treatment affected all three mechanisms but that the treatment effect was strongest on the democratic procedure mechanism. Here, we complement that analysis by following the procedures outlined in Imai et al. (2011) to calculate the average mediation effect – i.e., the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable that is channeled through a particular mechanism.

The underlying assumptions of mediation analysis are much more difficult to satisfy than the experimental analysis in the main paper. They require sequential ignorability (no confounding) and independence of the mechanisms. Since these assumptions are rarely met, we provide this analysis as suggestive evidence consistent with our findings in the main paper.

As shown in the table below, conducting mediation analysis strengthens the findings reported in the main paper. The mediation effect of the democracy mechanism is the most negative, suggesting that the largest proportion of the negative executive order effect can be explained by the democracy mechanism. The policy effectiveness mechanism is also negative and significant, though its magnitude is not as large. The durability mechanism is the smallest and not consistent across samples. These results imply that the negative effect of unilateral action on public approval is mediated more so by people's concerns about following democratic procedures than by their beliefs about the policy's effectiveness or durability.

A.23: Mediation Results

Mediator	USA	Egypt
Effective	-0.227 [-0.333, -0.122]	-0.182 [-0.268, -0.010]
Durable	0.008 [-0.007, 0.026]	-0.009 [-0.020, -0.001]
Democratic	-0.849 [-0.956, -0.743]	-0.329 [-0.406, -0.255]

Mediation analysis (Imai et al. 2011). 95 c.i.

E US Survey Questions

E.1 Experimental Vignettes

Corporate Taxes:

> *Next, you will read a fictional news story about a policy implemented by* ***the Republican / the Democratic / the*** *administration of President Jones, the United States president in the year 2024.*
>
> ***President Jones issues executive order / Congress passes President Jones' law*** *regarding corporate taxes.*
>
> *In 2024, the US government increased penalties for corporations that did not pay their taxes. President Jones implemented this policy change* ***without the approval of Congress by issuing an executive order / with the approval of Congress by passing a law*** *requiring the IRS to increase fines against tax-avoidant corporations.* ***/ When polled, a majority of Americans said they support the policy.***

Legalization of Marijuana:

> *Next, you will read a fictional news story about a policy implemented by* ***the Republican / the Democratic / the*** *administration of President Jones, the United States president in the year 2024.*
>
> ***President Jones issues executive order / Congress passes President Jones' law*** *regarding marijuana.*
>
> *In 2024, the US government decriminalized marijuana. President Jones implemented this policy change* ***without the approval of Congress by issuing an executive order / with the approval of Congress by passing a law*** *requiring the Department of Justice to stop prosecuting individuals arrested with marijuana in their possession.* ***/ When polled, a majority of Americans said they support the policy.***

Sending Soldiers to Mexican Border:

> *Next, you will read a fictional news story about a policy implemented by* ***the Republican / the Democratic / the*** *administration of President Davis, the United States president in the year 2024.*
>
> ***President Davis issues executive order / Congress passes President Davis' law*** *regarding the border.*
>
> *In 2024, the US government deployed troops to monitor the US-Mexico border. President Davis implemented this policy change* ***without the approval of Congress by issuing an executive order / with the approval of Congress by passing a law*** *authorizing the presence of troops at the southern border.* ***/ When polled, a majority of Americans said they support the policy.***

Sending Soldiers to East Africa:

> *Next, you will read a fictional news story about a policy implemented by* ***the Republican / the Democratic / the*** *administration of President Davis, the United States president in the year 2024.*
>
> ***President Davis issues executive order / Congress passes President Davis' law*** *regarding Eastern Africa.*
>
> *In 2024, the US government deployed troops to Eastern Africa to combat militant groups. President Davis implemented this policy change* ***without the approval of Congress by issuing an executive order / with the approval of Congress by passing a law*** *authorizing the military deployment.* ***/ When polled, a majority of Americans said they support the policy.***

E.2 Outcome and Mechanism Questions

Do you approve or disapprove of President Jones' handling of this issue? (Strongly Approve to Strongly Disapprove)

Given that President Jones / Davis implemented the policy [with / without] the approval of the Congress, do you AGREE or DISAGREE with the following statements? (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree)

The policy will be effective at addressing issues related to [policy].

Even though the policy was successfully implemented, it will only be reversed by the next presidential administration.

The way the policy was implemented followed appropriate democratic procedures.

E.3 Manipulation Check

According to the news story you just read, how was the policy implemented?

- With a law passed through Congress
- With an executive order
- With the Supreme Court
- The story did not say
- I don't know

E.4 Moderator Questions

What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If you are currently enrolled, what is the highest degree you have received?

- Less than a high school diploma
- High school degree or equivalent (e.g. GED)
- Some college, no degree
- Associate degree (e.g. AA, AS)
- Bachelor's degree (e.g. BA, BS)
- Master's degree (e.g. MA, MS, MEd)
- Professional degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM)
- Doctorate (e.g. PhD, EdD)

On a scale from 1 to 10, how important is it for you to live in a democracy? (Note: Low, Medium, and High values were created using a tertile split of this 10-point scale)

- 1 = not important at all
- 10 = very important

Do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, or none of these?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- None of the above
- Don't know

F Egypt Survey Questions – English

F.1 Experimental Vignettes

Minimum Wage:

Next, you will read a fictional news briefing about a policy implemented by the Egyptian government in 2022.

[President Sisi issues Decree / House of Representatives Passes President Sisi's Law] *regarding minimum wage.*

In 2022, the Egyptian government raised the minimum wage. President Sisi implemented this policy change ***[without the approval of the House of Representatives by issuing a presidential decree / with the approval of the House of Representatives by passing a law]*** *requiring employers to pay workers 2500 Egyptian pounds per month. [/* ***In a public opinion poll, a majority of Egyptians said they support the policy.]***

Cigarette Taxes:

Next, you will read a fictional news briefing about a policy implemented by the Egyptian government in 2022.

[President Sisi issues Decree / House of Representatives Passes President Sisi's Law] *regarding cigarette taxes.*

In 2022, the Egyptian government raised cigarette taxes. President Sisi implemented this policy change ***[without the approval of the House of Representatives by issuing a presidential decree / with the approval of the House of Representatives by passing a law]*** *requiring consumers to pay an additional 5 percent tax on cigarette purchases. [/* ***In a public opinion poll, a majority of Egyptians said they support the policy.]***

Deploying Soldiers to Libya:

Next, you will read a fictional news briefing about a policy implemented by the Egyptian government in 2022.

[President Sisi issues Decree / House of Representatives Passes President Sisi's Law] *regarding intervention in Libya.*

In 2022, the Egyptian government deployed soldiers as part of a peacekeeping operation in Libya. President Sisi implemented this policy change ***[without the approval of the House of Representatives by issuing a presidential decree / with the approval of the House of Representatives by passing a law]*** *authorizing the military deployment. [/* ***In a public opinion poll, a majority of Egyptians said they support the policy.]***

Purchasing Russian Tanks:

> *Next, you will read a fictional news briefing about a policy implemented by the Egyptian government in 2022.*
>
> ***[President Sisi issues Decree / House of Representatives Passes President Sisi's Law]*** *regarding purchase of Russian tanks.*
>
> *In 2022, the Egyptian government purchased new tanks from Russia to replace American tanks. President Sisi implemented this policy change* ***[without the approval of the House of Representatives by issuing a presidential decree / with the approval of the House of Representatives by passing a law]*** *authorizing the purchase of the tanks.* ***[/ In a public opinion poll, a majority of Egyptians said they support the policy.]***

F.2 Outcome and Mechanism Questions

Do you approve or disapprove of President Sisi's handling of this issue? (Strongly Approve to Strongly Disapprove)

Given that President Sisi implemented the policy [with / without] the approval of the House of Representatives, do you AGREE or DISAGREE with the following statements? (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree)

The policy will be effective at addressing issues related to [policy].

Even though the policy was successfully implemented, it will only be reversed in the future.

The way the policy was implemented followed appropriate democratic procedures.

F.3 Manipulation Check

According to the news story you just read, how was the policy implemented?

- With a law passed through the House of Representatives
- With a presidential decree
- With the prime minister
- The story did not say
- I don't know

F.4 Moderator Questions

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- No formal education
- Primary school
- Middle school
- Secondary school
- Technical degree
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree or higher

On a scale from 1 to 10, how important is it for you to live in a democracy? (Note: Low, Medium, and High values were created using a tertile split of this 10-point scale)

- 1 = not important at all
- 10 = very important

Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Sisi is handling his job as president?

- Strongly approve
- Approve
- Somewhat approve
- Neither approve nor disapprove
- Somewhat disapprove
- Disapprove
- Strongly disapprove

To what extent do you trust the following institutions: the army; security forces?

- I trust it to a great extent.
- I trust it.
- I do not trust it.

- I do not trust it at all.

To what extent do you trust that the Egyptian government is capable of responding effectively to the coronavirus pandemic?

- To a great extent.
- Somewhat.
- A little.
- Not at all.

To what extent do you trust that the Egyptian government will provide honest and accurate information about the coronavirus pandemic?

- To a great extent.
- Somewhat.
- A little.
- Not at all.

G Egypt Survey Questions – Arabic

G.1 Experimental Vignettes

Minimum Wage (Executive Order):

بعد ذلك، سوف تقرأ الأخبارالافتراضية التالية حول السياسة التي تتبناها الحكومة المصرية بحلول 2022.
أصدر الرئيس السيسي أمراً تنفيذياً حول الحد الأدنى للأجور.
فى عام 2022 ، قامت الحكومة المصرية بزيادة الحد الأدنى للأجور. أحدث الرئيس السيسي هذا التغيير في السياسات العمالية دون موافقة مجلس النواب، وذلك بإصداره قراراً رئاسياً بالزام أصحاب الأعمال بدفع أجر شهري للعمال مقداره 2500 جنيه مصري. وفقاً لاستطلاع الرأي العام ، فقد أبدى غالبية الشعب المصري تأييدهم لتلك السياسة العامة.

Minimum Wage (Legislation):

بعد ذلك، سوف تقرأ الأخبارالافتراضية التالية حول السياسة التي تتبناها الحكومة المصرية بحلول 2022.
صادق مجلس النواب على المرسوم بقانون الذى أصدره الرئيس السيسي بشأن الحد الأدنى للأجور.
فى عام 2022 ، قامت الحكومة المصرية بزيادة الحد الأدنى للأجور. أحدث الرئيس السيسي هذا التغيير في السياسات العمالية بموافقة مجلس النواب، وذلك بالتصديق على قانون يلزم أصحاب الأعمال بدفع أجر شهري للعمال مقداره 2500 جنيه مصري. وفقاً لاستطلاع الرأي العام ، فقد أبدى غالبية الشعب المصري تأييدهم لتلك السياسة العامة.

Cigarette Taxes (Executive Order):

بعد ذلك، سوف تقرأ الأخبارالافتراضية التالية حول السياسة التي تتبناها الحكومة المصرية بحلول 2022.
أصدر الرئيس السيسي أمراً تنفيذياً حول الضرائب على السجائر.
فى عام 2022 ، قامت الحكومة المصرية بزيادة الضرائب على السجائر. أحدث الرئيس السيسي هذا التغيير في سياسات التسعير دون موافقة مجلس النواب، وذلك بإصداره قراراً رئاسياً بالزام مشترى السجائر بدفع ضريبة إضافية مقدارها 5 بلمائة على مشتريات السجائر. وفقاً لاستطلاع الرأي العام ، فقد أبدى غالبية الشعب المصري تأييدهم لتلك السياسة العامة.

Cigarette Taxes (Legislation):

بعد ذلك، سوف تقرأ الأخبارالافتراضية التالية حول السياسة التي تتبناها الحكومة المصرية بحلول 2022.
صادق مجلس النواب على المرسوم بقانون الذى أصدره الرئيس السيسي بشأن الضرائب على السجائر.
فى عام 2022 ، قامت الحكومة المصرية بزيادة الضرائب على السجائر. أحدث الرئيس السيسي هذا التغيير في سياسات التسعير بموافقة مجلس النواب، وذلك بالتصديق على قانون يلزم مشترى السجائر بدفع ضريبة إضافية مقدارها 5 بالمائة على مشتريات السجائر. وفقاً لاستطلاع الرأي العام ، فقد أبدى غالبية الشعب المصري تأييدهم لتلك السياسة العامة.

Deploying Soldiers to Libya (Executive Order):

بعد ذلك، سوف تقرأ الأخبارالافتراضية التالية حول السياسة التي تتبناها الحكومة المصرية بحلول 2022.
أصدر الرئيس السيسي أمراً تنفيذياً حول التدخل في الشأن الليبي.
في عام 2022، قامت الحكومة المصرية بنشر الجنود المصريين في ليبيا كجزء من عملية حفظ السلام في ليبيا.
أحدث الرئيس السيسي هذا التغيير في السياسة العامة للدولة دون موافقة مجلس النواب، وذلك بإصداره قرارً رئاسياً بالموافقة على الانتشار العسكري. وفقاً لاستطلاع الرأي العام ، فقد أبدى غالبية الشعب المصري تأييدهم لتلك السياسة العامة.

Deploying Soldiers to Libya (Legislation):

بعد ذلك، سوف تقرأ الأخبارالافتراضية التالية حول السياسة التي تتبناها الحكومة المصرية بحلول 2022.
صادق مجلس النواب على المرسوم بقانون الذى أصدره الرئيس السيسي بشأن التدخل فى ليبيا.
في عام 2022، قامت الحكومة المصرية بنشر الجنود المصريين في ليبيا كجزء من عملية حفظ السلام في ليبيا.
أحدث الرئيس السيسي هذا التغيير في السياسة العامة للدولة بموافقة مجلس النواب، وذلك بالتصديق على قانون بالموافقة على الانتشار العسكري. وفقاً لاستطلاع الرأي العام ، فقد أبدى غالبية الشعب المصري تأييدهم لتلك السياسة العامة.

Purchasing Russian Tanks (Executive Order):

بعد ذلك، سوف تقرأ الأخبارالافتراضية التالية حول السياسة التي تتبناها الحكومة المصرية بحلول 2022.
أصدر الرئيس السيسي أمراً تنفيذياً حول شراء الدبابات الروسية.
في عام 2022، قامت الحكومة المصرية بشراء دبابات من روسيا لإحلال الدبابات الأمريكية. أحدث الرئيس السيسي هذا التغيير في السياسة العامة للدولة دون موافقة مجلس النواب، وذلك بإصداره قرارً رئاسياً بالموافقة على شراء الدبابات. وفقاً لاستطلاع الرأي العام ، فقد أبدى غالبية الشعب المصري تأييدهم لتلك السياسة العامة.

Purchasing Russian Tanks (Legislation):

بعد ذلك، سوف تقرأ الأخبارالافتراضية التالية حول السياسة التي تتبناها الحكومة المصرية بحلول 2022.
صادق مجلس النواب على المرسوم بقانون الذى أصدره الرئيس السيسي بشأن شراء الدبابات الروسية.
في عام 2022، قامت الحكومة المصرية بشراء دبابات من روسيا لإحلال الدبابات الأمريكية. أحدث الرئيس السيسي هذا التغيير في السياسة العامة للدولة بموافقة مجلس النواب، وذلك بالتصديق على قانون بالموافقة على شراء الدبابات. وفقاً لاستطلاع الرأي العام ، فقد أبدى غالبية الشعب المصري تأييدهم لتلك السياسة العامة.

G.2 Outcome and Mechanism Questions

هل توافق أو لا توافق على اسلوب تعامل الرئيس السيسي مع هذه المسألة؟

بالنظر الى قيام الرئيس السيسي بتنفيذ السياسات ب دون موافقة مجلس النواب، هل توافق أو لا توافق على البيانات التالية؟

السياسة المتبعة سوف تكون فعالة في معالجة القضايا والمسائل المتعلقة فيما يلي: الأجور.

على الرغم تم تنفيذ هذه السياسة بنجاح، إلا أنه سوف يتم نقضها في المستقبل.

الطريقة التي تم بها تنفيذ السياسة متبوعة بإجراءات ديمقراطية.

G.3 Manipulation Check

وفقاً للتقارير الإخبارية التي قرأتها مؤخراً، ما هي الكيفية التي تم بها تنفيذ السياسة ؟ بموجب قانون أصدره مجلس النواب. بموجب قرار رئاسي. عن طريق رئيس مجلس الوزراء. لم يرد في التقرير الإخباري شيء عن ذلك. لا أعرف لا أتذكر

G.4 Moderator Questions

ما هو أعلى مستوى تعليمي قمت بإكماله؟
وفقاً لمقياس يتراوح من رقم □1□ إلى رقم □10□ ، ما مدى أهمية العيش في بلد ديمقراطي؟ 1 □ غير هام على الإطلاق. 10 □ بالغ الأهمية.

هل توافق أو لا توافق على الكيفية التي يدير بها الرئيس السيسي مهامه كرئيس للجمهورية؟

الى أي درجة تثق في هذه المؤسسات؟ الجيش, الامن العام

إلى أي مدى تثق بأن الحكومة المصرية يمكن أن تستجيب بشكل فعال إلى جائحة فيروس الكورونا؟

إلى أي مدى تثق بأن الحكومة المصرية ستقدم معلومات دقيقة وصادقة حول جائحة فيروس كورونا؟

H Pre-Analysis Plan for Egypt Survey

This pre-registration was filed with EGAP in March 2020.

H.1 Overview

Research in American Politics shows that presidents who enact policies via executive orders rather than via the legislature incur a penalty in terms of public approval (e.g., Reeves and Rogowski 2016; Christenson and Kriner 2017; Reeves and Rogowski 2018). We seek to build upon this literature in two significant ways. First, we investigate whether this logic extends to the authoritarian context (i.e., in Egypt), and by doing so, we also contribute to literatures in comparative politics on legislative institutions. Second, we examine theoretical mechanisms to explain this "executive order deficit": do citizens prefer legislative policies for reasons relating to policy success or democratic legitimacy? We will answer these questions by fielding an online survey experiment in Egypt.

H.2 Hypotheses

- H1 (Main Effect—"executive order deficit"): Citizens will prefer policies that are passed via the legislature over policies passed via executive decree.
- Moderated Effects
  - H2: The "executive order deficit" will be larger when it comes to foreign policymaking as opposed to domestic policymaking.
  - H3: The more citizens hold a generally disposition in favor of democratic over autocratic rule, the greater the "executive order deficit."
  - H4: The more citizens trust the legislature over the head of state, the greater the "executive order deficit."
- Causal Mechanisms
  - H5 (credible commitment): People believe policies passed by the legislature (as opposed to unilateral policies by the executive) are less likely to be reversed in the future.
  - H6 (policy effectiveness): People believe policies passed by the legislature (as opposed to unilateral policies by the executive) are more effective.
  - H7 (procedural legitimacy): People believe policies passed by the legislature (as opposed to unilateral policies by the executive) follow appropriate democratic procedures.
  - H8 (democratic representation): People believe policies passed by the legislature (as opposed to unilateral policies by the executive) are more representative of the will of the people.
- Exploratory analysis: In addition to these hypotheses, we will conduct exploratory analysis primarily by analyzing the hypotheses conditional on demographic subgroups.

H.3 Research Design

We will test our hypotheses by collecting and analyzing data from a survey experiment. The survey will be fielded online to 1,000 Egyptian adults, targeted to be completed in March 2020. We will program the survey in Qualtrics in the Arabic language, then Qualtrics will distribute the survey link to their online panel. The sample will draw from Qualtrics's survey panel, with quota sampling to match census targets for Age, Gender, and Education. Respondents will be compensated by Qualtrics.

The survey will include pre-treatment moderator questions, a vignette (which includes the experimental manipulations), post treatment questions, and additional demographic questions. Questions are summarized here and written out in full in the Appendix.

In the survey vignette, respondents will first read a pre-amble and then about the passage of two hypothetical policies by the president of Egypt, President Sisi. One of the policies will be a domestic policy, while the other will be a foreign policy. The order in which each policy is presented will be determined by random assignment.

Within each scenario, three pieces of information will be determined by random assignment. First is the substantive issue of the policy. The domestic policy will be either about the minimum wage or cigarette taxes. The foreign policy will be either about acquiring weapons another country or peacekeeping in Libya. Second is the method of policymaking: the policy will be either passed by executive decree or through the legislature. Third, and lastly, is information about the level of popular support for the policy. Respondents will either read that a majority of Egyptians support the policy, or they will read nothing at all (i.e., an informationless control group).

Each of the three randomizations are independent from one another. The first (substantive issue) and third (information about popular support) will be determined using simple random assignment. The second (executive order versus legislation) will be assigned using block randomization, based on respondent gender and education.

Sample Survey Vignette: Domestic Scenario:

- Next, you will read a fictional news briefing about a policy implemented by the Egyptian government in 2022.
- "[President Sisi issues Executive Order/House of Representatives Passes President Sisi's Law] regarding [Minimum Wage/Cigarette Taxes]"
- In 2022, the Egyptian government raised [the minimum wage / taxes on cigarettes]. President Sisi implemented this policy change [without the approval of the House of Representatives by issuing a presidential decree / with the approval of the House of Representatives by passing a law] requiring [employers to pay workers 2500 Egyptian pounds per month / consumers to pay an additional 5 percent tax on cigarette

purchases]. [/ In a public opinion poll, a majority of Egyptians said they support the policy.] *NOTE: square brackets indicate randomized content. Actual text will be Arabic. See Appendix.*

After reading each of the scenarios (i.e., once after the domestic policy and once after the foreign policy), respondents will express their approval of President Sisi's handling of the situation. They can select from a 7-point approval-disapproval likert scale. Next, respondents will answer three additional post-treatment questions in which they can agree or disagree about whether the policy would be effective, stable (i.e., not reversed in the future), and followed appropriate democratic procedures.

In addition to the main vignette, we will ask a variety of moderator and demographic questions, which are all detailed in the questionnaire.

H.4 Analysis

The main effect will be tested with a difference in means t-test. The moderated effects (H2 – H4) will be tested first comparing conditional average treatment effects, then analyzing in regression framework the interaction of the treatment variable (executive order versus legislative policy) and the moderator variable.

For the first three mechanisms (H5 – H7) we will test the treatment effect on the mechanism using a simple difference in means test, and we will also conduct mediation analysis using the procedures outlined by Imai et al. (2011).

For the final mechanism, we will test its effect by randomizing the inclusion of a value for the mechanism variable as an independent experiment within the survey vignette. I.e., by random assignment, only some respondents will read whether a majority of citizens support the policy. The statistical test is to see if inclusion of information about the mechanism shrinks the average treatment effect. If so, then we can infer the relevance of that mechanism.

H.5 References

- Christenson, Dino P., and Douglas L. Kriner. 2017. "Mobilizing the Public Against the President: Congress and the Political Cost of Unilateral Action." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (4): 769-85.
- Reeves, Andrew, and Jon C. Rogowski. 2016. "Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion, and the Presidency." *Journal of Politics* 78 (1): 137-151.
- Reeves, Andrew, and Jon C. Rogowski. 2018. "The Public Cost of Unilateral Action." *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (2): 424-440.

I Pre-Analysis Plan for US Follow-Up Study 2

This plan was registered with OSF in July 2023.

I.1 Study Information

Hypotheses:

- We expect the executive will receive less support for implementing policies through unilateral action as opposed to implementing policies through the legislative process.
- We expect these negative effects to be driven by perceptions that unilateral action is less consistent with democratic procedure, less likely to result in policies that are representative of the public's preferences, less effective, and less durable.
- We specify unilateral action in two ways: first by describing it as an executive order, and second by describing it as an executive order implemented without the approval of congress.
- If both treatments have a negative effect relative to the legislative treatment, it would be consistent with our expectations about unilateral action.
- However, we expect the unilateral action treatments to have negative effects because people associate legislatures with important procedures and outcomes in the policy process. Therefore, results in which the effects are stronger for the unilateral action treatment that mentions the lack of agreement with congress (including where there is no effect of the treatment that mentions only the executive order) would also be consistent with our theoretical expectations.

I.2 Design Plan

Study type: Experiment

Blinding: For studies that involve human subjects, they will not know the treatment group to which they have been assigned.

Study design:

- We will run a survey experiment about hypothetical policies implemented by US presidential administrations.
- Each respondent will see two versions of the survey experiment. The first will address domestic policy. The second will address foreign policy. We will randomize whether the domestic policy vignette focuses on tax increases or marijuana decriminalization, and we will randomize whether the foreign policy vignette focuses on deploying soldiers to the US-Mexico border or to Somalia.

- Within the vignettes, the primary randomization is whether the policy is implemented: (1) through a law passed by Congress; (2) through an executive order without the approval of Congress; (3) through an executive order.
- We also randomize whether the policy is said to be supported by a majority of Americans or not.
- Following the vignettes, respondents answer four outcome questions: how much they approve of the president's handling of the issue; how much they think the policy process reflects democratic procedure; how durable they think the policy will be; and how effective they think the policy will be.

Randomization: Individuals will be assigned to the treatment groups with equal probability.

I.3 Sampling Plan

Existing data: Registration following analysis of the data.

Explanation of existing data: We piloted the study with a small sample prior to full implementation. The experiment is also a replication and extension of a study that has been run previously in the United States and Egypt.

Sample size: Approximately 2,000 respondents.

I.4 Variables

Manipulated variables:

- The following is the text of the treatments for the marijuana decriminalization vignette: "In 2024, the US government decriminalized marijuana. President Jones implemented this policy change [by issuing an executive order / without the approval of Congress by issuing an executive order / with the approval of Congress by passing a law] requiring the Department of Justice to stop prosecuting individuals arrested with marijuana in their possession. [/ When polled, a majority of Americans said they support the policy.]"
- The structure is the same for the other three policy issues that constitute the vignettes.

Measured variables:

- Primary Outcome: Do you approve of disapprove of President Davis'/Jones' handling of the issue? (7 point Likert scale from strongly approve to strongly disapprove).

- Agreement with the following three mechanism statements (7 point Likert scales ranging from strongly approve to strongly disapprove):
  - Effectiveness Mechanism: The policy will be effective at addressing issues related to [the issue].
  - Durability Mechanism: Even though the policy was successfully implemented, it will only be reversed by the next administration.
  - Democratic Procedure Mechanism: The way the policy was implemented followed appropriate democratic procedures.

I.5 Analysis Plan

Statistical models: We will use OLS regression to analyze the treatment effects (aggregated across both domestic and foreign policy issues, and for these issues separately). We will use ordered probit models as a robustness check.

J Results for US Follow-Up Study 1

This section reports the results of a follow-up survey experiment conducted in the United States. The Survey was administered online by Lucid May 30 through June 1, 2021. The survey experiment replicates the survey used in the original study with two extensions. First, this follow-up study includes a pure control group in which respondents were not presented information about the method of policymaking, whereas the original study only had two treatment groups (i.e., the policy was passed by executive order or by legislation). Second, this follow-up study also randomized whether the executive in office was Donald Trump or Joe Biden. The scenario still takes places in 2024, but instead of using hypothetical executives as was used in the original study, it names real politicians. The results are very similar to those from the main study.

A.5: Main Effects Relative to Pure Control Reflect Results in Main Paper



Note: Treatment effects relative to a control group that does not mention executive orders or legislative approval. The executive order has a negative and significant effect on approval, while the legislative treatment is positive but insignificant relative to the control.

A.6: Negative Executive Order Effects Persist with Real US Presidents



Note: Treatment effects weaken but continue to be negative and significant when US presidents in the vignettes were named as Biden or Trump.

K Results for US Follow-Up Study 2

Here we report results from our second follow-up experiment conducted in the United States in July 2023. The survey was administered online with a sample from Lucid. We replicated the original design with the executive order and legislative treatments. It also adds a third treatment group in which the policy is said to have been passed through an executive order, and Congress is not mentioned at all. The goal was to assess whether the negative effects would persist when only attributing the policy to the executive's unilateral action, or if the effects were dependent on stating clearly that the executive had bypassed Congress.

A.7: Negative Executive Order Effects Persist in US Follow-Up 2



Note: Treatment effects weaken but continue to be negative and significant when the treatment does not mention Congress.

The results are reported in Figure 7. The effects replicate for the original executive order treatment, with a negative effect on approval and on the three mechanisms. The results also replicate for the new executive order treatment that does not mention Congress: the effect on overall approval is negative and significant, as are the effects on the mechanism outcomes, and the largest effect is for the democratic procedure mechanism. The effect sizes are smaller without the mention of Congress; however, this pattern is consistent with our theory and the pre-analysis plan for the follow-up (see above), since we expect unilateral action to trigger a negative response *because* the executive is excluding the legislature.

L Observational Analysis

L.1 List of Countries for Observational Analysis

A.24: Countries in Barometer Surveys

Afro Barometer	Wave	Observations	Arab Barometer	Wave	Observations	Asian Barometer	Wave	Observations
Algeria	5,6	2,404	Algeria	2	958	Cambodia	1,2,3	3,400
Benin	5,6	2,400	Bahrain	1	366	China	1,2,3	12,639
Botswana	5,6	2,400	Iraq	2	1,140	Hong Kong	1,2,3	3,273
Burkina Faso	5,6	2,400	Jordan	1,2	2,106	Indonesia	1,2,3	4,698
Burundi	5,6	2,400	Lebanon	1,2	2,437	Japan	1,2,3	4,028
Cameroon	5,6	2,382	Morocco	1	1,093	Korea	1,2,3	3,619
Cape Verde	5,6	2,408	Palestine	2	1.012	Malaysia	1,2,3	3,639
Cote d'Ivoire	5,6	2,399	Sudan	2	1,407	Mongolia	1,2,3	3,649
Egypt	5,6	2,388	Yemen	1,2	1,517	Myanmar	3	1,620
Gabon	6	1,198				Philippines	1,2,3	3,600
Ghana	5,6	4,800				Singapore	1,2,3	3,051
Guinea	5,6	2,400				Taiwan	1,2,3	4,836
Kenya	5,6	4,796				Thailand	1,2,3	4,258
Lesotho	5,6	2,397				Vietnam	1,2,3	3,591
Liberia	5,6	2,398						
Madagascar	5,6	2,400						
Malawi	5,6	4,807						
Mali	5,6	2,400						
Mauritius	5,6	2,400						
Morocco	5,6	2,396						
Mozambique	5,6	4,800						
Namibia	5,6	2,400						
Niger	5,6	2,399						
Nigeria	5,6	4,800						
Senegal	5,6	2,400						
Sierra Leone	5,6	2,381						
South Africa	5,6	4,789						
Sudan	5,6	2,399						
Swaziland	5,6	2,400						
Sao Tome	6	1,196						
Tanzania	5,6	4,786						
Togo	5,6	2,400						
Tunisia	5,6	2,400						
Uganda	5,6	4,800						
Zambia	5,6	2,399						
Zimbabawe	5,6	4,800						

L.2 Observataional Results – Variation by Individuals

Our experiments establish a causal link between unilateral action and public disapproval of the executive in the United States and Egypt, and probe the mechanisms explaining that link. Here, we summarize the results of analyses that further explore how the exclusion of the legislature by the executive affects public opinion using survey data from the Afro, Arab, and Asian Barometers. Doing so allows us to evaluate our theory from additional data sources and to corroborate our experimental findings in an observational context.

By analyzing tens of thousands of responses from dozens of countries in different regions and with different regime types, we find that people who perceive the legislature to play a weak role in decision-making are also less likely to approve of the executive, more likely to protest, and less likely to believe their countries are democratic. While these results are correlational, they complement the experimental results regarding the public opinion cost of unilateral action as well as our finding that beliefs about democracy constitute the primary mechanism driving the experimental effects.

In our experimental study, our explanatory variable is unilateral policymaking in the context of a vignette. We find analogous questions in the barometer data that capture our core theoretical interest in executives bypassing the legislature in the policymaking process. The Afro Barometer asks respondents how often the president ignores parliament, which is closest to our conceptualization of unilateralism. The Asian Barometer does not have this same variable but does ask about the effectiveness of the legislature in keeping government leaders in check. While not exactly the same, the ability of the legislature to check the executive is proximate to the ability of the executive to ignore the legislature. For the Arab Barometer, we combine responses to three questions about how much parliament influences economic, social, and foreign policies. Here, like with the Asian barometer's question, our variable from the Arab barometer focuses on the legislature's involvement in policymaking, which is the other side of the coin of the executive bypassing the legislature.

For our outcome variables, the barometers ask respondents about their approval of the executive, their likelihood of participating in protests, and how democratic they believe their country to be. We convert the explanatory and outcome variables to indicators that are coded 1 for individuals who perceive less parliamentary influence, approve of the executive, are willing to protest, and believe the country is democratic. See SI-J for more information on the surveys and questions.

We use OLS regression to analyze whether individuals who perceive the legislature's influence as weak are less approving of the executive, more likely to protest, and less convinced their countries are democracies. We incorporate several control variables into the analysis, including assessments of the economy and public safety, trust in the legislature, a history of voting, internet usage, the belief that democracy is the best form of government, feeling free to criticize the government, gender, university education, and a Christian religious identity. These controls address the most plausible confounders, including cynicism about political elites, access to better political information, and general approval of authoritarianism. The models also include dummy variables as fixed-effects for country, year, and barometer. Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 26 summarizes our results. Respondents who viewed the legislature as less influential were 17.5 percentage points less likely to approve of the executive, 2.5 points

more likely to say they would participate in protests, and 13 points less likely to define their countries as democracies. Tables 27, 28, and 29 also show that these patterns hold within each of the three barometers and in both democratic and non-democratic regimes. In addition, in the following section, we show that the results are consistent when using country-waves rather than individuals as the unit of analysis.

These relationships connecting perceived legislative influence to executive approval, protest, and democracy ratings are highly robust. We cannot rule out omitted variable bias or alternative explanations with this design, but the results are consistent with executives incurring public opinion costs as they use unilateral action more frequently and are perceived to be violating democratic standards of governance. As such, they corroborate and speak to the generalizability of the experimental results.

A.25: Perception That Legislature Has Low Influence Correlates with Lower Approval of Executive, More Protest, and Lower Ratings of Country's Democracy

	Outcomes		
	Approval of Executive	Willing to Protest	Rating of Democracy
Low Legislative Influence	-0.175***	0.025***	-0.129***
	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Barometer FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	119,318	131,408	125,494
Clusters	55	56	56
R-Squared	0.29	0.07	0.19

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by country.

A.26: Perceived Legislative Influence with Logistic Regression

	Approval of Executive	Willing to Protest	Rating of Democracy
Low Legislative Influence	-0.892***	0.302***	-0.618***
	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Barometer FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	119,318	131,408	125,494
Clusters	55	56	56

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Logistic Regressions - Standard errors clustered by country.

A.27: Perceived Legislative Influence and Approval of Executive

	All Countries	Afro Barometer	Arab Barometer	Asian Barometer	Autocratic Countries	Democratic Countries
Low Legislative Influence	-0.175***	-0.193***	-0.116***	-0.165***	-0.177***	-0.175***
	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Barometer Dummies	✓				✓	✓
Observations	119,318	69,781	11,313	38,224	82,570	36,748
Clusters	55	36	9	13	42	16
R-Squared	0.29	0.28	0.20	0.29	0.31	0.28

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by country.

A.28: Perceived Legislative Influence and Protest Participation

	All Countries	Afro Barometer	Arab Barometer	Asian Barometer	Autocratic Countries	Democratic Countries
Low Legislative Influence	0.025***	0.038***	0.017	0.011*	0.028***	0.018***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Barometer Dummies	✓				✓	✓
Observations	131,408	73,545	12,036	45,827	92,702	38,706
Clusters	56	36	9	14	43	17
R-Squared	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.02	0.08	0.03

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by country.

A.29: Perceived Legislative Influence and Rating of Democracy

	All Countries	Afro Barometer	Arab Barometer	Asian Barometer	Autocratic Countries	Democratic Countries
Low Legislative Influence	-0.129***	-0.146***	-0.074**	-0.125***	-0.131***	-0.120***
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.007)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Barometer Dummies	✓				✓	✓
Observations	125,494	69,531	10,609	45,354	87,912	37,582
Clusters	56	36	9	14	43	17
R-Squared	0.19	0.19	0.14	0.14	0.21	0.12

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regressions - Standard errors clustered by country.

L.3 Observational Results – Variation by Survey

Here, we record the percentage of respondents in each barometer survey who perceive the legislature as weak, approve of the executive, were willing to protest, and rated their country as democratic. As shown in Figure 8, executives had much lower average levels of approval in countries where more respondents perceived legislative influence as weak, and more citizens said they would protest in these countries as well. We would expect both patterns if public opinion generally disapproves of executives sidelining the legislature. These countries were also described as democratic by far fewer citizens on average, which is consistent with the relevance of the democracy mechanism driving negative responses to unilateral action.

The respective correlation coefficients between perceptions of weak legislative influence and the other variables were: -0.68 (approval), 0.30 (protest), and -0.51 (rating of democracy). All three relationships are significant at $p<0.001$ when analyzed using OLS regression.

A.8: When More People Perceive Legislative Influence As Weak, Fewer Approve of the Executive, Refrain from Protest, and Believe the Country Is Democratic



Note: Each point represents a survey wave in a specific country from waves 5 and 6 of the Afro Barometer, waves 1 and 2 of the Arab Barometer, and waves 2, 3, and 4 of the Asian barometer. Plot shows correlations between percent in each country survey believing the legislature has little influence relative to the executive and approval of the executive (left), protest non-participation (center), and rating of the country's democracy (right).