SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR "DEGREES OF RIVALRY"

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1. Experimental Details and Principles Declaration

All research presented herein received clearance from the Institutional Review Board at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (Protocol Title *Local and State Foreign Relations*, ID 5508, May 3, 2024). No deception was used in any research.

Respondents were recruited by Bovitz Forthright. Respondents were compensated for their time. Collection began on May 17, 2024, and ended on May 30, 2024.

Table A1 provides summaries of the respondents, which was broadly representative of major U.S. demographic groups.

Table A1. Demographics By Experiment

	Experiment		
	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Total
N	1,020 (50.8%)	989 (49.2%)	2,009 (100.0%)
Age category			
18-29	206 (20.2%)	216 (21.9%)	422 (21.1%)
30-49	396 (38.9%)	359 (36.4%)	755 (37.7%)
50-64	256 (25.1%)	220 (22.3%)	476 (23.8%)
65+	161 (15.8%)	190 (19.3%)	351 (17.5%)
Gender			
Female	489 (48.0%)	488 (49.4%)	977 (48.7%)
Male	515 (50.5%)	476 (48.2%)	991 (49.4%)
Alternative	15 (1.5%)	23 (2.3%)	38 (1.9%)
White ID			
Not White ID Only	397 (39.1%)	340 (34.5%)	737 (36.9%)
White ID Only	618 (60.9%)	645 (65.5%)	1,263 (63.1%)
Hispanic ID			
Not Hispanic	852 (83.5%)	842 (85.2%)	1,694 (84.4%)
Hispanic	168 (16.5%)	146 (14.8%)	314 (15.6%)
Education			
No College Degree	652 (63.9%)	641 (64.8%)	1,293 (64.4%)
Has College Degree	368 (36.1%)	348 (35.2%)	716 (35.6%)
Party ID (3-value)			
Democrat	341 (33.4%)	374 (37.8%)	715 (35.6%)
Independent	294 (28.8%)	287 (29.0%)	581 (28.9%)
Republican	385 (37.7%)	328 (33.2%)	713 (35.5%)

2. Pew Survey Full Results

Table A2 presents the demographics for the Pew poll. Note that Pew weighted their responses to provide overall representative samples.

Table A2. Demographics For Pew Survey

	Summary
N	2,596
Age category	
18-29	301 (11.6%)
30-49	849 (32.8%)
50-64	756 (29.2%)
65+	680 (26.3%)
Gender	
Male	1,149 (44.4%)
A woman	1,417 (54.7%)
Non-binary / other definition	24 (0.9%)
Race-Ethnicity	
White non-Hispanic	1,717 (66.1%)
Black non-Hispanic	248 (9.6%)
Hispanic	395 (15.2%)
Other	87 (3.4%)
Asian non-Hispanic	125 (4.8%)
Refused	24 (0.9%)
Education Level	
Less than high school	135 (5.2%)
High school graduate	679 (26.2%)
Some college, no degree	442 (17.1%)
Associate's degree	186 (7.2%)
College grad/some postgrad	629 (24.3%)
Postgraduate	520 (20.1%)
Party	
Republican	755 (29.3%)
Independent	909 (35.3%)
Democrat	912 (35.4%)

Table A3 presents full results for the models presented in the manuscript. Models (1) and (2) correspond to the Base and Priority models in Figure 2A, respectively; models (5) and (6) correspond to the Base and Priority models in Figure 2B, respectively.

Models (3) and (7) include a measure of feeling toward China on a thermometer scale, constructed by averaging the respondents' evaluations of China, Japan, India, and North Korea and subtracting that from their evaluations of China. On average, respondents were 11 points frostier toward China. Models (4) and (8) include responses to a question asking respondents to describe the U.S. relations with China as one of partnership, competition, or enemy. Although critical evaluations toward China were associated with less generous attitudes toward international students in general, their relationship with hostile measures toward Chinese students in particular was much stronger. Specifically, whereas 37 percent of those who described China as a "partner" strongly opposed limiting Chinese international students (53 percent any oppose), only 9 percent of those who described China as an enemy took the same view (24 percent any oppose). In total, 76 percent of those who viewed China as an enemy supported restrictions, compared to 37 percent of those who viewed China as a partner (41 percent strongly support vs 9 percent strongly support).

TABLE A3. Pew Full Results for International Enrollment

	(1) International	(2) International	(3) International	(4) International	(5) PRC	(6) PRC	(7) PRC	(8) PRC
main								
Party ID								
Independent	0.13*	0.09*	0.14*	0.09*	-0.87*	-0.68*	-0.78*	-0.67*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Democrat	0.21*	0.16*	0.23*	0.15*	-1.46*	-1.24*	-1.32*	-1.15*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Age								
30-49	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.04*	0.62*	0.47*	0.62*	0.56*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.13)
50-64	-0.12*	-0.09*	-0.12*	-0.09*	1.44*	1.18*	1.39*	1.31*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.14)
65+	-0.14*	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.10*	1.58*	1.35*	1.39*	1.39*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.14)
Gender								
Male	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.16*	0.10	0.11	0.13+
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Non-binary / other definition	0.01	0.09*	-0.02	-0.00	0.10	0.79	-0.63	0.12
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.39)	(0.72)	(0.44)	(0.39)
Education								
High school graduate	0.04	0.01	0.09	0.05	-0.26	-0.10	-0.55+	-0.28
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.21)
Some college, no degree	0.10*	0.07	0.13*	0.10*	-0.31	-0.26	-0.46	-0.32
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.21)
Associate's degree	0.12*	0.05	0.20*	0.13*	-0.46*	-0.26	-0.79*	-0.50*
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.23)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.24)
College grad/some postgrad	0.14*	0.08	0.19*	0.14*	-0.45*	-0.26	-0.77*	-0.45*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.21)
Postgraduate	0.21*	0.17*	0.25*	0.21*	-0.88*	-0.67*	-1.24*	-0.82*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.21)
Nativity								
Born in USA	-0.08*	-0.05+	-0.10*	-0.07*	0.23+	0.23	0.22	0.19
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.13)
Race/Ethnicity								
Black non-Hispanic	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05+	0.27*	0.45*	0.23	0.39*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Hispanic	-0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.27*	0.17	0.30	0.30*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.13)
Other	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.16	-0.09	-0.22	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.21)
Asian non-Hispanic	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.33	0.41	0.34	0.32
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.20)
Refused	-0.10	-0.06	-0.18	-0.06	-0.13	-0.79	0.35	-0.25
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.54)	(1.09)	(0.67)	(0.55)
Limiting PRC Power Priority								
Top priority		-0.10*				1.01*		
		(0.02)				(0.11)		
China net thermometer			0.00*				-0.03*	
			(0.00)				(0.00)	
Competitor				-0.01				0.43*
				(0.02)				(0.16)
Enemy				-0.17*				1.43*
				(0.02)				(0.17)
Observations	2516	1240	1262	2500	2509	1241	1241	2497

Robust standard errors.

3. Experiment 1

3.1. **Balance Tables.** Table A4 presents balance tests for assignment by the two dimensions of treatments.

Table A4. Experiment 1 Balance by Treatments

	PRC Stance			Level of Government		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	PRC Not Hostile	PRC Hostile	Difference (1)-(2)	State	Federal	Difference (4)-(5)
Age	45.65	45.18	0.46	46.10	44.57	1.53
	(16.35)	(16.50)	(1.09)	(16.42)	(16.44)	(1.03)
Female ID	0.52	0.46	0.06	0.47	0.49	-0.02
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.03)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.03)
White ID	0.61	0.61	0.01	0.61	0.61	-0.00
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.03)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.03)
Hispanic ID	0.16	0.17	-0.01	0.16	0.17	-0.00
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.02)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.02)
Education	0.34	0.37	-0.03	0.35	0.38	-0.03
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.03)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.03)
Democrats	0.33	0.34	-0.00	0.34	0.33	0.01
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.03)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.03)
Independents	0.29	0.29	-0.00	0.29	0.29	0.00
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.03)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.03)
Republicans	0.38	0.38	0.01	0.37	0.38	-0.01
	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.03)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.03)
Observations	340	680	1020	510	510	1020

3.2. **Full Results.** Table A5 presents the full results for Figure 3. Please note that Models 1 and 4 were reported in the main text as Base and Interaction, respectively.

Table A5. Experiment 1, Principal Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	Logit	Ologit	OLS	Logit	Ologit
main						
Government Level						
Federal	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.1
	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.3)
China Reaction						
Hostile	-0.0	-0.0	-0.2	-0.2	-1.0	-0.3
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.6)	(0.6)
Cuegiver						
China expresses	-0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.0	-0.2	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Manipulation Check						
Passed manipulation check	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.2	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Survey Mode						
Mobile	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Relative Trust						
Trusts the Same				0.0	0.0	-0.2
				(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.3)
Trusts Level More				0.0	0.1	-0.2
				(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.3)
Federal × Trusts the Same				-0.1	-0.5	-0.1
				(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.4)
Federal × Trusts Level More				-0.1	-0.2	0.0
				(0.1)	(0.6)	(0.5)
Views of PRC						
A minor threat				-0.2*	-1.1*	-0.2
				(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.5)
A major threat				-0.0	-0.1	0.5
				(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Hostile × A minor threat				0.2+	1.2+	0.2

				(0.1)	(0.7)	(0.6)
Hostile × A major threat				0.2	1.0	0.1
				(0.1)	(0.6)	(0.6)
Trust in Fed Govt						
A little				-0.1*	-0.4*	-0.1
				(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
A lot				0.2*	0.9*	0.8*
				(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Trust Grid Straightlining						
Straightlined				0.0	0.1	0.4*
				(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1004	1004	1004	997	997	997

Robust standard errors in parantheses. Covariates for age, gender, race, ethnicity, educational attainment, and partisanship included but not displayed.

Table A6 presents the (null) results of alternative tests of H2 and H2.1, focusing only on the federal/state coefficient based upon the treatment condition of China's response. There is no substantively meaningful difference between the coefficient estimates.

TABLE A6. Experiment 1 H2 and H2.1 Focus Results (OLS)

	(1) H2 China No Stance	(2) H2 China Hostile	(3) H2.1 No Stance	(4) H2.1 Hostile (Any)
Government Level				
Federal	0.1	-0.0	0.1	-0.0
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)
Manipulation Check				
Passed manipulation check	-0.1	0.1*	-0.1	0.0
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)
Constant	0.4*	0.3*	0.4*	0.3*
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)
Observations	340	344	340	679

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Following Kleinberg and Fordham, we used multinomial logistic regression to see if treatment conditions induced variation in respondents' propensity to select "neither support nor oppose"; it did not.[1] Table A7 reports the results. The treatment variables had no direct effect on moving respondents from "support" to "oppose" or "neither".

TABLE A7. Experiment 1, Multinomial Logit

	(1)		(2)	
	Support Preventing PRC Researchers		Support Preventing PRC Researchers	
	Oppose	Neither	Oppose	Neither
Government Level				
Federal	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
China Reaction				
Hostile	0.2	-0.2	0.9	0.9
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.6)	(0.7)
Cuegiver				
China expresses	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Manipulation Check				
Passed manipulation check	0.0	-0.4^{+}	0.0	-0.4*
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Survey Mode				
Mobile	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Covariates				
Age	-0.0	0.1^{+}	-0.0	0.1^{+}
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Age × Age	0.0	-0.0*	0.0	-0.0^{+}
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Female ID	0.2	0.0	0.2	-0.0
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
White ID	-0.1	-0.4^{+}	-0.1	-0.3
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Hispanic ID	-0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Education	0.2	-0.7*	0.1	-0.8*
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Independent	-0.1	0.5	-0.1	0.5^{+}
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Republican	-1.3*	-1.0*	-1.3*	-0.9*
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Views of PRC				
A minor threat			1.2*	1.2*
			(0.5)	(0.6)
A major threat			-0.1	0.5
			(0.5)	(0.6)
Hostile × A minor threat			-1.0	-1.3^{+}
			(0.7)	(0.8)
Hostile × A major threat			-0.7	-1.2
			(0.6)	(0.7)
Constant	1.2^{+}	-0.4	0.5	-1.2
	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.9)
Observations	1004		997	

Robust standard errors in parantheses

3.3. **Additional Results.** I pre-registered a number of explorations for heterogeneous treatment effects. Figure A1 presents those. I had intended to carry out checks based on whether respondents accurately knew if their state had such a policy, but as only five of Florida's 175 respondents correctly identified that it does this was infeasible.

The results show general consistency across specifications. Floridians appear uniquely susceptible to hostile expression from China, and respondents who passed the manipulation check were more likely to support the ban in the federal than the state condition. I do not interpret either as challenging the interpretation provided in the manuscript, however. In particular, the results of the manipulation check produce little substantive differences.

[1]Kleinberg, Katja B. and Benjamin O. Fordham. Don't Know Much about Foreign Policy: Assessing the Impact of "Don't Know" and "No Opinion" Responses on Inferences about Foreign Policy Attitudes. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2017.



FIGURE A1. Examination for heterogeneous treatment effects. OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals (robust standard errors). Full specifications include manipulation check, mobile/desktop indicator, age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, and party ID

A counterfactual (within-subject) change[2] in which respondents were asked to imagine they had been assigned to the opposite government level (state instead of federal or vice versa) did not produce any consistent changes in support for the bill.

[2]Graham, Matthew H., and Alexander Coppock. "Asking about attitude change." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 85, no. 1 (2021): 28-53.

3.4. **Effect on Relations Results.** Respondents were asked to judge how the bill would affect U.S.-Chinese relations (five point scale, greatly help to greatly harm). Table A8 presents results. There were no differences between federal and state actions on this measure, but a warning from China or experts about harms did slightly increase respondents' belief that the bill would harm the relationship in models that did not control for respondents' beliefs China's threat.

TABLE A8. Experiment 1 Full Results for Effects DV (Higher = Harm Relationship)

	(1) OLS	(2) Logit	(3) Ologit	(4) OLS	(5) Logit	(6) Ologit
main						
Government Level						
Federal	-0.0	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.4	-0.4
	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.4)
China Reaction						
Hostile	0.1^{+}	0.4^{+}	0.3^{+}	-0.0	-0.1	0.1
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.7)
Cuegiver						
China expresses	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Manipulation Check						
Passed manipulation check	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Survey Mode						
Mobile	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Covariates						
Age	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Age × Age	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Female ID	0.1*	0.4*	0.2*	0.1*	0.4*	0.3*
	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
White ID	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.0	-0.1	-0.3
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Hispanic ID	-0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Education	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Independent	-0.1	-0.3	-0.4^{+}	-0.0	-0.3	-0.3
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.3)	(0.2)
Republican	-0.1*	-0.5*	-0.5*	-0.1*	-0.4*	-0.5*
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Relative Trust						
Trusts the Same				0.0	0.3	0.0
				(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.4)
Trusts Level More				0.0	0.2	-0.0
				(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.4)
Federal × Trusts the Same				0.1	0.4	0.4
				(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Federal × Trusts Level More				-0.1	-0.3	0.1
				(0.1)	(0.6)	(0.5)
Views of PRC						
A minor threat				0.2*	1.1*	0.5
				(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.5)
A major threat				0.2	0.8^{+}	0.5
				(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Hostile × A minor threat				0.0	0.2	0.1
				(0.1)	(0.6)	(0.7)
Hostile × A major threat				0.1	0.5	0.2
				(0.1)	(0.6)	(0.7)
Trust in Fed Govt						
A little				0.1*	0.5*	0.2
				(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.1)
A lot				0.0	0.1	-0.2
				(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Trust Grid Straightlining						
Straightlined				-0.1*	-0.8*	-0.6*
				(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Observations	1004	1004	1004	997	997	997

Robust standard errors in parantheses

3.5. **Effect on Intermediate Variables.** I presented respondents with a list of potential mediator measures that sought to tap into particular concerns that respondents might have for the bill.

The specific statements were:

- The bill unfairly discriminates against people
- The bill would harm universities
- The bill would protect the U.S. against a threat
- Science should be open and international
- There should be a rigorous screening process for foreign researchers rather than a complete ban
- U.S. universities should be for Americans first

Figure A2 presents summary measures for agreement with these statements.



FIGURE A2. Summaries of percent agreeing with statements.

Table A9 presents results of OLS regressions testing whether the treatments substantially infuenced these evaluations. There were no substantially significant differences on a battery of subsidiary measures, such as whether the bill unfairly discriminated against people and would harm universities, although there was substantial variation in levels of agreement with those statements.

TABLE A9. Models of Subsidiary DVs with Demographics

	(1) Discriminates	(2) Harms universities	(3) Science open	(4) Protects USA	(5) America First	(6) Screening
Government Level						
Federal	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.05^{+}	0.02	-0.03
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
China Reaction						
Hostile	0.00	-0.00	0.03	-0.05	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Covariates						
Age	-0.00*	-0.00*	0.01*	0.00*	0.00*	-0.00*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Female ID	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.03
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
White ID	-0.03	0.01	-0.09*	0.03	0.03	0.04
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Hispanic ID	0.10*	-0.10*	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	0.03
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Education	0.02	0.05^{+}	0.07*	-0.04	0.01	0.08*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Independent	-0.09	-0.11*	0.02	0.04	0.08^{+}	-0.22*
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
Republican	-0.21*	-0.21*	-0.01	0.20*	0.25*	-0.28*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Survey Mode						
Mobile	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.06^{+}	-0.07*	0.01
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Observations	1009	1009	1009	1009	1009	1009

Robust standard errors in parantheses

4. Experiment 2

4.1. **Balance Tables.** Table A10 presents balance tests for assignment into treatment. Note that there were some modest differences by age for assignment into the federal (state department) treatment.

Table A10. Experiment 2 Balance by Treatments

	PRC Stance			State Department Stance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	No Stance	Undermine	Difference (1)-(2)	No Stance	Undermine	Difference (4)-(5)
Age	46.21	45.33	0.88	44.13	47.45	-3.32**
	(17.22)	(17.30)	(1.10)	(17.05)	(17.32)	(1.09)
Female ID	0.49	0.50	-0.01	0.49	0.50	-0.01
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.03)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.03)
White ID	0.67	0.64	0.02	0.66	0.65	0.01
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.03)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.03)
Hispanic ID	0.15	0.14	0.01	0.15	0.14	0.01
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.02)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.02)
Education	0.33	0.38	-0.05	0.38	0.32	0.06*
	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.03)	(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.03)
Democrats	0.37	0.38	-0.01	0.37	0.38	-0.01
	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.03)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.03)
Independents	0.29	0.29	-0.00	0.32	0.26	0.06*
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.03)	(0.47)	(0.44)	(0.03)
Republicans	0.34	0.33	0.01	0.31	0.36	-0.05
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.03)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.03)
Observations	495	494	989	500	489	989

4.2. **Full Results.** Table A11 presents the core results. Models 1 and 2 are presented in the text as "Base" and "Interaction" respectively. The table also presents results for logit and ologit models.

Table A11. Experiment 2 Core Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	Logit	Logit	Ologit	Ologit
main						
State Department Cue						
Undermine	0.0	0.1*	0.1	0.4^{+}	0.1	0.4*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Trust in Fed Govt						
A little		-0.1		-0.3		-0.1
		(0.0)		(0.2)		(0.2)
A lot		0.1		0.4		0.3
		(0.1)		(0.4)		(0.3)
State Cue x Trust Feds						
Undermine × A little		-0.1		-0.4		-0.4
		(0.1)		(0.3)		(0.3)
Undermine × A lot		-0.2^{+}		-0.9^{+}		-1.0*
		(0.1)		(0.5)		(0.4)
PRC Reaction						
PRC Hostile	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Covariates						
Passed manipulation check	-0.0	-0.0	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3*	-0.3*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Age	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Female ID	-0.1*	-0.1*	-0.3*	-0.3*	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
White ID	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Hispanic ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Education	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)

Independent	-0.1*	-0.1*	-0.6+	-0.7*	0.3	0.2
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Republican	0.3*	0.2*	1.3*	1.1*	1.3*	1.2*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Mobile	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	975	968	975	968	975	968

Robust standard errors in parantheses

4.3. **Additional Results.** Table A12 presents a multinomial logistic regression check that takes neither answers as one of three possible values, with support and oppose as the other two.

TABLE A12. Experiment 2, Multinomial Logit

	(1) Q75		(2) Q75	
	Oppose	Neither	Oppose	Neither
State Department Cue				
Undermine	-0.17	-0.11	-0.45+	-0.46
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)
PRC Cue				
PRC Hostile	0.09	-0.03	0.10	-0.04
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Manipulation Check				
Passed manipulation check	0.50*	-0.30	0.51*	-0.33+
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Covariates				
Age	-0.02*	-0.01*	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Female ID	0.27+	0.41*	0.26	0.35+
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
White ID	-0.16	-0.19	-0.15	-0.20
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Hispanic ID	0.06	-0.15	0.02	-0.16
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Education	-0.01	-0.56*	-0.01	-0.57*
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Independent	0.32	1.06*	0.41	1.12*
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Republican	-1.50*	-0.80*	-1.38*	-0.65*
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Mobile	-0.09	-0.05	-0.10	-0.06
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
A little			0.31	0.31
			(0.2)	(0.3)
A lot			-0.30	-0.65
			(0.4)	(0.5)
State Cue x Trust Feds				
Undermine × A little			0.29	0.52
			(0.3)	(0.4)
Undermine × A lot			1.00+	0.54
			(0.5)	(0.7)
Constant	1.66*	0.97*	1.53*	0.92*
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)
Observations	975		968	

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Figure A3 presents checks for heterogeneous effects. There are minimal interesting variations for most moderators. Notably, respondents who believed China was a threat were more likely to support the policy if the federal government said that the policy would undermine Washington's foreign policy. That is, respondents who believed that China was not a threat were 23 points (34.7 to 11.2) less likely to approve after a federal warning, but respondents who believed that China posed a minor threat became about 9 points (29 to 19.8) more likely to support the policy after a federal warning; respondents who believed China was a major threat were no more likely to support it based on the federal warning.



FIGURE A3. Examination for heterogeneous treatment effects.

4.4. **Effect on Relations Results.** Table A13 presents results for evaluations of whether the measures would affect relations between the USA and PRC. Note that respondents typically agreed that PRC hostility indicated worse relations between the USA and the PRC (an effect size of 5 to 6 points in the OLS specifications).

TABLE A13. Experiment 2 Evaluation Results

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit	(5) Ologit	(6) Ologit
main						
PRC Hostile	0.1*	0.1*	0.3*	0.3*	0.2+	0.2+
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
State Department Cue						
Undermine	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.2
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Covariates						
Passed manipulation check	0.1*	0.1*	0.7*	0.7*	0.5*	0.5*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Age	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Female ID	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
White ID	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Hispanic ID	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Education	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Independent	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0	0.1	0.1
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Republican	-0.1*	-0.1*	-0.6*	-0.5*	-0.6*	-0.6*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Mobile	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
A little		0.1		0.4+		0.1
		(0.0)		(0.2)		(0.2)
A lot		0.1		0.3		-0.0
		(0.1)		(0.4)		(0.3)
State Cue x Trust Feds						
Undermine × A little		-0.1		-0.4		-0.1
		(0.1)		(0.3)		(0.3)
Undermine × A lot		-0.1		-0.5		0.2
		(0.1)		(0.5)		(0.5)
-						
View of China Threat						
Major threat						
PRC Hostile × Major threat						
Observations	976	969	976	969	976	969

Robust standard errors in parantheses

4.5. **Effect on Intermediate Variables.** Figure A4 presents the intermediate variables summary, while Table A14 presents the results of OLS regressions.



FIGURE A4. Summaries of percent agreeing with statements.

TABLE A14. Models of Subsidiary DVs with Demographics

	(1) Discriminates	(2) Harms universities	(3) Science open	(4) Protects USA	(5) America First	(6) Screening
State Department Cue						
Undermine	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.1*	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
PRC Cue						
PRC Hostile	-0.0	0.0	0.1+	-0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Manipulation Check						
Passed manipulation check	0.1*	0.0	0.2*	-0.0	0.0	0.1*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Covariates						
Age	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	0.0*	0.0+	0.0*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Female ID	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.1*	-0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
White ID	0.0	-0.0	0.1*	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Hispanic ID	0.0	-0.1+	-0.1*	0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Education	0.1*	0.1*	0.1*	0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Independent	0.0	-0.1*	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Republican	-0.3*	-0.2*	-0.2*	0.3*	0.3*	-0.1
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Mobile	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Constant	0.7*	0.7*	0.6*	0.1	0.1	0.2*
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	976	976	976	976	976	976

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.051$

5. Questionnaire

5.1. **Attention Check.** We are checking to make sure that your browser is working properly. Please select the number 9 from the answers below. • 9 • 4 • 7 • 3 • 2

5.2. **Quota Demographics.**

(1) In what year were you born? _____
(2) What is your gender? • Male • Female • Non-binary / third gender • I prefer not to say
Not listed here; please state: _____
(3) How would you describe your racial identity? Please choose one or more categories. ☐ American Indian or Alaska Native ☐ Asian ☐ Black or African-American ☐ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander ☐ White
(4) Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? • Yes • No
(5) Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what? • Republican • Democrat • Independent • Other
(6) *[If Democrat]* Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? • Strong • Not very strong
(7) *[If Republican]* Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? • Strong • Not very strong
(8) *[If Independent or Other]* Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party? • Republican • Democratic • Neither

5.3. **Experiment 1.** Now, imagine there is a proposed bill being debated in [Congress / your state's legislature]. The bill would **ban public universities in [the United States / your state]** from hiring any researchers from the People's Republic of China.

Supporters of the bill say that it is a reaction to the foreign policies of the government of China. Some supporters have charged that Chinese researchers use U.S. universities to copy advanced technologies they then take back to China. "We need to take a stand against the Chinese Communist Party, and stop foreign influence in our education system," said one supporter.

Opponents of the bill point out that many of the best researchers in the world come from China, and that many stay and work in the United States after they study at U.S. universities, benefiting U.S. companies and the public. "Any country that cuts itself off, wholly or in part, from international scientific exchange is shooting itself in the foot," warned one university leader.

- The Chinese government has not taken a public stance on the bill.
- The Chinese government has publicly stated that, if passed, the bill would be a blow to cooperation between the two countries.
- The Chinese government has not taken a public stance on the bill, but independent experts have publicly stated that, if passed, the bill would be a blow to cooperation between the two countries.

(1) Would you support or oppose this bill that would prevent public universities in [the United States / your state] from hiring any researchers from the People's Republic of China?
   (a) Strongly support
   (b) Somewhat support
   (c) Neither support nor oppose
   (d) Somewhat oppose
   (e) Strongly oppose
(2) Which of the following statements do you agree with? Choose all that apply.
   ☐ The bill unfairly discriminates against people
   ☐ The bill would harm universities
   ☐ The bill would protect the U.S. against a threat
   ☐ Science should be open and international
   ☐ There should be a rigorous screening process for foreign researchers rather than a complete ban
   ☐ U.S. universities should be for Americans first
   ☐ None of these
(3) If the bill passed, how do you think would it affect relations between the United States and China? • It would greatly harm them • It would harm them somewhat • It would have no effect • It would help them somewhat • It would greatly help them
(4) Now, imagine that everything about the scenario you just read was the same, except that the bill to ban hiring researchers from China was being considered by [your state's legislature/ Congress] and would affect [your state / the United States].
   If that were the case, would you support or oppose this bill? • Strongly support • Somewhat support • Neither support nor oppose • Somewhat oppose • Strongly oppose

(5) In the scenario you just read, what did the Chinese government say publicly about the bill? • It opposed it • It did not say anything, but experts said it would oppose it • It did not say anything • I don't recall
(6) To the best of your knowledge, does your state already have a similar law in place? • Yes, it does • No, it does not • I don't know

5.4. **Experiment 2.** Now, imagine there is a proposed bill being debated in your state's legislature. The bill would **ban public universities in your state** from hiring any researchers from the People's Republic of China.

[Same supporter/opponent text as Experiment 1]

The Chinese government has

- not taken a public stance on the bill.
- publicly stated that, if passed, the bill would be a blow to cooperation between the two countries.

Leading officials at the U.S. State Department, which handles the country's foreign relations,

- declined to comment on the bill and stated that it it is a question for state legislators to decide.
- have stated that, if passed, the bill could undermine Washington's ability to coordinate foreign policy.

[Same questions as Experiment 1]

5.5. **Trust in Government.** How much trust and confidence do you have in the following levels of government? [Response options: A lot, A little, None at all]

- The federal government in Washington
- Your state government
- Your local city or county government
- Your local school board
- The United Nations

5.6. **Threats.** Do you think each of the following is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to the United States?

- Global climate change
- The spread of false information online
- Cyberattacks from other countries
- China's power and influence
- Russia's power and influence
- Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming to the United States

5.7. **Country Thermometer.** Rate your feelings toward the government of each country on a scale from 0 (very unfavorable) to 100 (very favorable): • China • Japan • France • Israel • Morocco • Mexico • Nigeria • Canada

5.8. **Additional Demographics.**

(1) What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? (If you are currently enrolled in school, please indicate the highest degree you have received.)
   (a) Less than a high school diploma
   (b) High school degree or equivalent (e.g. GED)
   (c) Some college, no degree
   (d) Associate's degree (e.g. AA or AS)
   (e) Bachelor's degree (e.g. BA or BS)
   (f) Master's degree (e.g. MA, MS, M.Ed.)
   (g) Professional degree (e.g. JD, MD, DDS)
   (h) Doctorate (e.g. PhD, EdD)
(2) Are you a veteran or currently serving member of the U.S. military? • Yes • No
(3) *[If veteran/military]* Which branch did/do you serve in? Select the answer that best fits. • Army • Navy • Air Force • Marine Corps • Coast Guard • Space Force • Army or Air National Guard
(4) What is your employment status?
   (a) Full-time employed
   (b) Part-time employed
   (c) Full-time self-employed
   (d) Contract/temporary
   (e) Unemployed
   (f) Retired
   (g) Full-time student
   (h) Unable to work
   (i) Other: _____
   (j) I prefer not to say

(5) Do you currently live in a rural area, small town, suburb, or a city? • Rural area • Small town • Suburb • City Other: _____
(6) What is the level of your annual household income?
   (a) Less than $25,000
   (b) $25,000-$50,000
   (c) $50,000-$100,000
   (d) $100,000-$200,000
   (e) More than $200,000
   (f) I prefer not to say

6. Pre-registration

The experiment was pre-registered with OSF at https://osf.io/3pdjc/?view_only=5679fab44ca5436f8711a27704ee15d9.

Many earlier writers have described state and local governments' efforts in international relations and foreign affairs (Bilder 1989,Conlan 2004,Conlan 2001,McMillan 2012,Spiro 2002) as part of a broader research agenda into subnational governments' efforts abroad (Cantir 2024). However, the bulk of this literature has been descriptive (Cantir 2024), comparatively apolitical (Howard 2004), focused on officials' perceptions of their own actions(McMillan 2012), or very broad (Wang 2022). In particular, we do not know much about how the public views these actions, with much of the literature inferring public approval from actors' choices. Nor do we know much about the factors that influence popular perceptions of representation. With states beginning to take action that influence great power relations, such as restricting Chinese researchers in higher education, this is a propitious time to investigate these factors in a new light.[3]

These experiments investigate how the public evaluates policy actions by state governments—specifically, regarding the role of foreign researchers in higher education. Study 1 investigates whether respondents evaluate *state* or *federal* action differently. A key question in evaluating state paradiplomacy concerns whether actions by state and federal officials are evaluated differently. This study varies whether the federal government or state government is acting. Study 2 evaluates a similar question but from a different direction, varying whether the U.S. State Department objects to the state action or not. Both studies also include a treatment regarding Chinese hostility toward the bill.

6.1. Study 1 Hypotheses.

Study 1 will principally test whether respondents evaluate similar policies differently based on whether they are implemented by federal or state policy.

Federal Exclusivity: Respondents will be likelier to support a policy touching on foreign relations when it comes from the federal, rather than the state, level.

It could, however, be the case that respondents prefer states to be "laboratories of foreign policy":

State Leeway: Respondents will not evaluate a policy differently if it comes from the federal or state level.

It may also be the case that respondents conditionally evaluate federal or state action depending on foreign response. In particular, respondents may punish state legislatures for endangering relations more than the federal government:

Rogue State: Respondents will be likelier to disapprove of a state policy than a federal one if a foreign government expresses disapproval.

Rogue State v2: Respondents will be likelier to disapprove of a state policy than a federal one if informed the policy is likely to harm overall relations.

There are two variants of this hypothesis because one cue comes from the Chinese government and the other invokes expert appraisal.

It also seems likely that expectations of general harm to relations will mediate these effects:

Harm as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about a policy's potential to harm overall relations between the U.S. and China.

Threat as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about a policy's potential to protect against a threat.

International Science Support as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about how it could affect the international character of science.

University Harm as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about harm to universities.

Xenophobia as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about universities' role for being for Americans first.

Discrimination as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about discrimination being unfair.

6.2. Study 2 Hypotheses.

Study 2 will principally test whether respondents evaluate state foreign policy differently if the federal government opposes it. The key hypothesis is

Federal Supremacy: Respondents will be likelier to disapprove of a state policy if the federal government signals disapproval of state policymaking in this area.

Deceptively simple, this hypothesis does test a key question. If approval is conditional on federal *approval* of states' rights to act, then this implies that states' actions are not viewed as co-ordinately sovereign but as tacitly condoned if they are allowed to go forward.

It may also be the case that respondents conditionally evaluate federal or state action depending on foreign response. In particular, respondents may punish state legislatures for endangering relations:

[3]See, for instance, Rivero, Daniel. "After Florida passes laws to limit Chinese influence in higher ed, this university is cutting its ties with China." *The World* February 28 2024 https://theworld.org/stories/2024-02-29/after-florida-passes-laws-limit-chinese-influence-higher-ed-university-cutting.

Rogue State: Respondents will be likelier to disapprove of a state policy proposal if a foreign government expresses disapproval of the proposal.

It also seems likely that expectations of general harm to relations will mediate these effects:

Harm as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about a policy's potential to harm overall relations between the U.S. and China.

Threat as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about a policy's potential to protect against a threat.

International Science Support as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about how it could affect the international character of science.

University Harm as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about harm to universities.

Xenophobia as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about universities' role for being for Americans first.

Discrimination as Mediator: The effect of treatments will be mediated by respondent expectations about discrimination being unfair.

6.3. **Procedure.** I will work with Bovitz/Forsight to recruit approximately 1,700 respondents from the United States, with party, gender, and age quotas. Respondents will complete a Qualtrics survey and will be divided at random into Study 1 or Study 2.

6.4. **Analysis.** I will use standard regression analysis models to study respondents' evaluations of the dependent variables, including ordinal logistic regression, logistic regression, and OLS, with OLS preferentially reported as easiest to interpret). I will use conventional significance thresholds. I will also employ the counterfactual within-subjects variation format described by Graham and Coppock (2021) to [cut off in original — explore variations].

I will explore responses by demographic, educational, partisan, and knowledge factors, as well as group animus (measured by threat, perceptions of the Chinese government, and perceptions of Chinese people). I will also explore these results by attitudes toward group and country's government and by foreign policy attitudes. I will ask whether respondents know of whether their state has passed such a measure and investigate for heterogenous effects by that level. I will also explore whether respondents who trust state (federal) governments more (less) answer differently.

Further, there are open-ended questions in both studies. I will explore these reactions to see if theory can be improved by finding additional observations or hypotheses.

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7. DeSantis Use of Paradiplomacy

Florida Governor Ron DeSantis used the three bills described in the introduction to burnish his anti-China credentials. Here are five examples of that.

7.1. **Second Republican Presidential Debate.** *September 28, 2023*, Source: Rev.com

Moderator Stuart Varney asked

> Governor DeSantis, we have a question for you. Governor DeSantis, China invested $12 billion in Latin America just last year. They signed strategic partnerships with seven countries including Mexico, and China's military ties to the region now include arm sales and training exercises. Are you comfortable with China deepening ties with our southern neighbors?

DeSantis responded

> Of course not. And the reason why we're in this mess, is because elites in DC for far too long have chosen surrender over strength when it comes to the CCP. Some people in our country got rich, our industrial base got hollowed out and they have been able to build the second most powerful military in the entire world. We need a totally new approach to China. We are going to have real hard power in the Indo-Pacific, like Reagan, to deter their ambitions. We're going to have economic independence from China where we're decoupling our economy, and we are going to go after the cultural power they have in this country. As governor of Florida, I banned the CCP from buying land in our state. We should do that all across these United States. We shouldn't have them in our universities. We shouldn't have Confucius Institutes. So you see a country in decline, our power's in decline. China's going to surpass us this decade, and if they do that, that's going to affect every single American household. As your president, I am not going to let that happen. I'm going to reverse this country's decline. We are going to choose strength, not surrender when it comes to the CCP

7.2. **Third Republican Presidential Primary Debate.** *November 9, 2023* Source: Rev.com

Moderator Hugh Hewitt asked

> Governor DeSantis, my question is specifically about the Navy. It's at 291. It's going to go down perhaps as low as 280. Is it enough? And what would you build if you were going to build more?

De Santis responded

> Not enough. We have to have the ability to back up a strategy of denial of President Xi's ambitions. And if China's able to be the world's leading superpower that will affect you and your family in ways that are going to be very bad. They will export authoritarianism all around the world as the cost of doing business. They will impose things like social credit scores and internet monitoring. So this is to this generation what the Soviet Union was to the post-World War II generation. I've already released a plan. We're going to get to 355 ships at the end of the first term, 385 ships at the end of the second term, but we're going to have a path to 600 ships over the next 20 years.
>
> I think the future of freedom is going to be determined in the Indo-Pacific. We have a strategy, not just military, but decoupling from the economy and fighting them here at home with our cultural. Ambassador Haley said somehow I wasn't doing. She welcomed them into South Carolina, gave them land near a military base, wrote the Chinese ambassador a love letter saying what a great friend they were. That was like their number one way to do economic development. In Florida, I banned China from buying land in this state and we kicked out on our universities and we kicked the Confucius institutes out of our universities. We've recognized the threat and we've acted swiftly and decisively.

7.3. **Debating Gavin Newsom.** *November 30, 2023* Source: Rev.com

Host Sean Hannity asked:

> I talk about this often, intellectual property theft, unfair trade practices, that China has been hostile to our fighter jets in international airspace, hostile to our Navy in international waterways. We know all about the China spy balloon that happened, eight days right across the United States over military installations. The Communist Chinese, they have nationals buying up thousands of acres of branch land, farmland, and land near military installations. Their hostility towards Taiwan. They are, Governor DeSantis, our number one geopolitical foe. I don't see that the Biden administration has been tough with them. What would you do differently?

And DeSantis responded

> Well, first in Florida, we banned China from buying land in our state, because you're right. You don't want them buying farmland or land near military bases. So we acted. We also got the Confucius Institutes out of our universities. China should not be involved in our universities at all.
>
> What you need to do is you need to have hard power in the Indo-Pacific to deter China's ambitions. You need to take the economy, and we need to decouple from China. We're dependent on them for so

many things. And then finally, we need to get serious about their influence in this country. They shouldn't be able to buy farmland anywhere. I can tell you this, I would not go to China and grovel in front of Xi like Gavin Newsom did. He says China is a partner on climate change. China is adding two new coal plants every year. China is laughing at us with what they're doing. So yes, they're the number one threat we face, and we need to take it seriously. And Joe Biden is not doing that.

7.4. **Fifth Republican Presidential Primary Debate.** *January 20, 2024* Source: Rev.com

The way you deal with China is threefold. One, we need more hard power in the Indo-Pacific. I'm a Navy guy. We need more sea power. We're going to build that up and we're going to have a strategy to deny their ability to invade Taiwan or to get beyond the first island chain. On the current course, they're going to take advantage of Biden and we're going to rue the day when that happens.

Second, we got to decouple our economy, particularly things that are nationally significant to our national survival and you got to be methodical, strategic about it. There's a lot of moving parts there, but we're going to do that. Nikki Haley's not going to be able to do that because a lot of her supporters make a lot of money in China, and so she's going to talk tough, but she'll cave on that.

And then also with here in the United States, she's saying they shouldn't be buying land and be in the universities, when she was governor of South Carolina, the state gave China land and they were in the universities. As governor in Florida, I banned China from buying land and we kicked them out of our universities. That's what you want to do.

7.5. **Campaigning in Iowa.** *January 2024.* Source: Rev.com

We also beat the left by banning China from buying land in the state of Florida. No farmland, no land near military bases, none of that. We need to do that nationwide, so that's what we have to do. And oh, by the way, we came in as governor in a state that had usually been decided by one point, perfectly divided almost. 300,000 more Democrats than Republicans actually in the state of Florida. We led, we led strongly and boldly and unapologetically, and what was the political result of that? We didn't win by one point or 40,000 votes. We won by 20 points and a 1.5 million-vote margin. People respond to leadership. When they see that you're willing to fight for them, and when they see that you're going to deliver results for them, they will come out in droves to support you. And that's the direction that we have to go.