Bargain Down or Shop Around? Outside Options and IMF Conditionality

Codebook for prelimlagimp.csv

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1 Variable Names and Definitions (note that all independent variables except for DUR and PRGF are lagged by one year; missing data is imputed by multiple imputation)

- ROWID: the row number.
- CCODE: iso3c country code.
- YEAR: conditionality year (from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- CTRY: country name.
- DATE: date of IMF program approval (from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- ID: original EBM reference number (from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- DUR: IMF program duration in months of the initial agreement (from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- TYPE: specific arrangement type (from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- LOANSIZE: total amount of the loan agreed upon for all years at program initiation in millions of SDR (from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- COUNT: number of policy conditions applied by the IMF in a given program-year (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- DEB: number of conditions dealing with external debt issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- FIN: number of conditions dealing with financial sector, monetary policy, and Central Bank isues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- FP: number of conditions dealing with fiscal issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- EXT: number of conditions dealing with external sector issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- RTP: number of conditions dealing with revenues and tax issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- SOE: number of conditions dealing with state-owned enterprises (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).

- LAB: number of conditions dealing with labor issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- PRI: number of conditions dealing with privatization (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- SP: number of conditions dealing with social policy issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- POV: number of conditions dealing with redistributive issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- INS: number of conditions dealing with institutional issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- ENV: number of conditions dealing with environmental issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- OTH: number of conditions dealing with other issues (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- WAIVER: number of conditions waived by the IMF in a given year (aggregated from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- PRGF: indicator equal to 1 if a program is of type PRGF, ESAF, SAF, ECF, RCF, or SCF and 0 otherwise (type is from from Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- GDP: gross domestic product in current USD (from WDI).
- GDPPC: per capita gross domestic product in current USD (from WDI).
- USAID: gross official development aid received from the United States in constant USD (from WDI).
- DACAID: gross official development aid received from the DAC countries in constant USD (from WDI).
- DSERVEXP: the ratio of total debt service to exports in current USD (from WDI).
- DSHORTEXP: the ratio of short-term debt to exports in current USD (from WDI).
- TRADE: the ratio of total trade to gross domestic product in current USD (from WDI).
- RESERVES: total reserve assets including gold in current USD (from WDI).
- CURRACCTOGDP: the ratio of a country's current account balance to gross domestic product in current USD (from WDI).
- FDIGDP: the ratio of inward foreign debt investment to gross domestic product in current USD (from WDI).

- INFLATION: measured as the consumer price index (from WDI).
- QUOTA: country's IMF quota in millions of constant USD (from IMF).
- ABSIDEALDIFF: absolute ideal point distance between a country's voting position at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the position of the U.S. (from Bailey et al. 2017).
- ABSIDEALIMPORTANTDIFF: absolute ideal point distance between a country's voting position at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the position of the U.S. for important votes only (from Bailey et al. 2017).
- POLITY2: polity2 democracy score (from Jaggers and Gurr 1995).
- CHECKS: number of institutional checks in country's government (from Scartiscini, Cruz, and Keefer 2018).
- LAST: number of years since country was last in IMF program (based on Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
- PROP_NEOLIBERAL: neoliberal ideology scores from Nelson (2014), who codes proportion of top policy officials in given country-year that are neoliberals based on place of education.
- AMFM: indicator for whether country belongs to Arab Monetary Fund hand-coded from institutional resources.
- CMIMM: indicator for whether country belongs to Chiang Mai Initiative hand-coded from institutional resources.
- CRAM: indicator for whether country belongs to Contingent Reserve Arrangement hand-coded from institutional resources.
- EFSDM: indicator for whether country belongs to Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development hand-coded from institutional resources.
- EFSMM: indicator for whether country belongs to European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism hand-coded from institutional resources.
- ESMM: indicator for whether country belongs to European Stability Mechanism hand-coded from institutional resources.
- EUBOPM: indicator for whether country belongs to European Balance of Payments facility hand-coded from institutional resources.
- FLARM: indicator for whether country belongs to Latin American Reserve Fund hand-coded from institutional resources.
- COFIN: number of instances of co-financing between RFAs and IMF in a given year hand-coded from institutional resources.

- INFOSHARE: number of instances of information sharing between RFAs and IMF in a given year hand-coded from institutional resources.
- COOPMEM: number of cooperative RFAs (i.e. co-financing or sharing information with IMF) a country belongs to in a given year hand-coded from institutional resources.
- OOMEM: number of competitive RFAs (i.e. not co-financing or sharing information with IMF) a country belongs to in a given year hand-coded from institutional resources.
- COOPAMT: total amount of co-financing given by RFAs to a country as a part of an IMF program in a given year hand-coded from institutional resources.
- OOAMT: total amount of financing given by RFAs to a country independent of the IMF in a given year hand-coded from institutional resources.
- PRES: binary indicating whether a country held presidential elections in a given year. 1 = held an executive election in a given year; 0 = did not hold an executive election in a given year (from NELDA).
- LEG: binary indicating whether a country held legislative elections in a given year. 1 = held a legislative election in a given year; 0 = did not hold a legislative election in a given year (from NELDA).
- ELEC: binary indicating whether a country held presidential or legislative elections in a given year. 1 = a country held a presidential or legislative election in a given year; 0 = a country did not hold an election in a given year (from NELDA).
- WAR: binary indicating whether a country is at war in a given year. 1 = country is at war with another country in a given year; 0 = country is not at war with another country in a given year (from UCDP).
- UNSC: binary indicating whether a country is a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in a given year. 1 = country is a non-permanent member of the Security Council in a given year; 0 = country is not a non-permanent Security Council member in a given year (from Dreher et al. 2009 and updated via hand-coding).

2 References

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