Supplementary Materials for "An Appeal to the People": Public Opinion and Congressional Support for the Supreme Court

Joseph Daniel Ura* Patrick C. Wohlfarth†

In several notes throughout the manuscript, we discuss the results of alternative measurement or modeling strategies, indicating in each case that the model estimates and the inferences we draw from them are generally robust to these measurement or model specification choices. This document provides those alternative model estimates.

Note 5: Augmenting McGuire's Supreme Court Institutionalization Index

In the manuscript, we note a variety of concerns arising from the use of McGuire's (2004, 2007) Supreme Court institutionalization index to measure congressional support for the Supreme Court. These led us to incorporate data on congressional budget authorizations for the Supreme Court and the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts into an augmented version of McGuire's index, which we, in turn, utilized as the dependent variable in our empirical analyses. Despite the important theoretical motives for supplementing the components of McGuire's (2004, 2007) Supreme Court institutionalization index with additional indicators of congressional support for the Court, the empirical implications of revising the index are quite modest. Parameters estimated for the original index are similar to those estimated for the augmented index and also provide significant support for our principal theoretical claims. Table 1 reports estimates of error correction models of both McGuire's original Supreme Court institutionalization index and our augmented index.

Both models show significant support for our public opinion hypotheses. The long run effects of public support for the Supreme Court and public support for Congress are correctly signed and

*Joseph Daniel Ura (corresponding author) is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, Box 4348 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-4348 (jura@politics.tamu.edu).

†Patrick C. Wohlfarth is Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB 3265, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3265 (pcwohlf@email.unc.edu).

significantly different from zero in both models, as are the long run multipliers (LRM, which estimate the total—long run *and* short run—effect) for each public opinion variable. Similarly, the magnitude of these estimated long run effects and LRMs do not significantly vary between the two models.

Despite the similarity of these core results, some differences do emerge between the two models. First, the models provide a somewhat different picture of the dynamic process by which changes in public opinion filter into Supreme Court institutionalization. Whereas the model of McGuire's original index shows a significant short run effect following changes in public support for Congress, the model of the augmented index shows no such effect. Second, the model of the augmented index indicates that the ideological distance between the Court and Congress has no effect in either the long run or the short run. This result conforms with Chutkow's (2008) finding that congressional removal of federal courts' jurisdiction is related to federal caseloads and not to the ideological proximity of courts and Congress (see also Landes and Posner 1975). Finally, the short run effect of the size of the Supreme Court's docket is significantly larger than its estimated effect in the model of the McGuire's institutionalization index.

In any event, though, none of the differences between the two models upsets the basic inferences we draw with respect to our principal hypotheses. Estimated models of both McGuire's original index and our augmented index show a picture of legislative support for the judiciary motivated strongly by public evaluations of the legislature as well as the courts.

Note 7: Missing Data

We implemented three different methods to fill in missing data in public confidence in Congress and the Supreme Court for years in which the GSS was not conducted: linear interpolation (LI), cubic spline interpolation (CSI) (Knott 2000) implemented with `WebCab XL`, and multiple random imputation (MRI) implemented with `Amelia II` (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2009; King *et al* 2001). All three procedures yield time series that are highly correlated with one another. (Obviously, MRI produces multiple imputed time series, each of which are highly correlated with one another—since they are dominated by observed data points—and with the time series produced by the LI and CSI methods.) Also, when used to estimate error correction models of Supreme Court institutionalization, all three approaches yield almost identical substantive inferences and produce statistically indistinguishable estimates of the magnitude of short run and long run effects for all variables in the models (Table 1).

Footnote 15: The Presidency

Most literature on the relationship between public opinion and political support for judicial authority examines the dyadic relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress while paying comparatively little attention to the role of the presidency. (Whittington 2007 is perhaps the most notable exception.) While we have followed this convention in the manuscript, we note that data are available to estimate the dynamic effects of public confidence in the executive branch (from the GSS) and the ideological divergence between the Supreme Court and the president (from Bailey 2007) on the Court's institutional development. We add these variables to the error correction model of our augmented version of McGuire's Supreme Court institutionalization index and report the results in Table 3. As indicated in the text, including these additional variables does not generally alter our model estimates. We also note that none of the estimated effects associated with the presidency are themselves statistically significant.

There are numerous explanations for these null results, though two, in particular, seem especially plausible. First, with respect to public opinion, there may be a distinction in the public mind between the business of the presidency (economic leadership, managing the bureaucracy, foreign affairs, and military leadership) and the duties of Congress and the judiciary (making and interpreting laws). Thus, expressions of public confidence in the executive may be more attuned to the concept of "presidential approval"—which is tied to indicators of presidential management success, such as the economy and foreign conflict—rather than the notions of diffuse and specific institutional support which motivate "confidence" in the Court (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003). Thus, indicators of confidence in the presidency and confidence in the Court and Congress actually might involve two distinct concepts regardless of question wording (King *et al* 2004).

Secondly, with respect to ideological divergence, it may be the case that presidential influence over judicial power is more episodic than continuous, especially compared to Congress which makes annual allocations of tangible resources to the Court which appear in McGuire's institutionalization index. As Whittington (2007) shows, presidential actions that support expansions of judicial power hinge on the confluence of political forces that make it advantageous for presidents to hand off difficult policy questions to the Court or seek the Court's imprimatur for his or her policy choices. Again, these actions are more aptly characterized as discrete decisions rather than ongoing choices. Thus, in data such as McGuire's index, or in any quantitative analysis that emphasizes repeated longitudinal observation, these effects are likely to be underestimated.

Obviously, these (null) results deserve more thorough attention. And, more generally, merging the theory of a linkage between public opinion and judicial authority with notions of the separation of powers obviously implies the need for a more thoughtful consideration of the role that the president might play in shaping judicial power, both in coordination with Congress and as an independent actor. The important point for these analyses, though, is that consideration of confidence in

the presidency does not alter the observed associations between public opinion and congressional support for the Supreme Court.

Note 16: Autocorrelation and Standard Error Correction

We observe significant negative first-order serial correlation in our model's residuals, which would inflate standard errors estimated by OLS and introduce the prospect of Type II errors (DeBoef 2004). Thus, we estimate Newey-West (1987) standard errors, which correct the inflation due to serial correlation. Newey-West standard errors are an extension of "robust" standard errors (White 1980) and produce consistent estimates in the presence of autocorrelation as well as heteroskedasticity. In the absence of autocorrelation, Newey-West standard errors reduce to conventional robust standard errors. While we emphasize that Newey-West standard errors are the most appropriate variance estimate in the presence of evidence of serial correlation, we note that conducting hypothesis tests with unadjusted standard errors would not alter our statistical inferences. Table 4 reports these model results with unadjusted OLS standard errors and the Newey-West standard errors.

Footnote 17: Reduced Form Models

The model included in the text of the paper includes all variables suggested by our "separation of powers" hypothesis and the rival hypotheses indicated by the literature. However, we are aware that model estimates are sometimes sensitive to specification, especially when sample sizes are relatively small. Thus, as we note, we have estimated several reduced form models which illustrate that our principal results—that the dynamics of the Supreme Court's institutional development is sensitive to both public confidence in the Court and public confidence in Congress—are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the other variables in the full model presented in the text.

Table 5 shows the full model presented in the text along with three alternative model specifications. Model 1 excludes both the workload and ideological distance effects. Model 2 excludes estimates for the short run and long run effects of the Supreme Court's workload. Model 3 excludes estimates of the effects of the ideological distance between the Court and Congress. In all three alternative models, the long run effects of confidence in the Supreme Court and confidence in Congress remain correctly signed and significantly different from zero. Likewise, estimates of the short run effect of the Supreme Court's workload are statistically significant and comparably sized in both models.

A Final Alternative Specification: Absolute v. Relative Confidence

In the manuscript, we test our "separation of powers" hypothesis by modeling Supreme Court institutionalization as a function of confidence in Congress, controlling for confidence in the Supreme Court. However, in previous versions of the paper, we operationalized this test by modeling Supreme Court institutionalization as a function of the difference between confidence in the Supreme Court and confidence in Congress (relative confidence) and confidence in the Court alone (absolute confidence).

As a substantive matter, the choice in specification makes no difference at all. Either set of variables contains the same information about the absolute and relative standing of the two institutions in the public's mind, and either model specification is merely an arithmetic rearrangement of the other. Table 6 illustrates this point. The first column displays the results of a model using the absolute level of confidence in the Supreme Court and confidence in the Court *relative* to Congress (the value of confidence in the Court minus confidence in Congress). The second column reports the results of the model presented in the manuscript (predicting institutionalization with the absolute levels of public confidence in the Court and Congress).

The only difference in the two models is that the effects are estimated by single sets of short- and long run parameters in the first model while they must be constructed from two parameter sets (the absolute and relative confidence parameters) in the second. The remaining parameter estimates are identical across the two models. Thus, the choice between the two is purely stylistic. The current model yields results that are easier to understand in their own right, leaving estimates plainly in terms of confidence in one institution or another. However, our separation of powers hypothesis hinges on a theoretical argument about the "relative" public standing of the Court and Congress. Although the absolute level of confidence in the two institutions has all the information necessary to gauge the relative standing of the two, as a matter of presentation, the extra interpretative step needed to connect relative standing to absolute standing is unwieldy. The alternative specification has the (valuable) benefit of being a more direct translation of the theory in some respects, showing that public confidence in the Supreme Court in both absolute terms and relative to Congress shapes congressional support for the Court. However, presentation and discussion of the model results can be convoluted, requiring, among other things, much repetition of the cumbersome phrases "absolute confidence in the Supreme Court," and "confidence in the Supreme Court relative to Congress."

References

Bailey, Michael A. 2007. "Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3):433–448.

Chutkow, Dawn M. 2008. "Jurisdiction Stripping: Litigation, Ideology, and Congressional Control of the Court." *Journal of Politics* 70(04):1053–1064.

DeBoef, Suzanna. 2004. Serial Correlation. In *The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods*, ed. Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman & Tim Futing Liao. Vol. 3 Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications pp. 1027–1029.

DeBoef, Suzanna & Luke Keele. 2008. "Taking Time Seriously." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(1):184–200.

Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence. 2003. "Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2):354–367.

Honaker, James, Gary King & Matthew Blackwell. 2009. *Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University (`http://gking.harvard.edu`).

King, Gary, Christopher J.L. Murray Joshua A. Salomon & Ajay Tandon. 2004. "Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research." *American Political Science Review* 97(04):567–583.

King, Gary, James Honaker Anne Joseph & Kenneth Scheve. 2001. "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation." *American Journal of Political Science* 95(1):49–69.

Knott, Gary D. 2000. *Interpolating Cubic Splines*. Boston, MA: Birkhauser.

Landes, William & Richard Posner. 1975. "The Indpendent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective." *Journal of Law and Economics* 18(December):875–911.

MacKinnon, James G. 1994. "Approximate Asymptotic Distribution Functions for Unit-Root and Cointegration Tests." *Journal of Business and Economic Statistics* 12(2):167–176.

McGuire, Kevin T. 2004. "The Institutionalization of the US Supreme Court." *Political Analysis* 12(2):128–142.

McGuire, Kevin T. 2007. "The Institutionalization of the US Supreme Court: Data Update." Available at http://www.unc.edu/∼kmcguire/ (Accessed May 20, 2007).

Newey, Whitney K. & Kenneth D. West. 1987. "A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix." *Econometrica* 55(3):703–708.

White, Halbert. 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity." *Econometrica* 48(4):817–838.

Whittingon, Keith E. 2007. *Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Table 1: Comparing Estimates of McGuire's Supreme Court Institutionalization Index with the Augmented Index

Predictors (Expected Sign)	McGuire's Index	Augmented Index
Long Run Effects		
Confidence in the Supreme Court$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	11.20*	12.82*
	(4.64)	(4.92)
Confidence in Congress$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	-7.34*	-7.15*
	(2.89)	(2.95)
Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	-2.20*	-0.18
	(1.06)	(1.04)
Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	-0.05	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.13)
Short Run Effects		
Δ Confidence in the Supreme Court$_t$ $(+)$	5.31	2.64
	(3.09)	(3.64)
Δ Confidence in Congress$_t$ $(-)$	-4.49*	-2.29
	(2.06)	(2.41)
Δ Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_t$ $(-)$	-1.20	0.07
	(1.64)	(1.62)
Δ Docket Size(Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	0.82*	1.31*
	(0.30)	(0.39)
Error Correction and Long Run Multipliers (LRM)[a]		
Error Correction (Supreme Court Institutionalization$_{t-1}$)	-0.67*	-0.68*
	(0.21)	(0.23)
LRM Confidence in the Supreme Court	16.64*	18.88*
	(4.24)	(6.04)
LRM Confidence in the Congress	-10.90*	-10.53*
	(3.02)	(3.24)
LRM Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance	-3.27*	-0.26
	(1.45)	(1.56)
LRM Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)	-0.07	0.03
	(0.13)	(0.19)
Constant and Diagnostics		
Constant	-1.15	-14.96*
	(3.18)	(5.67)
R^2	0.56	0.63
First-Order Residual Autocorrelation ($r_{\varepsilon_t,\, \varepsilon_{t-1}}$)	-0.36	-0.36
Breusch Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation[b]	8.43*	7.46*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root[c]	-7.61*	-7.52*

Note: OLS Estimates. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$; One-tailed tests. $N = 29$.
[a]LRMs are estimated via Bewley model (DeBoef and Keele 2008).
[b]The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests the null hypothesis of uncorrelated residuals.
[c]The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic tests the null hypothesis of a unit root (integrated) process in the model's residuals using MacKinnon's (1994) critical values.

Table 2: Alternative Missing Data Imputation Methods

Predictors (Expected Sign)	Interpolation Method		
	MRI	LI	CSI
Long Run Effects			
Confidence in the Supreme Court$_{t-1}$ (+)	15.66*	12.85*	12.82*
	(7.16)	(5.11)	(4.92)
Confidence in Congress$_{t-1}$ (−)	-7.52*	-7.01*	-7.15*
	(4.01)	(2.92)	(2.95)
Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_{t-1}$ (−)	-0.21	0.25	-0.18
	(1.85)	(1.08)	(1.04)
Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ (+)	0.07	0.02	0.02
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Short Run Effects			
Δ Confidence in the Supreme Court$_t$ (+)	6.75	2.79	2.64
	(4.77)	(3.85)	(3.64)
Δ Confidence in Congress$_t$ (−)	-3.16	-1.76	-2.29
	(3.15)	(2.39)	(2.41)
Δ Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_t$ (−)	-0.27	0.48	0.07
	(1.97)	(1.69)	(1.62)
Δ Docket Size(Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ (+)	1.10*	1.20*	1.31*
	(0.58)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Error Correction and Long Run Multipliers (LRM)[a]			
Error Correction (Supreme Court Institutionalization$_{t-1}$)	-0.67*	-0.69*	-0.68*
	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.23)
LRM Confidence in the Supreme Court	23.24*	18.49*	18.88*
	(7.40)	(6.04)	(6.04)
LRM Confidence in the Congress	-11.15*	-10.09*	-10.53*
	(4.17)	(3.24)	(3.24)
LRM Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance	-0.29	-0.37	-0.26
	(1.37)	(1.49)	(1.56)
LRM Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)	0.10	0.03	0.03
	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Constant and Diagnostics			
Constant	-20.78*	-15.35*	-14.96*
	(9.94)	(6.24)	(5.67)
R^2	0.61	0.62	0.63
First-Order Residual Autocorrelation ($r_{\varepsilon_t,\, \varepsilon_{t-1}}$)	-0.41	-0.34	-0.36
Breusch Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation[b]	11.41	6.63*	7.46*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root[c]	-7.96	-7.34*	-7.52*

Note: OLS Estimates. Standard errors in parentheses (Newey-West corrected for LI and CSI models).
*$p < 0.05$; One-tailed tests. $N = 29$.
[a]LRMs are estimated via Bewley model (DeBoef and Keele 2008).
[b]The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests the null hypothesis of uncorrelated residuals.
[c]The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic tests the null hypothesis of a unit root (integrated) process in the model's residuals using MacKinnon's (1994) critical values.
Model fit indicators and diagnostics for MRI model are mean values of relevant statistics for models estimated with each imputed dataset.

Table 3: Estimating Presidency Effects

Predictors (Expected Sign)	Executive Included	Executive Excluded
Long Run Effects		
Confidence in the Supreme Court$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	13.03*	12.82*
	(5.33)	(4.92)
Confidence in Congress$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	-8.74*	-7.15*
	(3.27)	(2.95)
Confidence in the Executive Branch$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	0.88	
	(2.14)	
Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	-0.72	-0.18
	(1.73)	(1.04)
President-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	0.41	
	(0.73)	
Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	0.08	0.02
	(0.22)	(0.13)
Short Run Effects		
Δ Confidence in the Supreme Court$_t$ $(+)$	2.72	2.64
	(4.56)	(3.64)
Δ Confidence in Congress$_t$ $(-)$	-1.92	-2.29
	(3.32)	(2.41)
Δ Confidence in the Executive Branch$_t$ $(+)$	-0.96	
	(1.85)	
Δ Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_t$ $(-)$	0.15	0.07
	(1.70)	(1.62)
Δ President-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_t$ $(-)$	-0.36	
	(0.95)	
Δ Docket Size(Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	1.51*	1.31*
	(0.50)	(0.39)
Error Correction and Long Run Multipliers (LRM)[a]		
Error Correction (Supreme Court Institutionalization$_{t-1}$)	-0.76*	-0.68*
	(0.30)	(0.23)
LRM Confidence in the Supreme Court	17.14*	18.88*
	(9.64)	(6.04)
LRM Confidence in the Congress	-11.49*	-10.53*
	(3.88)	(3.24)
LRM Confidence in the Executive Branch	1.16	
	(2.64)	
LRM Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance	-0.95	-0.26
	(2.49)	(1.56)
LRM President-Supreme Court Ideological Distance	0.54	
	(0.92)	
LRM Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)	0.11	0.03
	(0.25)	(0.19)
Constant and Diagnostics		
Constant	-14.76	-14.96*
	(6.39)	(5.67)
R^2	0.56	0.63
First-Order Residual Autocorrelation ($r_{\varepsilon_t,\, \varepsilon_{t-1}}$)	-0.36	-0.36
Breusch Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation[b]	8.43*	7.46*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root[c]	-7.61	-7.52*

Note: OLS Estimates. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$; One-tailed tests. $N = 29$.
[a]LRMs are estimated via Bewley model (DeBoef and Keele 2008).
[b]The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests the null hypothesis of uncorrelated residuals.
[c]The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic tests the null hypothesis of a unit root (integrated) process in the model's residuals using MacKinnon's (1994) critical values.

Table 4: Alternative Variance Estimates

Predictors (Expected Sign)	Uncorrected Var. Estimates	Newey-West Estimates
Long Run Effects		
Confidence in the Supreme Court$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	12.82*	12.82*
	(5.23)	(4.92)
Confidence in Congress$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	-7.15*	-7.15*
	(3.37)	(2.95)
Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	-0.18	-0.18
	(1.68)	(1.04)
Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	0.02	0.02
	(0.16)	(0.13)
Short Run Effects		
Δ Confidence in the Supreme Court$_t$ $(+)$	2.64	2.64
	(4.36)	(3.64)
Δ Confidence in Congress$_t$ $(-)$	-2.29	-2.29
	(3.17)	(2.49)
Δ Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_t$ $(-)$	0.07	0.07
	(1.74)	(1.62)
Δ Docket Size(Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	1.31*	1.31*
	(0.47)	(0.39)
Error Correction and Long Run Multipliers (LRM)[a]		
Error Correction (Supreme Court Institutionalization$_{t-1}$)	-0.68*	-0.68*
	(0.17)	(0.23)
LRM Confidence in the Supreme Court	18.88*	18.88*
	(8.06)	(6.04)
LRM Confidence in the Congress	-10.53*	-10.53*
	(4.97)	(3.24)
LRM Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance	-0.26	-0.26
	(2.49)	(1.56)
LRM Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)	0.03	0.03
	(0.23)	(0.19)
Constant and Diagnostics		
Constant	-14.96*	-14.96*
	(5.95)	(5.67)
R^2	0.63	0.63
First-Order Residual Autocorrelation ($r_{\varepsilon_t,\, \varepsilon_{t-1}}$)	-0.36	-0.36
Breusch Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation[b]	7.46*	7.46*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root[c]	-7.52*	-7.52*

Note: OLS Estimates. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$; One-tailed tests. $N = 29$.
[a]LRMs are estimated via Bewley model (DeBoef and Keele 2008).
[b]The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests the null hypothesis of uncorrelated residuals.
[c]The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic tests the null hypothesis of a unit root (integrated) process in the model's residuals using MacKinnon's (1994) critical values.

Table 5: Reduced Form Models

Predictors (Expected Sign)	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Full Model
Long Run Effects				
Confidence in the Supreme Court$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	15.48*	14.61*	12.48*	12.82*
	(5.73)	(5.87)	(4.50)	(4.92)
Confidence in Congress$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	-7.90*	-7.34*	-6.91*	-7.15*
	(3.49)	(3.59)	(2.86)	(2.95)
Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_{t-1}$ $(-)$		0.70		-0.18
		(1.19)		(1.04)
Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$			0.02	0.02
			(0.10)	(0.13)
Short Run Effects				
Δ Confidence in the Supreme Court$_t$ $(+)$	3.63	2.88	2.52	2.64
	(2.85)	(3.05)	(3.26)	(3.64)
Δ Confidence in Congress$_t$ $(-)$	-2.87	-2.28	-2.19	-2.29
	(2.37)	(2.55)	(2.62)	(2.41)
Δ Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_t$ $(-)$		0.62		0.07
		(1.53)		(1.62)
Δ Docket Size(Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$			1.30*	1.31*
			(0.35)	(0.39)
Error Correction and Long Run Multipliers (LRM)[a]				
Error Correction (Supreme Court Institutionalization$_{t-1}$)	-0.65*	-0.66*	-0.68*	-0.68*
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.23)
LRM Confidence in the Supreme Court	23.91*	22.05*	18.34*	18.88*
	(3.97)	(4.52)	(4.15)	(6.04)
LRM Confidence in the Congress	-12.20*	-11.08*	-10.15*	-10.53*
	(1.65)	(2.67)	(2.41)	(3.24)
LRM Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance		1.06		-0.26
		(1.75)		(1.56)
LRM Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)			0.04	0.03
			(0.15)	(0.19)
Constant and Diagnostics				
Constant	-19.08*	-18.37*	-14.73*	-14.96*
	(7.39)	(7.56)	(5.18)	(5.67)
R^2	0.47	0.48	0.63	0.63
First-Order Residual Autocorrelation ($r_{\varepsilon_t,\ \varepsilon_{t-1}}$)	-0.20	-0.20	-0.34	-0.36
Breusch Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation[b]	2.38	2.87	6.04*	7.46*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root[c]	-6.22*	-6.22*	-7.40*	-7.52*

Note: OLS Estimates. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$; One-tailed tests. $N = 29$.
[a]LRMs are estimated via Bewley model (DeBoef and Keele 2008).
[b]The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests the null hypothesis of uncorrelated residuals.
[c]The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic tests the null hypothesis of a unit root (integrated) process in the model's residuals using MacKinnon's (1994) critical values.

Table 6: Comparing Alternative Estimates of Relative and Absolute Confidence Parameterization

Predictors (Expected Sign)	Relative Confidence	Absolute Confidence
Long Run Effects		
Confidence in the Supreme Court$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	5.67*	12.82*
	(2.37)	(4.92)
Confidence in the SC minus Confidence in Congress$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	7.15*	
	(2.95)	
Confidence in Congress$_{t-1}$ $(-)$		-7.15*
		(2.95)
Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_{t-1}$ $(-)$	-0.18	-0.18
	(1.04)	(1.04)
Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	0.02	0.02
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Short Run Effects		
Δ Confidence in the Supreme Court$_t$ $(+)$	0.35	2.64
	(2.46)	(3.64)
Δ Confidence in the SC minus Confidence in Congress$_t$ $(-)$	2.29	
	(2.41)	
Δ Confidence in Congress$_t$ $(-)$		-2.29
		(2.41)
Δ Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance$_t$ $(-)$	0.07	0.07
	(1.62)	(1.62)
Δ Docket Size(Thousands of Cases)$_{t-1}$ $(+)$	1.31*	1.31*
	(0.39)	(0.39)
Error Correction and Long Run Multipliers (LRM)[a]		
Error Correction (Supreme Court Institutionalization$_{t-1}$)	-0.68*	-0.68*
	(0.23)	(0.23)
LRM Confidence in the Supreme Court	8.35*	18.88*
	(3.44)	(6.04)
LRM Confidence in the SC minus Confidence in Congress	10.53*	
	(3.24)	
LRM Confidence in the Congress		-10.53*
		(3.24)
LRM Congress-Supreme Court Ideological Distance	-0.26	-0.26
	(1.56)	(1.56)
LRM Docket Size (Thousands of Cases)	0.03	0.03
	(0.19)	(0.19)
Constant and Diagnostics		
Constant	-14.96*	-14.96*
	(5.67)	(5.67)
R^2	0.63	0.63
First-Order Residual Autocorrelation ($r_{\varepsilon_t,\ \varepsilon_{t-1}}$)	-0.36	-0.36
Breusch Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation[b]	7.46*	7.46*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root[c]	-7.52*	-7.52*

Note: OLS Estimates. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$; One-tailed tests. $N = 29$.
[a]LRMs are estimated via Bewley model (DeBoef and Keele 2008).
[b]The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests the null hypothesis of uncorrelated residuals.
[c]The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic tests the null hypothesis of a unit root (integrated) process in the model's residuals using MacKinnon's (1994) critical values.