APPENDIX

The Soldier in the State: Explaining Public Trust in the Armed Forces

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TABLES

Table 1. Variables—Operationalization & Data Sources

Variable	Source	Description	Citation
Trust Military	Gallup	Percentage of population. Question: In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about the military?	Gallup, 2000-2021
Trust Police	Gallup	Percentage of population. Question: In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about the police?	Gallup, 2000-2021
Trust Judiciary	Gallup	Percentage of population. Question: In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about the judicial system?	Gallup, 2000-2021
Gov Corruption Perception	Gallup	Percentage of population. Question: Is corruption widespread throughout the government in this country, or not?	Gallup, 2000-2021
Living Standards Improving	Gallup	Percentage of population. Question: Right now, do you feel your standard of living is getting better or getting worse?	Gallup, 2000-2021
Confidence National Government	Gallup	Percentage of population. Question: In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about national government?	Gallup, 2000-2021
Country Leadership Approval	Gallup	Percentage of population. Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of this country?	Gallup, 2000-2021
Crisis (t, t-1, t-2)	International Crisis Behavior Project	Three different variables. Dummy variables take the value of 1 if a country experienced an international crisis in the years t, t-1, and t-2, respectively. Coded by authors based on the cited dataset.	Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld (1997). *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Brecher, Michael, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, Patrick James and David Quinn (2023). International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, Version 15. http://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/data-collections/.
Crisis in the Past 2 Years (dummy)	International Crisis Behavior Project	Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the country experienced a crisis in the past two years. Coded by authors based on the cited dataset.	Same as above
Crisis in the Past 5 Years (dummy)	International Crisis Behavior Project	Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the country experienced a crisis in the past five years. Coded by authors based on the cited dataset.	Same as above
Time Since Crisis	International Crisis Behavior Project	Time since the last crisis, in years. Coded by authors based on the cited dataset.	Same as above
Victory Last Crisis (dummy)	International Crisis Behavior Project	Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a country experienced a victory in its last crisis. Coded by authors based on the cited dataset.	Same as above
Tie Last Crisis (dummy)	International Crisis Behavior Project	Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a country experienced a tie in its last crisis. Coded by authors based on the cited dataset.	Same as above
Military Dimension Index	V-Dem	Question: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by the military? Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1). "Aggregation: The index is based on whether the 'chief executive' was (a) appointed through a coup,	Coppedge, Michael, et al. 2023. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v13" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds23;

		rebellion or by the military, and (b) can be dismissed by the military. Both conditions (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the 'chief executive' by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal."	Pemstein, Daniel, et al. 2023. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data." V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 8th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.
Liberal Democracy Index	V-Dem		Same as above
Polity Score	V-Dem		Same as above
Population	V-Dem		Same as above
GDP Per Capita	V-Dem		Same as above
Economic Growth	V-Dem	Difference between current GDP Per Capita and GDP Per Capita(t-1). Coded by authors based on the cited dataset.	Same as above
Life Expectancy	V-Dem		Same as above
Appointment Decisions in the Armed Forces	V-Dem	Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit?	Same as above
Judicial Corruption Decision	V-Dem	Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?	Same as above
High Court Independence	V-Dem	Question: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?	Same as above
Lower Court Independence	V-Dem	Question: When judges not on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?	Same as above
Civil War	Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV)	Scale from low to high (0-10).	Marshall, Monty G. (1999) *Third World War*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield); Marshall, Monty G. (2002). "Measuring the Societal Impact of War," in F. O. Hampson and D. M. Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Prevention*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Conscription (dummy)	Toronto (2022) and *The Military Balance 2023* (IISS)	Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if conscription is in place in a given year. Based on Toronto (2022) and coded by the authors based on *The Military Balance* for the remaining years.	Toronto, Nathan. (2022), Military Recruitment Data Set, shared via e-mail; The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2023). *The Military Balance 2023*. London: Routledge.

Military Spending Per Soldier	Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Dataset, v6.0.	Defense spending divided by the number of soldiers. Coded by authors based on the cited dataset.	Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48; Singer, J. David. 1988. "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985" *International Interactions, 14: 115-32.*
Soldiers Per Capita	Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Dataset, v6.0.	Number of soldiers divided by population. Coded by authors based on the cited dataset.	See above.
Human Rights Score	Latent Human Rights Scores Version 4	Latent level of human rights, based on several human rights indicators.	Fariss, Christopher, Michael Kenwick, and Kevin Reuning, 2020, "Latent Human Rights Scores Version 4," https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RQ85GK, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:QPg88sybNJyuljPYph2OXQ== [fileUNF]
Military Rule	Democracy and Dictatorship Dataset	Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the country is a military dictatorship.	Bjørnskov, Christian, and Martin Rode (2020). "Regime Types and Regime Change: A New Dataset on Democracy, Coups, and Political Institutions." *Review of International Organizations* 15:2, 531-551.
Military Leader	The Database of Political Institutions 2020 (DPI2020)	Is Chief Executive a military officer? "1" if the source (Europa or Banks) includes a rank in their title, 0 otherwise. If chief executives were described as officers with no indication of formal retirement when they assumed office, they are always listed as officers for the duration of their term. If chief executives were formally retired military officers upon taking office, then this variable gets a 0.	Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer, and Carlos Scartascini. 2021. Database of Political Institutions 2020. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank Research Department.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Trust Military	1781	0.682	0.166	0.13	0.99
Trust Police	1774	0.630	0.157	0.14	0.99
Trust Judiciary	1776	0.477	0.178	0.04	0.97
Gov Corruption Perception	1751	0.663	0.191	0.01	0.96
Confidence National Government	1772	0.483	0.191	0.07	0.99
Country Leadership Approval	1693	0.468	0.188	0.04	0.99
Living Standards Improving	1765	0.436	0.151	0.03	0.93
Military Dimension Index	1779	0.116	0.144	0	1
Conscription	1772	0.362	0.481	0	1
Civil War	1435	0.116	0.659	0	5
Military Rule	1781	0.076	0.265	0	1
Military Leader	1665	0.099	0.299	0	1
Years Since Conscription	1772	27.342	29.207	0	87
Military Spending per Soldier (ln)	1163	10.159	1.533	0	13.53
Soldiers per Capita (ln)	1216	-3.702	0.950	-7.04	-1.46
Appointment Decisions in the Armed Forces	1779	0.384	1.144	-2.24	3
Crisis	1781	0.032	0.176	0	1
Crisis (t-1)	1781	0.022	0.146	0	1
Crisis (t-2)	1781	0.017	0.131	0	1
Victory Last Crisis	1781	0.203	0.403	0	1
Tie Last Crisis	1781	0.337	0.473	0	1
Time Since Crisis	1127	26.040	21.120	0	85
Liberal Democracy Index	1526	0.486	0.259	0.03	0.90
Polity Score	1449	5.836	4.836	-10	10
Population (ln)	1604	7.318	1.438	3.57	11.87
GDP per Capita (ln)	1604	2.275	1.162	-0.44	4.53
Economic Growth	1602	0.327	0.614	-3.38	7.00
Life Expectancy	1765	72.449	8.082	32.5	85.1
Human Rights Score	1605	0.681	1.496	-2.3	5.3

Table 3. Full Statistical Model – DV: Trust in the Armed Forces

Variables	Main Model
Trust in Police (std)	0.176***
	(0.019)
Trust in Judiciary (std)	0.215***
	(0.020)
Government Corruption Perception (std)	0.062***
	(0.017)
Military Dimension Index (std)	-0.110***
	(0.032)
Civil War	-0.049*
	(0.028)
Conscription	0.021
	(0.032)
Current Crisis	0.067**
	(0.030)
Crisis (t-1)	0.087**
	(0.035)
Crisis (t-2)	0.061*
	(0.032)
Crisis Victory	0.104**
	(0.048)
Crisis Tie	0.103**
	(0.044)
Military Spending per Soldier (ln, std)	0.271***
	(0.090)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Number of Countries	91
N	732

Notes: Estimates from population-averaged GEE model with probit link function and AR(1) correlation structure. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Variables marked with (std) are standardized (mean = 0, SD = 1). Military Dimension Index variable and Military Spending per Soldier variable are calculated as two-year moving averages. Controls include measures for lagged trust in the military, democracy, population, GDP per capita, economic growth, and life expectancy.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4. Alternative Measures of Public Trust in Judicial System – DV: Trust in the Armed Forces

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Judicial Corruption	-0.0223**		-0.0255**
	(0.00980)		(0.0108)
High court independence		0.00115	0.00523
		(0.0173)	(0.0174)
Lower court independence		0.00118	0.00571
		(0.0194)	(0.0189)
Model Specification	Appendix, Table 3	Appendix, Table 3	Appendix, Table 3
N	732	732	732
Number of countries	91	91	91

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 5. Interaction Between Partisanship and Trust in Congress and Supreme Court, DV: Trust in the Armed Forces

	(1)	(2)
Trust Congress # Republican	-1.209	
	(1.434)	
Trust Supreme Court # Republican		1.268
		(1.311)
Trust Supreme Court # Independent		2.831*
		(1.522)
N	130	161

Notes: In Feaver (2023)'s dataset, the majority of respondents received prompts intended to affect their trust in the military. We use data from the "promptless" respondents. We estimate probit regression models with survey-weighted standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 6. Interaction Between Leader Ideology and Government Corruption Perception in Democracies in Election Years
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces

Variables	(1)	(2)
Center # Gov Corruption Perception	0.0500	-0.0122
	(0.320)	(0.362)
Right # Gov Corruption Perception	-0.0626	-0.0177
	(0.184)	(0.173)
Democracy Restriction	Polity Score>0	Polity Score>5
N	120	105

Notes: Based on data subsample, including only election years and countries classified as democracies or anocracies. Baseline model is main model (Appendix, Table 3). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 7. Interactions Between Ideology and Government Corruption Perception
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces

INTERACTION	Death Penalty	Loyalty to Country	Migrant Acceptance Index	Climate Change
Gov Corruption Perception # Morally Wrong	-0.00362			
	(0.112)			
Gov Corruption Perception # Does Not Apply or Don't Know		-0.0101		
		(0.229)		
Gov Corruption Perception # Loyalty Important (1-9)			0.000543	
			(0.00456)	
Gov Corruption Perception # Somewhat Serious				0.00931
				(0.0309)
Gov Corruption Perception # Not Very Serious				0.0353
				(0.0518)
Gov Corruption Perception # Not at all Serious				0.0758
				(0.0606)
Country Coverage	11 countries	4 countries	153 countries	132 countries
Year Coverage	2006-2012	2006-2008	2016-2024	2007-2010
N	13,537	6,389	504,512	173,613

Notes: Entries are probit regression coefficients from models with survey weights. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The model includes year fixed effects and controls include trust in the police and judiciary. Data source: Gallup World Poll.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 8. Dependent Variable: Spending Per Soldier

Variables	RE Model	FE Model
Trust in Military	0.193	0.364
	(0.133)	(0.271)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.170***	0.923***
	(0.061)	(0.154)
GDP Growth	0.029	-0.035**
	(0.018)	(0.015)
Population (ln)	0.004	0.968***
	(0.010)	(0.339)
Personnel per capita (ln)	-0.145***	-0.687***
	(0.032)	(0.144)
Civil War	0.069**	-0.001
	(0.028)	(0.016)
Current Crisis	0.088**	0.043
	(0.037)	(0.040)
N	896	896
Number of Countries	123	123

Notes: Entries are coefficients from panel regression models. Controls are the same as in the main model (Appendix, Table 3). Only variables with at least one significant coefficient are reported, in addition to trust in the military. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9. Robustness Tests, Preference Falsification
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Police (std)	0.121***	0.107***	0.060***
	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.02)
Judiciary (std)	0.201***	0.111***	0.030***
	(0.03)	(0.011)	(0.01)
Gov Corrupt (std)	0.064**	0.029***	0.027**
	(0.027)	(0.01)	(0.012)
Military Dimension (std)	-0.152***	-0.067***	-0.363***
	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.132)
Civil War	-0.060**	-0.034*	
	(0.028)	(0.02)	
Conscription	0.001	0.011	-0.001
	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Current Crisis	0.237***	0.031**	0.080**
	(0.044)	(0.015)	(0.033)
Crisis Victory	0.009	0.050*	0.021
	(0.061)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Crisis Tie	-0.023	0.048*	0.004
	(0.046)	(0.027)	(0.032)
N	314	732	281
Number of Countries	51	91	39
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Model 1 restricts sample to cases where trust in military < 70%. Model 2 uses a modified trust measure (as described in the article). Model 3 restricts sample to cases where Military Dimension Index = 0. All models are GEE with probit link function and AR(1) correlation structure. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Model specification and controls are the same as in Table 3.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

FIGURES

Figure 1. Predicted Trust in the Armed Forces in Election Years, by Government Corruption Perception and Ideology



Note: See Table 6 for model.

Figure 2. Predicted Trust in the Armed Forces, by Government Corruption Perception and Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty, Gallup World Poll



Notes: See Table 7 for model. All interactions show parallel trends.

Figure 3. Marginal Effects, Perception of Improving Living Standards (replacing Government Corruption Perception)
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces



Notes: Model specification same as Appendix, Table 3. The variable is statistically significant (*p=0.048*).

Figure 4. Marginal Effects, Trust in National Government and Approval of National Leadership (replacing Government Corruption Perception); Military Dimension Index=0
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces



Notes: Model specification same as Appendix, Table 3. The variables are statistically significant (*p=0.056* and *p=0.036*, respectively).

Figure 5. Marginal Effects, Military Rule and Military Leader (replacing Military Dimension Index)
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces



Notes: Model specification same as Appendix, Table 3. The variables are statistically significant (*p=0.048* and *p=0.076*, respectively).

Figure 6. Interactive Effects, Civil War and Human Rights Score
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces



Notes: Model specification same as Appendix, Table 3. The interaction is not statistically significant (p=*0.32*).

Figure 7. Marginal Effects, Conscription
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces



Notes: Model specification same as Appendix, Table 3. The coefficients are not statistically significant (p=*0.52,* p=*0.97,* and p=*0.71*, respectively).

Figure 8. Threat Perception, Alternative Operationalizations
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces



Notes: Model specification same as Appendix, Table 3. All coefficients are statistically significant (p=*0.028,* p=*0.013,* p=*0.054*, p=*0.009,* p=*0.044,* and p=*0.036* respectively).

Figure 9. Interactive Effects, Victory and Time Since Crisis
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces



Notes: Model specification same as Appendix, Table 3. The interactive term is statistically significant (p=*0.028*), as is Victory when Time Since Crisis=0 (*p=0.000*).

Figure 10. Appointment Decisions in the Armed Forces
DV: Trust in the Armed Forces



Notes: Model specification same as Appendix, Table 3, with the new variable added. Higher levels indicate more professionalism with respect to military appointment decisions. The variable is statistically significant (p=*0.033*).