Online Appendix for

Joint Bodies in the EU's International Agreements:

Delegating Powers to the European Commission in EU External Relations

Markus Gastinger and Andreas Dür (University of Salzburg, Austria)

Table of Contents

Empirical findings of previous studies 2
Indicators of Commission discretion 4
Table A1. Frequency table for indicators in dependent variable 8
Table A2. Correlation matrix of indicators 8
Figure A1. Distribution of the dependent variable (*discretion*; additive index) 8
Table A3. Examples of Commission discretion 9
Table A4. Matching of agreements with CMP policy categories 11
Additional reflections on the impact of the HRVP on JBs 14
Table A5. Robustness checks 15
References 16

Empirical findings of previous studies

As mentioned briefly in the article, we include at this point a more extensive discussion of previous empirical findings. We focus on three studies applying the principal–agent model to the European Union (EU) and adopting a large-N research design, thereby apt to serve as a "benchmark" for our own contribution. These are Franchino (2007), Migliorati (2020b), and Thomson and Torenvlied (2011). Note that in contrast to our own study these contributions are all concerned with internal (domestic) legislation. While the EU ratification decision at the center of our article is also the result of a domestic legislative process taking place wholly within the EU, its ramifications are primarily external, which is why we consider them acts of external relations rather than domestic policy.

The positive relationship between complexity and Commission discretion – H_1 in our article – has received varied empirical support in these previous studies. Franchino (2007: 177) draws on 158 legal acts adopted in the period 1958–1999 and finds robust substantive and statistical support for this relationship. Migliorati (2020b) proceeds similarly as Franchino but bases her study on 309 legal acts adopted between 1985 and 2006. She finds a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between complexity and Commission discretion, which in her study only serves as a control variable (Migliorati 2020b: 15). Thomson and Torenvlied (2011) base their study on 86 legislative acts between 1999 and 2005 from the decision-making in the EU (DEUII) dataset (Thomson *et al.* 2012). They find a substantively large and statistically significant effect of complexity on Commission discretion (Thomson and Torenvlied 2011: 152). Our article thus also contributes to an unsettled question in the literature on the effect of complexity on Commission discretion, for which we find robust substantive and statistical support.

The expectation that unanimity leads to less Commission discretion (*H2* in the article) finds strong empirical support (Migliorati 2020b: 15), though not always at statistically significant levels (Franchino 2007: 177; Thomson and Torenvlied 2011: 153). Beyond the narrower question of Commission discretion, the voting rule also helps explain decision-making outcomes in the Council more broadly (Arregui and Thomson 2009: 670; Golub 2012: 1306). Also here our study sheds new light on an unsettled question by confirming a large and statistically significant negative relationship between unanimous voting and Commission discretion.

It is again interesting to see how the expectation that Council conflict leads to more Commission discretion (*H3*) has held up empirically in previous studies. Franchino (2007: 180–182) largely finds support for this positive relationship, but only for the policy dimension (not

the integration or left-right dimensions). Migliorati (2020b: 15) finds support in the same direction, but only for the left-right dimension (not the integration dimension; the policy dimension was not included in her study). Thomson and Torenvlied (2011: 153) also get a positive sign for their coefficient that, however, again fails to reach accepted levels of statistical significance. Still, the overriding evidence is that in the legislative arena Council conflict and Commission discretion are, if anything, positively correlated. This further supports our decision to specify the relationship in this way in our article. Moreover, our findings back up Franchino's work by identifying policy concerns as the most relevant preference dimension in the EU.

Empirically, results for a negative relationship between Commission discretion and the potential for agency losses are "less convincing" (Franchino 2007: 179). Franchino finds a negative effect the further the preferences of the Commission and the pivotal Council member diverge, but only for the integration and left-right dimensions – and also then highly sensitive to the model specifications. Thomson and Torenvlied (2011: 153) even find a weak positive relationship, but again far from levels of statistical significance. Migliorati (2020a: 173), when studying delegation to EU-level agencies, similarly finds no indication that agency losses play any significant role. Despite this limited empirical evidence, we included the hypothesis on policy distance (*H4*) since the possibility of diverging preferences between principals and agents plays a crucial role in the theoretical foundation of the PA model. Still, our findings similarly suggest that this is not an important determinant of Commission discretion in the EU.

Indicators of Commission discretion

The following indicators are included in our index of Commission discretion.

1) Does the Commission represent the EU in the joint committee? (*representation*)

Is the EU represented by the Commission in the joint committee? For example, in Art. 3 of *Council Decision (98/189/EC) of 23 February 1998 concerning the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Yemen* the EU member states have decided that: "**The Commission**, assisted by representatives of the Member States, **shall represent the Community in the Joint Cooperation Committee** provided for in Article 15 of the Agreement."

Where the international agreement and the Council decision both specify this indicator, we use the latter for the coding procedure because it has been adopted later. For example, Art. 87 (3) of the *Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with Egypt* reads: "The Association Committee shall be presided … by a representative of the **Presidency of the Council** of the European Union …." However, Art. 2 (2) of the Council decision later states: "A **representative of the Commission** shall preside over the Association Committee …." Consequently, we coded that the Commission represents the EU in this case. This example also shows that the EU is not necessarily bound by the international agreement as regards EU-internal matters such as external representation. If the EU wanted to change this part of the agreement, it could effectively do so unilaterally through a Council decision (cf. the Introduction in the article).

Readers may wonder why we are not including an analogue indicator for the joint council. The reason is that the Commission explicitly represents the EU only in the joint (implementation) council of the *Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union*. Hence, such an indicator would not capture much additional variation.

2) Are member states <u>not</u> foreseen to be physically present during joint committee meetings? (*no police patrol*)

Are EU member states forming part of the joint committee? This could be defined in the agreement directly, as is the case in Art. 118 (1) of the *Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part*, which states: "The Stabilisation and Association Council shall be assisted in the performance of its duties by a **Stabilisation and Association Committee, composed of representatives of the Council of the European Union** and of representatives of the European Commission, on the one hand, and of representatives of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other."

However, it could also be specified in an EU-internal act, as in Art. 3 (1) of the *Decision of the Council (2007/339/EC) and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council of 25 April 2007 on the signature and provisional application of the Air Transport Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one hand, and the United States of America, on the other hand*, which reads: "The Community and the **Member States shall be represented in the Joint Committee** established under Article 18 of the Agreement by representatives of the Commission and of the Member States." We also accepted here a more general statement that the Commission shall be "assisted by representatives of the Member States" (or similar), as was the case for example in Art. 3 of the *Council Decision (2007/821/EC) of 8 November 2007 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Albania on the facilitation of the issuance of visas*, which reads: "The Commission, **assisted by experts from Member States**, shall represent the Community in the Joint Committee of experts established by Article 12 of the Agreement."

We again did not include an analogue indicator for the joint council because in joint councils EU member states are almost always present.

3) Are member states not able to exert control over the Commission through a joint council? (*no joint council*)

While the first two indicators are ill-suited to be applied to joint councils, we are convinced that joint councils – where they exist – need to be incorporated in a paper on the degree of Commission discretion in JBs. As the Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the Republic of Cameroon shows (see above), the Council could let the Commission represent the EU in joint councils or even refrain from forming part of a joint council itself, if it wanted. If the Council explicitly empowers an EU agent other than the Commission in joint councils, this can thus be viewed as placing a check on the extent of discretion the Commission enjoys across *all* JBs included in an agreement. Consequently, all agreements where the Commission is not limited in its actions by a joint council were accord one additional point for Commission discretion.

Importantly, we are *not* explaining why joint councils are included in international agreements in the first place, which is a decision taken jointly with the third country that cannot be modelled as a game played exclusively among the Council and the Commission. However, if a joint council is included in the agreement (which is always clear when the Council adopts the decision concluding the agreement), EU member states will tailor their preferred degree of Commission discretion across two levels of JBs: the joint committee *and* the joint council. Put differently, we believe that the fact that the Council does not empower the Commission in a joint council indicates that EU member states wanted to keep the Commission on a shorter leash in that agreement.

4) Is the EU position, in at least one instance, foreseen to be taken with only majority support in the Council? (*majority decides*)

The adoption of the EU position, which should be upheld in negotiations with the third party within the JB, is another important dimension of who wields influence in JBs on the side of the EU. With this indicator, we code whether the Commission, in at least one instance, only needs some form of majority support in the Council to set the EU position. For example, Art. 3 of the *Council Decision (97/132/EC) of 17 December 1996 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and New Zealand on sanitary measures applicable to trade in live animals and animal products* states: “The Community position with regard to the issues to be treated by that Committee, as referred to in the last sentence of Article 16 (2) of the

Agreement, shall be established by the Council acting by a **qualified majority** on a proposal from the Commission."

Where the Council decision defines that positions should be taken "in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the Treaty" (or similar), we use the legal basis of the international agreement as an approximation of what member states likely implied when settling for this formulation. If the agreement contained at least one legal basis that required only qualified majority support in the Council, we also coded this indicator as being present.

5) Is the Council <u>not</u> charging a dedicated ("special") committee to monitor the Commission in the JB? (*no special committee*)

In the example of the cooperation agreement with Yemen above, the Council charges the Commission to work together with "representatives of the Member States." But sometimes the Council further institutionalizes its monitoring efforts by charging the Commission to cooperate with a "special" committee. For example, Art. 6 (1) of the *Decision of the Council (2002/309/EC, Euratom), and of the Commission as regards the Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, of 4 April 2002 on the conclusion of seven Agreements with the Swiss Confederation* states that: "As regards the Agreement on Mutual Recognition in Relation to Conformity Assessment, the Community shall be represented on the Joint Committee set up under Article 10 of the Agreement … by the Commission assisted by the **special committee** designated by the Council." Compare this with the *Agreement on the Carriage of Goods and Passengers by Rail and Road with Switzerland*, where – even though concluded in the same decision – no such special committee was foreseen. Where we had no indication that the Council foresaw the creation of a special committee, we accorded one point to Commission discretion.

Table A1. Frequency table for indicators in dependent variable.

Indicator	No	Yes
Representation	58	194
No police patrol	201	51
No joint council	38	214
Majority decides	155	97
No special committee	64	188

Table A2. Correlation matrix of indicators.

	No special committee	Majority decides	No joint council	No police patrol
Representation	-0.45	0.08	0.01	0.35
No police patrol	0.18	-0.10	0.43	
No joint council	-0.50	-0.35		
Majority decides	0.12			

Figure A1. Distribution of the dependent variable (*discretion*; additive index).



Table A3. Examples of Commission discretion.

Here we provide a few illustrative examples of what different levels of Commission discretion – and our coding procedure – concretely looked like. We also always provide the id in the Treaties Office Database (TOD) of the European External Action Service, which facilitates the identification of the underlying agreement following: https://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do (accessed January 2021).

Discretion score	Agreement (TOD id)	Relevant text from the EU ratification decision (or general explanation)
0 (example of low discretion)	Agreement between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status of the European Union-led Forces (EUF) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia **(id 154)**	The Commission was clearly not intended to play any role during implementation in this agreement. Here, it is the "EU-led forces" that represent the EU in the "Joint Coordination Group." We found no indication whatsoever that member states in the Council wanted to empower the Commission in any shape or form.
3 (example of intermediate discretion)	Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Montenegro on the readmission of persons residing without authorization **(id 6421)**	Article 3 The **Commission shall represent the Community** [*representation* **+1**] in the Joint Readmission Committee established by Article 18 of the Agreement. Article 4 The position of the Community within the Joint Readmission Committee with regard to the adoption of its rules of procedure as required under Article 18(5) of the Agreement shall be taken by the Commission after consultation with a **special committee** designated by the Council [there is a special committee set up to monitor the Commission; hence no point for *no special committee*]. [No indication that member states are present in the joint committee; hence *no police patrol* **+1**.] [Agreement does not set up a joint council to constrain the Commission; hence *no joint council* **+1**.]

5 (example of high discretion)	Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Chile on trade in organic products **(id 11801)**	Article 3 The **Commission shall represent the Union** [*representation* **+1**] in the Joint Committee. Article 4 Amendments to the lists of products in Annexes I and II to the Agreement made in accordance with point (b) of Article 8(3) of the Agreement shall be approved by the Commission on behalf of the Union. Before the Commission approves such amendments, it shall inform the representatives of the Member States of the anticipated position of the Union by providing an information document setting out the results of the equivalence assessment carried out with regard to the new or updated list of products in Annex I or II, including: (a) the list of products concerned, together with an indication of the expected quantities for export to the Union; (b) the production rules applied to the products concerned in the Republic of Chile, together with an indication of how any substantial difference with the relevant Union provisions has been resolved; (c) if relevant, the new or updated control system applied to the products concerned, together with an indication of how any substantial difference with the relevant Union provisions has been resolved; (d) any other information deemed relevant by the Commission. **Where a number of representatives of the Member States representing a blocking minority** [the Commission only needs to make sure it has no blocking minority against its proposal; hence *majority decides* **+1**] in accordance with the second subparagraph of point (a) of Article 238(3) of the Treaty object, the Commission shall make a proposal in accordance with Article 218(9) of the Treaty. [No indication that member states set up a special committee; hence *no special committee* **+1**.] [No indication that member states are present in the joint committee; hence *no police patrol* **+1**.] [Agreement does not set up a joint council to constrain the Commission; hence *no joint council* **+1**.]

Table A4. Matching of agreements with CMP policy categories.

CMP category	Action	Shift	EuroVoc descriptors
agriculture and farmers (14)	more support for farmers/fishermen	rightward	alcoholic beverage; catch quota; conservation of fish stocks; designation of origin; fishing rights; foodstuff; labelling; mutual recognition principle; originating product; registered trademark; spirits; sustainable fisheries; wine
education (16)	more education	leftward	higher education; research and development; scientific cooperation; technological change; technology; vocational training; youth policy
environmental protection (12)	more protection	leftward	atmospheric pollution; climate change; emission trading; environmental cooperation; environmental protection; forestry holding; forestry policy; greenhouse gas; import licence; Kyoto Protocol; labelling; sustainable forest management; tradeable emission permit; wood industry; wood product
foreign special relationships (3)	more foreign special relationships	neutral	financial legislation; issuing of currency; monetary agreement; money laundering
internationalism (38)	more cooperation/aid	leftward	cultural cooperation; development aid; EAEC; economic cooperation; ECSC; environmental cooperation; sustainable development
law and order (15)	more law and order	rightward	drug addiction; drug traffic; fight against crime; illicit trade; judicial cooperation; narcotic; police cooperation; psychotropic substance; tax offence
market regulation (6)	more regulation/standards	leftward	satellite communications; satellite navigation; scientific cooperation; space policy; standardisation
military (1)	more foreign intervention	rightward	common foreign and security policy; military intervention; paramilitary force
multiculturalism (63)	more cultural diversity (43)	leftward	diplomatic profession; diplomatic protocol; free movement of persons; geographical mobility; migrant worker; passport; recognition of diplomas; rights of aliens; tourism
	less cultural diversity (20)	rightward	illegal migration; police cooperation; restriction of liberty; return migration; stateless person
protectionism (79)	less protectionism	rightward	air transport; common tariff policy; control of State aid; customs regulations; development aid; EAEC; economic cooperation; goods and services; harmonisation of standards; insurance; international transport; labelling; liberalisation of trade; market access; mutual recognition principle; originating product; public contract; public health; rail transport; right of establishment; road transport; simplification of formalities; tariff preference; technical regulations; trade promotion; transport licence
technology and infrastructure (5)	more training/research	leftward	audiovisual communications policy; research and development; scientific cooperation; statistics

To determine the policy preferences of all governments in the Council of the EU and the European Commission, we had to match the international agreements included in our dataset with categories found in the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Klingemann *et al.* 2006). We adopt the same general procedure as described in Franchino (2007: 126–127). As can be seen from Table A4, we used eleven policy categories included in the CMP: **agriculture and farmers** (*per703*), **education** (*per506 – per507*), **environmental protection** (*per501*), **foreign special relationships** (*per101 – per102*), **internationalism** (*per107 – per109*), **law and order** (*per605*), **market regulation** (*per403*), **military** (*per104 – per105*), **multiculturalism** (*per607 – per608*), **protectionism** (*per406 – per407*), and **technology and infrastructure** (*per411*). The number in brackets after each category in the table refers to the number of agreements falling into it.

To match agreements, we used three main sources: an agreement's EuroVoc descriptors available from EUR-Lex, summaries of each agreement in the TOD, and agreement texts themselves. In Table A4, we present key terms found in the EuroVoc descriptors across the various categories. These give a good indication of the differences across categories. While our matching choices are certainly open to discussion, this is what we consider the best fit of the CMP data with the agreements included in our dataset. Naturally, all our matching choices are fully transparent and included in the replication material available from the publisher's website.

Despite known shortcomings (Däubler *et al.* 2012; Mikhaylov *et al.* 2012), we use the CMP for policy positions because it includes the widest array of different issues. CMP data is also used in most of the empirical studies presented above, which is another reason to adopt them in our own work to increase comparability to previous findings. Still, mindful of the shortcomings of manifesto data, we rely on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to estimate the integration dimension of governments in the Council and the Commission (Bakker *et al.* 2015; Benoit and Laver 2007). To link policy and integration preferences to specific parties in government, we used the parliaments and governments database (ParlGov) (Döring 2013). The linking up of values from the CMP and CHES with ParlGov data was facilitated by the Party Facts project (Döring and Regel 2019). At this point, we have the data necessary to determine the *Council policy* (or *integration*) *range* under unanimity and the position of individual Commissioners and, consequently, the Commission President. The position of the Commission as a whole is the median position in the college (Franchino 2007: 136).

To determine the **Council pivot** under qualified majority voting and the *Council Commission(er) distance* a few further steps are necessary (Franchino 2007: 132–133). The Council pivot is the government necessary to reach a qualified majority in the Council. To

determine this pivot, one needs to determine the direction of the shift. For example, in the integration dimension the direction of the action is always *more* integration. Therefore, we can simply line up all governments in the Council from those least disposed towards further integration (e.g., the British Conservatives reaching values as low as 1.5 on further integration in CHES on a scale ranging from 1 to 7) to the most integration friendly (e.g., the Christian Social People's Party of Luxembourg, reaching the maximum value of 7 in all years). Then, beginning from the Tories, we go right along this line. If, for example, the voting rule is the double majority rule introduced with the Lisbon Treaty, we constantly tally up the percent of the total population represented by all countries up to each point and the absolute number of member states in favor. This is continued until we reach the government at which the requisite threshold is reached (i.e., at least 55 percent of all member states representing at least 65 percent of the EU's total population). Whatever the integration value of that government, this is what we used to compute the *Council integration range* under qualified majority voting. If we assume that this value is 5 and the British Conservatives had the lowest value of 1.5 at the time, the range would be **5 – 1.5 = 3.5**. (The *Council integration range* under unanimity would be the highest value minus the lowest value, i.e., **7 – 1.5 = 5.5**.) Assuming again, for the sake of illustration, that the international agreement was negotiated by a Directorate General led by a Commissioner from Luxembourg appointed by the Christian Social People's Party scoring 7, the *Council Commissioner integration distance* would be **7 – 5 = 2**.

So far, we have illustrated the procedure with the help of the integration dimension because it seems to us more intuitive. But we proceed in the exact same fashion for the policy dimension. More specifically, we follow the *exact* same procedure whenever the action is in the direction of more of something, e.g., *more* support for farmers/fishermen or *more* law and order. If discussions in the Council go in the other direction (e.g., less protectionism or less cultural diversity), we follow the same procedure with the sole exception that governments at the beginning are lined up not from the lowest to the highest but highest to lowest values. To stick to the previous example, imagine for a moment that a discussion in the Council would be about *less* European integration. In this case, we would count governments beginning with Luxembourg and then move forward in the direction of the British Conservatives until the voting threshold is met. Again, while we just illustrated the procedure with the integration dimension because it seems to us more tangible, the procedure to determine policy positions proceeds analogously.

Additional reflections on the impact of the HRVP on JBs

While not an important factor for most of the period under investigation in our article, the High Representative/Vice President (HRVP) will certainly gain in importance in JBs in the future. Therefore, we include some additional reflections in this Appendix.

Though initially created at Amsterdam, the HRVP became relevant for JBs only with Lisbon, when her remit was widened beyond CFSP issues and her post merged with the position of Commissioner for External Relations. In joint councils, the HRVP plays an increasing role. The first time the HRVP represented the EU in a joint council was the association agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed in 2008 but fully entering into force only in 2015. But she does not always represent the EU, as the association council with Serbia signed in 2008 and entering into force in 2013 shows, in which the Council Presidency took the reins. Joint councils thus continue to be tailored to the Council's preferences. Still, since the Commission always had a diminished role in joint councils, this development does not come at its expense. To the extent that the HRVP is closer to the Commission than national governments, the Commission will be enjoying an even more central role in JBs going forward.

The situation is somewhat different for joint committees, where the Commission was almost universally empowered to represent the EU in the past. The first time the HRVP was tasked to represent the EU in a joint committee was the framework agreement with Korea signed in 2010. Since then, the HRVP has been put in charge of joint committees in eight more framework or cooperation agreements that would have likely been chaired by the Commission in her absence. Nevertheless, the Commission is still charged with representing the EU in most joint committees, including in two agreements where the joint councils are chaired by the HRVP (the association agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo). More importantly, this again only curtails Commission discretion to the extent that the HRVP has preferences closer to the Council. In sum, the HRVP should reinforce the supranational element in JBs rather than curtail it. This further empowers the Commission in EU external relations and elevates the argument we have expounded in the article.

Table A5. Robustness checks.

	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8
Complexity	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	0.06***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unanimity	0.08	-0.32***	-0.22**	-0.18*	-0.38***	-0.30***
	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Council policy range		0.05***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04*	0.04***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Council integration range	-0.09					
	(0.06)					
Council Commissioner distance	0.05***		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Council Commissioner integration distance		0.01				
		(0.05)				
Core competences	0.16**	0.17**	0.19**	0.19**	0.11	0.14*
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
EP assent	-0.08	0.12	0.04	0.07	0.16	0.14
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Mixed agreement	-0.24**	-0.31***	-0.26**	-0.03	-0.28***	-0.37***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)
CFSP			-0.46***			
			(0.15)			
Word count				-0.20**		
				(0.08)		
Association agreement				-0.24		
				(0.15)		
Constant	-0.32**	-0.29**	-0.36***	1.18**	-0.13	-0.33**
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.59)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Observations	245	245	245	245	245	239
Adjusted R^2	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.20	0.27	0.16

Note: The models are estimated using linear regression. The coefficients for the year dummies in M7 and Treaty fixed effects for all other models are excluded from the table. We report heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

References

Arregui, J. and Thomson, R. (2009) 'States' bargaining success in the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 16(5): 655–676.

Bakker, R. et al. (2015) 'Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010', *Party Politics* 21(1): 143–152.

Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2007) 'Estimating party policy positions: Comparing expert surveys and hand-coded content analysis', *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 90–107.

Däubler, T., Benoit, K., Mikhaylov, S. and Laver, M. (2012) 'Natural Sentences as Valid Units for Coded Political Texts', *British Journal of Political Science* 42(4): 937–951.

Döring, H. (2013) 'The collective action of data collection: A data infrastructure on parties, elections and cabinets', *European Union Politics* 14(1): 161–178.

Döring, H. and Regel, S. (2019) 'Party Facts: A database of political parties worldwide', *Party Politics* 25(2): 97–109.

Franchino, F. (2007) *The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EU*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Golub, J. (2012) 'How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers', *Journal of European Public Policy* 19(9): 1294–1315.

Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., McDonald, M. D., Budge, I. and Bara, J. (2006) *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Migliorati, M. (2020a) 'Relying on agencies in major European Union legislative measures', *West European Politics* 43(1): 159–180.

Migliorati, M. (2020b) 'Where does implementation lie? Assessing the determinants of delegation and discretion in post-Maastricht European Union', *Journal of Public Policy* 1–22.

Mikhaylov, S., Laver, M. and Benoit, K. R. (2012) 'Coder Reliability and Misclassification in the Human Coding of Party Manifestos', *Political Analysis* 20(1): 78–91.

Thomson, R. et al. (2012) 'A new dataset on decision-making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (DEUII)', *Journal of European Public Policy* 19(4): 604–622.

Thomson, R. and Torenvlied, R. (2011) 'Information, Commitment and Consensus: A Comparison of Three Perspectives on Delegation in the European Union', *British Journal of Political Science* 41(1): 139–159.