Online Data Appendix for "Casting a Shadow Over War Zones? The International Criminal Court's Impact on African Government and Rebel Forces' Use of Civilian Killings"

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Part I. Government Data Set Details

List of Governments in the Sample

The following 26 African countries are included in the sample of government forces. Each country has experienced at least one episode of civil war at some point while the ICC was active. The list builds off the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset, version 19.1 (2019). The unit of observation is the government-year between 2002 (when the ICC became active) and 2017 (the upper limit of available statistical data).

Algeria
Angola
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo
DR Congo (Zaire)
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Somalia
South Sudan
Sudan
Tunisia
Uganda

Variable Description

Civilian Killing Count by Government Forces. Best estimated count of civilians killed by a government in a specific year. *Source*: UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset version 19.1-2019, 2002-2017 as described in Eck and Hultman (2007).

ICC Conflict Actions. Three-year moving average counts of ICC actions (preliminary examinations, investigations, public arrest warrants/summons, apprehensions (i.e. arrests, surrenders, or voluntary appearances), and convictions (i.e. a guilty judgment)) *in a particular conflict/situation* announced by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) prior to a particular year. For example, in 2005, the UNSC referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC. In 2006, the ICC did not complete any of the aforementioned actions in the Darfur situation. In 2007, however, the OTP announced one warrant against Ahmad Harun. Consequently, the value for ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS for the year of 2008 is a moving average of the previous three year's counts: (1 + 0 + 1)/3 = 0.667 (ICC, 2018b).

ICC Conflict Actions Dummy. ICC Conflict Actions Dummy is "0" when ICC Conflict Actions is less than 0.33 and "1" when it is greater or equal to 0.33. 0.33 is the point in the three-year moving average of ICC Conflict Actions at which the ICC has usually launched a situation, thereby signaling its will and capacity to not only investigate, but also to prosecute atrocity crimes.

ICC Cumulative Actions. Three-year moving average counts of *all* ICC actions (preliminary examinations, investigations, public arrest warrants/summons, apprehensions (i.e. arrests, surrenders, or voluntary appearances), and convictions (i.e. a guilty judgment)) announced by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) prior to a particular year, updated and expanded from (H. Jo & B. Simmons, 2016). For example, in 2002, the OTP opened one preliminary examination into Venezuela. In 2004, the OTP opened two additional preliminary examinations into Iraq and Colombia, as Ill as opened investigations into Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. Consequently, the value for CUMULATIVE ICC ACTIONS for the year of 2005 is a moving average of the previous three year's counts: (1 + 0 + 5)/3 = 2 (ICC, 2018a, 2018b; H. Jo & B. Simmons, 2016).

ICC Cumulative Actions Dummy. ICC Cumulative Actions Dummy is "0" when ICC Cumulative Actions is less than 3.33 and "1" when it is greater or equal to 3.33. 3.33 is the point in the three-year moving average at which the ICC has taken action globally to open a situation in a previous year, thereby demonstrating a will and capacity to not only investigate, but also to prosecute atrocity crimes.

ICC Ratification. Whether ("1") or not ("0") a government has ratified the Rome Statute (ICC, 2019b).

Domestic Crime Statute. An ordinal measure updated from Jo & Simmons 2016 of whether a country reformed its crime statute in conformance with the Rome Statute. "0" indicates no domestic legislation related to ICC crimes; "1" indicates minor criminal statute reform; and "2" indicates substantial criminal statute reform, meaning there are signs that the

government/others took the new laws seriously (for instance, the government creates new institutions, such as the High Court of Uganda in 2010; lawyers pursue domestic legal cases based on changes) (ICC, 2019a; H. Jo & B. Simmons, 2016).

Domestic Crime Statute Dummy. I code this variable "0" when DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE is less than 2 (which amounts to minor reform in line with ICC ratification) and "1" when it is greater or equal to 2.

Pre-1998 Culpable Leaders. A dummy variable updated from Krcmaric 2020. If a government presided over mass atrocities—defined as state-sponsored killing of at least one thousand civilians (Krcmaric draws on Ulfelder and Valentino 2008's definition of a mass killing)—*prior* to 1998, that government is coded "1" for each year that the government remains in power, and "0" otherwise (Krcmaric, 2020; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008).

Pre-1998 Non-Culpable Leaders. A dummy variable updated from Krcmaric 2020. If a government did *not* preside over mass atrocities—defined as state-sponsored killing of at least one thousand civilians (Krcmaric draws on Ulfelder and Valentino 2008's definition of a mass killing)—*prior* to 1998, that government is coded "1" for each year that the government remains in power, and "0" otherwise (Krcmaric, 2020; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008).

Average Annual Battle Deaths (Ln). The average number of battle deaths suffered by a government and the various rebel forces it confronts, logged (the average is a constant, thus requiring a log) (Pettersson et al., 2019).

Per Capita GDP (Ln). Gross Domestic Product (US dollars), lagged and logged (World Bank, 2019).

Government Level of Democracy. A country's polity score. -10 = most autocratic, while +10 = highly democratic (Marshall & Jaggers, 2017).

Rule of law. An ordinal measure that captures "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society." The measure ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak rule of law) to 2.5 (strong rule of law) (Kaufman & Kraay, 2018).

Justice Preference. A categorical measure of a country's likelihood to adopt justice-focused policies, such as the use of international and/or domestic trials, along with truth commissions. Justice Preference is coded "0" when a country has no previous experience with international or domestic human rights trials, or truth commissions; "1" when a country has prior experience with one of these; "2" when a country has prior experience with two; and "3" when it has prior experience with all three. I adopt these coding criteria from H. Jo and B. A. Simmons (2016). I recode and expand their variable using these sources (Human Rights Watch Staff, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017; L. Payne & Sikkink; L. A. Payne et al.).

Peace Preference. A categorical measure of a country's likelihood to adopt peace-focused policies, such as peacekeepers and the use of amnesties. Peace preference is coded "0" when a country has not had peacekeepers or an amnesty policy in the past; "1" when one of these

policies is in place; and “2” when both are in place. I adopt these coding criteria from H. Jo and B. A. Simmons (2016). I recode and expand their variable (Bell et al., 2019; Jetschke & Schlipphak, 2019; H. Jo & B. A. Simmons, 2016).

Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Civilian killings by government forces	381	48.617	0	2,595
ICC Conflict Actions	381	0.177	0	3.667
ICC Conflict Actions Dummy	381	0.150	0	1
ICC Cumulative Actions Dummy	381	0.738	0	1
ICC Ratification	381	0.465	0	1
Domestic Crime Statute	381	0.491	0	3
Domestic Crime Statute Dummy	381	0.134	0	1
Pre-1998 Culpable Leaders	381	0.323	0	1
Avg. Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	381	2.217	0	8.472
Per Capita GDP, Logged	364	23.253	20.408	27.066
Government Level of Democracy	380	0.647	-7	9
Rule of Law	381	-0.994	-2.61	0.13
Justice Preference	381	1.312	0	3
Peace Preference	381	1.084	0	2

Additional Results

Sample Selection Bias: Differences in Differences Tests

Overview of Difference-in-Difference Method

Evaluating sample selection effects is tremendously difficult, especially in negative binomial models involving continuous variables. In my study, I am fortunately able to take advantage of variation in the timing of African governments' involvement in civil wars: some governments in my sample started fighting civil wars before the ICC came into being in 2002, while others began fighting afterwards. Such variation can help me to evaluate sample selection bias because leaders could not have foreseen future ICC actions, ratification, or associated criminal statute reforms if they started fighting civil wars (and potentially harming civilians in those civil wars) before the court came online. In other words, any deterrent or escalatory effect of possible future ICC actions, ratification, and related criminal statute reforms could not have been selected out at the outset. If there is a statistical difference for ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS, ICC CUMULATIVE ACTIONS, ICC RATIFICATION, and DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE between countries in pre- versus post-2002 cases of civil war, then selection effects may bias the results.

The following Tables A through D test the differences between subsamples by respectively interacting ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS DUMMY, ICC CUMULATIVE ACTIONS DUMMY, ICC RATIFICATION, and DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE DUMMY with a dummy variable coded 1 for governments whose civil conflicts began before the Rome Statute entered into force.[1] The coefficient for each interaction term in Table A through D (i.e. ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS DUMMY*GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR; ICC CUMULATIVE ACTIONS DUMMY * GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR; ICC RATIFICATION * GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR; AND DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE DUMMY* GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR) is the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator (I also put a red box around each DID estimator). As you can see from the results in Tables A through D below, none of these estimators are significant at the 5 percent level.

[1] Recall that ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS, ICC CUMULATIVE ACTIONS, and DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE are continuous variables, which I cannot run in an interaction. I thus create dummy variables for each. I explain how I construct each of these dummies in the Variable Description section of the online appendix, as well as in the Tables A-D.

Table A. Impact of ICC Conflict Actions by Conflict Start Date	
ICC Conflict Actions Dummy	-1.399* (0.829)
Govt. Engaged in Pre-ICC Civil War	0.107 (0.530)
ICC Conflict Actions Dummy * Govt. Engaged in Pre-ICC Civil War	1.082 (0.882)
Avg. Annual Battle Deaths (Ln)	0.426*** (0.062)
Per Capita GDP (Ln)	0.333** (0.144)
Government Level of Democracy	-0.061 (0.045)
Rule of Law	-1.288** (0.497)
Justice Preference	0.390 (0.284)
Peace Preference	0.236 (0.322)
Constant	-13.784*** (3.636)
Observations	364
Number of Countries	26
Wald Chi2	121.91
Prob > Chi2	0.00

Notes:

- The dependent variable is a count of civilians intentionally killed by government forces.
- Recall that ICC Conflict Actions is a continuous variable, which I cannot run in an interaction. I thus create ICC Conflict Actions Dummy: I code this variable "0" when it is less than 0.33 and "1" when it is greater or equal to 0.33 (0.33 is the point in the three-year moving average at which the ICC has usually launched a situation, thereby signaling its will and capacity to not only investigate, but also to prosecute atrocity crimes).
- Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
- Results are based on a negative binomial panel analysis with random effects.
- Year fixed effects are included, but not reported.
- * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.
- The coefficient for ICC Conflict Actions Dummy * Govt. Engaged in Pre-ICC Civil War (highlighted in red) is the difference in differences (DID) estimator. While the treatment (ICC Conflict Actions Dummy) on both subsamples (governments that experienced civil conflict before and after the ICC was established) has a negative effect, it is not significant.

Table B. Impact of ICC Cumulative Actions by Conflict Start Date	
ICC Cumulative Actions Dummy	-1.020 (0.779)
Govt. Engaged in Pre-ICC Civil War	0.009 (0.668)
ICC Cumulative Actions Dummy * Govt. Engaged in Pre-ICC Civil War	0.338 (0.633)
Avg. Annual Battle Deaths (Ln)	0.437*** (0.064)
Per Capita GDP (Ln)	0.301** (0.142)
Government Level of Democracy	-0.066 (0.045)
Rule of Law	-1.271*** (0.481)
Justice Preference	0.372 (0.283)
Peace Preference	0.140 (0.311)
Constant	-12.905*** (3.558)
Observations	364
Number of Countries	26
Wald Chi2	114.35
Prob > Chi2	0.00

Notes:

- The dependent variable is a count of civilians intentionally killed by government forces.
- Recall that ICC Cumulative Actions is a continuous variable, which I cannot run in an interaction. I thus create ICC Cumulative Actions Dummy: I code this variable "0" when it is less than 3.33 and "1" when it is greater or equal to 3.33 (3.33 is the point in the three-year moving average at which the ICC has taken action globally to open a situation in a previous year, thereby demonstrating a will and capacity to not only investigate, but also to prosecute atrocity crimes).
- Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
- Results are based on a negative binomial panel analysis with random effects.
- Year fixed effects are included, but not reported.
- * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.
- The coefficient for ICC Cumulative Actions Dummy * Govt. Engaged in Pre-ICC Civil War (highlighted in red) is the DID estimator. The treatment (ICC Cumulative Actions Dummy) is not significant for subsamples (governments that experienced civil conflict before and after the ICC was established).

Table C. Impact of ICC Ratification by Conflict Start Date	
ICC RATIFICATION	0.986 (0.861)
GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR	0.796 (0.576)
ICC RATIFICATION * GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR	-1.725* (1.013)
AVG. ANNUAL BATTLE DEATHS (LN)	0.407*** (0.063)
PER CAPITA GDP (LN)	0.138 (0.177)
GOVERNMENT LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY	-0.056 (0.061)
RULE OF LAW	-1.542*** (0.526)
JUSTICE PREFERENCE	0.239 (0.308)
PEACE PREFERENCE	0.207 (0.322)
Constant	-9.853** (4.112)
Observations	364
Number of Countries	26
Wald Chi2	122.31
Prob > Chi2	0.00

Notes:

- The dependent variable is a count of civilians intentionally killed by government forces.
- Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
- Results are based on a negative binomial panel analysis with random effects.
- Year fixed effects are included, but not reported.
- * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.
- The coefficient for ICC RATIFICATION * GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR (highlighted in red) is the DID estimator. The treatment (ICC RATIFICATION) is not significant at 5% for the subsamples (governments that experienced civil conflict before and after the ICC was established).

Table D. Impact of Domestic Crime Statute Reform by Conflict Start Date	
DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE DUMMY	-1.258 (0.855)
GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR	-0.091 (0.530)
DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE DUMMY * GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR	1.225 (1.075)
AVG. ANNUAL BATTLE DEATHS (LN)	0.453*** (0.065)
PER CAPITA GDP (LN)	0.186 (0.166)
GOVERNMENT LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY	-0.076* (0.046)
RULE OF LAW	-1.650** (0.559)
JUSTICE PREFERENCE	0.263 (0.297)
PEACE PREFERENCE	0.008 (0.324)
Constant	-10.533*** (4.024)
Observations	364
Number of Countries	26
Wald Chi2	120.64
Prob > Chi2	0.00

Notes:

- The dependent variable is a count of civilians intentionally killed by government forces.
- Recall that DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE is a continuous variable. I thus create DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE DUMMY: I code this variable "0" when it is less than 2 (which amounts to minor reform in line with ICC ratification) and "1" when it is greater or equal to 2.
- Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
- Results are based on a negative binomial panel analysis with random effects.
- Year fixed effects are included, but not reported.
- * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.
- The coefficient for DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE DUMMY * GOVT. ENGAGED IN PRE-ICC CIVIL WAR (highlighted in red) is the DID estimator. The treatment (DOMESTIC CRIME STATUTE DUMMY) is not significant for subsamples (governments that experienced civil conflict before and after the ICC was established).

Part II. Rebel Data Set Details

List of Rebels in the Sample

The following 83 rebel groups appear in the sample.[2] Each rebel group was active in a country that experienced at least one episode of civil war at some point since the ICC has been active. The list builds off of the Non-State Actor Data Set and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset, version 19.1 (2019).[3] The unit of observation is the rebel group-year of active conflict between 2002 (when the ICC became active) and 2017 (the upper limit of available statistical data).

ADF
Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa
al-Murabitun
Al-Shabaab
AN
Ansar Dine
anti-Balaka
APCLS
AQIM
ARS/UIC
ASL
ATNMC
BDK
Boko Haram (or Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad in UCDP)
CMA
CNDD-FDD
CNDP
CNPSC (Yakutumba)
CPJP
Darfur Joint Resistance Forces
EIJM - AS
Faction of Francois Bozize (or in UCDP Forces of Francois Bozize)
FDLR
FDSI-CI
FLEC-R
FLEC–FAC
FLM
Forces of Muammar Gaddafi
Forces of Paul Joseph Mukungubila
Forces of the House of Representatives
FPB
FRCI
FUCD
GIA
Hizbul-Islam
IS - Sinai Province
ISGS (The Islamic State in the Greater Sahel)
JEM
Kamuina Nsapu
Kata Katanga
LRA
LURD
M23
MDJT
MFDC
Military faction (forces of Godefroid Niyombare)
Military faction (Red Berets)
MJP
MNJ
MODEL
MPCI
MPIGO
MUJAO
NDPVF
NRF
NTC
Ntsiloulous
OLF
ONLF
Palipehutu-FNL
PFRN
RAFD
RED-TABARA
Renamo
Republic of South Sudan
SARC
Seleka
Signed-in-Blood Battalion
SLM/A
SLM/A – MM
SLM/A–Unity
SPLM
SPLM/A In Opposition
SPLM/A-North
SRF
SRRC

[2] Please note that there are three rebel groups that do not ultimately appear in the statistical analysis. Missing data for GDP or a country's level of democracy explain why the following groups are absent: ARS/UIC (Somalia), Hizbul-Islam (Somalia), and SRRC (Somalia). Statistically, the exclusion of these groups should not bias the final results: the standard rule of thumb is that if the number of missing cases is less than 5 percent of the sample (the exclusion of these cases results in a 3 percent loss), then it is acceptable to drop these cases (Allison, 2002).

[3] Please note that the NSA Data Set builds off an earlier version of the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset. Sources include Cunningham et al. (2013c); Harbom et al. (2008); Pettersson et al. (2019).

SSDM/A	UFDD	Zintan Military Council
SSDM/A - Cobra Faction	UFR	
SSLM/A	UNITA	

Variable Description

Civilian Killing Count by Rebel Forces. Best estimated count of civilians killed by a rebel group in a specific year. *Source*: UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset version 19.1-2019, 2002-2017 as described in (Eck & Hultman, 2007).

ICC Conflict Actions. I code this variable the same way as the ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS variable in the government data set.

ICC Conflict Actions Dummy. Recall that ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS is a continuous variable, which I cannot run in an interaction. I thus code ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS DUMMY "0" when ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS is less than 0.67 and "1" when ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS is greater or equal to 0.67. 0.67 is the point in the three-year moving average (used for ICC CONFLICT ACTIONS) at which the ICC has taken action in a conflict beyond opening a preliminary examination and/or situation in a previous year, thereby demonstrating the will and capacity to not only investigate, but also to prosecute atrocity crimes.

ICC Cumulative Actions. I code this variable the same way as the ICC CUMULATIVE ACTIONS variable in the government data set.

ICC Ratification. I code this variable the same way as the ICC RATIFICATION variable in the government data set.

Weak Rebel Group. Whether (1) or not (0) a rebel group is "much weaker" or "weaker" than government forces according to the Non-State Actor (NSA) Data Set's rebel strength (*rebstrength*) variable. For years covering 2012-2017, I update the rebel strength variable by using Cunningham et al's coding procedures and more recent versions of the materials they cite in the case description book. In cases where NSA sources Ire insufficient, I rely on reports from Global Security—a database that provides detailed overviews of militaries' and non-state armed groups' capabilities. To ensure that coding was reliable, I re-coded a random sample of cases from the 2002-2012 period using sources listed in the NSA case book. I then compared my codes to those in the NSA data, achieving a high-degree of inter-rater reliability (Cunningham et al., 2013a, 2013b; Global Security, 2018a).

Total Annual Battle Deaths (Ln). The total number of battle deaths suffered by a rebel group and opposing government forces in a given year, logged (the data is over-dispersed, thus necessitating a natural log). *Source*: UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, (Pettersson et al., 2019).

Per Capita GDP (Ln). Gross Domestic Product (US dollars), logged. *Source*: (World Bank, 2019).

Government Level of Democracy. A country's polity score. -10 = most autocratic, while +10 = highly democratic. *Source*: (Marshall & Jaggers, 2017), version 2017.

Rule of law. An ordinal measure that captures "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society." The measure ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak rule of law) to 2.5 (strong rule of law). *Source*: (Kaufman & Kraay, 2018).

Secessionist Aim. A binary indicator of whether (1) or not (0) a rebel group is a secessionist group or is seeking autonomy. The measure is based on the classification of conflict type in the Non-State Actor Dataset, updated past 2011 using the same coding rules as the NSA Data Set and by using information from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Stanford University's Mapping Militants Project, and the Global Security Database. To ensure that coding was reliable, I re-coded a random sample of cases from the 2002-2012 period using sources listed in the NSA case book. I then compared my codes to those in the NSA data, achieving a high-degree of inter-rater reliability (Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2019; Cunningham et al., 2013c; Global Security, 2018b; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2019).

Rebel Discipline. To measure whether rebel groups are disciplined, I primarily rely on the NSA Data Set. This source provides information on whether or not a rebel group has a clear central command (*centcontrol* variable), as well as the extent to which a central command exercises control over the constituent groups of an insurgent movement (*strengthcent* variable*)*. In a given year, if a rebel group lacks a central command (*centcontrol* = "0"), or has a central command that only exercises low control over fighters (*strengthcent* = "low"), then they are not disciplined (e.g. REBEL DISCIPLINE is coded 0). A rebel group is considered disciplined if, in a given year, it has a central command (*centcontrol* = "1") that exercises either moderate to high control (*strengthcent* = "moderate" or "high") over fighters (e.g. REBEL DISCIPLINE is coded 1). I update this variable following NSA coding procedures and data. Where NSA data is insufficient, I use reports Stanford University's Mapping Militants Project and the Global Security Database. To ensure that coding was reliable, I re-coded a random sample of cases from the 2002-2012 period using sources listed in the NSA case book. I then compared my codes to those in the NSA data, achieving a high-degree of inter-rater reliability (Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2019; Cunningham et al., 2013c; Global Security, 2018b).

Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Civilian killings by Rebel forces	252	166.060	0	6,063
ICC Conflict Actions	252	0.278	0	2.333
ICC Conflict Actions Dummy	252	0.139	0	1
ICC Cumulative Actions	252	4.706	0	9
ICC Cumulative Actions Dummy	252	0.698	0	1
Weak Rebel Group	252	0.901	0	1
Avg. Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	252	4.612	0	8.472
Peace Agreement	252	0.167	0	1
Per Capita GDP, Logged	250	23.683	20.407	27.066
Government Level of Democracy	251	-0.076	-7	8
Secessionist Aim	252	0.190	0	1
Rebel Discipline	252	0.623	0	1

Part III. Additional Data Details

Average Annual Battle Deaths (Ln): Proxy for Military Campaigns

AVERAGE ANNUAL BATTLE DEATHS (LN) provides a useful proxy variable for military campaigns. The conflict involving the Lord's Resistance Army provides a useful example. Specifically, the most successful military campaign against the group involved that of the African Union's Regional Task Force (RTF), which was authorized by the AU and then the United Nations Security Council in 2011. As the first graph below shows, there is a slight uptick in the log of average annual battle deaths in 2011, and then the most enduring decline in the log of these deaths in subsequent years due to the success of the RTF's military campaign against the LRA (upticks in the log of these deaths in 2002, 2004, and 2009 also all coincide with the launch of other largely unsuccessful military campaigns against the LRA).[4] As the second graph below shows, we also see the most enduring decline in civilian killings by the LRA as a result of the RTF's successful military campaign against the LRA.





[4] Specifically, 2002 marked the start of Operation Iron Fist I; 2004 marked the start of Operation Iron Fist II; and 2009 witnessed both Operation Rudia and Operation Lightning Thunder.

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